ML20197J262

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Proposed Tech Specs Pages Re Changes to TS Definition 1.2, TS 3/4/9.5 & New TS 3.0.6 & Associated Bases.Ts Index Rev to Reflect Change to TS 3/4.9.5,included
ML20197J262
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 12/23/1997
From:
CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:
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ML20197J241 List:
References
NUDOCS 9801020124
Download: ML20197J262 (34)


Text

-.

I IAR 97-0002- '

h Pcg3 12-'

INDEX '

LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVETILANCE REQUIREMENT _

SECTION PAGE 3/4.9 REFUEIJNG OPERATIONS _ -

'3/4.9.1

-3/4.9.2 BORON CONCENTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/4 . . .9-l' \

INSTRUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .= . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/49-2 ...

3/4.9.3 ' DECA Y TIME. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/49-3 .........

3/4.9.4 - CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/49-4 ........ '

3/4.9.5 DFT RTED GGMML"! CATIONS . . . .' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3/4.9.6 FUEL HANDLING BRIDGE OPERABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/49 ..

3/4.9.7 CPANE TRAVEL - FUEL HANDLING BUILDING. . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/49-7 3/4.9.8 DECAY HEAT REMOVAL AND COOLANT CIRCULATION All Water Le vels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/49-8 low Wa ter Le vel s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/4

. . .9-8a 3/4.9.9 DELETED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/49-9 3/4.9.10 WATER LEVEL - REACTOR VESSEL. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 . . .9-10....

3/4.9.11 STORAGE POOL WATER LEVEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/49-11 .......

3/4.9.12 STORAGE POOL VENTILATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 . . .9-12.....

3/4.9.13 SPENT FUEL POOL FUEL ASSEMBLY STORAGE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3/4 . . .9-13 4

3/4.10 SPECIAIcTESTEXCEPTIONS 3/4.10.1 GROUP HEIGHT, INSERTION AND POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS.......................................................... 3/4 10-1 3/4.10.2 PHYSICS TESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/4 . . 10-2 3/4.10.3 REACTOR COOLANT LOOPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/4 . . 10-3 3/4.10.4 S HUTDOWN MARGIN. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3/4 . .10-4

- DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 VIII Amendment No. 38,130,186, giogk [h 6 P

y e ___.,_,uma m .

LAR 97-0002 i

PZg3 13 INDEX BASES SECTION ,. PAGE 3/4.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3/4.7.1 TURBINE CYCLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-1 3/4.7.2 STEAM GENERATOR PRESSUREffEMPERATURE LIMITATION . B 3/4 7-4 3/4.7.3 - C'OMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 -

3/4.7.4 . SERVICE WATER SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 ,

3/4.7.5 ULTIMATE HEAT SINK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 '

3/4.7.6 CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEM . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-4 ~ ~

3/4.7.7 S NUB BERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-5 3/4.7.8 SEALED SOURCE CONTAMINATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 7-6 3/4.7.9 Deleted 3/4.7.10 Deleted i

3/4.8 ELECTilICAL POWER SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 8-1 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.21NSTRUMENTATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B 3/4 9-1 3/4.9.5 Deleted COMMU". CATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E 3/1 9 1 4

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 . XII Amendment No. 38,106.135,174, v.

- 1Altf 97 0002 :

[, ,

, -Pag) 143 1 DEFINrrlONE

' ~

CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTESI 4

1.11 JA CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST shall be:

a'.

Analog channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel as close to the primary sensor as' practicable to verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or :

trip functions. -

- b. Bistable channels - the injection of a simulated signal into the channel sensor to -

verify OPERABILITY including alarm and/or trip functions.

. CORE ALTERATIQM ' ~

T1.12 CORE ALTERATION shall be the movement erinanipulation-of any fuet sources or wtivity control component,s within the reactor presswe-vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel. Suspension of CORE ALTERATIONS shall not preclude completion of rnovement of a component to a safe ccr. ;-/;9/c position.

= SHUTDOWN MARGIN 1.13 SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be the instantaneous amount of reactivity by which the reactor is suberitical or would be suberitical from its present condition assuming:

a. No chang- la axial power shaping rod position, and b.

All control rod assemblics (safety and regulating) are fully inserted except for the single rod assembly of highest reactivity woith which is assumed to be fully withdrawn.

- IDEN 1 winn IRAKAGE .

1.14 IDENTwmv LEAKAGE shallbe:

a.

Leal. Se (except CONTRO1 tm LEAKAGE) into closed systems, such as pump seal or valve packing leaks that are captured and conducted to a su.mp or collecting tank, or b.

Leakage into the containment atmosphere from sources that are both specifically , ,

located and known either not to interfere with the operation ofleakage detection -

systems or not to be PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE, or-L DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT l~ 1-3 i

~~ Amendment No.

__m._____.___ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ ._. _ _ _ _ _ -

.. - - -. - - - - - - . . . - - . -. . ~

1AR 9750002' i Paga'15

3/4 LIMITING COliDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE REOUI i3/4.0 APPLICABII.ITY .

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION '

3.0.1 Limiting Conditions for Operation and ACTION requiren.:nts shall be applicable during the-OPERATIONAL MODES or other conditions specified for each specification.

3.0.2 Adherence to the requirements of the Limiting Condition for Operation and/or associated

- ACrlON within the specified time interval shall constitute compliance with the specification. In the ~

event the Limiting Condition for Operation is restored prior to expiration of the specified time interval, completion of the ACTION statement is not required.

, 3.0.3 When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, action shall be initiated within I hour to place the unit in a MODE in which the >

Specification does not apply by plachig it, as applicable, in:

1.- At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, 2.- At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and ,

3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Where corrective measures are completed that perndt operation under the ACTION requirements, t

- ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified time limits as f uured from the time of failure to meu the Limiting Condition for Operation. Exceptions to these requwments are stated in the individual Specifications.

- 3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL MODE or other specified applicability condition shall not be made unless the canditions of the Limiting Condition for Operation are met without reliance on provis contained in the ACTION statements unless otherwise excepted.- This provision shall not prevent passage through OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION statements.

