ML17251A166

Rev 2 to Design Criteria Ginna Station Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valve Program.

ML17251A166
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/29/1987
From:	DAVIS R T, SMITH J H ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML17251A167	List: ML17251A166 ML17309A405
References
EWR-4539, NUDOCS 8807130072
Download: ML17251A166 (35)

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wDesignCriteriaGinnaStationSafetyRelatedMotorOperatedValveProgramRochesterGasandElectricCorporation89EastAvenueRochester,NewYork14649EWR4539Revision2December29,1987Preparedby:ElectricalEngineeringLeadEngineel-8-88DATEReviewedby:~~yuaz,yssuranceDATEApprovedby:Manage,ElectricaEngineeringDATE8807g300728~000Pc}4880708pgpADOC~pt4u8DCSHPagei4292 RevisionStatusSheetLatestRev.PageLatestRev.PageLatestRev.0007101213DesignCriteriaWR4539PageiiRevision212/29/87Date4291 1.0.1.1.1SummarDescritionSummaryMotoroperatedvalves(MOVS)arepresentlyusedinbothClass1EandnonClass1EapplicationsatGinnaStation.Theoperatorsize,andprotectivefeatureswereoriginallyselectedbythemanufacturer,Limitorque,andarebasedondesigninformationsuppliedbythedesignengineerinconjunctionwithinformationsuppliedbythevalvemanufacturer.Onceavalveandoperatoraresizedforaspecificapplication,Iimitorquethenselectedatorqueswitchsettingwhichinsuredproperoperabilityunderaccidentdesignconditionsandalsoaffordedequipmentprotectionagainstoverseating.Limitorquemaintainsahistoricalfileonsuchdesigndata.SpecifictorqueswitchsettingswereobtainedforeachMOVandtheinformationdocumentedoncontrolconfigurationdrawingsseries03021.TheprimarypurposeofthiscriteriaistoestablishtherequirementsnecessarytoensurepropertorqueswitchsettingsconsistentwiththeguidelinesestablishedinIENotice85-03,(reference2.7).TheexistingtorqueswitchsettingswillbereviewedandcomparedtosettingsobtainedfromaninsitutestingprogramdevelopedbyMOVATSInc.TheMOVATSprogramusesasignatureanalysistechnique,whichhasbeenproveneffectiveindiagnosingtheoverallperformanceofmotoroperatedvalves.ThebasisfortheseswitchsettingsareoutlinedinSections17.1.2and17.1.7.1.1.2TheprimarysourceofmostMOVfailurescanbeattributedtotheimpropersettingofthelimitswitches.Theseswitches,unlikethetorqueswitches,arenot,setbythemanufacturer.Therequirementsforsettingthelimitswitchesisthe,responsibilityofthedesignengineerandmustbecontrolledalongwiththetorqueswitchsettings.TheoriginallimitswitchsettingshavebeenestablishedgenericallyforallMOVSbytheArchitecht/Engineer(A/E)tobeapproximately10%ofvalvetravel.Thesesettingsareassumedtoexist,onallMOVS.However,fieldinvestigationindicatesthattheactualsettingsareinmostcases,muchlower.Therefore,abasesmustbeestablishedtosetthelimitswitchesthatwillinsureoperabilityduringpostulatedeventsconsistentwithIEBulletin85-03.TheMOVATSprogramaddressesthesesettings,andthecriteriaforresettingeachlimitswitchwillbeestablishedduringtheinsitutesting.ThebasisfortheseswitchsettingsareoutlinedinSections17.1.3,17.1.4,17.1.5,17.1.6,17.1.8,17.1.9,and17.1.10.DesignCriteria4539Page1Revision1 