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MONTHYEARML13304B4452013-10-28028 October 2013 Revised License Amendment Request for One-Time Change to Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating for Battery Replacement Project stage: Request ML13351A3432013-12-19019 December 2013 Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action License Amendment Request for One-Time Change to Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating for Battery Replacement Project stage: Acceptance Review ML14127A4622014-05-12012 May 2014 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify Specification 3.8.4 Setpoint Project stage: RAI MNS-14-045, Responses to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for One-Time Change to Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating for Battery Replacement Dated October 28, 20132014-06-0303 June 2014 Responses to Request for Additional Information Related to License Amendment Request for One-Time Change to Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating for Battery Replacement Dated October 28, 2013 Project stage: Response to RAI ML14178B2322014-07-14014 July 2014 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification 3.3.2 Setpoint Project stage: RAI ML14231A6342014-09-10010 September 2014 Issuance of Amendments Regarding Technical Specification 3.8.4, DC Sources-Operating, Project stage: Approval ML15202A6612015-07-27027 July 2015 Acceptance Review of License Amendment Request Temporary Changes to Technical Specifications for Correction of Nuclear Service Water System Degraded Condition Project stage: Acceptance Review ML15196A3862015-08-0404 August 2015 Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing and Order Imposing Procedures for Document Access To.. Project stage: Other MNS-15-062, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request (LAR) for Temporary Changes to Technical Specifications for Correction of an 'A' Train Nuclear Service Water System (Nsws) Degraded Condition2015-08-11011 August 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request (LAR) for Temporary Changes to Technical Specifications for Correction of an 'A' Train Nuclear Service Water System (Nsws) Degraded Condition Project stage: Response to RAI ML15196A6162015-08-13013 August 2015 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - License Amendment Application; Opportunity to Comment, Request a Hearing, and Petition for Leave to Intervene; Order Project stage: Other ML15243A4082015-08-28028 August 2015 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft RAI for Nsws Temp AOT Extension Project stage: Draft RAI ML15252A2762015-09-14014 September 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension Project stage: RAI MNS-15-073, Response to NRC Letter Dated August 27, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension2015-09-24024 September 2015 Response to NRC Letter Dated August 27, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension Project stage: Request MNS-15-078, Response to NRC Letter Dated September 14, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension2015-10-0808 October 2015 Response to NRC Letter Dated September 14, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension Project stage: Request ML15289A5552015-10-26026 October 2015 Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension Project stage: RAI ML15343A0122015-12-0707 December 2015 Response to NRC Letter Dated 10/26/2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension. Project stage: Request MNS-16-005, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) During January 12, 2016, NRC Teleconference Pertaining to License Amendment Request for Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension2016-02-10010 February 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) During January 12, 2016, NRC Teleconference Pertaining to License Amendment Request for Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension Project stage: Response to RAI 2015-12-07
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000369/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023004 and 05000370/2023004 ML24019A1392024-01-25025 January 2024 TSTF 505 and 50.69 Audit Summary ML24019A2002024-01-24024 January 2024 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection IR 05000369/20234022023-12-14014 December 2023 Material Control and Accounting Program Inspection Report 05000369/2023402 and 05000370/2023402 ML23317A2272023-11-17017 November 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Transmittal of Dam Inspection Report - Non-Proprietary ML23317A3462023-11-14014 November 2023 Duke Fleet - Correction Letter to License Amendment Nos. 312 & 340 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000369/20230032023-10-24024 October 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023003 and 05000370/2023003; and Inspection Report 07200038/2023001 IR 05000369/20240102023-10-13013 October 2023 Notification of McGuire Nuclear Station Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Inspection Report 05000369, 370/2024010 IR 05000369/20230102023-10-13013 October 2023 Age Related Degradation Inspection Report 05000369/2023010 and 05000370/2023010 ML23256A0882023-09-25025 September 2023 Issuance of Alternative to Steam Generator Welds IR 05000369/20233012023-09-20020 September 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station - NRC Examination Report 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML23230A0652023-08-31031 August 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Relief Request Use of Later Edition of ASME Code ML23195A0782023-08-29029 August 2023 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-554, Revision 1 IR 05000369/20230052023-08-25025 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (Report 05000369/2023005 and 05000370/2023005) IR 05000369/20230022023-07-28028 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023002 and 05000370/2023002 IR 05000369/20234202023-07-24024 July 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 050003692023420 and 050003702023420 ML23206A0092023-07-24024 July 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station Operator Licensing Written Examination Approval 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML23207A0762023-07-14014 July 2023 EN 56557 - Update to Part 21 Report