ML17325B547

LER 99-009-00:on 990304,as-found RHR Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than TS Limit Occurred.Cause Investigation for Condition Has Not Been Completed.Update to LER Will Be Submitted,Upon Completion of Investigation

ML17325B547
Person / Time
Site:	Cook
Issue date:	04/12/1999
From:	Orourke B INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG
To:
Shared Package
ML17325B546	List: ML17325B545 ML17325B547
References
LER-99-009, LER-99-9, NUDOCS 9904210035
Download: ML17325B547 (2)

Text

C Form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULAT Y COMMISSION APPROVED BY MB NO. 3160%104 EXPIRES 06/30/2001 (6-1 998) ESTPAATEO IKIRDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REOUESTI'BOO HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSINO PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FORWARD COMMENTS REOARDINC BURDEN ESTRIATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAOEMENT BRANCH IT4I FSTL U S NUCLEAR RECUIATORv COAPJISSNN. WASHINGTON. DC DNSSCQOI, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTKIN PROJECT ISISDCIOJL OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET. WASHINOTON DC (See reverse for required number of 2OKO digits/characters for each block)

FACIUTY NAME II) DOCKET NUMBER I2) PAD E (3)

Cook Nuclear Plant Unit 1 05000-315 1 of1 TITLE (4)

As-Found Residual Heat Removal Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoint Greater than Technical Specification Limit EVENT DATE (6) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)

FACILITYNAM DOCKET NUMB R SEQUENTIAL REVISION DC Cook, Unit 2 05000-316 MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR AGILITYNAME DOCKET NUMB R

03. 04 1999 1999 009 00 04 12 1999 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR Ii: (Check one or more) (11)

MODE (8) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(viir)

POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)

LEVEL (10) 00 73.71 202203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(Il) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 20.2203(a)(2)(li) 20.2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(v)

Specrr In ABSUect below 20.2203(a)(2)(lv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) or nNRC Form 36EA UCENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

TELEPHONE NUMBER 0norude Area Code)

Ms. Brenda O'ourke, Compliance Engineer 616/465-5901, x2604 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

REPORTABLE REPORTABLE TO CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO EPIX CAUSE COMPONENT MANUFACTURER EPIX SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 14 EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR X YES SUBMISSION 06 18 1999 IfYes, corn late EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE NO DATE 15 Abstract (Umit to 1400 spaces, I.e., approximately 15 s)ngl~paced typewritten lines) (16)

On March 4, 1999, during the Expanded System Readiness Review of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system, several concerns were identified regarding the RHR shutdown cooling relief valve (SV-103) lift setpoints for Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Low Temperature Overpressurization Protection (LTOP). Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.9.3 requires the RHR safety valves to have a lift setting of less than or equal to 450 pounds per square inch gage (psig). A preliminary review of recent In-Service Testing data identiTied that the as-found lift setpoints for the 1- and 2-SV-103 were 455 and 452 psig, respectively. These values are greater than the TS limit of 450 psig, and as a result, the valves were declared inoperable on March 10, 1999. On March 11, 1999 it was determined that 1-SV-1 03 had been taken credit for in October and November 1998 to satisfy LTOP requirements when a Unit 1 Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) was inoperable.

Preliminary investigation indicates the cause was incorre'ct implementation of TS surveillance requirements. The ASME Operations and Maintenance Standards Code-1995 allows the application of a 3 percent setpoint tolerance to valve lift settings during valve testing and requires a temperature correction factor to be incorporated into the lift setting. However, the TS limit is a strict value that, does not take into account allowable Code tolerances or the use of a temperature correction factor when determining the setpoint. As immediate corrective action both unit's safety valves were declared inoperable. Engineering evaluation results indicate that the reactor vessel and the RHR system piping were always adequately protected against ovefpressure, and there was no safety significance associated with the inoperable valves.

The RHR system is currently operable and the LTOP TS requirements are being met. The root cause investigation for this condition has not been completed. As part of the investigation, instances where credit was taken for either SV-103 being operable with a PORV inoperable will also be reviewed. Upon completion of the investigation an update to this LER will be submitted, including any additional corrective and preventive actions.

9904210035 9904i2 PDR ADQCK 050003i5 8 PDR