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(( 4 !; 125/250V. D.C. SYSTEM AND 120V. A.C. VITAL POWER SYSTEM SYSTEM DIAGRAM essa me OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION FIGURE 8-3 ; | |||
]8b | ]8b | ||
~* U D | ~* U D | ||
Latest revision as of 16:14, 27 February 2020
| ML19322A789 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 12/01/1966 |
| From: | DUKE POWER CO. |
| To: | |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7911250007 | |
| Download: ML19322A789 (25) | |
Text
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i O TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page 8 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 8-1 8.1 DESIGN BASES 8-1 8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN 8-1 8.2.1 NETWORK INTERCONNECTIONS 8-1 8.2.1.1 Single Line Diagram 8.
8.2.1.2 Reliabilit9 Considerations 8-1 8.2.2 STATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 8-3 8.2.2.1 System Diagrams 8-3 8.2.2.2 Unit Auxiliary and Start-up Transformers 8-3 8.2.2.3 6900 volt and 4160 Voic Auxiliary System x 8-3
\ 8.2.2.4 600 Volt Auxiliary System 8-4 8.2.2.5 125/250 Volt DC System 8-4 8.2.2.6 120 Volt AC Vital Power Busses 8-5 8.2.2.7 120 Volt Regulated Power System 8-9 i
8.2.2.8 120Y208 Volt Power System , 829 8.2.2.9 Evaluation of the Physical Layout, Electrical 8-9 Distribution System Equipment 8.2.3 EMERGENCY POWER 8-10 8.2.3.1 Sif Description of five Power Sources to Each Unit 8-10 8.2.3.2 Power to Vital Loads 8-12 8.2.3.3 Reliability Considerations 8-13 8.2.3.4 Back-Up Power from Gas Turbines 8-13 8.3 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS 8-13 8-i (Revised 5-25-67) - .
! l l
LIST OF FIGURES I
Figures l l
! 8-1 Electrical Power Systems - Single Line Diagram i i
jr 8-2 Site Transmission Map
, 8-3 125/250 Volt DC System and 120 Volt AC Vital Power System j i
- 8-4 Electrical Power Systems - Single Line Diagram - Unit 3 i
I
- LIST OF TABLES i !
Table g i i
j 8-1 Single Failure Analysis for the 125/250 Volt DC System 8-6 :l l thru 8-8 1
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8-11 (Revised 5-25-67) , .
O V 8 ELECTRICAL SYSTEMS 8.1 DESIGN BASES The design of the electrical systems for this three-unit nuclear station is based on providing the required electrical equipment and power sources to insure continuous operation of the essential station auxiliary equipment under all conditions.
8.2 ELECTRICAL SYSTEM DESIGN 8.2.1 NETWORK INTERCONNECTIONS Each unit will generate electric power at 19 kv which will be fed through an isolated phase bus to a unit step-up transformer where it will be stepped up to the transmission voltage, 230 kv for Units 1 and 2 and 500 kv for Unit 3.
From nit 1 and Unit 2, overhead transmission lines will feed the power to the station 230 kv switching station which will be connected to the existing Duke Power Company 230 kv transmission network by six circuits. Four circuits will be installed with Unit 1, two north to J'2assee and two southeaat to Central with two additional circuits east-northe2st to Tiger installed with Unit 2.
From Unit 3, an overhead transmission line will feed the power to the 500 kv switching station which will be connected to Duke's 500 kv transmission net-work by two circuits. One 500 kv circuit will be installed north and east-northeast to the Lake Norman area and one east-northeast to the Lake Wylic area. In addition with Unit 3, a 230/500 kv auto-transformer will tie the v 500 kv switching station to the 230 kv switching station and two additional 230 kv circuits will be run southeast to Central. In addition to the power available from the nuclear units, the 230 kv and 500 kv trmsmission networks, the entire output of two 87,500 kva units of the on-site Keowee Hydro Station will be connected to the station 230 kv switching station through a single circuit overhead transmission line. The 230 kv busses, disconnect switches and circuit breakers will be arranged into a breaker and a half configuration while the 500 kv switching station will be arranged into.a ring bus configura-tion. See Figures 8-1, 8-2 and 8-4 for arrangement of lines in the station and on the site.
8.2.1.1 Single Line Diagram i
Figures 8-1 and 8-4 are single line diagrams of the station busses and circuits.
8.2.1.2 Reliability Considerations Reizability considerations to minimize the probability of power failure duc )
to faults in the network interconnections and the associated switching are ;
as follows:
)
(a) Redundancy will be designed into the network interconnections by in- l stalling two full capacity transmission circuits for each double circuit ;
connection to the 230 kv grid. Either circuit may be interrupted and l the other will be capable of carrying double its normal current, j h
1 (b) The two single 230 kv transmission circuits will be installed on the aame line of towers, but each line of double circuit towers will be -
8-1 (Revised 5-25-67) 162 i
- u. 1 l
separated a safe distance from the others, and in most cases installed over a different route.
