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{{#Wiki_filter:NAC tesee SOC s5451 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)US.NVCLEAII XSOULATOIIY COMMISSION AttAOV EO OMS NO.5)CC OIOV EXHASS 0/Ss/05 SACILITY NAME Ill R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant OOCXKT NVMSK II ISI A 0 6 0 0 0 2 4 4 1 OF 0 8 Due To A Design Deficiency The Failure Of The SI Block/Unblock Switch Could Render Some Automati.c Actuation Features of Both Trains of SI Ino rable EVENT OATS 15)L K II N VMS C A Ltl IlttOIIT OATC ln OTNtX SAC)I.ITItc INYOLVKO Icl MONTss OAY YK Ail YEAH SKOUINTIAL NUSJ~C SS~~NuseeeA MONT)I OAY YEA)I tACSLSTY NASSCS OOCXKT NUMSKIIISI 0 6 0 0 0 2 0'8 9 016 0 0112 90 0 6 0 0 0 Ot<<AT)NO MOOS lol tosscll LKYKL 9 9 TO.eOS)el 50.e00 I~)l1)I 0 10.e00 4))I)I V I TO.SOS 4)ll I I w)50.e00 Is I i)I)Is)50.ecc le I ll I Is)TO.eotlsl~0M)e))ll~Cable)IEI 50.554)IT II 0~0.554)ISI(SI 50.5 54 I ISI IXII LICENSEE CONTACT tOII THIS Ltll 115)50.154IISI)is)
{{#Wiki_filter:NAC tesee   SOC s5451                                                                                                                                                                 US. NVCLEAII XSOULATOIIYCOMMISSION AttAOVEO      OMS NO. 5)CC OIOV LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)                                                                        EXHASS       0/Ss/05 SACILITY NAME       Ill                                                                                                                                 OOCXKT NVMSKII ISI                                A R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                                                                                                         0 6 0 0 0 2 4 4                             1   OF 0       8 Due To A Design Deficiency The Failure Of The SI Block/Unblock Switch Could Render Some Automati.c Actuation Features of Both Trains of SI Ino rable EVENT OATS 15)                           L K II N VMS C A     Ltl                       IlttOIITOATC ln                                   OTNtX SAC)I.ITItc INYOLVKO Icl MONTss       OAY         YK Ail   YEAH             SKOUINTIAL ~~                       MONT)I       OAY     YEA)I                   tACSLSTY NASSCS                         OOCXKT NUMSKIIISI NUSJ ~ C SS        NuseeeA 0     6    0     0  0 2 0         '8 9                           016                 0             0112 90 Cable) 0     6     0     0 0 Ot<<AT)NO                   TIIIS IsttoIIT Is KUKMITTco wAsvANT To                  THE AECUIAEMKNTs      ot lect  0 $ : /cssce one os osece      ol see looossot)  Ill)
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MOOS lol                        TO.eOS)el                                         TO.eotlsl                                  50.154IISI)is)                                     TS.1 I )el tosscll                            50.e00 I ~ ) l1 ) I 0                            ~ 0M)e))ll                                 ~ 0.1541)El)el                                      15.1) lel LKYKL 9 9          10.e00 4) )I) I V I                               ~         IEI                              50 T54) IS) lee l                                  CTHE)I /Soecot Ae Aosoecl teste osst Io Teel, NAC lossss TO.SOS 4) llII w)                                50.554)   ITII0                            SS.T54) It)lest)IAI                                JSSAI 50.e00 Is I i)I)Is)                               ~ 0.554)ISI(SI                            ~ 0.154 I IS I)sec I I ~ I                       10 CFR 21 50.ecc le I llI Is)                              50.5 54 I ISI IXII                        ~ O.TS Ie)15) le)
~0.154 I IS I)sec I I~I~O.TS Ie)15)le)TIIIS IsttoIIT Is KUKMITTco wAsvANT To THE AECUIAEM KNTs ot lect 0$:/cssce one os osece ol see looossot)Ill)TS.1 I)el 15.1)lel CTHE)I/Soecot Ae Aosoecl teste osst Io Teel, NAC lossss JSSAI 10 CFR 21 NAME Wesley H.Backus Technica'sistant to the rations Mana er TELtt)SONS HUIASKII AIIEA COOS 31 5524-4446 COMt LET E ONE LINE t Oil EACH COMAONCNT tAILUAE OKSCIII~KO IH TSSIS llctOAT llcl CAV5K SYSTEM COMtONEHT MANUSAC.TVAEII ttOIITASLK TO HtIIOS CAUS t SYSTEM COMtONEHT MANUSAC.TVAKII ttOATASL TO Htl)OS&~4~4>@w: SuttLEMCNTAL tittOAT CxttCTCO 1)u YES II/tee, csesstsese EXt/CTEO SUSMISSION CATE)HO ASSTAACT ILossN so laXI eeocN,)e., etocoeosseselt Nfseeo slotseetece cttesssssseo ooesl llc)EXSKCTKO LVSMS55IOH OATS lit)MONTSI CAY YEAII On November 17, 1989, an initial Engineering evaluation was completed, which identified a potential problem with the Safety injection (SZ)Block/Unblock Switch.On December 20, 1989, at 1630 EST, with the reactor at approxi-mately 99%full-power, the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC)reviewed the Engineering evaluation, and made afinal determination that a single failure of the SI Block/Unblock Switch could render some automatic actuation, features of both trains.of SZ inoperable.
LICENSEE CONTACT        tOII THIS Ltll 115)
f'The PORC, after reviewing the situation thoroughly,;:oncluded that sufficient justification existed, for continued safe plant operation.
NAME                                                                                                                                                                            TELtt)SONS HUIASKII Wesley H. Backus                                                                                                                                            AIIEA COOS Technica'                      sistant to the                                  rations Mana er                                                              31        5524 -4446 COMt LET E    ONE LINE  t Oil EACH COMAONCNT tAILUAEOKSCIII~ KO IH TSSIS                  llctOAT llcl MANUSAC.                  ttOIITASLK                                                                              MANUSAC.             ttOATASL CAV5K SYSTEM              COMtONEHT                TVAEII              TO HtIIOS                              CAUS  t SYSTEM       COMtONEHT                   TVAKII            TO Htl)OS       &~4~4>@w:
The underlying cause of the event was a-design;=error
SuttLEMCNTAL tittOAT CxttCTCO 1)u                                                                                                     MONTSI      CAY  YEAII EXSKCTKO LVSMS55IOH OATS    lit)
'.which occurred during the original construction of-,the.R.E..Ginna..Nuclear Power Plant.Immediate corrective action was taken to verify that the plunger position of the SX Block/Unblock Switch contacts were in'he proper position.et" s io NAC Sere SOS I&45I 5)0012401 2 900112 PDR'DOCK 05000244 PDC ee'.1o NRC Form 844A I9$51 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER)TEXT CONTINUATION
YES II/ tee, csesstsese EXt/CTEO SUSMISSION CATE)                                                 HO ASSTAACT ILossN so       laXI eeocN,)e., etocoeosseselt     Nfseeo slotseetece cttesssssseo ooesl   llc)
.U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO.5150&144 EXPIRES.BISI/85 FACILITY NAME (11 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT iH moro spoco is rxrrerorL oso RsrOooW HRC Forrrr SBSA'sl I IT I DOCKET NUMBER IXI o s o o o 2 448 9 LER NUMBER (El 5EOVCNTIAL sP I REVISION NVMPER'<1;NVMPPR 0 1 6-0 0 0~AOE IS)OF 0 8 PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 994 steady state full power with no major activities in progress.DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCUREKNCES:
On          November                         17, 1989, an initial Engineering evaluation was completed,                       which identified a potential problem with the Safety injection                     (SZ) Block/Unblock Switch.
o Initial plant operation in 1969: Event date.o November 17, 1989: Discovery date.o December 20, 1989, 1630 EST: Reportability date and time.o December 20, 1989, 1630 EST: Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC)determines that safe operation of plant may continue.B.EVENT On November 17, 1989, an initial Engineering evaluation was completed, which identified a potential problem with the SI Block/Unblock Switch.Subsequently, PORC review of the Engineering evaluation, on December 20, 1989, with the reactor at approximately 994 full power, determined that a single failure of the Safety Injection (SI)Block/Unblock Switch could render some automatic actuation features of both trains of SI Inoperable.
On December 20,                                         1989,             at       1630 EST, with the reactor at approxi-mately                 99%               full -power,                             the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC)               reviewed                         the Engineering evaluation, and made a final determination that a single failure of the SI Block/Unblock Switch could render some automatic actuation, features of both trains. of SZ inoperable.                                                                                                                                         f The PORC, after reviewing the situation thoroughly, ;:oncluded that sufficient justification existed, for continued safe plant operation.
This determination followed.an evaluation of the following correspondences:
The underlying cause of the event was a - design;=error '.which occurred during the original construction of -,the R.E.. Ginna..                                                                                                       .
o Letter from S.P.Swigart of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (NS-OPLS-OPL-I-89-517) to Mr.R.Eliasz, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E), dated October 12, 1989, Sub)ect: Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.NRC FORM 554A 1945 I NRC Form 344A (&43l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U$.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.3150&10(EXPIRES.Sfll/85 FACILITY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMSER (ll LER NUMSER IS)PACE (3I R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT N moro oPoco r'o rorRrood, uw dduoonro(HRC%%dnrr 383A1I (ITI o s o o o 244"EA" AN 8 9 SEOVENTIAL NVM ER 016 oiy.IIEVOION:AA NVM 81-0 0 3 DF0 8 o Interoffice Correspondence from Richard Baker to P.Wilkens and G.Wrobel, dated November 17, 1989, Sub)ect: Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.The Westinghouse Correspondence (NS-OPLS-OPL-I 517)identified a potential single failure mechanism which could result in blocking of some automatic actuation features of both trains of SI, (i.e.SI automatic actuation from low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure).
Nuclear Power Plant.
Specifically, a single manual switch on the Main Control Board (MCB)is used to control this SI Block/Unblock function for both SI trains.An Engineering Evaluation of the existing Ginna Station SI Block/Unblock wiring configurations has concluded that, the Westinghouse described potential single failure mechanism is applicable to Ginna Station.The Engineering Evaluation also concurred with the Westinghouse position that due to the low probability of a switch failure sufficient)ustifica-tion exists for continued plant operation until separate A train and B train SI Block/Unblock Switches can be installed.
Immediate corrective action was taken to verify that the plunger position of the SX Block/Unblock Switch contacts were in 'he et" s io proper position.
The PORC after reviewing the above correspondence concluded that sufficient Justification exists for continued safe operation of the plant.C~INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT: None.D.OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED: None.NRC FORM 344A 18431 NRC Form BASSA 1943)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO, 3)50&104 EXPIRES)8/31/85 FACILITY NAME I 1)DOCKET NUMSER IS)LER NUMBER 14)VEA4 QrK SEQUENTIAL 889 4EVISION'4 NVM 44~>i8 NVM 44 PACE IS)R.E.G'nna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT///moro o/rooo 4 44/vomE Iroo///ooro///RC For//I JSSA'el I)7)o 5 o o o" 44 8 9 016 0 0 0 4 OF E.METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
NAC Sere     SOS I&45I 5)0012401                     2 900112 PDR           'DOCK 05000244                                                                                                 ee' .     1o PDC
The event was made apparent due to Engineering's review of the following correspondence:
 
