ML17251A166

Rev 2 to Design Criteria Ginna Station Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Program.

ML17251A166
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/29/1987
From:	Robert Davis, James Smith ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17251A167	List: ML17251A166 ML17309A405
References
EWR-4539, NUDOCS 8807130072
Download: ML17251A166 (35)

Text

w Design Criteria Ginna Station Safety Related Motor Operated Valve Program Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 EWR 4539 Revision 2 December 29, 1987 Prepared by:

Electrical Engineering Lead Enginee l- 8-88 DATE Reviewed by: ~~y ua z, y ssurance DATE Approved by:

Manage , Electrica Engineering DATE 880708 8 ~000Pc}4 8807 g 30072 ADOC~

pgp pt4u 8

Page i DCSH 42 92

Revision Status Sheet Latest Latest Latest Rev. Page Rev. Page Rev.

0 0

0 7

10 12 13 Design Criteria WR 4539 Page ii Revision 12/29/87 2

Date 42 91

1.0 Summar Descri tion Summary

.1.1.1 Motor operated valves (MOVS) are presently used in both Class 1E and non Class 1E applications at Ginna Station.

The operator size, and protective features were originally selected by the manufacturer, Limitorque, and are based on design information supplied by the design engineer in conjunction with information supplied by the valve manufacturer. Once a valve and operator are sized for a specific application, Iimitorque then selected a torque switch setting which insured proper operability under accident design conditions and also afforded equipment protection against overseating. Limitorque maintains a historical file on such design data.

Specific torque switch settings were obtained for each MOV and the information documented on control configuration drawings series 03021. The primary purpose of this criteria is to establish the requirements necessary to ensure proper torque switch settings consistent with the guidelines established in IE Notice 85-03, (reference 2.7). The existing torque switch settings will be reviewed and compared to settings obtained from an insitu testing program developed by MOVATS Inc. The MOVATS program uses a signature analysis technique, which has been proven effective in diagnosing the overall performance of motor operated valves. The basis for these switch settings are outlined in Sections 17.1.2 and 17.1.7.

1.1.2 The primary source of most MOV failures can be attributed to the improper setting of the limit switches. These switches, unlike the torque switches, are not, set by the manufacturer. The requirements for setting the limit switches is the, responsibility of the design engineer and must be controlled along with the torque switch settings. The original limit switch settings have been established generically for all MOVS by the Architecht/Engineer (A/E) to be approximately 10% of valve travel. These settings are assumed to exist, on all MOVS. However, field investigation indicates that the actual settings are in most cases, much lower.

Therefore, a bases must be established to set the limit switches that will insure operability during postulated events consistent with IE Bulletin 85-03. The MOVATS program addresses these settings, and the criteria for resetting each limit switch will be established during the insitu testing. The basis for these switch settings are outlined in Sections 17.1.3, 17.1.4, 17.1.5, 17.1.6, 17.1.8, 17.1.9, and 17.1.10.

Design Criteria Revision 1 Page 1 4539

In addition, some of the proposed work may consist of actual modifications.

One such modification that is proposed will consist of installing new rotors on selected valve operators which will allow separation of the switches used for control and indication. The additional rotors shall be used for indication and will be set independently of the control rotors. These rotors will monitor actual valve position. When limit switches are used for indication on a two rotor valve operator, the fully closed indica-tion is received when in fact the valve is not, fully seated. This condition has been identified by INPO on SOER-B6-2, (reference 2.12). In the performance of insitu MOV testing, the consequences of erroneous valve position indication will be evaluated. New rotors will be added if the indicating limit switches cannot, be set to preclude erroneous indications as outlined in SOER-86-2.

The design requirements for the addition of new rotors will be addressed herein, however the actual modification will be performed at a later date under EWR 4539.

Another modification that is proposed will consist of rewiring the circuitry of selected valve operators which will prevent repeated closure of the valve when the torque switch resets due to worm gear relaxation.

A torque switche allows the valve to close until a predetermined force is applied to the seat. On non-locking gear ratios the worm gear may relax to the point where the torque switch resets, initiating hammerblow. This condition has been identified by USNRC on IE Information Notice 85-20 (Reference 2.4) and references 2.5 and 2.6. In the performance of insitu testing, the consequences of hammering effects will be evaluated and the circuitry changed if required. The design requirements for the modification to the circuitry will be addressed herein, however the actual modification will be performed at a later date under EWR 4539.