(c) One of the circuits on a line of 230 kv transmission towers will be insulated at a higher insulation level than the other, thus minimizing the probability of double outages due to flashovers.
(d) Each circuit will be protected from lightning and switching surges by an overhead electrostatic shield wire and lightning arresters at both ends.
(e) The breaker and a half switching arrangement in the 230 kv switching station will include two full capacity main busses which will feed each circuit through a circuit breaker connected to each bus. Primary and backup relaying will be provided for each circuit along with circuit breaker failure backup switching. These provisions will permit the following:
- 1. Any circuit can be switched under normal or fault switching without affecting another circuit.
- 2. Any single circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance without interrupting the power or protection to any circuit.
- 3. Short circuits of a single main bus will be isolated without interrupting service to any circuit.
- 4. Short circuit failure of the tie breaker will result in the loss of its two adjacent ircuits until it is isolated by disconnect switches.
- 5. Short circuit failure of a bus side breaker will result in the loss of only one circuit until it is isolated.
- 6. Circuit protection will be insured from failure of the primary pro-tective relaying by backtp relaying.
(f) The ring bus switching arrangement in the 500 kv switching station will permit the following:
- 1. Any circuit can be switched under normal or fault switching without affecting another circuit.
- 2. Any single circuit breaker can be isolated for maintenance without interrupting the power or protection to any circuit.
- 3. Short circuit of a single circuit breaker will result in the loss of only a single transmission circuit.
- 4. Circuit protection will be insured from failure of the primary protective relaying by backup relaying.
With the above protective features, the probability of loss of more than one source of 230 kv or 500 kv power from credible faults is low; however, in the event of an occurrence causing loss of up to all the 230 kv and 500 kv -
1 8-2 (Revised 5-25-67) jg}
connections, the station will be supplied from one or more of the five re-maining sources of power (See 8.2.3).
8.2.2 STATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM The station distribution system will consist of the various auxiliary elec-trical systems designed to provide reliabic electrical power during all modes of station operation and shutdown conditions. The systems will be designed with sufficient power sources, redundant busses and required switching to accomplish this. Engineered safeguard auxiliaries for each unit will be arranged so that the loss of a single bus section for any reason will result in only single losses of auxiliaries leaving redundant auxiliaries to perform the same function. In general, the auxiliaries related to unit operation will be connected to their respective unit auxiliary electrical busses, whereas auxiliaries common to and serving all units will be distributed be-tween unit auxiliary electrical busses. With the initial installation, special provisions will be made to supply all of the common auxiliaries from Unit 1 busses. The control of all switching will be accomplished from the common control room for Units 1 and 2 while control of switching for Unit 3 will be from a separate control room.
8.2.2.1 System Diagrams Figure 8-1 is a single line diagram of the station distribution system.
Figure 8-3 is a diagram of the 125/250 volt de system and 120 volt ac vital power system.
8.2.2.2 Unit Auxiliary and Start-Up Transformeg Each unit will be provided with one full-size auxiliary transformer and one full-size start-up transformer. The auxiliary transformer will be connected to its respective generator bus and will provide a source of normal power requirements to the unit. Each start-up transformer will be connected to the 230 kv switching station and will provide a source of power for start-up, shutdown and after shutdown requirements. The start-up transformer will also serve as a complete standby source to serve auxiliaries in the event of failure of the auxiliary transformer.
8.2.2.3 6900 volt and 4160 voit Auxiliary Systems Each auxiliary and start-up transformer will have two isolated secondary windings rated 6900 volts and 4160 volts respectively. Each unit will be provided with two separate 6900 volt busses from which the reactor coolant pumps will be supplied and two redundant 4160 volt main feeder busses from which the remainder of the auxiliaries will be supplied. During start-up, shutdown and after shutdown, the 6900 volt and 4160 volt auxiliary busses will be supplied from the start-up transformer. During normal operation and following the unit separation from the 230 kv transmission system because of s disturbance external to the unit, the 6900 volt and 4160 volt auxiliary bus.ses will be supplied from the auxiliary transformer. Normal transfer of l the 6900 volt and 4160 volt auxiliary busses between the two sources will be I initiated by the operator from the control room, while emergency transfer from the auxiliary transformer to the start-up transformer will be initiated
[' j , 8-3 (Revised 5-25-67) }bk l
automatically by protective relay action. Normal bus transfers used on start-up or shutdown of a unit will be " live bus" transfers, ie, the incoming source feeder circuit breaker will be closed onto the energized bus section and its interlocks will trip the outgoing source feeder circuit breaker which will result in transfers without power interruption. Extergency bus trans fers which will be used on the loss of normal unit sources will be rapid bus trans-fers, ie, the outgoing source feeder circuit breaker will be tripped and its interlocks will close the incoming source feeder circuit breaker which will result in a transfer within a maximum of four cycles. Paralleling sources which are out of phase will be prevented by the use of synchronism check relays. Auxiliary systems for each of Units 1, 2 and 3 will have identical arrangements. Each unit's 4160 volt auxiliary busses will be arranged into a double bus-double circuit breaker switching arrangement, thus providing redundant main feeder busses and feeder circuit breakers for the power sources and switchgear bus sections. Tie circuit breakers will be provided between the 4160 volt main feeder busses from Unit I to Unit 2 and from Unit 2 to Unit 3 so that any unit's 4160 volt main feeder busses can supply power to the other's.