o, Letter from S.P.Swigart of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (NS-OPLS-OPL-I-89-517), to Mr.R.Eliasz, RG&E, dated October 12, 1989,  
NRC Form 844A                                                                                                   U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION I9$ 51 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION .                               APPROVED OMB NO. 5150&144 EXPIRES. BISI/85 FACILITY NAME (11                                                       DOCKET NUMBER IXI LER NUMBER (El                    ~ AOE IS) 5EOVCNTIAL sP I REVISION NVMPER    '<1; NVMPPR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                       o  s  o  o  o  2  448    9    0    1 6    0        0 0        OF    0 8 TEXT iH moro spoco is rxrrerorL oso RsrOooW HRC Forrrr SBSA'sl I IT I PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 994 steady state                                        full power with no major activities in progress.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A.         DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCUREKNCES:
o             Initial plant       operation in 1969: Event date.
o             November 17, 1989: Discovery date.
o             December 20, 1989, 1630 EST:             Reportability date and time.
o               December   20, 1989,         1630 EST:       Plant Operating Review   Committee         (PORC) determines               that safe operation of plant         may continue.
B.       EVENT On November 17, 1989, an                   initial Engineering evaluation was completed, which identified a potential problem with the SI Block/Unblock Switch. Subsequently, PORC review of the Engineering evaluation, on December 20, 1989, with the reactor at approximately 994 full power, determined that a single failure of the Safety Injection (SI) Block/Unblock Switch could render some automatic actuation features of both trains of SI Inoperable. This determination followed. an evaluation of the following correspondences:
o             Letter from S.P. Swigart of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (NS-OPLS-OPL-I-89-517) to Mr. R. Eliasz, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E), dated October 12, 1989, Sub)ect:     Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.
NRC FORM 554A 1945 I
 
