ML20100E010

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Proposed TS 3/4.3.2.1,Table 3.3-3,safety Features Actuation Sys Instrumentation,Reflecting Design & Actuation Logic of Plant Sequencers & Essential Bus Undervoltage Relays
ML20100E010
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 02/05/1996
From:
CENTERIOR ENERGY
To:
Shared Package
ML20100E008 List:
References
NUDOCS 9602120016
Download: ML20100E010 (9)


Text

LAR 93-0003 Page 12 ,

3/4 LIMITING CONDITIONS FOR OPERATION AND SURVEILLANCE RECITIRENDrfs 3/4.0 APPLICASILITT LIMIT"lC CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.0.1 Limiting Conditions for Operation and ACTION requiraseets shall be applicable during the OPERATIONAL MODES or. other conditions specified for each specification.

3.0.2 Adherence to the requirements of the Limittag Coedition for Operation and/or associated ACTICel within the specified ties . interval shall constitute 75pt compliance with the specification. In the event the Limiting Condition for as4013 Operation is restored prior to espiration of the specified time interval, completion of the ACTION statement is not required.

3.0.3 When a Limiting condition for operation is not net, escept as provided in the associated ACTION requirements. action shall be initiated withia I hour to TER place the unit in a MODE la which the Specification does set apply by placing l

it. as applicsele. ins 884013

1. At least HOT STANDST within the ease G hours.
2. At least 80T $8UTD0VN withis the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. .and l
3. At least C0ta SEUTD0VN withis the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Where corrective sensurea are' completed that permit operation under the ACIION requirements, the ACTION say be takaa is accordamse with the specified time limits as seasured from the time of failure to meet the Limittag Ccadition for Operation. Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the. individual Specifications.

3.0.4 Entry into an OPERATIONAL N00E or other specified applicability condition shall not be made unless the conditions of the Limiting condition for operation are met without reliance os previstems contained in the ACTION statements unless otherwise excepted. This provistos shall not prevent passage through OPERATIONAL MODES as required to comply with ACTION statenests.

3.0.5 Vhen a systes, subsystem. trais, coopeeest or device is determined to be inoperable solely besesse its emergemey poser seeres is inoperable. or solely g because its normal power source is inoperable. it say be considered OPERABLE for the purpose of satisfying the requirements W its aplicable Limiting Condition 834 013 for Operaties, providads (1) its carrespeeding normal or emergency power source is CPERABLE: and (2) all of its redundant.pystes(s) subsystes(s), train (s),

component (s) and device (s) are OrtRABLE. or likavise satisfy the requirements of this specification. Unless both conditions (1) and (2) are satisfied, within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> action shall be faitiated to place the unit la a NOCE in which the applicable Limiting condition for operaties does not apply by placing it as applicable in:

1. At least ECT STANDST withis che nest ,6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. l
2. At least 50T SIUTDOWN withis the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and
3. At least COLD SIUTDOVN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

This Specification is not applicable in MODES S or 4.

DAVIS-8 ESSE. UNIT 1 3/A 0 1 g ytNo.'W.

INFORilATION ONLY 9602120016 960205 PDR ADOCK 05000346 p PDR

' LAR 93-0003 -

Page 1)

INFORilATION ONLY INSTRUMENTATION 3/a.3.2 SAFETY SYSTEM INST 2LHENTAT10N SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRLNENTATION L1MITING CONDITION FOR OPERATfON 3.3.2.1 The Safety Features Actuation System (5FAS) functional units sacwn in Table 3.3-3 snell be OPERABLE with their trip setpoints set consistent with the values shown in the Trip Setpoint coluan of Table 3.3-4 and with RESPONSE TIMES as shown in Table 3.3-5.

a APPt!CA8!LITY: As snown in Table 3.3 3..

ACT!CN:

a. Witn a SFAS functional unit trip setpoint less conservative than tn value snown in the A110 web's Values column of Table 3.3-4, declare the functional unit inoperable and apply the applicable ACTION requirement of Table 3.3-3. until the func.

tional unit is restored to OPERABLE status with the trip setpoint adjustes consistent with the Trip Setpoint value.

b. With a SFA5 functional unit inoperable. take the action shown in Table 3.3-3.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS .

4. 3. 2.1.1 Each 5FAS functional unit shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CFANNEL CHECK. CHANNEL CAL 15 RATION and CMANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST during the MODES and at the frequencies shewn in Table

~

4.3-2.