Subsequent monitoring of MOV's with AC motors.

Subsequent monitoring of AC MOV performance shall be based on Data collected using motor load monitoring techniques. Motor load monitoring, deve1oped for the "MOVATS" program, consists of measuring line currents and line voltages. A threshold value will be established based upon data collected during testing which will be used as a reference to document proper MOV operation on a periodic basis. These values will be controlled through the use of Controlled Configuration Drawings-Design Criteria .Revision 1 Page 2 EWR 4539

1.1.5 Subsequent Monitoring of MOV's with DC Motors 1.1.5.1 Subsequent monitoring of DC MOV performance shall be based on performing the "Movats" Insitu Test. This test, shall be performed periodically to monitor performance of the MOV.

1.2 Functions 1.2.1 The function of the insitu testing program is to establish torque and limit switch settings that will insure system operability under the required design bases events as required by IEB-85-03 (ref. 2.7).

1.3 Performance Requirements 1.3.1 The testing shall not adversely affect the existing MOV configuration and system operability.

1.4 Control 1.4'. 1 This testing program, or subsequent modifications if required, will not change or modify any of the control features of the motor operated valves.

1.5 Modes of Operation 1.5.1 The safety related motor operated valves shall be capable of operation during all normal plant operating and all post accident conditions.

2.0 Referenced Documents 2.1 Ginna Station Updated Final Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 1, dated December, 1985.

2.2 USNRC IE Information Notice 84-10, "Motor-Operated Valve Torque Switches Set Below the Manufacturer's Recommended Value", dated February 21, 1984.

2.3 Letter, G. S. Link to B. A. Snow dated July 24, 1984.

2.4 USNRC IE Information Notice 85-20, "MOV Failures Due to Hammering Effects", dated March 12, 1985.

2.5 Letter, G. S. Link to C. Edgar dated August 16, 1985.

2.6 Letter, C. Edgar to G. S. Link dated August 23, 1985.

2.7 USNRC IE Bulletin 85-03, "Motor-Operated Valve Common Mode Failures During Plant Transients- Due to Improper Switch Settings", dated November 15, 1985.

Design Criteria Revision 1 Page 3 EWR 4539

2.8 Corrective Action Report 51679, dated November 26, 1985, Reference Document IEB 85-03.

2.9 USNRC IE Information Notice 86-29, "Effects of Changing Valve Motor-Operator Switch Settings", dated April 25, 1986.

2.10 Letter, G. S. Link to S. Spector dated June 16, 1986.

2.11 Letter, G. S. Link to G. W. Daniels dated July 18, 1986.

2.12 INPO Significant Operating Experience Report (SOER) 86-2, "Inaccurate Closed Position Indication on Motor-Operated Valves", dated July 29, 1986.

2. 13 Ietter, G. W. Daniels to R. E. Smith dated August ll, 1986.

2.14 "Generic Procedure for Baseline Testing of Limitorque Motor Operated Valves Using the Movats 2100 or 2150 System", Rev. 1, dated April 31, 1987.

2.15 SEP Topic III-10A.

2.16 Design Analysis, "Motor Operated Valves, IE Bulletin 85-03", EWR 4348, dated April 30, 1986, The results of which are contained in Attachment 1.

3.0 Seismic Cate or 3.1 Any modifications to the valve operators as a result of the program outlined below will be Seismic Category I.

4.0 ualit Grou Code Class Fluid S stems Onl 4.1 Not Applicable.

5.0 Electrical S stem Safet Classification 5.1 Any modifications to IE valve operators or circuitry as a result of the testing program outlined below be Seismic Category I Class IE.

will 6.0 A Pro ram A licabilit 6.1 The QA program requirements of the C

Ginna QA manual will apply to analysis, testing, modification, and setpoint maintenance activities performed on the valve operators.

7.0 Codes, Standards, and Re lator Guides 7.1 The following codes, .standards, and regulatory guides will be used as guidelines in the design of any modifica-tions required.