Re Potential Defect with Trane External Auto/Stop Emergency Stop Relay Card Pn: XI2650728-06 ML23159A2712023-06-20020 June 2023 William B. McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 - Relief Request Impractical Reactor System Welds ML23237A2672023-06-13013 June 2023 June 13, 2002 - Meeting Announcement - McGuire and Catawba Nuclear Stations 50-369, 50-370 and 50-413, 50-414 ML23159A0052023-06-0505 June 2023 56557-EN 56557 - Paragon - Redlined ML23115A2122023-05-0101 May 2023 Review of the Spring 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report ML23118A0762023-05-0101 May 2023 Approval for Use of Specific Provision of a Later Edition of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI IR 05000369/20230012023-05-0101 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2023001 and 05000370/2023001 ML23094A1832023-04-18018 April 2023 Audit Plan TSTF-505, Rev. 2, RITSTF Initiative 4B & 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization & Treatment of Structures, Systems & Components for Nuclear Power Reactors (EPIDs L-2023-LLA-0021 & L-2023-LLA-0022) ML22332A4932023-03-10010 March 2023 William States Lee III 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Relocation of the Emergency Operations Facility IR 05000369/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 (NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2022006 and 05000370 2022006) IR 05000369/20220042023-01-30030 January 2023 Mcguire Nuclear Station - Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022004 and 05000370/2022004 IR 05000369/20224202023-01-11011 January 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000369/2022420 and 05000370/2022420 ML22356A0512022-12-14014 December 2022 Curtiss-Wright Nuclear Division, Letter Regarding Potential Efect in a Configuration of the 11/2 Inch Quick Disconnect Connector Cable Assemblies Supplied to Duke Energy (See Attached Spreadsheet) for a Total of 460 of Connectors Only Suppl ML22347A1512022-12-13013 December 2022 William B. Mcguire Nuclear Station Notification of Licensed Operator Initial Examination 05000369/2023301 and 05000370/2023301 ML22340A6662022-12-0808 December 2022 Summary of November 30, 2022, Public Meeting with Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC for McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 & 2 Proposed LAR to Adopt TSTF-505, Rev. 2 and 10 CFR 50.69 Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems ML22290A1012022-11-29029 November 2022 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 326 and 305, Regarding Changes to Technical Specification 3.4.3, Reactor Coolant System Pressure Temperature Limits ML22096A0032022-11-18018 November 2022 McGuire Nuclear Station and Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant Authorization of RA-19-0352 Regarding Use of Alternative for RPV Head Closure Stud Examinations ML22256A2532022-11-14014 November 2022 Issuance of Amendments Regarding the Adoption of Technical Specifications Task Force Traveler TSTF-541, Rev. 2 IR 05000369/20220032022-10-27027 October 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022003 and 05000370/2022003 IR 05000369/20220112022-09-29029 September 2022 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000369/2022011 and 05000370/2022011 ML22266A0782022-09-26026 September 2022 William B. Mcguire Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve Relief Request ML22258A0302022-09-15015 September 2022 Evacuation Time Estimate Reports ML22242A0022022-09-12012 September 2022 Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF 569, Revision 2, Revise Response Time Testing Definition IR 07200038/20220012022-09-12012 September 2022 Operation of an Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Report 07200038/2022001 ML22230B6132022-09-0101 September 2022 Review of the Draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Brunswick Steam Electric Plant and McGuire Nuclear Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations Decommissioning Funding Plans IR 05000369/20220052022-08-29029 August 2022 Updated Inspection Plan for McGuire Nuclear Station Units 1 and 2 NRC Inspection Report 05000369/2022005 and 05000370/2022005 IR 05000369/20220022022-07-26026 July 2022 Integrated Inspection Report 05000369/2022002 and 05000370/2022002 ML22215A2502022-07-25025 July 2022 EN 55960 - Update - Curtiss Wright ML22164A0362022-07-19019 July 2022 Mcguire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2; Issuance of Amendments to Revise the Conditional Exemption of the End-Of-Cycle Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement Methodology (EPID L-2021-LLA-0198) Public ML22175A0162022-06-24024 June 2022 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information for NRC Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection ML22046A0222022-06-14014 June 2022 Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF-439, Eliminate Second Completion Times Limiting Time from Discovery of Failure to Meet an LCO ML22111A3112022-05-16016 May 2022 Letter Issuing Exemption to McGuire IR 05000369/20224012022-05-12012 May 2022 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000369/2022401 and 05000370/2022401 2024-01-31
[Table view] Category:Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)
MONTHYEARRA-23-0154, Duke Energy - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)2023-07-20020 July 2023 Duke Energy - Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) RA-23-0136, Duke Energy Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)2023-07-20020 July 2023 Duke Energy Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) RA-23-0142, Mcguire, Units 1 and 2, Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, H. B. Robinson, Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Restrictive Technical Specification Surveillance Require2023-07-0707 July 2023 Mcguire, Units 1 and 2, Oconee, Units 1, 2, and 3, H. B. Robinson, Unit 2, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise Restrictive Technical Specification Surveillance Require RA-23-0076, Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Spring, 2022 Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report2023-03-16016 March 2023 Supplement to Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Spring, 2022 Outage Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report