ML20098C411

Proposed TS 3/4.1.2.8 Re Reactivity Control Sys - Borated Water Sources - Shutdown TS 3/4.1.2.8 Re Reactivity Control Sys - Operating & TS 3/4.5.1 Re ECCS - Core Flooding Tanks

ML20098C411
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	09/29/1995
From:	CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:
Shared Package
ML20098C371	List: ML20098C368 ML20098C393 ML20098C411
References
NUDOCS 9510100133
Download: ML20098C411 (21)

Text

- _ _ _ _

LAR 95-0010 Page 14

.3/4.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS 3/4.1.1 B0 RATION CONTROL SHUTDOWN MARGIN LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.1.1.1 The SHUTOOWN MARGIN shall be 2 1% Ak/k.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2*,

3**, 4 and 5.

l ACTION:

.With the. SHUT 00WN MARGIN <.1% Ak/k, immediately initiate and continue

~

boration at 2 25 gpnt of 7375 ppm boron or its equivalent, until the required SHUTDOWN MARGIN is restored.

SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.1.1.1 The SHUTOOWN MARGIN shall be determined to be 21% Ak/k:

4 Within one hour after detection of an inoperable control rod (s) a.

and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter while the rod (s) is inoperable.

If the inoperable control rod is immovable or untrippable, the above required SHUTDOWN MARGIN shall be increased by an amount at least equal to the withdrawn worth of the immovable or untrippable control rod (s).

b.

When in MODES 1 or 2#, at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, by verifying that regulating rod groups withdrawal is within the limits of Specifica' ion 3.1.3.6.

c.

When in MODE 2## within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> prior to achieving reactor criticality by verifying that the predicted critical control rod position is within the limits of Specification 3.1.3.6.

d.

Prior to initial operation above 5% RATED THERMAL POWER after each fuel loading by consideration of the factors of e. below, with the

]

regulating rod groups at the maximum insertion limit of Specification 3.1.3.6.

1. With k 2 1.0

1. 1. With(,,## < 1.0

• See Special Test Exception 3.10.4

• • See LC0 3.4.5, Steam Generators, for additional SHUTDOWN MARGIN requirements.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-1 Amendment No. AM,192 9510100133 950929 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P

PDR

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LAR 95-0010

)

' Page-15

. REACTIVITY CONTROL-SYSTEMS 3

BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHUTDOWN' 4

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j

3.1.2.8 As a minimum, one of the following borated water sources shall be OPERABLE:

a.

A boric acid addition system with:-

1.

~ A minimum available borated water volume of $[ 7-00 gallons,

}

2.

[Between7875andl13,125ppmofboron,and

)

3.

A. minimum solution temperature of 105*F.

b.

'The borated water storage tank (BWST) with:

1.

A minimum available borated water volume of 3,000 gallons.

2.

A minimum boron concentration of M 2400 ppm, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 35*F.

i APPLICABILITY: MODES 5 and 6 1

ACTION:

With no borated water sources OPERABLE, suspend all operations involving r

CORE ALTERATION or positive reactivity changes until at least one borated

. water source is restored to OPERABLE status.

- SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.1.2.8 The above required borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

1-l a.

At least once per 7 days by:

i 1.

Verifying the available borated water volume of the source.

i i

2.

- Verifying the boron concentration of the water, and g

l i

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-14 Amendment No.67,I23,19I j'

r a

C ""

THIS PAGE PROVIDED I

FORINFORETION ONIY REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS l

I: SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 3.

Verifying the boric acid addition system solution tempera-ture when it is the source of borated water.