Design Criteria Revision 1 Page 4 4539

7.2 Nuclear Regulatoiy Commission (NRC) 7.2.1 Regulatory Guides 7.2.1.1 Regulatory Guide 1.29 - Seismic Design Classification.

7.2.1.2 Regulatory Guide 1.75 - Physical Independence of Electric Systems (Rev. 1-1/75).

7.2.1.3 . Regulatory Guide 1.89 - Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Plants.

7.2.1.4 Regulatory Guide 1.39 - Housekeeping Requirements for Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Rev. 2-9/77).

7.3 Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE) 7.3.1 IEEE-308 (1974) Standard Criteria for Class IE Power Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

7.3.2 IEEE-323 (1983) Standard for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations..

7;3.3 IEEE-344 ( 1975 ) Recommended Practices for Seismic Qualification of Class IE Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

7.3.4 IEEE-383 (1974) Guide for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations.

7.3.5 IEEE-384 (1981) Standard Criteria for Separation Independence of Class IE Equipment and Circuits.

7.4 American National Standard Institute (ANSI) 7.4.1 ANSI-N45.2.2 (1978) Packaging, Shipping, Receiving, Storage, and Handling of Items for Nuclear Power Plants.

8.0 Desi Conditions 8.1 Not Applicable 9.0 Load Conditions 9.1 Not Applicable.

Design- Criteria Revision 1 Page 5 EWR 4539 Date 11 3 87

10.0 Environmental Conditions Normal Accident 10.1 Auxiliary Building Ambient Temperature ('F) 50-104 50-104 Ambient Pressure (psig) 0 0 Relative Humidity (%) 60 60 Radioactivity (rads) <100 mr/hr 2.8 x 10 RadTotal Flooding (in) 8 10.2 Intermediate Building Ambient Temperature ('F) 50 -104 215 Ambient Pressure (psig) 0 .25 Relative Humidity (%) 60 100 Radioactivity (rads) <1 mr/hr Negligible Flooding (ft) 0 10.3 Auxiliary Building Annex Ambient Temperature ('F) 60 120 60 = 120 Ambient Pressure (psig) 0 . 0 Relative Humidity (%) 60 60 Radioactivity (rads) Negligible Negligible Flooding (ft) 11.0 Interface Re uirements 11.1 The torque switch settings are intended to allow the MOV to operate during abnormal conditions.- The current to operate the MOV at these settings must be coordinated with the thermal overload system that has been developed under EWR 3319 consistent with SEP Topic III-10.A.

12.0 Material Re irements 12.1 Not Applicable.

13.0 Mechanical Re uirements

13. 1 Not Applicable.

14.0 Structural Re irements 14.1 Not Applicable.

Design Criteria Revision 1 Page 6 4539

15.0 H draulic Re irements 15.1 Attachment 1 provides a list of the valves to be included in this program and design information for the operation of each valve. The information consists of:

a. Valve Number.

b. Brief description of valve function.

c. Conditions analyzed.

d. Maximum differential pressures for opening and closing as determined by a fluid systems evaluation.

(Ref. 2. 16) 15.2 The maximum anticipated system differential pressures are identified in Reference 2.16 and will be the lowest values used:in the Insitu Testing Program to set the torque and limit switches.

16.0 Chemistr Re uirements 16.1 Not Applicable.

17.0 Electrical Re irements 17.1 The technical basis for establishing setpoints for the torque and limit switches has been developed by MOVATS. MOVATS utilized test results. from many plants to establish and justify several alternate policies for torque and limit switch setpoint adjustments.

17.1.1 Listed below are the switches for which it determined that setpoint policies are required in has been response to IE Bulletin 85-03. Attachment 2 is a typical MOV schematic and is intended to show the relative positions of the torque, and limit schematic is a generic representation only and switches'his should not, be used as a source for specific MOV information-Specific circuit information shoul'd be obtained from approved elementaries and/or control schematics.

a 0 Open Torque Switch (to)

b. Open Torque Switch Bypass Limit Switch (bc)

C. Open Limit Switch (bo)

d. Open Indication Limit Switch (ac)

e. Close Torque Switch (tc)

f. Close Torque Switch Bypass Limit Switch (ao)

Close Indication Limit Switch (bo)

Design Criteria Revision Page 7 EWR 4539 11 3 87

The open torque switch (to) is set to actuate at a maximum thrust value of approximately 90% of the operator rating, or 90% of the total thrust available if a limiter plate is used. The minimum thrust value shall be 1.25 (running load + opening thrust required to overcome system differential pressure after the open torque switch bypass limit switch (bc) opens).. However, values less than 1.25 may be required to ensure the operator design is not exceeded, in which case engineering direction will be required to accept the lower value.