NRC Form 344A                                                                                                       U$ . NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION
(&43l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                     APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150&10(
EXPIRES. Sfll/85 FACILITY NAME (11                                                         OOCKET NUMSER (ll             LER NUMSER IS)                     PACE (3I "EA" AN SEOVENTIAL oiy. IIEVOION NVM ER    :AA NVM 81 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                       o  s  o  o  o  244  8 9      016 0              0        3  DF0    8 TEXT N moro oPoco r'o rorRrood, uw dduoonro( HRC %%dnrr 383A1I (ITI o             Interoffice        Correspondence from Richard Baker to P. Wilkens and G. Wrobel, dated November 17, 1989, Sub)ect:               Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.
The Westinghouse                     Correspondence         (NS-OPLS-OPL-I                                                   517) identified a                   potential single failure mechanism which could               result         in blocking of some automatic actuation             features       of     both trains of SI, (i.e. SI automatic actuation from low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure).                         Specifically, a single manual switch on the Main Control Board (MCB) is used to control this SI Block/Unblock function for both SI trains. An Engineering Evaluation of the existing Ginna Station SI Block/Unblock wiring configurations has concluded that, the Westinghouse described potential single failure mechanism is applicable to Ginna Station. The Engineering Evaluation also concurred with the Westinghouse position that due to the low probability of a switch failure sufficient )ustifica-tion exists for continued plant operation until separate             A train     and   B   train SI Block/Unblock Switches can be             installed.
The PORC after reviewing the above correspondence concluded that sufficient Justification exists for continued safe operation of the plant.
C ~         INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS,                             OR     SYSTEMS             THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:
None.
D.           OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:
None.
NRC FORM 344A 18431
 
NRC Form   BASSA                                                                                                       U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 1943)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                       APPROVEO OMS NO, 3)50&104 EXPIRES) 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME I 1)                                                           DOCKET NUMSER IS)
LER NUMBER 14)                   PACE IS)
VEA4 '4 QrK SEQUENTIAL NVM 44 889
                                                                                                                              ~>i8 4EVISION NVM   44 R.E. G'nna Nuclear Power Plant                                             o  5  o  o  o"    44  8  9      016              0 0      0 4 OF TEXT /// moro o/rooo 4 44/vomE Iroo ///ooro///RC For//I JSSA'el I)7)
E.         METHOD OF DISCOVERY:
The event was made apparent due                       to Engineering's review of the following correspondence:
o, Letter from S.P. Swigart of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (NS-OPLS-OPL-I-89-517), to Mr. R. Eliasz, RG&E, dated October 12, 1989,


