ML20057E627
| ML20057E627 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Fermi, Brunswick  |
| Issue date: | 09/13/1993 |
| From: | Chaffee A Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| OREM-93-034, OREM-93-34, NUDOCS 9310120399 | |
| Download: ML20057E627 (21) | |
Text
September 13, 1993 e
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Brian K.
Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support FROM:
Alfred E.
Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support
SUBJECT:
OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 - BRIEFING 93-34 On September 8, 1993, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events Briefing (93-34) to inform senior managers from offices of the Chairman, NRR, ACRS, SECY, AEOD, RES, and regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on September 1, 1993. lists the attendees.
presents the significant elements of the discussed events.
There were no reactor scrams for the week ending September 5, 1993.
No significant events were identified for input into the NRC Performance Indicator Program.
[ original signed by]
Alfred E.
Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support
Enclosures:
As stated DISTRIBUTION:
Central Files cc w/ enclosures:
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l T. Murley, NRR (12G18)
V. Nerses (PDII-3)
F. Miraglia, NRR (12G18)
D. Matthews (PDII-3) i F.
Gillespie, NRR (12G18)
P. Milano (PDII-1)
J.
Partlow, NRR (12G18)
S.
Bajwa (PDII-1)
S.
Varga, NRR (14E4)
T. Colburn (PDIII-1)
J.
Calvo, NRR (14A4)
T. Marsh (PDIII-1)
G. Lainas, NRR (14H3)
J.
Roe, NRR (13E4)
J.
Zwolinski, EPR (13H24)
E. Adensam, NRh (13E4)
W.
Russell, NRR (12G18)
J. Wiggins, NRR (7D26)
A. Thadani, NRR (8E2)
S.
Rosenberg, NRR (10E4)
C.
Rossi, NRR (9A2)
B. Boger, NRR (10H3)
F. Congel, NRR (10E2)
D. Crutchfield, NRR (11H21)
W. Travers, NRR (11B19) i D. Coe, ACRS (P-315)
E. Jordan, AEOD (MN-3701)
G. Holahan, AEOD (MN-9112)
L. Spessard, AEOD (MN-3701)
K. Brockman, AEOD (MN-3206)
S. Rubin, AEOD (MN-5219)
M. Harper, AEOD (MN-9112)
G.
Grant, EDO (17G21)
}
R. Newlin, GPA (2G5)
E. Beckjord, RES (NLS-007) i A. Bates, SECY (16G15)
T. Martin, Region I W.
Kane, Region I R. Cooper, Region I S.
Ebneter, Region II E. Merschoff, Region II S. Vias, Region II J. Martin, Region III E. Greenman, Region III J. Milhoan, Region IV B.
Beach, Region IV B.
Faulkenberry, Region V K. Perkins, Region V bec:
Mr. Sam Newton, Manager Events Analysis Department Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 700 Galleria Parkway Atlanta, GA 30339-5957
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,,....J m.s September 13, 1993 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Brian K.
Grimes, Director Division of Operating Reactor Support FROM:
Alfred E.
Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support
SUBJECT:
OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 - BRIEFING 93-34 On September 8, 1993, we conducted an Operating Reactors Events Briefing (93-34) to inform senior managers from offices of the Chairman, NRR, ACRS, SECY, AEOD, RES, and regional offices of selected events that occurred since our last briefing on September 1, 1993. lists the attendees.
presents the significant elements of the discussed events.
There were no reactor scrams for the week ending September 5, 1993.
No significant events were identified for input into the NRC Performance Indicator Program.
/
Alfred E.
Chaffee, Chief Events Assessment Branch Division of Operating Reactor Support
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page
s t
I i
ENCLOSURE 1 i
LIST OF ATTENDEES OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS FULL BRIEFING (93-34)
SEPTEMBER 8, 1993 i
NAME OFFICE NAME OFFICE l
R.
DENNIG NRR D.
LANGE NRR s
E. BENNER NRR C.
THOMAS NRR l
K.
GOODWIN NRR G.
YAMADA NRR N. HUNEMULLER NRR T.
COLBURN NRR i
P.
ENG NRR R.
DEPRIEST NRR R.
ECKENRODE NRR J.
