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{{#Wiki_filter:}} | {{#Wiki_filter:ads tUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555February 28, 1990NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-12:MONITORING OR INTERRUPTION OFPLANT COMMUNICATIONS | ||
==Addressees== | |||
: -All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors. | |||
==Purpose== | |||
:This information notice is intended to inform licensees of the potential formonitoring and/or disruption of onsite radio communications at power reactors.It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicabilityto their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similarproblems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do notconstitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written responseis required. | |||
==Description of Circumstances== | |||
:Between January 1989 and January 1990, an individual located offsite monitoredand recorded onsite communications originating from the control room at Seabrook.No security transmissions were recorded, only routine outgoing operationalmessages from the control room. NRC representatives from both operations andsafeguards randomly sampled portions of these taped communications. No safe-guards or other sensitive information which could have jeopardized safety wasfound to have been Intercepted. In an additional Incident at Seabrook, an un-authorized transmission interrupted control room communications by transmittingon the same frequency. It was not determined if the outside transmitting sourcewas on or offsite.Discussion:Although no safety or security compromise appears to have been involved inthe Seabrook incidents, they demonstrate the potential for such compromise,considering power reactor transmittal of routine operational and securityradio messages on unencrypted (clear) radio frequencies, and the potentialfor interruption from external sources. The | |||
==Intent== | |||
of this notice Is tocall licensees' attention to the potential for similar type communicationevents at their facilities and the possible need for additional communi-cations discipline for plant operations and security.//<9 C' | |||
IN 90-12February 28, 1990 In regard to plant security, 10 CFR 73.21 prohibits the transmission of safe-guards information except by protected telecommunications circuits. Thisincludes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communications. NUREG-0794,"Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information," suggests that if protected(encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radio transmissions between sitesecurity personnel be limited to message formats or codes that do not disclosefacility safeguards features or response procedures.There are no specific requirements related to the security of radios and telephonesfor transmission of information on site in support of operations. Radios havebeen increasingly used as a means to provide more mobile and efficient communi-cations links between plant operators. However, radio communications are notprivate. In viewof the Seabrook event, addressees may wishlto. examine com-munications discipline and basic operations procedures that they now have.Various commercial scanners are available that can pick up site frequencies andare simple to operate. An individual can listen in on all radio traffic forcommunications that are not secure-; lEicrypted systems can.helplin overcomingthe vulnerability of radio transmistions'to exploitation.. However, these systemsmay still be susceptible to.imonitoting.. -.iThe unauthorized transmission~at'Seabrook demonstrates other methods that mightexploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming-.and'deception could be used----in-rad4o-transmissions-although this did not appear to he the intent at Seabrook.Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and'willfully causing orattempting to cause physical damage to a utilization fabilityoir cause an inter-ruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or-tampering withthe machinery, components, or controls of any such facility,'and prescribespenalties for such attempts.{(Sectioh 236 of the "AtomicEnergy Act)' -The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolentacts varies considerably. Proper communications discipline and basic radiooperating procedures, commensurate.iwith the operations and security significanceof the communications, can lessen vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming,-and-deception. ' 'This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.-:r~les ER~ossl, Director'Division of Operational Events'AssessmentOffice of;7Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
===Technical Contact:=== | |||
Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211 | |||
===Attachment:=== | |||
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Noticesa D K ; .I l jK)AttachmentIN 90-12February 28, 990LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date otNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to90-1190-1090-0988-30,Supp. 1Maintenance DeficiencyAssociated with Solenoid-Operated ValvesPrimary Water StressCorrosion Cracking (PWSCC)of Inconel 600Extended Interim Storage ofLow-Level Radioactive Wasteby Fuel Cycle and MaterialsLicenseesTarget Rock Two-Stage SRV-Setpoint Drift Update2/28/902/23/902/5/902/2/90All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for PWRs.All holders of NRCmaterials licenses.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.____ 90-08__ Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed -211/90FuelAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors andholders of licensesfor permanently shut-down facilities withfuel on site.88-23,Supp. 290-0790-06Potential for Gas Bindingof High-Pressure SafetyInjection Pumps During aLoss-of-Coolant AccidentNew Information RegardingInsulation MaterialPerformance and DebrisBlockage of PWR Contain-ment SumpsPotential for Loss ofShutdown Cooling Whileat Low Reactor CoolantLevels1/31/901/30/901/29/90All holders of OLsor CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit IN 90-12February 28, 1990 In regard to plant security, 10 CFR 73.21 prohibits the transmission of safe-guards information except by protected telecommunications circuits. Thisincludes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communications. NUREG-0794,"Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information," suggests that if protected(encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radio transmissions between