ML20236H571

Proposed Tech Specs Revising MSIV Closure Time

ML20236H571
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	07/27/1987
From:	TOLEDO EDISON CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20236H557	List: ML20236H555 ML20236H564 ML20236H571
References
1387, TAC-65858, NUDOCS 8708050249
Download: ML20236H571 (25)

Text

1 Serial No. 1387 l ge j ,

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INSTRUMENTATION 3/a.3.2 SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION  ;

3.3.2.1 The Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) functional units shown in Table 3.3-3 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown.in the Trip Setpoint column of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-5. i APPLICABILITY: As shown in Ta ble 3.3-3.

ACTION:

a. With a SFAS functional unit trip setpoint less conservative than the value shown in the A11owab1e Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the functional unit inoperable and apply the -

applicable ACTION requirement .of Table ).3-3, until the func-tional unit is restored to OP(RABLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent sith the Trip 5etpoint value.

b. With a SFAS functional unit inoperable. 'take the action shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4 . 3. 2.1.1 Each SFAS functional unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CPANNEL CHECK. CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL l FUNCTIONAL TEST during the MODES and at the frequencies shewn in Table 4.3-2. ,

a 3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall. be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of functional units affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing  ;

of each functional unit affected by bypass operation. 1 4.3.2.1.3 The SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each SFAS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

Each test shall include at least one functional unit per function such that all functional units are tested at least once every N times 18 .

months where N is the total number of redundant functional units in a

/ specific SFAS function as shown in the " Total No. of Units" Column of Table 3.3-3. ,

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 3-9 e708050249 87072736 ADOCK 05

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Serial No'.-1387 Yf b? [:

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q BU 3.3-5_

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS INITI ATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION d

1. Manual

a. Fans NA

1. Emergency Vent Fan NA

2. Containment Cooler Fan Hy & AC isolation Valves q

b. l NA 1 1 .- ECCS Room j NA

2. Emergency Ventilation Containment Air Sample NA

3.

• NA 3 4 Containment Purge ,

I Pentration Room Purge NA 5.

NA

c. Control Room HV & AC Units 1

d. High Pressure Injection

~ j NA

1. High Pressure Injection Pumps '

l NA l

2. High Pressure Injection.. Valves

e. Component Cooling Water Component Cooling Water Pumps NA 1.

Component Cooling Aux. Equip. Inlet Valves NA 2.

Cemponent Cooling to Air Compressor Valves NA 3.

f. Service Water System Service Water Pumps NA 1.

2. Service Water From Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves NA Containment Spray Isolation Valves NA g.

NA

h. Emergency Diesel Generator

1. Containment Isolation Valves NA

1. Vacuun Relief NA

2. Normal Sump RCS 1.etdown Delay Coil Outlet NA

3. NA

• 4 RCS Letdown High Temperature DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3 14

ta m t5 .i f I '( L  ;

Page 3 TABLE 3.3 (Continue -

SAFETY FEATURES' SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

1. Containment Isolation Valves-(cont'd)

5. Pressurizer Sample NA

6. Service Water to Cooling Water- NA

7. Vent Header NA

8. Drain Tank NA

9. Core Flood Tank Vent NA

'10. Core Flood Tank Fill NA

11. Steam Generator Sample NA

12. Atmospheric Vent NA

13. Quench Tank NA

14. Emergency Sump .NA

15. RCP Seal Return NA

16. Air Systems NA

17. N7System _. NA

18. Quench Tank Sample NA i

19. Main Steam Warmup Drain' NA

20. Makeup '-

NA -

21. RCP Seal Inlet NA

22. Core Flood Tank Sampli -

NA

23. RCP Standpipe Demin, Water Supply NA

24. Containment2H Dilution Inlet NA

25. Containment 2H Dilution Outlet ,

NA

j. BWST Outlet Valves NA

k. Low Pressure Injection.

1. Decay Heat Pumps NA

2. Low Pressure Injection Valves NA

3. Decay Heat Pump Suction Valves NA 4 Decay Heat Cooler Outlet Valves NA -

5. Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves NA

1. Containment Spray Pump NA

m. Component Cooling' Isolation Valves

1. Inlet to Containment NA-

2. Outlet from Containment NA

3. Inlet to CRDM's NA 4 CRDM Booster Pump Suction NA

5. Component Cooling from Decay Heat Coolers NA

n. Steam and Feedwater Isolation Valves

1. Main Steam Line NA DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-15

Serial No. 1387 %glgj ()fy; a 6, h  !$

6L(3) L ., e hra g h l l

5 5 h TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS j

n. Steam and Feedwater Isolation Valves (continued)