ARILDSEN NRR P.
MILANO NRR C.
WU NRR i
K. JABBOUR NRR G.
HORNSETH NRR S.
ROSENBERG NRR W..MINNERS RES J.
STAREFOS NRR V.
BENAROYA AEOD R.
PARKHILL NRR R.
SPENCE AEOD V.
NERSES NRR K.
SHEMBARGER OCM/IS D.
FISCHER NRR K. HART SECY S. VARGA NRR J.
MATHIS ACRS 1
l TELEPHONE ATTENDANCE 1
(AT ROLL CALL)
Recions Resident Inspectors Region I R. Prevatte (Brunswick)
Region II W.
Kropp (Fermi)
Region III Region IV IIT/AIT Team Leaders Misc.
C. Casto (McGuire)
l l
ENCLOSURE 2 OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING 93-34 LOCATION:
10 B11, WHITE FLINT WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 8, 1993, 11:00 A.M.
t MCGUIRE, UNIT 2 STEAM LEAK FROM STEAM GENERATOR DRAIN LINE (AIT) f i
~
BRUNSWICK, UNIT 1 CORE SHROUD CRACKS j
FERMI, UNIT 2 SPURIOUS REACTOR SCRAM WITH COMPLICATIONS PRESENTED BY:
EVENTS ASSESSMENT BRANCH DIVISION OF OPERATING REACTOR SUPPORT, NRR
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93-34 MCGUIRE, UNIT 2 STEAM LEAK FROM STEAM GENERATOR DRAIN LINE AUGUST 31, 1993 PROBLEM STEAM LEAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT.
l i
CAUSE l
DURING AN ATTEMPT TO PERFORM A LEAK SEAL REPAIR OF A STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY SIDE DRAIN LINE DOWNSTREAM OF A LEAKING DRAIN VALVE, A DRAIN LINE PIPE CAP BLEW OFF RESULTING IN A SUBSTANTIAL MAIN STEAM LEAK.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE j
THE STEAM LEAK RESULTED IN PERSONAL INJURY AND PRESSURIZATION OF THE ICE CONDENSER CONTAINMENT.
SEQUENCE OF EVENTS AUGUST 30, 1993:
e MODE 3, NORMAL OPERATING PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE.
l CONTAINMENT WALKDOWN REVEALED LEAKAGE FROM DRAIN LINE e
PIPE CAP DOWNSTREAM 0F DRAIN VALVE CF-130 (STEAM GENERATOR SECONDARY SIDE DRAIN VALVE).
e LICENSEE DECIDED TO HAVE USSI (VENDOR) REPAIR LEAK BY:
REMOVE EXISTING PIPE CAP AND INSTALL VENDOR MODIFIED THREAD INJECTION CAP (MTIC) PIPE CAP e
INJECT LEAK SEALANT INTO PORTS IN MTIC i
CONTACT:
E. BENNER, NRR/ DORS /0EAB AIT: YES
REFERENCES:
10 CFR 50.72 #25994 SIGEVENT: TBD AND PN29343
l..
l' MCGUIRE, UNIT 2 93-34 AUGUST 31, 1993 - 12:34 A.M.
DURING ATTEMPT TO PERFORM LEAK SEAL REPAIR, PIPE CAP BLEW 0FF RESULTING IN SUBSTANTIAL MAIN STEAM LEAK.
e VENDOR REPRESENTATIVE RECEIVED BURNS ON HIS LEG.
e INCREASE IN PRESSURE CAUSED ICE CONDENSER D0 ORS TO OPEN AS DESIGNED.
CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE INCREASED FROM 115 *F TO 129 *F; PRESSURE INCREASED FROM 0 PSIG TO 0.45 PSIG.
LICENSEE INITIATED PLANT C00LDOWN IN.ACCORDANCE WITH e
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DUE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE.
5:00 A.M.
e TWO ICE CONDENSER DOORS DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO PLANT PERSONNEL HOLDING THEM CLOSED WHEN PRESSURE DIFFERENTIAL WOULD DICTATE THAT THEY BE OPEN.
e TWO LICENSED SENIOR REACTOR OPERATORS (SR0s) MADE DECISION TO HOLD THE D0 ORS CLOSED.