sitesecurity personnel be limited to message formats or codes that do not disclosefacility safeguards features or response procedures.There are no specific requirements related to the security of radios and telephonesfor transmission of information on site in support of operations. Radios havebeen increasingly used as a means to provide more mobile and efficient communi-cations links between plant operators. However, radio communications are notprivate. In view of the Seabrook event, addressees may wish to examine com-munications discipline and basic operations procedures that they now have.Various commercial scanners are available that can pick up site frequencies andare simple to operate. An individual can listen in on all radio traffic forcommunications that are not secure. Encrypted systems can help in overcomingthe vulnerability of radio transmissions to exploitation. However, these systemsmay still be susceptible to monitoring.The unauthorized transmission at Seabrook demonstrates other methods that mightexploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming and deception could be usedin radio transmissions although this did not appear to be the intent at Seabrook.Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and willfully causing orattempting to cause physical damage to a utilization facility or cause an inter-ruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or tampering withthe machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, and prescribespenalties for such attempts. (Section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act")The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolentacts varies considerably. Proper communications discipline and basic radiooperating procedures, commensurate with the operations and security significanceof the communications, can lessen vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming, anddeception.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
===Technical Contact:=== | |||
Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211 | |||
===Attachment:=== | |||
List of Recently*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES*OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RSGB:DRIS:NRR INPKadambi MSWarren02/22/90 02/22/90Issued NRC Information NoticesDdl8O9.~.5R *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRRC CHBerlinger02/A46'90 02/23/90'C/RSGB:DRIS:NRR *D/DRIS:NRRPMcKee BKGrimes02/22/90 02/23/90*RPB:ADMTechEd02/22/90*OGC02/22/90 IN 90-XXFebruary xx, 1990;\ the transmission of safeguards information except by protected telecommunica-tions circuits. This includes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communi-cations. NUREG-0794 "Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information"suggests that if protected (encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radiotransmissions between site security personnel must be limited to messageformats or codes that do not disclose facility safeguards features or responseprocedures. There are no specific requirements related to the security ofradio and telephones for transmission of information on site in support ofoperations. Radios have been increasingly used as a means to provide moremobile and efficient communications links between plant operators. Licenseesshould be aware that their radio communications are not private. Althoughoperational communications are normally not sensitive, consideration should begiven to whether information potentially being monitored could assist malevo-lent acts that could jeopardize public health and safety.Various commercial scanners are available that can pick upare simple to operate. An individual can listen in on allcommunications that are not secure. Encrypted systems canthe vulnerability of radio transmissions to exploitation.systems may still be susceptible to monitoring.site frequencies andradio traffic forhelp in overcomingHowever, theseThe unauthorized transmission at Seabrook demonstrates other methods that mightexploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming and deception could beused in radio transmissions although this did not appear to be the intent atSeabrook.Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and willfully causing orattempting to cause physical damage to a utilization facility or cause aninterruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or tamperingwith its machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, and pre-scribes penalties for such attempts. (Section 236 of the "Atomic Energy Act")Proper communications discipline and basic radio operating procedures canlessen communications vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming, and deception.The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolentacts varies considerably. Some programs related to this subject may deservemore attention than others.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
===Technical Contact:=== | |||
Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211 | |||
===Attachment:=== | |||
List of Recently*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES*OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RSGB:DRIS:NRR ,NPKadambi MSWarren02/22/90 02/22/90Issued NRC Information NoticesD/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA;NPRCERossi CHBerlinger tAL02/ /90 0 02/0f/90*C/RSGB:DRIS:NRR *D/DRIS:NRRPMcKee BKGrimes02/22/90 02/23/90RPr~A- u~xoRPB:ADMTechEd02/22/90*OGC02/22/90 IIN 90-XXFebruary xx, 1990 The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolentacts varies considerably. Some programs related to this subject may deservemore attention than others.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation | |||
===Technical Contact:=== | |||
Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211 | |||
===Attachment:=== | |||
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Noticesj p Zocument Name:OGCB:DOEA:NRRNPKadambi02h=;t9OASSe. 'i.ffatqcadsl # ,rCsash -~IN ON RADIOSRSGB:DRIS:NRMSWarren02/22/90#s4 :sztRPB:ADMS TechEd02/ /90t74/OC/OGCB:DOEA:NRRCHBerlinger02/ /90D/DOEA:NRRCERossi02/ /90}} | |||
{{Information notice-Nav}} | {{Information notice-Nav}} | ||
Revision as of 08:58, 20 February 2018
ads tUNITED STATESNUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONOFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIONWASHINGTON, D.C. 20555February 28, 1990NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 90-12:MONITORING OR INTERRUPTION OFPLANT COMMUNICATIONS
Addressees
- -All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear powerreactors.