4.3.2.1.2 The logic for the bypasses shall be demonstrated CPERA8LE MR uring the at Mwer CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST of functional units affected 89-0012 by bypass operation. The total bypass function shall be demonstrated OPERA 8LE at least once per 18 months during CHANNEL CALilRATION tasting g' of each functional unit affected by bypass operation.

4. 3. 2.1.3 The SAFETY FEATURES RESPONSE TIME of each 5FA5 function shall be demonstrated to be within the limit at least once per 18 months.

Each test shall include at least one functional unit per function such that 7.11 functional units are tested at least once every N *.imes 18 months where N is the total number of redundant functional units in a specific 5FAS function as shown in the

  • Total No. of Units' Colam of Table 3.3-3. ,

DAV!$-8E15E. UNIT 1 3/4 3 9 e

/

INFORilATION ONLY 9

. L

  • b y '

liin -

TABLE 3.3-3 >

os E SAFETY FEATIRES ACTtlATICII SYSTEN INSTRLAtENTATION N

NININutt '

l4 TOTAL 800. ISIITS ISIITS APPLICABLE j FIRICTIcetal.18117 0F WIITS TO TRIF OPERABLE N00ES ACTION

1. INSTRIGIENT STRIIES
a. Caetainment Radiation - '

Eigh 4 2 3 1,2,3,4,6***a 103  !

i

b. Centalement Pressure -  ;

Righ 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 tog ll

c. Caetalmeent Pressure -

Bish-Sigh 4 2 3 1, 2, 3 lug

d. SCS Pressure - I4v 4 2 3 1, 2, 3* 108

, e. RCS Pressere - Ime-Lov 4 2 3 1, 2, 3aa tog ,

y f. BEST 84 vel - tav-law 4 2 3 1., 2, 3 108

[.

o

2. OMTrur IAGIC ,
a. Incident inval 01:

Centalement Isolatten 2 1 2 1,2,3,4,6***a 11 Il

b. Incident lavel 02: l

' Nigh Pressure Isjection and startlag Diesel Generators 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 si l ,

c. Incident level 03: l tav Pressure Injection 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 11 l!

a d. Incident lave! 04:

y Centalement Spesy 2 1 2 1,2,3,4 11 1;

e. Incident 14 vel 05: i S Centalement Semp s Becirculatlee Fermissive 2 1 2 1, 2, 3, 4 II l ;

I TSIR

!;i 89 =

i r

m' k" !cg 3

5 CY T

m

.o.

, g TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued) -8w SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION E UNITS MINIMUM UNITS APPLICABLE TOTAL NO.

Q OF UNITS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION FUNCTIONAL UNIT

3. MANUAL ACTUATION
a. SFAS (except Containment Spray and Emergency Sump Recirculation) 2 2 2 1.2.3.4.6**** 12 l b. Containment Spray 2 2 2 1.2.3.4 12
4. SEQUENCE LOGIC CHANNELS
a. Sequencer 4 EM 3*fdt M3 1.2.3.4 jgj 40#

ca 4 b. Essential Bus Feeder

- Breaker Trip (90%) LM 3 M4 DBUS p*****

1.2.3.4 15f l c. Diesel Generator Start.

! Load Shed on Essential Bus (59%) 33 26lt@ 4 [/jRJ!i 3 1.2.3.4 15#

5. INTERLOCK CHANNELS
a. Decay Heat Isolation Valve 1 1 1 1.2.3 13#

@ b. Pressurizer Heaters 2 2 2 3****** 14 n

O

~

98 i

! N

, .N I

w I

l I

- - _ _ . _ _ _ - - - ~ . -. .--a- - - - a_, s.--.ae, c-

LAR 93-0003 Page 16

/

TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

TABLE NOTATION

  • Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 1800 pg.BypassshallbeautomaticallyremovedwhenRCSpressureexceeds 1 psig
    • Trip function may be bypassed in this MODE with RCS pressure below 600 psig. Bypass shall be automatically removed when RCS pressure exceeds 600 psig.
      • th n mi i c- & kn 4r CEAC