Inaddition,someoftheproposedworkmayconsistofactualmodifications.Onesuchmodificationthatisproposedwillconsistofinstallingnewrotorsonselectedvalveoperatorswhichwillallowseparationoftheswitchesusedforcontrolandindication.Theadditionalrotorsshallbeusedforindicationandwillbesetindependentlyofthecontrolrotors.Theserotorswillmonitoractualvalveposition.Whenlimitswitchesareusedforindicationonatworotorvalveoperator,thefullyclosedindica-tionisreceivedwheninfactthevalveisnot,fullyseated.ThisconditionhasbeenidentifiedbyINPOonSOER-B6-2,(reference2.12).IntheperformanceofinsituMOVtesting,theconsequencesoferroneousvalvepositionindicationwillbeevaluated.Newrotorswillbeaddediftheindicatinglimitswitchescannot,besettoprecludeerroneousindicationsasoutlinedinSOER-86-2.Thedesignrequirementsfortheadditionofnewrotorswillbeaddressedherein,howevertheactualmodificationwillbeperformedatalaterdateunderEWR4539.Anothermodificationthatisproposedwillconsistofrewiringthecircuitryofselectedvalveoperatorswhichwillpreventrepeatedclosureofthevalvewhenthetorqueswitchresetsduetowormgearrelaxation.Atorqueswitcheallowsthevalvetocloseuntilapredeterminedforceisappliedtotheseat.Onnon-lockinggearratiosthewormgearmayrelaxtothepointwherethetorqueswitchresets,initiatinghammerblow.ThisconditionhasbeenidentifiedbyUSNRConIEInformationNotice85-20(Reference2.4)andreferences2.5and2.6.Intheperformanceofinsitutesting,theconsequencesofhammeringeffectswillbeevaluatedandthecircuitrychangedifrequired.Thedesignrequirementsforthemodificationtothecircuitrywillbeaddressedherein,howevertheactualmodificationwillbeperformedatalaterdateunderEWR4539.SubsequentmonitoringofMOV'swithACmotors.SubsequentmonitoringofACMOVperformanceshallbebasedonDatacollectedusingmotorloadmonitoringtechniques.Motorloadmonitoring,deve1opedforthe"MOVATS"program,consistsofmeasuringlinecurrentsandlinevoltages.AthresholdvaluewillbeestablishedbasedupondatacollectedduringtestingwhichwillbeusedasareferencetodocumentproperMOVoperationonaperiodicbasis.ThesevalueswillbecontrolledthroughtheuseofControlledConfigurationDrawings-DesignCriteriaEWR4539Page2.Revision1

1.1.5SubsequentMonitoringofMOV'swithDCMotors1.1.5.1SubsequentmonitoringofDCMOVperformanceshallbebasedonperformingthe"Movats"InsituTest.Thistest,shallbeperformedperiodicallytomonitorperformanceoftheMOV.1.2Functions1.2.1ThefunctionoftheinsitutestingprogramistoestablishtorqueandlimitswitchsettingsthatwillinsuresystemoperabilityundertherequireddesignbaseseventsasrequiredbyIEB-85-03(ref.2.7).1.3PerformanceRequirements1.3.1ThetestingshallnotadverselyaffecttheexistingMOVconfigurationandsystemoperability.1.4Control1.4'.1Thistestingprogram,orsubsequentmodificationsifrequired,willnotchangeormodifyanyofthecontrolfeaturesofthemotoroperatedvalves.1.5ModesofOperation1.5.1Thesafetyrelatedmotoroperatedvalvesshallbecapableofoperationduringallnormalplantoperatingandallpostaccidentconditions.2.0ReferencedDocuments2.1GinnaStationUpdatedFinalFacilityDescriptionandSafetyAnalysisReport,Rev.1,datedDecember,1985.2.2USNRCIEInformationNotice84-10,"Motor-OperatedValveTorqueSwitchesSetBelowtheManufacturer'sRecommendedValue",datedFebruary21,1984.2.3Letter,G.S.LinktoB.A.SnowdatedJuly24,1984.2.4USNRCIEInformationNotice85-20,"MOVFailuresDuetoHammeringEffects",datedMarch12,1985.2.52.6Letter,G.S.LinktoC.EdgardatedAugust16,1985.Letter,C.EdgartoG.S.LinkdatedAugust23,1985.2.7DesignCriteriaPage3EWR4539USNRCIEBulletin85-03,"Motor-OperatedValveCommonModeFailuresDuringPlantTransients-DuetoImproperSwitchSettings",datedNovember15,1985.'Revision1 