ENS 57181 | Perry | 18 June 2024 20:40:00 | Inoperability of Division 3 Diesel Generator Supporting High Pressure Core Spray | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
At 1640 EDT on 06/18/2024, the division 3 diesel generator was declared inoperable. This condition could prevent the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). All other emergency core cooling systems were operable during this time.
There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The division 3 diesel generator was declared inoperable due to potential water intrusion into the electrical generator. Inspection of the generator is in progress.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
This event resulted in Perry Unit 1 entering a 72 hour limiting condition for operation (LCO) in accordance with Technical Specification 3.8.1. condition 'B'.
- * * RETRACTION ON 8/15/2024 AT 0943 EDT FROM TONY MCGOWAN TO ERNEST WEST * * *
Investigation and assessment of the division 3 diesel generator exciter and generator as-found condition revealed that no water intrusion occurred and, therefore, would not have impacted the diesel generator's ability to start, run, and produce the required electrical power to perform its required safety function. Therefore, EN 57181 is being retracted.
The NRC resident inspector has been notified of the Event Notification retraction.
Notified R3DO (Feliz-Adorno) |
ENS 57090 | Browns Ferry | 25 April 2024 03:15:00 | Automatic Reactor Scram with Eccs Actuation | The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
On 4/24/2024 at 2215 CDT, Browns Ferry Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor scram. The cause of the scram is currently under investigation. The main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) remain open with the main turbine bypass valves controlling reactor pressure. The reactor feedwater pumps are in service to control reactor water level.
Primary containment isolation systems (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolation signals were received. Upon receipt of these signals, all components actuated as required. Following the reactor scram, due to reactor water level reaching minus 45 inches, both high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) initiation signals were received, and both initiated as designed. All safety systems operated as expected.
This event requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), `Any event that results or should have resulted in emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system as a result of a valid signal except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
This event requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), `Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.
This event requires an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), `Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B): 1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip. 2) General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs). 4) ECCS for boiling water reactors (BWRs) - high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI). 5) BWR reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC).
All safety systems operated as expected. At no time was public health and safety at risk. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
Units 2 and 3 were not affected. |
ENS 57042 | Waterford | 22 March 2024 04:37:00 | Notification of Unusual Event Due to Fire in the Protected Area | The following information was provided by the licensee:
A Notification of Unusual Event, HU4.4 (see note below) was declared based a fire in the protected area requiring off site assistance to extinguish. The fire was in the main transformer yard. The fire was detected at 2328 CDT on March 21, 2024, and the fire was declared out at 0009 CDT on at March 22, 2024. An automatic reactor trip was initiated due to a loss of offsite power to the "B" train and a failure to automatically transfer from unit auxiliary transformer "B" to startup transformer "B.
The licensee notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.
The NRC remained in Normal.
Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
NOTE: Due to a typographical error initiating condition HU4.1 was initially recorded for the event. The correct initiating condition is HU4.4 as now shown.
- * * UPDATE AT 0345 EDT ON 03/22/24 FROM LARRY GONSALES TO BILL GOTT * * *
The licensee terminated the Notification of Unusual Event at 0221 CDT on 3/22/24.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Gepford), IR-MOC (Grant), NRR-EO (Felts), DHS-SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), CWMD Watch Desk (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk (email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).
- * * UPDATE AT 0420EDT ON 03/22/24 FROM JOHN LEWIS TO BILL GOTT * * *
RPS ACTUATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
On March 21, 2024, at 2328 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 was operating at 98 percent power when an automatic reactor trip was initiated due to a loss of offsite power to the B train and a failure to automatically transfer from unit auxiliary transformer B to startup transformer B.
Emergency feedwater actuation signal 2 (EFAS), safety injection actuation signal (ECCS), containment isolation actuation signal and emergency diesel generators automatically actuated. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted and all other plant equipment functioned as expected. Forced circulation remains with one reactor coolant pump per loop running. Decay heat removal is via the main condenser. A train safety bus is being supplied by off-site power, and B train safety bus is being supplied by emergency diesel generator B.
Following the loss of offsite power to the B train, it was reported that main transformer B and startup transformer B were both on fire. The Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at time 2337 CDT. The fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, and the Unusual Event was terminated at 0221 CDT on March 22, 2024. Offsite assistance was requested. The local fire department responded to the site but the fire was extinguished by the on-shift fire brigade. NRC Region IV management was contacted regarding the emergency plan entry at 0030 CDT on March 22, 2024.