RA-23-0024, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) for Relief Request for RPV Reactor Coolant System Welds2023-02-28028 February 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) for Relief Request for RPV Reactor Coolant System Welds RA-23-0025, End of Cycle 28 (M1R28) Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI)2023-02-15015 February 2023 End of Cycle 28 (M1R28) Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) RA-22-0147, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request for Relocating the Duke Energy Emergency Operations Facility2022-05-13013 May 2022 Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, and Duke Energy Progress, LLC, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request for Relocating the Duke Energy Emergency Operations Facility RA-22-0102, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Revision 1 of DPC-NE-1007-P, Conditional Exemption of the EOC Mtc Measurement Methodology2022-04-0707 April 2022 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Revision 1 of DPC-NE-1007-P, Conditional Exemption of the EOC Mtc Measurement Methodology RA-22-0003, Response to Requests for Additional Information for Reactor Vessel Closure Stud Exam Extension Alternative2022-01-31031 January 2022 Response to Requests for Additional Information for Reactor Vessel Closure Stud Exam Extension Alternative RA-21-0259, Response to Request for Additional Information for Request to Use Provisions of a Later Edition and Addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/ Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(42021-10-0404 October 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information for Request to Use Provisions of a Later Edition and Addenda of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/ Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4 RA-21-0063, 1, 2; Catawba Nuclear Station 1, 2; H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 2; Mcgguire Nuclear Station 1, 2; Oconee Nuclear Station 1, 2, 3; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 1 - Response to RAI Re Amend for Emergency Plan2021-03-11011 March 2021 1, 2; Catawba Nuclear Station 1, 2; H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant 2; Mcgguire Nuclear Station 1, 2; Oconee Nuclear Station 1, 2, 3; Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant 1 - Response to RAI Re Amend for Emergency Plan RA-21-0032, Duke Energy - Response to Requests for Additional Info for Request to Use a Provision of Later Edition & Addenda of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(42021-02-11011 February 2021 Duke Energy - Response to Requests for Additional Info for Request to Use a Provision of Later Edition & Addenda of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI for Repair/Replacement Activities in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(4)( RA-21-0017, Response to Request for Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Revise Tech Spec 3.8.1 to Reduce Emergency Diesel Generator Maximum Steady State Voltage2021-01-29029 January 2021 Response to Request for Additional Information Re License Amendment Request to Revise Tech Spec 3.8.1 to Reduce Emergency Diesel Generator Maximum Steady State Voltage RA-20-0087, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Alternative in Accordance with 10CFR 50.55a(z)(1) to Delay the Update of the ASME Code of Record for the First Inspection Period2020-04-0202 April 2020 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Alternative in Accordance with 10CFR 50.55a(z)(1) to Delay the Update of the ASME Code of Record for the First Inspection Period RA-19-0189, Supplement to Response for Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specifications 3.8.12019-04-0808 April 2019 Supplement to Response for Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specifications 3.8.1 RA-19-0004, Response to NRC for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specifications 3.8.1 for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 22019-03-0707 March 2019 Response to NRC for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specifications 3.8.1 for Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 RA-19-0026, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Proposed Alternative to the Depth Sizing Qualification Requirement of Appendix Viii, Supplements 2 and 10 (18-GO-001)2019-02-11011 February 2019 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Proposed Alternative to the Depth Sizing Qualification Requirement of Appendix Viii, Supplements 2 and 10 (18-GO-001) RA-19-0005, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Review Request of the Aging Management Program and Inspection Plan for the Reactor Vessel Internals to Implement MRP-227-A2019-01-30030 January 2019 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding Review Request of the Aging Management Program and Inspection Plan for the Reactor Vessel Internals to Implement MRP-227-A RA-18-0229, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specification 3.8.12018-12-0303 December 2018 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to the Technical Specification 3.8.1 RA-18-0213, Response to the Second Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Licensing Bases for Protection from Tornado-Generated Missiles2018-11-0101 November 2018 Response to the Second Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Licensing Bases for Protection from Tornado-Generated Missiles ML18191A5642018-07-10010 July 2018 Attachment 3 - Response to NRC Request for Additional Information MNS-18-036, Redacted Response to the Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Licensing Bases for Protection from Tornado Generated Missiles2018-07-0303 July 2018 Redacted Response to the Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request to Revise the Licensing Bases for Protection from Tornado Generated Missiles ML20052D9362018-07-0303 July 2018 Response to Nrg Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding NAC Magnastor Cask Loaded to Incorrect Helium Backfill Density MNS-17-048, Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies2017-12-12012 December 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment Request Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies ML17349A1572017-12-12012 December 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request for Temporary