ML16124A778

(4) Robinson 2016-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML16124A778
Person / Time
Site:	Robinson
Issue date:	04/27/2016
From:	Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Duke Energy Progress
References
50-261/OL-16-301
Download: ML16124A778 (356)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 I-RO Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW N-BOP I(TS)-SRO 2 2 I-BOP C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 3 3 R-RO Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 4 4 C-BOP CRDM Fan A Failure C-SRO 5 5 C-RO Continuous Inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6 6 M-RO C Steam Generator Tube Rupture M-BOP M-SRO 7 7 C-BOP Loss of Off-Site Power

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL, and AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation.

Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G C, FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, Steam Flow. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation.

Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction. Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, Heater Drain and Vents, to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, or OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), to lower plant power.

During the downpower, the A CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the B CRDM Fan.

Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor.

On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the C Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the C Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS.

Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615) initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the A and B Steam Generator PORVs.

During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV.

The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The C Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 - R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 I-RO VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH I-SRO 3 2 C-BOP C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO C-SRO 4 3 C-RO B Charging Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO 5 4 I-BOP Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO Cold Leg SBLOCA M-BOP M-SRO 7 6/7 NA 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes 8 6 C-RO C SI Pump fails to Auto Start 9 7 C-RO CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The C Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Next, the C Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and control the C S/G level manually throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Following this, the B Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and/or APP-001-B6, LP LTDN LN HI TEMP, and raise speed of the A Charging Pump and reduce Letdown flow. The operator may enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions. The operator will address 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System.

Shortly afterwards, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP), and restore the A and B Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the A EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train A equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event.

Additionally, the C SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and the break size will become larger. Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the B CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, both Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

SI-880C&D (B CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves.

The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2. (EOP-Based)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity).

Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111115)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered.

Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, EMERG OIL PMP OVLD, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of Instrument Bus 3 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 2 2 I-BOP B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW I-SRO 3 NA R-RO Load Decrease N-BOP N-SRO 4 3 C-RO Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED C-SRO 5 4 I-RO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to I(TS)-SRO fully CLOSE 6 5 M-RO Inadvertent FWIS M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate 8 7 NA A & B MDAFW Pump Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111115)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days.

Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating).

RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, EMERG OIL PMP OVLD, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, Loss of Instrument Bus, and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating, and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems-Operating.

Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G B, FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, Feed Flow (FWF).

Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve.

Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS pressure Control, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).

After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur.

Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the A and B MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The operator will direct that AFW Pump C be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, however, the AFW Pump C Diesel will fail to start.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111115)

The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control B S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the B S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This effective steamline break is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary.

Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operators having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111815)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-RO Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert C-SRO Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT 3 2 I-BOP Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 4 3 N-BOP Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH I(TS)-SRO 5 4 C-RO Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control C-BOP Rods Fail in AUTO C-SRO 6 5/6 M-RO ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV M-BOP M-SRO 7 7 C-BOP MOV-350 fails to OPEN

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111815)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD, divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT.

Following this, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, Steam Generator Pressure (SGP).

The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation.

Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, Turbine Trip Below P-8. When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. The Control Rods will fail to operate in AUTO and the operator will need to insert rods in MANUAL.

Subsequently, the B Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes).

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation-ATWS. While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST.

Upon completion of FRP-S.1, the operator will return to EOP-E-0. Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the flow into and out of the B Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111815)

The scenario will terminate at Step 16.b of EOP-E-2, when the operator prepares to restore normal letdown.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF.

Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error),

continuation of the challenge is a result of the operators failure to insert negative reactivity.

Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Roll Turbine N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP High Turbine Eccentricity C-SRO 3 2 I-BOP Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 I(TS)-SRO 4 3 I-RO VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH I-SRO 5 4 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to C(TS)-SRO CLOSE 6 5 M-RO Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to M-BOP CLOSE M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, Power Operation.

When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration, and place the Turbine startup on HOLD.

Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).

The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and determine to continue with the power increase.

Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the B RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, and AOP-014, Component Cooling Water Malfunction. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Containment, and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically.

The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and manually trip the reactor.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm.

While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the A MSIV will close and the A S/G pressure is expected to rise higher than that of the B and C S/Gs. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2.

The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the B and C Steam Generators. Depending on the timing of the actions Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915) taken by the crew when the A MSIV is closed, the A S/G pressure may not rise significantly higher than that of the B and C S/Gs, and the crew will remain in EOP-ECA-2.1 past the SI termination steps (i.e. Step 19). If this situation occurs, the scenario will terminate at Step 20 of EOP-ECA-2.1.

Critical Tasks:

Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1 Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN C-SRO 2 NA R-RO Lower Power N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-BOP C Service Water Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-RO DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start C(TS)-SRO 5 4 C-RO A RCP Seal Failure C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Loss of Offsite Power M-BOP M-SRO 7 5 C-BOP B EDG Fails to Start 8 6 NA DSDG Trips 9 7 C-BOP D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and close the valve.

After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

After the power reduction is in progress, the C Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW, and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS), and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.

Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, or various APPs to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the C CCW Pump will trip, and only the B CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the A RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.

Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The operator will subsequently start the B EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the D Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started.

Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1.

Critical Tasks:

Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0 Safety Significance: Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room.

Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.

Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling Prior to the EDG Failing Due to Overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG.

Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of engine high temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-1 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111615 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-1

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 203)

2. APP-003, RCS & Makeup Systems (Rev 54)

3. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure (Rev 24)

4. OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters (PLT) (Rev 11)

5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

6. AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction (Rev 33)

7. OWP-034, Steam Flow (SF) (Rev 19)

8. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

9. APP-007, Condensate & Feedwater (Rev 44)

10. OP-407, Heater Drain and Vents (Rev 51)

11. AOP-038, Rapid Downpower (Rev 3)

12. OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power (Rev 62)

13. OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (Rev 112)

14. APP-010, HVAC-Emerg. Generators & Misc. Systems (Rev 81)

15. AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System (Rev 33)

16. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

17. EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 7)

18. EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Rev 7)

Validation Time: 131 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 I-RO Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW N-BOP I(TS)-SRO 2 2 I-BOP C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 3 3 R-RO Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 4 4 C-BOP CRDM Fan A Failure C-SRO 5 5 C-RO Continuous Inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6 6 M-RO C Steam Generator Tube Rupture M-BOP M-SRO 7 7 C-BOP Loss of Off-Site Power

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL, and AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.

Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G C, FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, Steam Flow. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation.

Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction. Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, Heater Drain and Vents, to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, or OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), to lower plant power.

During the downpower, the A CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the B CRDM Fan.

Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor.

On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the C Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the C Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS.

Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the A and B Steam Generator PORVs.

During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV.

The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 608 T = 0 Malfunctions:

SDAFW Pump OOS:

• irf EPSMCC5_189 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8A, A S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC6_226 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8B, B S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC6_227 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8C, C S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC10_262 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14A, SDAFW discharge to A S/G)

• irf EPSMCC9_254 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14B, SDAFW discharge to B S/G)

• irf EPSMCC10_267 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14C, SDAFW discharge to C S/G)

PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):

• A MDAFW RTGB Switch

• B MDAFW RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch

• Protected Switchyard FI-613 CCW System Flow OOS

• IOR aoCCWAOD010B f:0 Place WHITE DOT on FI-613 RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3 failed ON

• IMF ANNXN10B03 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-010-B3 Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-1.

At direction of Event 1 Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW examiner ICO PRSXMTLT_459 r:15 f:0 At direction of Event 2 examiner C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW ICO SGNXMTFT_494 r:01:00 f:0 At direction of Event 3 Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower examiner IMF CFW14G r:02:00 f:800000 At direction of Event 4 CRDM Fan A Failure examiner IMF HVA05A f:MOTOR_SHORT At direction of Event 5 examiner Continuous Inward Rod Motion IMF CRF06A IMF CRF06B NOTE: This will occur on a Rod Inward signal

($006_RODS_INCRF07 r:5 f:72)

At direction of Event 6 C Steam Generator Tube Rupture examiner IMF SGN02F NOTE: The SGTR will occur on Rx Trip r:10:00 f:500

($006_N16-1-1_SGTR_ON_TRIP)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Loss of Off-Site Power Upon IMF EPS13 Transition to EOP-E-3 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL, and AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO PRSXMTLT_459 r:15 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL

• PZR Level LI-459A lowering

• PZR Level LI-460/461 stable

• C Charging Pump speed rising

• Normal Letdown isolates Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-025 directly.

APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL RO (Step 1) IF Letdown is isolated, THEN NOTE: The RO will take ensure one Charging Pump running at Charging Pump to MANUAL minimum. and adjust to MINIMUM speed.

CRS (Step 2) IF a load rejection has occurred, THEN CRS (Step 3) IF excessive RCS leakage exists, THEN..

RO (Step 4) IF a level controller has failed, NOTE: The RO will control THEN manually adjust Charging and/or Charging flow as needed.

Letdown to maintain PZR level The RO will adjust Seal Injection flow by controlling HIC-121.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) IF a level channel failure has NOTE: The CRS will transition occurred, THEN refer to AOP-025, RTGB to AOP-025.

Instrument Failure AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section B of AOP-025.

• PZR LEVEL (LT-459, 460, 461) -

SECTION B AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE RO (Step 1) CHECK Failed Instrument FAILED LOW RO (Step 2) PLACE LCV460 A&B Control NOTE: The RO may re-Switch In CLOSE positioned the Control Switch earlier based on Step 5.3.7.5 of OMM-22.

RO (Step 3) CHECK Charging Pumps ONLY ONE PUMP RUNNING IN MANUAL CONTROL RO (Step 3 RNO) ENSURE only one charging pump is running in manual control.

RO (Step 4) ADJUST Charging Pump Speed To NOTE: Pzr level will rise, and Control PZR LEVEL Between 22% And 53% may exceed TS LCO 3.4.9 (63.3%).

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The BOP will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM RO (Step 6 RNO) Locally THROTTLE RCP NOTE: The BOP may contact SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE(s) the AO to adjust Seal Injection to obtain flow to each RCP between 8 gpm flows.

and 13 gpm. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable

• CVC297A

• CVC297B

• CVC297C

• IF required to maintain 8 GPM flow, THEN THROTTLE HIC121, CHARGING FLOW, while maintaining charging pump discharge pressure less than 2500 psig.

• REVIEW TS LCO 3.4.17 for applicability.

RO (Step 7) CHECK Controlling Channel NOTE: LT-459 has failed FAILED LOW.

RO (Step 8) CHECK LT461 OPERABLE RO (Step 9) PLACE LM459 In 461 REPL 459 RO (Step 10) PLACE LR459 In REC 461 RO (Step 11) CHECK Normal Letdown IN SERVICE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 11 RNO) IF normal letdown is desired, NOTE: The CRS will hand off THEN RESTORE normal letdown using the restoration of Letdown to Attachment 1, Restoration of Normal the BOP.

Letdown.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE ATTACHMENT 1, RESTORATION OF NORMAL LETDOWN BOP (Step 1) ENSURE Normal Charging Flow Through The Regenerative Heat Exchanger Is In Service.

BOP (Step 2) ENSURE Phase A Containment Isolation Signal NOT Present.

BOP (Step 3) NOTIFY RC That Normal Letdown NOTE: The BOP will call RC Flow Will Be Restored And The Affected to address the potential Areas Should Be Monitored For Changing changing radiological Radiological Conditions. conditions.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RC.

BOP (Step 4) ENSURE The Following Valves Are Closed:

• CVC204A, LETDOWN LINE ISO

• CVC204B, LETDOWN LINE ISO

• LCV460A, LTDN LINE STOP

• LCV460B, LTDN LINE STOP

• CVC200A, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION

• CVC200B, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION

• CVC200C, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION BOP (Step 5) ENSURE HIC121, CHARGING FLOW, Is Set For Full Open.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 13 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) ENSURE PZR Level Is Greater NOTE: Pzr Level will likely be Than Or Equal To Program Level. above program.

BOP (Step 7) IF Desired, THEN PLACE TCV143, VCT/DEMIN In The VCT Position.

BOP (Step 8) PLACE PCV145, PRESSURE, In MAN.

BOP (Step 9) ADJUST PC145 To Throttle PCV 145 To 45% To 55% Open.

BOP (Step 10) OPEN The Following:

• CVC204A, LETDOWN LINE ISO

• CVC204B, LETDOWN LINE ISO BOP (Step 11) OPEN LCV460A&B:

• PLACE LTDN LINE STOP LCV460 A&B switch to OPEN.

• PLACE LTDN LINE STOP LCV460 A&B switch to AUTO.

BOP (Step 12) ESTABLISH Cooling To NON REGEN HX:

• PLACE TC144, NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP in MANUAL.

• ADJUST TC144 NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP as necessary to ensure letdown temperature does not rise above 127°F when letdown is reestablished.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 14 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 13) While MAINTAINING Charging Pump Discharge Pressure As Indicated On PI121 Less Than 2500 psig, ADJUST Charging Pump Speed To The Expected Letdown Flow To Be Established In The Next Step.

BOP (Step 14) OPEN One LTDN ORIFICE Valve: NOTE: Pzr Level will likely be above program, and the BOP may place a 60 gpm orifice in service.

• CVC200A, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION

• CVC200B, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION

• CVC200C, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION BOP (Step 15) PLACE PC145 In AUTO And CHECK Letdown Pressure As Indicated On PI145, LOW PRESS LTDN PRESS, Is Being Maintained Between 300 Psig And 320 Psig.

BOP (Step 16) PLACE TC144, NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP, In AUTO.

BOP (Step 17) IF TCV143 Was Selected To VCT, THEN POSITION TCV143 As Directed By The CRS/SM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 15 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 18) IF Charging Flow Is Changed, NOTE: The BOP may contact THEN ESTABLISH RCP Seal injection Flow the AO to adjust Seal Injection Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM By Throttling flows.

The Following:

If so, Booth Instructor

• CVC297A, RCP A SEAL WATER FLOW acknowledge as AO; and use:

CONTROL VALVE

• CVC297B, RCP B SEAL WATER FLOW IRF CVC030 f: variable CONTROL VALVE IRF CVC031 f: variable

• CVC297C, RCP C SEAL WATER IRF CVC032 f: variable FLOW CONTROL VALVE BOP (Step 19) IF Additional Letdown Flow Is NOTE: Pzr Level will likely be Desired,. above program, and the BOP may discuss with the CRS/RO about additional Letdown flow.

BOP (Step 20) NOTIFY Chemistry That Normal NOTE: The BOP will call Letdown Has Been Restored. Chemistry to notify that normal letdown is back in service.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE RO (Step 12) RESTORE PZR Level Control To Examiner Note: Pzr Level Automatic: may require additional adjustment prior to restoring the controller to AUTO. The crew may complete the event with Level control still in MANUAL.

• CHECK PZR level WITHIN +/- 1% OF PROGRAMMED REFERENCE LEVEL

• RESTORE PZR level control to automatic RO (Step 13) RESET PZR Heaters:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 16 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• PLACE PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP control switch in OFF and return to ON

• PLACE PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A control switch in OFF and return to AUTO or ON as desired

• PLACE PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B control switch in OFF and return to AUTO or ON as desired RO (Step 14) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM RO (Step 14 RNO) Locally THROTTLE RCP NOTE: The BOP may contact SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE(s) the AO to adjust Seal Injection to obtain flow to each RCP between 8 gpm flows.

and 13 gpm: If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable

• CVC297A

• CVC297B

• CVC297C CRS (Step 15) REMOVE Failed Transmitter From NOTE: The CRS will address Service Using OWP030 OWP-030.

OWP-030, PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (PLT)

PLT-1, PRESSURIZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-459 CRS Address PLT-1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 17 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE: The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room).

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN

• BST058 TRIP

• BST001 TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED

• B/S 459A-1, Hagan Rack #2 (PZR Hi Level)

• B/S 459A-2, Hagan Rack #2 (PZR Lo Level)

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 16) GO TO Procedure Main Body, NOTE: The CRS will address Step 2 Technical Specifciations.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 18 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 8, M. One channel M.1 Place 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Pressurizer Water Level -

inoperable. channel in trip.

OR High, is affected and that M.2 Reduce Action M.1 or M.2 must be THERMAL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> entered.

POWER to < P-7.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 19 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G C, FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, Steam Flow. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO SGNXMTFT_494 r:01:00 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-C3, S/G C LVL DEV

• Lowering demand on FCV-498 (C S/G Feedwater Reg Valve)

• Narrow Range Level in C S/G lowering

• FR-498 indicates that the gap between Feedwater and Steam flow to and from C S/G is rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner Note: It is most likely that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-010 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first.

If so, proceed to AOP-025 section below.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):

NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint NOTE: A Power Limit Warning BOP BEING APPROACHED is possible during this event which will require a reduction in power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 20 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

Critical Task:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System.

Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58 BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level AT OR NOTE: The CRS will likely TRENDING TO PROGRAM transition to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section D of AOP-025.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 21 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• S/G Steam Flow (FT-476, 477, 484, 485, 494, 495) - SECTION D AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 1) CHECK Affected FRV In MAN: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL.

• FCV478 (FRV "A")

• FCV488 (FRV "B")

• FCV498 (FRV "C")

BOP (Step 2) RESTORE Affected S/G Level To Immediate Action Program Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System.

Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is NOTE: This is a Continuous approached, THEN. Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

GO TO Step 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 22 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 6 RNO) IF failure was a steam flow instrument, THEN GO TO Step 12.

BOP (Step 12) PLACE Affected S/G Steam Flow Selector Switch To The Alternate Channel:

• S/G "C" STEAM FLOW FR498

• Failed Channel FT-494 - Position CH495 BOP (Step 13) RESTORE Affected Controller To Automatic:

• CHECK S/G level WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL

• PLACE affected controller in AUTO BOP (Step 14) REMOVE Affected Transmitter NOTE: The CRS will address From Service Using OWP034: OWP-034.

Channel FT-494 - OWP SF-5 OWP-034, STEAM FLOW (SF)

SF-5, STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-494 CRS Address SF-5 BOP DELETE INPUT FT-494 (MSF0445A) FROM CALO PROCESSING IAW OMM-007.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 23 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE: The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room).

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN

• BST020 TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED

• B/S 494, HAGAN RACK #16 (LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW)

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 15) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability:

• TS LCO 3.3.1

• TS LCO 3.3.2 CRS (Step 16) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 24 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Functions 1.f D. One channel NOTE (SI-High Steam Flow in Two inoperable For Function 4.c, a channel may Steam Lines), 1.g (SI- High be taken out of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Steam Flow in Two Steam the trip condition Lines Coincident with Steam for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Line Pressure Low), 4.d (MSI -

maintenance.

High Steam Flow in Two D.1 Place channel 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Steam Lines Coincident with in trip. Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI -

High Steam Flow in Two OR Steam Lines Coincident with D.2.1 Be in Steam Line Pressure Low),

18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> MODE 3. are affected; and that Action D.1 of D2.1 and D.2.2 must be AND entered D.2.2 Be in .

MODE 4.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 25 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction. Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, Heater Drain and Vents, to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, or OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When > 25%

Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), to lower plant power.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CFW14G r:02:00 f:800000 (NOTE: This Malfunction requires 3 minutes to generate APP-007-E7)

Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL

• Feed Flow lowering on all three S/Gs

• Narrow Range Level lowering on all three S/Gs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner Note: When this alarm occurs the crew may address AOP-010 or use APP-007 E7 to direct entry into OP-407.

If the crew uses APP-007-E7, continue below.

If the crew enters AOP-010, proceed to Step 1 on Page 26.

APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL CRS (Step 1) IF level alarm is due to low power maneuvering, THEN..

BOP (Step 2) IF required, THEN dispatch an NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Operator to check: an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the 4A FWH sightglass is FULL and the LCV is FULL OPEN.

• Sightglass level

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 26 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Level Control Valve position BOP/ (Step 3) IF a level control valve has CRS malfunctioned, THEN.

CRS (Step 4) IF tube leakage is occurring, THEN Examiner NOTE: The CRS bypass the affected string of Heaters for will transition to OP-407 to repair of defective tubes using OP-407, remove Heaters 5A, 4A and Heater Drains and Vents 3A from service.

If so, proceed to OP-407 actions on Page 29.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BOP BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 27 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From NOTE: The CRS go to Step 33 Table Below: based on a known tube leak in the A Train FWHs, or Step 35 based on other malfunctions Known Leak - 33 Other - 35 BOP (Step 33) REDUCE Turbine Load Using NOTE: The CRS may address Attachment 1 To Match Feedwater And Step 33 of AOP-010. Steam Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH flow and Feed flow are This Procedure matched.

CRS (Step 34) OBSERVE NOTE Prior To Step 41 NOTE: If the CRS entered at And GO TO Step 41 Step 33 of AOP-010, they will move forward to Step 41.

CRS (Step 35) REDUCE Turbine Load Using NOTE: The CRS may address Attachment 1 To Match Feedwater And Step 35 of AOP-010. Steam Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH flow and Feed flow are This Procedure matched.

CRS/ (Step 36) DISPATCH An Operator To NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP Observe Valve Positions: an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the both valves are operating properly.

• LCV1530A, HDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE

• LCV1530B, HEATER DRAIN PUMPS SUCTION DUMP TO CONDENSER CRS (Step 37) DETERMINE If A Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve Has Failed:

• CHECK HDT level control valve or controller HAS MALFUNCTIONED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 28 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 37.a RNO) IF HDT Level is controlling correctly, THEN OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 40 and GO TO Step 40.

CRS (Step 40) CHECK For Leak CAUSING FW NOTE: The crew may TRANSIENT determine that a FWH Tube Leak exists and that the Train A FWH string must be bypassed/isolated.

• Visual indication of leak

• FW Heater level alarms FW Heater normal and alternate drain valve positions level dump valve positions

• FW Heater #1 & #2 emergency dump valve positions

• Gland Steam Condenser abnormal indications/alarms CRS (Step 41) ISOLATE Leak:

CONSULT with Operations to determine leak isolation strategy

• Isolate in current plant condition OR

• Repair online OR

• Shutdown to repair OR

• Trip Unit Examiner NOTE: The crew should address OP-407 to remove the 5A, 4A, and 3A FWHs from service.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 29 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP-407, HEATER DRAINS AND VENTS SECTION 6.4.5 REMOVING HEATERS 5A, 4A, AND 3A FROM SERVICE CRS (Step 1) To remove Heater 4A from service, perform the following:

• Ensure power is reduced to 659 Mwe Examiner NOTE: The CRS gross (maximum of 20% power conduct a downpower to 659 reduction) MWe using AOP-038 or OP-105.

If AOP-038 is selected, continue below.

If OP-105 is selected, proceed to Page 34.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER CRS (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page likely make this System announcement.

RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST 947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN

• Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min

• Target Power Level ___

• Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 130 Steps.

• Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 306 gallons.

CRS (Step 3) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:

• Reason for downpower

• Target Power Level

• Target Rod Height

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 30 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Rate of load reduction

• Amount of boric acid addition RO (Step 4) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters

• PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control IN AUTO RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action.

RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 31.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 31 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2 RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

• IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

• RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure

• CHECK EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO

• PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:

• CHECK IMP IN ILLUMINATED

• SELECT the desired Load Rate

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 32 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5°F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:

• ADJUST Load Rate OR

• DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons CRS/ (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The NOTE: The CRS may ask BOP Following: SM/WCC/Communicator to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge.

• Load Dispatcher of load reduction

• E&C to control secondary chemistry

• RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley

• Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team

• E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

• E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection

• NRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers AT LEAST ONE OPERATING BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is NOTE: The BOP will dispatch required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least an AO.

one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY Booth Instructor HEATING SYSTEM. acknowledge as AO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 33 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg WITHIN 5°F OF Tref RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution WITHIN TARGET BAND BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following NOTE: This is a Continuous Conditions MET: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

• Target load/power has been reached

• Load reduction is no longer required

• CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction

• STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower CRS (Step 15 RNO) WHEN any of the following conditions are met:

• Target load/power has been NOTE: The target load is 659 reached MWe.

• Load reduction is no longer required

• CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction

• THEN STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower.

CRS

• GO TO Step 16.

RO (Step 16) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN 85%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 34 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) CHECK Heater Drain Pumps TWO RUNNING

• STOP one Heater Drain Pump RO (Step 18) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN 70%

Examiner NOTE: If the crew decides to reduce power using OP-105, Examiners continue HERE.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER CRS (Step 6.1.1.1) Check that an EOOS Risk Assessment has been performed CRS (Step 6.1.1.2) IF an EOOS Risk Assessment has NOT been performed for this Power Reduction, THEN perform one of the following actions:

• Direct the STA or the Work Week NOTE: The CRS may ask Coordinator (WWC) to perform an STA to address.

EOOS Risk Assessment If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as STA.

OR

• Perform a qualitative Risk Assessment per OMM-048, Work Coordination and Risk Assessment BOP (Step 6.1.1.3) Notify the Load Dispatcher that NOTE: The BOP will call Load unit load will be reduced. Dispatcher.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher BOP (Step 6.1.1.4) Notify RC that higher radiation NOTE: The BOP will call RC.

levels should be expected in the CV Pump If so, Booth Instructor Bays and in Pipe Alley due to normal acknowledge as RC shutdown crud bursts

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 35 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6.1.1.5) IF this is a Power Reduction NOTE: The BOP may call greater than 20%, THEN notify Chemistry to Chemistry.

shutdown the RCS Zinc Injection Skid If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry RO (Step 6.1.1.6) Monitor the highest operable Power Range Channel and the highest operable Intermediate Range Channel on NR-45 CRS (Step 6.1.1.7) IF this will be a planned power reduction of greater than 10% power, THEN..

CRS/ (Step 6.1.1.8) IF Reactor Engineering has BOP NOT provided technical guidance, THEN use the most recent OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan data to determine the reactivity change required RO (Step 6.1.2.1) IF additional letdown flow is NOTE: The RO may place desired, THEN perform the following: additional Letdown in service.

• Start additional Charging Pumps per OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System

• Place additional letdown orifice in service per OP-301 RO (Step 6.1.2.2) IF a significant change in RCS Boron concentration is expected or occurs (10 ppm or more), THEN energize additional PZR heaters

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 36 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6.1.2.3) Maintain Tave within 5°F of NOTE: The RO will start a Tref using a combination of Control Rods boration per Section 8.2.8 of and Boron Concentration changes. OP-301.

Examiner Note:

RO Examiner follow actions of OP-301.

CRS/BOP Examiners follow OP-105 Actions, Step 6.1.2.4, on Page 38.

OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

RO (Step 8.2.8.1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.

RO (Step 8.2.8.2) DETERMINE the amount of NOTE: The RO will use Boric Acid to add to the RCS and if Attachment 10.4 of OST-947 applicable, the expected change in RCS and determine that the Target temperature AND Reactor Power Rod Height is 191 and 53.76 gallons of BA will need to be added.

RO (Step 8.2.8.3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of Boric Acid required.

RO (Step 8.2.8.4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR SM to add the amount of boric acid previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

RO (Step 8.2.8.5) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the BORATE position.

RO (Step 8.2.8.6) SET YIC-113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 37 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8.2.8.7) IF desired, THEN PLACE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND ADJUST controller FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons flow rate.

RO (Step 8.2.8.8) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.