2.8CorrectiveActionReport51679,datedNovember26,1985,ReferenceDocumentIEB85-03.2.92.102.112.122.132.142.152.16USNRCIEInformationNotice86-29,"EffectsofChangingValveMotor-OperatorSwitchSettings",datedApril25,1986.Letter,G.S.LinktoS.SpectordatedJune16,1986.Letter,G.S.LinktoG.W.DanielsdatedJuly18,1986.INPOSignificantOperatingExperienceReport(SOER)86-2,"InaccurateClosedPositionIndicationonMotor-OperatedValves",datedJuly29,1986.Ietter,G.W.DanielstoR.E.SmithdatedAugustll,1986."GenericProcedureforBaselineTestingofLimitorqueMotorOperatedValvesUsingtheMovats2100or2150System",Rev.1,datedApril31,1987.SEPTopicIII-10A.DesignAnalysis,"MotorOperatedValves,IEBulletin85-03",EWR4348,datedApril30,1986,TheresultsofwhicharecontainedinAttachment1.3.0SeismicCateor3.1AnymodificationstothevalveoperatorsasaresultoftheprogramoutlinedbelowwillbeSeismicCategoryI.4.0ualitGrouCodeClassFluidSstemsOnl4.15.0NotApplicable.ElectricalSstemSafetClassification5.1AnymodificationstoIEvalveoperatorsorcircuitryasaresultofthetestingprogramoutlinedbelowwillbeSeismicCategoryIClassIE.6.06.1AProramAlicabilitCTheQAprogramrequirementsoftheGinnaQAmanualwillapplytoanalysis,testing,modification,andsetpointmaintenanceactivitiesperformedonthevalveoperators.7.0Codes,Standards,andRelatorGuides7.1Thefollowingcodes,.standards,andregulatoryguideswillbeusedasguidelinesinthedesignofanymodifica-tionsrequired.DesignCriteria4539Page4Revision1 7.27.2.17.2.1.17.2.1.27.2.1.3.7.2.1.47.3NuclearRegulatoiyCommission(NRC)RegulatoryGuidesRegulatoryGuide1.29-SeismicDesignClassification.RegulatoryGuide1.75-PhysicalIndependenceofElectricSystems(Rev.1-1/75).RegulatoryGuide1.89-QualificationofClassIEEquipmentforNuclearPowerPlants.RegulatoryGuide1.39-HousekeepingRequirementsforWater-CooledNuclearPowerPlants(Rev.2-9/77).InstituteofElectricalandElectronicEngineers(IEEE)7.3.17.3.27;3.3IEEE-308(1974)IEEE-323(1983)IEEE-344(1975)StandardCriteriaforClassIEPowerSystemsforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations.StandardforQualifyingClass1EEquipmentforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations..RecommendedPracticesforSeismicQualificationofClassIEEquipmentforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations.7.3.47.3.5IEEE-383(1974)IEEE-384(1981)GuideforTypeTestofClassIEElectricCables,FieldSplices,andConnectionsforNuclearPowerGeneratingStations.StandardCriteriaforSeparationIndependenceofClassIEEquipmentandCircuits.7.47.4.18.08.19.09.1AmericanNationalStandardInstitute(ANSI)ANSI-N45.2.2(1978)Packaging,Shipping,Receiving,Storage,andHandlingofItemsforNuclearPowerPlants.DesiConditionsNotApplicableLoadConditionsNotApplicable.Design-CriteriaEWR4539Page5Revision1Date11387 10.0EnvironmentalConditionsNormalAccident10.110.210.3AuxiliaryBuildingAmbientTemperature('F)AmbientPressure(psig)RelativeHumidity(%)Radioactivity(rads)Flooding(in)IntermediateBuildingAmbientTemperature('F)AmbientPressure(psig)RelativeHumidity(%)Radioactivity(rads)Flooding(ft)AuxiliaryBuildingAnnexAmbientTemperature('F)AmbientPressure(psig)RelativeHumidity(%)Radioactivity(rads)Flooding(ft)50-104060<100mr/hr50-104060<1mr/hr60-120060Negligible50-1040602.8x10RadTotal8215.25100Negligible060=120.060Negligible11.011.112.012.113.013.114.014.1InterfaceReuirementsThetorqueswitchsettingsareintendedtoallowtheMOVtooperateduringabnormalconditions.