ML20217R282

Proposed Tech Specs,Clarifying LCO 3.6.1.3.a & Revising Surveillance Requirement 4.6.1.3.c

ML20217R282
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse
Issue date:	08/26/1997
From:	CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:
Shared Package
ML20217R281	List: ML20217R280 ML20217R282
References
NUDOCS 9709040389
Download: ML20217R282 (6)

Text

. .LAR 97-0014 -

• . ' Page 9 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION .

l 3.6.1.3 sach containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with:

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a. Both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for-nermal-transit entry and exit through the containment, then at least one air lock door shall be closed,:.nd

b. An overall air lock leakage rate of # 0.002 L, at P ,38 psig.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2,3 and 4.

ACTION:

• a. With one air lock door inoperable in one or more containment air locks, or with the containment air lock interlock mechanism inoperable in one or more containment air locks:

1. Verify an OPERABLE door in each affected air lock is closed within one hour, and

2. Lock an OPERABLE door closed in each affected air lock within 24' hours, and

3. Operation may then continue provided that an OPERABLE door in each affected air -

lock is maintained closed and is verified to be locked closed at least once per 31 days, and provided that the containment air lock passes each scheduled performance of SR 4.6.1.3b.

Othenvise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

• b. With one or more containment air locks inoperable except as a result of an inoperable air lock door or air lock interlock mechanism:

1. Verify at least one door in each affected air lock is closed within one hour, and

2. Restore air lock (s) to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3. Otherwise, be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

• Entry and exit through the OPERABLE door is permissible if necessary to perform repairs of the affected air lock components. After each entry and exit, the OPERABLE door must be -

closed without delay.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-6 Amendment No.194, 9709040389 970826 PDR ADOCK 05000346 P PDR

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., ' bali 97-0014 Page 10 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS COhTAINMENT AIR LOCKS SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS 4.6.1.3 Each containment air lock shall be demonstrated OPERABLE:

a By verifying either no detectable seal leakage when the volume between the door seals is pressurized to 10 psig, or by verifying a seal leakage rate of s 0.0015 L.

when the volume between the dwr seals is pressurized to P.,38 psig, and the air lock door holddowns are installed:

1 #Within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after each opening,(in MODES 1,2,3, and 4) except when the air lock is being used for multiple entries, then at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and

2.

• Prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY when maintenance has not been performed on the air lock that could affect the air lock sea. ling capability. Reperfonnance of this test is no: required prior to entering MODE 4 if the air lock has not been opened since the previous test.

b.- By conducting an overall air lock leakage test at P.,38 psig, and by verifying that the overall air lock leakage rate is within its limit:

1. #At least once per 6 months, and

2.

• Prior to establishing CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY when maintenance has been performed on the air lock that could affect the air lock sealing capability.

c. At least once per REFUELING INTERVAL 6menths-by verifying that only one door in each air lock can be opened at a time.

• Exemption to Appendix "J" of 10 CFR 50.

1. The provisions of Specification 4.0.2 are not applicable.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 3/4 6-6a Amendment No.194, l

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.. 'INR 97-0014 Page11

[t B{LU[ LING OPERATIONS TH p h n EA L CONTAINMENT PENETPATIONS LIMITING CONDITTON FOR OPERAT10N 4 Ulk 3.9.4 The containment penetrations shall be in the following status

a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,

b. A minimum of one door in each air lock closed, but both doors of the containment personnel air lock may be open provided that at least one personnel air lock door is capable of being closed and a designated individual is available imediately outside the personnel air lock to close the door, and

c. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the atmosphere outside containment shall be either: 1

1. Closed by a man' or automatic isolation valve, blind flange, or equivalent, or

2. Be capable of being closed by an OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust isolation valve.

- APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION:

a. With the requirements of the above specification not satisfied, immediately suspend all operations involving CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment. I

b. With the containment purge and exhaust isolation system inoperable, close each of the purge and exhaust penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmo.phere to the outside atmosphere.

c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.3 are not applicable.

StlRVEf tLANCE REOUTREMENTS 4.9.4 Each of the above required containment penetrations shall be determined to be either in its required condition or capable of being closed by an l OPERABLE containment purge and exhaust valve, within 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> prior to the start of and at least once per 7 days during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel in the containment, by:

a. Verifying the penetrations are in their required condition, or l

b. Verifying that with the containment purge and exhaust system in operation, and the containment pu ge and exhaust system noble gas monitor capable of providing a hl h radiation signal to the control room, that after initiation of th high radiation signal, the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves can be closed from the control room, or If using the SFAS area radiation monitors, verifying that on a Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation test signal, each purge and exhaust isolation valve automatically actuates to its isolation position.

DAVIS-BESSE,. UNIT 3 3/4 9-4 Amendment No. -fM 202

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L,AR 97-00-14 S. Pag) 12 3/4.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS BASES 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT

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3/4.6.1.1 CONTAINMENTINTEGRITY Primary CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY ensures that the release of radioactive materials from the containment atmosphere will be restricted to those leakage paths and associated leak rates assumed in the safety analyses. This restriction, in conjunction with the leakage rate limitation and air lock door requirements, will limit the site boundary radiation doses to within the limits of 10 CFR 100 during accident conditions.