RO (Step 8.2.8.9) IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

• Rod Motion is blocked

• Rod Motion is in the wrong direction

• Tavg goes up

• Boric Acid addition exceeds the desired value RO (Step 8.2.8.10) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV-113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

• IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

• The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

RO (Step 8.2.8.11) IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow..

RO (Step 8.2.8.12) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 38 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments PLACE FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to the AUTO position.

PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position.

ENSURE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, is in AUTO.

Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

RO (Step 8.2.8.13) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC 113 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.

RO (Step 8.2.8.14) MONITOR parameters for the Examiner NOTE: If AOP-038 expected change in reactivity AND inform the was used to downpower the CRS OR SM the results of the boration. plant, move forward to Event 4.

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER BOP (Step 6.1.2.4) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN reduce turbine load as follows:

Ensure the EH Turbine Impulse Pressure NOTE: The BOP will use Control in the desired position using Attachment 6 of OP-105 to Attachment 6, Transferring Control Mode transfer Turbine Control Mode Between IMP-IN and IMP-OUT: from IMP OUT to IMP IN

• IMP IN (preferred)

OR

• IMP OUT (if required for plant conditions)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 39 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER ATTACHMENT 6, TRANSFERRING CONTROL MODE BETWEEN IMP-IN AND IMP-OUT BOP (Step 1) Record the Valve Position Limit reading:

BOP (Step 2) Lower the limiter setting until the turbine is on the limiter BOP (Step 3) Check that the Tracking Meter indicates a nulled condition. (approximately zero)

BOP (Step 4) Press the appropriate pushbutton to change sensing modes:

IMP IN (preferred for load changes)

OR IMP Out (preferred for steady state)

BOP (Step 5) Wait for the Tracking Meter to indicate a nulled condition BOP (Step 6) Return the limiter setting to the value recorded in Step 1 or as directed by CRS/SM.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER BOP (Step 6.1.2.4) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN reduce turbine load as follows:

• Set the desired load in the SETTER

• Select the desired Load Rate NOTE: The BOP will select 1-2%/Minute

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 40 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Depress the GO pushbutton BOP (Step 6.1.2.5) IF EH Turbine Control is in NOTE: The Turbine is in TURB MANUAL, THEN. OPER AUTO.

BOP (Step 6.1.2.6) Maintain Gland Seal Steam Header Pressure (PI-4004, PI-1382 or ERFIS Point GSP2095A) in the normal operating band (3 to 6 psig)

RO (Step 6.1.2.7) WHEN Reactor Power is less than 90% as indicated on NR-45, THEN check that APP-005-D6 is received.

After a load reduction of 15-20 MWe, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 41 of 68 Event

Description:

CRDM Fan A Failure During the downpower, the A CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the B CRDM Fan.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF HVA05A f:MOTOR_SHORT Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator, APP-009-E7, 480V GRD FAULT

• RTGB Annunciator, APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD

• CRDM Fan HVH-5A Green status light LIT, Red status light OFF Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD BOP (Step 1) EVALUATE CRDM indicating lights to determine affected fan:

• HVH-5A, CRDM COOLING FAN

• HVH-5B, CRDM COOLING FAN BOP (Step 2) MONITOR the following ERFIS points to determine if a single-phase open circuit is present:

• ERFIS point ELV3020A, BUS E1 VOLTAGE.

• ERFIS point ELV3021A, BUS E2 VOLTAGE.

CRS (Step 3) IF a single-phase open circuit NOTE: This will require condition is suspected, THEN GO TO AOP- additional assessment.

026, Grid Instability BOP (Step 4) IF a CRDM COOLING FAN has NOTE: The BOP will start tripped, THEN ENSURE the Standby CRDM HVH-5B.

COOLING FAN is running.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 42 of 68 Event

Description:

CRDM Fan A Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) DISPATCH Operator to evaluate NOTE: The CRS will dispatch affected CRDM COOLING FAN supply an AO.

breaker status: If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that there was no apparent reason for the Fan failure.

• Breaker MCC-5(5M), CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING FAN, HVH-5A.

• Breaker MCC-6(4M), CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING FAN, HVH-5B.

CRS (Step 6) INITIATE a Work Request to NOTE: The CRS may call investigate the cause of the affected CRDM WCC to address the Fan COOLING FAN alarm. failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

CRS (Step 7) IF RCS temperature is greater than NOTE: The HVH-5B Fan is or equal to 350ºF AND both CRDM running.

COOLING FANs are unavailable, THEN..

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 43 of 68 Event

Description:

Continuous Inward Rod Motion Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CRF06A IMF CRF06B Indications Available:

• Rod Inward Arrow Indicating Light is LIT

• The Tavg-Tref deviation is inconsistent with the control rod movement

• Group Steps Counters and IRPI indication inward control rod motion Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM RO (Step 1) Check Unexpected Rod Motion IN Immediate Action PROGRESS RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power GREATER Immediate Action THAN 15%

BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Load Immediate Action

• CONTROL RODS STEPPING IN AND

• UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION IN PROGRESS OR

• UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION HAS OCCURRED RO (Step 3 RNO) Attempt To Stop Rod Motion Immediate Action As Follows:

• IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch NOTE: When the RO places position in A (AUTO), THEN Place the control rods in MANUAL, the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M rod motion will continue.

(Manual)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 44 of 68 Event

Description:

Continuous Inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M NOTE: Although control rods (Manual) OR Individual Bank Select, are expected to be in AUTO, if THEN Place the ROD BANK the control rods are in SELECTOR Switch in A (Auto). MANUAL the RO will take this action.

• IF Rod Motion does NOT stop, THEN Trip the Reactor and Go To EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE:The CRS will enter EOP-E-0 Upon Rx Trip, move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 45 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the C Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the C Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS.

Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the A and B Steam Generator PORVs. During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF SGN02F r:10:00 f:500 Indications Available:

• All control rods on the bottom

• RCS pressure is lowering

• RCS Tavg is trending to no load

• RTGB Annunciator APP-036-C7, R24 MONITOR HIGH

• R24 Leakage Recorder indicating S/G leakage greater than TS Limit Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 46 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED RO (Step 4.a RNO) CHECK if SI is required: Immediate Action

• PZR pressure LESS THAN 1715 PSIG OR

• Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4 PSIG OR

• Steam Line P bistables ILLUMINATED OR

• High Steam Flow with Low Tavg OR Low Steam Pressure bistables ILLUMINATED IF SI is required, THEN manually ACTUATE BOTH Trains of SI.

IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 47 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS

• GO TO EOPES0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1.

NOTE: It is expected that SI will not be required, and the CRS will transition to EOP-ES-0.1 NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

EOP-ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Examiner NOTE: A large SGTR is occurring. It is expected that the crew will transition back to EOP-E-0.

Because of this, only 5 steps are scripted.

When the crew re-enters EOP-E-0, move forward to EOP-E-0 steps on Page 49.

RO/ Foldout Page BOP SI ACTUATION CRITERIA NOTE: The crew will subsequently transition back to EOP-E-0 based on this criteria.

LOSS OF POWER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK CRITERIA RO (Step 1) CHECK RCS Temperature Control:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

• CHECK RCS temperatures:

• With ANY RCP running, CHECK RCS Average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F BOP (Step 2) CHECK Feedwater Status:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 48 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK RCS average temperatures LESS THAN 554°F

• CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Total feed flow to S/Gs GREATER THAN 300 gpm (0.2x106 PPH)

BOP (Step 3.a) CHECK S/G Levels:

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels GREATER THAN 9%

BOP (Step 3.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm AFW OR 0.2x106 pph Main Feedwater UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%

in at least one S/G.

BOP (Step 3.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 9%

AND 50%

BOP (Step 4) CHECK All AC Busses ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR Level Control:

• CHECK PZR level GREATER THAN 14%

RO (Step 5 RNO) PERFORM the following:

ISOLATE Letdown by closing the following valves:

• CLOSE LCV460 A & B, LETDOWN LINE STOP Valves.

CLOSE LTDN LINE ISO Valves:

• CVC204A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 49 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CVC204B CLOSE LTDN ORIFICE Valves:

• CVC200A 45 gpm

• CVC200B 60 gpm

• CVC200C 60 gpm CLOSE CVC387, EXCESS LETDOWN STOP Valve.

TURN OFF ALL PZR Heaters.

WHEN charging is available, THEN NOTE: The crew will likely CONTROL charging to restore PZR level to manual actuate SI and the GREATER THAN 14%. CRS will transition to EOP-E-0.

Examiner NOTE: If the crew proceeds past Step 5 of EOP-ES-0.1, wait here until the crew decides to re-enter EOP-E-0.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 50 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 54.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 51 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 52 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG OR

• High steam flow with:

• S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR

• Tavg LESS THAN 543°F BOP (Step 6.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING

• CHECK SW Booster Pumps BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 53 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 54 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may (If the Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary LOOP has occurred) contact (38 KW each): the Inside AO.

If so, Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187 f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c

• If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

• CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump NOTE: The SDAFW Pump is RUNNING OOS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 55 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper NOTE: The RO/BOP may Emergency Alignment: take a Prudent Action (OMM-

22) to throttle AFW flow to the C S/G and control Narrow Range level between 9-50%.

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG

• CHECK CV Spray NOT ACTUATED RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm EXTINGUISHED OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 56 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE

• Seal Injection flow GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP OR

• Thermal Barrier Ps GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

• With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F OR

• With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

• CHECK SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F[32°F]

CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 57 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:

• Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS

• R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

• S/G levels NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER CRS (Step 15 RNO) PERFORM the following: NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-3.

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

• GO TO EOPE3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1.

Booth Instructor: Upon transition to EOP-E-3, IMF EPS13 (Loss of Offsite Power)

Examiner NOTE: The LOOP will cause the AFW valves to fully open and re-initiate AFW flow to all S/Gs.

EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 58 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Foldout Page)

BOP SI REINITIATION CRITERIA SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be NOTE: The RCPs will NOT be Stopped: running.

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.

BOP (Step 2) IDENTIFY Ruptured S/G(s): NOTE: The crew will identify the C S/G as the ruptured S/G.

• CHECK for ANY of the following indications:

• Unexpected rise in ANY S/G Narrow Range level OR

• R31s Steamline Radiation Monitors ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION OR

• R19s SG Blowdown Radiation ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION OR

• High radiation reported from ANY S/G sample

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 59 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CONTACT Chemistry to periodically NOTE: The CRS may call sample ALL S/Gs for activity. WCC/Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

BOP (Step 3) ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured S/G(s):

• ADJUST Ruptured S/G(s)Steam Line PORV Controller to 1060 psig

• CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Line PORV CLOSED

• RV13 NOTE: The crew will ensure that the C S/G PORV is CLOSED.

• CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves:

• V18C NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED.

• Locally CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s)Bypass Drn AND Warmup Line To AFW Pump Valve(s)While CONTINUING WITH this procedure:

• MS38 (S/G C)(Pipe Jungle NOTE: The CRS will dispatch above/right of V18C) an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the MS-38 is CLOSED.

IRF MSS051 f:0

• CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) S/G Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves CLOSED

• CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves:

• S/G C:

• V13C

• MS353C BOP (Step 4) CHECK Ruptured S/G

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 60 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Ruptured S/G FAULTED CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Level:

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range level GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

RO

• RESET SI

• STOP feed Flow to ruptured S/G(s):

• CLOSE Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valve(s):

• V214C NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED.

• CLOSE AFW Header Discharge Valve(s):

• V216C

• PERFORM Supplement D, NOTE: The BOP will use Deenergizing AFW Valves For Attachment D, and call AO for AFFECTED S/G local Actions.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that actions are complete.

IRF EPSMCC9_256 f:0 (Other breakers are already Racked Out)

Critical Task:

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 61 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure GREATER THAN 500 PSIG BOP (Step 7) CHECK The Following Valves For Ruptured S/G CLOSED

• MSIVs

• MSIV Bypass Valves

• S/G Steam Line PORVs

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves BOP (Step 8) INITIATE RCS Cooldown:

• DETERMINE required Core Exit NOTE: The CRS will temperature: determine the Target temperature to 519°F.

• DUMP steam to Condenser from intact S/G(s) at MAXIMUM rate:

• CHECK Condenser AVAILABLE BOP (Step 8.b RNO) DUMP steam at MAXIMUM NOTE: The crew will dump rate from Intact S/G(s) using S/G Steam Line steam using the A and the PORV(s). B S/G PORVs.

• IF S/G Steam Line PORV(s) can NOT be opened from the Control Room, THEN....

• IF NO intact S/G available, THEN...

BOP (Step 8.c-f) CHECK RCS Tavg LESS THAN 543°F Momentarily PLACE STEAM DUMP MODE Control Switch to BYPASS TAVG INTLK position CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP NOTE: This Annunciator is ARMED alarm ILLUMINATED extinguished (Steam Dumps not available).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 62 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE BOP (Step 8.f RNO) WHEN Core Exit T/Cs are LESS THAN required temperature, THEN PERFORM Steps 8.g and 8.h.

CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 9.

BOP (Step 9) CHECK Intact S/G Levels:

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels NOTE: Narrow Range levels GREATER THAN 9%[18%] may be greater than 9%. If so, perform Step 9.b.

BOP (Step 9.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%

[18%] in at least one S/G.

BOP (Step 9.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 21%

[21%] AND 50%

RO (Step 10) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:

• CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK PZR PORV Block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN RO (Step 11) RESET SI RO (Step 12) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 63 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 13 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument NOTE: If not already done, the Air Compressor(s)as necessary (38 KW BOP will contact the Inside each): AO.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187 f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

• WHEN Instrument Air is established, THEN PERFORM Steps 13.b AND 13.c.

CRS

• CONTINUE WITH Step 14.

RO (Step 13.b-c) RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV1716 OPEN RO (Step 14) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RHR Pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• Pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

• Pressure STABLE OR RISING

• STOP RHR Pumps

• CHECK RCS pressure remains GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 64 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 15) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:

• CHECK Charging Pumps AT LEAST NOTE: All Charging Pumps ONE RUNNING are OFF.

CRS (Step 15.a RNO) IF CCW flow to RCP(s) NOTE: CCW flow was Thermal Barrier is lost, THEN GO TO Step momentarily lost on the LOOP,

16. but exists now.

RO (Step 15.b) ALIGN Charging Pump suction to RWST:

• OPEN LCV115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCTION

• CLOSE LCV115C, VCT OUTLET Valve

• PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Control Switch to STOP ESTABLISH MAXIMUM charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND MAXIMUM Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 65 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16) CHECK If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED CORE EXIT T/C TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 8

• STOP RCS cooldown

• MAINTAIN Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE Critical Task:

While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red path Limit)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

BOP (Step 17) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure STABLE OR RISING RO (Step 18) CHECK RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 38°F

[57°F]

RO (Step 19) DEPRESSURIZE RCS To MINIMIZE Break Flow AND Refill PZR:

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray AVAILABLE CRS (Step 19.a RNO) OBSERVE CAUTIONS and NOTE prior to Step 20 AND GO TO Step 20.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 66 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 20) DEPRESSURIZE RCS Using PZR BOP PORV To Minimize Break Flow AND Refill PZR:

• CHECK PZR PORV AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE

• OPEN one PZR PORV until ANY of the following conditions satisfied:

• BOTH of the following:

• RCS pressure LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE

• PZR level GREATER THAN 14% [31%]

OR

• PZR level GREATER THAN 73%

[66%]

OR

• RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 18°F [37°F]

• CLOSE PZR PORV RO (Step 21) CHECK RCS Pressure RISING RO/ (Step 22) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be BOP Terminated:

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 18°F

[37°F]

• CHECK Secondary Heat Sink:

• Total feed flow to S/G(s)

GREATER THAN 300 GPM AVAILABLE OR

• S/G Narrow Range level in at least one Intact S/G GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 67 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING

• CHECK PZR level GREATER THAN 14% [31%]

RO (Step 23) STOP SI Pumps Critical Task:

Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines.

Safety Significance: Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16 1-1 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: MOL b) Reactor Power: 100% Mode 1 c) Turbine Load: 770 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 853 ppm e) Rod Height: 218 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 53.3 %

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 A Restore AFW pump or flow path(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days AND 8 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) SDAFW Pump

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A MDAFW Pump and flowpath b) B MDAFW Pump and flowpath

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-2 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111615 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-2

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating (Amendment 176)

2. OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power (Rev 62)

3. OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (Rev 112)

4. AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control (Rev 20)

5. AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction (Rev 33)

6. APP-003, RCS & Makeup Systems (Rev 54)

7. APP-001, Miscellaneous NSSS (Rev 60)

8. AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions (Rev 31)

9. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

(Amendment 223)

10. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure (Rev 24)

11. OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP) (Rev 13)

12. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

13. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

14. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

15. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

16. CSFST, Critical Safety Function Status Trees (Rev 7)

17. EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (Rev 4)

18. FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure (Rev 10)

19. EOP-ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization (Rev 1)

Validation Time: 104 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The C Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 - R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 I-RO VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH I-SRO 3 2 C-BOP C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO C-SRO 4 3 C-RO B Charging Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO 5 4 I-BOP Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO Cold Leg SBLOCA M-BOP M-SRO 7 6/7 NA 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes 8 6 C-RO C SI Pump fails to Auto Start 9 7 C-RO CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The C Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating).

The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Next, the C Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and control the C S/G level manually throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Following this, the B Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and/or APP-001-B6, LP LTDN LN HI TEMP, and raise speed of the A Charging Pump and reduce Letdown flow. The operator may enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions. The operator will address 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System.

Shortly afterwards, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP), and restore the A and B Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the A EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train A equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the C SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and the break size will become larger. Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the B CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 both SI-880C&D (B CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves.

The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room.

Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity).

Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 609 T = 0 Malfunctions:

A SI Pump OOS:

• IRF EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT (A SI Pump OOS)

• IRF EPS480E1_124 f: RACK_IN (B SI Pump Racked IN to E-1)

PLACE Red Cap over A SI Pump Control Switch C Charging Pump OOS:

• IRF EPSV480E2_152 f:RACK_OUT PLACE Red Cap over C Charging Pump Control Switch PLACE Green Cap over A and B Charging Pump Control Switch LI-928 C SI Accumulator Level indication OOS

• IOR aoSISAOD021A f:0 Place WHITE DOT on LI-928 RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3 failed OFF

• IMF ANNXN09C03 f:ALARM_OFF Place WHITE DOT on APP-009-C3 Insert the following:

• IRF SIS029 f: NO_AUTO (C SI Pumps fails to AUTO start)

• IRF CNS010 f:NO-AUTO (SI-880C fails to OPEN in AUTO)

• IRF CNS011 f:NO-AUTO (SI-880C fails to OPEN in AUTO)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EPS05A (Normal Supply Breaker to E-1 trips on Rx Trip)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG03A (Diesel Output Breaker to E-1 fails to CLOSE)

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Adjust Steam Dump Potentiometer to 7.28 (Per OP-105)

Ensure B Charging Pump operating AUTO, A Charging Pump operating in MANUAL Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-2.

At direction of Event 1 Raise Power examiner At direction of Event 2 examiner VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH ICO CVCXMTLT_115 r:00:30 f:60 At direction of Event 3 C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO examiner IMF CFW17C r:15 f:100 At direction of Event 4 B Charging Pump Trip examiner IMF CVC05B At direction of Event 5 examiner Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW ICO TURXMTPT_447 r:30 f:0 At direction of Event 6 Cold Leg SBLOCA examiner IMF RCS01C r:5:00 f:1000 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Post-Rx Trip Event 7 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes IMF EPS05A NOTE: E-1 will de-energize on Rx Trip IMF EDG03A

$006_RTA_TRIP IMF EPS05A (Normal Supply Breaker to E-1 trips on Rx Trip)

$006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG03A (Diesel Output Breaker to E-1 fails to CLOSE)

Post-Rx Trip Event 8 C SI Pump fails to Auto Start IRF SIS029 NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 f:NO_AUTO Post-Rx Trip Event 9 CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN IRF CNS010 Automatically f:NO_AUTO NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 IRF CNS011 f:NO_AUTO Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5°F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes.

OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.

RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.

RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.

RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.

RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.

RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, THEN RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.

RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.

RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

• Unanticipated Rod Motion

• Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 12 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops.

• The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

• IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.

RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

• ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO.

• PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position.

• Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.

RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER BOP (Step 6) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER NOTE: Since power is AUTO, THEN raise turbine load as follows: stabilized at 75%, the BOP will perform Step 6 to initiate the load increase. The next applicable Step in Section 6.2.2 of OP-105 is Step 22.

• Adjust the SETTER indication using the REF or REF pushbuttons to the desired load.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 13 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Use the GO, HOLD, REF , and REF pushbuttons as necessary to continue the rise in load.

BOP (Step 22) WHEN average Reactor Power NOTE: The Turbine is in crosses greater than 90% by Power Range OPER AUTO.

Indications, THEN check that APP-005-D6 is received.

After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 61 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO CVCXMTLT_115 r:00:30 f:60 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E3, VCT HI/LO LVL

• VCT Level LI-115 indicates HIGH

• LCV-115 diverting to CVCS HUT

• VCT Level LI-112 on ERFIS indicates lowering VCT Level Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL NOTE: The crew could refer to APP-003-E3 before entering AOP-003.

RO (Step 1) Check For Failure Of A Level Transmitter As Follows:

• Obtain a VCT level for LT115 using ERFIS

• PT ID CHL0115A

• Obtain a VCT level for LT112 using ERFIS

• PT ID CHL0112A

• Check VCT level indicators OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED CRS (Step 1.c RNO) Go To Step 1.e RO (Step 1.e) Check VCT level deviation between LT112 and LT115 GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 61 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check LT115 FAILED NOTE: LT-115 has failed HIGH.

RO (Step 3) Stabilize The RCS Makeup System As Follows:

• Check LT115 FAILED HIGH

• Place LCV115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV, Control Switch to VCT

• Obtain Hagan Racks Key number 10

• Place VCT Level Transmitter Selector NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Switch located in Hagan Rack #19, IN the BOP to the Hagan Racks.

LT112 POSITION Booth Instructor: use IRF CVC 067 f:LT-112.

• Check LT115 FAILED HIGH

• Place the LCV115A Control Switch to AUTO CRS

• Contact I&C to repair fail channel NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the VCT Transmitter failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

CRS

• Go To Step 6 CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement For NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 7) Implement The EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (21%)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 61 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 12.5 inches (21%), THEN perform Action. The CRS will make Steps 9 and 10. both board operators aware.

CRS Go To Step 11.

RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)

CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go To Step 21.

RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)

RO (Step 22) Verify Charging And Letdown Flows Are Normal For Plant Conditions RO (Step 23) Check APP003D5, BA FLOW DEV ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go To Step 28.

RO (Step 28) Check APP003E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 28 RNO) Go To Step 34.

RO (Step 34) Check Boration REQUIRED NOTE: The decision point for the CRS is based on the LT-115 failure and its resulting effects, NOT based on the fact that there is an on-going power ascension.

CRS (Step 34 RNO) Go To Step 37.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 61 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 37) Check Dilution REQUIRED NOTE: The decision point for the CRS is based on the LT-115 failure and its resulting effects, NOT based on the fact that there is an on-going power ascension.

CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go To Step 40.

CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, NOTE: Technical Specification Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume LCO 3.4.17 is MET.

Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO CRS (Step 41) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 18 of 61 Event

Description:

C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO Next, the C Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and control the C S/G level manually throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CFW17C r:15 f:100 Indications Available:

• C S/G Narrow Range level is rising on FR-498

• C S/G Feed Flow level is rising on FR-498

• FCV-498 Controller Output is rising

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-C1, S/G C FW > STM FLOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): NOTE: FCV-498 in NOT operating properly in AUTO.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL.

• ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control.

• ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow.

• STOP any load change in progress.

• If unable to control S/G level, THEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 19 of 61 Event

Description:

C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BOP BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58 BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM RO (Step 59) CHECK Tavg AT OR TRENDING TO Tref

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 61 Event

Description:

C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 60) CONTACT Maintenance To NOTE: The CRS may call Troubleshoot And Correct The Feedwater WCC/I&C to address the FRV Problem Controller failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

CRS (Step 61) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 62) CHECK Total Reactor Power NOTE: The power change Change LESS THAN 15% associated with the FRV Failure is less than 15%.

RO (Step 63) CHECK APP005B5, ROD BANKS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 64) MONITOR Axial Flux Difference To Ensure Compliance With TS 3.2.3 BOP (Step 65) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher Of Unit's NOTE: The CRS/BOP will Load Capability contact the Load Dispatcher.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher.

CRS (Step 66) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 21 of 61 Event

Description:

B Charging Pump Trip Following this, the B Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and/or APP-001-B6, LP LTDN LN HI TEMP, and raise speed of the A Charging Pump and reduce Letdown flow. The operator may enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions. The operator will address 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CVC05B Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW

• B Charging Pump Green status light LIT

• FR-124 RCP Seal Injection Flow has lowered to less than Tech Spec value Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP RO (Step 1) Ensure at least one Charging Pump NOTE: The RO will raise the running supplying adequate RCP Seal speed of the A Charging Injection flow. Pump.

CRS (Step 2) Dispatch Operator to check the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Charging Pump breaker(s): an AO.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report within 1 minute that there is an acrid odor at E-1.

• Dispatch Operator to check the Charging Pump(s).

CRS (Step 3) Dispatch Operator to check the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Charging Pump(s). an AO.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report within 1 minute that the A Charging Pump is operating normally.

RO (Step 4) IF Seal Injection is lost to any RCP, THEN..

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 22 of 61 Event

Description:

B Charging Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF a single-phase open circuit condition is suspected, THEN..

NOTE: Because letdown flow is higher than Charging flow, it is expected that APP-001-B6 will alarm within 1 minute of the B Charging Pump trip.

APP-001-B6, LP LTDN LN HI TEMP RO (Step 1) IF Charging Flow is low, THEN NOTE: The RO will reduce RAISE Charging Flow OR LOWER Letdown letdown flow to control Flow to clear alarm. Pressurizer Level.

RO (Step 2) IF PT-145 has failed, THEN. NOTE: PT-145 has NOT failed.

RO (Step 3) IF PC-145 has failed, THEN.. NOTE: PC-145 has NOT failed.

CRS (Step 4) IF required, THEN DISPATCH an NOTE: The RO may contact operator to adjust RCP SEAL WATER FLOW the AO to adjust Seal Injection CONTROL VALVEs CVC-297A, CVC-297B, flows.

and CVC-297C per requirements of OP-301.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable NOTE: The CRS will address the Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.17, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

CRS LCO 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection shall be OPERABLE with:

Two Charging Pumps shall be OPERABLE; and

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 23 of 61 Event

Description:

B Charging Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Two makeup water pathways from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that the B A. One required A.1 Restore 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Charging Pump is one of the charging pump required charging inoperable. pump to two required to be OPERABLE OPERABLE, and enter status. Condition A.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 24 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Shortly afterwards, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP), and restore the A and B Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO TURXMTPT_447 r:30 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD

• PT-447, 1st Stage Pressure starts to lower

• PT-446, 1st Stage Pressure remains constant

• A and B S/G Narrow Range levels will lower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: With the C FRV in Manual, the C S/G level will remain stable. However, with this failure, the A and B FRVs will auto respond to the failure, and trend toward 39%

NR level. After stabilized there, the BOP will take MANUAL control of both the A and B FRVs and restore S/G level to the normal band.

APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-025 directly (If so, See BELOW).

RO/ (Step 1) CHECK AMSAC Switch position per BOP current plant procedures BOP (Step 2) MONITOR the following parameters:

• PI-446, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESS

• PI-447, TURBINE FIRST STAGE NOTE: The BOP will notice PRESS that PT-447 has failed LOW, the CRS may enter AOP-025.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 25 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• LI-474, CH I SG 1 NAR RANGE LEVEL

• LI-485, CH I SG 2 NAR RANGE LEVEL

• LI-496, CH I SG 3 NAR RANGE LEVEL BOP (Step 3) IF the difference between SG level indicators (LI-474, LI-485, LI-496) is greater than or equal to 25%, THEN..

BOP (Step 4) IF the difference between 1st stage NOTE: The BOP will notice pressure indicators (PI-446, PI-447) is that PT-447 has failed LOW, greater than or equal to 150 psig, THEN: and the CRS will likely enter AOP-025, rather than OWP-033.

• DETERMINE which pressure indicator is suspect.

• REMOVE affected pressure channel from service per OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP).

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section E of AOP-025.

• TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE, (PT-446, 447) - SECTION E AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 1) CHECK Turbine Load Rejection

• IN PROGRESS OR

• HAS OCCURRED CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 26 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) CHECK S/G Level Trend NOTE: FCV-498 is in CONTROLLING IN AUTO TO 39% MANUAL, and the failure has NOT caused C S/G level to change.

BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• ENSURE affected FRV controllers are in MAN:

• FCV478 NOTE: The BOP will place FCV-478 in MANUAL after level reaches 39%.

• FCV488 NOTE: The BOP will place FCV-488 in MANUAL after level reaches 39%.

• FCV498 NOTE: FCV-498 is already in MANUAL.

• CONTROL S/G level between 39% and 52%.

RO (Step 4) CONTROL Reactor Power:

PLACE rod bank selector switch in M NOTE: The RO already has (Manual) the control rods in MANUAL.

OPERATE rods to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) PERFORM The Following: NOTE: The C S/G Level is likely stabilized.

• CHECK S/G Level STABILIZED BETWEEN 39% AND 52%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 27 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6.a RNO) WHEN S/G level is stabilized NOTE: The BOP will be in the between 39% and 52%, THEN CONTINUE process of raising and WITH Step 6.b. stabilizing the A and B S/G Levels.

BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK FRV Controllers ALL IN NOTE: All FRV controllers are MAN: expected to be in MANUAL.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 CRS (Step 7) SELECT Alternate Channel For 1st Stage Pressure Input:

• Failed Channel - PT-447, Alternate Channel - PT-446 BOP (Step 8) ADJUST Each S/G Level To Program Level RO (Step 9) ADJUST Tavg To Within 1.5 TO

+1.5°F Of Tref RO (Step 10) CHECK Reactor Power GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%

BOP (Step 11) RESTORE Each S/G FRV To NOTE: The BOP will NOT Automatic: restore previously failed FRV-498 to AUTO.

• CHECK S/G level WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL BOP (Step 11 RNO) WHEN S/G level is within

+/-1% of programmed level, THEN PLACE affected controller in AUTO.

CRS

• GO TO Step 12.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 28 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) RESTORE Rod Control To NOTE: Since the power Automatic: increase is likely suspended, the RO/CRS may discuss placing the control rods back in AUTO.

• CHECK Tavg WITHIN 0.5 to +0.5°F OF Tref.

• Place Rod Control Selector Switch in AUTO CRS (Step 13) REMOVE Affected Transmitter From Service Using OWP033:

• Channel - PT-447, OWP-FSP-2 NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-033.

OWP-033, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE (FSP)

FSP-2, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-447 CRS Address FSP-2 BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE: The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room).

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN

• IRF BST100 f:TRIP

• IRF BST092 f:TRIP

• IRF BST017 f:TRIP

• IRF BST019 f:TRIP

• IRF BST021 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 29 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• B/S 447-2 HAGAN RACK #25 (70%

TURBINE LOAD LIMIT)

• B/S 447-1 HAGAN RACK #25 (PERMISSIVE P-7)

• B/S 475, HAGAN RACK #24 (LOOP 1 HI STM FLOW)

• B/S 485 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 2 HI STM FLOW)

• B/S 495 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW)

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 14) CHECK TS LCO 3.3.1 And 3.3.2 NOTE: The CRS will address For Applicability Technical Specifications.

CRS (Step 15) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 30 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 17.e T. One channel T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-inoperable interlock is in required state for 7 Input is affected; and that existing unit Action T.1 or T.2 is required.

conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> 2.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Functions 1.f D. One channel NOTE (SI-High Steam Flow in Two inoperable For Function 4.c, a channel may Steam Lines), 1.g (SI- High be taken out of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Steam Flow in Two Steam the trip condition Lines Coincident with Steam for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Line Pressure Low), 4.d (MSI -

maintenance.

High Steam Flow in Two D.1 Place channel 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Steam Lines Coincident with in trip. Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI -

High Steam Flow in Two OR Steam Lines Coincident with D.2.1 Be in Steam Line Pressure Low),

18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> MODE 3. are affected; and that Actions D.1, or D.2.1 and D.2.2.

AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 31 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 4 Refer to LCO (Safety Injection), is affected, 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," which requires the Action of Function 1, for all LCO 3.3.2.

initiation functions and requirements.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 32 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop.

The operator will enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the A EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train A equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the C SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and the break size will become larger. Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the B CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, both SI-880C&D (B CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves. The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF RCS01C r:5:00 f:1000 Indications Available:

• Pressurizer level is lowering

• Pressurizer pressure is lowering

• Charging Pump is rising

• Containment pressure is rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: If a reactor trip occurs move forward to EOP-E-0 actions on Page 35.

AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE RO (Step 1) DETERMINE If Reactor Trip Needed As Follows:

• CHECK RCS Pressure GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG

• CHECK the following:

• PZR Level LESS THAN 14% AND LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 33 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OR

• RCS Subcooling LESS THAN 18°F RO (Step 1.b RNO) IF PZR Level can NOT be NOTE: This is a Continuous maintained greater than 14% OR Subcooling Action. The CRS will make can NOT be maintained greater than 18°F, both board operators aware.

THEN trip the Reactor and GO TO EOPE 0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CRS

• GO TO Step 2.

CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

RO (Step 3) CONTROL Charging Flow To NOTE: The A Charging Maintain Desired RCS Level. Pump is running a maximum speed.

RO (Step 4) CHECK VCT Level LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES RO (Step 4 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 12.5 inches, THEN OBSERVE the Note Action. The CRS will make prior to Step 5 AND PERFORM Step 5. both board operators aware.

CRS

• GO TO Step 6.

RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Pump Status NOTE: Only one Charging LESS THAN TWO RUNNING Pump is available.

RO (Step 7) CHECK Charging Pump Status NONE RUNNING RO (Step 7 RNO) IF an additional Charging Pump is available, THEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 34 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS

• GO TO Step 11.

RO (Step 11) PLACE Running Charging Pump Speed Controller(s) In MAN AND ADJUST Output To Maximum RO (Step 12) CHECK RCS Level LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RO (Step 13) CHECK Any Letdown IN SERVICE RO (Step 14) ENSURE All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated As Follows:

• LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP Valves CLOSED

• HIC142, PURIFICATION FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO 0%

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO 0%

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP CLOSED RO (Step 15) CHECK RCS Level LOWERING NOTE: By this time it is likely IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER that Przr level is lowering uncontrollably.

RO (Step 16) CHECK RCS Pressure GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG RO/ (Step 17) TRIP The Reactor AND GO TO CRS EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 35 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES: NOTE: Bus E-1 is NOT energized.

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED BOP (Step 3) WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to Immediate Action restore power to deenergized AC Emergency Bus.

RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 36 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING NOTE: The operator has to manually start the C SI Pump.

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: The RCP Trip Criteria will apply in this event.

FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 NOTE: The Instrument FAILURE CRITERIA Bus/MCC-5 Criteria will apply in this event requiring performance of Attachment 2, and will likely be performed prior to Attachment 1.

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform Attachment 2 with the AO, and then perform Attachment 1.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 2 and 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 43.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 2, DC BUS OR INSTRUMENT BUS FAILURE BOP (Step 1) IF DC Bus Failure Has Occurred, NOTE: A DC Bus failure has THEN NOT occurred.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) IF MCC5 Is NOT Energized, THEN NOTE: The CRS will dispatch PERFORM The Following: an AO, and direct that the AO perform Step 2 of Attachment 2 of EOP-E-0.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 2 minutes that this action is complete.

IRF EPSL005 f:SHDN_BUS IRF EPMSMCC5_187 f:

RACK_IN

• ENSURE DS Bus is ENERGIZED

• TRANSFER power source to DS Bus using the posted instructions at the Kirk Key Interlocked Breakers

• Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

BOP (Step 3) IF Instrument Bus Failure Has NOTE: The failure of Occurred,.. Instrument Bus 1 will be resolved with the restoration of power to MCC-5 (Step 2).

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 43.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as NOTE: There is no power to necessary. the A SI Pump, and the C SI had to be started manually.

Critical Task:

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0 Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A NOTE: Some valves will not Valves CLOSED have power. The BOP may dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) NOTE: Some valves will NOT as necessary. have power to CLOSE, however all CV penetrations will be isolated.

• IF ANY Containment penetration can NOT be isolated, THEN...

BOP

• CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

• CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG OR

• High steam flow with:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR

• Tavg LESS THAN 543°F BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 7.a RNO) Manually START pump(s) NOTE: The C and D SW as necessary. Pumps will be running. The A and B SW Pumps do NOT have power.

BOP (Step 7.b) CHECK SW Booster Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 7.b RNO) Manually START pump(s) NOTE: The B SW Booster as necessary. Pump will be running. The A SW Pump does NOT have power.

BOP (Step 7.c) CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING NOTE: BOTH EDGs are running however, the A EDG Output Breaker cannot be CLOSED.

BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

• CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED

• CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans NOTE: The 3 and 4 CV ALL RUNNING Recirc Fans will be running.

The 1 and 2 SW Fans do NOT have power.

BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 12 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R 11 OR R12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation.

• IF ANY Containment Ventilation NOTE: The BOP may contact Isolation valve does NOT close, THEN an AO to locally close valves.

manually OR locally ISOLATE If so, Booth Instructor AFFECTED penetration outside acknowledge as AO, and Containment while CONTINUING WITH report after 5 minutes that all this procedure.

valves are CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation NOTE: If the AO has restored Aligned For Pressurization Mode: power to Instrument Bus 1 (Via restoration of MCC-5), each of these valves will be CLOSED.

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers NOTE: If the AO has restored ENERGIZED: power to MCC-5, each of these will be extinguished.

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may contact Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary the Inside AO.

(38 KW each): Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report that the B IA Compressor is running, and the A IA Compressor is NOT running.

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c

• If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps BOTH RUNNING (Step 6.a) Manually START pump(s). NOTE: The B MDAFW Pump will be running. The A MDAFW Pump does NOT have power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

• CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump NOTE: The SDAFW Pump is RUNNING running.

RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge NOTE: The A and C valves Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP are CLOSED, the B Valve is RUNNING OPEN.

RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS NOTE: Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG has remained < 10 psig.

CRS OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10.

RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm EXTINGUISHED OR

• Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE

• Seal Injection flow GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP OR

• Thermal Barrier Ps GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures: NOTE: The LOCA may be causing a cooldown. If so, the RNO will be performed.

Otherwise proceed to Step 12.

• With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F OR

• With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:

• STOP dumping steam.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

• CHECK SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core NOTE: Adverse Containment Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F[32°F] Numbers may be required.

• STOP ALL RCPs NOTE: Depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the RCP trip criteria may or may not be met.

If the criteria is NOT met here, the leak degrades after entry into EOP-E-1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied:

SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:

• Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS

• R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

• S/G levels NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER CRS (Step 16) PERFORM the following:

• CHECK If RCS Is Intact:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CV radiation NORMAL

• R2, CV AREA

• R32A, CV HIGH RANGE

• R32B, CV HIGH RANGE

• CV pressure NORMAL

• CV Sump level NORMAL NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-1.

Booth Instructor: The Cold Leg break will degrade IMF RCS01C r:2:00 f:3 NOTE: Shortly after entry into EOP-E-1, it is expected that an Orange path will occur on the Containment CSFST. When the CRS transitions to FRP-J.1, continue with the below actions.

FRP-J.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CRS (Step 1) CHECK CV Spray Operation CONTROLLED BY EOPECA1.1, Loss Of Emergency Coolant Recirculation CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.

RO (Step 2.a) CHECK Containment Spray NOTE: The A CV Spray Status: Pump has no power.

• CHECK CV Spray pumps BOTH RUNNING RO (Step 2.a RNO) PERFORM the following:

• ENSURE CV Spray Pump Inlet Valves are OPEN:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• SI844A

• SI844B

• Manually START CV Spray Pump(s). NOTE: The A CV Spray Pump has no power.

RO (Step 2.b.1) CHECK CV Spray System PROPER VALVE ALIGNMENT

• CHECK CV Spray Pump Discharge valves OPEN

• SI880A NOTE: SI-880A and B have no power.

• SI880B

• SI880C NOTE: SI-880A and B have failed to Auto Open.

• SI880D RO (Step 2.b.1 RNO) Manually OPEN valve(s) as necessary.

RO (Step 2.b.2) CHECK CV Spray Additive Tank NOTE: SI-845A has no power Discharge Valves OPEN and B has failed to Auto Open.

• SI845A

• SI845B RO (Step 2.b.2 RNO) IF Spray Additive Tank NOTE: The operator will level is GREATER THAN 0%, THEN manually open SI-845B.

manually OPEN valve(s) as necessary.

RO (Step 2.b.3) CHECK Spray Additive Tank flow APPROXIMATELY 12 GPM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2.b.3 RNO) IF Spray Additive Tank NOTE: SI-845B will be level is GREATER THAN 0%, THEN adjusted such that flow is 12 ADJUST SI845C, SAT THROTTLING gpm.

VALVE, as necessary.

Critical Task:

Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2 Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity). Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

RO (Step 2.c) CHECK Containment Isolation NOTE: Some valves will NOT Phase B Valves CLOSED have power.

RO (Step 2.c RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as NOTE: The RO may dispatch necessary. an AO to locally check the position of the A Train valves.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

• IF ANY Containment Isolation Phase B valve can NOT be closed, THEN locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

RO (Step 2.d) STOP ALL RCPs

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied:

SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

RO (Step 3) MONITOR Spray Additive Tank level GREATER THAN 0%

BOP (Step 4) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass NOTE: depending on the Valves CLOSE timing of mitigation actions, the MSIVs may be open or closed.

If the MSIVs are OPEN, the BOP will perform the Step 4 RNO.

BOP (Step 4 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.

RO (Step 5) CHECK Containment Isolation NOTE: Some valves will NOT Phase A Valves CLOSED have power to CLOSE, however all CV penetrations will either be isolated, or in the process of being isolated from the performance of Attachment 1 of EOP-E-0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5 RNO) IF valve(s) are NOT CLOSED AND associated flow path(s) are NOT necessary, THEN manually CLOSE AFFECTED valve(s).

• IF AFFECTED valve(s) can NOT be CLOSED, THEN locally ISOLATE affected penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation NOTE: Some valves will NOT VALVES CLOSED have power.

BOP (Step 6 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R11 OR R12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation.

• IF ANY Containment Ventilation NOTE: The BOP may dispatch Isolation Valve does NOT CLOSE, an AO to locally check the THEN manually OR locally ISOLATE position of the A Train AFFECTED penetration outside valves.

Containment while CONTINUING WITH If so, Booth Instructor this procedure. acknowledge as AO.

RO (Step 7) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans NOTE: The A Train HVH ALL RUNNING Fans do not have power.

RO (Step 7 RNO) Manually START fan(s) as necessary.

BOP (Step 8) CHECK If Feed Flow Should Be Isolated To ANY S/G:

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs:

• ANY S/G pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner OR

• ANY S/G completely depressurized

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 8 RNO) GO TO Step 9.

CRS (Step 9) PERFORM The Following:

• RESET SPDS

• RETURN TO Procedure AND Step In Examiner NOTE: The CRS Effect will transition back to EOP-E-1 (Go to step that was in effect at the time that FRP-J.1 was entered).

EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Examiner NOTE: Terminate the exam AT ANY TIME after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig.

RO/ FOLDOUT PAGE:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA SI TERMINATION CRITERIA SI REINITIATION CRITERIA SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA EOPE3 TRANSITION CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be NOTE: The RCPs are OFF.

Stopped:

CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CRS (Step 1.a RNO) GO TO Step 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Intact S/G Levels: NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.

CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 9% [18%] AND 50%

RO (Step 4) RESET SI RO (Step 5) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A BOP (Step 6) CHECK Secondary Radiation:

• CHECK Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS

• R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

• PERFORM the following: NOTE: The CRS may call Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

• REQUEST Chemistry periodically sample ALL S/Gs for activity.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Secondary sample results NORMAL (WHEN RESULTS AVAILABLE)

RO (Step 7) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block NOTE: The A Train Block Valves: Valve does NOT have power.

• CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK PZR PORV Block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN RO (Step 8) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

• CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm EXTINGUISHED

• RESET IA PCV1716,INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV1716 OPEN BOP (Step 9) CHECK Power Supply To Charging Pumps OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE RO (Step 10) CHECK If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

• CHECK Charging Pumps AT LEAST NOTE: The A Charging ONE RUNNING Pump is the only Charging Pump available.

• ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated RO (Step 11) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core NOTE: Adverse Containment Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 18°F Numbers will be required.

[37°F]

CRS (Step 11 RNO) GO TO Step 12.

RO (Step 12) CHECK If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK CV Spray Pumps ANY RUNNING

• CHECK Containment pressure LESS NOTE: CV pressure will likely THAN 4 PSIG be lowering, and may be below 4 psig.

If so, move forward to Step 13.

CRS (Step 12.b) WHEN Containment pressure is NOTE: This is a Continuous LESS THAN 4 psig, THEN PERFORM Steps Action. The CRS will make 12.e. both board operators aware.

• OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 13 AND CONTINUE WITH Step 13.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 13) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be NOTE: This is a Continuous Stopped: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• Pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG NOTE: Adverse Containment

[325 PSIG] Numbers will be required.

CRS (Step 13.a RNO) GO TO Step 15.

BOP (Step 15) CHECK If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK AC Emergency Busses ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER

• Bus E1,BKR 52/18B CLOSED NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-energized. The CRS may stop here and address the possibility of restoring power to Bus E-1.

• Bus E2,BKR 52/28B CLOSED

• CHECK Emergency Diesel Generator(s)

Starting Air annunciators EXTINGUISHED

• APP010B2, EDG A START AIR LO PRESS

• APP010B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS

• STOP ANY unloaded Emergency Diesel Generator(s)

CRS (Step 16) INITIATE Evaluation Of Plant Status:

• CHECK Cold Leg Recirculation capability:

• Train A:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK the following pumps AVAILABLE

• RHR Pump A

• ANY CCW Pump

• ANY two SW Pumps

• CHECK the following valves AVAILABLE

• SI860A, CV SUMP TO RHR

• SI861A, CV SUMP TO RHR

• SI862A, RWST TO RHR

• CC749A, CCW FROM RHR HX

• Train B:

• CHECK the following pumps AVAILABLE

• RHR Pump B

• ANY CCW Pump

• ANY two SW Pumps

• CHECK the following valves AVAILABLE

• SI860B, CV SUMP TO RHR

• SI861B, CV SUMP TO RHR

• SI862B, RWST TO RHR

• CC749B, CCW FROM RHR HX

• CHECK Auxiliary Building Conditions NORMAL

• R3, PASS PANEL AREA

• R4, CHARGING PUMP ROOM

• R6, SAMPLING ROOM

• RI14C, Plant Effluent NGLO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• LI615A, RHR PIT "A" LEVEL INDICATOR

• LI615B, RHR PIT "B" LEVEL INDICATOR

• Aux Bldg Sump Tank "A" level

• Aux Bldg Sump Tank "B" level

• OBTAIN samples:

• CONTACT Chemistry to obtain the NOTE: The CRS may call following samples: WCC/Chemistry to address the sampling requirements.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

• RCS boron concentration

• RCS activity

• CV atmosphere

• CONSULT Plant Operations Staff as NOTE: The CRS may call necessary to assess additional WCC/Plant Management to sampling requirements for fuel address the sampling damage requirements.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/ Plant Management.

• EVALUATE plant equipment to support long term recovery:

• RHR Pumps

• SI Pumps

• CV Spray Pumps

• CV Fans

• AFW Pumps

• SW System

• CCW System

• IVSW System

• EDG Fuel and Auxiliaries

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 60 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• START additional plant equipment to assist in recovery as necessary:

• Aux Boiler NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to start the Aux Boiler.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

• Other plant equipment needed during RCS cooldown to Cold Shutdown RO (Step 17) CHECK If RCS Cooldown AND Depressurization Is Required:

• CHECK RCS pressure GREATER NOTE: Adverse Containment THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] Numbers will be required.

RO (Step 17.a RNO) IF RHR Pump flow is GREATER THAN 1500 gpm, THEN ...

• IF RHR Pump flow is LESS THAN 1500 gpm, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS.

• GO TO EOPES1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization, Step 1.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16 1-2 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 75%

c) Turbine Load: 543 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 1476 ppm e) Rod Height: 172 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 44.2%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1.

b) The C Charging Pump is also OOS.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) B SI Pump from E-1

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED (i.e. OFF) condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 100% in accordance with Reactivity Plan

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) will be available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 2100 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch dilutions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100% power

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-3 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111115 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-3

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 203)

2. AOP-024, Loss of Instrument Bus (Rev 41)

3. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating (Amendment 176)

4. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, Distribution System - Operating (Amendment 176)

5. AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction (Rev 33)

6. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure (Rev 24)

7. OWP-026, Feed Flow (FWF) (Rev 14)

8. AOP-038, Rapid Downpower (Rev 3)

9. APP-001 Miscellaneous NSSS (Rev 60)

10. AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control (Rev 20)

11. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System (Amendment 203)

12. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits (Amendment 176)

13. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs)

(Amendment 203)

14. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

15. EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 7)

16. CSFST, Critical Safety Function Status Trees (Rev 7)

17. FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (Rev 29)

18. OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System (Rev 96)

Validation Time: 72 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered.

Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, EMERG OIL PMP OVLD, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of Instrument Bus 3 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 2 2 I-BOP B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW I-SRO 3 NA R-RO Load Decrease N-BOP N-SRO 4 3 C-RO Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED C-SRO 5 4 I-RO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to I(TS)-SRO fully CLOSE 6 5 M-RO Inadvertent FWIS M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate 8 7 NA A & B MDAFW Pump Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, EMERG OIL PMP OVLD, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, Loss of Instrument Bus, and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources -

Operating, and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems-Operating.

Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G B, FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, Feed Flow (FWF).

Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve.

Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS pressure Control, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).

After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur.

Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the A and B MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 operator will direct that AFW Pump C be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, however, the AFW Pump C Diesel will fail to start.

The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control B S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the B S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This effective steamline break is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary.

Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operators having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 610 T = 0 Malfunctions:

SDAFW Pump OOS:

• irf EPSMCC5_189 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8A, A S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC6_226 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8B, B S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC6_227 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8C, C S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC10_262 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14A, SDAFW discharge to A S/G)

• irf EPSMCC9_254 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14B, SDAFW discharge to B S/G)

• irf EPSMCC10_267 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14C, SDAFW discharge to C S/G)

PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):

• A MDAFW RTGB Switch

• B MDAFW RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch

• Protected Switchyard TI-471 PRT Temperature indication OOS

• IOR aoPRTAOD30A f:50 Place WHITE DOT on TI-471 RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3 failed on

• IMF ANNXN08C03 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-008-C3 Insert the following:

• IMF TUR02A (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)

• IMF TUR02B (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)

• IMF TUR02C (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IOR diTUREHI029 f:AS-IS (Turbine Fails to Runback on Reactor Trip)

• IRF SGN023 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)

• IRF SGN024 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)

• IRF SGN025 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF CFW1A d:45 (A MDAFW Pump Trips after Auto Start)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF CFW1B d:45 (B MDAFW Pump Trips after Auto Start)

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-3.

At direction of Event 1 examiner Loss of Instrument Bus 3 IRF EPSIB3_600 f:OPEN At direction of Event 2 B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW examiner ICO CFWXMTFT_487 r:00:30 f:0 At direction of Event 3 Load Decrease examiner NA NOTE: to initiate this event, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that It has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

At direction of Event 4 Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller examiner fails CLOSED IMF CVC07 r:30 f:100 IOR aoCVCAAD046A r:30 f:100

$006_PCV-145_MAN DMF CVC07

$_PCV-145_MAN DOR aoCVCAAD046A Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 5 examiner PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE ICO RPSXMTPT_444 r:01:00 f:2500 IMF PRS03D f:10 when

$006_PCV-455C_OPEN At direction of Event 6 Inadvertent FWIS examiner IMF CFW20A c:20 IMF CFW20B c:20 IMF CFW20C c:20 Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Post-Rx Trip Event 8 A & B MDAFW Pump Trip NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, Loss of Instrument Bus, and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating, and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems-Operating.

Booth Operator Instructions: IRF EPSIB3_600 f:OPEN Indications Available:

• C Feed Regulating Valve Controller in MANUAL

• FR-498 Stem/Feed Flow Recorder for C S/G is de-energized

• Bistable Panel A is de-energized

• PT-445, Pzr Pressure has failed LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-024, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS BOP (Step 1) Place The Main Turbine in Manual Immediate Action BOP (Step 2) Verify S/G(s) Maintained At Program Immediate Action Level RO (Step 3) Place Rods in M (Manual) Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Maintain Reactor Power Less Than OR Equal To 100%

RO (Step 5) Determine If RCS Makeup Needs To Be Stopped:

• Check Auto Makeup, Boration OR Dilution IN PROGRESS OR

• Check Instrument Bus 2 AND Instrument Bus 7 DEENERGIZED RO (Step 5 RNO) IF Auto Makeup is received, THEN Check Auto Makeup, Boration

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS

• Go To Step 7 RO (Step 7) Control PZR Heaters And Sprays To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band CRS (Step 8) Make PA Announcement For NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

RO (Step 9) Control Charging And Letdown Flow To Maintain PZR Level RO (Step 10) Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM BOP (Step 11) Determine Failed Instrument Bus (IB) From Any Of The Following:

• Available indications OR

• Table Below

• 3, FR-498, "C" S/G Level BOP (Step 12) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2 ENERGIZED FROM THE 4160V BUSSES RO/ (Step 13) Check Affected Instrument Bus BOP ENERGIZED CRS (Step 13 RNO) WHEN affected Instrument NOTE: Step 14 will be Bus is Energized, THEN observe the NOTE performed when power to IB-3 prior to Step 14 and perform Step 14 is restored.