4 b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the BWST temperature when. it is the source of borated water and the outside air temperature is < 35'F.

l f

1 DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 3/4 1-15

LAR 95-0010 Page 17 Figure 3.1-1.Bo ic Acid Addition System Minimum Required Volume as a F nction of Boric Acid Conc ntration Required in Mode 1-4 10000

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7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 Concentration of Boric Acid s lution, ppmB Replace Figure with new Figure shown on following page s

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 1-16 Amendment No. M,

Au,11/

LAR 95-0010 Page 18 Figure 3.1-1 Boric Acid Addition System Minimum Required Volume as a Function of Boric Acid Concentration Required in Modes 1-4 1 3 000

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7000 8000 9000 10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 Concentration of Boric Acid (ppmB) 4 1

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'LAR 95-o01o Psgn:19' h

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS-BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATING r

L LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION j.

4

-3.1.2.9 Each of the'following borated water sources,shall be OPERABLE:

i I

.a.

The. boric. acid addition system (BAAS) with:

1.

- A minimum available borated water volume in accordance with

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Figure 3.1-1, 2.

l Sct=cn 7875 and l 13,125 ppm of boron, and -

[

.3.

A' minimum solution temperature of-105'F.

2 b.

The borated water storage tank (BWST) with:

o 1.

An available borated water volume of between 482,778 and 550,000

gallons,

' 2.-.l Sct900n M 2400 and M 2400 ppm of boron, and 3.

A minimum solution temperature of 35*F.

Ii APPLICABILITY: H0 DES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

ACTION:

~ With the boric acid addition system (BAAS) inoperable, restore the.

p a.

BAAS to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY and borated to a SHUTDOWN MARGIN equivalent to 1% Ak/k at 200*F within the next 6 hour6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />s: restore the BAAS to OPERABLE status within the next e

7 days or be in COLD SHUTDOWN within the next 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b.

With the BWST inoperable because of boron concentration or tem)erature not within limits, restore the BWST to OPERABLE status wit 11n 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least H0T STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

With the BWST inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration or c.

tem>erature not within limits.. restore the BWST to OPERABLE status wit 11n one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the.following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />, i

la I

' DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 3/4 1-17 Amendment No. 26.67,I23.I9I x

s j

i -

i LAR 95-0010 y11l8 PAGE PROVIDED Page 20 1

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE0VIREMENTS 4.1.2.9 Each borated water source shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the available borated water volume of each water

source, 2.

Verifying the boron concentration in each water source, and 3.

Verifying the BAAS solution temperature.

b.

At least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the BWST temperature when the outside. air. temperature is < 35'F.

1 J

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't 1

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i DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I 3/4 1-18 Amendment No. Yp,1gj

LAR 95-0010 Page 21 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.1.1.4 MINIMUM TEMPERATURE FOR CRITICALITY This specification ensures that the reactor will not be made critical with the reactor coolant system average temperature less than 525'F. This limitation is required to ensure (1) the moderator temperature coefficient is within its analyzed temperature range. (2) the protective instrumentation is within its normal operating range. (3) the pressurizer is capable of being in an OPERABLE status with a steam bubble, and (4) the reactor pressure vessel is above its minimum RT,a temperature.

3/4.1.2. BORATION SYSTEMS The boron injection system ensures that negative reactivity control is available

~

during each mode of facility operation. The components required to perform this function include (1) borated water sources. (2) makeup or DHR pumps. (3) separate flow paths, (4) boric acid pumps. (5) associated heat tracing systems, and (6) an emergency power supply from operable emergency busses.

With the RCS average temperature above 200*F. a minimum of two separate and redundant boron injection systems are provided to ensure single functional capability in the event an assumed failure renders one of the systems inoperable. Allowable out-of-service periods ensure that minor component repair or corrective action may be completed without undue risk to overall facility safety from injection system failures during the repair period. With either the borated water storage tank (BWST) boron concentration or BWST borated water temperature not within limits, the condition must be corrected in eight hours. The eight hour limit to restore the temperature or boron concentration to within limits was developed considering the time required to change boron concentration or temperature and assuming that the contents of the BWST are still available for injection.

The boration capability of either system is sufficient to provide a SHUT 00WN MARGIN from all operating conditions of 1.0% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown to 200*F.