3/4.6.1.2 CONTAINMENT LEAKAGE The limitations on containment leakage rates ensure that the total containment leakage volume will not exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses at the peak accident pressure of 38 psig, P.. As an added conservatism, the measured overall as-left integrated leakage rate is further limited to < 0.75 L,, during performance of the periodic tests to account for possible degradation of the containment leakage barriers between leakage tests.

The special test for the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves is intended to detect gross degradation of seals on the valve seats. The special test is performed in addition to ilm Appendix J requirements.

USAR 6.2.4 identifies all penetrations that are secondary containment bypass leakage paths.

3/4.6.1.3 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCKS The limitations on closure and leak rate for the containment air locks are required to meet the restrictions on CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY and containment leak rate. Surveillance testing of the air lock seals provide assurance that the overall air lock leakage will not become excessive due to seal damage during the intervals between air lock leakage tests.

The air lock interlock allows only one air lock door of an air lock to be onened at a time.

This nrovision ensures that a crose breach of containment does not exist when CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY is reouired. Closure of a sincle door in each air lock is sufficient to orovide a leak, ticht barrier followinn postulated events. Neverthe! css, in MODES 1 throuch 4. both doors are kept closed when the air lock is not beine used for entry and exit. i.e.. containment entries / exits.

air lock maintenance. or air lock testing, DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I B 3/4 6-1 Amendment No. 90,146,160 194,198,205,

LAR 97-0014 Page 13 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES l

3/4.9.1 BORON CONCENTRATION The limitation on reactivity during REFUELING ensures that: 1) the reactor will remain subcritical during CORE ALTERATIONS, and 2) a uniform boron concentration is maintained for reactivity control in the water volumes having direct access to the reactor vessel. This limitation is consistent with the initial conditions assumed foi the boron dilution incident in the accident analysis.

The ACTION statement's minimum boration flow rate of 12 gpm is less than the minimum boration flow rate of 25 gpm specified in TS 3/4.1.1.1, Reactivity Control - Shutdown Margin because the lower flow rate is based on only borating the reactor vessel.

3/4.9.2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of source range neutron flux monitors ensures that redundant g

monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 DECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to movement ofirradiated fuel assemblies in the reactor pressure vessel ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses.

3/4.9.4 CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS During CORE ALTERATIONS or monment ofirradiated fuel within the containment, release of fission product radioactivity to the environment as a result of a fuel element rupture must be minimized. During MODES 1,2,3, and 4, this is accomplished by maintaining CONTAINMENT INTEGRITY as described in LCO 3.6.1.1. In other situations, the potential for containment pressurization as a result of an accident is not present, and therefore less stringent requirements are needed to isolate the containment from the atmosphere outside containment. Both containment personnel air lock doors may be open during CORE ALTERATIONS or during movement ofirradiated fuel within the containment provided the conditions specified in LCO 3.9.4.b are met. The individual designated to be continuously available to close the air lock door must be stationed at the auxiliary building side of the air lock.

A containment personnel air lock door is considered capable of being closed if the door is not blocked in such a way that it cannot be emeditiously closed and any hoses and cables runiiiiig throuch the air lock emplov a means to allow safe, quick disconnect or severance, and are tanced at the air lock with specific instructions to expedite removal, unb!ccNed end there are rc enMes or4 eses 4mn;; rn through the a:r icch The LCO 3.9.10 requirement to maintain a minimum of 23 feet of water over the top ofirradiated fuel assemblies seated within the reactor pressure vessel during movement of fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel while in MODE 6 ensures that sufficient water depth is available to remove 99% of the assumed iodine gap activity released from the rupture of an irradiated fuel assembly. Further, sufficient time is available to close the personnel air lock following a loss of shutdown cooling before boiling occurs.

DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I B 3/4 9-1 Amendment No. I86,202,207,

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LAR 97-0014 Pago 14 TW,8 PAGE PROLDED 3/4.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9,4 CONTAINMENT PENETpATIONS (Continued)

Regarding LCO 3.9.4.c, the phrase " atmosphere outside containment

• refers to anywhere outside the containment vessel, including (but not limited to) the containment annulus and the auxiliary building.

For penetrations that are closed by a method equivalent to a manual or automatic isolation valve, or a blind flange, the isolation technique must be approved by an engineering evaluation. The isolation technique may include the use of a material that can provide a temporary seal capable of maintain-ing the integrity of the penetration to restrict the release of radioactive material from a fuel handling accident.

With the containment purge and exhaust system in operation, a high radiation signal received from the containment purge and exhaust system nobic sas monitor will effectively automatically contain the release by shutting down the containment purge system supply and exhaust fans and closing their inlet and outlet dampers. On a valid signal, the control room operator will then manually close the containment purge and exhaust isolation valves.

Therefore, the uncontrolled relr.ase of radioactive material from the contain-ment to the environment will be restricted.

Likewise, use of the SFAS area radiation monitors provide an automatic containment isolation signal u high radiation, restricting the uncontrolled release of radioactive caterial from the containment to the environment.

3 /4. 9.5 COMKUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of sigr.ificant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during CORE ALTERATIONS.

6 DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT I B 3/4 9-la Amendment No. -3 G6, 202

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