CRS

• Go To Step 15.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 11 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 15) Check LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP CLOSED RO (Step 16) Place The Selector Switch For LCV 460A & B In The Closed Position RO (Step 17) Verify only ONE Charging Pump running at minimum speed RO (Step 18) Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM RO/ (Step 19) Check Affected Instrument Bus BOP ENERGIZED RO/ (Step 19 RNO) Locally perform the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP applicable step below: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the IB-3 Feeder breaker has tripped, and that there is no apparent reason for the trip (i.e. no acrid odor).

• IB1 through IB4

• IF the cause is known OR NOT a fault NOTE: The CRS will direct the OR suspected damage, THEN attempt AO to attempt to re-close the to reset and close the open IB-3 Feeder Breaker.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use:

IRF EPSIB3_600 f:CLOSE and report after 1 minute that the IB-3 is re-energized.

BOP (Step 20) Stop All Radioactive Batch Releases

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 12 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 21) Check Status Of Local Actions:

• Check Local Actions Of Step 19 RNO REQUIRED

• Check Local Actions Of Step 19 RNO ATTEMPTED RO/ (Step 22) Check Affected Instrument Bus NOTE: IB-3 is energized.

BOP ENERGIZED RO (Step 23) Restore RCS Makeup Control To AUTO

• Place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch in STOP

• Verify the RCS MAKEUP MODE Switch in AUTO

• Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START RO (Step 24) Restore Rod Control To Automatic As Follows:

• Check Power GREATER THAN 15%

• Check Automatic Rod Control AVAILABLE

• Place the Rod Control Selector Switch to A (Automatic)

BOP (Step 25) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2 ENERGIZED BOP (Step 26) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2 ENERGIZED FROM THEIR 4160V BUSSES

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 27) Implement The EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

RO/ (Step 28) Check Status Of Instrument Bus 4 BOP ENERGIZED:

BOP (Step 29) Place Turbine Controls In Automatic RO (Step 30) Determine CCW Pump Status As Follows:

• Check CCW Pumps MORE THAN ONE RUNNING

• Check CCW Pumps MORE THAN ONE REQUIRED

• Stop CCW Pumps as necessary using OP306 Section, Operating CCW Pumps, to obtain desired CCW pump status BOP (Step 31) Check RMS1, RMS2, RMS3, AND RMS4 ALL OPEN BOP (Step 32) Check Affected Instrument Bus ENERGIZED RO (Step 33) Check PZR Heater Status DEENERGIZED RO (Step 34) Reset PZR Heaters As Follows:

• Place PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP Control Switch to OFF position AND return to ON position

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Place PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A Control Switch to OFF position AND return to AUTO OR ON position as desired

• Place PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B Control Switch to OFF position AND return to AUTO OR ON position as desired RO (Step 35) Check Normal Letdown ISOLATED CRS (Step 35 RNO) Go To Step 37.

BOP (Step 37) Check All Radiation Monitor Alarms EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 37 RNO) Reset Radiation Monitor alarms that are illuminated due to loss of Instrument Bus as follows:

• For RMS 1112, 1518, OR 2031, momentarily depress ALARM/RESET Pushbutton.

• For RMS 19 OR 33, momentarily depress the RESET Pushbutton.

• For RMS 14 OR 19, contact E&C NOTE: The CRS may call personnel to reset the monitor(s). WCC/Chemistry to address resetting R-14s.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry and use:

IRF RMS067 f:RESET IRF RMS068 f:RESET IRF RMS069 f:RESET And report that the R-14 monitors have been reset.

• For RMS32, momentarily depress SAFE/RESET Pushbutton.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 15 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 38) Check R11 OR R12 IN SERVICE

• RMS1, RMS2, RMS3, and RMS4 OPEN AND

• R11 and R12 Vacuum Pump Operating BOP (Step 39) Check R20, Fuel Handling Bldg Lower Level Low Range IN SERVICE BOP (Step 40) Check R21, Fuel Handling Bldg Upper Level IN SERVICE BOP (Step 41) Check Control Room Ventilation ALIGNED FOR PRESSURIZATION MODE CRS (Step 41 RNO) Go To Step 43.

RO (Step 43) Check PZR PRV Safety Acoustic Monitor Lights ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 43 RNO) Go To Step 45.

RO/ (Step 45) Check Instrument Busses 1, 2, 3, BOP AND 4 ENERGIZED FROM THEIR NORMAL SOURCE (As Indicated Below):

• IB1: MCC5 (Via E1)

• IB2: INVERTER A

• IB3: INVERTER B

• IB4: MCC6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 16 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 46) Check Status of EDGs START SIGNAL RECEIVED CRS (Step 46 RNO) Observe the NOTE prior to Step 65 and Go To Step 65.

BOP (Step 65) Check ALL Safety Related Electrical Buses ENERGIZED CRS (Step 66) Check Technical Specifications For NOTE: The CRS will address Applicable LCOs the Technical Specifications.

• ITS LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating

• ITS LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources Operating

• ITS LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems Operating RO (Step 67) Check Annunciator APP005A3, PR DROP ROD ILLUMINATED RO (Step 68) Reset Dropped Rod Alarm By Performing The Following:

• Place DROPPED ROD MODE switch for the affected Power Range Drawer to RESET Position

• Place DROPPED ROD MODE switch for the affected Power Range Drawer to NORMAL Position

• Check Annunciator APP005A3, PR DROP ROD EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 69) Check APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 69 RNO) Go To Step 71

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 17 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 71) Check APP005F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD ILLUMINATED BOP (Step 72) Reset AMSAC TROUB/BYPD NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Alarm By Depressing The SYSTEM RESET an AO.

Pushbutton On AMSAC Front Panel. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry and use:

IRF RPS005 f:RESET And report that AMSAC have been reset.

(Step 73) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.7, AC INSTRUMENT BUS SOURCES -

OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.7 The following AC Instrument Bus Power Sources shall be OPERABLE:

• Inverters A and B, and

• Constant Voltage Transformers (CVT) 1 and 2.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 18 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1 is A. One AC NOTE: Enter 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> required (When Inverter is Instrument Bus applicable power source Conditions and NOT powering IB-3).

inoperable. Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems -

Operating" with any instrument bus de-energized.

A.1 Restore AC Instrument Bus Power Source to OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION B.1 is B. One AC B.1 Restore AC 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> required (When IB-3 is de-instrument bus instrument bus subsystem subsystem to AND energized).

inoperable. OPERABLE 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from status. discovery of failure to meet LCO At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G B, FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, Feed Flow (FWF).

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO CFWXMTFT_487 r:00:30 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-B1, S/G B FW > STM FLOW

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-B2, S/G B STM > FW FLOW

• B S/G Feed flow lower than Steam flow on FR-488

• FRV-488 controller output at 100%

• FRV-488 Red status light is LIT, Green status light is OFF Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD.

Examiner Note: It is possible that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-010 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first.

If so, proceed to AOP-025 section below.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION NOTE: The BOP will take Immediate Actions to control FCV-488 in MANUAL prior to procedure implementation.

BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):

NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-488 in MANUAL.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 20 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action

• ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control.

• ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow.

• STOP any load change in progress.

• If unable to control S/G level, THEN..

Critical Task:

Manually control B S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the B S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BOP BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 21 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58 BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level AT OR NOTE: The CRS will likely TRENDING TO PROGRAM transition to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE NOTE: The BOP will take Immediate Actions to control FCV-488 in MANUAL prior to procedure implementation.

CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section D of AOP-025.

• S/G Feed Flow (FT-487) - SECTION D (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

(Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 1) CHECK Affected FRV In MAN: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-488 in MANUAL.

• FCV488 (FRV "B")

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 22 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1 RNO) PLACE affected FRV in Immediate Action manual.

BOP (Step 2) RESTORE Affected S/G Level To Immediate Action Program Critical Task:

Manually control B S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the B S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is NOTE: This is a Continuous approached, THEN TRIP the reactor, Action. The CRS will make Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. both board operators aware.

GO TO Step 5.

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 7) PLACE Affected S/G Feed Flow Selector Switch to the Alternate Channel:

• S/G B FEED FLOW - FR-488

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 23 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Failed Channel FT-487 - Position CH486 BOP (Step 8) RESTORE Affected Controller to Automatic:

• CHECK S/G level - WITHING +/-1% OF NOTE: The BOP may not PROGRAMMED LEVEL have S/G level at programmed, and perform the RNO (Placing affected controller in AUTO when at programmed level).

• PLACE affected controller in AUTO.

BOP (Step 9) REMOVE Affected Transmitter from NOTE: The CRS will address Servicing Using OWP-026: OWP-026.

• CHANNEL FT-487 - OWP FWF-4 OWP-026, FEEDWATER FLOW (FWF)

FWF-4, STEAM GENERATOR B FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-487 CRS Address FWF-4 BOP FR-488 FEEDWATER FLOW SELECTOR SWITCH - Selected to 486 BOP DELETE INPUT FT-487 FROM CALO PROCESSING. (FWF0424A)

NOTE: The CRS will return to AOP-025, Section D.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 10) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability:

• TS LCO 3.3.1

• TS LCO 3.3.2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 24 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 11) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 NOTE: The CRS will return to the main body of AOP-025.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In NOTE: The CRS will likely Effect conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 25 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

Booth Operator Instructions: Call as the WCCS and state It has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST 947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN

• Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min

• Target Power Level ___

• Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 130 Steps.

• Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 350 gallons.

RO (Step 3) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE CRS (Step 4) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 26 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Reason for downpower

• Target Power Level

• Target Rod Height

• Rate of load reduction

• Amount of boric acid addition RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters

• PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control IN AUTO RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action.

RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 27.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 27 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2 RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

• IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

• RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure

• CHECK EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO

• PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:

• CHECK IMP IN ILLUMINATED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 28 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8.b.1 RNO 1) IF Turbine Load reduction is available using IMP IN, THEN PERFORM the following:

• DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton

• CHECK IMP IN light illuminated

• CHECK IMP OUT light extinguished BOP (Step 8.b) SET desired load in the SETTER

• SELECT the desired Load Rate

• DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5°F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:

• ADJUST Load Rate OR

• DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons CRS/ (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The NOTE: The CRS may ask BOP Following: SM/WCC/Communicator to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge.

• Load Dispatcher of load reduction

• E&C to control secondary chemistry

• RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley

• Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team

• E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

• E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 29 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• NRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers AT LEAST ONE OPERATING BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is NOTE: The BOP will dispatch required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least an AO.

one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY Booth Instructor HEATING SYSTEM. acknowledge as AO.

RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg WITHIN 5°F OF Tref RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution WITHIN TARGET BAND BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions MET:

• Target load/power has been reached

• Load reduction is no longer required

• CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction

• STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 30 of 46 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CVC07 r:30 f:100 IOR aoCVCAAD046A r:30 f:100

$006_PCV-145_MAN DMF CVC07

$_PCV-145_MAN DOR aoCVCAAD046A Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-E6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS

• PCV-145 CLOSES

• Normal Letdown flow indicates 0 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD.

APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS RO (Step 1) IF controller PC-145 has NOTE: The RO will take malfunctioned, THEN TAKE manual control Manual control of PC-145 and of PC-145. control letdown pressure manually.

RO (Step 2) IF PT-145 has failed, THEN ... NOTE: PT-145 has NOT failed.

RO (Step 3) IF PCV-145 failed, THEN . NOTE: PCV-145 has NOT failed.

RO (Step 4) IF Letdown is required AND PCV- NOTE: PCV-145 has NOT 145 failed, THEN . failed.

RO (Step 5) IF too many orifices are in service, THEN .

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 31 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS pressure Control, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO RPSXMTPT_444 r:01:00 f:2500 IMF PRS03D f:10 when

$006_PCV-455C_OPEN Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-C7, PZR PRESS CONTROLLER HI OUTPUT

• Narrow Range Pressurizer Pressure rising on PR-444

• Master Pressure controller PC-444J demand rising to 100%

• Both Pressurizer Spray valves indicate fully OPEN

• Pressurizer PORV PCV-455C Red status light is LIT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD.

Examiner Note: It is possible that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-019 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first.

If so, proceed to AOP-025 ,

Step 1, actions on Page 33.

NOTE: The RO will likely take action, including closing the PORV Block before the CRS enters the procedure.

AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 32 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming Immediate Action Switches Selected to NORMAL RO (Step 2) Determine If PZR PORVs should be Immediate Action closed:

• Check PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG

• ENSURE both PZR PORVs - CLOSED RO (Step2b RNO) IF any PZR PORV can NOT Immediate Action be closed THEN close its PORV BLOCK NOTE: PCV-455C will OPEN Valve. in about 1 minute.

RO (Step 3) Control the Normal PZR Spray Immediate Action Valves AND PZR Heaters to Restore RCS Pressure to the desired control Band.

CRS (Step 4) Make PA Announcement for NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

RO (Step 5) Check PZR Pressure - UNDER OPERATOR CONTROL Critical Task:

Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 33 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6) Check Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-444 OR PT-445 - FAILED.

CRS (Step 7) Go To AOP025, RTGB Instrument NOTE: The CRS will transition Failure to AOP-025.

Examiner Note: If the CRS addresses AOP-025 rather than AOP-019, follow actions here.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument:

• PZR PRESSURE (PT-444) - Section C NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section C of AOP-025.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION C, PZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming Immediate Action Switches - SELECTED TO NORMAL RO (Step 2) DETERMINE If PZR PORVs should Immediate Action be closed:

• CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG

• CHECK both PZR PORVs CLOSED RO (Step 2b RNO) IF any PZR PORV can NOT Immediate Action be closed, THEN CLOSE associated PORV BLOCK valve.

NOTE: The RO will have previously determined that PCV-455C has failed to CLOSE, and Close the Block Valve.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 34 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) CONTROL PZR Heaters and Spray Immediate Action to restore RCS Pressure to desired Control Band CRS (Step 4) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

RO (Step 5) CHECK PT-445 - FAILED RO (Step 5 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• ENSURE PC-444J in MAN.

• ENSURE PZR SPRAY VALVEs are in AUTO.

• CONTROL PZR pressure with PC-444J.

Critical Task:

Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

RO (Step 6) CHECK Selector Switch PM-444 -

SELECTED TO THE OPERABLE CHANNEL

• REC 445 RO (Step 6 RNO) SELECT operable channel

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 35 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 7) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability: NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the instrument failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

• TS LCO 3.3.4

• TS LCO 3.4.1

• TS LCO 3.4.11 CRS (Step 8) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step NOTE: The CRS will return to 2 the main body of AOP-025.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect NOTE: The CRS will address Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.4, REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Function shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. NOTE: The CRS will determine that only one Pressurizer Pressure instrument is required, and that the other channel is OPERABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 36 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:

• Pressurizer Pressure 2205 psig CRS APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: If RCS pressure ACTION TIME lowered to less than 2205 A. One or more A.1 Restore RCS psig, the CRS will determine RCS DNB DNB parameter(s) to within limit. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> that ACTION A.1 is required.

parameters not within limits.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVS)

CRS LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 37 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION B.1, B. One PORV B.1 Close B.2 and B.3 is required.

inoperable associated block valve. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and not capable of being AND manually cycled. B.2 Remove power from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> associated bock valves.

AND B.3 Restore PORV 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to OPERABLE status.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 38 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur. Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the A and B MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The operator will direct that AFW Pump C be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, however, the AFW Pump C Diesel will fail to start. The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CFW20A c:20 IMF CFW20B c:20 IMF CFW20C c:20 Indications Available:

• All Feed Regulating Valves have CLOSED

• The A and B Main Feedwater Pumps have tripped

• The AFW Pumps have started Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers -

OPEN

• Rod position indicators - FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights - ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux - LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED BOP (Step 2a RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 39 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF Turbine will NOT trip, THEN manually RUNBACK Turbine at maximum rate UNTIL ALL Governor valves are CLOSED.

• IF Turbine can NOT be runback, THEN manually CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

BOP (Step 2.b) All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves - CLOSED Critical Task:

Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First Safety Significance: Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This effective steamline break is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power to AC EMERGENCY Immediate Action BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E-1 OR E AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E-1 AND E BOTH ENERGIZED RO/ (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action BOP

• CHECK if SI is actuated:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• SI annunciator - ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment - AUTO STARTED (Step 4a RNO) CHECK if SI is required: Immediate Action

• PZR pressure LESS THAN 1715 PSIG OR

• Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4 PSIG OR

• Steam Line P bistables ILLUMINATED OR

• High Steam Flow with Low Tavg OR Low Steam Pressure bistables ILLUMINATED

• IF SI is required, THEN manually ACUTATE BOTH Trains of SI.

• IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

• GO TO EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip NOTE: The CRS will transition Response, Step 1. to FRP-H.1 due to the Red Path on Heat Sink.

FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK RO/ (Step 1) CHECK If Secondary Heat Sink is BOP required:

• CHECK RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE

• CHECK RCS Hot Leg temperatures -

GREATER THAN 350°F

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 2) CHECK If RCS Bleed AND Feed is BOP required:

• CHECK S/G Wide Range level in ANY TWO S/Gs -LESS THAN 13% [16%]

CRS (Step 2a RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 3 AND GO TO Step 3.

BOP (Step 3) TRY to establish AFW Flow to at least one S/G:

• CHECK S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED

• CHECK Control Room indications for cause of AFW failure:

• CST level

• Steam Driven AFW pump, Steam Shutoff valves

• Motor Driven AFW pump

• AFW valve alignment BOP (Step 3.c) TRY to restore AFW flow:

• CHECK CST level - AVAILABLE AND GREATER THAN 13%

• CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump - NOTE: The CRS will dispatch RUNNING an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. The SDAFW Pump will NOT be restored. Provide cues as required.

BOP (Step 3.c.2 RNO) Manually OPEN Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valve(s):

• V1-8A

• V1-8B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• V1-8C If Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valves can NOT be opened manually, THEN locally OPEN valves while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.c.3) CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) - RUNNING BOP (Step 3.c.3 RNO) IF power is available, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SI.

• IF SI will NOT RESET, THEN NOTE: SI will RESET.

• PLACE available Motor Driven AFW Pump control switch(es) to STOP.

• START available Motor Driven AFW Pump(s).

• IF available Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch is NOT running, THEN DISPATCH an AO.

Operator to perform Attachment 2, Local If so, Booth Instructor Start of Motor Driven AFW Pump. acknowledge as AO. The MDAFW Pump will NOT be restored. Provide cues as required.

• IF pump(s) NOT available, THEN TRY to restore Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.c.4) CHECK AFW Valves - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT

• AFW Header Discharge valves - FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section valves - FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW pump Discharge valves - FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.c.5) CHECK total feed flow to S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 300 GPM CRS (Step 3.c.5 RNO) GO TO Step 3.c.7 CRS/ (Step 3.c.7) PLACE AFW Train C in service NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP using OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, an AO.

Section titled Rapid Alignment of AFW Pump If so, Booth Instructor C as Directed by FRP-H.1 acknowledge as AO. Wait 5 minutes and report that the Train C AFW Diesel Generator will NOT start.

BOP (Step 3.d) CHECK total feed flow to S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 300 GPM BOP (Step 3.d RNO) IF ANY feed flow to at least one S/G is verified, THEN.

CRS IF feed flow is NOT verified, THEN GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) STOP ALL RCPs RO (Step 5) ESTABLISH Instrument Air to CV:

• CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm - EXTINGUISHED

• RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISO TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN RO (Step 5 RNO) PLACE IA PCV-1716 in OVERRIDE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) TRY to establish Main Feedwater Flow to at least one S/G:

• CHECK Condensate System - IN SERVICE

• CHECK Feed Reg Bypass Valves -

OPEN

• FCV-479

• FCV-489

• FCV-499 BOP (Step 6.b RNO) PERFORM the following:

• RESET Feedwater Isolation:

• RESET SI.

• IF SI will NOT RESET, THEN

• PLACE ALL Feedwater Isolation Key Switches to OVRD/RESET.

• OPEN Feed Reg Bypass Valves:

• FCV-479

• FCV-489

• FCV-499 BOP IF Feed Reg Bypass valves can NOT be OPENED, THEN (Step 6.c) ESTABLISH Main Feedwater flow:

• CHECK FW HDR SECTION valves -

CLOSED

• V2-6A

• V2-6B

• V2-6C BOP (Step 6.c.1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 6.c.2) START one Main Feedwater Pump

• CHECK Feedwater Flow -

ESTABLISHED TO AT LEAST ONE S/G BOP (Step 7) CHECK S/G Levels:

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 9%

[18%]

BOP (Step 7.a RNO) IF feed flow to at least on S/G is established, THEN PERFORM the following:

• MAINTAIN feed flow to restore S/G Narrow Range level to GREATER THAN 9% [18%].

• PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS.

• RETURN TO procedure AND step in effect.

Critical Task:

Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operators having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16-1-3 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 68% for the past 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> c) Turbine Load: 502 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 144 ppm e) Rod Height: 135 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 41.8%

h) Xenon: Peak

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 Condition C

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The SDAFW Pump is OOS. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A & B MDAFW pump

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) IAW OST-947 data

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-4 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111815 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-4

REFERENCES:

1. OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power (Rev 62)

2. OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (Rev 112)

3. APP-001, Miscellaneous NSSS (Rev 60)

4. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure (Rev 24)

5. OWP-025, Steam Generator Pressure (SGP) (Rev 15)

6. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

7. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation (Amendment 203)

8. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

9. OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) (Rev 24)

10. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

11. AOP-007, Turbine Trip Below P-8 (Rev 16)

12. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

13. CSFST, Critical Safety Function Status Trees (Rev 7)

14. FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power generation- ATWS (Rev 22)

15. EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev 3)

Validation Time: 84 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-RO Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert C-SRO Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT 3 2 I-BOP Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 4 3 N-BOP Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH I(TS)-SRO 5 4 C-RO Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control C-BOP Rods Fail in AUTO C-SRO 6 5/6 M-RO ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV M-BOP M-SRO 7 7 C-BOP MOV-350 fails to OPEN

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD, divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT.

Following this, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, Steam Generator Pressure (SGP). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation.

Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, Turbine Trip Below P-8. When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. The Control Rods will fail to operate in AUTO and the operator will need to insert rods in MANUAL.

Subsequently, the B Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes).

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS. While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Upon completion of FRP-S.1, the operator will return to EOP-E-0. Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the flow into and out of the B Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection.

The scenario will terminate at Step 16.b of EOP-E-2, when the operator prepares to restore normal letdown.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operators failure to insert negative reactivity.

Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 611 T = 0 Malfunctions:

A SI Pump Pump OOS:

• IRF EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT (A SI Pump OOS)

• IRF EPS480E1_124 f: RACK_IN (B SI Pump Racked IN to E-1)

PLACE CAPs as follows:

• RED Cap over A SI Control Switch

• GREEN Cap over C SI Pump Control Switch PI-1616 SW North Header Pressure indication OOS

• IOR aoSWSDOD024A f:0 Place WHITE DOT on PI-1616 RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3 failed OFF

• IMF ANNXN07C03 f:ALARM_OFF Place WHITE DOT on APP-007-C3 Insert the following:

• $006_MANUAL_TURB_TRIP DMF TUR05B (Stop Valve closes on Manual Turb Trip)

• $006_MANUAL_TURB_TRIP DMF TUR05C (Gov Valve closes on Manual Turb Trip)

• $006_TURBINE_TRIP IMF CRF02 (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)

• IMF ANNXN05E02 f:ALARM_OFF (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)

• $006_RODS_IN_MAN DMF CRF02 (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)

• $006_RODS_IN_MAN IOR diRPSBOI063 c:1 f:DE_PRSSD (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)

• IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH (ATWS on SLB)

• IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH (ATWS on SLB)

• IOR diCVCAOI731 f:AS-IS (MOV-350 fails to OPEN)

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-4.

At direction of Event 1 Raise Power examiner At direction of Event 2 examiner Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT IMF CCW08 r:01:00 f:85 IOR diCVCAAI047 Note: The Booth Instructor will need to DOR f:DEMIN diCVCAAI047 when the operator places TCV-

$006_TC-144_MAN 143 Control Switch to VCT.

DMF CCW08 At direction of Event 3 Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails examiner LOW ICO SGNXMTPT_495 r:01:15 f:0 At direction of Event 4 Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH examiner IMF NIS07G f:70 At direction of Event 5 examiner Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO IMF TUR14 r:01:00 f:100 IMF TUR05B f:100 IMF TUR05C f:AS-IS Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 6 ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV examiner IMF MSS01B NOTE: The ATWS is inserted at T=0 r:10:00 f:9.95E6 Post-Rx Trip Event 7 MOV-350 fails to OPEN IOR diCVCAOI731 f:AS-IS NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 9 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5°F of Tref NOTE: The RO will likely place using a combination of Control Rods and Control Rods in MANUAL.

Boron Concentration changes.

OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.

RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to NOTE: The RO will determine add to the RCS and if applicable, the that several 200-300 gallon expected change in RCS temperature AND batches of water must be Reactor Power. added.

RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.

RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 10 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.

RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.

RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.

RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service NOTE: Two orifices will be in and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, service.

THEN RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.

RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.

RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

• Unanticipated Rod Motion

• Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 11 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops.

• The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

• IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.

RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

• ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO.

• PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position.

• Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.

RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER BOP (Step 6) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN raise turbine load as follows:

• Adjust the SETTER indication using the REF or REF pushbuttons to the desired load.

• Use the GO, HOLD, REF , and REF pushbuttons as necessary to continue the rise in load.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 12 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 7) IF EH Turbine Control is in TURB NOTE: The Turbine is in MANUAL, THEN.. OPER AUTO.

CRS (Step 8) IF Heater Drain Tank suspended NOTE: From Turnover it is solids are greater than 25 ppb, THEN.. noted that HDT Suspended Solids are < 25 ppb.

CRS (Step 9) WHEN Heater Drain Tank suspended solids are less than or equal to 25 ppb, THEN perform the following while continuing with this procedure:

BOP

• Start a Heater Drain Pump. NOTE: The BOP will start one HDP.

• Ensure Quenching Valve control NOTE: The CRS/BOP may switches on QUENCHING VALVES contact an AO.

CONTROL PANEL are placed in AUTO: If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use IRF CFW102 f:AUTO and report after 1 minute that the BOTH valves are in AUTO.

• FCV-1597

• FCV-1596

• Locally check Quenching Valves are NOTE: The CRS/BOP may CLOSED: contact an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the BOTH valves are CLOSED.

• FCV-1597

• FCV-1596

• Check proper operation of the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may contact an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the ALL valves are operating properly.

• LC-1530

• LCV-1530A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 13 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• LCV-1530B After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 14 of 51 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD, divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CCW08 r:01:00 f:85 IOR diCVCAAI047 f:DEMIN

$006_TC-144_MAN DMF CCW08 NOTE: The malfunction takes 2-3 minutes to fully develop NOTE: The Booth Instructor will need to DOR diCVCAAI047 when the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT.

Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD

• TCV-144 Controller demand is rising

• NRHX Outlet Temperature (TI-144) is rising

• TCV-143 Red status light is LIT with Control Switch in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD RO (Step 1) IF Letdown Temperature is greater NOTE: The RO will divert than 135°F, THEN ENSURE controller TC- TCV-143 to the VCT.

143 is diverted to the VCT.

Booth Instructor use DOR diCVCAAI047 WHEN the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT.