The maximum boration capability requirement occurs from full power equilibrium xenon boratedwaterfromtheboricacidadditionsystem[27!2009474 allons of 7875 ppm conditions and requires the equivalent of either (BAAS) or 1700 allons of 600 GM0 ppm borated water from the BWST._;TJ@iiMf5ETITO f6

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IG9f&algditjggshMf fi[}3shatcyg The requirement for a minimum available volume of 482.778 gallons of borated water in the BWST ensures the capability for borating the RCS to the desired level. The specified quantity of borated water is consistent with the ECCS requirements of Specification 3.5.4; therefore, the larger volume of borated water is specified.

With the RCS temperature below 200*F. one injection system is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the additional restrictions prohibiting CORE ALTERATIONS and positive reactivity changes in the event the single injection system becomes inoperable.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-2 Amendment No. II.33.36, 45.61.123.I91 l

i

LAR 95-0010 Pagm 22 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

}

BASES 3/4.1.2 BORATION SYSTEMS (Continued)

The boron capability required below 200*F is sufficient to provide a SHUTDOWN MARGIN of 1% Ak/k after xenon decay and cooldown from 200*F to 70*F.

This condition requires either 90(1 M0 gallons of 7875 ppm borated water from the BAASor3,000gallonsof$10902MOppmboratedwaterfromtheBWST.

The bottom 4 inches of the BWST are not available, and the instrumentation is calibrated to reflect the available volume. All of the boric acid addition tank volume is available. The limits on water volume, and boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the solution recirculated within containment after a design basis accident. The pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and components.

The OPERABILITY of one boron injection system during REFUELING ensures that this system is available for reactivity control while in MODE 6.

3/4.1.3 MOVABLE CONTROL ASSEMBLIES The specifications of this section (1) ensure that acceptable power distribution limits are maintained, (2) ensure that the minimum SHUTDOWN MARGIN is maintained, and (3) limit the potential effects of a rod ejection l

accident. OPERABILITY of the control rod position indicators is required to determine control rod positions and thereby ensure compliance with the control rod alignment and insertion limits.

The ACTION statemen" which permit limited variations from the basic requirements are at panied by additional restrictions which ensure that the i

original criteria ar e met.

For example, misalignment of a safety or regulating rod requires a restriction in THERMAL POWER.

The reactivity worth of a misaligned rod is limited for the remainder of the fuel cycle to prevent exceeding the assumptions used in the safety analysis.

The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment should not be included in computing the average group position for determining the OPERABILITY of rods with lesser misalignments.

l I

t i

l DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 1-3 Amendment No. I23.I91 f

L

LAR 95-0010 Page,23 3/4.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

CORE FLOODING TANKS LIMITING' CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.1 Each reactor coolant system core flooding tank (CFT) shall be OPERABLE with:

a.

The isolation valve open, b.

A contained borated water volume between 7555 and 8004 gallons of borated water, l Betwccr ggjj 2M9 and l 3500 ppm of boron, and c.

d..

A nitrogen cover-pressure of between 575 and 625 psig.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2 and 3*.

ACTION:

a.

With one CFT inoperable because of boron concentration not within limits, restore the inoperable CFT to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the RCS pressure to less than 800 psig within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, b.

With any CFT inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration not within limits, restore the CFT to OPERABLE status within one hour or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and reduce the RCS pressure to less than 800 psig within the following 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.5.1 Each core flooding tank shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> by:

1.

Verifying the contained borated water volume and nitrogen cover-pressure in the tanks, and 2.

Verifying that each tank isolation valve is open.

'With Reactor Coolant pressure > 800 psig.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. 19I

LAR 95-0010

~"

l THIS PAGE PROVIDED 1

a negapUgy Ulg EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVElllANCE RE0VIREMENTS (Continued) b.

At least once per 31 days, and within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of each solution volume increase of 2 80 gallons that is not the result of addition from the borated water storage tank (BWST), by verifying the boron concentration of the CFT solution.

c.

At least once per 31 days by verifying that power to the isolation valve operator is disconnected by locking the breakers in the open position.

d.