Changes to Technical Specifications to Address the 'A' Train Nuclear Service Water System Non-Conforming Condition RA-17-0039, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Threads in Flange Examination (17-GO-001)2017-08-0909 August 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1)Proposed Alternative to ASME Section XI Threads in Flange Examination (17-GO-001) RA-17-0035, Supplement to License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to Technical Specification 3.5.1, AC Sources - Operating.2017-07-20020 July 2017 Supplement to License Amendment Request Proposing Changes to Technical Specification 3.5.1, AC Sources - Operating. MNS-17-030, Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 3, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary Submittal2017-06-28028 June 2017 Response to March 12, 2012, Request for Information Enclosure 2, Recommendation 2.1, Flooding, Required Response 3, Flooding Focused Evaluation Summary Submittal RA-17-0030, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Reverse Technical Specifications to Adopt Multiple Technical Specification Task Force Travelers2017-06-0808 June 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Application to Reverse Technical Specifications to Adopt Multiple Technical Specification Task Force Travelers MNS-17-023, Response to Request for Additional Information to License Amendment Request Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies2017-05-25025 May 2017 Response to Request for Additional Information to License Amendment Request Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies CNS-16-066, Stations - Supplemental Information Regarding Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Screening and Prioritization Results - Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task..2016-10-20020 October 2016 Stations - Supplemental Information Regarding Reevaluated Seismic Hazard Screening and Prioritization Results - Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task.. ML16294A2542016-10-13013 October 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request 16-MN-002, Alternative to Defect Removal Prior to Performing Repair Activities on Nuclear Service Water System Piping RA-16-0035, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Application for Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Consolidation2016-10-0303 October 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Application for Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) Consolidation ML16244A0602016-08-18018 August 2016 Response to Request for Addition Information to RR 16-MN-003 MNS-16-070, Response to Request for Additional Information to Relief Request 16-MN-0032016-08-18018 August 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information to Relief Request 16-MN-003 MNS-16-060, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident2016-08-18018 August 2016 Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident ML16230A0062016-08-11011 August 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Technical Specification 3.6.13, Ice Condenser Doors RA-16-0027, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2016-09 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2016-07-14014 July 2016 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2016-09 Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations MNS-16-056, License Amendment Request, One-Time Extension of Appendix J Type a Integrated Leakage Rate Test Interval, Response to Request for Additional Information2016-06-30030 June 2016 License Amendment Request, One-Time Extension of Appendix J Type a Integrated Leakage Rate Test Interval, Response to Request for Additional Information MNS-16-023, Response to Request for Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Regarding License Amendment Request for Control Room Chilled Water System Technical Specifications2016-03-16016 March 2016 Response to Request for Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Regarding License Amendment Request for Control Room Chilled Water System Technical Specifications ML16056A2422016-02-18018 February 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding the License Amendment Request (LAR) to Change the Emergency Plan to Upgrade Emergency Action Levels Based on NEI 99-01, Revision 6 MNS-16-005, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) During January 12, 2016, NRC Teleconference Pertaining to License Amendment Request for Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension2016-02-10010 February 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) During January 12, 2016, NRC Teleconference Pertaining to License Amendment Request for Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension MNS-16-008, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima..2016-02-0404 February 2016 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Closeout, Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10 CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.. MNS-16-009, Response to NRC Letter Dated December 9, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Exemption from Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74.19(c)2016-02-0404 February 2016 Response to NRC Letter Dated December 9, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding Request for Exemption from Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 74.19(c) RA-16-0006, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Application to Use Alternate Fission Gas Gap Release Fractions2016-02-0101 February 2016 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding Application to Use Alternate Fission Gas Gap Release Fractions MNS-16-003, Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation2016-01-0707 January 2016 Response to Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation ML15343A0122015-12-0707 December 2015 Response to NRC Letter Dated 10/26/2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension. MNS-15-093, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Regarding Residual Heat Removal System2015-11-13013 November 2015 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Regarding Residual Heat Removal System MNS-15-078, Response to NRC Letter Dated September 14, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension2015-10-0808 October 2015 Response to NRC Letter Dated September 14, 2015, Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request, Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension MNS-15-077, Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima..2015-10-0808 October 2015 Expedited Seismic Evaluation Process (ESEP) Report (CEUS Sites), Response to NRC Request for Information, Per 10CFR50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1 of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima.. 2023-07-07