RO (Step 2) IF CCW flow to the Non- NOTE: The RO will manually regenerative Heat Exchanger is low, THEN adjust controller to maintain RAISE Component Cooling Water flow using temperature at 105-110°F on TC-144. TI-143.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 15 of 51 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) IF letdown flow is high, THEN NOTE: It is likely that control REDUCE Letdown flow. of control of TCV-144 will stabilize the event, and Letdown will NOT need to be reduced.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to request a Demin effluent sample prior to placing TCV-143 back to the DEMIN position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/CHEMISTRY, wait 20 minutes and report that the Demin effluent is acceptable to be placed in operation.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Controller failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief, and THEN re-commence the up-power.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 16 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Following this, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, Steam Generator Pressure (SGP). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO SGNXMTPT_495 r:01:15 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-A4, STM LINE HI P

• Main Steam Pressure indicator PI-945 is lowering

• C FRV controller output is lowering

• Feed Flow to C S/G is lowering

• Steam Flow to C S/G is lowering

• C S/G Narrow Range Level is lowering Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION Examiner NOTE: The CRS go to AOP-025 directly.

If so, go to AOP-025 Step 1 actions on Page 18.

BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): NOTE: FCV-498 in NOT operating properly in AUTO.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL.

• ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 17 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow.

• STOP any load change in progress.

• If unable to control S/G level, THEN Critical Task:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BOP BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

• FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 18 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level AT OR NOTE: The CRS go to AOP-TRENDING TO PROGRAM 025 based on the Note prior to Step 58.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section D of AOP-025.

• S/G STEAM PRESSURE, (PT-495) -

SECTION D AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 1) CHECK affected FRV in MAN: Immediate Action NOTE: FCV-498 will likely be in MANUAL by this Step.

• FCV-498 (FRV C)

BOP (Step 2) RESTORE affected S/G level to Immediate Action program NOTE: The C S/G Narrow Range level will likely be at programmed level by this Step.

Critical Task:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 19 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/ (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint - NOTE: This is a Continuous CRS BEING APPROACHED Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN GO TO Step 5 CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure - FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE BOP (Step 6 RNO) IF failure was a steam flow NOTE: The BOP/CRS could instrument, THEN go to Step 12 incorrectly believing that it is the Steam Flow instrument that has failed.

CRS IF failure was a steam pressure instrument, THEN GO TO Step 17.

BOP (Step 17) PLACE S/G Steam Flow Selector Switch affected by Failed Pressure Instrument to Alternate Channel Below:

• S/G C STEAM FLOW - FR-498

• FAILED CHANNEL (PT-495) AFFECTED CHANNEL (FI-494) SELECTED POSITION (CH 495)

BOP (Step 18) RESTORE affected Controller to Automatic:

• CHECK S/G level - WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL

• PLACE affected controller in AUTO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 20 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 19) REMOVE affected Transmitter from Servicing Using OWP-025:

CHANNEL (PT-495) OWP (SGP-12) NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-025.

OWP-025, STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE (SGP)

SGP-11, MAIN STEAM LINE C PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-495 BOP FR-498 (STM) - SELECTED TO 495 BOP DELETE INPUT PT-495 FROM CALO PROCESSING. (MSP0441A)

BOP BISTABLE SWITCH B/S 495 RACK #17 NOTE: The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room).

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN

• IRF BST014 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED NOTE: The CRS will return to Section D of AOP-025.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 20) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability: NOTE: The CRS will address Technical Specifications.

• TS LCO 3.3.1

• TS LCO 3.3.2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 21 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• TS LCO 3.3.3

• TS LCO 3.3.4 CRS (Step 21) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 1.e D. One channel NOTE (Steam Line High Differential inoperable For Function 4.c, a channel may Pressure Between Steam be taken out of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Header and Steam Lines) is the trip condition affected, and ACTION D.1 or for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for D.2 and D.3 are required.

maintenance.

D.1 Place channel 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in trip.

OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.3, POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM)

INSTURMENTATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 22 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITON REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME F. As required F.1 Be in MODE 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will by Required 3.

determine that Function 20 Action E.1 and AND referenced in (Steam Generator Pressure) is Table 3.3.3-1 F.2 Be in MODE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> affected, and ACTION F.1 and 4.

F.2 are required.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 23 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 4 Refer to LCO (Safety Injection), is affected.

3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation,"

Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief, and THEN re-commence the up-power.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 24 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF NIS07G f:70 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV

• Power Range N44 is indicating Off-Scale HIGH

• Delta-Flux Power Range N44 is Off-Scale HIGH

• RTGB Annunciator APP-005-D6, FLUX WARNING/STATUS (30 seconds delayed)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV RO (Step 1) MONITOR the following parameters:

• Reactor power

• Control rod position RO (Step 2) IF a Control Rod is misaligned, NOTE: There is NO THEN. misaligned Control Rod.

RO (Step 3) IF indications of a radial flux tilt are present, THEN PERFORM a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio per FMP-007, Quadrant Power Tilt.

RO/ (Step 4) IF a Power Range detector has CRS failed, THEN REMOVE failed Power Range Detector from service per OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).

CRS (Step 5) REFER TO TS:

• 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) .

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 25 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection NOTE: The CRS will address System Instrumentation. OWP-011.

OWP-011, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI)

BOP REMOVE NI-44 from ERFIS SCAN:

NIN0044A BOP DROPPED ROD MODE Switch BOP NI-44 OUT OF SERVICE TRIP SWITCH BOP ROD STOP BYPASS Switch BOP COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT Switch BOP DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR Drawer:

• UPPER SECTION Switch

• LOWER SECTION Switch NOTE: The CRS will address the Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1, The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS ACTIONS NOTE: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 26 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Functions 2 D. One Power D.1.1 Place 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Power Range Neutron Flux, Range Neutron channel in trip.

Flux-High AND a. High, b. Low), 17.c (RPS channel D.1.2 Reduce 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Interlocks - P8) and 17.d inoperable. THERMAL (RPS Interlocks - P10) are POWER to 75% affected, and:

RTP.

OR ACTION D.1.1 and D.1.2 or D.2.1 Place 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> D.2.1 and D.2.2 or D.3 are channel in trip. required; AND ACTION E.1 or E.2 is required; NOTE: Only required to be ACTION S.1 or S.2 is performed when required; the Power Range Neutron Flux input ACTION T.1 or T.2 is to QPTR is required.

inoperable.

D.2.2 Perform SR Once per 12 3.2.4.2.

hours OR D.3 Be in MODE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.

E. One channel E.1 Place channel 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> inoperable. in trip.

OR E.2 Be in MODE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.

S. One channel S.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.

OR S.2 Be in MODE

3. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> T. One channel T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE

2. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 27 of 51 Event

Description:

Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, Turbine Trip Below P-8. When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. The Control Rods will fail to operate in AUTO and the operator will need to insert rods in MANUAL.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF TUR14 r:01:00 f:100 IMF TUR05B f:100 IMF TUR05C f:AS-IS NOTE: The malfunction takes 1 minute to fully develop Indications Available:

• Turbine Bearing Oil pressure is lowering

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-A4, TURB BRG OIL LO PRESS

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-B4, LO BRG OIL PRESS TURB TRIP Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-007, TURBINE TRIP BELOW P-8 BOP (Step 1) CHECK turbine stop valves -

CLOSED

• BOTH turbine stop valves - CLOSED OR

• ALL governor valves - CLOSED BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• Manually TRIP the turbine by simultaneously depressing the THINK and TURBINE TRIP pushbuttons.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK MSR PURGE and SHUTOFF VALVES - CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Steam Dump Control - IN PRESSURE MODE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 28 of 51 Event

Description:

Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3 RNO) PLACE steam dumps in pressure control mode:

• ENSURE STEAM HEADER PRESS Controller PC-464B is in AUTO.

• ENSURE PC-464B pot setting is 7.28.

• IF PC-464B has a demand output greater than 1, THEN PERFORM the following:

• PLACE PC-464B in MAN.

• SET PC-464B demand output to 0.

• PLACE PC-464B in AUTO.

• SELECT STEAM DUMP MODE Switch to STEAM PRESS.

• Slowly ADJUST PC-464B pot setting to 7.17.

BOP (Step 4) CHECK Steam Dump Operation -

STEAM DUMP OPEN RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters RO (Step 6) CHECK Control Rods - INSERTING NOTE: The rods will fail to IN AUTO insert in AUTO, however, it is likely that the Control Rods would have been in MANUAL for the up-power.

RO (Step 6 RNO) Manually INSERT control rods to achieve Tavg between 547F and 551F AND reactor power between 5 and 10%.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Main FW Status:

• CHECK MFPs - ANY RUNNING NOTE: The A MFWP is RUNNING.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 29 of 51 Event

Description:

Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK FRVs - IN SERVICE

• CHECK FRVs - IN AUTOMATIC RO (Step 8) CHECK Reactor Power - LESS THAN 15%

BOP (Step 9) PLACE FRV Bypass Valves in Service:

• MAINTAIN S/G level between 35 to 44%

• Slowly OPEN FRV bypass valves

• CHECK FRVs - INDICATE CLOSED

• PLACE FRV controllers in MAN

• FCV-478

• FCV-488

• FCV-498

• CLOSE FW HDR SECTION valves

• V2-6A

• V2-6B

• V2-6C RO (Step 10) CHECK PZR PORVs - CLOSED BOP (Step 11) CHECK the following Breakers -

OPEN

• NORTH OCB BKR 52/9

• SOUTH OCB BKR 52/8

• EXCITER FIELD BREAKER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 30 of 51 Event

Description:

Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK Reactor - CRITICAL Examiner NOTE: Because of the development time for Event 6, direct the Booth operator to move to Event 6 now.

RO (Step 13) STABILIZE Reactor Power Below 10% By One Or Both Of The Following:

• Manual control of control rods

• Adjusting Boron concentration using OP 301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Section "RCS Boration Quick Checklist" or "RCS Dilution Quick Checklist" BOP (Step 14) STABILIZE Plant Conditions:

• ADJUST PC464B to maintain Tavg 547°F to 551°F

• CONTROL feedwater (AFW or MFW) to maintain S/G levels 35 to 44%

• CONTROL PZR heaters and sprays to maintain PZR pressure between 2225 psig and 2250 psig

• CONTROL charging and letdown flows to maintain PZR level within 5% of program level At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 31 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Subsequently, the B Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes).

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS).

The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS. While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST. Upon completion of FRP-S.1, the operator will return to EOP-E-0. Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the flow into and out of the B Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection. The scenario will terminate at Step 16.b of EOP-E-2, when the operator prepares to restore normal letdown.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF MSS01B r:10:00 f:9.95E6 Indications Available:

• Rx Trip First Out LIT, without Rx Trip

• Pressurizer level is lowering

• Pressurizer pressure is lowering

• Charging Pump speed is rising

• Containment pressure is rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED RO (Step 1 RNO) Manually TRIP Reactor Immediate Action IF reactor power is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5% OR Intermediate Range SUR is positive, THEN GO TO FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation 0 ATWS, Step 1.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to FRP-S.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 32 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron flux - LOWERING RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action

• Manually TRIP Reactor.

• IF Reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT Control Rods.

Critical Task:

Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF.

Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operators failure to insert negative reactivity.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 33 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• DISPATCH operator to locally open the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch following breakers: both the Inside and Outside AO.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as each AO, and report after 2 minutes use:

IRF EPSV480B3_104 f:RACK_OUT IRF EPSV480B2B_097 f:RACK_OUT and report that the Rx has been locally tripped.

• Reactor Trip breakers

• Reactor Trip Bypass breakers

• BOTH MG Set Generator Output breakers

• BOTH MG Set Motor Input breakers BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED

• CLOSE MSR Purge and Shutoff valves NOTE: With the Immediate Actions complete the BOP may take Prompt/Prudent action to Close the B MSIV and/or stop AFW flow to the B S/G.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps -

BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels -

TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

BOP/ (Step 3b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level CRS lowers to less than 16% on two S/Gs THEN PERFORM Step3.c.

CONTINUE WITH Step 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 34 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/ (Step 4) INITIATE Emergency Boration:

RO

• START two Charging Pumps at maximum speed

• ALIGN Boration Flow Path:

• OPEN MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT BOP/ (Step 4.b.1 RNO) ALIGN suction from RO RWST:

• OPEN LCV-115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCT.

IF LCV-115B can NOT be opened THEN

• CLOSE LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET Valve.

BOP/ (Step 4.b.2) START Boric Acid Pump RO ALIGNED for BLEND BOP/ (Step 4.b.3) CHECK for Boric Acid flow on RO FI-110 BOP/ (Step 4.c) ALIGN Charging flow path:

RO

• OPEN CVC-310B, LOOP 2 COLD LEG CHG Valve

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection and MAXIMUM Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm and 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 35 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• MAINTAIN Charging flow on FI-122A -

GREATER THAN BORIC ACID FLOW

• CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG BOP/ (Step 5) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation RO Valves - CLOSED BOP/ (Step 6) CHECK NO SI Signal Exists RO BOP/ (Step 6 RNO) PERFORM Attachment 3, Examiner NOTE: The CRS RO Auto Action Verification while CONTINUING may assign the BOP to WITH this procedure. perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 3.

Other Examiners follow FRP-S.1 Actions, Step 7, on Page 39.

FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS ATTACHMENT 3, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 36 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

• CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG

• CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING

• CHECK SW Booster Pumps - BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 37 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG] Numbers will be required.

• CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED

• CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] Numbers will be required.

BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 38 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may contact Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary the Inside AO.

(38 KW each): Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report that the B IA Compressor is running, and the A IA Compressor is NOT running.

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 39 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

RO (Step 7) CHECK IF the Following Trips Have Occurred:

• Reactor - TRIPPED

• Turbine - TRIPPED RO (Step 8) CHECK IF Reactor is Subcritical:

• Power Range channels - LESS THAN 5%

• Intermediate Range channels -

NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE

• OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 18 and GO TO Step 18 RO (Step 18) CHECK ARPI - LESS THAN TWO RODS STUCK OUT RO (Step 19) STOP RCS Boration:

• CHECK MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT - CLOSED

• CHECK Boric Acid Pump Control Switch aligned for blend - IN AUTO

• CHECK Emergency Boration -

PERFORMED USING MOV-350 FLOWPATH CRS (Step 19.c RNO) GO TO Step 19e)

RO (Step 19.c) CHECK BOTH of the following conditions - EXIST:

• Emergency Boration performed using RWST flowpath AND

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 40 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Charging Pump suction aligned to the VCT is desired

• CHECK VCT Level - GREATER THAN 20 INCHES

• OPEN LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET

• CLOSE the RWST supply valve previously opened:

• LCV-115B, EMERG TO CHG SUCT

• REDUCE Charging Pump speed as desired RO/ (Step 20) PERFORM the following:

CRS

• RESET SPDS

• RETURN TO Procedure AND Step in Effect NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-0.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 41 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action RO CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: The condition is MET, and the RCPs have been tripped.

FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE: The condition is MET, and the AFW flow to the B S/G is isolated.

• PERFORM Supplement D, De- NOTE: The CRS will dispatch energizing AFW Valves For an AO.

AFFECTED S/G. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF EPSMCC9_254 f: RACKED_OUT IRF EPSMCC10_266 f: RACKED_OUT As AO, report after 3 minutes that the Supplement D is complete.

AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 42 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto NOTE: It is likely that this will Action Verification, While CONTINUING NOT be completed because WITH This Procedure the equivalent Attachment (Attachment 3) in FRP-S.1 has already been completed.

RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels -

TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

BOP (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c.

CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 7 RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 43 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact NOTE: Adverse Containment S/G Narrow Range level between Numbers will be required.

9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG RO (Step 9 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• CHECK CV Spray actuated.

• IF CV Spray is NOT actuated, THEN.

• ENSURE BOTH CV Spray Pumps are running.

• ENSURE CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves are OPEN:

• SI880A

• SI880B

• SI880C

• SI880D

• ENSURE CV Spray Additive Tank Discharge Valves are OPEN:

• SI845A

• SI845B

• ADJUST Spray Additive Tank flow using SI845C,SAT THROTTLING VALVE to approximately 12 gpm.

• ENSURE Containment Isolation Phase B Valves are closed.

• STOP ALL RCPs.

CRS

• OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 44 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 10 RNO) IF CCW to ANY RCP Motor OR ALL Seal Cooling to ANY RCP has been lost, THEN

• IF ALL Charging Pumps are STOPPED, THEN RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

• With ANY RCP running,..

OR

• With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:

• STOP dumping steam.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.

• MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER NOTE: Adverse Containment THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Numbers will be required.

Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 45 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be NOTE: It is likely that the Stopped: RCPs are already OFF.

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED CRS (Step 14 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

• GO TO EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.

EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves for Faulted S/G(s) - CLOSED

• S/G B

• V1-3B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 46 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• MS-353B BOP (Step 2) CHECK IF ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary is Intact

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs -

ANY STABLE OR RISING BOP (Step 3) IDENTIFY Faulted S/G(s): NOTE: The B S/G is Faulted.

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs

• ANY S/G PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR

• ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (Step 4) ISOLATE Faulted S/G(s):

• CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valve, Reg Bypass Valve AND Header Section Valve to Faulted S/G(s) shut:

• S/G B valves - CLOSED

• FCV-488

• FCV-489

• V2-6B

• RESET SI

• CLOSE AFW Discharge Valve(s) to Faulted S/G(s):

• S/G B valves - CLOSED

• V2-14B

• V2-16B

• CLOSE Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valve(s) from Faulted S/G(s);

• V1-8B

• CHECK Faulted S/G(s) Steam Line PORV - CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 47 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• RV1-2

• PERFORM Supplement D, De-energizing NOTE: If not already done, the AFW Valves for AFFECTED S/G CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF EPSMCC9_254 f: RACKED_OUT IRF EPSMCC10_266 f: RACKED_OUT As AO, report after 3 minutes that the Supplement D is complete.

• Locally CLOSE Faulted S/G(s) Bypass Drn AND Warmup line to AFW Pump Valve(s) while CONTINUING WITH this procedure:

• MS-29 (S/G B) (Pipe Jungle NOTE: The CRS will dispatch above/right of V1-8B) an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF MSS048, f: 0 As AO, report after 3 minutes that MS-29 IS closed.

• CHECK Faulted S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED Critical Task:

Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs.

RO (Step 5) CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 13%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 48 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) CHECK Secondary Radiation:

• REQUEST Chemistry periodically sample NOTE: The CRS may call ALL S/Gs for activity Chemistry to request samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

• CHECK unisolated Secondary Radiation Monitors - HAVE REMAIND NORMAL

• R-15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR RADIATON

• R-19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R-31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs CRS

• CHECK Secondary sample results -

NORMAL (WHEN RESULTS AVAILABLE)

RO/ (Step 7) Check If ECCS Flow Should Be BOP Terminated

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core NOTE: Adverse Containment Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18°F [37°F] Numbers will be required.

• CHECK Secondary Heat Sink -

AVAILABLE

• Total AFW flow to Intact S/G(s) - AT LEAST 300 GPM OR

• S/G Narrow Range level in at least one NOTE: Adverse Containment Intact S/G - GREATER THAN 9% Numbers will be required.

[18%]

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

AND

• RCS Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

• CHECK PZR level - GREATER THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 14% [31%] Numbers will be required.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 49 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8) RESET SI RO (Step 9) RESET Phase A Containment Isolation RO (Step 10) ESTABLISH Instrument Air to CV:

• CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm - EXTINGUISHED

• RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN RO (Step 11) STOP ECCS Pumps:

• STOP SI Pumps

• CHECK RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

• STOP RHR Pumps RO (Step 12) CHECK Charging Flow NOTE: There are two Established: Charging Pumps running.

• CHECK Charging Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

• ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following a necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 50 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 13) CHECK ECCS Flow NOT NOTE: Adverse Containment Required: Numbers will be required.

• RC Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 18°F [37°F]

• PZR level - GREATER THAN 14% [31%]

BOP (Step 14) TRANSFER Steam Dumps to Pressure Control Mode:

• CHECK Condenser - AVAILABLE NOTE: The Condenser is NOT available.

BOP (Step 14a RNO) If Condenser Steam Dumps are NOT available, THEN USE S/G Steam Line PORVs.

RO (Step 15) CHECK RCS Hot Let Temperatures - STABLE RO (Step 16) CHECK if Letdown Can Be Established:

• PZR Level - GREATER THAN 27%

[44%]

• ESTABLISH Letdown using Supplement L, Establishing Letdown At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16-1-4 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 25%

c) Turbine Load: 129 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 1598 ppm e) Rod Height: 147 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 28.5%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) C SI Pump

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (NOT-PROTECTED)

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 100% at 1%/minute.

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

b) Chemistry reports that Heater Drains tank suspended solids is < 25 ppb.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) is available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 6300 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch additions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100%

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-5 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111915 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-5

REFERENCES:

1. GP-005, Power Operation (Rev 128)

2. AOP-006, Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration (Rev 21)

3. APP-005, NIS & Reactor Control (Rev 39)

4. OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) (Rev 24)

5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

6. AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control (Rev 20)

7. APP-001, Miscellaneous NSSS (Rev 60)

8. AOP-014, Component Cooling Water Malfunction (Rev 37)

9. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Containment (Amendment 176)

10. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves (Amendment 176)

11. OMM-001, RNP Conduct of Operations (Rev 67)

12. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

13. EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev 3)

14. EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators (Rev 1)

Validation Time: 117 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Roll Turbine N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP High Turbine Eccentricity C-SRO 3 2 I-BOP Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 I(TS)-SRO 4 3 I-RO VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH I-SRO 5 4 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to C(TS)-SRO CLOSE 6 5 M-RO Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to M-BOP CLOSE M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, Power Operation.

When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine.

The operator will respond using AOP-006, Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration, and place the Turbine startup on HOLD.

Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail.

The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and determine to continue with the power increase.

Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the B RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, and AOP-014, Component Cooling Water Malfunction. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Containment, and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically.

The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and manually trip the reactor.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm.

While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the A MSIV will close and the A S/G pressure is expected to rise higher than that of the B and C S/Gs. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the B and C Steam Generators. Depending on the timing of the actions taken by the crew when the A MSIV is closed, the A S/G pressure may not rise significantly higher than that of the B and C S/Gs, and the crew will remain in EOP-ECA-2.1 past the SI termination steps (i.e. Step 19). If this situation occurs, the scenario will terminate at Step 20 of EOP-ECA-2.1.

Critical Tasks:

Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1 Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 612 T = 0 Malfunctions:

B Condensate Pump OOS:

• IRF EPSV4160B4_069 f: RACK_OUT (B Condensate Pump Breaker Racked Out)

PLACE RED CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for the B Condensate Pump PLACE GREEN CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for the A Condensate Pump LI-1417A Hotwell Level Indication OOS

• IOR aoCFWDOD035B f:2 Place WHITE DOT on LI-1417A RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7 failed ON

• IMF ANNXN06f07 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-006-F7 Insert the following:

• $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR diCVCAAI103 d:9 f:OPEN (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)

• $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR doCVCAAO103O d:10 f:ON (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)

• $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR doCVCAAO103S d:10 f:ON (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)

• $006_FCV_626_TRIP IRF EPSMCC6_221 d:11 f:RACK_OUT (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)

• IMF MSS03A f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE (A MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IMF MSS03B f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE (B MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IMF MSS03C f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE (C MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IOR diMSSDDI049 f:OPEN (A MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IOR diMSSDDI050 f:OPEN (B MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IOR diMSSDDI051 f:OPEN (C MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO

• IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase

• Attachment 8, Turbine Recommended Start-Up and Loading Times, of GP-005

• Attachment 10, Condenser Backpressure Limit Curve, of GP-005

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-5.

At direction of Event 1 Roll Turbine examiner Turbine RPM Event 2 reaches 150 High Turbine Eccentricity RPM $006_ECC_RPM ICO TURXMTET_HP r:15 NOTE: This malfunction will occur when the f:3.3 Turbine speed reaches 150 RPM At direction of Event 3 examiner Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 IMF NIS06A f:4.4E-7 At direction of Event 4 VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH examiner ICO CVCXMTLT_112 r:01:00 f:100 At direction of Event 5 B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve examiner FCV-626 fails to CLOSE IMF RCS12B r: 01:00 f:40 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 6 Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs examiner w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE IMF MSS09 f:855700 Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Signal IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, NOTE: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0 AUTO IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 9 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, Power Operation.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments GP-005, POWER OPERATION SECTION 6.3, ROLLING THE TURBINE Examiner NOTE: Procedure Steps are NOT numbered in a continuous manner because some Steps in GP-005 have been previously signed off/completed.

RO (Step 8) WHEN Reactor Power approaches 5% THEN perform the following:

• Make a plant announcement that MODE 1 has been entered

• Record time MODE 1 entered

• Change ERFIS Mode Indication to display MODE 1 RO (Step 9) Adjust Control Rods to maintain Reactor Power between 5% and 8% while continuing with this procedure RO/ (Step 10) Ensure the ERFIS Calorimetric BOP (CALO) program is properly configured for the current plant operation:

• Current Excess Letdown operation

• Current AFW Pump operation

• Current Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBD) operation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 10 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11) Ensure cooling water is being supplied to the following components per OP-903, Placing Secondary Coolers in Service:

• Generator Hydrogen Coolers.

• H2 Seal Oil Coolers.

• Turbine Lube Oil Coolers.

• Exciter Air Coolers.

BOP (Step 12) Equalize hydrogen and air side seal oil temperatures per OP-505, Hydrogen Seal Oil System, Section titled Equalizing Hydrogen Side and Air Side Seal Oil Temperatures Prior to Rolling Turbine.

BOP (Step 13) IF the Generator Temperature Recorder is shutdown, THEN..

BOP (Step 14) Ensure the following recorders and associated instruments monitoring the Turbine Generator are energized and functional to the point necessary to support Turbine operation:

• Turbine Generator Supervisory Recorder.

• Turbine MSR Temperature Recorder (MSR-TEMP-REC).

• Turbine Supervisory Alarm Mimic Display.

• Generator Temperature Recorder.

BOP (step 15) Record the As Found turbine eccentricity (ECC) as indicated on the Turbine Supervisory Instrument Recorder.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 11 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16) IF turbine rotor eccentricity (ECC) is greater than or equal to three mils (0.003 inches) as indicated on the Turbine Supervisory Instrument Recorder OR is in alarm on the RTGB Mimic Display, THEN BOP (Step 17) Using Curve 7.8 or Attachment 8, Turbine Recommended Start-Up And Loading Times, determine the Time Required to Accelerate to Sync Speed based on point TC-MTL-IMP-CHMBR indicated temperature and record.

BOP (Step 18) Depress the Valve Position Limit (lower) pushbutton until the Valve Position Limit indicator registers 0% Valve Limit Position.

BOP (Step 19) IF this is a turbine startup following replacement OR repair of any turbine shaft components or bearings, THEN..

BOP (Step 20) IF AT ANY TIME during turbine NOTE: This Attachment startup it is required to stop turbine rolling provides steps for securing the activities, THEN perform Attachment 6, Turbine Startup.