A "MOVATS" signature analysis will be performed to verify these values and to verify that the operator design is not exceeded. The maximum operator design shall be the- thrust rating for non-rotating stems and the torque rating for rotating stems.

The opening thrust required to overcome system differential pressure will be determined using the differential pressure values contained in Ref. 2.16 and applying them to formulae developed by MOVATS. The relationships developed by MOVATS apply only to valve sizes contained in their database. A valve will be considered to be included in their database if one of the two following conditions are satisfied.

1) Four (4) sets of pressure data exist for the same type and size of valve.

2) Twenty (20) sets of pressure data exist for the same type but various size of valve.

In the event the "MOVATS" database is not used, full or partial differential pressure testing will be required.

A "MOVATS" Signature Analysis will be performed to verify that the Torque Switch is set to. provide the required thrust.

The open torque switch bypass limit switch (bc) will be set to bypass torque switch actuation during the initial high loading conditions due to valve unseating plus the opening thrust required to overcome system differential pressure. The resulting setting should be less than 10% of total valve travel. However, settings greater than 10% may be required to overcome full differential pressure, in which case engineering-direction will be required to accept the higher setting.

The open limit switch (bo) sh'all be set at approximately 90% of stroke from the close-to-open position. To insure that backseating does not occur, the valve will be electrically opened and allowed to come to a complete stop. An attempt will then be made to manually operate Design Criteria Revision 2 Page 8 EWR 4539 Date 12 29 87

the valve in the open direction. If any valve travel can be determined, the setting is acceptable.

if However, travel cannot be detected, the valve will be assumed to be on its backseat and the open limit switch setting will be lowered in small increments, typically 1%,

it until can be assured that backseating does not occur.

Open Indication Iimit Switch (ac) on Two Rotor Systems:

The open torque switch bypass limit switch (bc), as described in 17.1.3, also determines the open indication limit switch (ac) setting. These switches are located on the same rotor and cannot be set independently. The effect the open torque switch bypass switch has on the open indication limit switch will be evaluated by Engineering to assess the accuracy of indication and its applicability to INPO SOER 86-2, Ref. 2.12.

Open Indication Iimit Switch (ac) on Four Rotor Systems:

The open indication limit switch (ac) will be set as close as practical to the point at which the valve is open. This value will be verified by performing a "MOVATS" signature analysis.

The close torque switch (tc) is set to actuate at a maximum thrust value of approximately 90% of the operator rating, or 90% of the total thrust available if limiter plate is used. The minimum thrust value shall a

be 1.25 (running load + closing thrust required to overcome system differential pressure). However, values less than 1.25 may be required to ensure the operator design is not exceeded, in which case the engineering direction will be required to accept the lower value. A "MOVATS" signature analysis will be performed to verify these values and to verify that the operator design is not exceeded. The maximum operator design shall be the thrust rating for non-rotating stems and the torque rating for rotating stems.

The closing thrust required to overcome system differential pressure wi2.1 be determined by using the differential pressure values contained in Ref. 2.16 and applying them to formulae developed by MOVATS. The relationships developed by MOVATS apply only to valve sizes contained in their database. A valve will be considered to be included in their database conditions are satisfied.

if one of the two following

1) Four (4) sets of pressure data exist, for the same type and size of valve.

Design Criteria Revision Page 9 EWR 4539

2) Twenty (20) sets of pressure data exist for the same type but. various size of valve.

In the event the "MOVATS" database is not used, full or partial differential pressure testing will be required.

A "MOVATS" signature analysis will be performed to verify that the torque switch is set to provide the required thrust.