At least once per 18 months by verifying that each core flooding tank isolation valve opens automatically and is interlocked against closing whenever the Reactor Coolant System pressure exceeds 800 psig.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-2 Amendment No.191

IAR 95-0010 Page 25 l

IfilS PAGE PROVIDED EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T

_ A280*F l

L1HITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

One OPERABLE high pressure injection (HPI) pump, a.

b.

One OPERABLE low pressure injection (LPI) pump, c.

One OPERABLE decay heat cooler, and d.

An OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the borated water storage tank (BWST) on a safety injection signal and manually transferring suction to the containment sump during the recirculation phase of operation.

APPLICABILITY: H00ES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTION:

With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable a.

subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, b.

In the. event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Comission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

SURVE!Lt.ANCE RE001REMENTS 4.5.2 Each ECCS subsystem shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

At least once per 31 days by verifying that each valve (manugl.

a.

power operated or automatic) in the flow path that is not locked, j

sealed or otherwise secured in position, is in its correct position.

OAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5-3

1. cendment No. 66.182

THIS PAGE PROVIDED LAR 95-0010

~~

FORINFORMATION ONLY Revised by NRC Letter Dated June 6, 1995 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued) b.

At least once per 18 months, or prior to operation after ECCS piping has been drained by verifying that the ECCS piping is full of water by venting the ECCS pump casings and discharge piping high points.

clothing, etc.)pection which verifies that no loose debris (rags, trash,is present in t By a visual ins c.

to the containment emergency sump and cause restriction of the pump suction during LOCA conditions. This visual inspection shall be performed:-

1.

For all accessible areas of the containment prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY. and 2.

For all areas of containment affected by an entry at least once daily while work is ongoing and again during the final exit after completion of work (containment closecut) when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is established.

j d.

At least once per 18 months by:

1.

Verifying that the interlocks:

a)

Close DH-11 and DH-12 and deenergize the pressurizer heaters, if either DH-11 or DH-12 is open and a simulated reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint

(<438 psig) is applied. The interlock to close DH-11 and/or DH-12 is not required if the valve is 'losed and 480 V AC power is disconnected from its motor opero s s.

b)

Prevent the opening of DH-11 and DH-12 when a simulated or actual reactor coolant system pressure which is greater than the trip setpoint (<438 psig) is applied.

2.

a)

A visual inspection of the containment emergency sump which verifies that the subsystem suction inlets are not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

b)

Verifying that on a Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) Low-Low Level interlock trip, with the motor operators for the BWST outlet isolation valves and the containment emergency sump recirculation valves energized. the BWST Outlet Valve HV-DH7A (HV-DH78) automatically close in 575 seconds after the operator manually pushes the control switch to open the Containment Emergency Sump Valve HV-DH9A (HV-DH9B) which should be verified to open in 575 seconds.

3.

Deleted DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5-4 Amendment No. 2.25,28,40.//.

I25,IB2,I95,196

LAR 95-0010

- EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS rage 27 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) 4.

Verifying that a minimum of 290 74 cubic feet of trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSPTis contained within the TSP storage baskets, i

1 5.

DEHfid Verify that a representative :=p'^

^#

Eforffe basket has a density Of. 2 53 lb:/cu ft.

6.

p5Tsfsd Verifying that when a representative :=ple of TSP from f^E P*Iitorage basket is submerged. without agitat10n. in at least one liter of 180 10*F berated water from the BWST. Such that the resulting cencentration of TSP is les: than 0.81 gr=:

per liter, the pH of the mixed 50lut40n is raised to 27 (mcacured at 77 F) within i hour.

e.

At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by 1.

brifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a safety injection test signal.

2.

Verifying that each HPI and LPI pump starts automatically upon receipt of a SFAS test signal.

f.

By performing a vacuum leakage rate test of the watertight enclosure for valves DH-11 and DH-12 that assures the motor operators on valves DH-11 and DH-12 will not be flooded for at least 7 days following a LOCA:

1.

At least once per 18 months.

2.