2. Main Feedwater Stop NA

3. Main Steam Warmup NA

2. Containment Pressure - High

a. Fans 1

1. Emergency Vent Fans < 25*

2. Containment Cooler Fans i45* )

b. HV & AC Isolation Valves

1. ECCS Room < 75*

2. Emergency Ventilation .- .. 7 75* l

3. Containment Air Sample ~ 7'30*

4. l Containment Purge -

7 15* 1

5. Penetration Room Purge i75*

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c. Control Room HV & AC Units < 10*

d. High P-essure Injection

1. High Pressure Injection Pumps < 30*

High Pressure Injection Valves

2. 7

_ 30*

I

e. Component Cooling Water

1. Component Cooling Water Pumps < 180*

2. Component Cooling Aux. Equip. Inlet Valves 7 180*

3. Component Cooling to Air Compressor Valves i180*

f. Service Water System

1. Service Water Pumps -< 45*

2. Service Water From Component Cooling Heat Exchanger Isolation Valves < NA*

g ., Containment Spray Isolation Valves < 80*

h. Emergency Diesel Generator < 15

• DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-16

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$ ape 5 TABLE 3.'3-5 (Continued)_ k i SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE tit 1ES-RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS I_NITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION

2. Containment Pressure - High (Continued)

1. Containment Isolation Valves

1. Vacuum Relief < 30*

2. Normal Sump. 7 25*

3. RCS Letdown Delay Coil Outlet 7 30*

4 RCS Letdown High Temperature {30*

5. Pressurizer Sample _s 48*

6. Service Water to Cooling Water 1 45*

7. Vent Header ~< 15*

15*

l 8. Drain Tank

. 9. Core Flood Tank Vent < 15*

10. . Core Flood Tank Fill 7 15*

11. Steam Generator Sample 7 15*

12. Atmospheric Vent 7 17*

i 13. Quench Tank 7 15*

14. Emergency Sump s. NA*

15. RCP Seal. Return < 45*

16. Air System- .,.- 7 15*

17. N7 System < 15*

18. Quench Tank Sample' 'I 35*

19. Main Steam Warmup Drain 7 15*

20. Makeup 7 30*

21. RCP .al Inlet 7 17*

22. Core Flood Tank Sample- 7 15*

23. RCP Standpipe Demin Water Supply. 7 15*~

24. Containment2 H Dilution Inlet 7 75*

25. Containment H Dilution Outlet i75*

j. BWST Outlet Valves NA*

k. Low Pressure Injection

1. Decay Heat Pumps < 30*

2. Low Pressure Injection Valves 7 NA*

3. Decay Heat Pump Suction Valves 7 NA-4 Decay Heat Cooler Outlet Valves 7 NA*

h

5. Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves [NA*

3. Containment Pressure--High-High

a. Containment Spray Pump 1 80* l

b. Component Cooling Isolation Valves i

1. Inlet to Containment < 25*-

2. Outlet from Containment [25*

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-17

1 Serial N</.r 1387 Attachment 5 Page 6 TABLE 3.3 (Continued)

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING $1GNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

b. Component Cooling Isolation Valves (Continued) '

3. Inlet to CRDM's < 35*

.4. CRDM Booster Pump Suetior. 7 35*

5. Component Cooling from Decay Heat Cooler iNA*

c. Steam and Feedwater Isolation Valves

1. Main Steam Line 2.

3.

Main feedwater Stop Main Steam Warmup

[<30* N/A*

{ 15*

4 RCS Pressure-Low

a. Fans

1. Emergency Vent fans < 25*

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2. Containment Cooler Fans 7_ 45*

b. HV & AC Isolation Valves ' ~ r .' --

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1. (CCS Room < 75*

2. Escrgency Ventilation 7 75*

3. Containment Air Sample 7 30*

4. Containment Purge 7 15*

9: Penetration Room Purge { 75*

c. Control Room NY & AC Units 1 10*

d. High Pressure Injection

1. High Pressure Injection Pumps < 30*

2. High Pressure Injection Valves 330*

e. Component Cooling Water

1. Component Cooling Water Pumps < 180*

2. Component Cooling Aux. Equipment Inlet Valves < 180*

3. Component Cooling to Air Compressor Valves {180*

f. Service Water System

1. Service Water Pumps < 45*

~

2. Service Water from Component Cooling He'at Exchanger Isolation Valves 1 NA*

g. Containment Spray Isolation Valves 1 80*

h. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 15*

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-18 .

erb h; *Attlic M n@3

.b138PM*

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@ %lhM87 (Continued)__ I

[.[Uh.f"h0 DidNFA$ bb!]Vi <b] WTRBLE 3.3 5 f( dR A

FEATURES S"STCH RESTC;:SC TlHES RESP 0ftSE tit'E Ifl SECONOS I!!!T!f TU:G SIGi??.L At?D TUliCTION

4. CCS Pressurc-Lou (continued)

1. Containm:nt Isolation Yalves Vacuum Relief < 30*

1.