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DUKE Steven D. CappsDUKE Vice PresidentENERGYMcGuire Nuclear StationDuke EnergyMG01VP 1 12700 Hagers Ferry RoadHuntersville, NC 28078o: 980.875.4806f: 980.875.4809Steven.Capps@duke-energy.com10 CFR 50.90September 24, 2015Serial: MNS-1 5-073U.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWashington, DC 20555-001ATTENTION: Document Control DeskDuke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370Renewed License Nos. NPF-9 and NPF-17Subject: Response to NRC letter dated August 27, 2015, "McGuire Nuclear Station, Units1 AND 2: Request for Additional Information Regarding License AmendmentRequest Nuclear Service Water System Allowed Outage Time Extension (TACNOS. MF2983 AND MF2984)"References:1. Duke Energy Letter dated June 30, 2015, "License Amendment Request for TemporaryChanges to Technical Specifications for Correction of an 'A' Train Nuclear Service WaterSystem (NSWS) Degraded Condition" (Agencywide Documents Access andManagement System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15191A025).2. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Letter dated July 27, 2015 "McGuire NuclearStation, Units 1 and 2 -Acceptance Review of License Amendment Request RE:Temporary Changes to Technical Specifications for Correction of Nuclear Service WaterSystem Degraded Condition (TAC NOS. MF6409 AND MF641 0)" (ADAMS AccessionNo. ML15202A661)3. Duke Energy Letter dated August 11, 2015, "Response to Request for AdditionalInformation Regarding License Amendment Request for Temporary Changes toTechnical Specifications for Correction of an 'A' Train Nuclear Service Water System(NSWS) Degraded Condition (TAC Nos. MF6409 and ME 6410)" (ADAMS AccessionNo. ML15247A066)4. NRC Letter dated August 27, 2015, "McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 AND 2: Requestfor Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request Nuclear ServiceWater System Allowed Outage Time Extension (TAC NOS. MF2983 AND MF2984)"(ADAMS Accession No.ML15237A416)
US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionSeptember 24, 2015Page 2By letter dated June 30, 2015 (Reference 1), Duke Energy requested a license amendment forthe Renewed Facility Operating Licenses (FOL) and Technical Specifications (TS) for theMcGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, to allow temporary changes to TS 3.5.2, EmergencyCore Cooling System (ECCS) -Operating; TS 3.6.6, Containment Spray System (CSS); TS3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System; TS 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System;TS 3.7.7, Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS); TS 3.7.9, Control Room Area VentilationSystem (CRAVS); TS 3.7.11, Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System (ABFVES),and TS 3.8.1, AC Sources- Operating.By letter dated August 11, 2015 (Reference 3), Duke Energy responded to NRC letter datedJuly 27, 2015 (Reference 2), request for additional information (RAI) needed for completion ofNRC staff review of the proposed LAR.By letter dated August 27, 2015 (Reference 4), the NRC provided Duke Energy a second RAIneeded for completion of the NRC staff review of the LAR. The enclosure provides DukeEnergy's responses to the RAI questions. Attachment 1 in the enclosure revises commitment13 and adds a new commitment 31 to the Regulatory Commitments described in Reference 1.The conclusions reached in the original determination that the June 30, 2013, LAR contains NoSignificant Hazards Considerations, and the categorical exclusion from performing anEnvironmental/Impact Statement have not changed as a result of the RAI responses inEnclosure the enclosurePursuant to 10OCFR50.91, a copy of this LAR has been forwarded to the appropriate NorthCarolina state officials.Please direct any comments or questions regarding this submittal to George Murphy at(980) 875-5715.I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed onSeptember 24, 2015.Sincerely,Steven D. CappsEnclosure:Response to Request for Additional Information US Nuclear Regulatory CommissionSeptember 24, 2015Page 3cc wI/Attachments:V. M. McCreeAdministrator, Region IIU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionMarquis One Tower245 Peachtree Center Ave., NE, Suite 1200Atlanta, GA 30303-1257J. ZeilerNRC Senior Resident InspectorMcGuire Nuclear StationG. E. Miller, Project ManagerU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission11555 Rockville PikeMail Stop 0-8 G9ARockville, MD 20852-2738W. L. Cox, Ill, Section ChiefNorth Carolina Department of Environment and Natural ResourcesDivision of Environmental HealthRadiation Protection Section1645 Mail Service CenterRaleigh, NC 27699-1 645 ENCLOSUREResponse to Request for Additional Information Response to Request for Additional InformationREQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATIONBY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONRELATED TO A LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST SUPPORTING CORRECTION OF ANUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM DEGRADED CONDITIONDUKE ENERGY CAROLINAS. LLCMCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION. UNITS 1 AND 2DOCKET NOS. 50-369 AND 50-370By letter dated June 30, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System(ADAMS) Accession No. ML15191A025), Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy)submitted a license amendment request (LAR) to temporarily change McGuire Nuclear Station(MNS), Units 1 and 2, Technical Specifications (TSs) for correction of a degraded conditionaffecting the 'A' Train of the nuclear service water system (NSWS). The requested amendmentwould temporarily change the following TSs to allow the inoperability of the 'A' Train of theNSWS for a total of up to 14 days: TS 3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) -Operating; TS 3.6.6, Containment Spray System (CSS); TS 