After each opening of the watertight enclosure.

3.

After any maintenance on or modification to the watertight enclosure which could affect its integrity.

g.

By verifying the correct position of each mechanical position stop l

for valves DH-14A and DH-14B.

1.

Within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> following completion of the opening of the valves to their mechanical position stop or following completion of maintenance on the valve when the LPI system is required to be OPERABLE.

I 2.

At least once per 18 months.

l DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. 26.40.19I i

i 1

LAR 95-0010 Page 28 DllS PAGE PR6VIDED EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS FORINFORETION ONIY SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (Continued) h.

By performing a flow balance test, during shutdown, following completion of modifications to the HPI or LPI subsystems that alter the subsystem flow characteristics and verifying the following flow rates:

HP System - Single Pump

~

Injection Leg 1-1 3 375 gpm at 400 psig*

Injection Leg 1-2 2 375 gpm at 400 psig*

Injection Leg 2-1 1 375 gpm at 400 psig*

Injection Leg 2-2

> 375 gpm at 400 psig*

LPI System - Single Pump Injection Leg 1 1 2650 gpm at 100 Hig**

Injection Leg 2 1 2650 gpm at 100 p'sig**

l l

Reactor coolant pressure at the HPI nozzle in the reactor coolant pump discharge.

Reactor coolant pressure at the core flood nozzle on the reactor vessel.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-Sa Amendment tio. 20 I

LAR 95-0010..

Pcga'29-l EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS-S0 RATED WATER STORAGE TANK LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.4 The borated water storage. tank.(BWST) shall be OPERABLE with:

a.- ' An available borated water volume of between 482,778 and 550,000 gallons...

b.

[ Schren 3 M00 and BW 2000 ppm of: boron, and i

c.

A minimum water temperature of 35*F.

APPLICABILITY:

MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTION:

a.

With the BWST inoperable because of boron concentration or tem mrature not within limits, restore the BWST to GPERABLE status i

wit 11n 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

b.

With the BWST inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration or tem xrature not within limits, restore the BWST to OPERABLE status wit 11n one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

i SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS i

4.5.4 The BWST shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a.

At least once per 7 days by:

1.

Verifying the available borated water volume in the tank, 2.

Verifying the boron concentration of the water.

b.

At least once per. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> by verifying the water temperature when outside air temperature <35'F.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 5-7 Amendment No. 36,I23,I91

i IAR 95-0010 Page 30 TlilS PAGE PROVIDED 5 EMERGENCY CORE C00llNG SYSTEMS (EC l

3/4.5.1 CORE FLOODING TANKS The OPERABILITY of each core flooding tank ensures that a sufficient volume of borated water will be immediately forced into the reactor vessel in the event the RCS pressure falls below the pressure of the tanks. This. initial surge of water into the vessel provides the initial cooling mechanism during large RCS pipe ruptures.

The limits on volume boron concentration and pressure ensure that the assumptions used for cor,e flooding tank injection in the safety analysis are met.

The tank power operated isolation valves are considered to be

" operating bypasses in the context of IEEE Std. 279-1971 which requires thatbypassesofaprotectivefunctionberemovedautomatlcallywhenever permissive conditions are not met. In addition, as these tank isolation valves fail to meet single failure criteria, removal of power'to the yalves is required.

The one hour limit for operation with a core flooding tank (CFT) inoperable for reasons other than boron concentration not within limits minimizes the time the plant is exposed to a possible LOCA event occurring with failure of a CFT, which may result in unacceptable peak cladding temperatures.

With boron concentration for one CFT not within limits, developed the condition must be corrected within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit was considering that the effects of reduced boron concentration on core subcriticality during reflood are minor. Boiling of the ECCS water in the core during reflood concentrates the boron in the saturated liquid that remains in the core.

In addition the volume of the CFTs is still available for injection. Since the bor,on requirements are based on the average boron concentration of the total volume of both CFTs, the consequences are less severe than they would be if the contents of a CFT were not available for injection.