DISCUSSION e
USSI PROCEDURE INDICATED THAT PIPE CAP SHOULD BE BACKED 0FF SLOWLY AND MONITORED FOR SIGNIFICANT INCREASES IN LEAKAGE.
4
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MCGUIRE, UNIT 2 3-93-34 VALVE CF-130 APPEARED TO 0FFER VERY LITTLE RESISTANCE e
TO FLOW:
MAINTENANCE PERFORMED ON THIS VALVE DURING RECENT REFUELING OUTAGE o
VALVE WAS NOT STROKED PER PROCEDURE INSPECTION OF VALVE REVEALED INCORRECTLY INSTALLED e
PARTS WHICH BLOCKED VALVE OPEN 1
ICE BASKET DOORS OPEN AT 1 LB/FT DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE.
2 e
DOORS FOR BAY 21 OPENED TWO FEET DOORS FOR BAYS 5 THROUGH 24 (EXCLUDING BAY 21) WERE e
OPEN SLIGHTLY.
WEIGHING OF ICE REVEALED THAT 2400 LBS. OF ICE HAD MELTED.
NO INDICATIONS OF PRIMARY-TO-SECONDARY LEAKAGE.
s AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) NOTED THAT SEVERAL e
LEAKS WERE IN THE PROCESS OF BEING REPAIRED PRIOR TO STARTUP:
VALVE NC-14 FROM THE LETDOWN HEAT EXCHANGER HAD A PACKING LEAK WHICH WAS IMPINGING ON VALVE NV-1 (LETDOWN ISOLATION VALVE).
NC-14 HAD UNDERGONE SEVERAL PREVIOUS TEMPORARY REPAIRS DUE TO NECESSITY TO DRAIN VESSEL TO '
PROPERLY REPAIR VALVE; TEMPORARY FIXES HAD BECOME
" PERMANENT".
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j MCGUIRE, UNIT 2 4-93-34
~
e NY-1 CLOSED AT-2:30 P.M. ON 08/30/93 WITHOUT A DEMAND SIGNAL; LETDOWN WAS. ACCOMPLISHED VIA EXCESS LETDOWN; STEAM FROM NC-14 MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSE.
FOR EXCESS LETDOWN TO BE EFFECTIVE, PRESSURE HAD T0 i
BE MAINTAINED; PRESSURE-TEMPERATURE CURVE REQUIRED TEMPERATURE TO BE AB0VE 320 *F.
t 4
e OPERATORS WERE SENSITIZED TO 320 *F REQUIREMENT, BUT WERE NOT AWARE OF MODE'4 REQUIREMENT TO KEEP TEMPERATURE BELOW 350 *F.
i e
MODE 3 INADVERTENTLY ENTERED DURING EVOLUTION i
BECAUSE OF INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF TEMPERATURE REQUIREMENTS.
THE LICENSEE DISPATCHED A SIGNIFICANT EVENT INVESTIGATION TEAM FROM ITS CORPORATE OFFICE.
FOLLOWUP THE RESIDENT INSPECTOR RESPONDED TO THE SITE.
e AN AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM WAS DISPATCHED TO THE SITE i
e AND HAS COMPLETED ITS ONSITE INSPECTION ACTIVITIES.
e NRC CONSIDERING AN INFORMATION NOTICE ON HAZARDS TO PLANT EQUIPMENT OF REPEATED APPLICATIONS OF LEAK SEALANTS.
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93-34 BRUNSWICK, UNIT 1 CORE SHROUD CRACKS JULY 1993 PROBLEM CIRCUMFERENTIAL CRACK IN HEAT AFFECTED ZONE OF CORE SHROUD WELD H3 IN TOP GUIDE SUPPORT PLATE.
SMALL AXIAL CRACK PROJECTING FROM SHROUD CIRCUMFERENTIAL WELD H4.
CAUSES WELD H3 - INTERGRANULAR STRESS CORROSION CRACKING WELD H4 - IRRADIATION ASSISTED STRESS CORROSION CRACKING SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE NEED ABOUT 0.25" LIGAMENT TO SUSTAIN LOAD.