17.1.8 The close torque switch bypass limit switch-(ao) does not require a specific setting criteria because the valves do not torque out in the open direction, and are not allowed to backseat.

17.1.9 Close Indication Limit Switch (bo) on Two Rotor Systems:

The open limit switch (bo) setting, *as described in 17.1.4, also determines the close indication limit switch (bo) setting. These switches are located on the same rotor and cannot be set independently. The effect the open limit switch has on the operation of the close indication limit switch will be evaluated by Engineering to assess the accuracy of indication and its applicability to INPO SOER 86-2, Ref. 2.12.

17.1.10 Close Indication Limit Switch (bo) on Four Rotor Systems:

The close indication limit switch (bo) will be set as close as practical to the point at which the valve is closed. This value will be verified by performing a "MOVATS" signature analysis.

17.2 The Insitu test program will demonstrate that the valves will function properly under the maximum system differential pressures expected on the valves during .

both normal and abnormal events within the design basis as identified in Ref. 2.16.

17.3 A test method developed by MOVATs will be used for subsequent testing which verifies valve operability once the MOVATs signature analysis has been performed.

This method monitors the load characteristic of the MOV as the valve is operated. '

threshhold value is then determined for each MOV. As long as the resultant value is below the "Threshold Value", the valve can be shown to have sufficient thrust needed to operate the valve under design base events.

The motor load threshold value can be determined'y thrust signature analysis. The threshold value is the thrust developed by the operator at control switch trip less the system differential pressure thrust requirements'evision Design Criteria 2 Page 10 EWR 453 9

The threshold valve represents the excess thrust capability of the operator above the running load thrust.

17.3.2 Motor load values recorded during routine tests will be compared to the established threshold value. As long as the motor running load is less than the threshold, value, the operator is capable of delivering sufficient thrust to satisfy valve operator thrust, requirements.

If the motor running load increases to the threshold value, the valve will be declared inoperable until repair and testing verifies operability.

17.4 New cable or splices shall be qualified per IEEE 383-1974.

17.5 The minimum voltage rating of all new control cable shall be 600 .volts.

18.0 0 erational Re irements 18.1 No additional requirements for normal plant operations will be imposed due to this testing program.

19.0 Instrumentation and Control Re uirements 19.1 Not Applicable.

20.0 Access and Administrative Control Re irements 20.1 The existing controlled drawings shall be upgraded to reflect any new setpoints that are derived from this testing program.

20.2 A file of MOVATS signature analysis will be maintained at Ginna Station with a duplicate file maintained at Engineering.

21.0 Redundanc , Diversit , and Se aration Re uirements 21.1 Not Applicable.

22.0 Failure Effects Re irements 22.1 Spurious torque or limit switch operation detecteg during-operation, subsequent to the completion of the insitu testing for a particular MOV, will require retesting before permanent switch changes can be made.

Short term switch changes may be made to maintain the operability of. the system provided that 'the deviation is documented, tracked and evaluated by engineering.

22.2 Operator or valve failures caused by 0he test program will be corrected and/or resoved prior to the MOV being declared operable.

Design Criteria Revision 2 Page 11 4539 Date 12 29 87

23.0 Test Re uirements 23.1 Test procedures will be developed as part of this EWR to establish and monitor MOV performance data, limit switch settings, and torque switch settings.

23.2 MOV's with AC Motors Each MOV will be tested as a minimum once per year using motor load monitoring and once every four years using the full MOVATS signature analysis. These tests and frequencies will be evaluated and revised as necessary as test data is obtained and analyzed.

23.3 MOV's with DC Motors Each MOV will be tested as a minimum once per year using the full MOVATS signature analysis. These tests and frequencies will be evaluated and revised as necessary as test data is obtained and analyzed.

23.4 Appropriate testing will be performed following MOV maintenance or repairs which could impact performance.

These tests and frequencies will be evaluated and revised as necessary as test data is obtained and analyzed.

24.0 Accessibilit , Maintenance, Re air and Inservice Ins ection Re irements 24.1 Not Applicable.

25.0 Personnel Re irements 25.1 Personnel performing testing shall be qualified in accordance with ANSI N45.2.6 and trained in the use MOVAT's test equipment and procedures.