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w. e m. . -v 4n #9

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        • Thir < trumentation, or the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas ultor (with the containment purge and exhaust system in operation), must be OPERABLE during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within containment to meet the requirements of Technical Specification 3.9.4. When using the containment purge and exhaust system noble gas monitor. SFAS is not required to be OPERABLE in MODE 6.
          • All functional units may be bypassed for up to one minute when starting each Reactor Coolant Pump or Circulating Water Pump.
            • When either Decay Heat Isolation Valve is open.
  1. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 10 - With the number of OPERABLE functional units one less than the Total Number of Units. STARTUP and/or POWER OPERATION may proceed previded both of the following conditions are satisfied:

a. The inoperable functional unit is placed in the tripged condition within one hour. For 4" function:1 unit ' tc sequencer channel ch ll be pl:ced the tri by physical re c'/1 cf the ccquencer ~cdule.pped conditi^n
b. The Minimum Units OPERABLE requirement is met: however, one additional functional unit may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2.1.1.

ACTION 11 - With any component in the Output Logic inoperable, trip the associated components within one hour or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 3-12 Amendment No. 28, 37, 52. 102.

135. 159. 186

. I R 93-0003

  • Pags 17 TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 12 - With the number of OPERABLE Units one less than the Total Number of Units restore the inoperable functional unit to OPERABLE status within '

48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ACTION 13 - a. With less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant 3ressure > 438 psig, both Decay Heat Isolation Valves (DH11 and

)H12) shat 1 be verified closed.

b. With Less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure < 438 psig operation may continue; however, the functional unit shall be OPERABLE prior to increasing reactor coolant pressure above 438 psig.

ACTION 14 - With less than the Minimum Units OPERABLE and reactor coolant pressure ,

< 438 psig, operation may continue; however, the functional unit shall i be OPERABLE prior to increasing reactor coolant pressure above 438 I psig, or the inoperable functional unit shall be placed in the tripped I state. l 1

ACTION 15 - C kWithithei;WUmbsifT6ff0PERABLEhhitsT6 dei 1E55%thshith#1NihihissIUnith

~^

~ 0perdbl eiperTBdiW pl acsitheli rjopef abls10nittinithslthi~pped '^~~ ~

conditionswithintoneshoun w o g fsnctionalsunitt4?althesse4066ddh I shal l L belplaced ffnitheltfippEdic6ndi tioriib?? phy5icalkeinovalfof ' l thenseq9encecimoddlei4Tne;inoperablbifunctionaBuritimagbe~

  • bypassedifor/Opitoi21h00rssfoesdrv6111anceitestM~ 'pei Spec 1 D eay onl4 2 2]M W ~ ~ ^"" ~ ~ ~ ~~

bid [With!the@umbeN(bDOPERABLEinnitiitWoHs5MtharilthelMirlininiEUnits

. Operable pet;BusNdeclarelinoperableithelEmergencW0iesel 1 GeneratoN associ ated:with9thesfuncti onalibni tsinottmeeti npiths requiredininimumf0ni tsiOPERABLEs and stakeiths2ACT10Nireq~ui red Mt ~~

SpecgicationgBjMf- ~~"~~~~^~~~

With the number of CPER^SLE functional unit: One les: than the T0tal Number of Unit: Operation may proceed provided both of the follow ng condition: are : tisfio4+

4

3. The inoperable Ocction of a functional unit is placed 4^

the tripped condition "ithd^ One hour

b. The m =4 mum Unit: OPER^ ELE requirement is met; however.

the 490perable ccction of a functional unit may be bype cd for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for cur"^" lance testing per Speci'ication '.3.2.1.1.

DAVIS-BESSE. UNIT 1 3/4 3-12a Amendment No. 28. 52. 102. 135

INFORMATION ONLY $,

? TABLE 3.3-4 m; O

$Ar[TY FtATURES ACTUATION SYSitM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SCTP0lMis .S

=

.N TRIP 5tTP0lNT ALLONA8tt VALUts ,

_ FUNCTIONAL UNIT

$ INSTRUHtNT STRINGS

a. Containment Radiation < 4 s Sackground at RATIO < 4x Sackground at TittRMAL P0wtR RAtto THERMAL PolttR, [
b. Containment Pressure - High 4 18.4 psia 4 18.52 psla I
c. Containment Pressure - High-High < 38.4 psla 4 3R.52 psla#
d. RCS Pressure - Ldv t 620.75 1 psig g 1615.75 psig#

$ e. RCS Presscre - Low-Low > 420.75 psig t 415.75 psig#

"2. f. 8WST Level > 89.5 and < 100.5 in. H 2O

~ ~

> 88.3 and

~

" 1 101.7 in. H2O f ,

[ 5tqutNCE LOGIC CHAIWitLS

a. Essential ses Feeder erester Trip (901) 13744 volts for 1 3558 volts h < 7.8 sec < 7.8 sec g

Olesel Generator start, lead Shed on I W b.