IF FULLY CRACKED, POSSIBLE MOVEMENT OF SHROUD DURING DESIGN BASIS ACCIDENT LOADING CONDITIONS THAT MAY AFFECT R0D INSERTION.
DISCUSSION FOUND DUkIhG GE RECOMMENDED VISUAL INSPECTION OF SHROUD j
SEAM WELDS AFTER CRACKING FOUND AT A FOREIGN REACTOR IN i
l 1990.
l I
)
SHROUD FABRICATED BY SUN SHIPBUILDING AND DRYDOCK l
l COMPANY.
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5 l
CONTACTS:
PATRICK MILANO, NRR/PD II-1 AIT:
HQ l
ROBERT HERMANN, NRR/EMCB SIGEVEVENT:
80 i
REFERENCE:
DIRECTOR'S HIGHLIGHT
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BRUNSWICK, UNIT 1 2-93-34 1
TOP GUIDE SUPPORT PLATE (RING) FABRICATED FROM SIX BUTT l
WELDED SEGMENTS OF HIGH CARBON 304 SERIES STAINLESS STEEL.
SEGMENTS PROBABLY FLAME CUT AND MACHINED.
COURSE MACHINING CONTRIBUTED TO STRESS RISERS.
t i
SUPPORT PLATE WELDED TO SHROUD USING MULTI-PASS, SINGLE e
j ELECTRODE, SUBMERGED ARC PROCESS.
CP&L PROCURING SPECIAL ULTRASONIC (UT) EQUIPMENT TO CHARACTERIZE CRACK SIZE.
EDDY CURRENT DEVICE WILL BE i
USED TO DETERMINE LOCATION OF SEGMENT BUTT WELDS.
LICENSEE EVALUATING POSSIBLE TEMPORARY REPAIRS SHOULD I
j UT INDICATE INSUFFICIENT LIGAMENT SIZE.
LICENSEE AND GE DESIGNING MODIFICATION TO MECHANICALLY CONNECT TOP GUIDE SUPPORT PLATE TO SHROUD.
WILL BE INSTALLED NEXT REFUELING OUTAGE.
LICENSEE TO MEET WITH NRR TO DISCUSS RESULTS OF NDE e
EXAMINATION AND LICENSEE'S PLANS.
NRC ACTION NRR OBSERVE DEVELOPMENT OF UT EQUIPMENT AT GE, I
e CALIBRATION, AND PERFORMANCE OF NDE.
e SER NEEDED BEFORE PLANT RESTART.
MONITOR GE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO OTHER SUSCEPTIBLE e
l PLANTS.
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93-34 FERMI, UNIT 2 SPURIOUS REACTOR SCRAM WITH COMPLICATIONS AUGUST 13, 1993 PROBLEM REACTOR PRESSURE VESSEL (RPV) C00LDOWN LIMITS EXCEEDED.
CAUSE SPURIOUS REACTOR TRIP CAUSED BY OPERATOR REMOVING TAPE FROM RPV INSTRUMENT EQUALIZING VALVE HANDLE.
EVENT COMPLICATED BY:
e LACK 0F PROCEDURES / SIMULATOR TRAINING:
LOSS OF GLAND SEAL STEAM (GSS)/ CONDENSER VACUUM CAUSED MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE (MSIV) CLOSURE DELAY IN RESTORING REACTOR WATER CLEANUP / THROTTLING CONTROL R0D DRIVE (CRD) PUMPS NEED TO USE SAFETY RELIEF VALVE (SRV) PRESSURE CONTROL e
OPERATOR DISTRACTIONS - 100 FAILED LIGHT BULBS PLUS e
SEVERAL ALARMS HIGH OPERATOR WORK LOAD / STRESS OF UNKNOWN CAUSE OF TRIP e
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CHALLENGES TO PLANT FROM BOTH SRV AND ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE OPERATION.
STRESS ON RPV.
9 CONTACT:
R. SPENCE, AE0D/DSP/ROAB AIT:
NO
REFERENCE:
10 CFR 50.72 #25911 SIGEVENT:
TBD l
].
