05000285/FIN-2014004-01: Difference between revisions
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| identified by = NRC | | identified by = NRC | ||
| Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | | Inspection procedure = IP 71111.15 | ||
| Inspector = M Hay, N Greene, N Taylor, P Hernandez, P Jayroe, S Schneider, J Kirkland, J O | | Inspector = M Hay, N Greene, N Taylor, P Hernandez, P Jayroe, S Schneider, J Kirkland, J O'Donnell, J Wingebach, L Ricketson | ||
| CCA = H.12 | | CCA = H.12 | ||
| INPO aspect = QA.4 | | INPO aspect = QA.4 | ||
| description = The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensees failure to implement procedural changes and water level alarm setpoint changes relied upon by operators to initiate compensatory actions to maintain the operability of raw water pump AC-10C. The licensee subsequently implemented these changes. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is related to the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, in that the failure to implement the required procedure and setpoint changes increased the likelihood that the affected raw water pump cable would become inoperable after significant rainfall or flooding. The inspectors performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated July 1, 2012, this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area associated with the Avoiding Complacency aspect because operators did not recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes and assumed that the necessary procedural and alarm setpoint changes had been made. | | description = The inspectors identified a Green finding for the licensees failure to implement procedural changes and water level alarm setpoint changes relied upon by operators to initiate compensatory actions to maintain the operability of raw water pump AC-10C. The licensee subsequently implemented these changes. The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is related to the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, in that the failure to implement the required procedure and setpoint changes increased the likelihood that the affected raw water pump cable would become inoperable after significant rainfall or flooding. The inspectors performed an initial screening of the finding in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power. Using IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 2, Mitigating Systems Screening Questions, dated July 1, 2012, this finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating system; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program for greater than 24 hours. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area associated with the Avoiding Complacency aspect because operators did not recognize and plan for the possibility of mistakes and assumed that the necessary procedural and alarm setpoint changes had been made. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 23:21, 21 February 2018
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000285/2014004 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Hay N Greene N Taylor P Hernandez P Jayroe S Schneider J Kirkland J O'Donnell J Wingebach L Ricketson |
| CCA | H.12, Avoid Complacency |
| INPO aspect | QA.4 |
| ' | |