==Subject:==
==Subject:==
Control.Room Safety In)ection Block Switches.o This was documented in Interoffice Correspondence from Richard Baker to P.Wilkens and G.Wrobel, dated November 17, 1989, Sub)ect: Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.o The event was determined to be reportable following PORC review of the previous correspon-dence.F.OPERATOR ACTION: As this was a design deficiency, with only the potential for component failure, no immediate operator action was necessary.
Control. Room Safety In)ection Block Switches.
G.SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
o             This was documented in Interoffice Correspondence from Richard Baker to P. Wilkens and G. Wrobel, dated November 17, 1989, Sub)ect:                         Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.
None required.U OP The underlying cause of the event is a design error which occurred during the original construction of th'';E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.NRC FORM SSSA)943)
o             The     event     was       determined to be reportable following     PORC   review of the previous correspon-dence.
NRC Fons 3SSA (943)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROV EO OMS NO, 3150M(04 EXPIRES.8/31/SS FACILITY NAME (II OOCKET NUMSER (2)LER NUMBER (SI VEAR.~j: SSOVSNTIAL hSVISION NUMeth PACE (3I R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TExT///more toeot/I reovethE e>>/A/o'st////Ic
F.         OPERATOR ACTION:
%%drrrr 30%4't/l)TI o 5 o o o 2 4 4 8 9-0 j.6 0 0 0 5 OF 0 8 IV.ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, items (a)(2)(v)(D) and (a)(2)(vi) which requires a report of,"any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident", and 10 CFR 21,"Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances".
As         this         was   a   design       deficiency,         with only the potential for               component         failure,   no immediate               operator action               was necessary.
The"basic component" is the SZ Block/Unblock Switch, supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation as part of the original Ginna Station design.The potential failure of the SI Block/Unblock Switch rendering the automatic actuation of SI from low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure inoperable is considered a condition that alone could have prevented the immediate fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:
G.         SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:
PORC determined there were no immediate operational or adverse safety consequences due to the potential failure of the SZ Block/Unblock Switch because: 0 Westinghouse has stated that the probability of a SI Block/Unblock Switch failure is very low (approximately 10 to 10/yr).o Immediate action step 4 (performed from memory)of Emergency Operating Procedure E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Zn)ection, directs the operator to check parameters for SZ actuation rather than rely on automatic actuation features.Manual actuation of SI and containment isolation is required if parameters fall below the auto SZ actuation setpoints.
None           required.
NRC FORM 3SSA 1943)
U         OP The       underlying cause of the event is a design error which occurred during the original construction of                                                   th'';E.
NRC Ferrtr 3ddA)883)t LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION V.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMS NO, 3150M)04 EXPIRES,'/31/85 FACILITY NAME (I)DOCKET NUMbER (31 YEAII LER NUMSER Idl SSOVSNTIAL
Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
??.o NVM SN II@V IS IO N NVM SN PACE (31 R.E.Ginna Nuclear Power Plant TEXT///more douce it/equeed, ute I/IRuuM/HRC Fer?II~'t/I)7)p t?pp ps 4 4 89 016 0 006 OF 0 8 o Containment pressure of 4 psig will automatically actuate SI independent of the SI Block/Unblock Switch configuration.
NRC FORM SSSA
SI on HI Containment Pressure is used as a backup to the low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure SI actuation.
)943)
o If the SI signal is blocked during depressurization, a bistable light.will alert the operator of the blocked status.o Initial inspection of the plunger position of the SI Block/Unblock Switch verified that the switch contacts were (and continue to be)in the proper position.Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety will be assured at all times.Due to the date of occurrence, the condition is technically not 10 CFR 21 reportable.
 
However, due to the potential significance of the failure scenario, Rochester Gas and Electric is submitting voluntary notification.
NRC Fons 3SSA                                                                                                           U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (943)
V.CORRECTIVE ACTION A.ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE EVENT: 0 0 Knowledgeable personnel inspected the plunger position of the SI Block/Unblock
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION                                           APPROV EO OMS NO, 3150M(04 EXPIRES. 8/31/SS FACILITY NAME (II                                                           OOCKET NUMSER (2)                 LER NUMBER (SI                   PACE (3I VEAR .~j: SSOVSNTIAL     hSVISION NUMeth R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                           o  5  o  o  o  2  4 4 8  9  0 j.6                0 0 0      5 OF      0 8 TExT ///more toeot /I reovethE e>> /A/o'st////Ic %%drrrr 30%4't/ l)TI IV.               ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, items (a)(2)(v)(D) and (a)(2)(vi) which requires a report of, "any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident", and 10 CFR 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances".                                                         The "basic component" is the SZ Block/Unblock Switch, supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation as part of the original Ginna Station design. The potential failure of the SI Block/Unblock Switch rendering the automatic actuation of SI from low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure inoperable is considered a condition that alone could have prevented the immediate fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
" Switch and verified that the switch contacts were in the proper position.Operating Procedure 0-1.1 (Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown)"was changed to add the following note and chyck-off to step F 11.6: I NIIC FOIIM SSSA IS431 NRC FOIRI 344A (P43)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY
An assessment                       was   performed considering both the safety consequences                       and   implications of this event with the following results                       and conclusions:
(:OMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO, 3150&1(N EXPIRES: 813(185 FACILI'TY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMSER (ll LER NUMSER (5)YEAR: M 55QVENTIAL
PORC         determined there were no immediate operational or adverse safety consequences due to the potential failure of the SZ Block/Unblock Switch because:
+REVISION NVMSER",X'VM ER PACE I31 R.E.Ginna Nuclear PGwer P3.ant: TEXT Il(mom NMce N IeqviNS u>>ddcoonsl lyRC FomI 3(5(AS((ITI o s o o o 24 489 01 6-00 07 OF NOTE: Prior to placing the SZ Block/Unblock Switch to the normal position, station an operator inside the MCB in direct observation of the SZ Block/Unblock Switch, to observe that both plunger tips are recessed inward after the switch is placed to normal position.Block switch plunger tips position inward o An RG&E operator aid tag was placed on the MCB ad)acent to the SZ Block/Unblock Switch denoting the note from O-l.l.o An RG&E operator aid tag was also placed inside the MCB adjacent to the rear of the SZ Block/Un-block Switch stating the following:
0           Westinghouse                 has stated           that the probability of a SI Block/Unblock Switch                     failure is very low (approximately 10             to   10   /yr) .
This is the switch we verify that the plunger's tips are recessed inward when the switch is placed to normal (labeled LAK).o A spare switch of similar design has been placed in the Control Room for the purpose of training the operators to recognize the differences in plunger position.B.ACTZON TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
o           Immediate action step 4 (performed from memory) of Emergency Operating                       Procedure E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Zn) ection,                       directs the operator to check parameters for SZ actuation rather than rely on automatic actuation features. Manual actuation of SI and containment isolation is required fall below the auto SZ actuation setpoints.
0 0 0 During the 1991 Refueling Outage, subject to equipment availability, a design change and modification will be made-,to:, separate the Block Switches for each SZ train".A review of the application of:similar switches will be performed, to determine if there are ,.:, sric implications.
if    parameters NRC FORM 3SSA 1943)
Due to the delay between"discovery
 