In addition, a 4160 volt power feeder from the 100 kv transmission system and a 4160 volt powr feeder from the Keowee hydro units are connected to the Unit 2 4160 volt redundant main feedar busses through circuit breakers. This permits power to be supplied from these sources to any unit's 4160 volt auxi-11ary electric system through the tic circuit breakers.
8.2.2.4 600 Volt Auxiliary System Each unit 600 volt auxiliary system will be arranged into six separate bus sections. Each bus section will be fed from a separate load center trans-former which will be connected to one of the three 4160 volt bus sections. A tie circuit will be provided between each pair of 600 volt bus sections.
Various 600 volt motor control centers will be located throughout the station to supply power to equipment within the related area. Each motor control center will be provided with feeders from two of the 600 volt auxiliary system busses. The equipment will be arranged and switching accomplished so as to prevent all the power from being lost to all equipment associated with a particular function in the event of a failure of any single component of the 4160 volt or 600 volt systems.
8.2.2.5 125/250 Volt DC System For the station, a 125/250 volt de system will provide a source of reliable continuous power for control, instrumentatien and other loads for normal operation and orderly shutdown and control of the station.
Refer to Figure 8-3. The system will consist of three 125/250 volt de, three conductor, metalclad switchgear assemblies, nine 125 volt de power supply-battery chargers and six 125 volt de batteries arranged to provide 125 volts de from "P" bus to "PN" bus ,125 volts de from "PN" to "N" bus and 250 volts de from "P" to "N" bus. Each 125 volt de half of a bus section normally will be supplied from one of the 125 volt de power supply-battery chargers and with one of the 125 volt de batteries " floating" on the bus. A bus tie with breakers will be provided between the three switchgear bus sections to "back-up" a battery when it is renoved for servicing. One spare 125 volt de power -
8-4 (Revised 5-25-67) l65
. _ . . . _ . _ . _ . . _ . _ . . _ . . _ . . _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ .. _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - ____. . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ __ _ 1_ .. _ _..._.
(
I l
Table 8-1 i
Single Failure Analysis For The 125/250 Volt DC System Component Halfunction Comments and Consequences
- 1. Station Control Power Loss of power from one a. For one unit, either Engineered Safeguard con-Panel DC-A, DC-B, trol Power Bus No. 1 or Bus No. 2 will lose de DC-C or DC-D power, but' not both, thus leaving the other to perfona its function.
- b. For both units, one-fourth of all switchgear will lose de control power, and the remaining sufficient redundant switchgear will be supplied y con *.rol power from the other de panels, n r N
- c. One-third of the circuit breakers of 4.16 kv i
-s switchgear "T" will lose de control power; how- '
$f ever, the remaining redundant circuit breakers N will be supplied control power from the other 5 de panels, permitting the switching of 4.16 kv emergency power to either unit.
7 d. One channel each of relaying and logic equip-C
ment associated with switching emergency power and engineered safeguards will be lost; however, sufficient redundant channels will receive de control power from the other de panels.
i
$ 9 i .
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i
, l' _ . _ . . . __ _ _
J v s Table 8-1 (Cont 'd . )
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences
- 2. 125/250 Volt DC Loss of power from one a. All six 125 volt de control panelboards, DC-A, Bus 1 or Bus 2 DC-B, DC-C, DC-D, DY-A and DY-B, will lose one de power supply. Ilowever, each will have an alternate de power supply from the remaining bus available through diodes and power will con-tinue to be supplied uninterrupted.
- b. All power would be lost to the other loads supplied from the faulted bus; however, they are not associated with reactor instrumentation and protective systems or engineered safeguards.
oo f; 3. 125 Volt DC Section of Loss of power from one a. Those 125 volt de control panelboards supplied 125/250 Volt Bus 1 or from the affected bus will continue to receive g; Bus 2 uninterrupted power from their alternate power Q supplies through their respective diodes.
E g, b. All power would be lost to the other loads
,,, supplied from the faulted bus; howeser, they
' are not associated with reactor instrumentation g , and protective systems or engineered safeguards, v
4 4
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M N
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- ~- ---- - -- _ _ - . - - _ . . _ _ _ . - - . --..---__ -.