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW)System; TS 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System; TS 3.7.7, Nuclear Service WaterSystem (NSWS); TS 3.7.9, Control Room Area Ventilation System (CRAVS); TS 3.7.11,Auxiliary Building Filtered Ventilation Exhaust System (ABEVES), and TS 3.8.1, AC Sources-Operating. The 'A' Train of the shared NSWS would be inoperable while the safety-relatedsupply from the MNS Nuclear Service Water Pond was drained and isolated to correct adegraded condition affecting that line.Based on the NRC staff's review of this amendment request, the NRC staff has determined thefollowing additional information is necessary to support completion of its technical review:SBPB-RAI-001The LAR included a potential activity to install a piping penetration in the drained section of theNSWS within the auxiliary building if required for personnel access to remove suspectedblockage. The LAR also included information indicating the opening in the pipe for personnelaccess establishes the potential for NSWS leakage into the auxiliary building. To ensureagainst the potential for significant leakage, the LAR indicated that the Standby Nuclear ServiceWater Pond (SNSWP) water source would be isolated by the installation of a bolted flange andthe Lake Norman water source would be isolated by closure of ORN-7A under proceduralcontrols. Dedicated personnel and procedures would be established to address excessiveleakage past the valve. However, the MNS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report includedinformation indicating the auxiliary building is a Category 1 structure that is sealed to provideprotection against external flooding. Although unlikely, the procedural control of valve 0RN-7Aposition creates the credible potential for inadvertent opening of the valve while the pipingpenetration in the auxiliary building is open that could cause flooding of the auxiliary buildingfrom Lake Norman.Please clarify how this approach is consistent with defense-in-depth, particularly the principal ofavoiding an over-reliance on programmatic activities. The programmatic control of the 0RN-7APage 2 of 5 Response to Request for Additional Informationvalve position and the programmatic response to significant valve leakage should have reliabilitycommensurate with the likelihood and consequences of significant leakage past valve 0RN-7Awith an opening in the pipe within the auxiliary building. The NRC staff requests additionalinformation that addresses these considerations. As appropriate, these considerations may beaddressed by eliminating the need for a piping penetration within the auxiliary building,establishing by analysis that the consequences of flooding through the auxiliary buildingpenetration would be small (e.g., passive barriers within the auxiliary building would protectessential equipment from flooding through that path), or providing independent additional pipingisolations (e.g., a freeze seal in the NSWS piping between valve ORN-7A and Lake Norman).Duke Energy Response to SBPB-RAI-0010RN-7A will be used as the isolation barrier between Lake Norman and the new NSWS pipingmanway in the auxiliary building. Isolation will be controlled via the plants clearance and tag outprocess. The tag out process requires Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) approval for changes inplant component configuration. For defense-in-depth, Operations will utilize the concurrent dualverification process that requires an additional parallel verification of plant/system conditions,hands on the correct component, and an understanding of the intent of actions prior to actualoperation of 0RN-7A. Additionally, control of the new manway will be under the clearance andtag out process for 0RN-7A such that 0RN-7A cannot be opened unless the manway is closed.The tag out process will place danger tags on the 0RN-7A actuator motor operator breaker aswell as the hand wheel. The tag out process will maintain the 0RN-7A actuator motor breakerlocked in the off position and the mechanical hand wheel will be locked closed with a restrainingdevice to prevent inadvertent operation via bumping of 0RN-7A.In summary, the programmatic control of 0RN-7A under the clearance and tag out programensures that ORN-7A will be maintained closed during periods when the new NSWS pipingmanway is open. This includes the tagging and locking of the Motor Control Center breaker for0RN-7A and the placement of a restraining device with a lock on the hand wheel of 0RN-7A.The reliability of this programmatic control will be enhanced by the addition of concurrent dualverification for any operation of 0RN-7A during the LAR activity, a step in the tag out checklistfor verification that the new NSWS manway is closed prior to opening ORN-7A.Zero leakage cannot be guaranteed for 0RN-7A. Prior to performing the activities described inthe LAR, the motor operator will be tested and adjusted for the optimum closure position andtorque for minimal seat leakage. If the new manway is required for access to remove theblockage, then prior to cutting the pipe for access, an evaluation of leakage will be performed tovalidate proper isolation and ensure that 0RN-7A leakage is within expected limits.0RN-7A is a motor operated butterfly valve with its actuator stem in the approximate center ofthe valve disk. This design (stem in center of disk), results in application of pressure on thebutterfly disk due to natural forces (head pressure of Lake Norman), which keeps the butterflydisk against its closed valve seat when the valve is in the closed position.A review of operating experience and of manufacturer information for failure modes andconcerns with valves like 0RN-7A has yielded no information that would challenge theexpectation for 0RN-7A to be a reliable isolation point for protection against unacceptableleakage into the auxiliary building while the auxiliary building NSWS manway is open. NoPage 3 of 5 Response to Request for Additional Informationcredible failures have been identified that would suggest a failure resulting in a leak scenariooutside the scope of discussion described in this response.During periods when the new NSWS manway is open, dedicated personnel havingcommunication to the main control room with procedures to continuously monitor and respondto 0RN-7A leakage will be in place. If leakage increases and reaches the