26.0 Trans ortabilit Re irements 26.1 Not Applicable.

27.0 Fire Protection Re irements 27.1 Not Applicable.

28.0 Handlin Re uirements 28.1 Not Applicable.

29.0 Public Safet Re uirements 29.1 Not Applicable.

Design Criteria Revision Page 12 4539

30.0 A licabilit 30.1 Not Applicable.

31.0 Personnel Safet Re uirements 31.1 Appropriate principles of ALARA will be applied to minimize personal exposures.

32.0. Environmental uglification Re irements 32.1 Modifications to IE valve operators as a result of this program will be subject to the environmental qualifica-tion requirements of IEEE-323. Appendix E to the Ginna QA manual shall apply to modifications to valve operators listed in Table 1 of Appendix E.

33.0 Uni e Re uirements 33.1 As found stem thrust, motor load characteristics (AC Motors), and switch setting will be documented. As left stem thrust, motor load characteristics (AC Motors),

and switch settings will be documented and controlled.

Design Criteria Revision 2 Page 13 4539 Date 12 29 87

S Nm.NP to 83Ag Bg Cg D o SI pap mcticn fam bxm acid tanks 17 p3&

o 2 ~mallei paths, 2 ml~ pec ~th o 1 vie pec path is nxrrally cpen if rot cpen 9.2 psxd o all mlvee cpen cn SI o all elves clos Q~ bxic acid tanks teach l(R o 2 ~rallel istic, 1 mlve per Iath o nxnaQy clceed; cpen'autxnatiadly if 8'b rot cpen in 5 search BABIh to fMP ~

o %ives cpaed fee SI ~tdxme fran beeches ER.

level in either'81

PtMRMEB to ClcxR l~,B o %Q~ axe aurally gal< U Cay will autcnathaliy cpm cn ahyal.

~ SX AU peal 871Ag B o Mmes really cpen; if A pap fails to start> 8719 will clcee; if B pep fhils to etaxt< 871A will cine.

ATTACHMENT 1 TABLE 1 NOTES

1. The maximum opening~ P xs due to elevation head from the BAST on one s 1 de and e 1 eva t >on head of the RWST on the other side ~

Since a check valve maintains RHST pressure on the SI pxpxng<

the max>mum~ P across the closed valve occurs with maximum RMST level and minimum BAST level.

2. The valve automatically closes when the BAST level reaches 10'. The g P is calculated assuming negligible pump suction pressure (0 ps xg ) and the BAST a t 10% level.

3. The valves are conf zgured in two parallel paths with two secures valves per path. Assuming inadvertent operation is a single failure I z.e. < only one valve is assumed to be inadvertently operatedI the worst case4P is bounded by the Note 1 scenario.

4. The maximum opening D P occurs when negligible pump suet>on pressure exists on the downstream sade and maximum level xn the RHST.

5. Sxnce the valves are configured in parallel paths< each controlled by separate switches on the control board, only one inadvertent operation is assumed to occur (similar to the single failure criteria). Therefore, the maximum abnormal', P across an inadvertently closed valve xs theD P developed across the parallel valve under full flow. Thxs pressure is I

bounded by the Note 4 scenario.

6. The maximum opening 6 P is due to elevation'ead or. the RNST at maximum level pressurizing through a check'alve and negligiole C SI pump suction pressure.

~ '4 ATTACHtFMT 1

7. The maximum pressure for closing would occur during high head recircula tion when the 1815s are used to isolate the normal high head recirculation path and the C SI pump is .operating at man>mum flow.

8. Two cases were evaluated. Case li the valve was inadvertently closed awhile supplying water from the RWST.

Case 2< the valve was inadvertently closed while supplying water from RHR pumps. Bounding A P resulted from Case 2. The valve must close or open against RHR pump shutof f head.

9. Two cases were evaluated. Case 1, valve is'equl,red to c1ose during small LOCA because SI pump fails to start. Case 2, valve is required to close during large LOCA because SI pump fails to start. In both cases check valves prevent the 871s I

from seeing the operating pump's pressure. Since the pipe downstream of the valve is pressurizing as the valve is closing the 8 P across the valve is negligible.