-ThecurrenttooperatetheMOVatthesesettingsmustbecoordinatedwiththethermaloverloadsystemthathasbeendevelopedunderEWR3319consistentwithSEPTopicIII-10.A.MaterialReirementsNotApplicable.MechanicalReuirementsNotApplicable.StructuralReirementsNotApplicable.DesignCriteria4539Page6Revision1 15.015.1HdraulicReirementsAttachment1providesalistofthevalvestobeincludedinthisprogramanddesigninformationfortheoperationofeachvalve.Theinformationconsistsof:a.ValveNumber.b.Briefdescriptionofvalvefunction.c.Conditionsanalyzed.d.Maximumdifferentialpressuresforopeningandclosingasdeterminedbyafluidsystemsevaluation.(Ref.2.16)15.2ThemaximumanticipatedsystemdifferentialpressuresareidentifiedinReference2.16andwillbethelowestvaluesused:intheInsituTestingProgramtosetthetorqueandlimitswitches.16.016.117.017.1ChemistrReuirementsNotApplicable.ElectricalReirementsThetechnicalbasisforestablishingsetpointsforthetorqueandlimitswitcheshasbeendevelopedbyMOVATS.MOVATSutilizedtestresults.frommanyplantstoestablishandjustifyseveralalternatepoliciesfortorqueandlimitswitchsetpointadjustments.17.1.1ListedbelowaretheswitchesforwhichithasbeendeterminedthatsetpointpoliciesarerequiredinresponsetoIEBulletin85-03.Attachment2isatypicalMOVschematicandisintendedtoshowtherelativepositionsofthetorque,andlimitswitches'hisschematicisagenericrepresentationonlyandshouldnot,beusedasasourceforspecificMOVinformation-Specificcircuitinformationshoul'dbeobtainedfromapprovedelementariesand/orcontrolschematics.a0b.C.d.e.f.OpenTorqueSwitch(to)OpenTorqueSwitchBypassLimitSwitch(bc)OpenLimitSwitch(bo)OpenIndicationLimitSwitch(ac)CloseTorqueSwitch(tc)CloseTorqueSwitchBypassLimitSwitch(ao)CloseIndicationLimitSwitch(bo)DesignCriteriaEWR4539Page7Revision11387

Theopentorqueswitch(to)issettoactuateatamaximumthrustvalueofapproximately90%oftheoperatorrating,or90%ofthetotalthrustavailableifalimiterplateisused.Theminimumthrustvalueshallbe1.25(runningload+openingthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferentialpressureaftertheopentorqueswitchbypasslimitswitch(bc)opens)..However,valueslessthan1.25mayberequiredtoensuretheoperatordesignisnotexceeded,inwhichcaseengineeringdirectionwillberequiredtoacceptthelowervalue.A"MOVATS"signatureanalysiswillbeperformedtoverifythesevaluesandtoverifythattheoperatordesignisnotexceeded.Themaximumoperatordesignshallbethe-thrustratingfornon-rotatingstemsandthetorqueratingforrotatingstems.TheopeningthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferentialpressurewillbedeterminedusingthedifferentialpressurevaluescontainedinRef.2.16andapplyingthemtoformulaedevelopedbyMOVATS.TherelationshipsdevelopedbyMOVATSapplyonlytovalvesizescontainedintheirdatabase.Avalvewillbeconsideredtobeincludedintheirdatabaseifoneofthetwofollowingconditionsaresatisfied.1)Four(4)setsofpressuredataexistforthesametypeandsizeofvalve.2)Twenty(20)setsofpressuredataexistforthesametypebutvarioussizeofvalve.Intheeventthe"MOVATS"databaseisnotused,fullorpartialdifferentialpressuretestingwillberequired.A"MOVATS"SignatureAnalysiswillbeperformedtoverifythattheTorqueSwitchissetto.providetherequiredthrust.Theopentorqueswitchbypasslimitswitch(bc)willbesettobypasstorqueswitchactuationduringtheinitialhighloadingconditionsduetovalveunseatingplustheopeningthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferentialpressure.Theresultingsettingshouldbelessthan10%oftotalvalvetravel.However,settingsgreaterthan10%mayberequiredtoovercomefulldifferentialpressure,inwhichcaseengineering-directionwillberequiredtoacceptthehighersetting.Theopenlimitswitch(bo)sh'allbesetatapproximately90%ofstrokefromtheclose-to-openposition.Toinsurethatbackseatingdoesnotoccur,thevalvewillbeelectricallyopenedandallowedtocometoacompletestop.AnattemptwillthenbemadetomanuallyoperateDesignCriteriaEWR4539Page8Revision2Date122987

thevalveintheopendirection.Ifanyvalvetravelcanbedetermined,thesettingisacceptable.However,iftravelcannotbedetected,thevalvewillbeassumedtobeonitsbackseatandtheopenlimitswitchsettingwillbeloweredinsmallincrements,typically1%,untilitcanbeassuredthatbackseatingdoesnotoccur.OpenIndicationIimitSwitch(ac)onTwoRotorSystems:Theopentorqueswitchbypasslimitswitch(bc),asdescribedin17.1.3,alsodeterminestheopenindicationlimitswitch(ac)setting.Theseswitchesarelocatedonthesamerotorandcannotbesetindependently.TheeffecttheopentorqueswitchbypassswitchhasontheopenindicationlimitswitchwillbeevaluatedbyEngineeringtoassesstheaccuracyofindicationanditsapplicabilitytoINPOSOER86-2,Ref.2.12.OpenIndicationIimitSwitch(ac)onFourRotorSystems:Theopenindicationlimitswitch(ac)willbesetascloseaspracticaltothepointatwhichthevalveisopen.Thisvaluewillbeverifiedbyperforminga"MOVATS"signatureanalysis.Theclosetorqueswitch(tc)issettoactuateatamaximumthrustvalueofapproximately90%oftheoperatorrating,or90%ofthetotalthrustavailableifalimiterplateisused.Theminimumthrustvalueshallbe1.25(runningload+closingthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferentialpressure).However,valueslessthan1.25mayberequiredtoensuretheoperatordesignisnotexceeded,inwhichcasetheengineeringdirectionwillberequiredtoacceptthelowervalue.A"MOVATS"signatureanalysiswillbeperformedtoverifythesevaluesandtoverifythattheoperatordesignisnotexceeded.Themaximumoperatordesignshallbethethrustratingfornon-rotatingstemsandthetorqueratingforrotatingstems.Theclosingthrustrequiredtoovercomesystemdifferentialpressurewi2.1bedeterminedbyusingthedifferentialpressurevaluescontainedinRef.2.16andapplyingthemtoformulaedevelopedbyMOVATS.TherelationshipsdevelopedbyMOVATSapplyonlytovalvesizescontainedintheirdatabase.Avalvewillbeconsideredtobeincludedintheirdatabaseifoneofthetwofollowingconditionsaresatisfied.1)Four(4)setsofpressuredataexist,forthesametypeandsizeofvalve.DesignCriteriaEWR4539Page9Revision

