The team identified a non-cited violation of
10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with the licensees failure to properly evaluate
NRC Bulletin 88-04, Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss, regarding the
auxiliary feedwater pumps. Specifically, from November 28, 2010, through February 2013, the licensee failed to properly evaluate
NRC Bulletin 88-04, for strong pump, weak pump, interaction regarding
auxiliary feedwater pumps FW-6 and FW-10. The evaluation failed to consider pump-to-pump interaction that may result due to pump discharge
check valve leakage. In addition, the licensee failed to re-evaluate the condition after surveillance testing performed on November 28, 2010, and September 1, 2012, identified leakage past both pump discharge
check valves. This issue has been entered into the corrective action program as Condition Reports CR 2013-04680 and CR 2013-04806. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the
Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to
initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using
Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The
Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the finding is determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because it: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system, or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than their technical specification allowed outage time; (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees
maintenance rule program; and (5) did not involve the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a seismic, flooding or severe weather event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems such that appropriate corrective actions were promptly implemented