2. f:ormal Sump' 7 25*

RCS Letdown Oclay Coil Outlet -7 30* ~

3.

4 RCS Letdown High Temperature 7 30*

5. Pressurizer Sample 7 45*

Service Water to Cooling t!ater 7 45*

6. 7 15*

7. Vent Header

8. Drain Tank 7 15*

9. Core Flood Tank Vent 7 15*

10. Core Flood Tank Fill 7 15*

11. Steam Generator Sample 7 15*

f.tmospheric Vent . ~ 17*

12.

13.

7 15*

Quench Tank -

14. Emergency Sump NA.

15. Air Systems ,, 1 15*

l N2 System

~

< 1E*

l 16. 7 35*

17. Quench Tank Sample .

18. Main Steam Vamup Drain C- 5 15*

Core Flood Tank Sample .' < 15*

19.

2C. RCP Standpipe Demin Water Supply 5 15' Containment H9 Dilution Inlet < 75*

21 .

5 75*

22. Containment Hj Dilution Outlet

j. SWST Outlet Valves NA.

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5. RCS Pressure--Low-Low l

a. Low Pressure-Injection

1. Decay Heat Pumps < 30*

i

?. Low Pressure Injection Valves 7 NA*

3. Decay Heat Pump Suction Yalves 7 NA* f 4 Decay Heat Cooler Outlet Yalves 7 NA*

5. Decay Heat Cooler Bypass Valves {NA*

b. Component Coo 7fng Isolation Yalves

1. Auxiliary Equipment In'it < 90* ,

~

2. Inlet to Air Compresso.- 7 90

3. Component Cooling from Decay Heat Cooler

[NA*

c. Containment Isolation valves I- RCP Seal Return < 45* I

2. Makeup . 130*

3.^ RCP Seal Inlet 1 17*

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TABLE 3.3-5 (Continued) .

SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES INITIATING SIGNAL AND FUNCTION RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

6. Containment Radiation - High

a. Emergency Vent fans < 25*

b. HV & AC Isolation Yalves

1. ECCS Room < 75*

2. Emergency Ventilation 575*

3. Containment Air Sample < 30*

4 Containment Purge 7 15*

5. Penetration Room Purge'- E75*

c. Control Room HV & AC Units - . < 10*

TABLE NOTATION <

Oiesel generator starting and sequence loading delays included when applicable. Response time limit includes movement of valves and attainment of pump or blower discharge pressure.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-20 ,%endment No. 40

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Serial No. 1387 Attachment 5 TE (E t . 1 .

Page,p/4,3 !q$39,ENiaIICN w ]

BASES t ,

3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND J 5;eili 5Y5 TEM INSTRUMENTATION.

The OPERABILITY of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that 1) the associated action and/or trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, 3) .

sufficient redundancy is maintained to pennit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS, SFAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse ,

parameters. l The OPERABILITY of these systerns is required to provide the overall f reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility l design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient con-dit. ions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

~

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the overall systee functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests perfonned at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the RPS, SFAS, and SFRCS action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be dernonstrated by any series of sequential, overlapping or total channel test measuranents provided that such test demonstrate the total charnel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sehsors with cartified response times.

An SFRCS channel consists of 1) the sensing device (s), 2) associated logic and output relays (including Isolation of Main Feedwater Non Essential Valves and Turbine Trip), and 3) power sources. .

]

Safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a turb.ine trip (&ove25percentofRATEDTHERMANLPOWER)ortripofbothmainfeedwater pump turbines. This anticipatory trip will operate in advance of the ,

reactor coolant system high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak'  !

reactor coolant system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the power {

operated relief valve. This anticipatory reactor trip system was j i

installed to satisfy Ites 11.K,2.10 of NUREG-0737

)

1 DAVIS-BESSE Unit 1 B 3/4 3 1 Amendment No. 73

Serial No. 1387 f -

.b - - -

INSTRUMENTATION STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION -

3.3.2.2 The Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System (SFRCS) instrumen-tation channels shown in Table 3.3-11 shall be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint column of Tabie 3.3-12 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-13.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

a. With a SFRCS instrumentation channel trip setpoint less con-servative than the value shown in the Allowable Values column of Table 3.3-12, declare th.e channel inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-11, until the channel is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint

~

adjusted consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With a SFRCS instrumentation channel inoperable, take the actimi shown in Table 3.3-11.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS -

4. 3. 2. 2.1 Each SFRCS instrumentation channel shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL CHECK, CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST during the MODES and at the frequencies shown ir. Table 4.3-11.