Purpose
- This information notice is intended to inform licensees of the potential formonitoring and/or disruption of onsite radio communications at power reactors.It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicabilityto their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similarproblems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do notconstitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written responseis required.
Description of Circumstances
- Between January 1989 and January 1990, an individual located offsite monitoredand recorded onsite communications originating from the control room at Seabrook.No security transmissions were recorded, only routine outgoing operationalmessages from the control room. NRC representatives from both operations andsafeguards randomly sampled portions of these taped communications. No safe-guards or other sensitive information which could have jeopardized safety wasfound to have been Intercepted. In an additional Incident at Seabrook, an un-authorized transmission interrupted control room communications by transmittingon the same frequency. It was not determined if the outside transmitting sourcewas on or offsite.Discussion:Although no safety or security compromise appears to have been involved inthe Seabrook incidents, they demonstrate the potential for such compromise,considering power reactor transmittal of routine operational and securityradio messages on unencrypted (clear) radio frequencies, and the potentialfor interruption from external sources. The
Intent
of this notice Is tocall licensees' attention to the potential for similar type communicationevents at their facilities and the possible need for additional communi-cations discipline for plant operations and security.//<9 C'
IN 90-12February 28, 1990 In regard to plant security, 10 CFR 73.21 prohibits the transmission of safe-guards information except by protected telecommunications circuits. Thisincludes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communications. NUREG-0794,"Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information," suggests that if protected(encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radio transmissions between sitesecurity personnel be limited to message formats or codes that do not disclosefacility safeguards features or response procedures.There are no specific requirements related to the security of radios and telephonesfor transmission of information on site in support of operations. Radios havebeen increasingly used as a means to provide more mobile and efficient communi-cations links between plant operators. However, radio communications are notprivate. In viewof the Seabrook event, addressees may wishlto. examine com-munications discipline and basic operations procedures that they now have.Various commercial scanners are available that can pick up site frequencies andare simple to operate. An individual can listen in on all radio traffic forcommunications that are not secure-; lEicrypted systems can.helplin overcomingthe vulnerability of radio transmistions'to exploitation.. However, these systemsmay still be susceptible to.imonitoting.. -.iThe unauthorized transmission~at'Seabrook demonstrates other methods that mightexploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming-.and'deception could be used----in-rad4o-transmissions-although this did not appear to he the intent at Seabrook.Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and'willfully causing orattempting to cause physical damage to a utilization fabilityoir cause an inter-ruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or-tampering withthe machinery, components, or controls of any such facility,'and prescribespenalties for such attempts.{(Sectioh 236 of the "AtomicEnergy Act)' -The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolentacts varies considerably. Proper communications discipline and basic radiooperating procedures, commensurate.iwith the operations and security significanceof the communications, can lessen vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming,-and-deception. ' 'This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.-:r~les ER~ossl, Director'Division of Operational Events'AssessmentOffice of;7Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Noticesa D K ; .I l jK)AttachmentIN 90-12February 28, 990LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUEDNRC INFORMATION NOTICESInformation Date otNotice No. Subject Issuance Issued to90-1190-1090-0988-30,Supp. 1Maintenance DeficiencyAssociated with Solenoid-Operated ValvesPrimary Water StressCorrosion Cracking (PWSCC)of Inconel 600Extended Interim Storage ofLow-Level Radioactive Wasteby Fuel Cycle and MaterialsLicenseesTarget Rock Two-Stage SRV-Setpoint Drift Update2/28/902/23/902/5/902/2/90All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for PWRs.All holders of NRCmaterials licenses.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.____ 90-08__ Kr-85 Hazards from Decayed -211/90FuelAll holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors andholders of licensesfor permanently shut-down facilities withfuel on site.88-23,Supp. 290-0790-06Potential for Gas Bindingof High-Pressure SafetyInjection Pumps During aLoss-of-Coolant AccidentNew Information RegardingInsulation MaterialPerformance and DebrisBlockage of PWR Contain-ment SumpsPotential for Loss ofShutdown Cooling Whileat Low Reactor CoolantLevels1/31/901/30/901/29/90All holders of OLsor CPs for PWRs.