FERMI, UNIT 2 93-34 DISCUSSION 0946 e RPV LEVEL 8 - SPIKED AS EQUIPMENT OPERATOR UNSEATED INSTRUMENT EQUALIZING VALVE ON "B" & "D" RPV WATER l
LEVEL COMMON REFERENCE LEG WHILE REMOVING DUCT TAPE RESIDUE.
e T/G, REACTOR, & FEEDWATER PUMPS TRIPPED -
93% POWER.
6 R0D FULLY INSERTED LIGHTS FAILED.
THIRD REACTOR OPERATOR INITIATED STANDBY FEEDWATER (SBFW) - INJECTION VALVE OPEN LIGHT FAILED.
i e
RPV LEVEL 2 - REACTOR WATER CLEANUP (RWCU)
ISOLATION, ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM i
RECIRC PUMP TRIP, HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION / REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING 3
(HPCI/RCIC) AUTO ACTUATION.
4 DRYWELL PRESSURE RECORDER FAILED.
CONTROL ROOM OPERATORS SMELLED BURNING INSULATION.
0949 e RPV LEVEL 8 - HPCI/RCIC/SBFW AUTO TRIP.
0950 e " CONDENSER HI PRESSURE" ALARM.
0955
- ISOLATION PANEL MIMIC LIGHT FAILED.
J
- OPERATOR DISTRACTION l
FERMI, UNIT 2 93-34 1003 e MSIVs CLOSE ON LOSS OF CONDENSER VACUUM.
1006 e RPV PRESSURE CONTROL WITH SRVs, SBFW (9 CYCLES, 1 AT A TIME).
- SRV TAILPIPE TEMPERATURE LIGHT FAILED.
1010
- REACTOR FEED PUMP TURBINE (RFPT) SEAL WATER RETURN TANK OVERFILL ALARM.
1015 e UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO HPCI INJECTION.
1125 e RWCU RESTORED TO SERVICE TECH SPEC C00LDOWN LIMIT OF 100 F/HR FOUND EXCEEDED.
TEMPERATURE DIFFERENCE PREVENTED RESTARTING RECIRC PUMPS.
1131
- REACTOR OPERATOR BYPASSED LEVEL 8 SBFW TRIP - HELD VALVE PUSH BUTTON FOR NATURAL CIRCULATION LEVEL 1149 e MSIVs RE0PENED 7 0F 8 MSIV OPEN LIGHTS FAILED 1150
- EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR AIR SYSTEM LOW PRESSURE ALARM
- OPERATOR DISTRACTION
FERMI, UNIT 2 93-34 1315 e EXITED EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURES - REACTOR
]
STABLE IN MODE 3 1910 e EXITED UNUSUAL EVENT 1
PROCEDURES / TRAINING PROCEDURES AND SIMULATOR TRAINING DID NOT ADDRESS WHEN e
TO RESTART RWCU AND CRD, DESPITE INDUSTRY GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS.
GSS SYSTEM MANUAL OPERATION WAS NOT ADDRESSED IN REACTOR OR TURBINE TRIP RESPONSE PROCEDURES OR SIMULATOR TRAINING.
SIMULATOR DID NOT MODEL MANUAL OPERATION OF THE GSS.
SIMULATOR TRAINING USES 2 REACTOR OPERATORS, AS e
LICENSED, WITHOUT USING ADDITIONAL AVAILABLE LICENSED PERSONNEL.
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SIMULATOR DID NOT PROPERLY MODEL REACTOR COOLANT e
INVENTORY DECREASE FOR THIS EVENT.
SIMULATOR TRAINING HAD FEWER DISTRACTIONS.
COMMAND. CONTROL. COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES WERE NOT DELINEATED FOR s
MORE THAN 2 REACTOR OPERATORS.
SOME CONFUSION RESULTED AND ALARMS WERE MISSED WHEN 3RD REACTOR OPERATOR TOOK OVER SOME TASKS OF DUTY REACTOR OPERATOR.
TURBINE ALARMS WERE NOT ACKNOWLEDGED DURING INITIAL RESPONSE.
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j FERMI, UNIT 2 93-34 NO STANDARDIZED WAY FOR VOLUNTEERS TO REPORT TO CONTROL e
ROOM SHIFT SUPERVISION, RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS, OR WAIT 4
QUIETLY.