4.3.2.2.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the at power CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of channels affected by 3 bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated 1 OPERABLE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALIBRATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.2.3 The STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of ea'ch SFRCS function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months. Each test shall include at least one channel per function such that all channels are tested at least once every N times 18 months where N is the total nember of redundant channels in a specific SFRCS function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" Column of Table 3.3-11.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-23

Serial No. 1387 Attachment 5 -

Page 11 ADDlil0NAL CHANCES PREVf005Li-PROPO![D Di LEITER Suial NoJ35_4 patey_p3g_7 TABLE 3.3-13 STEAM AND FEEDWATER RUPTURE CONTROL SYSTEM RESPONSE TIMES ACTUATED EQUIPMENT RESPONSE TIME IN SECONDS

1. Auxiliary Feed Pump 104

2. Main Steam Isolation Valves *

[

3. Main Feedwater Valves

a. Main Control <8 b ', Startup Control 1 13

c. Stop Valve 16 1

4. Turbine Stop Valves 16 1s 4

. N 4 N4In $bearn low Pres 50/C fg channa is

b. Feeclwader /.$ lea m l Cne erador 'f h b- T D; renlial e nvre kannel.s l

5The resfonse Emc is 40 b' He Eme elapsed frorn the monilored velable exceeding ife Mp Sefpo;d unLl} Lhe +1MV is fa t]y aloseg, DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-29

- - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I

Serial No. 1387

v " TW!8 PAGE PROMDED 3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS P M*DMlWileN DNIJ BASES 3/4.1.1 BORATION CONTROL 3/4.1.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN A sufficient SHUTDOWN MARGIN ensures that 1) the reactor can ue made subcritical from all operating conditions, 2) the reactivity transients associated with postulated accident conditions are controllable within acceptable limits, and 3) the reactor will be maintained sufficiently subcritical to preclude inaptent criticality in the shutdown condition.

During Modes 1 and 2 the SHUTDOWN MARGIN is known to be within limits if all control rods are OPERABLE and withdrawn to or beyond the insertion limits.

SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements vary throughout core life as a function of fuel depletion, RCS boron concentration and RCS T a . The most restrictive condition occurs at E0L, with T at no Y8ad operating temperature. TheSHUTDOWNMARGINrequiredil9 consistent with FSAR safety '

analysis assumptions. l 3/4.1.1.2 BORON DILUTION A minimum flow rate of at least 2800 GPM provides adequate mixing, prevents stratification and ensures that reactivity changes will be gradual through the Reactor Coolant System in the core during boron concentration reductions in the Reactor Coolant System. A flow rate of at least 2800 GPM will circulate an equivalent Reactor Coolant System volume of 12,110 cubic feet in approximately 30 minutes. The reactivity change rate associated with boron concentration reduction will be within the capability for operator recognition and control.

3/4.1.1.3 MODERATOR TEMPERATURE COEFFICIENT The limitations on moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) are provided to ensure that the assumptions used in the accident and transient analyses remain valid through each fuel cycle. The surveillance require-ment for measurement of the MTC each fuel cycle are adequate to confirm the MTC value since this coefficient changes slowly due principally to the reduction in RCS boron concentration associated with fuel burnup.

The confinnation that the measured MTC value is within its limit provides assurance that the coefficient will be maintained within acceptable values throughout each fuel cycle.

(

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DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-1

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Page 13 h}

CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LJITINGCONDITIONFOROPERATION 3.6.3.1 The containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be OPERABLE with isolation times as shown in Table 3.6-2.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) specified in Table 3.6-2 inoperable, either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or '

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b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated aucomatic valve secured in the isolation position, or

c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />'by use of at -

least one closed manual valve or blind flange; _or

d. Be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

l l

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.3.1.1 The isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be

demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after i maintenance, repair or replacement work is performed on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by performance af a cycling test and verification of isolation time.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT.1 3/4 6-14  !

l

l Serial No. 1387 kj n ,t f2 j) r (Ofl;,h h a vt' d i N. t).h4 b(')'

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Page 14 gy,,.;.n re v , 'i r

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b j $t $ iti it h u CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve specified in Table 3.6-2 shall be demonstrated OPERABLE during the COLD SHUTDOWN or REFUELING MODE at least once per 18 months by:

a. Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each ,

automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position. l

b. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation test signal, each Purge and Exhaust automatic valve actuates to its isolation position.