-.date"...and"reportability date", improvements will'be'made in the RG&E internal review process, including means for formal notification of Ginna Station of potentially reportable.
NRC Ferrtr 3ddA                                                                                                   V.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION
issues.'RC FORM 355A (5431 NRC form 3$4A (NI3)LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION APPROVEO OMS NO.319)&(OS EXPIRES;8/31/8$FACILITY NAME (I I OOCKET NUMBER l2)YEA/I LER NUMSER (8)SSOUCNTIAL NUM S II II S V IS IO N NUM SA PACE ISI R.E.Ginna NUclear Power-Plant TEXT/I/moro s/>>so/s or)UsOIE oso sASSO'cv>>/
  )883) t                                     LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                   APPROVED OMS NO, 3150M)04 EXPIRES,'/31/85 FACILITY NAME (I)                                                       DOCKET NUMbER (31                                                   PACE (31 LER NUMSER Idl YEAII      SSOVSNTIAL       II@ V IS IO N
H//C forrrr 3/E(A'/Ill)o 5 o o o 2 489 0 1 6 0 008 OF 0 8 o Westinghouse will be notified of this isolated occurrence, in which Ginna Station was not notified by Westinghouse.
                                                                                                        ??.o   NVM SN         NVM SN R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant                                     p  t?pp        ps 4 4 89          016              0        006    OF    0 8 TEXT /// more douce it /equeed, ute I/IRuuM/HRC Fer?II ~'t/ I)7) o       Containment pressure of 4 psig will automatically actuate SI independent of the SI Block/Unblock Switch configuration. SI on HI Containment Pressure is used as a backup to the low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure SI actuation.
VI..ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.FAILED COMPONENTS':
o         If       the SI signal is blocked during depressurization, a bistable light. will alert the operator of the blocked status.
B.None identified.
o         Initial inspection of the plunger position of the SI Block/Unblock Switch verified that the switch contacts were (and continue to be) in the proper position.
PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS: A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified.
Based on the above,                 it   can be concluded that the public's health and safety will be assured at all times. Due to the date of occurrence, the condition is technically not 10 CFR 21 reportable.                           However, due to the potential significance of the failure scenario, Rochester Gas and Electric is submitting voluntary notification.
C.SPECIAL COMMENTS: None.<<<<<<'<<<<,<<".I (44<<I NIIC FORM 344A (943)<<QP~<<(h/<<}}
V.                 CORRECTIVE ACTION A.       ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE EVENT:
0           Knowledgeable         personnel     inspected             the plunger position of the SI Block/Unblock Switch and                 "
verified that the switch contacts were in the proper position.
0          Operating       Procedure 0-1.1 (Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown) "was changed to add     the following note and chyck-off to step F     11.6:                                                                   I NIIC FOIIM SSSA IS431
 
NRC FOIRI 344A                                                                                                     U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY (:OMMISSION (P43)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION                                         APPROVEO OMS NO, 3150&1(N EXPIRES: 813(185 FACILI'TY NAME (11                                                     OOCKET NUMSER (ll                 LER NUMSER (5)                   PACE I31 YEAR:       M 55QVENTIAL NVMSER
                                                                                                                            + REVISION
                                                                                                                          ",X'VM   ER R.E. Ginna Nuclear PGwer P3.ant:                                   o  s  o  o  o  24 489              01      6  00 07            OF TEXT Il(mom NMce N IeqviNS u>> ddcoonsl lyRC FomI 3(5(AS( (ITI NOTE:         Prior to placing the SZ Block/Unblock Switch to the normal position, station an operator inside the MCB in direct observation of the SZ Block/Unblock Switch, to observe that both plunger tips are recessed inward after the switch is placed to normal position.
Block switch plunger tips position inward o           An RG&E operator aid tag was placed on the MCB ad)acent to the SZ Block/Unblock Switch denoting the note from O-l.l.
o           An RG&E operator aid tag was also placed inside the MCB adjacent to the rear of the SZ Block/Un-block Switch stating the following: This is the switch we verify that the plunger's tips are recessed inward when the switch is placed to normal (labeled LAK).
o             A spare switch of similar design has been placed in the Control Room for the purpose of training the operators to recognize the differences in plunger position.
B.         ACTZON TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:
0             During the 1991 Refueling Outage, subject to equipment availability, a design change and modification will be made-,to:, separate the Block Switches for each SZ train".
0            A     review of the application of:similar switches will be performed, to determine sric implications.
if      there are 0            Due to the delay between "discovery -.date" ...and "reportability date", improvements will 'be 'made in the RG&E internal review process, including means for formal notification of Ginna Station of potentially reportable.
issues.'RC FORM 355A (5431
 