Table 8-1 (Cont 'd. )
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences -
- 4. 125 Volt DC Power Loss of power from one a. The 125 volt de bus would continue to receive Supply - Battery power from its respective battery without in-Charger terruption except as in (b) below. *
- b. Severe internal faults may cause high short circuit currents to flow with the resulting voltage reduction on the 125 volt de bus until the fault is cleared by the isolating circuit l
breakers. Complete loss of voltage on the 125 volt de bus may result if the battery circuit breakers open, the most severe consequences of
? which would be the same as described in 3.
n n
- 5. 125 Volt DC Batteries Loss of Power from one Same comment as 3.
9o
- 6. 125/250 volt DC Bus 1 Grounding single bus or The 125/250 volt de system is an ungrounded electri-p or Bus 2 conductor cal system. Ground detector equipment will be pro-g, vided to monitor and alarm a ground anywhere on the
, 125/250 volt de system. A single ground will not a cause any malfunction or prevent operation of any 4
w safety system.
- 7. 125/250 Volt DC Gradual decay of voltage Each 125 volt bus will be monitored to detect the '
Bus 1 or Bus 2 on one bus voltage decay on the bus and initiate an alarm at a setting above a voltage where the battery can deliver its power for safe and orderly shutdown of the plant. Upon detection, power will be re-
[ stored either by correcting the deficiency or by
, employing one of the redundant circuits.
00.
I
i I
8.2.2.6 120 Volt AC Vital Power Busses
, Refer to Figure 8-3. For the station, four redundant 120 volt ac vital power j busses will be provided to supply power to essential power, instrumentation
- and control loads under all operating conditions. Each bus will be supplied l separately from a static inverter connected to one of the four 125 volt de 4
control power panelboards described in 8.2.2.5. Upon loss of power from either 125/250 volt Bus 1 or Bus 2, the inverters will be supplied power from the re-3 maining bus through their respective de control power panelboards and transfer j diodes. A tie with breakers will be provided between each of the 120 volt i vital ac busses and an alternate 120 volt ac regulated bus to provide backup for and to permit servicing of the inverters, i For each unit, each of the four redundant channels of the nuclear instrumen-i tation and reactor protective system equipment described in 7.1.2.1 will be 4 supplied from a separate bus of the four redundant busses. Also for each
] unit, each of the three redundant channels of the engineered safeguards pro-tective system described in 7.1.2.2 will be supplied from a separate bus of j the four redundant busses. ,
8.2.2.6.1 Single Failure Analysis of the 120 Volt Vital Power Busses i
I The system is arranged such that any type of single failure or fault will not i
preclude the reactor protective system, engineered safeguards protective sys-
! tem and engineered safeguards from performing their safety functions. This is evident since there are four independent busses, and a single failure within the system can involve only one bus.
. 8.2.2.7 120 volt Regulated Power System i
' For the station, a system will be provided to supply instrumentation, control and power loads requiring regulated 120 volts ac power. It will consist of distribution panels, transformers and regulators fed from motor control-i centers as shown on Figures 8-1 and 8-3.
i 8.2.2.8 120Y208 Volt Power System '
For the station, a system will be provided to supply instrumentation, control and power loads requiring unregulated 120Y208 volt ac power. It will consist of distribution panels and transformers fed from motor control centers.
8.2.2.9 Evaluation of the Physical Layout, Electrical Distribution System Equipment The physical locations of electrical distribution system equipment will be l such as to minimize vulnerability of vital circuits to physical damage as a result of accidents. . The proposed locations'are as follows:
(a) Auxiliary transformers, start-up transformers and the 100 kv transformer will be located out of doors physically separated from each other. The 13.8 kv transformers fed from the hydro station will be physically sepa-
' rated from the other. transformers. Lightning arresters will be used where applicable for lightning protection. All transformers will be covered by automatic water spray systems to extinguish oil fires quickly O and prevent the spread of fire. Transformers will be well spaced to minimize their exposure to fire,-. water and mechanical damage. _ , ,
-6 - -
) f) 8-4d -(Revised 4-1-67) a .
~ .- -. -_ . _ . _ - - - . - _ . - . . . . . . - ,- -
f l
supply-battery charger will be provided between each pair of the 125 volt de batteries for servicing and to backup the normal power supply-charger. In general, control and instrumentation loads will be supplied at 125 volts dc with heavier loads such as motors supplied at 250 volts dc.
Forthestation,$ separate 125 voit de control power panelboards will be provided. Each panelboard will be supplied by redundant feeders from dif ferent 125/250 volt de bus sections through diodes to prevent connecting the de busses together normally and the reverse flow of current. Panels DC-A, DC-B, DC-C, DC D, DC-E and DC-F will provide de instrumentation and control power to the station and the nuclear steam supply systems of the three units. Redundant 4.16 kv and 600 volt switchgear bt as will be pro-vided for each unit to maintaht the redundancy of the engineered safeguards.