2)Twenty(20)setsofpressuredataexistforthesametypebut.varioussizeofvalve.Intheeventthe"MOVATS"databaseisnotused,fullorpartialdifferentialpressuretestingwillberequired.A"MOVATS"signatureanalysiswillbeperformedtoverifythatthetorqueswitchissettoprovidetherequiredthrust.17.1.8Theclosetorqueswitchbypasslimitswitch-(ao)doesnotrequireaspecificsettingcriteriabecausethevalvesdonottorqueoutintheopendirection,andarenotallowedtobackseat.17.1.9CloseIndicationLimitSwitch(bo)onTwoRotorSystems:Theopenlimitswitch(bo)setting,*asdescribedin17.1.4,alsodeterminesthecloseindicationlimitswitch(bo)setting.Theseswitchesarelocatedonthesamerotorandcannotbesetindependently.TheeffecttheopenlimitswitchhasontheoperationofthecloseindicationlimitswitchwillbeevaluatedbyEngineeringtoassesstheaccuracyofindicationanditsapplicabilitytoINPOSOER86-2,Ref.2.12.17.1.10CloseIndicationLimitSwitch(bo)onFourRotorSystems:Thecloseindicationlimitswitch(bo)willbesetascloseaspracticaltothepointatwhichthevalveisclosed.Thisvaluewillbeverifiedbyperforminga"MOVATS"signatureanalysis.17.2TheInsitutestprogramwilldemonstratethatthevalveswillfunctionproperlyunderthemaximumsystemdifferentialpressuresexpectedonthevalvesduring.bothnormalandabnormaleventswithinthedesignbasisasidentifiedinRef.2.16.17.3AtestmethoddevelopedbyMOVATswillbeusedforsubsequenttestingwhichverifiesvalveoperabilityoncetheMOVATssignatureanalysishasbeenperformed.ThismethodmonitorstheloadcharacteristicoftheMOVasthevalveisoperated.'threshholdvalueisthendeterminedforeachMOV.Aslongastheresultantvalueisbelowthe"ThresholdValue",thevalvecanbeshowntohavesufficientthrustneededtooperatethevalveunderdesignbaseevents.DesignCriteriaPage10EWR4539Themotorloadthresholdvaluecanbedetermined'ythrustsignatureanalysis.Thethresholdvalueisthethrustdevelopedbytheoperatoratcontrolswitchtriplessthesystemdifferentialpressurethrustrequirements'evision2 17.3.2Thethresholdvalverepresentstheexcessthrustcapabilityoftheoperatorabovetherunningloadthrust.Motorloadvaluesrecordedduringroutinetestswillbecomparedtotheestablishedthresholdvalue.Aslongasthemotorrunningloadislessthanthethreshold,value,theoperatoriscapableofdeliveringsufficientthrusttosatisfyvalveoperatorthrust,requirements.Ifthemotorrunningloadincreasestothethresholdvalue,thevalvewillbedeclaredinoperableuntilrepairandtestingverifiesoperability.17.417.5NewcableorsplicesshallbequalifiedperIEEE383-1974.Theminimumvoltageratingofallnewcontrolcableshallbe600.volts.18.018.10erationalReirementsNoadditionalrequirementsfornormalplantoperationswillbeimposedduetothistestingprogram.19.019.120.020.120.221.021.122.022.1InstrumentationandControlReuirementsNotApplicable.AccessandAdministrativeControlReirementsTheexistingcontrolleddrawingsshallbeupgradedtoreflectanynewsetpointsthatarederivedfromthistestingprogram.AfileofMOVATSsignatureanalysiswillbemaintainedatGinnaStationwithaduplicatefilemaintainedatEngineering.Redundanc,Diversit,andSearationReuirementsNotApplicable.FailureEffectsReirementsSpurioustorqueorlimitswitchoperationdetectegduring-operation,subsequenttothecompletionoftheinsitutestingforaparticularMOV,willrequireretestingbeforepermanentswitchchangescanbemade.Shorttermswitchchangesmaybemadetomaintaintheoperabilityof.thesystemprovidedthat'thedeviationisdocumented,trackedandevaluatedbyengineering.22.2Operatororvalvefailurescausedby0hetestprogramwillbecorrectedand/orresovedpriortotheMOVbeingdeclaredoperable.DesignCriteria4539Page11Revision2Date122987 