Securing Turbine During Startup BOP (Step 21) Monitor EH oil pressure during latching using ERFIS BOP (Step 22) Latch the Turbine using one of the following methods:

• Depress and hold the Turbine NOTE: The BOP will contact pushbutton until local indication PI- the AO at the Turbine 63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is Standard, and direct that greater than 80 psig pressure on PI-63ASO be reported.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report > 80 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 12 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 23) WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig, THEN perform the following:

• Ensure SL and SR Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED

• Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 24) Record the following data from the NOTE: The BOP will contact EH Pump (Governor Fluid Pump) local flow the AO, and direct that the EH indications Pump local flow indications be reported.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report:

FI-4428A - 5 gpm FI-4427A - 3 gpm FI-4428B - 5 gpm FI-4427B - 3 gpm BOP (Step 25) IF either EH Pump Discharge Flow NOTE: No EH Pump reads greater than 6 gpm OR IF either Eh Discharge Flow is greater than Pump Drain Flow indicated greater that 4 6 gpm.

gpm, THEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 13 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 26) IF the Turbine has rolled off the NOTE: The Turbine has NOT Turning Gear AND it is desired to place the rolled off the Turning Gear.

Turbine back on the Turning Gear, THEN BOP (Step 27) PERFORM the Turbine Valve/Trip Test

• Trip the Turbine by simultaneously depressing the Thing and Turbine Trip pushbuttons

• CHECK the following Valves:

• SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves -

CLOSED

• 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves - CLOSED

• 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves -

CLOSED

• Monitor EH pressure during latching using ERFIS

• Latch the Turbine using one of the following methods:

• Depress and hold the Turbine Latch NOTE: The BOP will contact pushbutton until local indication PI- the AO at the Turbine 63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is Standard, and direct that greater than 80 psig pressure on PI-63ASO be reported.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report > 80 psig.

• WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig THEN perform the following:

• Ensure SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 14 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED

• Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED

• Direct an Operator to trip the Turbine NOTE: The BOP will contact locally at the Turbine Front Standard the AO at the Turbine by positioning the Turbine Trip Lever Standard, and direct that the to the TRIP Position Turbine be tripped.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF TUR004 f:TRIPPED and report that the Turbine has been tripped.

• Check the following:

• SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves -

CLOSED

• 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves - CLOSED

• 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves

- CLOSED

• Direct the Operator at the Turbine NOTE: The BOP will contact Front Standard to reset the Turbine the AO at the Turbine locally by placing the Turbine Trip Standard, and direct that the Lever to RESET and holding (lever Turbine be latched.

will be released in Section 6.3 Step Booth Instructor 27.j) acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF TUR004 f:RESET_HOLD And report that the Turbine has been reset.

• Check the following:

• Ensure SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 15 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED

• Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED

• (Operator at the Front Standard) NOTE: The BOP will contact WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil the AO at the Turbine Press) indicates greater than 80 Standard, and direct that the psig, THEN position the Turbine Trip Turbine Trip Lever to Normal Lever to NORMAL. when PI-63ASO is greater than 80 psig.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF TUR004 f:NORMAL And report the Turbine Trip Lever has been returned to Normal.

BOP (Step 30) Depress the Valve Position Limit (raise) pushbutton until the Valve Position Limit indicator stops rising.

BOP (Step 31) Depress the Oper Auto pushbutton BOP (Step 33) Set a speed of 490 rpm to 510 rpm in the Setter display using the REF and/or REF pushbuttons.

BOP (Step 34) Set the Acceleration Rate thumbwheel to 50 rpm/minute

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 16 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 35) Record steam inlet pressure as indicated on PI-1304 (HP Turb Throttle Press)

BOP (Step 36) Record Condenser back pressure as indicated on PI-1310 (LP Turb A Cond Press Indicator) and PI-1311 (LP Turb B Cond Press Indicator)

BOP (Step 37) WHEN steam inlet pressure is at least 600 psig as indicated on PI-1304 (HP Turb Throttle Press) [Step 35] AND Condenser back pressure is less than or equal to 3.8 inches Hg Abs on PI-1310 (LP Turb A Cond Press Indicator) and PI-1311 (LP Turb B Cond Press Indicator) [Step 36]

THEN depress the Go pushbutton to raise speed.

BOP (Step 38) Perform the following as turbine speed raises;

• Ensure turning gear disengages

• IF governor valve leakage is causing turbine speed to raise above the speed into the Setter, THEN

• IF Turbine speed stabilizes in resonant speed range, THEN

• IF Turbine speed exceeds 1395 rpm AND is NOT under positive control of the Operator, THEN When the Turbine Eccentricity Alarms move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 17 of 54 Event

Description:

High Turbine Eccentricity When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration, and place the Turbine startup on HOLD.

Booth Operator Instructions: $006_ECC_RPM ICO TURXMTET_HP r:15 f:3.3 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-A8, TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT

• Red ECC status light on Turbine Status Light Panel is LIT

• Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation Recorder indicates Turbine Eccentricity at 3.3 mils (If/When selected)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-008-A8, TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT BOP (Step 1) IF caused by High Rotor Eccentricity, THEN REFER TO AOP-006 AOP-006, TURBINE ECCENTRICITY/VIBRATION BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Speed LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 600 RPM BOP (Step 3) CHECK Turbine Eccentricity On TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT RECORDER LESS THAN 3 MILS BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• DEPRESS turbine HOLD pushbutton.

• CONTACT Engineering to evaluate conditions and to provide recommended actions.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 18 of 54 Event

Description:

High Turbine Eccentricity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• MAINTAIN turbine speed less than 600 NOTE: The BOP will suspend rpm until Engineering provides the Turbine Startup.

recommended actions.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the abnormal Turbine condition.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 19 of 54 Event

Description:

Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation, and determine to continue with the power increase.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF NIS06A f:4.4E-7 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-005-B2, N-35 LOSS OF COMP VOLT

• N35 indication changed slightly on NR-45 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-005-B2, N-35 LOSS OF COMP VOLT RO (Step 1) MONITOR Intermediate Range amps.

RO (Step 2) IF NI-35 has failed, THEN REMOVE NI-35 from service per OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).

RO (Step 3) IF a Reactor shutdown occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN manually ACTIVATE Source Range Action. The CRS will make NIS. both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 4) REFER TO TS Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation.

OWP-011, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI)

NI-7, NI-35 INTERMEDIATE RANGE BOP REMOVE NI-35 from ERFIS SCAN:

NIN0035A BOP START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECT Switch - N36

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 20 of 54 Event

Description:

Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP LEVEL TRIP Switch - Bypass TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1: The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS NOTE: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION F.1or F. THERMAL F.1 Reduce 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> F.2 must be entered.

POWER > P- THERMAL 6 and < P-10, POWER to < P-6.

one Intermediate OR 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Range F.2 Increase Neutron Flux THERMAL channel POWER to > P-inoperable. 10.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 21 of 54 Event

Description:

VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO CVCXMTLT_112 r:01:00 f:100 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E3, VCT HI/LO LVL

• LT-112 indicates HIGH on ERFIS

• LCV-115 Amber status light is LIT (indicating full divert to CVC HUT)

• Auto Makeup occurs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL RO (Step 1) Check for Failure of A Level NOTE: An Auto Makeup is Transmitter as follows: likely to occur due to Letdown being diverted to the radwaste system.

• Obtain a VCT level for LT-115 using ERFIS

• PT ID CHL0115A

• Obtain a VCT level for LT-112 using ERFIS

• PT ID CHL0112A

• Check VCT level indicator -

OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED CRS (Step 1.c RNO) GO to Step 1.e RO

• CHECK VCT level deviation between LT-112 and LT-115 - GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%)

CRS (Step 2) CHECK LT-115 - FAILED NOTE: LT-115 is NOT failed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 22 of 54 Event

Description:

VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 2 RNO) GO to Step 4 RO (Step 4) CHECK LT-112 - FAILED RO (Step 5) Stabilize the RCS Makeup System as follows:

• Check LT-112 - FAILED HIGH

• Place LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV, Control Switch to VCT

• Obtain Hagan Racks Key number 10

• Place VCT Level Transmitter Selector NOTE: The BOP will go to the Switch located in Hagan Rack #19, IN Hagan Room.

LT-115 POSITION Booth Instructor use IRF CVC067 f:LT-115.

• Place the LCV-115A Control Switch to AUTO

• Contact I&C to repair failed channel NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the failed channel.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement for NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 7) Implement the EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN Examiner NOTE: All required 12.5 INCHES (21%) actions have been completed for this failure. Move to the next event as desired.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 23 of 54 Event

Description:

VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches (21%) THEN perform Steps 9 and 10.

CRS

• Go to Step 11.

RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)

CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go to Step 21 RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)

RO (Step 22) Verify Charging and Letdown Flows are Normal for Plant Conditions RO (Step 23) Check APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV - ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go to Step 28.

RO (Step 28) Check APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV - ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 28 RNO) Go to Step 34 RO (Step 34) Check Boration - REQUIRED CRS (Step 34 RNO) GO to Step 37 RO (Step 37) Check Dilution - REQUIRED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 24 of 54 Event

Description:

VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go to Step 40.

CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO CRS (Step 41) Return to Procedure and Step in Effect At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 25 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the B RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, and AOP-014, Component Cooling Water Malfunction. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Containment, and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF RCS12B r: 01:00 f:40 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B2, RCP LABYRTH LO P

• Seal Injection flow on B RCP rising

• B RCP Thermal Barrier P, PI-123A indicating 0

• CCW Surge Tank Level rising

• RTGB Annunciator APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW RO (Step 1) IF CCW AND Seal Injection are lost to any RCP, THEN RO (Step 2) IF result of CCW Pump start only, THEN CRS (Step 3) IF a failure of an RCP Thermal NOTE: The CRS will transition Barrier has occurred, THEN REFER to AOP- to AOP-014.

014.

RO (Step 4) IF a RCP Number 1 Seal failure has occurred, THEN AOP-014, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 26 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 1) IMPLEMENT The EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 3) GO TO Appropriate Section for Indicated Malfunction:

• Rising CCW inventory OR R-17 NOTE: The CRS will address Alarming - Go to Section B Section B of AOP-014.

AOP-014, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION SECTION B, RISING CCW INVENTORY OR R-17 ALARMING RO (Step 1) CHECK FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT - AUTO CLOSED RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following:

IF APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, is ILLUMINATED, THEN PERFORM ONE of the following:

• ENSURE FV-626 is CLOSED AND GO NOTE: FCV-626 will fail to TO Step 2. (RTGB) CLOSE.

OR

• IF FCV-626 will NOT close, THEN NOTE: CC-735 will be COSE CC-735, THERM BAR OUT ISO, CLOSED.

AND GO TO Step 2.

RO (Step 2) CHECK RCP Seal Leakoff - ANY GREATER THAN 5 GPM CRS (Step 2 RNO) GO TO Step 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 27 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4) CHECK the following indications of an RCP Thermal Barrier Failure - BOTH EXIST

• RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling - NOTE: Thermal Barrier is ISOLATED DUE TO HIGH FLOW isolated by CC-735.

AND

• R-17, COMPONENT COOLING NOTE: R-17 is in alarm.

WATERRADIOACTIVE LIQUID -

RISING TREND OR ALARM RO (Step 5) CHECK Seal Injection Flow to the Affected RCP(s) - LOST CRS (Step 5 RNO) GO TO Step 7.

CRS (Step 7) DISPATCH Operator to NOTE: The CRS may call Containment to Perform Attachment 6, RCP WCC to address the Thermal Barrier Isolation performance of Attachment 6.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 8) CHECK RCP Status as follows:

• CHECK RCP B OR C - RUNNING

• CHECK RCP B - RUNNING

• CHECK RCP C - RUNNING CRS (Step 9) WHEN Attachment 6 is completed, NOTE: This Attachment will THEN GO TO Step 23 require a Containment Entry, and will not be completed within the remainder of the Scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 28 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: Because of the dynamic nature of the this event , and the response, the CRS may NOT check the Tech Specs. If not, evaluate the Technical Specification after the Scenario is complete.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.3, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES CRS LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4.

CRS ACTIONS NOTES

1. Penetration flow path(s) may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves.

4. Enter applicable Conditions and NOTE: When FCV-626 is Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, unisolated and failed OPEN, Containment, when isolation valve Technical Specification LCO leakage results in exceeding the overall 3.6.1 is NOT met.

containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

5. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.8, Isolation Valve seal Water (IVSW)

System when required IVSW supply to a penetration flowpath is isolated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 29 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1, A. One or more A.1 Isolate the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and A.2 must be entered.

penetration affected flow paths penetration flow with one path by use of at containment least one closed isolation and de-activated valve automatic valve, inoperable. closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

AND A.2 NOTE: Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by Once per 31 use of days for administrative isolation means. devices outside containment Verify the affected penetration flow AND path is isolated. Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1, CONTAINMENT CRS LCO 3.6.1: Containment shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 30 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1 A. Containment A.1 Restore 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> must be entered until FCV-626 inoperable. containment to is isolated.

OPERABLE status.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 31 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and manually trip the reactor. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm. While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the A MSIV will close and the A S/G pressure will rise higher than that of the B and C S/Gs. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2. The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the B and C Steam Generators.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF MSS09 f:855700 Indications Available:

• Steam noise heard in the Control Room

• Lowering pressure in all Steam Generators

• Rising level in all Steam Generators

• Rising steam flowing all Steam Generators

• RCS pressure is lowering Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers NOTE: The operator will need OPEN to trip the Reactor Manually.

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 32 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1 Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO/ (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action BOP CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 33 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 37.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 34 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST NOTE: The A CCW Pump is ONE RUNNING running.

BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED BOP

• CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

• High steam flow with: NOTE: The High Steam Flow criteria will be met.

• S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR

• Tavg LESS THAN 543°F

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 35 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass NOTE: The valves have failed Valves CLOSED OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.

BOP (Step 6.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING

• CHECK SW Booster Pumps BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

• CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED NOTE: Based on event timing the SI Pumps may or may not be indicating flow.

• CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 36 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 37 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: This step is NOT Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary necessary.

(38 KW each):

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c

• If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running: NOTE: Based on timing of events, and response actions to these events, the operator may not perform the RNO.

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps -

BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels -

TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

RO (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level NOTE: This is a Continuous lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, Action. The CRS will make THEN PERFORM Step 6.c. both board operators aware.

CONTINUE WITH Step 7.

RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 38 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge NOTE: it is likely that the Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP SDAFW Pump is running.

RUNNING RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG

• CHECK CV Spray - NOT ACTUATED RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR NOTE: APP-001-D1 is LIT COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm because CC-735 is CLOSED.

EXTINGUISHED OR

• Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE

• Seal Injection flow GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 39 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS NOTE: Due to the unisolable THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN Steam Rupture the RCS PERFORM the following: temperature is lowering.

• STOP dumping steam.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.

• MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN NOTE: The valves have failed CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass OPEN and cannot be Valves. CLOSED from the RTGB.

RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

• CHECK SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F[32°F]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 40 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure NOTE: All Steam Generator Boundaries Are Intact: pressures are lowering uncontrollably.

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED CRS (Step 14 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE NOTE: The Red Path on monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Subcriticality is due to the IR Status Trees. failure.

• GO TO EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam NOTE: The CRS will transition Generator Isolation, Step 1. to EOP-E-2.

EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves For Faulted S/G(s) CLOSED:

• S/G A:

• V13A

• MS353A

• S/G B:

• V13B

• MS353B

• S/G C:

• V13C

• MS353C

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 41 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as NOTE: The valves have failed necessary. OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK If ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs ANY NOTE: All Steam Generator STABLE OR RISING pressures are lowering uncontrollably.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) IF ALL S/G pressures are lowering in an uncontrolled manner, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS.

• GO TO EOPECA2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization Of All Steam Generators, Step 1.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ECA-2.1.

EOP-ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP SI REINITIATION CRITERIA EOP-E-2 TRANSITION CRITERIA

• IF ANY S/G pressure rises at ANYTIME, NOTE: This criteria is EXCEPT while performing SI expected to be applicable Termination in Steps 10 THROUGH 19, while in EOP-ECA-2.1.

THEN GO TO EOPE2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.

EOP-E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 42 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1) CHECK Secondary Pressure NOTE: The valves have failed Boundary: OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.

• CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves

- CLOSED BOP/ (Step 1.a RNO) Manually OR locally CLOSE CRS valve(s) as necessary, ONE S/G loop at a time:

• S/G A NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. This action will NOT be taken until Step 11 of EOP-ECA-2.1, AFTER Phase A Containment Isolation is RESET.

• V1-3A

• MS-353A

• S/G B

• V1-3B

• MS-353B

• S/G C

• V1-3C

• MS-353C BOP

• CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• FW Reg valves - CLOSED

• FW Reg Bypass valves - CLOSED

• FW Header Section valves -

CLOSED BOP

• CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves - CLOSED:

• V1-8A, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-5, CMPT-16F)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 43 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• V1-8B, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-6, CMPT-16M)

• V1-8C, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-6, CMPT-18M)

BOP

• CHECK S/G Steam Line PORVs -

CLOSED BOP

• CHECK Faulted S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED

• CHECK valve status using ERFIS/SPDS.

BOP

• Locally ENSURE the following valves NOTE: The CRS will dispatch CLOSED: (pipe jungle above/right of an AO.

associated V1-8 valves): Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the area has too much steam, and that entry cannot be made.

• BYPASS DRN & WARM-UP LINE TO AFW PUMP

• MS-20

• MS-29

• MS-38

• STEAM LINE BEFORE SEAT DRAIN ROOT ISOL

• MS-19

• MS-28

• MS-37

• STEAM LINE AFTER SEAT DRAIN ROOT ISOL

• MS-21

• MS-30

• MS-39

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 44 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/ (Step 2) CHECK for adequate Shutdown NOTE: The CRS may call CRS Margin: WCC/Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

• SAMPLE RCS for boron

• SAMPLE PZR for boron

• CHECK Shutdown Margin -

ADEQUATED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN (When results available)

RO/ (Step 3) CONTROL Feed Flow to MINIMIZE BOP RCS Cooldown:

• CHECK cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs

- LESS THAN 100°F in the last 60 minutes BOP (Step 3.a RNO) LOWER feed flow to 60 gpm NOTE: The crew may take to each S/G. various actions to reduce FW flow to 60 gpm to each S/G, including stopping AFW Pump(s), adjusting Pump discharge valves and/or directing that the AO locally adjust flow (If so, Booth Instructor use codes listed BELOW).

BOP (Step 3.b) CHECK S/G Narrow Range level in ALL S/Gs - LESS THAN 50%

• CHECK RCS Hot Leg temperatures -

STABLE OR LOWERING

• CHECK ANY S/G Narrow Range Level -

LESS THAN 9% [18%]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 45 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/

• OPEN MDAFW HEADER DISCHARGE NOTE: The CRS will dispatch CRS Valve breakers: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use codes listed BELOW.

• V2-16A, MCC-9, CMPT-2ML IRF EPSMCC9_255 f:RACK_OUT

• V2-16C, MCC-9, CMPT-3J IRF EPSMCC9_256 f:RACK_OUT

• V2-16A, MCC-10, CMPT-4C IRF EPSMCC10_264 f:RACK_OUT

• V2-16B,MCC-10, CMPT-4F IRF EPSMCC10_266 f:RACK_OUT BOP/

• THROTTLE AFFECTED S/G MDAFW NOTE: The CRS will dispatch CRS HDR DISCH valve to establish a an AO.

MINIMUM of 60 gpm to the AFFECTED S/G

• S/G A - V2-16A IRF CFW009 r: 35 f:2.2

• S/G B - V2-16B IRF CFW010 r: 33 f:2

• S/G C - V2-16C IRF CFW011 r: 31 f:2 Examiner NOTE: When AFW flow is throttled to 60 gpm to each S/G a Red Path will exists on the HEAT SINK CSFST. The operator will address FRP-H.1 and immediately return to EOP-ECA-2.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 46 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

RO (Step 4) CHECK if RCPs Should be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs - ANY RUNNING

• CHECK SI Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE Of DELIVERING FLOW

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]

CRS (Step 4.c RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 5 AND GO TO Step 5 RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:

• CHECK power to PORV Block Valves -

AVAILABLE

• CHECK PORVs - CLOSED

• CHECK PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN BOP (Step 6) Check Secondary Radiation:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 47 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• REQUEST periodic activity samples of NOTE: The CRS may call ALL S/Gs RP/Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP/Chemistry.

• CHECK unisolated secondary radiation monitors - HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R-15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS

• R-19s S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R-31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORS CRS

• CHECK secondary sample results -

NORMAL (When results available)

RO (Step 7) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• Pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

• Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

• RESET SI

• STOP RHR pumps

• CHECK RCS pressure remains -

GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

RO (Step 8) CHECK IF CV Spray Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK CV Spray Pumps - ANY RUNNING CRS (Step 8.a RNO) GO TO Step 9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 48 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 9) CHECK RWST Level - GREATER THAN 27%

RO (Step 10) RESET SI RO (Step 11) RESET Containment Isolation:

• PHASE A NOTE: The CRS has previously dispatched an AO to locally CLOSE an MSIV.

Booth Instructor: AFTER Phase A Containment Isolation is RESET in Step 11, use:

DMF MSS03A DOR diMSSDDI049 To locally CLOSE the A MSIV.

30 seconds later report that the A MSIV has been CLOSED.

NOTE: The A S/G will rise in comparison to the B and C S/Gs and the criteria for item

1. 2 on the Foldout Page will be met. However, the transition back to EOP-E-2 cannot take place until the SI Termination Step is complete (Step 19).

• PHASE B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 49 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) RESET IVSW System: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF SIS026 f:RESET IRF SIS027 f:RESET and report after 1 minute that the IVSW System has been reset.

• IVSW RESET PCV-1922A (In Relay Cabinet ARP-1)

• IVSW RESET PCV-1922B (In Relay Cabinet ARP-2)

RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

• CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR O PRESS alarm -

EXTINGUISHED

• RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN RO (Step 14) CHECK if SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK at least two RCS Hot Leg temperatures -LESS THAN 430°F

• CHECK power to Accumulator Discharge Valves - ENERGIZED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 50 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14.b RNO) RESTORE power to NOTE: The CRS/RO will Accumulator Discharge Valves by closing the dispatch an AO to CLOSE the following: Accumulator Isolation Valve motor breakers.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF EPSMCC5_204 f:RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC5_205 f:RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_232 f:RACK_IN report after 2 minutes that the breakers are CLOSED.

• MCC-5 CMPT 9F (SI-865C)

• MCC-5 CMPT 14F (SI-865A)

• MCC-6 CMPT 10J (SI-865B)

• CLOSE ALL Accumulator Discharge Valves BOP (Step 15) CHECK Power Supply to Charging Pumps - OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE RO (Step 16) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:

• CHECK Charging Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

• ESTABLISH desired charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 51 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated RO (Step 17) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:

• CHECK SI pumps - ANY RUNNING

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18°F [37°F]

• Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG CRS (Step 17.c RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior NOTE: Based on the EOP-to STEP 3 AND RETURN TO Step 3. ECA-2.1 Foldout Page criteria being met, the CRS will transition back to EOP-E-2, and isolate the B and C S/Gs.

EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves For Faulted S/G(s) CLOSED:

• S/G A: NOTE: The A MSIV and Bypass Valves are CLOSED.

• V13A

• MS353A

• S/G B: NOTE: The B MSIV is failed OPEN.

• V13B

• MS353B

• S/G C: NOTE: The C MSIV is failed OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 52 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• V13C

• MS353C BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as NOTE: The valves have failed necessary. OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.

The CRS may dispatch an AO to locally CLOSE one of the two failed OPEN MSIVs.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK If ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs ANY NOTE: The A S/G pressure STABLE OR RISING is stable for plant conditions.

BOP (Step 3) IDENTIFY Faulted S/G(s):

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs

• ANY S/G PRESSURE LOWERING NOTE: The B and C S/Gs IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER are still faulted.

OR

• ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOP (Step 4) ISOLATE Faulted S/G(s):

• CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valve, Reg Bypass Valve AND Header Section Valve to Faulted S/G(s) shut:

• S/G B valves CLOSED

• FCV488

• FCV489

• V26B

• S/G C valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 53 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• FCV498

• FCV499

• V26C

• RESET SI

• CLOSE AFW Discharge Valve(s) to Faulted S/G(s):

• S/G B valves CLOSED

• V214B

• V216B NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that V2-16B be locally CLOSED.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use IRF CFW010 f:0.

• S/G C valves CLOSED

• V214C

• V216C NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that V2-16C be locally CLOSED.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use IRF CFW011 f:0.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16-1-5 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 3%

c) Turbine Load: 0 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 158 ppm e) Rod Height: 127 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 22.2%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The B Condensate Pump is OOS.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A Condensate Pump

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (NOT-PROTECTED)

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 30% IAW GP-005 starting with Section 6.3

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) is available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a __00 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch additions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately __ steps upon achieving 30%

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-6 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111915 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-6

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating (Amendment 203)

2. AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction (Rev 33)

3. OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater Than 25% Power (Rev 62)

4. OP-301, Chemical And Volume Control System (Rev 112)

5. APP-008 SW, CW, & TURB GEN AUX (Rev 67)

6. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS) (Amendment 176)

7. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems (Amendment 176)

8. AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions (Rev 31)

9. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System (Amendment 176)

10. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

(Amendment 223)

11. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

12. EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power (Rev 4)

13. EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination (Rev 2)

14. EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 7)

Validation Time: 100 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN C-SRO 2 NA R-RO Lower Power N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-BOP C Service Water Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-RO DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start C(TS)-SRO 5 4 C-RO A RCP Seal Failure C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Loss of Offsite Power M-BOP M-SRO 7 5 C-BOP B EDG Fails to Start 8 6 NA DSDG Trips 9 7 C-BOP D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and close the valve.

After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

After the power reduction is in progress, the C Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW, and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS), and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.

Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, or various APPs to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the C CCW Pump will trip, and only the B CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the A RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.

Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The operator will subsequently start the B EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the D Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started.

Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1.

Critical Tasks:

Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0 Safety Significance: Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals.

Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.

Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling Prior to the EDG Failing Due to Overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of engine high temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 613 T = 0 Malfunctions:

EDG A OOS:

• IRF EPSV480E1_120, d:0 f: RACK_OUT (EDG BKR Racked Out)

• IRF EDG01A, d:0 (EDG A OOS)

• IRF EDG003, d:0 f: Local (EDG A OOS)

PLACE RED CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for EDG A Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):

• HVS-5 RTGB Switch

• HVE-17 RTGB Switch

• 52/27B RTGB Switch

• 52/28B RTGB Switch

• B EDG RTGB Switch

• V1-8A RTGB Switch

• V1-8B RTGB Switch

• V1-8C RTGB Switch

• V2-14A RTGB Switch

• V2-14B RTGB Switch

• V2-14C RTGB Switch

• Protected Switchyard Place WHITE DOT on APP-010-D2 R-15 OOS

• IRF RMS049 f:PWR_OFF Place WHITE DOT on R-15 Place WHITE DOT on APP-036-D8 Place WHITE DOT on APP-036-E7 RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8 failed ON

• IMF ANNXN02F08 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-002-F8 Insert the following:

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG01B (B EDG fails to START on Rx Trip)

• IMF EDG04E f:TRAIN_B (D SW Pump fails to Sequence ON when E-2 re-energized)

Verify that the A Charging Pump is RUNNING and the B and C Charging Pumps are OFF.