NRC form 3$ 4A                                                                                                 U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (NI3)
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION                               APPROVEO OMS NO. 319)&(OS EXPIRES; 8/31/8$
FACILITY NAME (I I                                                       OOCKET NUMBER l2)         LER NUMSER (8)                       PACE ISI YEA/I  SSOUCNTIAL       IIS V IS IO N NUM S II      NUM SA R.E. Ginna NUclear Power -Plant                                         o  5  o  o  o  2 489      0 1        6      0        008      OF    0 8 TEXT /I/ moro s/>>so /s or)UsOIE oso sASSO'cv>>/ H//C forrrr 3/E(A'/ Ill) o             Westinghouse    will be notified of this isolated occurrence,     in which     Ginna     Station               was         not notified by Westinghouse.
VI   ..           ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A.             FAILED COMPONENTS':
None         identified.
B.            PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:
A       similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results:                       No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified.
C.           SPECIAL COMMENTS:
None.
                                                                                                                                                            <<".I<<
(44<<I
                                                                                                                                                        <<QP~<<(h       /<<
NIIC FORM 344A (943)}}

Latest revision as of 09:55, 4 February 2020

LER 89-016-00:on 891220,determined That Single Failure of Safety Injection Block/Unblock Switch Could Render Some Automatic Actuation Features Inoperable.Caused by Design Deficiency.Also Reportable Per Part 21
ML17261A916
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 01/12/1990
From: Backus W
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17261A915 List:
References
REF-PT21-90 LER-89-016, LER-89-16, NUDOCS 9001240152
Download: ML17261A916 (8)
v • d • e


Text

NAC tesee SOC s5451 US. NVCLEAII XSOULATOIIYCOMMISSION AttAOVEO OMS NO. 5)CC OIOV LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) EXHASS 0/Ss/05 SACILITY NAME Ill OOCXKT NVMSKII ISI A R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 0 6 0 0 0 2 4 4 1 OF 0 8 Due To A Design Deficiency The Failure Of The SI Block/Unblock Switch Could Render Some Automati.c Actuation Features of Both Trains of SI Ino rable EVENT OATS 15) L K II N VMS C A Ltl IlttOIITOATC ln OTNtX SAC)I.ITItc INYOLVKO Icl MONTss OAY YK Ail YEAH SKOUINTIAL ~~ MONT)I OAY YEA)I tACSLSTY NASSCS OOCXKT NUMSKIIISI NUSJ ~ C SS NuseeeA 0 6 0 0 0 2 0 '8 9 016 0 0112 90 Cable) 0 6 0 0 0 Ot<<AT)NO TIIIS IsttoIIT Is KUKMITTco wAsvANT To THE AECUIAEMKNTs ot lect 0 $ : /cssce one os osece ol see looossot) Ill)

MOOS lol TO.eOS)el TO.eotlsl 50.154IISI)is) TS.1 I )el tosscll 50.e00 I ~ ) l1 ) I 0 ~ 0M)e))ll ~ 0.1541)El)el 15.1) lel LKYKL 9 9 10.e00 4) )I) I V I ~ IEI 50 T54) IS) lee l CTHE)I /Soecot Ae Aosoecl teste osst Io Teel, NAC lossss TO.SOS 4) llII w) 50.554) ITII0 SS.T54) It)lest)IAI JSSAI 50.e00 Is I i)I)Is) ~ 0.554)ISI(SI ~ 0.154 I IS I)sec I I ~ I 10 CFR 21 50.ecc le I llI Is) 50.5 54 I ISI IXII ~ O.TS Ie)15) le)

LICENSEE CONTACT tOII THIS Ltll 115)

NAME TELtt)SONS HUIASKII Wesley H. Backus AIIEA COOS Technica' sistant to the rations Mana er 31 5524 -4446 COMt LET E ONE LINE t Oil EACH COMAONCNT tAILUAEOKSCIII~ KO IH TSSIS llctOAT llcl MANUSAC. ttOIITASLK MANUSAC. ttOATASL CAV5K SYSTEM COMtONEHT TVAEII TO HtIIOS CAUS t SYSTEM COMtONEHT TVAKII TO Htl)OS &~4~4>@w:

SuttLEMCNTAL tittOAT CxttCTCO 1)u MONTSI CAY YEAII EXSKCTKO LVSMS55IOH OATS lit)

YES II/ tee, csesstsese EXt/CTEO SUSMISSION CATE) HO ASSTAACT ILossN so laXI eeocN,)e., etocoeosseselt Nfseeo slotseetece cttesssssseo ooesl llc)

On November 17, 1989, an initial Engineering evaluation was completed, which identified a potential problem with the Safety injection (SZ) Block/Unblock Switch.

On December 20, 1989, at 1630 EST, with the reactor at approxi-mately 99% full -power, the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) reviewed the Engineering evaluation, and made a final determination that a single failure of the SI Block/Unblock Switch could render some automatic actuation, features of both trains. of SZ inoperable. f The PORC, after reviewing the situation thoroughly, ;:oncluded that sufficient justification existed, for continued safe plant operation.

The underlying cause of the event was a - design;=error '.which occurred during the original construction of -,the R.E.. Ginna.. .

Nuclear Power Plant.

Immediate corrective action was taken to verify that the plunger position of the SX Block/Unblock Switch contacts were in 'he et" s io proper position.