3.0.5 When a system, subsystem, train, component or device is determined to be inoperable so because its emergency power source is inoperable, or solely because its normal power' source is '

inoperable, it may be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of s' atisfying the requirements of 7 applicable Limiting Condition for Operation, previded: (1) its corresponding normal or emergenc power source is OPERABLE; and (2) all ofits redundant system (s), subsystem (s), train (s), compl

' and device (s) are OPERABLE, or likewise satisfy the requirements of this specification. Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> action shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in _which the applicable Limiting Condition for Operation does not apply by placin'g it as ap 1.

At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

, 2. A.t least IIOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and

.. 3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, This Specification is not applicable in MODES 5 or 6. j '

. 1 3IOM Eaulnment removed from service or declared inonerable to comolv

returned to service under administrative control solelv to nerform testine reauired to demonstrate its l

!- 10PERABIY 2TY or the OPERABILITY of other caninment. This is an excention t)

L - for the system returned to service under administintive control to nerform the testing reauired to demonstrate OPERABILITY. ,

" DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 L 3/4 0-1.

  • Any,ndment No 71 1

,. . , , - .. 'M .1 A- - .

a

IAR 97-oo02 Pega 16 F.EACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - SHUTDOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.1 At least one of the following boron injection flow paths shall be OPERABLE.

a. A flow path from the concentrated boric acid storage system via a boric acid pump and a makeup or decay heat removal (DHR) pump to the Reactor Coolant System, if only the boric acid storage system in Specification 3.1.2.8a is OPERABLE, or
b. A flow path from the borated water storage tank via a makeup or DHR pump to the Reactor Coolant System if only the borated water storage tank in Specification 3.1.2.8b is OPERABLE'.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6.

ACTION:

With none of the above flow paths OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one injection path is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1. 2.1 At least one of the above required flow paths shall be demon-strated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by verifying that the pipe tempera-ture of the heat traced portion of the flow path is > 105'F when a flow path from the concentrated boric acid storage system is used, and
b. At least once per 31' day's b{ verifying that each valve (manua'1, power operated or automatic, in the flow path that is not locked, sealed or otherwise secured in position is in its correct position.
If the 7 day verification falls during transfers of makeup water or dilute boron solutions (fluid source concentration of less than 5000 ppmB), the verification period may be extended up to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after the addition of dilute boron solution has been stopped for a period of at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1 6 Amendment No. 67

.+

LAR 97-0000 Pr.92 17 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEtts DECAY HEAT REMOVAL PUMP - SHUTOOWN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.5 At least one decay heat removal (OHR) pump in the boron injection flow path required by Specification 3.1.2.1 or 3.1.2.2 shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE essential bas.

_ APPLICABILITY: MODES 4*, 5* and 6.

ACTION:

With no OHR pump OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one OHR pump is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.5 No additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5.

RCS Pressure < 150 psig. -

DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 3/4 1-11

LAR 97-o002 P ge 18 .

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS MIS PAGE PROVIDED BORIC ACIO PUMP - SHUT 00Wt1 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.2.6 At least one boric acid pump shall be OPERABLE and capable of being powered from an OPERABLE essential bus if only the flow path through the boric acid pump in Specification 3.1.2.la is OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITl: H00ES 5 and 6.

ACTI0t{:

With no boric acid pump OPERABLE 'as required to complete the flow path of Specification 3.1.2.la, suspend all operations involving CORE At.TERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until at least one boric acid pump is restored to OPERAGl.E status.

SURVEILLANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.1.2.6 Ho additional Surveillance Requirements other than those required by Specification 4.0.5 are applicable.

[

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 1-12 Amendment No.197

I LAR 97-ooo2 l P ge 19 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS B0 RATED WATER SOURCES - SHtfTDOWN IIMITINGCONDITIONfbROPERATION -

3.1.2.8 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall i

be OPERABLE:

a. A boric acid addition system with:

1.

A minimum available borated water volume of 900 gallons, l

2. ;t 7875 and '.< 13,125 ppm of boron, and l
3. A minimum solution temperature of 105'F.
b. The borated water storage tank (BWST) with:

1.

A minimum available borated water volume of 3,000 gallons,

2. A minimum boron concentration of 2600 ppm, and l
3. A minimum solution temperature of 35'F.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6 i

ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPEPABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATION or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated water sourc'c is restored to OPERABLE status.

SURVElttANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.0 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a. At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the available borated water volume of the source, 2.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water, and DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-14 Amendment No.47612A-

-19h 207 '

IAR 97-0002 Pzg3 20 4

Tills PAGE PROVIDED 3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3/4.3.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEN'INSTRlNENTATION _

_LlHITING CO,'!0! TION FOR OPERATION 3.3.1.1 As a minimum, the Reactor r.otection System instrumentation channels and bypasses of Table 3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE with RESPONSE -

TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-2.

APPLICABILITl: As chown in Table 3.3-1. '

ACTION:

ADDlil0NAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY As shown in Table 3.3-1. PROPOSED BY LETTER SerialNo, 2 4O S Date i M"[%

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.3.1.1.1 Each Reactor Protection System instnsnentation channel shall be demcastrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL OlECK OlANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNZL FUNCTIONAL TEST operations during the MODES and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3-1, 4.3.1.1.2 The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at

- least once per 18 months during O(ANNEL CALIBFATION testing of each channel affected by bypass operation.

4:3.1.1 '3 The REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of each reactor trip18 per function months.shall be demonstrated to be within its limit at least once s Each test shall include at least one channel per function wuch that all channels are tested at least once every H times 18 nanths t here N is the total number of redundant channels in a specific reactor 3 rip.