10. Two cases were evaluated Case 1, valve opening 8, P af ter the valve was inadvertently closed. Case 2< valve closing 6 P to isola te the C SI pump.

Case 1 assumed the valve was inadvertently closed with the A or B SI pump not operating< the pxpxng downstream of 871 was depressurxzed> and the C SI pump was operating at shutof'f head with max>mum RWST level. The Sounding 4 P across the valve to open is the pump shutof f head plus RWST elevation head.

Case 2 assumed the valve must be closed while the C SI pump is running with maximum RWST level.

TPKE 2 AUXILMcYFHIMQM Axx. StdcLC Btlcl rue to Clcee o A:arally chxed cpn to to KAEH pep

~ly &l o roundly clawed cpen to

& to NNRJ pnp

~y TLV84 pjrp defer~

o anally cpen Qxnal Cl ate 3

'1MFW o rnmdly

'A 81CpQ

~

stem inlet autcnatically chere

Au.DP ta 359%i 3RXA (cxntimed) o valve initially <pcs full cpen 1450 psid USA ClCBBS bO AMA'tilbl28) QJll 1475 gaud 1475 pard iKKAI 4XXB

~

o vslvs aurally clued, cperad ta CXGBS CXXXRCC 1475 ~

l475 peud 1475 pad 1475 pm'

ATTACHMENT 1 TABLF. 2 NOTES Normal opening assumes service water design pressure on upstream side and empty condensate tank and lines on downstream side. Normal closing assumes closing against service wa ter design pressure.

2. If the valve is inadvertently opened, the closing AP is bounded by Note l.

3. Since check valve prevents reverse pressure > the maximum closing pressure approaches TDAFH pump discharge pressure at l00 gpm bypass flow with negligible SG pressure and design service water pressure at the pump suction.

4. Normal opening and closing assumes SG at HZP condition and the turbine at atmospheric oressure.

5. Assumes the valve is inadvertently closed or opened with SG pressure at the first safety setpoint with 3% accumulation and the turbine at atmospheric pressure.

6. Assumes the valve is inadvertently closed or opened with MDAFH pump discharge pressure at bypass head with negligible SG pressure and design service water pressure at the pump suction.

7. Maximum normal opening b P occurs when downstream pump fails to start, check valve prevents downstream piping from seeing SG pressure> operating pump near shutof f head with design service water pressure at operating pump suction.

8. Maximum normal closing h P occurs under the same condi tions as Note 7 except the SG is assumed to have negligible pressure.

TAKE 3 pod'u(.4 SI'%4M KKILIPRY FEEBNIH<

Rm. Static aa9 lhlve I Dxeri~cn P to 4515, 4616 Sl 23" I achr valve ~tee SAF systan o nxrral ly ~ valve clceer3 aUtcrIGtirxrlly cn SI. afd Lct39 of t303s 75 p;id 75 pseud 75

~

ps'4 to SAFW o nxn81Iy arly

~~

cperad mcticn ru aotcrrouc acticn>

S4 m ~lied to Ei any in.u9rectent calve cIxxaucn is baxxhd Q th~ above mse

&BI pap cKafmrp Axial wtaucn o rurally cpen< as ficrw inxemee uolte Notte 2 le. Iaxd tlxottles flow to ZO cpn

%NA, B SMl0 chs9arp.. imlaticn 144l ~d o ~~

o rxmally cpen CG flaw is via the rxcesccnnect di~ to cn.

Nm. Stauc ad Nu.& P to mi 9XHAi B 884 acexxmect o rmrally dceed bcuxhd ty above ms

~ RXa 4

1' AT ACHN ilT 1 TABlE 3 NOTES

1. Naximum opening or closing pressure is S'vf design pressure.

2. Naximum pressure occurs with pump at shutoff head> negligible SG pressure and suction pressure at design SH pressure.

3. Naximum normal opening> P occurs when pump fails to startl check. valve prevents downstream piping from seeing SG pressure> SG with operating pump at HZP pressure and 50 psi flow losses.

4. Naximum closing pressure occurs with one SG being fed while operating at safety valve pressure plus 3% accumulation> 50 psi flow losses and a break occurs in the loop of the inoperable pump.

IJ

~ 0 I

t I

4 ~ %

~

p I i