NAC Sere SOS I&45I 5)0012401 2 900112 PDR 'DOCK 05000244 ee' . 1o PDC

NRC Form 844A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION I9$ 51 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT ILER) TEXT CONTINUATION . APPROVED OMB NO. 5150&144 EXPIRES. BISI/85 FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER IXI LER NUMBER (El ~ AOE IS) 5EOVCNTIAL sP I REVISION NVMPER '<1; NVMPPR R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o s o o o 2 448 9 0 1 6 0 0 0 OF 0 8 TEXT iH moro spoco is rxrrerorL oso RsrOooW HRC Forrrr SBSA'sl I IT I PRE-EVENT PLANT CONDITIONS The plant was at approximately 994 steady state full power with no major activities in progress.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT A. DATES AND APPROXIMATE TIMES FOR MAJOR OCCUREKNCES:

o Initial plant operation in 1969: Event date.

o November 17, 1989: Discovery date.

o December 20, 1989, 1630 EST: Reportability date and time.

o December 20, 1989, 1630 EST: Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) determines that safe operation of plant may continue.

B. EVENT On November 17, 1989, an initial Engineering evaluation was completed, which identified a potential problem with the SI Block/Unblock Switch. Subsequently, PORC review of the Engineering evaluation, on December 20, 1989, with the reactor at approximately 994 full power, determined that a single failure of the Safety Injection (SI) Block/Unblock Switch could render some automatic actuation features of both trains of SI Inoperable. This determination followed. an evaluation of the following correspondences:

o Letter from S.P. Swigart of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (NS-OPLS-OPL-I-89-517) to Mr. R. Eliasz, Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation (RG&E), dated October 12, 1989, Sub)ect: Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.

NRC FORM 554A 1945 I

NRC Form 344A U$ . NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

(&43l LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 3150&10(

EXPIRES. Sfll/85 FACILITY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMSER (ll LER NUMSER IS) PACE (3I "EA" AN SEOVENTIAL oiy. IIEVOION NVM ER :AA NVM 81 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o s o o o 244 8 9 016 0 0 3 DF0 8 TEXT N moro oPoco r'o rorRrood, uw dduoonro( HRC %%dnrr 383A1I (ITI o Interoffice Correspondence from Richard Baker to P. Wilkens and G. Wrobel, dated November 17, 1989, Sub)ect: Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.

The Westinghouse Correspondence (NS-OPLS-OPL-I 517) identified a potential single failure mechanism which could result in blocking of some automatic actuation features of both trains of SI, (i.e. SI automatic actuation from low pressurizer pressure and low steam line pressure). Specifically, a single manual switch on the Main Control Board (MCB) is used to control this SI Block/Unblock function for both SI trains. An Engineering Evaluation of the existing Ginna Station SI Block/Unblock wiring configurations has concluded that, the Westinghouse described potential single failure mechanism is applicable to Ginna Station. The Engineering Evaluation also concurred with the Westinghouse position that due to the low probability of a switch failure sufficient )ustifica-tion exists for continued plant operation until separate A train and B train SI Block/Unblock Switches can be installed.

The PORC after reviewing the above correspondence concluded that sufficient Justification exists for continued safe operation of the plant.

C ~ INOPERABLE STRUCTURES, COMPONENTS, OR SYSTEMS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT:

None.

D. OTHER SYSTEMS OR SECONDARY FUNCTIONS AFFECTED:

None.

NRC FORM 344A 18431

NRC Form BASSA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION 1943)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO, 3)50&104 EXPIRES) 8/31/85 FACILITY NAME I 1) DOCKET NUMSER IS)

LER NUMBER 14) PACE IS)

VEA4 '4 QrK SEQUENTIAL NVM 44 889

~>i8 4EVISION NVM 44 R.E. G'nna Nuclear Power Plant o 5 o o o" 44 8 9 016 0 0 0 4 OF TEXT /// moro o/rooo 4 44/vomE Iroo ///ooro///RC For//I JSSA'el I)7)

E. METHOD OF DISCOVERY:

The event was made apparent due to Engineering's review of the following correspondence:

o, Letter from S.P. Swigart of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (NS-OPLS-OPL-I-89-517), to Mr. R. Eliasz, RG&E, dated October 12, 1989,

Subject:

Control. Room Safety In)ection Block Switches.

o This was documented in Interoffice Correspondence from Richard Baker to P. Wilkens and G. Wrobel, dated November 17, 1989, Sub)ect: Control Room Safety Injection Block Switches.

o The event was determined to be reportable following PORC review of the previous correspon-dence.

F. OPERATOR ACTION:

As this was a design deficiency, with only the potential for component failure, no immediate operator action was necessary.

G. SAFETY SYSTEM RESPONSES:

None required.