In addition, the 4.16 kv main feeder bus and tie circuit breakers will pro-vide emergency power to any unit in the event of loss of off-site power. To maintain the redundancy provided in the 4.16 kv and 600 volt systems, a de control power feeder will be provided for each redundant bus or appropriate group of circuit breskers from a different panel. In addition, Engineered Safeguard Power Bur No.1 and No. 2 will be supplied from Panels DC-A and DC-B for Unit 1 ar.d from Panels DC-C and DC-D for Unit 2 and DC-E and DC-F for Unit 3. Panels DY-A and DY-B will be provided for switch station con-trol and protects.ve relaying. Panel DY-A will supply power for primary switching and ralaying, while Panel DY-B will supply power for backup switching and jrotective relaying.
8.2.2.5.1 Single Failure Analysis of the 125/250 Volt DC System As shown in Table 8.1, the 125/250 volt de system will be arranged such that a single fault within the system will not preclude the reactor protective system, engineered safeguards protective system and the engineered safeguards from performing their safety functions.
8.2.2.6 120 Volt AC Vital Power Busses Refer to Figure 8-3. For the station, six redundant 120 volt ac vital instrument power busses will be provided to supply power to essential power, i instrumentation and control loads under all operating conditions. Each bus !
will be supplied separately from a static inverter connected to one of the '
six 125 volt de control power panelboards described in 8.2.2.5. Upon loss I of power from 125/250 volt Bus 1, Bus 2 or Bus 3, the affected inverters i
will bo supplied power from the remaining bus through their respective dc control p r anelboards and transfer diodes. A tie w t breakers will be provided each of the 120 volt vital ac busses alternate 120 volt ac regulated bus to provide backup for and to permit servicing of the inverters.
For each unit, each of the four redundant channels of the nuclear instrumen-tation and reactor protective system equipment described in 7.1.2.1 will be supplied from a separate bus of the six redundant busses. Also for each unit, each of the three redundant channels of the engineered safeguards pro-tective system described in 7.1.2.2 will be supplied from a separate bus of the six redundant busses. 1
-- \
8-5 (Revised 5-25-67) ...._
Table 8-1 Single Failure Analysis For The 125/250 Volt DC Sys tem Malfunction Comments and Consequences Component
- 1. Station Control Power Loss of power from one a. For one unit, either Engineered Safeguard con-Panel DC-A, DC-B, trol Power Bus No. 1 or Bus No. 2 will lose de DC-C , DC-D , DC-E , power, but not both, thus leaving the other to or DC-F perform its function.
- b. For two units, one-fourth of all switchgear will lose de control power, and the remaining a,
sufficient redundant switchgear will be supplied f,
control power from the other de panels.
To a
g c. All the 4.16 kv circuit breakers connected to one
= of a unit's main feeder bus will lose de control S- power; however, the remaining redundant circuit y breakers will be supplied control power from the y other de panels, permitting the switching of 4.16 kr emergency power to any unit.
as
- 0 d. One channel each of relaying and logic equip-ment associated with switching emergency power
' and engineered safeguards will be lost; however,
' sufficient redundant channels will receive dc
' control power from the other de panels.
~
I O O O
O O O Table 8-1 (Cont'd. )
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences
- 2. 125/250 Volt DC Loss of power trom one a. Those 125 volt de control panelboards Bus 1, Bus 2 or supplied from the af fected bus will lose one Bus 3 de power supply. However, each will have an alternate de power supply from the remaining bus available through diodes and power will con-tinue to be supplied uninterrupted.
- b. All power would be lost to the other loads supplied from the faulted bus; however, they o3 are not associated with reactor instrumentation 5 and protective systems or engineered safeguards.
)f 3. 125 Volt DC Section of Loss of power from one a. Those 125 volt de control panelboards supplied
$ 125/250 Volt Bus 1, from the affected bus will continue to receive
% Bus 2 or Bus 3 uninterrupted power from their alternate power supplies through their respective diodes.
Y Dl b. All power would be lost to the other loads
& supplied from the faulted bus; however, they
- j are not associated with reactor instrumentation and protective systems or engineered safeguards.
t M
M N
l _ _ _ _ __
Table 8-1 (Ocnt 'd . )
Component Malfunction Comments and Consequences
- 4. 125 Volt DC Power Loss of power from one a. The 125 volt de bus would continue to receive Supply - Battery power from its respective battery without in-Charger terruption except as in (b) below.
- b. Severe internal faults may cause high short circuit currents to flow with the resulting voltage reduction on the 125 volt de bus until the fault is cleared by the isolating circuit o, breakers. Complete loss of voltage on the 125
& volt de bus may result if the battery circuit
,s breakers open, the most severe consequences of g which would be the same as described in 3.