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I DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-15

i Serial'No. 1387' ..

i

T"" THIS PAGE PROVIDED  !

FBRlEBRMAii0N DE

-TABLE 3.6-2 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES PENETRATION VALVE ISOLATION'  ;

NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION TIME (seconds)

A. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION 1 RC240A Pressurizer Sample Line 30

~

1 RC240B Pressurizer Sample Line 30 2 # SS607 Steam Generator Secondary Water Sample ,

Line 10 3 CC1411A Component Cooling Water Inlet Line 15 l 3 CC1411B ComponentCooljngWaterInletLine 15 4 CC1407A Component Cooling' Water Outlet Line 15 )

4 CC1407B Component Cooling Water Outlet Line 15

-l 8A CV5070 Containment Y ssel Vacuum Breaker 15 I 8B CV5071 Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker 15 8C CV5072 Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker 15 80 CV5073 Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker , 15 8E CV5074 Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker 15 8F CV5075 Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker 15 8G CV5076 Containment Vessel Vacuum _ Breaker 15 1 8H CV5077 Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker 15 81 CV5078 Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker 15 8J CV5079 Containment Vessel Vacuum Breaker 15 12 CC1567A Control Rod Drive Cooling Supply Line 15 12 CC15678 Control Rod Drive Cooling Supply Line 15 13 DR2012A Containment Vessel Normal Sump Drain 15 13 DR2012B Containment Vessel Normal Sump Drain 15 14 MU3 RCS Letdown Line 10 14 MU2A RCS Letdown Line 15 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-16

Serial -No. 1387 c Attachment 5 Page 16 TABLE 3.6-2 CONTAINMENTDSOLATIONVALYES(Continued)

PENETRATION VALVE ISOLATION NUMBER NUMBER ' FUNCTION TIME (seconas) 16 RC1719A Containment Vessel' Vent Header 10, 16 RC17198 Containment Vessel Vent Header 10 18 i 55598 Steam Generator Secondary Water Sample Line 10 19 MU33 Normal RCS Makeup Line 10 19 i HPZA High Pressure Injection Line 15 20 i HP2B High Pressure Iidection Line 15 21 DW6831A Demineralized Water Supply Line 10 21 OW68318 Demineralized Water Supply Line 10 22 i HP2D High Pressure Injection Line 15

' 25 CS1531 Containment Spray Line 35 25 C51530 Containment' Spray Line -

35 30 f .DH9A Containment Sump Emergency Recire 71 Line 31 # DH9B Containment Sump Emergency Recire Line 71 32 MC1773A RCS Drain to RC Drain Tank 10 32 RC17738 RCS Drain to RC Drain Tank 10 37 i FW601 Main Feedwater Line 15 38 i FW612 Main Feedwater Line 15 >

• • 39 i M5100 Main Staan Line [N/A l

• -39 f ICS11A Main Steam Line 10 39 i MS375 Main Steam Line 10 39 i M5100-1 Main Steam Line 10

• • 40 i M5101 Main Steam Line N/A l

• • 40 i .IC511B Main Steam Line 10 40 i M5394 Main Steam Line 10 40 i M5101-1 Main Steam Line 10 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-17 AmendmentNo./,72

_.___.._._.__.__________.___________m_

1 ment ,

Page 17 '

E TABLE 3.5-2 1

CONTAllt!ENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

PENETRATION VALVE ISOLATION NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION  ;

TIME j

tseconas) 41 RC232 Pressurizer Quench Tank Circulating Inlet Line 10 42A SA2010 Service Air Supply Line 10 42B CY5010E Containment Yessel Air Sample Return 15 43A IA20ll Instrument Air Supply Line 10 4 38 CY5011E Containment Vessel Air Sample Return 15 44A CR541 Core Rood Tank Fill and N2 Supply Line 10 44B NN236 Pressurizer Quench Tank N2 Supply Line 10 47A CY1545 Core Mood Tank Sample Line 10 47B CY1542 Core Mood Tank Vent-Line ..u.