U OP The underlying cause of the event is a design error which occurred during the original construction of th;E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

NRC FORM SSSA

)943)

NRC Fons 3SSA U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (943)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPROV EO OMS NO, 3150M(04 EXPIRES. 8/31/SS FACILITY NAME (II OOCKET NUMSER (2) LER NUMBER (SI PACE (3I VEAR .~j: SSOVSNTIAL hSVISION NUMeth R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant o 5 o o o 2 4 4 8 9 0 j.6 0 0 0 5 OF 0 8 TExT ///more toeot /I reovethE e>> /A/o'st////Ic %%drrrr 30%4't/ l)TI IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, items (a)(2)(v)(D) and (a)(2)(vi) which requires a report of, "any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident", and 10 CFR 21, "Reporting of Defects and Noncompliances". The "basic component" is the SZ Block/Unblock Switch, supplied by Westinghouse Electric Corporation as part of the original Ginna Station design. The potential failure of the SI Block/Unblock Switch rendering the automatic actuation of SI from low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure inoperable is considered a condition that alone could have prevented the immediate fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

An assessment was performed considering both the safety consequences and implications of this event with the following results and conclusions:

PORC determined there were no immediate operational or adverse safety consequences due to the potential failure of the SZ Block/Unblock Switch because:

0 Westinghouse has stated that the probability of a SI Block/Unblock Switch failure is very low (approximately 10 to 10 /yr) .

o Immediate action step 4 (performed from memory) of Emergency Operating Procedure E-O, Reactor Trip or Safety Zn) ection, directs the operator to check parameters for SZ actuation rather than rely on automatic actuation features. Manual actuation of SI and containment isolation is required fall below the auto SZ actuation setpoints.

if parameters NRC FORM 3SSA 1943)

NRC Ferrtr 3ddA V.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION

)883) t LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMS NO, 3150M)04 EXPIRES,'/31/85 FACILITY NAME (I) DOCKET NUMbER (31 PACE (31 LER NUMSER Idl YEAII SSOVSNTIAL II@ V IS IO N

??.o NVM SN NVM SN R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant p t?pp ps 4 4 89 016 0 006 OF 0 8 TEXT /// more douce it /equeed, ute I/IRuuM/HRC Fer?II ~'t/ I)7) o Containment pressure of 4 psig will automatically actuate SI independent of the SI Block/Unblock Switch configuration. SI on HI Containment Pressure is used as a backup to the low pressurizer pressure and low steamline pressure SI actuation.

o If the SI signal is blocked during depressurization, a bistable light. will alert the operator of the blocked status.

o Initial inspection of the plunger position of the SI Block/Unblock Switch verified that the switch contacts were (and continue to be) in the proper position.

Based on the above, it can be concluded that the public's health and safety will be assured at all times. Due to the date of occurrence, the condition is technically not 10 CFR 21 reportable. However, due to the potential significance of the failure scenario, Rochester Gas and Electric is submitting voluntary notification.

V. CORRECTIVE ACTION A. ACTION TAKEN AS A RESULT OF THE EVENT:

0 Knowledgeable personnel inspected the plunger position of the SI Block/Unblock Switch and "

verified that the switch contacts were in the proper position.

0 Operating Procedure 0-1.1 (Plant Heatup From Cold Shutdown to Hot Shutdown) "was changed to add the following note and chyck-off to step F 11.6: I NIIC FOIIM SSSA IS431

NRC FOIRI 344A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY (:OMMISSION (P43)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO, 3150&1(N EXPIRES: 813(185 FACILI'TY NAME (11 OOCKET NUMSER (ll LER NUMSER (5) PACE I31 YEAR: M 55QVENTIAL NVMSER

+ REVISION

",X'VM ER R.E. Ginna Nuclear PGwer P3.ant: o s o o o 24 489 01 6 00 07 OF TEXT Il(mom NMce N IeqviNS u>> ddcoonsl lyRC FomI 3(5(AS( (ITI NOTE: Prior to placing the SZ Block/Unblock Switch to the normal position, station an operator inside the MCB in direct observation of the SZ Block/Unblock Switch, to observe that both plunger tips are recessed inward after the switch is placed to normal position.

Block switch plunger tips position inward o An RG&E operator aid tag was placed on the MCB ad)acent to the SZ Block/Unblock Switch denoting the note from O-l.l.

o An RG&E operator aid tag was also placed inside the MCB adjacent to the rear of the SZ Block/Un-block Switch stating the following: This is the switch we verify that the plunger's tips are recessed inward when the switch is placed to normal (labeled LAK).

o A spare switch of similar design has been placed in the Control Room for the purpose of training the operators to recognize the differences in plunger position.

B. ACTZON TAKEN OR PLANNED TO PREVENT RECURRENCE:

0 During the 1991 Refueling Outage, subject to equipment availability, a design change and modification will be made-,to:, separate the Block Switches for each SZ train".

0 A review of the application of:similar switches will be performed, to determine sric implications.

if there are 0 Due to the delay between "discovery -.date" ...and "reportability date", improvements will 'be 'made in the RG&E internal review process, including means for formal notification of Ginna Station of potentially reportable.

issues.'RC FORM 355A (5431

NRC form 3$ 4A U.S. NUCLEAR REOULATORY COMMISSION (NI3)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LERI TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVEO OMS NO. 319)&(OS EXPIRES; 8/31/8$

FACILITY NAME (I I OOCKET NUMBER l2) LER NUMSER (8) PACE ISI YEA/I SSOUCNTIAL IIS V IS IO N NUM S II NUM SA R.E. Ginna NUclear Power -Plant o 5 o o o 2 489 0 1 6 0 008 OF 0 8 TEXT /I/ moro s/>>so /s or)UsOIE oso sASSO'cv>>/ H//C forrrr 3/E(A'/ Ill) o Westinghouse will be notified of this isolated occurrence, in which Ginna Station was not notified by Westinghouse.

VI .. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. FAILED COMPONENTS':

None identified.

B. PREVIOUS LERs ON SIMILAR EVENTS:

A similar LER event historical search was conducted with the following results: No documentation of similar LER events with the same root cause at Ginna Station could be identified.

C. SPECIAL COMMENTS:

None.

<<".I<<

(44<<I

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NIIC FORM 344A (943)

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