.3-1.function as shown in the " Total No. of Channels" column

' o ' 'f Table DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-1 e

m_.____._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _

IABLE 3.3-1

~

e REACTOR PROTECTIC'i SYSTEM i STRtHENTATION E -. t m MINIMUM E 5e iOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICASLE k FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE PODES

=

M

,A ECTION

%{

1. Manual Reactor Trip 2 1 2 1, 2 and
  • O 1 . 3 E 2. High Flux 4 2 3 1, 2 ,

2i 10 l

3. RC High Te perature 4 2 3 1, 2 3#, 10
4. Flux - 61ux - Flow 4 2(a)(o) 3 1, 2 2f, 10
5. RC Lcw Pressure 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 3#, 10
6. RC High Pressure 4 2 3 1? 31, 10

$ 7. RC Pressure-Tc:perature 4 2(a) 3 1, 2 3f, 10

, 8. High Flux /Nu=ber of Reactor Coolank -

I Pu ps On - 4 2(a)(b) 3 1, 2 3f, 10

9. Contain=ent High Pressure 4 2 3 1, 2 3#, 10
10. Inter =ediate Range, Neutron Flux and Rate 2 N/A 2(c) 1, 2 and
  • 4 H p
11. Source Range, Heutron Flux and Rate X 2

E A. Startup B. Shutdown-2 N/A 2 2ff and

  • 5 Wy 2 N/A 1 3, 4 and 5 R

?- 12. Control Rod Drive Trip Breakers 1 per trip 6

2 ~13

=

2 per trip system system 2 per 1, 2 and

  • 7f, af D trip system

~

MM g 13. Reactor' Trip Module 2 per trip I per trip 2 per W

g system I, 2 and

  • 7f system trip system N

?

$ O

14. Shutdown. Bypass High Pressure 4 2 3 2**, 3**

4**, 5**

65 2 CD g g-

15. SCRRelayh 2 2 2 E 1, 2 and
  • 9f F
E =T1=

LAR 97-ooo2 P:ga 22 JABLE 3.3-1 (Continued) 11.8tf NOTATION

  • With the control rod drive trip breakers in the closed position and the control rod drive system capable of rod withdrawal.
    • Vhen Shutdown Bypass is actuated.

(The provisions 6f Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable, ffHigh voltage to detector may be d'e-energized above 10

  • an.ps on both Intermediate. Range channels.

(a) Trip may be manually bypassed when RCS pressure s 1820 psig by actaating Shutdown Bypass provided that: t (1) The iligh Flux Trip Setpoint is s 5% of RATED THEPJiAL POWER, (2) The Shutdown Bypass lIlgh Pressure Trip Setpoint of s 1820 psig is imposed, and (3) The Oh down Bypa.s is removed when.RCS pressure > 1820 psig.

(b) Trip may be manually bynassed when Specification 3.10.3 is in effect.

(c) The minimum channels OPERABLE requirement may be reduced to one when Specification 3.10.1 or 3.10.2 is in effect.

ACT'f0N STATEMENTS .

ACTION 1 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one les, than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 ho.rs or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next S hours and/or open the control rod drive trip breakers.

ACTION 2 -

With the number of OPERA 3LE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

[ .

a. The inoperable chaanel is placed in the bypassed or tripped condition within one hour. [
b. Either, THERMAL POWER is restricted to s 75% of RATED 11{ERMAL POWER and the High flux Trip Setpoint is reduced to S 85% of RATED THERMAL POWER within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or the QUADRANT F0WER TitT is monitored at least once per 12. hours.

THIS PAGE PROVIDED .

FORINFORMATION ONLY DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-3 Amendment No.185

IAR 97.o002 TABlf 3.3-1 fContinueql g l[pH STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 3 -

With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels STARTUP and POWER OPERATION may proceed provided .the inoperable.channe) .is placed in the hyprsscd or tripped condition within one hour.

ACTION 4 -

With the number of channels OPERABLE one lesi than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and with the THERMAL POWER level:

a. s 5% of RATED THERMAL POWER restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status prior to increasing THEPML POWER above 5% of RATED THERKAL POWER.
b. > 5% of RA'IED THERMAL POWER, POWER OPERATION may continue.

EBRinf0RWBHBE DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-4 Amendment No.J35,185

1AR 97 0002 IlilS PAGE PR01100 FORINFORIAAll0N DNiY

, TABLE 3.3 1 (Continued)

ACTION STATENDITS (Continued)

ACTION $ - .

Vith the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement and vith the THERMAL POVER levels

a. 3 10-10 amps on the Intermediate Range (IR) instru-mentation,restoretheinoperablechanneltoOPERA$p status prior to increasing TEPJiAL POVER above 10 amps on the IR instrumentation.
b. > 10-10 amps on the IR instrumentation, operation may continue.

ACTION 6 - Vith the number of channels OPERABLE one less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, verify compliance with the SBt/TDOVN MARGIN requirements of Specification 3.1.1.1 vithin one hour and at les.st once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereaf ter.

ACTIO!i 7 - Vith the nukbc of OP"ABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels STAhNP and/or POVER OPERATION may proceed provided all of the following conditions are satisfied

a. Vithin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />
1. Place the inoperable channel in the tripped condition.

or

2. Remove pover supplied to the control rod trip device associated vith the inoperative channel.

. b. One additional channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.1.1.1, and the inoperable channel above may be bypassed for up to 30 minutes in any 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> period when necessary to test the trip breaker associated vith the logic of the channel being tested per Specification 4.3.1.1.1. The inoperable channel above may not be bypassed to test the logic of a channel of the trip system associated with the inoperable channel.

DAVIS-BES$E. tJNIT 1 3/4 3-$ Amendment No. AM l'3 5

('ven t rage is 3/4 3-Sa.)

LAN 97 0002 P2 2 !,

JALIlE 3.3 1 (Continuedi_

ACTION STATEMENTS (Continued)

ACTION 8 -

With one of the Reactor Trip Breaker diverse trip features (undervoltage or shunt trip devices) inoperable, restore it to OPERABLE ' status in 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or place the breaker in trip in the next hour. I ACTION 9 .-

With one or both channels of SCR Relays inoperable, restore the channels to OPiRABLE status during the ncrt COLD SHUTDOWN exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

ACTION 10 -

With the number of channels OPEfa9LE one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, within one hour, place one ino)erable channel in trip and the second inoperable channel in aypass, and restore one of the inoperable channels to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and open the reactor trip breakers.