The completion times to bring the olant to a H0DE in which the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO? does not apply are reasonable based on operating experience. The completion times allow lant conditions to be changed in an orderly manner and without c$allenging plant systems.

CFT boron concentration sampling within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after an 80 gallon volume increase will identify whetfier inleakage from the RCS has caused a reduction in boron concentr,2fon to below the required limit. It is not necessary to verify boron co.. centration if the added water inventory is because the water contalned fromthebora~tedwaterstoragetank(BWST)lonrequirements.

in the BWST is within CF1 boron concentrat 3/4.5.2 and 3/4.5.3 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS The operability of two indept sent ECCS subsystems with RCS average l

temperature > 280 F ensures that sufficient emergency core cooling caoability will be available in the ev2nt of a LOCA assuming the loss of one subsystem +5 rough any single failure consideration. Either subsystem operating in conjunction with the core flooding tanks is capable of supplying sufficient core cooling a r.aintain the peak cladding temperatures within acceptable limits for all postulated break sizes ranging from the double ended break of the largest RCS cold leg pipe downward.

In addition, each ECCS subsystem provides long term core l

cooling capability in the recirculation mode during the accident recovery period DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I B 3/4 5-1 Amendment No. fA,191 1

.1 LAR 95-0010 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS Page 31 BASES With the RCS temperature below 280*F. one OPERABLE ECCS subsystem is acceptable without single failure consideration on the basis of the stable reactivity condition of the reactor and the limited core cooling requirements.

The Surveillance Requirements provided to ensure OPERABILITY of each component ensures that, at a minimum, the assumptions used in the safety analyses are met and that subsystem OPERABILITY is maintained.

The function of the trisodium. phosphate dodecahy@d je#mii5tdii5FiiisysuiiMp iighE56 e iTitI6 E

g g J @3 baskets 1s he'p5sCEDCA" borated water mixture [silYd waterf84 prior to nEntrMII5"Eheac yo Theboraf c tablishin~ containment emergency sump recirculation.

storage tank (BWST) borated water has a nominal pH value of approximately 5.

Raising the borated water mixture to a pH value of 7 will ensure that chloride stress corrosion does not occur in austenitic stainless steels in the event that chloride levels increase as a result of contamination on the surfaces of 1

the reactor containment building. Also, a pH of 7 is assumed for the containment emergency sump for iodine retention and removal post-LOCA by the containment spray system.

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NkN The Surveillance Requiremer.t: (SPJ :::cciated with TSP cnsure that the minimum i

amount :nd density of TSP 1 stored in the b kets. and that the TSP ir. the basket: 10 cufficient to provide adequate. post LOCA. long term pH adjustment.

Surveillance requirements for throttle valve position stops and flow balance testing provide assurance that proper ECCS flows will be maintained in the Maintenance of proper flow resistance and p(ressure drop in event of a LOCA.

the piping system to each injection point is necessary to:

1) prevent total pump flow from exceeding runout conditions when the system is in its minimum i

resistance configuration.

(2) provide the proper flow split between injection points in accordance with the assumptions used in the ECCS-LOCA analyses, and (3) provide an acce) table level of total ECCS flow to all injection points equal to or above tlat assumed in the ECCS-LOCA analyses.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-2 Amendment No. 20.I23.IB2, 191.I95

LAR 95-0010 4

fMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEM 3 Page 32

[ASES(Continued)

Containment Emergency Sump Recirculation Valves DH-9A and DH-9B are de-ener-gized during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent opening of the valves in the event of a Control Room fire, which could result in draining the Borated Water Storage Tank to the Containment Emergency Sump and the loss of this water source for normal plant shutdown.

Re-energization of DH-9A and DH-9B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 under administrative controls.

Station )rocedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing t1ese valves under such controls.

Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST) outlet isolation valves DH-7A and DH-78 are de-energized during MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4 to preclude postulated inadvertent closure of the valves in the event of a fire, which could result in a loss of the availability of the BWST.