EssentialBus(595) > 20F1.and < 2450 volts

~

2071 and < 2450

.h for 0.5

  • 0.1 sec

~

volts for y 0.5 + 0.1 sec#

INTERLOCK CllANNEL5 en E a. Decay Heat isolation. Valve < 438 psig < 443 psigf*

g and Pressurizer lleater I

Allowa'ble Value for CllANNtl FUNCTIONAL. ItST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

  • Referenced to the centeriina of DilH and 09*.' ,

LAR 93-0003  !

  • Page }9 <

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION l The OPERABILITY of the RPS, SFAS and SFRCS instrumentation systems ensure that

1) the associated action and/or trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof exceeds its setpoint, 2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained 3) sufficient redundancy is maintained to permit a channel to be out of service for testing or maintenance, and 4) sufficient system functional capability is available for RPS, SFAS and SFRCS purposes from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundance and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions. The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident analyses.

The surveillance requirements specified for these systems ensure that the J overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveillance tests aerformed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capa]ility.

The measurement of response time at the specified frequencies provides assurance that the RPS, SFAS, and SFRCS action function associated with each channel is completed within the time limit assumed in the safety analyses. No credit was taken in the analyses for those channels with response times

' indicated as not applicable.

Response time may be demonstrated by any series of sequential, overlap)ing or total channel test measurements provided that such tests demonstrate tie total channel response time as defined. Sensor response time verification may be demonstrated by either 1) in place, onsite or offsite test measurements or 2) utilizing replacement sensors with certified response times.

The' actuation logic"for Functional Units 4.'a T'4'.b. ~,"and'4.cl of Table 3.3-3 Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, is designed to provide protection and actuation of a single train of safety features equipment, essential bus or emergency diesel generator. Collectively, Functional Units i 4.a. 4.b.aand 4.c. function to detect a degraded voltage condition on either '

of the two o160 volt essential buses. shed connected loads, disconnect the affected bus (es) from the offsite power source and start the associated '

emergency diesel generator. In addition. if an SFAS actuation signal is present under these conditions, the sequencer channels for the two SFAS channels which actuate the train of safety features equipment Jowered by the affected bus will automatically sequence these loads onto the aus to 3revent overloading of the emergency diesel generator. Functional Unit 4.a. las a DAVIS-BESSE, UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-1 Amendment No. 73. I25 (Next page is B 3/4 3-la)

LAR 93-0003 Page 20 t e

3/4.3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.1 and 3/4.3.2 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM AND SAFETY SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION (Continued) ,

I t6tal'6f'f6ur"unitif orie associated'with~ea'ch^ SFAS" channel '(i .e. , tisio"for 'each

  • essential bus). ' Functional Units 4.b. and 4.c. each have'a total of four units. (two associated with each essential bus): each unit consisting 'of two ^ ' ' ^ ~ ^ ' " '

undervoltage, relays, and an auxiliary' relay;

An SFRCS channel consists of 1) the sensing device (s). 2) associated logic and outaut relays (including Isolation of Main Feedwater Non Essential Valves and Turaine Trip) and 3) power sources.

The SFRCS response time for the turbine stop valve closure is based on the combined response times of main steam line low pressure sensors, logic cabinet delay for main steam line low pressure signals and closure time of the turbine stop valves. This SFRCS response time ensures that the auxiliary feedwater to the unaffected steam generator will not be isolated due to a SFRCS low pressure trip during a main steam line break accident.

Safety-grade anticipatory reactor trip is initiated by a turbine trip (above 45 Jercent of RATED THERMAL POWER) or trip of both main feedwater pump tur)ines. This anticipatory trip will operate in advance of the reactor coolant system high pressure reactor trip to reduce the peak reactor coolant '

system pressure and thus reduce challenges to the pilot operated relief valve.

This anticipatory reactor trip system was installed to satisfy Item II.K.2.10 of NUREG-0737. The justification for the ARTS turbine trip arming level of 45% is given in BAW-1893. October, 1985.

l DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 B 3/4 3-la Amendment No. 73. I25. 128.

, 135 l

l

_. , - -.