THIS PAGE PROVIDED FORINFORMAll0N DE DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-Sa Amendment No.108.735)85 (Next page is 3/4 3-6.) -

- . _ ~ . _ _ . . . - - - . - - .- - - . - . . - - . . . . . _ - -- . -

IM 97 o002 Pego 26

~

TlilS PAGE PROVIDED

~s ~ ~ > = ~ FORINFORIN10N ONly 1/a.3.2 SAftTY SYSTEM INST 20MENTAT10N_

^

$UtTY (CATURt3 ACTUA710N SYSTEM INSTRUM(NTATION t

LIMitNG CON 0! TION FOR OPERAff 0N 3,3.2.1 The Safety features Actuation System ($FAS) functional units l shown in T.ble 3.3 3 shall be OPEPJBLC with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Tric Setpoint colurm of Table 3.3 4 and with RESPONSE 11NC5 as shown in Table 3.3 5.

a p pt,1 CA811,17Y : As snown in Table 3.3 3..

ACT!ON: j 1

Witn a 5FAS functional unit trip setpoint less conservative a.

than tht value snown in the Allowable Yalues column of Table .

3.3 4, declare. the functional unit inoperabia and apply the soplicable ACTION reovirement of Table 3.3-3. until the func.

- tional unit is restored to OPERAtLE status with the trip setpoint adjusted consistent with the Trip 5etpoint valut.

or ,

b. With a SFA5 functional unit inoperable. take the action shown gg oc : B in Table 3.3 3.

I

  • = d g3 -

13 w $URVE!LLANCE REQUIREMENT 5 E*

$fseN 4 . 3. 2.1.1 Each 5FAS functional unit shal be demonstrated OPEPASLE by EE* th'e perfomance of the CFANNEL CHECK. CHANNEL CALIBRATION and CHANNEL d FUNCTIONAL TEST during the MODE 3 and at t'a frecuencies shewn in Table g "" 5 4.3 2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be denonstrated OPERA 8LE during the at power CMANNEL FUNCT!0 MAL TEST of functional units affected by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated 0FEAASLE at least once per 18 sonths during CHANNEL Ch.!! RATION in, ting of each functional unit affected by bypass operation.

4.3.2.1.3 The SAFt1T FEATURES Rt519N5t TIME of each 5FAS function shall be denenstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 sonths.

Each test shall include at least one functjenal unit per fuiction such .

I I

that all functional units are tested ~st leas't once every N times 18 -

months whare N is the total number of redundant functional units in a '

specific 5FAS funct111 as shown in the ' Total No. of Units

  • Colism of i l

Table 3.3 3.

DAVI5 BE5SE. UNIT 1 3/4 3-9 i

- --- ---- - - -. - w,c-- w e ~ - -.e,.. w- - - ---

THIS PAGE PROVIDED ADDITIONAL CHANGES FREVIOUSLY

-s= =

. Serial Ne. 2 390 Date 424/91 n

! sm FORINf0RIET10NONIY . ~!"

taste 3.3-3

w - r i U SAFETT FEAftlBES ACTilATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION i
  • A I MINIMUM I TOTAL NO. IMITS INGITS APFt.ICABLE j FistCTIONAL IMIT OF 1581TS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTIIm
1. IllSTRISIENT STRIIIGS
a. Containment Radiation'- I j Eigh .

4 2 3 1,2,3,4,6a*** los

h. Costainment'Fressura '- ~

Eigh 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 101 i

c. Caetainee<st Pressure -

.Nigh-Sigh 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 lui i

d. RCS Fressure - Lov 4 2 3 1, 2, 3* 101
s. RCS Pressure - law-Low 4 2 3 1, 2, 3*e 101 '

BUST Level - 14v-14v 4 2 3 1., 2., 3 tog l

2 f.

w

- L o
2. DUTFttr IAGIC
a. Incident Imrel 51: -

I Centalement feelation 2 1 2 1,2,3,4,6***a 11

b. Incident level 52:

Bigh Pressere Isjection i and Startleg Diesel Generators 2 1 2 I , 2, 3, 4  :: 1

c. Tacidet Intel 83: 1,2,3,4 si l

a d.

I4e tru sste Injectico Incident imel 04:

2 1 2 1 y

costalement spray Incident I4 ,el 05:

2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 1: Il

e. ,

g Costelament Semp 2 1, 2, 3, 4 11 I j s Recircolation Fermissive 2 1 k

t',  !

1 .

m I I IS PAGE PROVIDED

="

. No3,e "l="" e., aau- M..

FORINFORIAATION ONIY IABLE 3.3-3 (Centinued)

~

SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRtHENTATION MINIMUM

. TOTAL rf0. UNITS UNITS Fl*NCTIONAL LMIT 0F UNITS APPLICABLE TO TRIP OPEPABLE _ MODES _

ACTION _

3. MANUAL ACTUATION w a. SFAS (except Containment 1 Spray and Emer w Recirculation)gency Su=p 2 2 L

2 1,2,3,4,6**** 12.

b. Containment Spray 2 t

2 2 1,2,3,4 12 1 j 4. SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS'

a. Sequencer 4 2/ BUS 2/ BUS 1,2,3,4 15f l
b. Essential Bus Feeder Breaker Trip (90%) 4***** 2/ BUS 2/ BUS 1,2,3,4 15# l

?" c. Diesel Generator Start, LF P*

Load shed on Essential Bus (59%) 4 ~

2/ BUS 2/ BUS 1,2,3,4 15#

o, " 5.

{

INTERLOCK CHANNELS

,P a.

i yi Decay Heat Isolation Valve 1

' H0

  • 1 1 1,2,3 137 -
b. Pressurizer Heaters 2 2 2 3****** 14 i

i

IAH 97-o003 itga 39

~

IlilS PAGE PROVIDED

=ww40RINFORNlATION ONN Trip function may be bypassed in this H00E with RCS pressure below 1800,psig. Dypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 1800 psig.