10 48 RC229A PressurizerQuencEiankCirculating Outlet Line

10 48 RC2298 Pressurizer Quench Tank Circulating 10 Outiet Lina 50 i HP2C High Pressure Injection Line 15 51 CV5037 Hydrogen Purge System Exhaust Line 60 51 CY5038 Hydrogen Purge System Exhaust Line 60 52 MU6M Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Supply 12 53 MU66B Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Supply 12 54 MU66C Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Supply 12 55 MU66D Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Supply 12 56 MU38 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return 12 56 MU59A Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return 30 t

56 MU59B Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return 30 56 MU59C Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Return 30 56 MU59D Reactor Coolant P:ap Seal Return 30 57 MS603 Steam Generator Blowdown Line 80 60 MS611 Steam Generator Dlowdown Line 80

{

l l

l OAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-18 Amendment No. 79 !

Serial No. 1387 Attachment 5 h3g$pd

[jf Te f'

I pp.,[

q Qf g ggg fjE9

,j {;jj f" %

l Page 18; TABLE 3.6-2  !

CONTAINMENTISOLATIONVALVES(Continued)

PENETRATION VALVE ISOLATION NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION TIME (seconds) {

67 CV5090 Hydrogen Oilution System Supply 60  !

68A SS235A Pressurizer Quench Tank Sample ' 30 68A SS235B Pressurizer Quench Tank Sample 30 1

68B CV5010B Containment Air Sample 15 68B CV5011B Containment Air Sample 15 I 69 CV5065 Hydrogen Oilution System Supply 60 71B CV5010A Containment Air Sample 15 718 CV5011A Containment Air Sample -15 71C CV1544 Core Flood Tank N2 Fill 10 73B CV5010C Containment Air. Sample 15 73B CV5011C Containment Air Sample 15 74B CV50100 Containment Airc iample 15 74B CV50110 Containment Aif Sample 15 B. CONTAINMENT PURGE ANO EXHAUST ISOLATION 33 ## CV5005 Containment Vessel Purge Inlet Line 10 33 #p CV5006 Containment Vessel Purge Inlet Line 10 34 ## CV5007 Containment Vessel Purge Outlet Line 10 34 ## CV5D08 Containment Vessel Purge Outlet Line 10 l C. OTHER 5 # SW1366 Containment Air Cooling Units SW Inlet Line N/A j 6 # SW1368 Containment Air Cooling Units SW '

. Inlet Line- N/A 7# SW1367 Containment Air Cooling Units SW l Inlet Line N/A ,

9 # SW1356 Containment Air Cooling Units SW Outlet Line N/A 0 AVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 Amendment No. 81.75 3/4 6-19

i serial No. 1387 y

cAttachment 5 .

y ;h g l age 10 .l TABLE 3.6 $

CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES (Continued)

PENETRATION VALVE i NUMBER ISOLATION NUMBER FUNCTION '

_ TIME j

Tseconas) 10 # SW1358 Containment Air Cooling Units SW N/A-Inlet Line 11 i SW1357 Containment Air Cooling Units SW Outlet Line N/A i 17 CV343 Containment Vessel Leak Test Inlet f Line ^

17 Flange Containment Vessel Leak Test Inlet Line (Inside Containment) N/A 19 i HPS/ High Pressure Injection Line N/A 4

20 f HP56 High Pressure Injection Line

+ N/A 22 i HP49 High Pressure Injection.Line N/A 23 # SF1 Fuel Transfer Tube N/A 23 Flange Fuel Transfer Tube;J - '

N/A 24 # ST2 Fuel Transfer Tube: N/A 24 Flange Fuel Transfer Tube- N/A

'25- C533 Containment spray Line N/A

• 25 C517 Containment Spray Line '

N/A 25 SA536 , Containment Spray.Line N/A 25 SA532 Containment Spray Line '

N/A

• 26 C536 Containment Spray Line N/A

• 26 C518 Containment spray Line N/A 26 SAS35 Containment Spray Line N/A l 26 SA533 Containment spray Line N/A 27 # DHIA Low Pressure. Injection Line N/A 27 i DH76 Low Pressure Injection Line N/A "i DH1B Low Pressure Injection Line N/A 28 f DH77 Low Pressure trigection Line N/A DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-20 Amendment No. 3  !