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-6.

At direction of Event 1 Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN examiner IMF CFW36 At direction of Event 2 examiner Lower Power NOTE: to initiate this event, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service.

At direction of Event 3 C Service Water Pump Trips examiner IMF SWS01C At direction of Event 4 DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on examiner Start IRF EPSV480DS_063 f:TRIP IMF CCW01C d:10 At direction of Event 5 examiner A RCP Seal Failure IMF RCS13A r:2:00 f:50 Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Loss of Offsite Power IMF EPS13 NOTE: This event occurs on the Rx Trip Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Post-Rx Trip Event 7 B EDG Fails to Start NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Post-Rx Trip Event 8 DSDG Trips IMF EDG01C d:2 NOTE: This event occurs on the Rx Trip Post-Rx Trip Event 9 D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 9 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and close the valve.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CFW36 Indications Available:

• Rx Power starts to RISE

• RTGB Annunciator APP-007-D7, HTR 3A HI/LO LVL

• RTGB Annunciator APP-007-D8, HTR 3B HI/LO LVL

• HCV-1459 Red and Green status lights are LIT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint NOTE: A Power Limit Warning BOP BEING APPROACHED is possible during this event which will require a reduction in power.

CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is NOTE: This is a Continuous approached, THEN TRIP the reactor and GO Action. The CRS will make TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety both board operators aware.

Injection.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 10 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 4 RNO) IF reactor power exceeds BOP 100%, THEN REDUCE turbine load as necessary using turbine valve limiter to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%.

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

• Other -Step 35 BOP (Step 35) REDUCE Turbine Load Using NOTE: The CRS may assign Attachment 1 to Match Feedwater And the BOP to perform this action.

Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH BOP Examiner follow actions This Procedure. of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-010 Actions, Step 36, on Page 11.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT 1, REDUCING TURBINE LOAD BOP (Step 1) REDUCE Turbine Load at 1%/MIN to 5%/ MIN to achieve Goal Specified in Procedure Body:

• CHECK control rods - IN AUTOMATIC

• CHECK turbine mode - AUTOMATIC

• DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton

• SET desired load rate

• DEPRESS GO or HOLD pushbutton as needed to reduce turbine load

• BORATE using OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist, as necessary to maintain AFD within the operating band

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 11 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) CHECK Goal of Load Reduction -

REACHED

• To achieve a target power level OR

• To match steam flow with feed flow OR

• To raise MFP suction pressure BOP (Step 3) CHECK Current Loading for the NOTE: The BOP will contact following Pumps - LESS THAN MAXIMUM the Outside AO to check associated parameters.

Booth Instructor report data from Attachment 10.2 of OST-013 (See Below).

• MFP - 0.710 KILOAMPS A MFP - .60 KAMPs B MFP - .59 KAMPs

• Condensate Pump - 370 AMPS A MCP - 360 AMPs B MCP - 350 AMPs

• HDP - 90 AMPS A HDP - 79 AMPs B HDP - 78 AMPs BOP (Step 4) Stop Load Reduction BOP (Step 5) NOTIFY CRS/SM that Load Reduction is Complete AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 12 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 36) DISPATCH an Operator to NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Observe Valve positions: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the LCV-1530A and B are operating normally.

• LCV-1530A, HDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE

• LCV-1530B, HEATER DRAIN PUMPS SUCTION DUMP TO CONDENSER BOP (Step 37) DETERMINE If a Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve has Failed:

• CHECK HDT level control valve or controller - HAS MALFUNCTIONED CRS (Step 37.a RNO) IF HDT Level is controlling correctly, THEN OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 40 and GO TO Step 40.

CRS (Step 40 ) CHECK for Leak - CAUSING FW NOTE: The CRS may dispatch TRANSIENT an AO to look for leaks, however, the reason for being in the AOP is because the Heater Bypass valve has opened.

• Visual indication of leak

• FW Heater level alarms

• FW Heater normal and alternate drain valve positions level dump valve positions

• FW Heater #1 & #2 emergency dump valve positions

• Gland Steam Condenser abnormal indications/alarms

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 13 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 40 RNO) OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 43 and GO TO Step 43.

CRS (Step 43) DETERMINE If a HDP has malfunctioned:

• DISPATCH an operator to evaluate NOTE: The CRS will dispatch HDPs for damage: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the HDPs are operating normally.

• LISTEN for unusual noise

• OBSERVE pump shaft for breakage

• OBSERVE for abnormal running current:

• A - 4KV Bus 1 CMPT-5

• B - 4KV Bus 4 CMPT-25

• CHECK pump damage - INDICATED CRS (Step 43.b RNO) OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 46 and GO TO Step 46.

CRS (Step 46) DETERMINE if a Condensate Pump has malfunctioned:

• DISPATCH an operator to evaluate NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Condensate Pumps for damage: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the Condensate Pumps are operating normally.

• LISTEN for unusual noise

• OBSERVE pump shaft for breakage

• OBSERVE for abnormal running current:

• A - 4KV Bus 1 CMPT-6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 14 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• B - 4KV Bus 4 CMPT-22

• CHECK pump damage - INDICATED CRS (Step 46.b RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 49 and GO TO Step 49.

BOP (Step 49) CHECK for HCV-1459 Failure:

• CHECK HCV-1459, LP HEATERS BYP

- OPEN CRS/ (Step 50) DISPATCH an Operator to monitor NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP MFP Suction Pressures: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, read indications from CFW3 and after 1 minute report the suction pressure for both pumps.

• PI-1433 - A FW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE

• PI-1434 - B FW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE CRS/ (Step 51) CHECK MFP Suction Pressures -

BOP LESS THAN 400 PSIG CRS (Step 51 RNO) GO TO Step 54.

BOP (Step 54) CLOSE HCV-1459 CRS (Step 55) CONTACT I&C to Troubleshoot NOTE: The CRS may call and Correct HCV-1459 Problem WCC/I&C to address the Valve failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 15 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 56) GO TO Step 58 BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level - AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM RO (Step 59) CHECK Tavg - AT OR TRENDING TO Tref CRS (Step 60) CONTACT Maintenance to NOTE: The CRS may call Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater WCC/I&C to address the Valve Problem failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

CRS (Step 61) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

RO (Step 62) CHECK Total Reactor Power Change - LESS THAN 15%

RO (Step 63) CHECK APP-005-B5, ROD BANDS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT -

EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 64) MONITOR Axial Flux Difference to Ensure Compliance with TS 3.2.3 BOP (Step 65) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher of Units NOTE: The BOP will call Load Load Capability Dispatcher.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher.

CRS (Step 66) RETURN TO Procedure and Step In Effect

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 16 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 17 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

Booth Operator Instructions: As WCCS, call Control Room and state the following:

A step change has occurred on the B Main Feedwater Pump vibrations, and station management has directed that reactor power be lowered to 50% using AOP-038 at 1-2%/minute for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service.

Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST 947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN

• Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min

• Target Power Level ___

• Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine

__ Steps.

• Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine

__ gallons.

RO (Step 3) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE CRS (Step 4) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 18 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Reason for downpower

• Target Power Level

• Target Rod Height

• Rate of load reduction

• Amount of boric acid addition RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters

• PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control IN AUTO RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action.

RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 19.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 19 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2 RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

• IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

• RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure

• CHECK EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO

• PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:

• CHECK IMP IN ILLUMINATED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 20 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8.b.1 RNO 1) IF Turbine Load reduction is available using IMP IN, THEN PERFORM the following:

• DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton

• CHECK IMP IN light illuminated

• CHECK IMP OUT light extinguished BOP (Step 8.b) SET desired load in the SETTER

• SELECT the desired Load Rate

• DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5°F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:

• ADJUST Load Rate OR

• DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons CRS/ (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The NOTE: The CRS may ask BOP Following: SM/WCC/Communicator to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge.

• Load Dispatcher of load reduction

• E&C to control secondary chemistry

• RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley

• Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team

• E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

• E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 21 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• NRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers AT LEAST ONE OPERATING BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is NOTE: The BOP will dispatch required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least an AO.

one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY Booth Instructor HEATING SYSTEM. acknowledge as AO.

RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg WITHIN 5°F OF Tref RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution WITHIN TARGET BAND BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions MET:

• Target load/power has been reached

• Load reduction is no longer required

• CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction

• STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 22 of 57 Event

Description:

C Service Water Pump Trips After the power reduction is in progress, the C Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW, and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS),

and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF SWS01C Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F4, SW PMP A/B/C/D OVLD

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F7, SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F8, NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• SW North Header Pressure PI-1616 indicating 12 psig

• SW South Header Pressure PI-1684 indicating 13 psig

• C SW Pump Green and Red status lights LIT

• A SW Booster Pump trips

• RTGB Annunciator APP-002-A8 THROUGH D8, HVH-1(2-4) WTR OUTLET LO FLOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew will likely place the Turbine in HOLD.

APP-008-F4, SW PMP A/B/C/D OVLD BOP (Step 1) IF an operating SW Pump has tripped, THEN PERFORM the following:

• START a Standby Pump.

• DISPATCH operator to check breaker(s) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch AND Current Limiter Fuses: SW Pump an AO.

C - 480V Bus E2 (CMP 24A) If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that the C SW Pump motor is Hot to the touch.

• THROTTLE CCW Heat Exchanger NOTE: This action is NOT Return Valves, as necessary, to needed (Starting the D SW maintain 40 to 50 psig in the SW Pump will restore system Headers. pressure).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 23 of 57 Event

Description:

C Service Water Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 2) IF a single-phase open circuit NOTE: This action will need condition is suspected ENTER AOP-026. further investigation.

APP-002-A8, HVH-1 WTR OUTLET LO FLOW BOP (Step 1) IF the operating Service Water Booster Pump has tripped, THEN start Standby Service Water Booster Pump.

BOP (Step 2) IF no Service Water Booster Pump NOTE: The Standby SW can be started, THEN.. Booster Pump will start.

BOP (Step 3) IF V6-33A (SW Booster Pump 'A' NOTE: V6-33A has NOT Supply to HVH-1) has closed, THEN. CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) IF a Service Water rupture outside NOTE: There is no SW Piping of the HVH boundaries is indicated, Rupture.

THEN..

BOP (Step 5) IF required, THEN dispatch NOTE: The CRS/BOP may personnel to check local indications: dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the system flows/pressures are normal and that the standby SW Booster Pump is NOT rotating in reverse.

• FI-1698A (HVH-1 Outlet Flow).

• PI-1646A (HVH-1 Outlet Pressure).

• Standby Service Water Booster Pump rotation.

BOP (Step 6) IF standby Service Water Booster NOTE: The standby SW Pump check valve is stuck open, THEN.. Booster Pump Check Valve is NOT stuck OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 24 of 57 Event

Description:

C Service Water Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 7) IF a SW leak exists inside the CV, NOTE: There is no SW leak in THEN.. the CV.

CRS (Step 8) IF at least 800 gpm flow through NOTE: Once the standby SW HVH-1 can NOT be established, THEN Booster Pump is started LCO declare HVH-1 inoperable and refer to ITS 3.6.6 will be met.

LCO 3.6.6.

BOP (Step 9) IF required, THEN ensure correct NOTE: This action will not be valve alignment in accordance with OP-903, required.

Service Water System.

BOP (Step 10) IF alarm is invalid, THEN . NOTE: The alarm is valid.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the C SW Pump failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS may address Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS)

CRS LCO 3.7.7: Two SWS trains and the Turbine Building loop isolation valves shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 25 of 57 Event

Description:

C Service Water Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1 A. One SWS A.1 NOTES: Enter must be entered.

train applicable inoperable. Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC NOTE: The A and B SW Sources- Pumps must declared Operating," for inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> emergency diesel because the A EDG is generator made inoperable by inoperable.

SWS.

Restore SWS train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS CRS LCO 3.6.6: Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION D.1 D. Two D.1 Restore one must be entered.

containment containment cooling trains cooling train to inoperable. OPERABLE 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> status.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

NOTE: The crew will likely continue to down power.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 26 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, or various APPs to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the C CCW Pump will trip, and only the B CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Booth Operator Instructions: IRF EPSV480DS_063 f:TRIP IMF CCW01C d:10 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW

• A Charging Pump trips

• FR-124 indicates no Seal Injection flow

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-F4, CCW PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP

• A CCW Pump trips

• B and C CCW Pump auto start

• C CCW Pump trips 10 seconds after start (Green and Red status lights are LIT)

• RTGB Annunciator APP-036-H6, DS BUS SUPPLY BKR 52/32A TRIP

• RTGB Annunciator APP-036-H8, DS BUS UNDER VOLT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will enter AOP-018.

AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS CRS (Step 1) MAKE PA announcement for NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:

• Loss of Seal Injection - Section C NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section C of AOP-018.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 27 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS SECTION C, LOSS OF SEAL INJECTION NOTE: Power will be automatically restored to the DS Bus in 95 seconds.

RO (Step 1) CHECK APP-001-D1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm -

ILLUMINATED RO (Step 1 RNO) IF APP-001-D1 NOTE: This is a Continuous ILLUMINATES, THEN GO TO Step 2. Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS

• OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 11 AND GO TO Step 11.

RO (Step 11) DETERMINE if a Charging Pump Can be Started:

• CHECK Charging System Piping -

RUPTURED CRS (Step 11.a RNO) GO TO Step 12 RO (Step 12) CHECK SI - INITIATED CRS (Step 12 RNO) GO TO Step 14 RO (Step 14) ENSURE at Least ONE Charging NOTE: The RO will start the Pump - RUNNING B and/or the C Charging Pump.

RO (Step 15) CHECK Seal Injection to RCPs:

• ANY Seal Injection flow - LESS THAN 6 GPM AND

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 28 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• ANY Thermal Barrier P - LESS THAN 5 inches CRS (Step 15 RNO) GO TO Step 47 (Step 47) ESTABLISH Charging Flow on FI-122A, CHARGING LINE FOW- GREATER THAN 40 GPM RO (Step 48) CHECK Normal Letdown - IN SERVICE RO (Step 49) CONTROL charging and Letdown Flow to Maintain Pressurizer Level as follows:

• Within +/- 5% Of Reference Level RO (Step 50) ESTABLISH Normal Seal Injection

• CHECK RCP Seal Injection - ALIGNED

• CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow -

BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM RO (Step 51) CHECK Seal Injection Flow -

ESTABLISH TO ALL RCPs CRS (Step 52) IMPLEMENT the EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 53) REFER to Technical Specification for any applicable LCOs

• 3.4.13 - RCS Operational Leakage

• 3.4.17 - CVCS

• 3.4.9 - PZR Level

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 29 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• 3.4.4, 3.4.5, & 3.4.6 - RCS Loops RO (Step 54) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling -

ISOLATED CRS (Step 54 RNO) OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 2 AND GO To the Main Body, Step 2 of this procedure.

AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:

CRS (Step 2 RNO) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the failure of the DS Bus normal supply breaker.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: While both the B and the C CCW Pump started on low system pressure, the C CCW Pump has tripped shortly after start.

The CRS will address the APP.

APP-001-F4, CCW PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP RO (Step 1) IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 30 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) IF the running CCW Pump has NOTE: Both the B and the tripped, THEN ENSURE Standby CCW C CCW Pump started on low Pump STARTED system pressure, however, the C CCW Pump has tripped shortly after start.

RO (Step 3) IF Standby CCW Pump can NOT be started, THEN RO (Step 4) IF FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW NOTE: FCV-626 is OPEN.

CONT, closes due to pump start, THEN (Step 5) IF CCW Pump tripped due to NOTE: The CRS will dispatch electrical fault, THEN DISPATCH an an AO.

operator to check breaker and Current Booth Instructor Limiter Fuses (E-1/E-2 breakers only) acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the C CCW Pump motor has an acrid smell.

CRS (Step 6) IF a single phase open circuit NOTE: This action will need condition is suspected ENTER AOP-026 further investigation.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the C CCW Pump failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)

SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains powered from emergency power supplies shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 31 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1 A. One required NOTE: Enter must be entered.

CCW train applicable inoperable. Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, NOTE: The B CCW Pump RCS Loops - must declared inoperable MODE 4, for within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> because the A residual heat EDG is inoperable.

removal loops made inoperable by CCW.

A.1 Restore required CCW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.17, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

CRS LCO 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection shall be OPERABLE, with :

• Two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE

• Two Makeup Water Pathways from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 32 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that because all E. Seal E.1 Initiate action Immediately Charging Pumps were OFF, injection to any to restore seal RCP not within injection to ACTION E.1, E.2 and E.3 limit. affected RCP(s) were entered; and that these ACTIONS were exited upon AND AND restoration of Seal Injection At least one Flow.

charging pump E.2 Be in MODE 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE. 3.

AND E.3 Be in MODE 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 5.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page 33 of 57 Event

Description:

A RCP Seal Failure Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the A RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF RCS13A r:2:00 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-D2, RCP #1 SEAL LEAKOFF HI FLOW

• FR-124 indicates that A RCP Seal injection flow is rising

• FR-124 indicates that B and C RCP Seal injection flow is lowering

• FR-154 indicates that A RCP seal leakoff flow is rising

• Charging Pump speed is increasing Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS CRS (Step 1) MAKE PA announcement for NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:

• Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure - NOTE: The CRS will transition Section A to Section A of AOP-018.

AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS SECTION A, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL FAILURE RO (Step 1) CHECK Any RCP #1 Seal Leakoff Flow - GREATER THAN 5.7 GPM RO (Step 2) CHECK Either of the following Conditions Exist:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page 34 of 57 Event

Description:

A RCP Seal Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• RCP #1 Seal Leakoff Flow On Unaffected RCP(s) - REDUCED OR

• RCP Thermal Barrier P On Affected RCP(s) - REDUCED RO (Step 3) CHECK Plant Status - MODE 1 OR MODE 2 RO (Step 4) PERFORM the following:

• TRIP the reactor

• TRIP the affected RCP(s)

• GO TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while continuing with this procedure.

RO (Step 5) CHECK Time Elapsed Since NOTE: This action will be Stopping the Affected RCP(s) - GREATER taken post-reactor trip.

THAN 3 MINUTES.

RO (Step 6) CLOSE Seal Leakoff Valve(s) for Affected RCP(s):

• RCP - A, VALVE - CVC-303A RO (Step 7) CHECK SI ACTUATED CRS (Step 7 RNO) GO TO Step 30 NOTE: The CRS will likely perform this procedure concurrently with the EOPs.

When the Operator Trips the Reactor, move to Events #6-9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 35 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The operator will subsequently start the B EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the D Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started. Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018. The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF EPS13 IMF EDG01C d:2 (Occurs on Rx Trip)

Indications Available:

• Indications of Reactor Trip

• Control Room lights dim

• Bus E-1 is de-energized

• Bus E-2 is de-energized

• DS Bus is de-energized

• B EDG RUNNING Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 2.a RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action NOTE: No power to the Turbine Control status lights.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 36 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF Turbine will NOT trip, THEN manually RUNBACK Turbine at maximum rate UNTIL ALL Governor valves are CLOSED.

• IF Turbine can NOT be runback, THEN manually CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

BOP (Step 2.b) All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Immediate Action Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss Of Immediate Action All AC Power, Step 1

• WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ECA-0.0.

EOP-ECA-0.0, TOTAL LOSS OF AC POWER RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass breakers -

OPEN

• Neutron flux - LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• BOTH Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED

• MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves -

CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action NOTE: No power to the Turbine Control status lights.

• If Turbine will NOT trip, THEN CLOSE MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

CRS/ (Step 3) DISPATCH an Operator to Perform Immediate Action BOP Attachment 1, Restoring AC Power From NOTE: The CRS will dispatch The DSDG an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the DSDG will NOT start.

RO (Step 4) CHECK if RCS is isolated:

CHECK LTDN LINE STOP Valves -

CLOSED

• LCV-460A

• LCV-460B CHECK PRZR PORVs - CLOSED CHECK CVC-387, EXCESS LTDN STOP Valve - CLOSED CHECK RCS Vent System Valves -

CLOSED OR DEENERGIZED

• RC-567, HEAD VENT

• RC-568, HEAD VENT

• RC-569, PZR VENT

• RC-570, PZR VENT

• RC-571, PRT ISO

• RC-572, CV ATMOS RO (Step 5) CHECK CCW Pump Running for RCP Seal Cooling

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5 RNO) IF LESS THAN 15 minutes NOTE: The DS Bus is de-elapsed since RCP SEAL Cooling lost, energized.

THEN START CCW Pump A.

IF RCP SEAL Cooing can NOT be restored WITHING 15 minutes, THEN PERFORM the following prior to starting a CCW Pump

• OPEN breaker for FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT Valve (MCC-6 CMPT 8F)

• Locally CLOSE FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT Valve.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK AFW Flow

• CHECK AFW flow- GREATER THAN 300 GPM

• DISPATCH an Operator to locally NOTE: The CRS will dispatch perform Attachment 4, Local Control Of an AO.

S/G Level and Pressure If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF CFW 012, f:100 IRF CFW 013, f:100 IRF CFW 014, f:100 And report after 5 minutes that the Attachment 4 is complete.

• CONTROL S/G WR level BETWEEN 60% and 67%

BOP (Step 7) TRY To Restore Power to ANY AC Emergency Bus:

• Energize AC Emergency Bus with EDG:

• CHECK EDG-A AND EDG-B - NOTE: The A EDG is OOS.

RUNNING The B EDG is NOT running.

BOP (Step 7.a.1 RNO) DEPRESS BOTH SAFETY INJECTION pushbuttons

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• If NO EDG started, THEN

• IF ANY EDG is running AND its output NOTE: The B EDG will start breaker is open, THEN and close in on Bus E-2.

BOP (Step 7.a.2) CHECK BOTH AC Emergency NOTE: Bus E-2 is energized.

Busses AUTOMATICALLY ENERGIZED

• E-1

• E-2 BOP (Step 7.a.2 RNO) IF ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker is open, THEN

• If ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker can NOT be closed from the Control Room, THEN

• If an AC Emergency Bus can NOT be NOTE: The D SW Pump has energized OR SW Cooling is NOT failed to auto-start; and the available to ANY running EDG, BOP will need to start this THEN. pump manually.

BOP

• CHECK AC Emergency Busses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• E-1 OR

• E-2 NOTE: E-2 is energized.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0 Safety Significance: Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.

RO

• Establish Seal Injection flow

• CHECK adequate DSDG OR EDG capacity to run one Charging Pump (108 KW each) (DSDG preferred)

• RESET SI

• ESTABLISH Charging flow NOTE: The RO will start the C Charging Pump.

• CHECK Charging Pumps - ANY RUNNING RO (Step 7.c.3.a RNO) IF RCP Seal Cooling has NOTE: It is expected that RCP been lost for LESS THAN 15 minutes, THEN Seal Cooling will be lost for START Charging Pumps as necessary less than 15 minutes.

• If ALL Seal Cooling to ANY RCP can NOT be restored within 15 minutes, THEN RO (Step 7.c.3.b) DISPATCH an operator to NOTE: These valves can be perform the following: controlled from the RTGB.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• OPEN CVC-358, RWST TO NOTE: The CRS may dispatch CHARGING PUMP SUCTION Valve an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use:

IRF CVC048 f:100 IRF CVC059 f:0 and report after 3 minutes that the Charging Pump suction is aligned to the RWST.

• CLOSE LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET Valve RO (Step 7.c.3.c) ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Sea Water Flow Control Valves RO/ (Step 7.c.3.d) MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow BOP between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated CHECK the applicable EDG has loaded required equipment

• SW Pumps NOTE: The D SW Pump had to be manually started.

• MDAFW Pump NOTE: The B MDAFW Pump is running.

• CCW Pump (as needed) NOTE: The C CCW Pump has previously failed.

• SW Booster Pump NOTE: The B SW Booster Pump has started on the SI.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling Prior to the EDG Failing Due to Overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of engine high temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

RO (Step 7.c.3.e) PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND Initiate MONITORING Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

• IMPLEMENT FRPs as necessary CRS

• RETURN TO procedure AND step in NOTE: The CRS will transition effect to EOP-E-0.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST NOTE: Bus E-2 is energized.

ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED CRS (Step 3 RNO) WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus.

RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated: NOTE: SI was manually actuated in EOP-ECA-0.0.

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO (Step 4.b) Manually ACTUATE SI by NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-depressing BOTH SI pushbuttons. energized and the A Train ECCS Pumps cannot be started.

RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 50.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-necessary energized and the A Train ECCS Pumps cannot be started.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually ALIGN valve(s) as NOTE: A Train valves cannot necessary. be aligned from the RTGB.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST NOTE: The only available ONE RUNNING CCW Pump has previously tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• IF NO CCW Pump is RUNNING AND CV Spray is NOT actuated, THEN START one CCW Pump on Emergency Bus energized by EDG (246 Kw)

• IF NO CCW Pump can be started, THEN TRIP ALL RCPs.

BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as NOTE: Some valves will need necessary to be closed manually.

BOP (Step 4.c) CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves NOTE: V2-6A has no CLOSED indication no power.

BOP (Step 5.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

• High steam flow with:

• S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR

• Tavg LESS THAN 543°F

• CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass NOTE: The MSIVs are Valves - CLOSED already CLOSED.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING NOTE: The A and B SW Pumps have no power, the C Pump has previously tripped, and the D SW Pump has failed to auto start.

BOP (Step 7.a RNO) Manually START pump(s) as NOTE: If the D SW Pump necessary has NOT been manually started, it will be started here.

BOP (Step 7.b) CHECK SW Booster Pumps NOTE: The B SW Booster BOTH RUNNING Pump has started on the SI, the A SW Booster Pump has no power.

BOP (Step 7.b RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary

• CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure NOTE: BOTH alarms will be Alarms EXTINGUISHED LIT.

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 7.c RNO) PERFORM the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• ISOLATE SW to the Turbine Building: NOTE: BOTH valves are already CLOSED.

• CLOSE V6-16C, SW Turbine Building Isolation valve.

OR

• CLOSE V6-16A and V6-16B, SW Turbine Building Supply valves

• WHEN this Attachment is complete, NOTE: The BOP will contact THEN PERFORM Supplement M, an AO and direct performance Component Alignment For Loss Of SW of Supplement M.

To Turbine Building, as time permits.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING NOTE: The B EDG is running.

BOP (Step 8 RNO) Manually START Emergency NOTE: The A EDG is OOS.

Diesel(s) as necessary.

BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans NOTE: The 3 and 4 HVH ALL RUNNING Fans are running (With Hi Vibration).

BOP (Step 10 RNO) Manually START fan(s). NOTE: The 1 and 2 HVH Fans are unavailable (No power).

BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves NOTE: The A Train valves CLOSED have no power or indication.

BOP (Step 12 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R-11 OR R-12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation.

• IF ANY Containment Ventilation NOTE: The BOP will contact Isolation valve does NOT close, THEN an AO and direct local action.

manually OR locally ISOLATE Booth Instructor AFFECTED penetration outside acknowledge as AO.

Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR NOTE: No Indication. The EXHAUST FAN STOPPED BOP will take the Control Switch to STOP

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED NOTE: The DS Bus is NOT energized. An attempt has already been made to start the DSDG and re-energize the DS Bus.