pre-determined leakrate limit, the repair activity will be stopped, and the manway will be closed. If conditionsprevent the prompt closure of the manway, then operations will place the 'B' NSWS train inoperation, secure 'A' NSWS operations and isolate the 'A' NSWS train to stop the leakagewithin 30 minutes. Existing commitment 13 will be revised to include the additional actionsdescribed above.The Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater pumps and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel equipment are physicallylocated in the room where the new NSWS manway opening will be installed. This room drainsto the auxiliary building Ground Water Drainage (WZ) sump, which has the capability ofremoving up to 500 gpm via two 250 gpm capacity WZ pumps that have emergency powersupplies and are also located in the same room as 0RN-7A.The design basis flood elevation for the affected room is 12 inches above the floor elevation.The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps and Auxiliary Shutdown Panel are not affected by flooding untilwater level exceeds 20 inches above the floor elevation in the room.It would take approximately 21,000 gallons of water in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater pumproom to exceed the design basis flood level of 12 inches. It would take approximately thirtyminutes to reach this volume of water assuming that 0RN-7A leakage is 700 gpm with no creditfor mitigation by the WZ sump pumps. Leakage for 0RN-7A is not expected to exceed a worstcase leak rate of 50-100 gpm. Assuming a 0RN-7A seat leakage limit of 100 gpm, the timeavailable to isolate NSW would be approximately three and a half hours.If manway closure is not possible then leakage from 0RN-7A via the new manway could bestopped with the use of dedicated personnel and procedural guidance well within the timebefore exceeding the design basis flood elevation in the Unit 2 Auxiliary Feedwater pump roomof 12 inches.Page 4 of 5 Response to Request for Additional InformationSBPB-RAI-002The LAR describes activities and design features that provide protection against macro-foulingof the NSWS from Lake Norman (i.e., inspection of fish barrier) and the SNSWP (i.e., fishpopulation controls, fish population survey, and fish barrier). Please describe how thetimeliness of these activities in managing the potential for macro-fouling will be verified prior toremoving the SNSWP supply to 'A' NSWS Train from service.Duke Energy Response to SBPB-RAI-002Historically, the potential for macro-fouling at the Low Level Intake (LLI) structure is higherduring the months of July to August when the alewife fish are drawn to higher levels of dissolvedoxygen caused by a natural lake cycle with cold water in the hypo limnetic layers. BySeptember, the higher dissolved oxygen levels are gone, and the fish move out of the hypolimnetic layers. During the July to August period, McGuire monitors the fish movement withacoustic surveys performed weekly. In addition, underwater live cameras were installed in June2015 and are used to monitor fish concentrations in the area above the LLI structure.The activities discussed in the LAR will not be performed during the seasonal conditions thatcause alewife macro-fouling phenomena. Existing Regulatory Commitment 25 in Reference 1states: "Prior to entering the 14 day CT perform an evaluation to ensure that there will be noanticipated impact to 'A' NSWS water supply from the LLI from alewife fish the during 14 dayCT". This evaluation will review the timing of the LAR activities to ensure that they will not beperformed during the seasonal time interval (July through August) when the alewife fishcongregate at the LLI. The timing of the LAR activities is also bounded by existing RegulatoryCommitment 19, which excludes the performance of the LAR activities during the months ofJune through October due to the rise in potential for tornados.Page 5 of 5 ATTACHMENT 1Regulatory Commitments REGULATORY COMMITMENTSThe following table identifies those actions committed to by Duke Energy in this document. Anyother statements made in this licensing submittal are provided for informational purposes onlyand are not considered to be regulatory commitments. Please direct any questions you mayhave in this matter to George Murphy at 980-875-5715.#__ REGULATORY COMMITMENTS1 The 'A' Train NSWS pumps will remain running and aligned to Lake Norman duringthe extended CT until the system is ready for post maintenance testing.2 Any maintenance that is performed on the remaining portions of 'A' Train NSWSduring the period in which the 'A' NSWS from the SNSWP supply piping is not___available will be limited to a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> completion time3 The 'B' Train NSWS will be placed in its ESFAS alignment to the SNSWP watersource with the 'B' Train pumps in standby prior to starting the LAR activity andremain in this alignment until the 'A' Train NSWS SNSWP water source is restoredand ready for post maintenance testing.4 Procedures will be established to provide an additional defense in depth contingencythat could be used in the event of an extremely low probability of a loss of the LakeNorman water source due to a seismic event. The procedures will ensure that systemoperation is maintained within design limits (less than or equal to 2 NSWS pumpsrunning on a header), control of maximum system flow, and that system configurationprevents interaction of the degraded equipment with the functional equipment.5 Fukushima Response FLEX modifications will be installed and the FLEX strategieswill be available for implementation as additional defense-in-depth on both units.6 During the period in which the 'A' NSWS suction path from the SNSWP is non-functional, no discretionary maintenance or discretionary testing will be planned onthe following:a. 1A EDGb. 2A EDGc. The 'A' Train of NSWS excluding the activities described in the LAR for the'A' Train NSWS piping to the SNSWP.d. The 'B' Train of NSWS, ECCS, CSS, AFW, CCW, CRAVS, ABFVES orthe EDGse. The switchyard and other offsite power sourcesf. The SSF7 A condition in which repairs could impact the ability of an SSC to perform its SafetyFunction would result in termination of activities. The inspection may identify acondition that cannot be resolved within the 14 day completion time. Should such acondition be identified then the