Re-energization of valves DH-7A and DH-7B is permitted on an intermittent basis during MODES 1, 2. 3. and 4 under admini-strative controls. Station procedures identify the precautions which must be taken when re-energizing these valves under such controls.

3/4.5.4 BORATED WATER STORAGE TANK The OPERABILITY of the borated water storage tank (BWST) as part of the ECCS ensures that a sufficient supply of borated water is available for injection by the ECCS in the event of a LOCA. The limits on the BWST minimum volume and boron concentration ensure that:

1) sufficient water is available within containment to permit recir-culation cooling flow to the core following manual switchover to the recirculation mode, and 2)

The reactor will remain at least 1% Ak/k subcritical in the cold condition at 70*F, xenon free, while only crediting 50% of the control rods' worth following mixing of the BWST and the RCS water volumes.

These assumptions ensure that the reactor remains subcritical in the cold condition following mixing of the BWST and the RCS water volumes.

With either the BWST boron concentration or BWST borated water temperature not within limits, the condition must be corrected in eight hours.

The eight hour limit to restore the temperature or boron concentration to within limits was developed considering the time required to change boron concentration or temperature and assuming that the contents of the BWST are still available for injection.

The bottom 4 inches of the BWST are not available, and the instrumentation is calibrated to reflect the available volume.

The limits on water volume, and boron concentration ensure a pH value of between 7.0 and 11.0 of the solution sprayed within the containment after a design basis accident.

The pH band minimizes the evolution of iodine and minimizes the effect of chloride and caustic stress corrosion cracking on mechanical systems and components.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 5-Ea Amendment No. 19I

LAR 95-0010

. Paga 33

)

3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS

. BORON CONCENTRATION

)

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.1 The boron concentration of all filled portions of the Reactor Coolant System and the refueling canal shall be maintained uniform and sufficient to i

ensure that the =rc restrictive of the f0110.-ling reactivity condition is met-Eithee a K rf of 0.95 or less. which includes a 1T Ak/k conservati,ve allowance for uncertainties l-se b.

f. bcron concentration of 1800 ppm, which include : 50 ppm c0n';crvative allowance for uncertaintics.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 6.

ACTION:

With the requirements of the above saecification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or positive re. activity changes and initiate and continue boration of a g 40 gpm of

..95lOrthe BMG ppm boric acid solution or its equivalent until K,rf 1s reduced to s bcron concentration is restored to 2 1800 ppe, whichever is th: =0rc restrictivc.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.9.1.1 The =rc rc:trictive Of the above twc reactivity co-11tions shall be determined prior to:

a.

Removing or unbolting the reactor vessel head, and i

b.

Withdrawal of any safety or regulating rod in excess of 3 feet 4

from its fully inserted position within the reactor pressure vessel.

4.9.1.2 The boron concentration of the reactor pressure vessel and the refueling canal shall be determined by chemical analysis at least once each 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. 143 d

LAR 95-0010 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS Page 34 BASES 3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitations on reactivity conditions during REFUELING ensures that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a unifd^rm boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel.

61s These limitations Q am consistent with theinitialconditionsassumedforthe[65Fondilutionincidentintheaccident analysis.

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gogatgg1[hstgiqt3g ES!!!11 3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIMF, The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products.

This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS The requirements on containment penetration closure and OPERABILITY ensure that a release of radioactive material within containment will be restricted from leakage to the environment. The OPERABILITY and closure requirements are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element ru)ture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential while in the REFUE_ING MODE.

With the containment purge and exhaust system in operation, a high radiation signal received from the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas munitor will effectively automatically contain the release by shutting down the containment purge system supply and exhaust fans and closing their inlet and outlet dampers. On a valid signal, the control room operator will then manually close the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves. Therefore, the uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the containment to the environment will be restricted.

Likewise, use of the SFAS area radiation monitors provide an automatic containment isolation signal on high radiation, restricting the uncontrolled release of radioactive material from the containment to the environment.

3/4.9.5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for comunications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 B 3/4 9-1 Amendment 186 i

l

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