ML17261A127

LER 79-012/01T-0 on 790606:during Inservice Insp,Identified Piping Supports for Safety Equipment Not Built Per Tech Spec Drawings.Caused by Inadequate Control on Const Installation. Supports Corrected

ML17261A127
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	06/20/1979
From:	Bodine J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML17244A561	List: ML17244A560 ML17261A127
References
LER-79-012-01T, LER-79-12-1T, NUDOCS 7906250255
Download: ML17261A127 (4)

Text

NRC FQ<tUt 366 U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LlCENSEE EVENT REPORT (CAR 1226)

CONTROL BLOCK: Qi (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) 6 I ~01 7 8 9 NXLICENSEERE CODE G1Q200 14 15 0 0 0 LICENSE NUMBER 0 0 0 0 25 Qo4 26 1 1 LICENSE TYPE I 1Q4~Qs 30 57 CAT 58 iCON'T

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~L~B 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4 7 0 6 0 6 7 9 B 0 6 2 0 7 9 QB 7 8 60 61 DOCKET NUMBER 68 69 EVENT DATE 74 75 REPORT DATE 80 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES 10 During inservice inspection of piping supports for safety equipment a number of them were identified as riot built in accordance with drawings . (T. S ~ 6~9~2 .a (9))

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23 SHUTDOWN 24 REPORT NO.

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~01 28 ATTACHMENT CODE 29 NPRDP TYPE

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~0 32 NO, COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION

~BQ~ZG, 33 34 ON PLANT

~ZQ ~ZQ 35 METHOD 36 37 HOURS +22 oo 0Q 40 41 YI SUBMITTED FORM SUB.

~NQ ~A 42 SUPPLIER 43 44 Bl 30Q MANUFACTURER 47 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS 027 o Inadequate control of construction installation. The supports were corrected. Addi-tional supports were examined and found to be able to perform intended function. Non-conformances and the evaluations for acceptability were documented for supports involved. Further correction action will be controlled by response to IE Bulletin

.~1 .4 79-02.

8 9 0

7 80 FACILITY METHOD OF STATUS 99 POWER OTHER STATUS DISCOVERY DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION Q32 5, E Q2s L1II0~0~ 1Qo NA ~BQ31 Inservice inspection 8 9 10 12 13 44 45 46 80 ACTIVITY CONTENT I~>>l i6 RELEASED OF RELEASE

~Z Q33 ~ZQ34 AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY NA NA LOCATION OF RELEASE Q

'7 8 9 10 11 44 45 80 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION 039 7,

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~00 0 Qoi Z Qos NA 7 9 11 12 13 80 PERSONNEL INJURIES NUMBER DESCRIPTIONQ41

~00 0 Qoo NA 7 8 9 11 12 80 LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY 043 i~i'

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DESCRIPTION 10 NA 906280 7 S.ip.

80 PUBLICITY

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~NQ44 DESCRIPTION Q NA NRC USE ONLY 8 9 10 68 69 80 o NAME OF PREPARER J. C. Bodine PHDNE 7 1 6/546-2700, ext. 29 1-206

Attachment to LER 79-012/01T-0 Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1 Docket No. 50-244 During the annual refueling maintenance shutdown, inservice inspec-tion was conducted on pipe support anchor bolts. Six such installations inside containment were observed not built in accordance with drawings.

Data on these supports was reported to the Engineering Department on March 26, 1979. The evaluation of the data on four of the supports (RH-21, RH-22, RH-32, RH-33) resulted in the conclusion that they required correc-tion to assure the capability to perform their intended function. The evalu-ation of the other two supports (CH-9 and CH-10) showed that the existing installations are adequate to assure performance of their intended functions.

On March 27 the Engineering Department was requested to determine additional supports for inspection to assure that the discrepancies found on RH-21, 22, 32 and 33 were limited to them. Over 500 pipe support drawings were then reviewed. The results of this review showed that there were no other Seismic Category I supports of similar design. Consequently, six additional supports outside containment of various designs containing anchor bolts were selected at random for inspection. These supports were located on several safety related systems in various locations throughout the plant.

The evaluation of the inspection results (NCR's G-79-38 through G-79-43) for these supports shows that all the existing installations are adequate to assure performance of their intended functions.

It was concluded that the discrepancies found on RH-21, 22, 32 and 33 were unique to those supports. It is believed that they were caused by the field conditions relative to the specific location of these supports.

Correction of these supports was judged to be the most prudent and conserv-ative approach based on the nature of the discrepancies and the intended function of the supports. The drawing discrepancies found on the remaining supports, both inside and outside containment, were judged to be of minimal consequence, and in all cases it was determined that the supports met their intended design function.

Further action in this area is planned in response to IE Bulletin 79-02, Pipe Support Base Plate Designs using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts .

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