system will be restored to its current OBDN condition.If the ROV survey presents any opportunities for a less intrusive or less timeconsuming solution for addressing the OBDN condition, then these opportunities willbe pursued, as appropriate.8 In an activity planned to be performed this summer separate from the 14 daycompletion time repair activity, 0RN-7A will be tested for leakage and adjusted ifnecessary to minimize leakage.9 In an activity planned to be performed this summer separate from the 14 daycompletion time repair activity the SNSWP isolation flange will be test fitted to the 'A'SNSWP pipe.Page 2 of 5 10 Procedure guidance will establish controls to limit evacuation air pressure to less thanIa predetermined value in order to prevent air intrusion into the operatingj NSWS.11 Dedicated personnel with procedure guidance will be provided to close the pathwayfrom the auxiliary building on the affected 'A' Train NSWS piping from the SNSWP inthe event of any of the following:* An Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuation* Entry into RP/0/A/5700/006 Natural Disasters* Entry into RP/O/A/5700/O07 Earthquake12 This activity will be controlled under the Infrequently Performed Test or Evolution(IPTE) process defined in Fleet Directive AD-OP-ALL-i106, "Conduct of InfrequentlyPerformed Tests or Evolutions", and Duke Energy's Work Management andExecution procedures.un.nticipate leaag..roedra.acios.il provide guidance to stop the..leakage.During periods when the new NSWS manway is open, dedicated personnel havingcommunication to the main control room with procedures to continuously monitor andrespond to 0RN-7A leakage will be in place. If leakage increases and reaches thepre-determined leak rate limit, the repair activity will be stopped, and the manway willbe closed. If conditions prevent the prompt closure of the manway, then operationswill place the 'B' NSWS train in operation, secure 'A' NSWS operations and isolatethe 'A' NSWS train to stop the leakage.14 If the second personnel access opening is necessary, then prior to the opening of thesystem an evaluation of leakage will be performed to validate proper isolation andthat leakage is within expected limits.15 McGuire will communicate with the Transmission Control Center (TCC) to ensure thatthe McGuire Control Room is notified in the event of potential grid disturbances inorder that an appropriate plant response can be formulated.16 The Work Control Center or OCC will monitor weather forecasts and radar during theactivities that require the NSWS piping personnel access points to be open to assessthe potential for severe weather conditions (tornado, thunderstorms).17 Training will be provided in accordance with the Systematic Approach to Training(SAT) process to Operations personnel on this TS change and the associatedevolution to inspect and correct the degraded condition in the 'A' NSWS supply pipingfrom the SNSWP.18 Operations will review applicable abnormal operating procedures related to theresponse to an earthquake, the loss of the Lake Norman and the loss of NSWS priorto making 'A' NSWS suction path from the SNSWP inoperable and each shift until 'A'Train NSWS operability is restored.19 The repair work on the NSWS 'A' Train suction from the SNSWP will be scheduledduring a period in which hurricanes and tornadoes have a lower likelihood ofoccurrence.20 The Outage Command Center (OCC) will be manned while performing the activitiesauthorized by this amendment.Page 3 of 5 21The following list of equipment will be protected:a. 'B' Train NSWSb. 1B EDGc. 2B EDGd. 1B ECCSe. 2B ECCSf. 1B CSSg. 2B CSSh. 1BAFWi. 2B AFWj. 1BCCWk. 2B CCWI. B CRAVSm. B ABEVESn. Auxiliary Building WZ Sump and equipment supporting function of sump22 If required to be installed the new personnel access opening to be located on the 'A'Train NSWS piping in the auxiliary building will be designed and installed inaccordance with the Engineering Change Process.23 Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) will be controlled during the proposed activities inaccordance with AD-MN-ALL-0002, Foreign Material Exclusion (FME). Any debrisresulting from the obstruction removal activity will be mechanically cleaned out beforethe system is closed for return to service per EME plan developed in accordance withthe above procedure. The system will be video inspected and reversed flushed fromthe LLI to the SNSWP with isolation to downstream components to force anysediment back to the SNSWP.24 Following 'A' Train NSWS restoration, testing will be performed to verify that the asleft NSWS performance meets or exceeds pre-activity performance including 'A' TrainNSW pump NPSH conditions.25 Prior to entering the 14 day CT perform an evaluation to ensure that there will be noanticipated impact to 'A' NSWS water supply from the LLI from Alewife fish the during14 day CT.26 The new personnel access piping opening (in the auxiliary building) will be controlledby using procedures developed or revised for this purpose to maintain positive controlof the opening and to prevent an unmonitored release.27 The ERAT program includes the option to use a SSA (Safety Significant Activity)code which will cause the risk condition color to be "YELLOW". MNS will use thiscode during the activities described in this LAR.28 Designated operators will be available to execute the manual actions associated withaligning the affected unit's 'A' Train NSWS pump to the 'B' NSWS SNSWP via the___Main Supply Crossover piping.29If the contingency personnel access opening is installed, then Security personnel willestablish the proper controls and compensatory measures prescribed by securityprocedures and the security plan.Page 4 of 5 30 In support of the contingency the following conditions will be established before thestart of activities in the LAR:* The 'A' valve (0RN-14A) will be opened prior to the evolution and power willbe removed from the valve operator.* The 'B' valve (0RN-15B) will be maintained closed with the ESFAS signalfrom each unit blocked prior to the evolution. Maintaining 0RN-1 5B closedwith power removed satisfies operability requirements for the 'B' Train NSWS.The 'B' valve (0RN-15SB) can be opened from the control room after power isrestored if conditions warrant the use of this contingency.31 Operations will utilize the concurrent dual verification process when operating0RN-7A.Page 5 of 5