C '3*

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[ TABLE'3.6-2 50i?%iMiloi\! Bir~ ~~" ~'"""""*

PENETRATION YALYE ISOLATION NUMBER NUMBER FUNCTION TIME

• 29 # DH11 Decay Heat Pump Suction Line N/A

$29 DH23 Decay Heat Pump Suction Line N/A 1 29 ! PSV4849 Decay Heat Pump Suction Line N/A I

35 # AF599 Au'x iliary Feedwater Line _ N/A 36 f AF608 Auxiliary Feedwater Line N/A

+39 i MS107 Main Steam Line N/A

+39 # M5107A Main Steam Line. N/A ,

a40 i M5106 Main Steam Line N/A

=40 i M5106A Main Stearn Line N/A 41 RC113 Pressurizer Quench Tank Inlet Line N/A 42A SA502 Service Air Supply Line N/A 42B CY124 Containment Vessel Air Sample Return .,

N/A 43A IA501 Service Air Supply Line N/A

~

438 CV125 Containment Vesse1 Air Sample Return  ;- N/A 44A CF15 Core Flood Tank Fill and Nitrogen Supply Line N/A 44B NN58 Pressurizer Quench Tank Inlet Line N/A

'47A CF2A Core Flood Tank Sample Line - N/A

'47A CF2B Core Flood Tank Sample Line N/A

'478 CFSA Core Flood Tank Vent Line N/A

'47B CF5B Core Flood Tank Vent Line N/A 49 DH87 Refueling Canal Fill Line N/A 49 DH88 Refueling Canal Fill Line N/A DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 .3/4 6-21 Amendment No. 3

er 3 TABLE 3.6-2 l4N<Plttsclunhtd5 hih,J38%nuosMtd%% h p - Pp e al ,e. mc,, m s. ,CONTA2NMENT ISOLATf0N VALVES.(Continued)

[gw bk. I ISOLATION N!MBER NUMBER FUNCTION _ TIME 49 DH87 Refueling Canal Fill Line N/A 49 DH88 Refueling Canal Fill Line N/A 50 # HP48 High Pressure Injection N/A 52 MU242 RCP Seal Water Supply N/A 53 MU243 RCP Seal Water Supply N/A S4 MU244 RCP Seal Water Supply N/A 55 MU245 RCP Seal Water. Supply N/A Deleted Deleted Deleted Deleted 59 Flange Secondary Side Cleaning (Inside Containment) N/A 59 Flange Secondary Side Cieaning (Outside Contairunent)

.: . . . N/A 67 CY209 Hydrogen Dilution System Supply N/A 69 CY210 Hydrogen Dilution System Supply N/A 71A f CV2000S Containment Pressure Sensor N/A 71C CF16 Core Flood Tank Nitrogen Fill Line h/A l 72A f CV2001B Containment Pressure Sensor N/A 72C f CV624B Containment Pressure Differential Transmitter N/A '

73A # CV2002B Containment Pressure Sensor N/A 73C i CV6458 Containment Pressure Differential Transmitter N/A 74A f CV2003B Containment Pressure Sensor N/A

+74C DH2735 Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray N/A

• 74C DH2736 Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray N/A vay be opened on an intermittent basis unoer administrative control. I

1. Not subject to Type C leakage tests.

l

" Surveillance testing not reguired prior to entering MODE 4 but shall be performed prior to entering Mode 3. ,

1. fProvisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable provided the valve is in tha closed positions and deactivated.

~

DAVIS-BESSE, UhIT 1 3/4 6-22 Amendment No. Z g,79 l

Serial'No. 1387 -. 'l e2 , ;l i

[' ;

o FORiSFDMAT10NDiB CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS-BASES i

leakage rate are consistent with the asstanptions used in the safety _ .

analyses. The leak rate surveillance requirements assure that the l 1eakage assumed for the system during' the recirculation phase will not i be exceeded.

3/4.6.2.2 CONTAINMENT COOLING SYSTEM

' The OPERABILITY of the containment cooling system ensures that 1) the containment air temperature will be maintained within limits during normal operation, and 2) adequate heat removal capacity is available when operated in conjunction with the containment spray systems during post-LOCA conditions.

3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES m.

The OPERABILITY of the containment isolatio'n valves ensures that the -

containment' atmosphere will be isolated from the.outside environment in the event ~ of a release of radioactive 'ma'terial to the containment atmosphere or pressurization of the containment. Containment isolation within +.he time limits specified ensures that the release of radioactive material to the environment will be consistent with the a,ssumptions used in the analyses for a LOCA.

i I

I DAVIS-BESSE, UNTI 1 8 3/4 6-3 1

l

Serial No. 1387

' Attachment 5 Page 23 PLANT SYSTEMS, ,

MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3. 7.1. 5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall-be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

MODE 1 - With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, POWER OPERATION may continue provided the inoperable valve is either restored to OPERABLE status or closed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

Otherwise, be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next-12 hours.

MODES 2 -

and 3 - With one main steam line isolation valve inoperable, subsequent operationinMODES1,2ogmay,proceedprovided:

a. The inoperable isolatjon j

valve.is maintained closed.

x- .~x Otherwise, be ir. HOT SHUT 90WN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

b. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. .