    • Trip function may be bypassed in this H0DE with RCS pressure below 600 psig. Dypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 600 psig.
      • DELETED l
        • This instrumentation, or the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor (with the containment purge and exhaust system in operation), must be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.9.4. When using the containment purge ano exhaust system noble gas monitor, SfAS is not required to be OPERABLE in H00E 6.
  • "** All functional units may be bypassed for up to one minute when starting each Reactor Coolant Pump or Circulating Water pump.
            • When either Decay lleat Isolation Valve is open, f The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 10 - With the r. umber of OPERABLE functional units one less than the Total Number of Units, STARTUp and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed provided both of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable functional unit is placed in the tripped condition within one hour.
b. The Minimum Units OPERABLE requirement is met; howeur, one additional functional unit may be bypa'ssed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 11 - With any component in the Output !.ogic inoperable, trip the associated components within one hour or be in at least il0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD Sl;UTDOWN within the

. following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

~

ADDill0NAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED BY LE11[R serial No. Ul? DaieI/IdM DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4.3-12 Amendment No. 48r-37r-52WC23

-1357-1597-18Gr 211

j 1AR 97 o002 l P g3 30 l

HIS PAGE PROVIDED TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

FORINFOMIATION ONLY

~

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE Units one less than the Total Number of Units, restore the inoperable functional unit to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least il0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SilUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 13 - a. With less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure ). 428 psig, both Decay lleat Isolation Valves (Dill) and Dill 2) shall be verified closed. .

b. With less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure < 438 psig operation may continue; however, the functional unit shall be OPERABLE prior to increasing reactor coolant pressure above 438 psig.

ACTION 14 - With less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure < 438 psig, operation may continue

  • however, the functional unit shall be OPERABLE prior to Increasing reactor coolant pressure abova 438 psig, or the inoperable functional unit shall be placed in the tripped state.

ACTION 15 - a.

With the number of OPERABLE units one less than the Minimum Units Operable per Bus, place the inoperable unit in the tripped condition within one hour. For functional unit 4.a '

the sequencer shall be placed in the tripped condition by physical removal of the sequencer module. The inoperable functional unit may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

b.

With the number of OPERABLE units two less than the Minimum

~ - ~ ' Units Operable per Bus, declare inoperable the Emergency Olesel Generator associated with the functional units not meeting the required minimum units GPERABLE and take the ACTION required of Specification 3.8.1.1.

PR P0 0 B 4 q

, serialNo__ _ .

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 3-12a Amendment Nar. -2Br-52dO3r 435) 211 l

__._____.___.____m__ _ . _ _ ____.__ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ ___

IAH 97-o002 PC93 31 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.6.3.1 All containment isolation valves shall be OPEPABLE with isolation times less than or equal to required isolation times.*

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

With one or more of the isolation valve (s) inoperable, either:

a. Restore the inoperable valve (s) tn OPEPABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or
    • b. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or .
    • c. Isolate each affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange; or
d. Be in at least il0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SituTDOWN 'within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4. 6. 3.1.1 The isolat' ion valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE prior to returning the valve to service after maintenance, repair or replacement work that could affect the valve's perfonnance is perfonned on the valve or its associated actuator, control or power circuit by perfonnance of a cycling test and verification of isolation time.
  • Surveillance testing of valves MS100, itS101, ICS11A and ICS118 is not required prior to entering MODE 4 but shall be perfonned prior to entering MODE 3'.
    • The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable. Selected valves may be opened on an intermittent basis under administrative controls.

Amendment No. 147 DAVIS-BESSE, UNil 1 3/4 6-14

!)Jt 97-o002 P ga 32

[.0ffTAINMENT SYSTEMS SURVfittANCf REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.6.3.1.2 Each isolation valve shall be dergonstrated OPERABLE at least.once each REFUEllifG Il(TERVAL, by:

a. Verifying that on a containment isolation test signal, each automatic isolation valve actuates to its isolation position.
b. Verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust isolation test signal, each Purge and Exhaust automatic valve actuates to its isolation position.

1 4.6.3.1.3 The isolation time of each )ower operated or automatic valve shall i be determined to be within its limit w1en tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

l IlilS PAGE PROVIDED FORINFORMATION ONLY 4

ADDlil0NAL CHANGES PREVIOUSLY ,

PROPOSED BY LETTER.

SerialNo._ Z 190 Datefhe/97 9

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-15 Amendment No. -Hh- 213

=>:"" THIS PAGE PRDVIDED ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS A.C. SOURCE _S_

l SHUTDOVt{

l THITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.8.1.2 As a minimum, the following A.C. electrical power sources shall be OPERABLE: l

a. One qualified circuit between the offsite transmission network and the onsite Class IE A.C. electrical power distribution system, and
b. One diesel generator with:
1. Day fuel' tank containing a minimum volume of 4000 gallons of fuel,
2. A fuel storage system containing a minimum volume of 32,000 gallons of fuel, and
3. A fuel transfer pump.

APPLICABILITY: N0 DES 5 and~6.

ACTION:

With less than the above minimum required A.C. electrical power sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes until the minimum required A.C. electrical power soure.es are restored to OPERABLE status.

EURVEllt ANCE REOUIREMENTS 4.8.1.2 The above required A.C. electrical power sources shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of each of the Surveillance Requirements of 4.8.1.1.1 and f..B.1.1.2 except for requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a 5, 4.8.1.1.2.a.7, 4.8.1.1.2.c.5 and 4.8.1.1.2.c.7.

l DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 8-5 Amendment No. -7h 203

IAR 97 ooo2 g PAGE PR -

2/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS f0RINf0RMMBM BNU LLORON CONCENTRATION 1IMITING CONDITION -

FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant ensure aand Systeta K the refueling canal.shall be maintained uniforra and sufficient to for uncertaYnties.of 0.95 or less, which includes a 1% ok/k conservative allowance APPLICABILITY: H0DE 6. '

/&Il01(:

With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, innedtately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive reactivity changes and initiate and continue boration of h 12 spm of 7875 ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until K is reduced to s 0.95. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are n,'t'o applicable.

SURVEittANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The above condition shall be determined prior to:

l

a. Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and b.

Withdrawal of any tafety or regulating rod in excess of 3 feet from its fully inserted position within.the reactor pressure vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the reactor pressure vessel and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once cach 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

DAVIS-DESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. -145 207 3

IAR 97-ooo2 l

REFUEt!.*;G OPERATIONS INSTTIENTATION LlHIT!*1G CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.2 As a minimum, two source range neutron flux monitors, one from each side of the reactor core, shall be operating, each with continuous visual indication in the control room and one with audible indication in the contain-ment and control room.