N
- 5. 125 Volt DC Batteries Loss of Power from one Same comment as 3.
f 6. 125/250 Volt DC Bus 1, Grounding single bus or The 125/250 volt de system is an ungrounded electri-j r Bus 2 or Bus 3 conductor cal system. Ground detector equipment will be pro-a vided to monitor and alarm a ground anywhere on the
- j 125/250 volt de system. A single ground will not cause any malfunction or prevent operation of any safety system.
- 7. 125/250 Volt DC Gradual decay of voltage Each 125 volt bus will be monitored to detect the Bus 1, Bus 2 or on one bus voltage decay on the but and initiate an alarm at Bus 3 a setting above a voltage where the battery can e
deliver its power for safe and orderly shutdown of the plant. Upon detection, power will be re-stored eithcr by correcting the deficiency or by
, employing one of the redundant circuits.
U I
O O O
O 8.2.2.6.1 Single Failure Analysis of the 120 Volt Vital Power Busses The system is arranged such that any type of single failure or fault will not preclude the reactor protective system, engineered safeguards protective sys-tem and engineered safcguards frcm performing their safety functions. This is evident since there are four independent busses available to a unit, and a single failure within the system can involve only one bus.
8.2.2.7 120 Volt Regulated Power System For the station, a system will be provided to supply instrumentation, control and power loads requiring regulated 120 volts ac power. It will consist of distribution panels, transformers and regulators fed from motor control cen-ters as shown on Figure 8-3.
8.2.2.8 120Y208 Volt Power System For the station, a system will be provided to supply instrumentation, control and power loads requiring unregulated 120Y208 volt ac power. It will consist of distribution panels and transformers fed from motor control centers.
8.2.2.9 Evaluation of the Physical Layout, Electrical Distribution System Equipment A The physical locations of electrical distribution system equipnent will be
() such as to minimize vulnerability of vital circuits to physical damage as a result of accidents. The proposed locations are as follows:
(a) Auxiliary transformers, start-up transformers and the 100 kv transformer will be located out of doors physically sepaicated from each other. The 13.8 kv transformers fed from the hydro station will be physically sepa-rated from the other transformers. Lightning arresters will be used where applicable for lightning protection. All transformers will be covered by automatic water spray systems to extinguish oil fires quickly and prevent the spread of fire. Transformers will be well spaced to minimize their exposure to fire, water and mechanical damage. ;
(b) The 6900 volt switchgear, 4160 volt switchgear and 600 volt load centers will be 1ccated in areas so as to minimize exposure to mechanical, fire )
and water damage. This equipment will be properly coordinated electrical- :
ly to permit safe operation of the equipment under normal and short cir- !
cuit conditions. !
(c) 600 volt motor control centers will be located in the areas of electrical load concentration. Those associated with the turbine-generator auxil-iary system in general will be located below the turbine-generator oper-ating floor level. Those associated with the oc 9,se steam supply system will be located in the Auxiliary Building. atu control centers will be
, located in areas so as tc minimize their my em to mechanical, fire and water damage.
(d) Within practical limits , nonsegregated , natal-enciond busses will be used for all major bus runs where large blocks of,curreat are to be 174 l
.j \ j 8-9 (Revised 5-25-67) i
carried. The routing of this metal-enclosed bus will be such as to O
minimize its exposure. to mechanical, fire and water damage.
(e) The application and routing of control, instrumentation and power cables will be such as to minimize their vulnerability to damage from any source. All cables will be applied using conservative margins with respect to their current carrying capacities, insulation properties and mechanical construction. Cable insulations in the Reactor Building will be selected so as to minimize the harmful effects of radiation, heat and humidity. Appropriate instrumentation cables will be shielded to mini-mize induced voltage and magnetic interference. Wire and cables related to engineered safeguards and reactor protective systems will be routed and installed in such manner as to maintain the integrity of their respective redundant channels and protect them from physical damage.
8.2.3 EMERGENCY POWER 8.2.3.1 Description of Six Power Sources to Each Unit When all three units are installed at Oconee Nuclear Station, each unit will have six sources of power (See Figures 8-1, 8-2 and 8-4). There will be four sources of power to Unit 1 before installation of Unit 2 and Unit 3. Each source will have various degrees of redundancy and reliability as outlined below.
(a) As described in 8.2.2.2, normal power supply to unit auxiliary loads will be provided through the auxiliary transformer connected to the generator bus. Upon trip of the generator circuit breaker and separation from the transmission system with no in-plant emergency, neither the reactor nor the turbine will be tripped. This conforms to Duke's standard practice with fossil-fired units. Load will be abruptly reduced to the unit auxiliary demand and the unit will be continued in service but separated from the transnission system. This sudden loss of load will cause vent-ing of secondary steam to the atmosphere until steam flow is reduced to maten turbine aemand plus partial bypass to condenser. Each auxiliary transformer will be sized to carry its full load auxiliaries plus the engineered safeguard auxiliaries of another unit. This source of power will be available except when:
- 1. The generating unit is in a normal shutdown condition, or
- 2. There is an in-plant malfunction or failure of equipment preventing continued operation of the reactor-turbine-generator-auxiliary trans-former combination.