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.All holders of OLsor CPs for nuclearpower reactors.OL = Operating LicenseCP = Construction Permit IN 90-12February 28, 1990 In regard to plant security, 10 CFR 73.21 prohibits the transmission of safe-guards information except by protected telecommunications circuits. Thisincludes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communications. NUREG-0794,"Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information," suggests that if protected(encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radio transmissions between sitesecurity personnel be limited to message formats or codes that do not disclosefacility safeguards features or response procedures.There are no specific requirements related to the security of radios and telephonesfor transmission of information on site in support of operations. Radios havebeen increasingly used as a means to provide more mobile and efficient communi-cations links between plant operators. However, radio communications are notprivate. In view of the Seabrook event, addressees may wish to examine com-munications discipline and basic operations procedures that they now have.Various commercial scanners are available that can pick up site frequencies andare simple to operate. An individual can listen in on all radio traffic forcommunications that are not secure. Encrypted systems can help in overcomingthe vulnerability of radio transmissions to exploitation. However, these systemsmay still be susceptible to monitoring.The unauthorized transmission at Seabrook demonstrates other methods that mightexploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming and deception could be usedin radio transmissions although this did not appear to be the intent at Seabrook.Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and willfully causing orattempting to cause physical damage to a utilization facility or cause an inter-ruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or tampering withthe machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, and prescribespenalties for such attempts. (Section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act")The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolentacts varies considerably. Proper communications discipline and basic radiooperating procedures, commensurate with the operations and security significanceof the communications, can lessen vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming, anddeception.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211
Attachment:
List of Recently*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES*OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RSGB:DRIS:NRR INPKadambi MSWarren02/22/90 02/22/90Issued NRC Information NoticesDdl8O9.~.5R *C/OGCB:DOEA:NRRC CHBerlinger02/A46'90 02/23/90'C/RSGB:DRIS:NRR *D/DRIS:NRRPMcKee BKGrimes02/22/90 02/23/90*RPB:ADMTechEd02/22/90*OGC02/22/90 IN 90-XXFebruary xx, 1990;\ the transmission of safeguards information except by protected telecommunica-tions circuits. This includes onsite and offsite radio and telephone communi-cations. NUREG-0794 "Protection of Unclassified Safeguards Information"suggests that if protected (encrypted) frequencies are not used, routine radiotransmissions between site security personnel must be limited to messageformats or codes that do not disclose facility safeguards features or responseprocedures. There are no specific requirements related to the security ofradio and telephones for transmission of information on site in support ofoperations. Radios have been increasingly used as a means to provide moremobile and efficient communications links between plant operators. Licenseesshould be aware that their radio communications are not private. Althoughoperational communications are normally not sensitive, consideration should begiven to whether information potentially being monitored could assist malevo-lent acts that could jeopardize public health and safety.Various commercial scanners are available that can pick upare simple to operate. An individual can listen in on allcommunications that are not secure. Encrypted systems canthe vulnerability of radio transmissions to exploitation.systems may still be susceptible to monitoring.site frequencies andradio traffic forhelp in overcomingHowever, theseThe unauthorized transmission at Seabrook demonstrates other methods that mightexploit radio communications vulnerabilities. Jamming and deception could beused in radio transmissions although this did not appear to be the intent atSeabrook.Federal law prohibits any person from intentionally and willfully causing orattempting to cause physical damage to a utilization facility or cause aninterruption of normal operations through the unauthorized use of or tamperingwith its machinery, components, or controls of any such facility, and pre-scribes penalties for such attempts. (Section 236 of the "Atomic Energy Act")Proper communications discipline and basic radio operating procedures canlessen communications vulnerability to monitoring, Jamming, and deception.The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolentacts varies considerably. Some programs related to this subject may deservemore attention than others.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211
Attachment:
List of Recently*SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCES*OGCB:DOEA:NRR*RSGB:DRIS:NRR ,NPKadambi MSWarren02/22/90 02/22/90Issued NRC Information NoticesD/DOEA:NRR C/OGCB:DOEA;NPRCERossi CHBerlinger tAL02/ /90 0 02/0f/90*C/RSGB:DRIS:NRR *D/DRIS:NRRPMcKee BKGrimes02/22/90 02/23/90RPr~A- u~xoRPB:ADMTechEd02/22/90*OGC02/22/90 IIN 90-XXFebruary xx, 1990 The sensitivity of onsite communications and the potential to aid malevolentacts varies considerably. Some programs related to this subject may deservemore attention than others.This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Ifyou have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact thetechnical contact listed below or the appropriate NRR project manager.Charles E. Rossi, DirectorDivision of Operational Events AssessmentOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical Contact:
Michael S. Warren, NRR(301) 492-3211
Attachment:
List of Recently Issued NRC Information Noticesj p Zocument Name:OGCB:DOEA:NRRNPKadambi02h=;t9OASSe. 'i.ffatqcadsl # ,rCsash -~IN ON RADIOSRSGB:DRIS:NRMSWarren02/22/90#s4 :sztRPB:ADMS TechEd02/ /90t74/OC/OGCB:DOEA:NRRCHBerlinger02/ /90D/DOEA:NRRCERossi02/ /90