This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system, ECCS, Containment Isolation and Emergency Diesel Generators.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Notified R4DO (Gepford)
- * * RETRACTION OF NOTICE OF UNUSUAL EVENT FROM ON 03/26/24 AT 1721 FROM L. BROWN TO K. COTTON * * *
The initial notification in event notice #57042 by Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, reported a Notice Of Unusual Event (NOUE) emergency declaration due to a fire in the protected area requiring off site support to extinguish. The basis for retraction of the initial emergency notification is that this event did not meet the definition of a fire in the protected area that requires off site support to extinguish. Guidance provided in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-01, Rev. 6 and implemented in Waterfords Emergency Plan procedure, initiating Condition HU4.4 states, The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. (NOTE: The Initial Notification Form sent from the Control Room at 2341 CDT on March 21, 2024, requested by and provided to the NRC Headquarter Operations Center via e-mail at 0302 CDT on March 22, 2024, stated that the Emergency Classification had been made on Initiating Condition HU4.4 rather than HU4.1)"
When the event occurred on March 21, 2024, the Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at 2337 CDT and requested offsite support based on the information available at that time including the initial assessment by the fire brigade leader and expected need for offsite support to extinguish the fire. As reported in the 0420 EDT update on March 22, 2024, the fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, by the Waterford Fire Brigade without the need of offsite support."
Notified R4DO (Kellar).
- * * UPDATE AT 1209 EDT ON 03/27/24 FROM JOHN LEWIS TO KAREN COTTON * * *
The initial notification in EN 57042 by Waterford Steam Electric Station, Unit 3, reported an emergency declaration of an Unusual Event due to a fire in the protected area requiring off site support to extinguish. The basis for the update to the initial notification is that this event did not meet the definition of a Fire in the Protected Area that requires offsite support to extinguish. As provided in NEI 99-01, Rev. 6 and implemented in Waterfords emergency plan procedure, initiating condition HU4.4 states, The dispatch of an offsite firefighting agency to the site requires an emergency declaration only if it is needed to actively support firefighting efforts because the fire is beyond the capability of the Fire Brigade to extinguish. Additionally, EAL 4.1 for a fire not extinguished within 15 minutes of detection in any Table H-1 fire area was not applicable because the fire did not occur in a Table H-1 fire area.
When the event occurred on March 21, 2024, the Emergency Director declared an Unusual Event at 2337 CDT and requested offsite support based on the information available at that time including the initial assessment by the fire brigade leader and expected need for offsite support to extinguish the fire. As reported in the 0420 EDT update on March 22, 2024, the fire was reported extinguished at 0009 CDT on March 22, 2024, by the Waterford Fire Brigade without the need of offsite support.
(NOTE: The Initial Notification Form sent from the Control Room at 2341 CDT on March 21, 2024, requested by and provided to the Headquarters Operation Center via e-mail at 0302 CDT on March 22, 2024, stated that the emergency classification had been made on initiating condition HU4.4 rather than HU4.1)
In accordance with NRC Approved guidance in FAQ 21-02 (ML21117A104), Waterford 3 is retracting the initial event notification made at 0117 EDT on March 22, 2024. The remaining events that were reported in EN 57042 as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW (emergency feedwater) system, ECCS (emergency core cooling system), containment isolation and emergency diesel generators are still applicable and require no additional update at this time.
The licensee also provided a site map.
Notified R4DO (Kellar) |
ENS 57021 | Hatch | 11 March 2024 17:37:00 | Manual Reactor Trip | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:
On March 11, 2024, at 1337 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 35 percent power performing power ascension activities, the reactor was manually tripped due to the 'A' reactor feed pump (RFP) tripping on low suction pressure. Due to the power level at the time, the 'B' RFP had not been placed in service. Closure of containment isolation valves (CIVs) in multiple systems and actuation of high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) occurred as a result of reaching the actuation setpoint on reactor water level as designed. The trip was not complex, with all safety systems responding normally post-trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. The 'B' RFP was placed in service and is controlling reactor water level. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected.
Due to the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharging into the reactor, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A). Also, the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of CIVs, RCIC and HPCI.
There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.
The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:
The cause of the 'A' RFP is under investigation. The reactor electric plant remains in a normal lineup with both emergency diesel generators available. There were no temperature or pressure technical specification limits approached. |