MANAGEMENT DELAY IN RESOLVING PROBLEMS WITH AUTOMATIC OPERATION OF e
4 GSS FOR 4 YEARS, WITHOUT REVISING PROCEDURES OR i
SIMULATOR TO MANUAL OPERATION.
NOVEMBER 1992 HUMAN PERFORMANCE ENHANCEMENT SYSTEM STUDY DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH.
MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO DEFAULT TO STUDY HUMAN PERFORMANCE e
IN EACH EVENT.
EQUIPMENT FAILURE RATES MAY HAVE IMPROVED, BUT MORE DISTRACTIONS IN THIS EVENT THAN IN OTHERS.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENT ON NOVEMBER 18. 1992 UNEXPECTED REACTOR TRIP DN LOSS OF FEEDWATER WHILE e
BRINGING CONDENSATE DEMINERALIZER ON LINE.
DISCUSSION LOW RESIDUAL HEAT, 98% POWER.
e OPERATORS THROTTLED HPCI/RCIC/SBFW FLOW AT NORMAL e
OPERATING LEVEL - MINIMIZED THERMAL STRATIFICATION AND RPV C00LDOWN RATE.
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l FERMI, UNIT 2 93-34 l
I e
REACTOR OPERATOR TOOK HPCI OUT OF SERVICE BY TURNING OFF AUX OIL PUMP AFTER RPV LEVEL 2 CLEARED "BY COMMON l
PRACTICE".
TEAMWORK, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS MITIGATED GSS e
LOSS.
NASS ANN 0UNCED " CONDENSER HI PRESSURE" ALARM AND RX EXPLAINED IT WAS CAUSED BY LOSS OF GSS.
RX RESTORED i
GSS AND STARTED MECHANICAL VACUUM PUMP WITHIN MIN TO l
AVOID MSIV CLOSURE AND SRV OPERATION.
EXPERIENCE / TEAMWORK PROMPTED RAPID RWCU RESTORATION.
e NASS WROTE RWCU RESTORATION PROCEDURE AND UNDERSTOOD THERMAL STRATIFICATION.
RESTORED RWCU WITHIN HOUR OF TRIP.
i NOV 92 CREW HAD FEWER DISTRACTIONS:
e NO BURNT GUT BULBS.
f NOV 92 CREW HAD STRONGER NASS DIRECTION AND TEAMWORK:
e USED 2 REACTOR OPERATORS INSTEAD OF 3 - AS TRAINED NASS USED 3RD RX FOR DISCRETE DUTIES NO EXTRA REACTOR OPERATORS CAME INTO CONTROL ROOM i
\\
FOLLOWUP PROJECT MANAGER, SENIOR RESIDENT INSPECTOR, REGION AND e
LICENSEE ARE AWARE OF INCREASED PERSONNEL ERROR RATE AND ARE INVESTIGATING CAUSES.
LICENSEE MODIFIED REACTOR SCRAM AND TURBINE TRIP.
e PROCEDURES TO INCLUDE GSS OPERATION.
FERMI, UNIT 2 93-34 LICENSEE WILL MODEL MANUAL OPERATION OF THE GSS AND IS e
INVESTIGATING WHY SIMULATOR DID NOT PROPERLY MODEL REACTOR COOLANT INVENTORY DECREASE FOR THIS EVENT.
LICENSEE WILL ISSUE PART 21 ON DRYWELL/ TORUS PRESSURE e
RECORDER FAILURE.
LICENSEE PLANS TO DETERMINE IF SIMULATOR MODELS REACTOR THERMAL STRATIFICATION.
LICENSEE IS EVALUATING CHANGES TO RWCU/CRD PROCEDURE OR e
TRAINING PENDING RECEIPT OF AE00 HUMAN PERFORMANCE i
STUDY.
LICENSEE EVALUATING BULB FAILURE PROBLEM.
INFORMATION NOTICE 93-62 " THERMAL STRATIFICATION OF WATER IN BWR REACTOR VESSELS" PREVIOUSLY ISSUED FOR OTHER THERMAL STRATIFICATION EVENTS.
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