(b) If power is not available from the auxiliary transformer, power will be supplied to the unit through its start-up transformer fed from either or both of the busses 'in the 230 kv switching station. Power to the start-up transformer can flow through the 230 kv switching station from any one of twelve supplies. These include eight 230 kv transmission cir-cuits (four installed with Unit 1; two added with Unit 2; two added with Unit 3), the nuclear generating unit if operating, the' other two nuclear generating units if operating (af ter installation of Unit 2 and Unit 3) and two hydroelectric units. Note that five of the twe Me supplies -
8-10 (Revised 5-25-67) 175
h (three of seven before installation of Unit 2 and four of seven before installation of Unit 3) to the 230 kv switching station will have availabilities independent of a system blackout. Each unit's start-up transformer will be sized to carry full load auxiliaries for one nuclear generating unit plus the engineered safeguard auxiliaries of another unit. This supply of power will be available except when:
- 1. / catastrophic wreck destroys both of the 230 kv busses in the switching station, or
- 2. There is a 230 kv system blackout, no nuclear generating unit is running, and neither hydro unit is capabic of supplying power through its 230 kv connection, or
- 3. All three start-up transformers fail (only one. until installation of Unit 2 and two until installation of Unit 3) or their connection to the 230 kv switching station fails.
(c) When power is not available to a unit from sources described in (a) and (b) above, it can be supplied from one of the other unit's generators through that unit's auxiliary transformer. Under emergency conditions, each auxiliary transformer will be sized to carry its own full load auxiliaries plus the engineered safeguard auxiliaries of another unit.
This source of power will be available except:
y,j 1. Before installation of Unit 2 and/or Unit 3, or after their installation when
- 2. The other two generating units are not cperating, or
- 3. Either of the other two generating units is nperating but its auxiliary transformer is out of service.
(d) Whenever there is inadequate power from sources described in (a) through (c) above, power will be available from a 100 kv transmission line connected to a separate transformer located on the opposite side of the station from the 230 kv facilities. This single 100 kv circuit will on ect to a 100 kv system transmission substation at Central located biles from Oconee. The transformer will be sized to carry all the engineered safeguard auxiliaries of both units. This source of power will be available except when:
- 1. The 100 kv line or transformer is out of service, or
- 2. There is a complete system blackout of all transmission facilities.
(e) Upon loss of all sources of power described in (a) through -(d) above, power will, be supplied from one of the two 87,500 kva units of the Keovee Hydro Station through a 4000 ft long underground 13.8 kv cable feeder to the nuclear station. This source will be available to carry load within 23 seconds after loss of other sources or when a severe 230 kv
[~'T system disturbance is detected by undervoltage and/or underfrequency.
\_ / Lake Keowee will have sufficient water storage to permit either of these __
t k
i ;
8-11 (Revised 5-25-67) . .
hydro units to carry shutdown and/or emergency power requirements for as O
long as required.
The Keowee Hydro Station will contain two units rated 87,500 kva each which generate at 13.8 kv. Each generator will be connected to a common 230 kv step-up transformer through a 13.8 kv metal-enclosed bus and synchronizing circuit breaker. The emergency p mer feeder for the nuclear station will be arranged with selector switches so that it can be connected te _ther 13.8 kv generator bus. The connection to the generator bus v. 1 be made with metal-enclosed bus. The circuit will be switched and protected by a metalciad circuit breaker. At the nuclear station, an outdoor, oil-filled transformer will transform the voltage to 4160 volts. If one hydro unit is out for maintenance, except hydraulic, the other unit can be available for service. The two units will be served by a common tunnel-penstock, and unwatering for tunnel or scroll case maintenance will make both units unavailable. Based upon Duke's ~
experience since 1919 with a hydro station similarly arranged, it is expected that unwatering frequency will be about one day per year plus four days every tenth year. Hydraulic outages will be scheduled during low-load periods which are also those periods of lowest pr,pb MM_d_Wi.r.W___Ma42_2_M_..
Au M.. <Mro*4gg 4MF.PkPun feeder. The source of power from the hydro units will be available except when:
- 1. The units are out of service for hydraulic maintenance, or
- 2. Both units are out of service for other reasons, or
- 3. There is a coincident failure of the 13.8 kv underground cable feeder and a complete oucage of the 230 kv feed through the switchyard.