23.023.1TestReuirementsTestprocedureswillbedevelopedaspartofthisEWRtoestablishandmonitorMOVperformancedata,limitswitchsettings,andtorqueswitchsettings.23.2MOV'swithACMotorsEachMOVwillbetestedasaminimumonceperyearusingmotorloadmonitoringandonceeveryfouryearsusingthefullMOVATSsignatureanalysis.Thesetestsandfrequencieswillbeevaluatedandrevisedasnecessaryastestdataisobtainedandanalyzed.23.3MOV'swithDCMotorsEachMOVwillbetestedasaminimumonceperyearusingthefullMOVATSsignatureanalysis.Thesetestsandfrequencieswillbeevaluatedandrevisedasnecessaryastestdataisobtainedandanalyzed.23.424.0AppropriatetestingwillbeperformedfollowingMOVmaintenanceorrepairswhichcouldimpactperformance.Thesetestsandfrequencieswillbeevaluatedandrevisedasnecessaryastestdataisobtainedandanalyzed.Accessibilit,Maintenance,ReairandInserviceInsectionReirements24.125.025.1NotApplicable.PersonnelReirementsPersonnelperformingtestingshallbequalifiedinaccordancewithANSIN45.2.6andtrainedintheuseMOVAT'stestequipmentandprocedures.26.026.127.027.128.028.129.029.1TransortabilitReirementsNotApplicable.FireProtectionReirementsNotApplicable.HandlinReuirementsNotApplicable.PublicSafetReuirementsNotApplicable.DesignCriteria4539Page12Revision 30.030.131.031.132.0.32.1AlicabilitNotApplicable.PersonnelSafetReuirementsAppropriateprinciplesofALARAwillbeappliedtominimizepersonalexposures.EnvironmentaluglificationReirementsModificationstoIEvalveoperatorsasaresultofthisprogramwillbesubjecttotheenvironmentalqualifica-tionrequirementsofIEEE-323.AppendixEtotheGinnaQAmanualshallapplytomodificationstovalveoperatorslistedinTable1ofAppendixE.33.033.1UnieReuirementsAsfoundstemthrust,motorloadcharacteristics(ACMotors),andswitchsettingwillbedocumented.Asleftstemthrust,motorloadcharacteristics(ACMotors),andswitchsettingswillbedocumentedandcontrolled.DesignCriteria4539Page13Revision2Date122987 S

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ATTACHMENT1TABLE1NOTES1.Themaximumopening~PxsduetoelevationheadfromtheBASTonones1deande1evat>onheadoftheRWSTontheotherside~SinceacheckvalvemaintainsRHSTpressureontheSIpxpxng<themax>mum~PacrosstheclosedvalveoccurswithmaximumRMSTlevelandminimumBASTlevel.2.ThevalveautomaticallycloseswhentheBASTlevelreaches-10'.ThegPiscalculatedassumingnegligiblepumpsuctionpressure(0psxg)andtheBASTat10%level.3.Thevalvesareconfzguredintwoparallelpathswithtwosecuresvalvesperpath.AssuminginadvertentoperationisasinglefailureIz.e.<onlyonevalveisassumedtobeinadvertentlyoperatedItheworstcase4PisboundedbytheNote1scenario.4.ThemaximumopeningDPoccurswhennegligiblepumpsuet>onpressureexistsonthedownstreamsadeandmaximumlevelxntheRHST.5.Sxncethevalvesareconfiguredinparallelpaths<eachcontrolledbyseparateswitchesonthecontrolboard,onlyoneinadvertentoperationisassumedtooccur(similartothesinglefailurecriteria).Therefore,themaximumabnormal',PacrossaninadvertentlyclosedvalvexstheDPdevelopedIacrosstheparallelvalveunderfullflow.ThxspressureisboundedbytheNote4scenario.6.Themaximumopening6Pisduetoelevation'eador.theRNSTatmaximumlevelpressurizingthroughacheck'alveandnegligioleCSIpumpsuctionpressure.