APPL!CABILITY: H0DE 6. -

,ACT!3*::

'dith the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, i. mediately

  • suspene all operations involving CORE ALTE8AT10NS or positive reactivity changes. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable. .

SUP.VEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.2 As a minimum, two source range neutron flu,' monitors, one from each sice of the reactor core, shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by performance of:

a. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at leas,t once per 7 days and
o. A CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> prior to the initial start of CORE ALTERATIONS and
c. A CHANNEL CHECK at least once per.12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATIONS. '

d.

A CHANNEL CALIBRATION prior to entry into H0DE 6 if not perfonned within the last 18 months. .

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 9-2 Amendment No.172

= "" TlilS PAGE PROYlDiD

= " - - "

[0NTAIMiMLfDIETMTIM F0RInmRHU10N.0 Nil AJDfil0NAL CllANGES PRlV10'J5tY LIMITINr. CONDITION FOR OPfRATION PROPOSED BY LtiTLR Seh.. No. 2 3 90 Datella 419 7 4

3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the f ollowing status:

a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,
b. A minimum of one door in each air lock closed, but both doors of the containment personnel air lock cay be open provided that at ler.st one personnel air lock door is capable of being closed and a designated individual is available im.ediately outside the personnel air lock to close the door, and c, Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the atmosphere outside containment shall be either: 1
1. Closed by a manual or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or .
2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment purge and

- exhaust isolation valve.

Pf_UfA_DillIY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within tae containment.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. I
b. close With each the containment of the purge andpurge andpenetrations exhaust exhaust isolation providing system inoperable,from direct access the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere,
c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVFIlIANCE RFOUIREMENTS ,

4.9.4 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be either in its required condition or capable of being closed by an l within 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> prior to the OPEPABLE start of and containment at least oncepurge per 7and exhaust days duringvalve, CORE ALTEPATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment, by:

s. Verifying the penetrations are in their required condition, or I
b. Verifying that with the containment purge and exhaust system in operation, and the containment pu ge and exhaust system noble gas monitor capable of providing a hi 6 radiation signal to the control that after initiation of th high radiation signal the room,inment purge and exhaust isolation valves can be clo, sed from conta the control room, or l If using the STAS area radiation monitor:, verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust isolation valve automatically actuates to its isolation positinn.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 3 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. 4 66,202

-_ _ - _ . _ . . _ _ m._ .__._.___ _ . . _ . _ . _ . . . - - _ - - _ -. - _ . . - _

i IAR 97 0002 Pag 3 37 pgaVEIANGOPERA' HON 6 Cpk.A.k..A.

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-DAVIS-13 ESSE, UNIT 1 3/495 Amendment No.

IAR 97+ 0002 PC338 APPLICAHilJTY l jlASES

, other specified conditions are satisfied. In this case, this would mean that for one division the emergency power source must be OPERABLE (as must be the components supplied by the emergency power sourec) and all redundant systemt, subsystems, trains, components and devices in the other division must be OPERADLE, or likewise satisfy Specification 3.0.5 (i.e., be capable of performing their design functions and have an emergency power source OPERABLE). In other worris, both emergency power sources must be OPERABLE and all redundant systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices in both divisions must also be OPERABLE. If these conditions are not satisfied, action is required in accordance with this specification. (

In MODES 5 or 6, Specification 3.0.5 is not applicable, and thus the individual ACTION statements for each applicable Limiting Condition for Operation in these MODES must be adhered to.

3.0.6 Soccification 3.0.6 establishes the allowance for restorine cogimnent to service under administra1ircJontrols whmit has been removed from service or__derl,ared inonerable to 02mply with ACTIONS. The sole ournose of thisJnecification is to provideJm exccotion to SocciDention 3.0.2 (e.c. to not comoly with the nonlicable Recuired Action (s)) to allow the perfonnRDCs.QLEQUl red testine to demonstrate:

a. The OPERABILITY of the eauloment beine returned to service: or
b. The OPERADILITY of other caulDment The administrative controls ensure the time the couloment is retumed to service in conflict with the trouirements of the ACTIONS is limited to the timp absolutely necessary to perform the gguired testine to demonstrate OPERABILITY. This Soecification does not orovide time to perform any other oreventive or corrective maintenang An examnle of demonstratine the OPERABILITY of the couloment beine retumed to service is 3%tIMDg,4 containment isolation valve that has been closed to comolv with ReauiredArtlanL ADdmust be reopened to oerform the traulted testing, Av.saample or demonstratine the OPERABILITY of other eauloment beine retumed to service is

[rfine an inonerable channel or trip system out of,1he tripped condition toprevent the trin hmetion from occurrine durine the nerformance of reauired testinc on ang1her channel in the ghg1]Iin system. A similar example of demonstratine the OPERABILITY of other conioment is inkinc an inonerable channel or trio system out of the trioned condition to oermit the locic to hingtion and indicate the noorocriate resconse durine the nerformance nbragd testinc ort pother channel in the same trin system, DAVIS-DESSE, UNIT 1 D 3/4 0-lb Amendment No. 71,135,

= "" .

THIS PAGE PR0YlDiD LGGilyJ1Y CONinot sysTrHs BAsrs 3/4.1.1.4 HIHji1UM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the reactor coolant system average tem)erature less than 525'f.

This limitation is required to ensure (1) tae moderat6r' tem)erature '

coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range, ( the protei ive instrumentation is within its nomal operating range, ( the prests ' .' e r is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bble, and , j

, the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT ,

m temperature.

3/4.1.2. 80 RATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available during each snode of facility operation. The components reouired to perform this function include (1) borated water sources, (2 makcup or DilR pumps, (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid pumps, (5))

associated heat tracing systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from operable. emergency busses. ..

With the RCS average temperature above 200'F, a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capabilit systems inoperable. yAllowable in the event an assumed out-of-service failureensure periods renders one that of the minor component repair or corrective action any be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period. With either the borated water storage tank (BWST) boron concentrat' n or BWST borated water temperature not within limits, the condition wust be corrected in eight hours. The eight hour limit to restore the temperature or boron concentration to within limits was developed con:idering the time required to chaqe boron concentration or temperature and assuming that the contents of the BWST are still available for injection.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a .