8.2.3.2 Power to Vital Loads All of the power sources will supply power through transformers to the redun-dant 4160 volt main feeder busses and tie circuit breakers which supply power to the redundant 4160 volt switchgear bus sections that serve the engineered safeguard auxiliaries and reactor protective systems. The engineered safe-guard auxiliaries and reactor protective systems will be arranged so that a failure of any single bus section will not prevent the respective systems from fulfilling their protective functions. The emergency power sources will be automatically switched onto the 4160 volt main feeder busses of a unit in the preferential sequence as follows: The start-up transformer bus; eiti:er of the other two unit's auxiliary electrical systems; the 100 kv transmission line;and the Keowee Hydro Station. On loss of the normal auxiliary trans former source, a rapid bus transfer will be made to the start-up transformer source.
If the start-up source fails or is not available, transfer w(11 be made to the next source in order of preference, and so on down the line until the Keowee Hydro Station source is reached. The control schemes will be designed to prevent the paralleling of two sources during the above switching opera-tions. Each of these power sources will be of such large capacity that it will accept the total load of the engineered safeguards for the units without overloading.
8-12 (Revised 5-25-67) k77
n U
8.2.3.3 Reliability Considerations Upon a total sy t m blackout, which has never occurred on the Duke system, there will be remai rcgs go Units 16 2 and 3; ie, the unit, the other two units andgngpygg
_..e Meer::soy Tyi [r,o [tation, or 44%emaining power sources to Unit 1 before Unit 2 and Unit 3 are installed. Both of the Keowee Hydro Station units will be designed so that either can be started with com-plete loss of all outside power. The coincident failure of all remaining power sources and a system blackout is incredible. However, should this occur, safe shutdown cooling without electric power will be accomplished as described in 14.1.2.8.3.
8.2.3.4 Back-Up Power from Gas Turbines In the unlikely circumstance that all power is unavailable to any of the 4160 volt main feeder busses of Units 1, 2 and 3 from all the sources outlined in 8.2.3, a source of power will be made available to supply the shutdown loads, including reactor cooling, of all three units. This source will consist of one of three available 44.1 mva gas turbine generating units located 30 miles distant at the Lee Steam Station and arranged to supply power over the 100 kv transmission line from Lee to Oconee via Central. (See Figure 8-1) Under this circumstance, the 100 kv transmission line will be isolated from the 100 kv transmission system to supply power solely to Oconee. The 100 kv transmission line is located above the level of any flood that can be postulated on the Keowee River. On the Duke system, as on the west coast, wind and ice loadings cae more severe than seismic loadings and govern the structural design of transmission lines, including this 100 kv line. When maintenarse requirements should make both Keowee hydro units unavailable, a Lee gas : rbine can be brought to speed-no-load and directly connected to Oconee through the 100 kv line which can be divorced from the balance of the transmission system.
8.3 TESTS AND INSPECTIONS Supervisory control of the waterwheel generators located at the Keowee Hydro Station will be provided on a panel located in each of the control rooms of the nuclear station. Provisions will be made in the supervisory control panel to manually initiate a fast start of either of the two waterwheel generators with closure of the associated air circuit breakers connecting the generator to the nuclear power station 4160 volt essential busses. Testing of this system may be done by the control operator at his convenience any time the Keowee hydro units are not otherwise running.
The 100 kv, 230 kv and 500 kv circuit breakers will be inspected, maintained and tested as follows:
(a) 100 kv transmission line circuit breakers will be tested on a routine basis.
(b) 230 kv and 500 kv transmission line ciret.it breakers will be tested on a routine basis. This can be accomplished without removing the transmission line from service.
O (c) 230 kv and 500 kv generator circuit breakers can be tested with the generator in service. -
8-13 (Revised 5-25-67)
Transmission line protective relaying will be tested on a routine basis.
O Generator protective relaying will be tested when the generator is off-line.
The 4160 volt circuit breakers and associated equipment will be tested in ser-vice by opening and closing the circuit breakers so as not to interfere with the operation of the station. The circuit breakers can be " jacked-out" to a test position and operated without energizing the circuits, if necessary.
The 600 volt circuit breakers, motor contactors and associated equipment will be tested in service by opening and closing the circuit breakers or con-tantors so as not to interfere with operation of the station. The power cir-cuits can be opened and the circuit breakers and motor contactors operated
~
without energizing the circuits.
Emergency transfers to the various emergency power sources will be tested on a routine basis to prove the operational ability of these systems.
The ungrounded de system will have detectors to indicate when there is a ground existing on any leg of the system. A ground on one leg of the de sys-tem will not cause any equipment to malfunction. Simultaneous grounds on two legs of the system may cause all energized equipment to drop out if the grounds are of sufficiently low resistance. This may be momentary if the grounded circuit is cleared by its circuit breaker or sustaincd if not. DC control circuits will be designed such that the de-energized condition will be
" fail-safe." Grounds will be located by a logical isclation of individual cir .
cuits connected to the faulted system, while taking the necessary precautions to maintain the integrity of the vital bus supp'.Les.
Motor operated valves will be tested in service so as not to interfere with the operation of the station. Motor operated isolating valves will be tested when the unit is off-line.
\9 ~
8-14 (Revised 5-25-67)
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