~'4ATTACHtFMT17.Themaximumpressureforclosingwouldoccurduringhighheadrecirculationwhenthe1815sareusedtoisolatethenormalhighheadrecirculationpathandtheCSIpumpis.operatingatman>mumflow.8.Twocaseswereevaluated.CaselithevalvewasinadvertentlyclosedawhilesupplyingwaterfromtheRWST.Case2<thevalvewasinadvertentlyclosedwhilesupplyingwaterfromRHRpumps.BoundingAPresultedfromCase2.ThevalvemustcloseoropenagainstRHRpumpshutoffhead.9.Twocaseswereevaluated.Case1,valveis'equl,redtoc1oseduringsmallLOCAbecauseSIpumpfailstostart.Case2,valveisrequiredtocloseduringlargeLOCAbecauseSIpumpfailstostart.Inbothcasescheckvalvespreventthe871sIfromseeingtheoperatingpump'spressure.Sincethepipedownstreamofthevalveispressurizingasthevalveisclosing<the8Pacrossthevalveisnegligible.10.TwocaseswereevaluatedCase1,valveopening8,Pafterthevalvewasinadvertentlyclosed.Case2<valveclosing6PtoisolatetheCSIpump.Case1assumedthevalvewasinadvertentlyclosedwiththeAorBSIpumpnotoperating<thepxpxngdownstreamof871wasdepressurxzed>andtheCSIpumpwasoperatingatshutof'fheadwithmax>mumRWSTlevel.TheSounding4PacrossthevalvetoopenisthepumpshutoffheadplusRWSTelevationhead.Case2assumedthevalvemustbeclosedwhiletheCSIpumpisrunningwithmaximumRWSTlevel.

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ATTACHMENT1TABLF.2NOTESNormalopeningassumesservicewaterdesignpressureonupstreamsideandemptycondensatetankandlinesondownstreamside.Normalclosingassumesclosingagainstservicewaterdesignpressure.2.Ifthevalveisinadvertentlyopened,theclosingAPisboundedbyNotel.3.Sincecheckvalvepreventsreversepressure>themaximumclosingpressureapproachesTDAFHpumpdischargepressureatl00gpmbypassflowwithnegligibleSGpressureanddesignservicewaterpressureatthepumpsuction.4.NormalopeningandclosingassumesSGatHZPconditionandtheturbineatatmosphericoressure.5.AssumesthevalveisinadvertentlyclosedoropenedwithSGpressureatthefirstsafetysetpointwith3%accumulationandtheturbineatatmosphericpressure.6.AssumesthevalveisinadvertentlyclosedoropenedwithMDAFHpumpdischargepressureatbypassheadwithnegligibleSGpressureanddesignservicewaterpressureatthepumpsuction.7.MaximumnormalopeningbPoccurswhendownstreampumpfailstostart,checkvalvepreventsdownstreampipingfromseeingSGpressure>operatingpumpnearshutoffheadwithdesignservicewaterpressureatoperatingpumpsuction.8.MaximumnormalclosinghPoccursunderthesameconditionsasNote7excepttheSGisassumedtohavenegligiblepressure.

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ATACHNilT1TABlE3NOTES1.NaximumopeningorclosingpressureisS'vfdesignpressure.2.Naximumpressureoccurswithpumpatshutoffhead>negligibleSGpressureandsuctionpressureatdesignSHpressure.3.Naximumnormalopening>Poccurswhenpumpfailstostartlcheck.valvepreventsdownstreampipingfromseeingSGpressure>SGwithoperatingpumpatHZPpressureand50psiflowlosses.4.NaximumclosingpressureoccurswithoneSGbeingfedwhileoperatingatsafetyvalvepressureplus3%accumulation>50psiflowlossesandabreakoccursintheloopoftheinoperablepump.

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