Sil0100WN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 1.0% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200'f. The maximum boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibr!um xenon conditions and requires the equivalent of either 12,200 gallons of 7875 ppm borated water from the boric acid addition system (BAAS) or 86,700 gallons of 2600 ppm borated water from the BWST. The minimum value for the BAAS of 12,200 gallons at a concentration of 7875 ppm baron is a lower value than that shown in TS Figure 3.1-1 because the Bases value is the minimum required actual value whereas TS Figure 3.1-1 shows the minimum indicated value, which was con,servatively increased to account for instrument and chemical analysis tolerances.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No.-1-ldh

-367 45 7 61rlNr191,207

= "" .

IlilS PAGE PRDVIDED

' fDXI1Y11LCIRIF01.itsl[ tis flASTS 114.1.2 BOMUOLSLsJIfis_ fContinuedl The requirement for a minimum available vc1Ne of 402,770 gallons of borated water in the BWST ensures the capability for borating the RCS to the desired level. The specified quantity of borated water is consistent with the CCCS recultteents of Specification 3.5.4; therefore, the larger volume of boratec water is spectfled.

With the RCS temperature below 200'f, one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stabic reactivity condition of the reactor and the additdnal restrictions prohibiting CORE AllUMTIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable. '

The baron capability required below 200'F is sufficient to provide a SilVIDOWN MRGIN of 1%IA/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 70'F. This condition requires either 900 gallons of 7875 ppm borated water s

from the BM3 or 3,000 gallons of 2600 ppm borated watcr from the BWST.

The bottom 4 inches of the UWST are not available, and the instruinentation is calibrated to reficct the available voliune. All of the boric acid addition tank volume is available. The limits on water volume and boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the, solution recirculated within containment after a derign basis accident. The til band minimizes the evolution er lodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosten cracking on mechanical fystems and components.

The OPEMBILITY of osc bot an injection system during REfilELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE' CONTROL ASSUmLIES The specifications of this section (1) ensure that acceptable power distribution limits are maintained (2) ensure that the minimum SHUIDGWN MRGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential c'ffects of a rod ejection accident. OPEMDill1T of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and tharchv ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The ACTION statements which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are accupanied by addittor,a1 restrictions which ensure that the original criteria are met.

regulating rod requires a restriction in THEp)%L POWER.For The reactivity example, misalignment of a saf worth of a-misaligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel. cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used in the safety analysis. .,

The position of a roi declared inoperable due to misalignment should not be included in computing the average group position for determining the OpEMBILITY of rads with lesser misalignments.

0+WIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 0 3/4 1-3 Amendment. No. -1237--191 7 207

IAR 97 ooo2 Tills PAGE PROVIDED 3/4.8 M ECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 1;ASES The OPEMDILITY of the A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribu-tion 5 stems during o)cration ensures that sufficient power will be availa le.to supply tle safety related equipment required for 1) the safe shutdown of the facility and 2) the mitigation and control of accident conditions within the facility. The minimum specified independent and redundant A.C. and D.C. power sources and distribution systems satisfy the requirements of General design Criterion 17 of Appendix 'A' to 10 CFR 50.

Qualified offsite to onsite circuits are those that are described in the USAR and are part of the licensing basis for the plant.

An OPERABLE qualified offsite to onsite circuit consists of all breakers transformers, switches, interrupting devices, cabling, and controls regulred to transmit power from the offsite transmission network to the onsite Class IE essential buses.

An OPERABLE qualified offsite to onsite circuit consists of:

1. M e OPERABLE 345 kV transmission line
2. Oao OPERABLE 345 - 13.8 kV startup transformer
3. One OPERABLE 13.8 kV bus, and
4. One OPERABLE 13.0 - 4.16 kV bus tie transformer. 1 Typically, the cicctrical power reserve source selector switches are selected to the two different startup transfomers. Ilowever, under certain conditions it is appropriate to select both switches to the same startup transformer.

The circuit in which the startup transfomer does not have a reserve source selector switch pre-selected to it must still meet the requirements of having its 345 kV transn:ission line, startup transformer,13.8 kV ! as and bus tie iransformer OPERABLE.

In the case where a 13.0 kV bus is powered from a startup transformer, the reserve source selector switch should be selected to the opposite startup transformer.

In H0 DES 1-4, if one of the required 13.8 kV - 4.16 LV bus tie transformers is inoperabic, then one qualified offsite to onse.e circuit is inoperable and the requirement of LCO 3.8.1.1.a is not met. The a)propriate corresponding ACTION statement must be entered. The essential 4.16 (V buses remain OPERABLE while energized with one 13.8 kV - 4.16 kV bus tie transformer inoperabic.

The ACTION requirements specified for the levels of de radation of the power sources provide restriction upon continued facil ty operation .

commensuratn with the level of degradation. The OPERABILITY of the power sources are t.onsistent with the initial condition assumptions of.the safety analyses and are based upon mair.taining at least one of each of the onsite A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems OPERABLE during accident conditions coincident with an assumed loss of offaite power and single failure of the other onsite A.C. source.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 h 3/4 8-1 Amendment No. 400H58; 203

MR 97-ooo2 P:g3 42 I I

"=="n'ar" Suial No. 2 4 03 Date 10/18/%

TlilS PAGE PROVIDED

- FDRINFORMATION DNly 3/4.0 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS 3ASES Surveillance Requirements 4.8.1.1.2.a.4 and 4.6.1.1.2.c.4 verify proper starting of the Emergency Diesel Generators from standby conditions.

Verification that an Emergency Diesel Generator has achieved a frequency of 60 ilz within the required time constraints meets the requirement for verifying the Emergency Diesel Generator has accelerated to 900 RPM.

The OPERABILITY of the minimum specified A.C. and D.C. power sources and associated distribution systems during shutdown and refueling ensures that

1) the facility can be maintained in the shutdown or refueling condition for extended time periods and 2) sufficient instrumentation and control capability is available for monitoring and maintaining the facility status.