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.7.1.5 Each main steam line isolation valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE +by :rifying ful' cleture withia 5 te:end when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5. ,

Psf fhe reguiremenis of Spalllcalion .5pt. 3, a.a q.

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 7-9 l

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Serial No. 1387 Attachment 5 flJjlO h%[

Page 24 l () p) h licA Lkhf%

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t PLANT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4. 7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEMS The OPERABILITY of the Auxiliary Feedwater Systems ensures that the Reactor Coolant System can be cooled down to less than 280*F from normal operating conditions in the event of a total loss of offsite power. f Each steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump is capable of delivering a total feedwater flor of 800 gpm at a pressure of 1050 psig to the entrance of the steam generators. This capacity is sufficient to ensure that adequate feedwater flow is available to remove decay heat and reduce the Reactor Coolant System temperature to lest Heat Removal System may be placed into operation.than 280*F where the Decay Following any modifications or repairs to the Auxiliary Feedwater System piping from the Condensate Storage Tank through auxiliary feed j

pumps to the steam generators that could affect the system's capability '

to deliver water to the steam generators, following extended cold shutdown, a flow path verification test shall be performed. This test may be conducted in MODES 4, 5 or 6 using auxiliary steam to drive the .,

auxiliary feed pumps turbine to demonstrate thst the- flow path exists from the Condensate Storage Tank to th~e feed pumps. '

[ steam generators via auxiliary 3/4.7 1.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE FACILITIES The OPERABILITY of the Condensate Storage Tank with the minimum i water volume ensures that sufficient water is available to maintain the l ]

RCS at HOT STANDBY conditions for 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> with steam discharge to atmosphere and to cooldown the Reactor Coolant System to less than )

280'F in the event of a total loss of offsite power or of the main i feedwater system. The contained water volume limit includes an allowance for water not usable because of tank discharge line location or other 'l physical characteristics. l 3/4.7.1.4 ACTIVITY The limitations on secondary system specific activity ensure that the resultant offsite radiation dose will be limited to a small fraction of 10 CFR Part 100 limits in the event of a steam line rupture. This dose includes the effects of a coincident 1.0 GPM primary to secondary tube leak in the steam generator of the affected steam line. These ,

values are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.7.1.5 MAIN STEAM LINE ISOLATION VALVES The OPERABILITY of the main steam line isolation valves ensures that no more than one steam generator will blowdown in the event of a steam line rupture. This restriction is required to 1) minimize the DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 7-2 Amendment No. 58, 96

LSerial No.:1387 a e

PLANT SYSTEMS' ,

BASES positive reactivity effects of the Reactor Coolant System cooldown associated with the blowdown, and 2) limit the pressure rise within containment in the event the steam line rupture occurs wi' thin contain-ment. The OPERABILITY of the main steam isolation valves within the '

closure times.of the surveillance requirements are consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4. 7.1. 6 SECONDARY WATER CHEMISTRY A test program will be conducted during approximately.the first 6 months following initial criticality to establish the appropriate limits' on the secondary water chemistry parameters and to deter.aine the appro--

priate frequencies for monitoring these parameters. The results of this l

test program will be submitted to the Comission for review. The Comis-sion will then-issue a . revision to this specification specifying the. -

limits on the parameters and the frequencies for monitoring these l parameters.

The test program will includUan analysis of the chemical constituents of the condenser cooling water at the point of-intake. -The analysis shall-identify the various traces of ions which'upon concentration in.the j condensate may have the potentia.1 for inducement for stress corrosion 1

in the steam generator tubing. The test program shall' also evaluate the efficiency of the water treatment systems in the facility for removal of such ions and the potential for addition of other' ions resulting from l

the treatment method. The test program shall analyze concentration phenomena'

and the concentration rates in the" steam generator and the secondary water system and shall consider concentration in the recirculating cooling water system.

l 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE / TEMPERATURE LIMITATION The limitation on steam generator pressure and temperature ensures that the pressure induced stresses in the steam generators do not exceed the maximum allowable fracture toughness stress limits. The limitations of 110*F and 237 psig are based on a steam generator RTNDT of 404 and are sufficient to prevent brittle fracture.

3/4.7.3 COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM The OPERABILITY of the component cooling water system ensures that sufficient cooling capacity is available for continued operation of safety related equipment during normal and accident conditions. The redundant cooling capacity of this system, assuming a single failure, is i

consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses ~.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 8 3/4 7-3

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