The Surveillance Requirements for demonstrating the OPERABILITY of the station batteries are bared on the recommendations of Regulatory Guido 1.129,

'Haintenance Testing and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Nuclear Power Plants", February 1978, and IEEE Std. 450-1980, "IEEE Recommended Practice for Maintenance, Testing, and Replacement of Large Lead Storage Batteries for Generating Stations and Substations". .

Verifying average electrolyte temperature above the minimum for which the battery was sized, total battery terminal voltage on float charge, connec-tion resistance values and the performaner #f battery service and discharge tests ensures the effectiveness of the charging system, the ability to handic high discharge rates and compares the battery capacity at that time with the rated capacity.

Tabic 4.8-1 specifies the normal limits for each designated pilot cell and each connected cell for electrolyte level, float voltage and specific gravity. The limits for the cignated pilot cells float voltage and

. specific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and .015 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity or a battery charger current of less than two amps is characteristic of a charge.1 cell with adequate capacity. The normal limits for each connected cell for float voltage and s)ccific gravity, greater than 2.13 volts and not more than .020 below tio manufacturer's full charge specific gravity with an average specific gravity of all the connected cells nnt more than .010 below the manufacturer's full charge specific gravity, ensures the OPERABILITY and capability of the battery. Exceptions to the specific gravity requirements are taken to allow for the normal devi9tions experienced after a battery discharge and subsequent recharge associated with a service or performance discharge test. The specific gravity deviations are recognized and discussed in IEEE 450-1980.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 8-la Amendment No. 4%.45a, 203

IAR - )? . 0003 IlilS PAGE PROVIDED 3/4.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTDiS FORINFORMAll0N BfM

. Basts .

Operation with a battery cell's parameter outside the normal limit but within the allowable value specified in Table 4.8-1 is permitted for up to seven days. During this seven-day periods (1) the allowable value for electrolyte level ensures no physical damage to the plates with an adequate electron transfer capability; (2) the allowable value for the average specific gravity of all the cells, not more than .020 below the manuf acturer's reconnended full charge specific gravity, ensures that the decrease in rating vill be less than the safety mergin provided in sizing (3) the allowable value for an individual cell's specific gravity, ensures that an individual cell's specific gravity will not be more than .040 below the manuf acturer's full charge specific gravity and that the overall capability of the battery vill be maintained within an acceptable limit; and (4) the allowable value for an individual cell's float voltage, greater than 2.07 volts, ensures the battery's capability to perform its design function.

DAVIS-BESSE. tNIT 1 B 3/4 8-2 Amendmenc Ho. 100 ,

I M 97-ooo2 kgts 44 718 PAGE PROVIDED l

m -u=== MRINKRWA31DE 3DlIl0f4At CHANGis PRLWOUStY ~_

UAsr5 PROPOSLO Bf LLUtH Sg gt no J JL 1 )_ _ Oate.7g /3 1 d i 2/4.9.1 DOR 01_CONCINTPA110!j l l

The limitation on reactivity during RETUELUiG ensures that:

uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity co This limitation water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel.

is consistent with the initial conditions assumed for the boron dilutio incident in the accident analysis.

The ACTION statement's minimum boration flow rate of 12 gpm is less than the minimum boration flow rate of 25 gpm specified in TS 3/4.1.1.1,d Reactivity Cont'ol r - Shutdown Hargin because the lower flow rate is base on only borating the reactor vessel.

3/4.9.2 INSTREENTATION The OPERABILITY of source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor suberiticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient timo has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

2/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment, release of fission product radioactivity Duringto the environment H0 DES 1, 2, 3,as a result of a fuel elemer.t rupture must be minimized.

and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY as describ in LCO 3.6.1.1. In other situations, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident -is not present, and therefore less stringent requirements are needed to containment Both isolate the containment personnel air from the may lock doors atmosphere outside containment.

be open during CORE ALTERATIONS or during movement of irradiated Thefuel wChin the containment provided the conditions specified in LC0 3.9.4.b are met.

individual designated to be continuously asailable to close the air Alock door must be stationed at the auxiliary building side of the air lock.

containment personnel air lock door is considered capable of being closed if the door is unblocked and there are no cables or hoses being run through the air lock. The LCO 3.9.10 requirement to maintain a rdinimum of 23 feet of-water over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies se ted within the reactor pressure vessel during movement of fuel assemblics within the reactor pressure vessel while in H0DE 6 ensures that sufficient water depth is availabic to remove 99% of the assumed iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly, further, sufficient time is available to close the persoi.nel air lock following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling occiars.

- ~ " " " ' ' n 3/4 9-1 Amendment 186,-2023 207

1 1AR 97-0002 Pago 45 3/4.9 REFUELING OPl! RATIONS PROPOSED BY LE11ER  :

j BASES SefialNo. _2 39o Date fff/12 3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS (Continued) l l

Regarding LCO 3.9.4.c, the phrase " atmosphere outside containment" refers to anywhere  !

outside the contalmnent vessel, including (but not limited to) the containment annulus and the  ;

auxiliary building. '

For penetrathns that are closed by a method equivalent to a manual or automatic isolation valve, or a blind flange, the isolation technique must be ap ? roved by an engineering evaluation.

The isolation technique may include the use of a material t iat can provide a temporary seal  !

capable of maintaining the integrity of the penetration to restrict the release of radioactive '

material from a fuel handling accident.

With the containment purge and exhaust system m o xration, a high radiation signal received from the containment purge aiid exhattst syr, tem ncile gas monitor will effectively automatically contain the sclease by shutting down the containment purge systerr. supply and  ;

exhaust fans and closing their inlet and outlet dampers. On a valid signal, the control room i operator will then manually close the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves. Therefore -

the uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the containment to the environment will be +

restricted.

Likewise, use of the SFAS area radiation monitors provide an automatic containment i- isolation signal on high radiation, restricting the uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the containment to the environment.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS Deleted The requkement for ecm=
!:::!cn:::pability ensure;; hat refte!!ng :::!cn per'. ::::::n be promptly4nictmed of r!gnif!:::: ch:nge:in the f ility staavser-eer :::::!e :y cenditica during40REAtrTERAT4GNSr.

9 i

n b

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-la Amendment No.186,202 l

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