BOP (Step 14 RNO) Locally PLACE DSDG in service using EPP-25, Energizing Supplemental Plant Equipment Using the DSDG.

BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 NOTE: The A Train DC Bus TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED is on the Battery.

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 15 RNO) RESTART Battery Chargers NOTE: The B Train DC Bus within 30 minutes of power loss using OP- is on the Battery Chargers.

601, DC Supply System. (46 KW each)

BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP will contact Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary the Inside AO about locally (38 KW each): resetting and starting the B IA Compressor.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c

• If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps NOTE: The B MDAFW Pump BOTH RUNNING is likely running.

(Step 6.a RNO) Manually START pump(s). NOTE: The A MDAFW Pump is unavailable (No power).

RO (Step 6.b) CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

RO (Step 6.b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level NOTE: This is a Continuous lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, Action. The CRS will make THEN PERFORM Step 6.c both board operators aware.

CRS

• CONTINUE WITH Step 7.

RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper NOTE: These valves are Emergency Alignment: under local control.

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge NOTE: The SDAFW Pump is Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP likely to be NOT running.

RUNNING RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER NOTE: It is likely the S/G THAN 300 GPM levels are high, and that AFW flow has been throttled to little or no flow.

RO (Step 8.c RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level is NOTE: S/G levels are likely GREATER THAN 9% [18%] in ANY S/G, high in the band, but under THEN CONTROL AFW flow to maintain S/G operator control.

Narrow Range level.

• IF S/G Narrow Range level is LESS THAN 9% [18%] in ALL S/Gs, THEN RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG

• CHECK CV Spray NOT ACTUATED RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR NOTE: The LO Flow alarm COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm will be LIT.

EXTINGUISHED OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE

• Seal Injection flow GREATER NOTE: It is likely that Seal THAN 6 GPM PER RCP Injection flow is > 6 to each RCP.

OR

• Thermal Barrier Ps GREATER NOTE: Thermal Barrier flow is THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP NOT > 5 inches H 2 O to each RCP.

RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

• With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg NOTE: It is likely that Tcolds temperatures STABLE AT OR are >547°F.

TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN IF temperature is GREATER THAN 547°F NOTE: Although Tcolds are AND rising THEN >547°F, they are most likely stable.

If Tcolds are rising, the CRS will contact the AO to locally dump steam steam using the S/G Steam Line PORVs.

If so, Booth Instructor use:

IRF MSS097 f:15:00 IRF MSS091 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS094 f:MANUAL IRF MSS098 f:15:00 IRF MSS092 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS095 f:MANUAL IRF MSS099 f:15:00 IRF MSS093 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS096 f:MANUAL IRF AIR027 f:N2_SUPPLY IRF MSS099 r:25 f:1022 IRF MSS098 r:25 f:1022 IRF MSS097 r:25 f:1022

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING NOTE: All RCPs are OFF.

CRS (Step 13.a RNO) GO TO Step 14.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:

• Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR NOTE: R-15 is OOS.

GAS

• R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation NOTE: R-19 is de-energized.

• R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

• S/G levels NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RO (Step 16) CHECK if RCS is Intact:

• CV radiation - NORMAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• R-2,CV AREA

• R-32A, CV HIGH RANGE

• R-32B, CV HIGH RANGE

• CV pressure - NORMAL

• CV Sump level - NORMAL RO/ (Step 17) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be BOP Terminated:

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18°F

• CHECK Secondary Heat Sink level

• Total AFW flow to S/G(s) -

GREATER THAN 300 GPM OR

• S/G Narrow Range level in at least NOTE: It is likely that all S/G one S/G - GREATER THAN 9% Narrow Range levels are >

9%.

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG

• Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

• CHECK PZR level - GREATER THAN 14%

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

• GO TO EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination, NOTE: The CRS will transition Step 1 to EOP-ES-1.1.

EOP-ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP

• SI REINITIATION CRITERIA

• SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA RO (Step 1) RESET SI RO (Step 2) RESET Containment Isolation PHASE A RO (Step 3) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

• CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR NOTE: If not previously done, LO PRESS alarm EXTINGUISHED the BOP will contact the Inside AO about locally resetting and starting the B IA Compressor.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN

• RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV1716 OPEN BOP (Step 4) CHECK DC Busses A AND B NOTE: Both DC Busses are ENERGIZED energized, although the A DC Bus is on the Battery.

RO (Step 5) STOP ECCS Pumps:

• STOP SI Pumps

• CHECK RHR Pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

• STOP RHR Pumps RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Flow Has Been ESTABLISHED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Charging Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

• ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain Charging flow AND Seal Injection:

• Charging Pump speed controller

• HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• RCP Seal Water Flow Control NOTE: The RO may contact Valve the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: 100 IRF CVC031 f: 100 IRF CVC032 f: 100

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16 1-6 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: MOL b) Reactor Power: 100%

c) Turbine Load: ____ MWe d) Boron Concentration: ____ ppm e) Rod Height: ____ CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 53.3%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.8.1 Condition B1, B.2, B.3.2.2 and B4

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The A EDG is OOS.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) B EDG

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

b) The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

c) SR 3.8.1.1, Offsite Power Checks were last completed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) IAW OST-947 data

11. RISK a) GREEN

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 I-RO Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW N-BOP I(TS)-SRO 2 2 I-BOP C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 3 3 R-RO Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 4 4 C-BOP CRDM Fan A Failure C-SRO 5 5 C-RO Continuous Inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6 6 M-RO C Steam Generator Tube Rupture M-BOP M-SRO 7 7 C-BOP Loss of Off-Site Power

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL, and AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation.

Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G C, FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, Steam Flow. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation.

Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction. Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, Heater Drain and Vents, to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, or OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), to lower plant power.

During the downpower, the A CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the B CRDM Fan.

Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor.

On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the C Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the C Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS.

Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615) initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the A and B Steam Generator PORVs.

During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV.

The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The C Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 - R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 I-RO VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH I-SRO 3 2 C-BOP C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO C-SRO 4 3 C-RO B Charging Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO 5 4 I-BOP Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO Cold Leg SBLOCA M-BOP M-SRO 7 6/7 NA 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes 8 6 C-RO C SI Pump fails to Auto Start 9 7 C-RO CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The C Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Next, the C Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and control the C S/G level manually throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Following this, the B Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and/or APP-001-B6, LP LTDN LN HI TEMP, and raise speed of the A Charging Pump and reduce Letdown flow. The operator may enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions. The operator will address 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System.

Shortly afterwards, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP), and restore the A and B Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the A EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train A equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event.

Additionally, the C SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and the break size will become larger. Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the B CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, both Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

SI-880C&D (B CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves.

The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2. (EOP-Based)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111615)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity).

Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111115)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered.

Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, EMERG OIL PMP OVLD, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of Instrument Bus 3 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 2 2 I-BOP B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW I-SRO 3 NA R-RO Load Decrease N-BOP N-SRO 4 3 C-RO Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED C-SRO 5 4 I-RO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to I(TS)-SRO fully CLOSE 6 5 M-RO Inadvertent FWIS M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate 8 7 NA A & B MDAFW Pump Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111115)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days.

Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating).

RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, EMERG OIL PMP OVLD, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, Loss of Instrument Bus, and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating, and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems-Operating.

Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G B, FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, Feed Flow (FWF).

Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve.

Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS pressure Control, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).

After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur.

Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the A and B MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response.

However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The operator will direct that AFW Pump C be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, however, the AFW Pump C Diesel will fail to start.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111115)

The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control B S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the B S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This effective steamline break is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary.

Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operators having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111815)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-RO Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert C-SRO Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT 3 2 I-BOP Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 4 3 N-BOP Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH I(TS)-SRO 5 4 C-RO Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control C-BOP Rods Fail in AUTO C-SRO 6 5/6 M-RO ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV M-BOP M-SRO 7 7 C-BOP MOV-350 fails to OPEN

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111815)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD, divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT.

Following this, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, Steam Generator Pressure (SGP).

The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation.

Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, Turbine Trip Below P-8. When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. The Control Rods will fail to operate in AUTO and the operator will need to insert rods in MANUAL.

Subsequently, the B Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes).

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation-ATWS. While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST.

Upon completion of FRP-S.1, the operator will return to EOP-E-0. Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the flow into and out of the B Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111815)

The scenario will terminate at Step 16.b of EOP-E-2, when the operator prepares to restore normal letdown.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF.

Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error),

continuation of the challenge is a result of the operators failure to insert negative reactivity.

Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Roll Turbine N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP High Turbine Eccentricity C-SRO 3 2 I-BOP Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 I(TS)-SRO 4 3 I-RO VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH I-SRO 5 4 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to C(TS)-SRO CLOSE 6 5 M-RO Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to M-BOP CLOSE M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, Power Operation.

When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration, and place the Turbine startup on HOLD.

Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).

The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and determine to continue with the power increase.

Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the B RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, and AOP-014, Component Cooling Water Malfunction. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Containment, and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically.

The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and manually trip the reactor.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm.

While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the A MSIV will close and the A S/G pressure is expected to rise higher than that of the B and C S/Gs. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2.

The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the B and C Steam Generators. Depending on the timing of the actions Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915) taken by the crew when the A MSIV is closed, the A S/G pressure may not rise significantly higher than that of the B and C S/Gs, and the crew will remain in EOP-ECA-2.1 past the SI termination steps (i.e. Step 19). If this situation occurs, the scenario will terminate at Step 20 of EOP-ECA-2.1.

Critical Tasks:

Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1 Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety.

It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN C-SRO 2 NA R-RO Lower Power N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-BOP C Service Water Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-RO DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start C(TS)-SRO 5 4 C-RO A RCP Seal Failure C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Loss of Offsite Power M-BOP M-SRO 7 5 C-BOP B EDG Fails to Start 8 6 NA DSDG Trips 9 7 C-BOP D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and close the valve.

After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

After the power reduction is in progress, the C Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW, and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS), and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.

Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, or various APPs to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the C CCW Pump will trip, and only the B CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the A RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.

Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The operator will subsequently start the B EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the D Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started.

Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 (Rev_111915)

The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1.

Critical Tasks:

Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0 Safety Significance: Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room.

Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.

Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling Prior to the EDG Failing Due to Overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG.

Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of engine high temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-1 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111615 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-1

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 203)

2. APP-003, RCS & Makeup Systems (Rev 54)

3. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure (Rev 24)

4. OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters (PLT) (Rev 11)

5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

6. AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction (Rev 33)

7. OWP-034, Steam Flow (SF) (Rev 19)

8. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

9. APP-007, Condensate & Feedwater (Rev 44)

10. OP-407, Heater Drain and Vents (Rev 51)

11. AOP-038, Rapid Downpower (Rev 3)

12. OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power (Rev 62)

13. OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (Rev 112)

14. APP-010, HVAC-Emerg. Generators & Misc. Systems (Rev 81)

15. AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System (Rev 33)

16. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

17. EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 7)

18. EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture (Rev 7)

Validation Time: 131 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 I-RO Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW N-BOP I(TS)-SRO 2 2 I-BOP C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 3 3 R-RO Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower N-BOP N-SRO 4 4 C-BOP CRDM Fan A Failure C-SRO 5 5 C-RO Continuous Inward Rod Motion C-SRO 6 6 M-RO C Steam Generator Tube Rupture M-BOP M-SRO 7 7 C-BOP Loss of Off-Site Power

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #1 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION A. FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL, and AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.

Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G C, FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, Steam Flow. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation.

Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction. Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, Heater Drain and Vents, to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, or OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When > 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), to lower plant power.

During the downpower, the A CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the B CRDM Fan.

Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor.

On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the C Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the C Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS.

Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the A and B Steam Generator PORVs.

During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV.

The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red Path Limit) (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 608 T = 0 Malfunctions:

SDAFW Pump OOS:

• irf EPSMCC5_189 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8A, A S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC6_226 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8B, B S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC6_227 f:RACK_OUT (V1-8C, C S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC10_262 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14A, SDAFW discharge to A S/G)

• irf EPSMCC9_254 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14B, SDAFW discharge to B S/G)

• irf EPSMCC10_267 f:RACK_OUT (V2-14C, SDAFW discharge to C S/G)

PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):

• A MDAFW RTGB Switch

• B MDAFW RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch

• Protected Switchyard FI-613 CCW System Flow OOS

• IOR aoCCWAOD010B f:0 Place WHITE DOT on FI-613 RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3 failed ON

• IMF ANNXN10B03 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-010-B3 Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-1.

At direction of Event 1 Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW examiner ICO PRSXMTLT_459 r:15 f:0 At direction of Event 2 examiner C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW ICO SGNXMTFT_494 r:01:00 f:0 At direction of Event 3 Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower examiner IMF CFW14G r:02:00 f:800000 At direction of Event 4 CRDM Fan A Failure examiner IMF HVA05A f:MOTOR_SHORT At direction of Event 5 examiner Continuous Inward Rod Motion IMF CRF06A IMF CRF06B NOTE: This will occur on a Rod Inward signal

($006_RODS_INCRF07 r:5 f:72)

At direction of Event 6 C Steam Generator Tube Rupture examiner IMF SGN02F NOTE: The SGTR will occur on Rx Trip r:10:00 f:500

($006_N16-1-1_SGTR_ON_TRIP)

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Loss of Off-Site Power Upon IMF EPS13 Transition to EOP-E-3 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 9 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Shortly after taking the watch, Pressurizer Level Transmitter, LT-459 will fail LOW causing normal letdown to isolate, de-energizing of pressurizer control group heaters and charging pump speed to rise for the pump in AUTO. The operator will respond in accordance APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL, and AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-030, Pressurizer Level Transmitters. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO PRSXMTLT_459 r:15 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-F4, CHG PMP HI SPEED

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL

• PZR Level LI-459A lowering

• PZR Level LI-460/461 stable

• C Charging Pump speed rising

• Normal Letdown isolates Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-025 directly.

APP-003-E8, PZR CONTROL HI/LO LVL RO (Step 1) IF Letdown is isolated, THEN NOTE: The RO will take ensure one Charging Pump running at Charging Pump to MANUAL minimum. and adjust to MINIMUM speed.

CRS (Step 2) IF a load rejection has occurred, THEN CRS (Step 3) IF excessive RCS leakage exists, THEN..

RO (Step 4) IF a level controller has failed, NOTE: The RO will control THEN manually adjust Charging and/or Charging flow as needed.

Letdown to maintain PZR level The RO will adjust Seal Injection flow by controlling HIC-121.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 10 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) IF a level channel failure has NOTE: The CRS will transition occurred, THEN refer to AOP-025, RTGB to AOP-025.

Instrument Failure AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section B of AOP-025.

• PZR LEVEL (LT-459, 460, 461) -

SECTION B AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE RO (Step 1) CHECK Failed Instrument FAILED LOW RO (Step 2) PLACE LCV460 A&B Control NOTE: The RO may re-Switch In CLOSE positioned the Control Switch earlier based on Step 5.3.7.5 of OMM-22.

RO (Step 3) CHECK Charging Pumps ONLY ONE PUMP RUNNING IN MANUAL CONTROL RO (Step 3 RNO) ENSURE only one charging pump is running in manual control.

RO (Step 4) ADJUST Charging Pump Speed To NOTE: Pzr level will rise, and Control PZR LEVEL Between 22% And 53% may exceed TS LCO 3.4.9 (63.3%).

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The BOP will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 11 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM RO (Step 6 RNO) Locally THROTTLE RCP NOTE: The BOP may contact SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE(s) the AO to adjust Seal Injection to obtain flow to each RCP between 8 gpm flows.

and 13 gpm. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable

• CVC297A

• CVC297B

• CVC297C

• IF required to maintain 8 GPM flow, THEN THROTTLE HIC121, CHARGING FLOW, while maintaining charging pump discharge pressure less than 2500 psig.

• REVIEW TS LCO 3.4.17 for applicability.

RO (Step 7) CHECK Controlling Channel NOTE: LT-459 has failed FAILED LOW.

RO (Step 8) CHECK LT461 OPERABLE RO (Step 9) PLACE LM459 In 461 REPL 459 RO (Step 10) PLACE LR459 In REC 461 RO (Step 11) CHECK Normal Letdown IN SERVICE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 12 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 11 RNO) IF normal letdown is desired, NOTE: The CRS will hand off THEN RESTORE normal letdown using the restoration of Letdown to Attachment 1, Restoration of Normal the BOP.

Letdown.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE ATTACHMENT 1, RESTORATION OF NORMAL LETDOWN BOP (Step 1) ENSURE Normal Charging Flow Through The Regenerative Heat Exchanger Is In Service.

BOP (Step 2) ENSURE Phase A Containment Isolation Signal NOT Present.

BOP (Step 3) NOTIFY RC That Normal Letdown NOTE: The BOP will call RC Flow Will Be Restored And The Affected to address the potential Areas Should Be Monitored For Changing changing radiological Radiological Conditions. conditions.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RC.

BOP (Step 4) ENSURE The Following Valves Are Closed:

• CVC204A, LETDOWN LINE ISO

• CVC204B, LETDOWN LINE ISO

• LCV460A, LTDN LINE STOP

• LCV460B, LTDN LINE STOP

• CVC200A, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION

• CVC200B, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION

• CVC200C, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION BOP (Step 5) ENSURE HIC121, CHARGING FLOW, Is Set For Full Open.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 13 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) ENSURE PZR Level Is Greater NOTE: Pzr Level will likely be Than Or Equal To Program Level. above program.

BOP (Step 7) IF Desired, THEN PLACE TCV143, VCT/DEMIN In The VCT Position.

BOP (Step 8) PLACE PCV145, PRESSURE, In MAN.

BOP (Step 9) ADJUST PC145 To Throttle PCV 145 To 45% To 55% Open.

BOP (Step 10) OPEN The Following:

• CVC204A, LETDOWN LINE ISO

• CVC204B, LETDOWN LINE ISO BOP (Step 11) OPEN LCV460A&B:

• PLACE LTDN LINE STOP LCV460 A&B switch to OPEN.

• PLACE LTDN LINE STOP LCV460 A&B switch to AUTO.

BOP (Step 12) ESTABLISH Cooling To NON REGEN HX:

• PLACE TC144, NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP in MANUAL.

• ADJUST TC144 NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP as necessary to ensure letdown temperature does not rise above 127°F when letdown is reestablished.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 14 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 13) While MAINTAINING Charging Pump Discharge Pressure As Indicated On PI121 Less Than 2500 psig, ADJUST Charging Pump Speed To The Expected Letdown Flow To Be Established In The Next Step.

BOP (Step 14) OPEN One LTDN ORIFICE Valve: NOTE: Pzr Level will likely be above program, and the BOP may place a 60 gpm orifice in service.

• CVC200A, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION

• CVC200B, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION

• CVC200C, LETDOWN ORFICE ISOLATION BOP (Step 15) PLACE PC145 In AUTO And CHECK Letdown Pressure As Indicated On PI145, LOW PRESS LTDN PRESS, Is Being Maintained Between 300 Psig And 320 Psig.

BOP (Step 16) PLACE TC144, NONREGEN HX OUTLET TEMP, In AUTO.

BOP (Step 17) IF TCV143 Was Selected To VCT, THEN POSITION TCV143 As Directed By The CRS/SM.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 15 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 18) IF Charging Flow Is Changed, NOTE: The BOP may contact THEN ESTABLISH RCP Seal injection Flow the AO to adjust Seal Injection Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM By Throttling flows.

The Following:

If so, Booth Instructor

• CVC297A, RCP A SEAL WATER FLOW acknowledge as AO; and use:

CONTROL VALVE

• CVC297B, RCP B SEAL WATER FLOW IRF CVC030 f: variable CONTROL VALVE IRF CVC031 f: variable

• CVC297C, RCP C SEAL WATER IRF CVC032 f: variable FLOW CONTROL VALVE BOP (Step 19) IF Additional Letdown Flow Is NOTE: Pzr Level will likely be Desired,. above program, and the BOP may discuss with the CRS/RO about additional Letdown flow.

BOP (Step 20) NOTIFY Chemistry That Normal NOTE: The BOP will call Letdown Has Been Restored. Chemistry to notify that normal letdown is back in service.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE RO (Step 12) RESTORE PZR Level Control To Examiner Note: Pzr Level Automatic: may require additional adjustment prior to restoring the controller to AUTO. The crew may complete the event with Level control still in MANUAL.

• CHECK PZR level WITHIN +/- 1% OF PROGRAMMED REFERENCE LEVEL

• RESTORE PZR level control to automatic RO (Step 13) RESET PZR Heaters:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 16 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• PLACE PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP control switch in OFF and return to ON

• PLACE PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A control switch in OFF and return to AUTO or ON as desired

• PLACE PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B control switch in OFF and return to AUTO or ON as desired RO (Step 14) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM RO (Step 14 RNO) Locally THROTTLE RCP NOTE: The BOP may contact SEAL WATER FLOW CONTROL VALVE(s) the AO to adjust Seal Injection to obtain flow to each RCP between 8 gpm flows.

and 13 gpm: If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable

• CVC297A

• CVC297B

• CVC297C CRS (Step 15) REMOVE Failed Transmitter From NOTE: The CRS will address Service Using OWP030 OWP-030.

OWP-030, PRESSURIZER LEVEL TRANSMITTERS (PLT)

PLT-1, PRESSURIZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER LT-459 CRS Address PLT-1

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 17 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE: The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room).

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN

• BST058 TRIP

• BST001 TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED

• B/S 459A-1, Hagan Rack #2 (PZR Hi Level)

• B/S 459A-2, Hagan Rack #2 (PZR Lo Level)

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION B, PZR LEVEL TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 16) GO TO Procedure Main Body, NOTE: The CRS will address Step 2 Technical Specifciations.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 18 of 68 Event

Description:

Pzr Level Transmitter LT-459 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 8, M. One channel M.1 Place 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Pressurizer Water Level -

inoperable. channel in trip.

OR High, is affected and that M.2 Reduce Action M.1 or M.2 must be THERMAL 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> entered.

POWER to < P-7.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 19 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Following this, the controlling steam flow channel for S/G C, FT-494, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-034, Steam Flow. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO SGNXMTFT_494 r:01:00 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-C3, S/G C LVL DEV

• Lowering demand on FCV-498 (C S/G Feedwater Reg Valve)

• Narrow Range Level in C S/G lowering

• FR-498 indicates that the gap between Feedwater and Steam flow to and from C S/G is rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner Note: It is most likely that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-010 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first.

If so, proceed to AOP-025 section below.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):

NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint NOTE: A Power Limit Warning BOP BEING APPROACHED is possible during this event which will require a reduction in power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 20 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

Critical Task:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System.

Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58 BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level AT OR NOTE: The CRS will likely TRENDING TO PROGRAM transition to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section D of AOP-025.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 21 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• S/G Steam Flow (FT-476, 477, 484, 485, 494, 495) - SECTION D AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 1) CHECK Affected FRV In MAN: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL.

• FCV478 (FRV "A")

• FCV488 (FRV "B")

• FCV498 (FRV "C")

BOP (Step 2) RESTORE Affected S/G Level To Immediate Action Program Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System.

Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is NOTE: This is a Continuous approached, THEN. Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

GO TO Step 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 22 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 6 RNO) IF failure was a steam flow instrument, THEN GO TO Step 12.

BOP (Step 12) PLACE Affected S/G Steam Flow Selector Switch To The Alternate Channel:

• S/G "C" STEAM FLOW FR498

• Failed Channel FT-494 - Position CH495 BOP (Step 13) RESTORE Affected Controller To Automatic:

• CHECK S/G level WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL

• PLACE affected controller in AUTO BOP (Step 14) REMOVE Affected Transmitter NOTE: The CRS will address From Service Using OWP034: OWP-034.

Channel FT-494 - OWP SF-5 OWP-034, STEAM FLOW (SF)

SF-5, STEAM FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-494 CRS Address SF-5 BOP DELETE INPUT FT-494 (MSF0445A) FROM CALO PROCESSING IAW OMM-007.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 23 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE: The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room).

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN

• BST020 TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED

• B/S 494, HAGAN RACK #16 (LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW)

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 15) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability:

• TS LCO 3.3.1

• TS LCO 3.3.2 CRS (Step 16) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 24 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Flow Transmitter FT-494 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Functions 1.f D. One channel NOTE (SI-High Steam Flow in Two inoperable For Function 4.c, a channel may Steam Lines), 1.g (SI- High be taken out of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Steam Flow in Two Steam the trip condition Lines Coincident with Steam for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Line Pressure Low), 4.d (MSI -

maintenance.

High Steam Flow in Two D.1 Place channel 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Steam Lines Coincident with in trip. Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI -

High Steam Flow in Two OR Steam Lines Coincident with D.2.1 Be in Steam Line Pressure Low),

18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> MODE 3. are affected; and that Action D.1 of D2.1 and D.2.2 must be AND entered D.2.2 Be in .

MODE 4.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 25 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Next, a tube leak will develop in Feed Water Heater 4A. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL, identifying the leak. The operator may enter AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction. Ultimately, the operator will use OP-407, Heater Drain and Vents, to remove Feedwater Heaters 5A, 4A, and 3A from Service. This will require a power decrease. The operator will use either AOP-038, Rapid Downpower, or OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When > 25%

Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), to lower plant power.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CFW14G r:02:00 f:800000 (NOTE: This Malfunction requires 3 minutes to generate APP-007-E7)

Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL

• Feed Flow lowering on all three S/Gs

• Narrow Range Level lowering on all three S/Gs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner Note: When this alarm occurs the crew may address AOP-010 or use APP-007 E7 to direct entry into OP-407.

If the crew uses APP-007-E7, continue below.

If the crew enters AOP-010, proceed to Step 1 on Page 26.

APP-007-E7, HTR 4A HI/LO LVL CRS (Step 1) IF level alarm is due to low power maneuvering, THEN..

BOP (Step 2) IF required, THEN dispatch an NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Operator to check: an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the 4A FWH sightglass is FULL and the LCV is FULL OPEN.

• Sightglass level

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 26 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Level Control Valve position BOP/ (Step 3) IF a level control valve has CRS malfunctioned, THEN.

CRS (Step 4) IF tube leakage is occurring, THEN Examiner NOTE: The CRS bypass the affected string of Heaters for will transition to OP-407 to repair of defective tubes using OP-407, remove Heaters 5A, 4A and Heater Drains and Vents 3A from service.

If so, proceed to OP-407 actions on Page 29.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BOP BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 27 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From NOTE: The CRS go to Step 33 Table Below: based on a known tube leak in the A Train FWHs, or Step 35 based on other malfunctions Known Leak - 33 Other - 35 BOP (Step 33) REDUCE Turbine Load Using NOTE: The CRS may address Attachment 1 To Match Feedwater And Step 33 of AOP-010. Steam Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH flow and Feed flow are This Procedure matched.

CRS (Step 34) OBSERVE NOTE Prior To Step 41 NOTE: If the CRS entered at And GO TO Step 41 Step 33 of AOP-010, they will move forward to Step 41.

CRS (Step 35) REDUCE Turbine Load Using NOTE: The CRS may address Attachment 1 To Match Feedwater And Step 35 of AOP-010. Steam Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH flow and Feed flow are This Procedure matched.

CRS/ (Step 36) DISPATCH An Operator To NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP Observe Valve Positions: an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the both valves are operating properly.

• LCV1530A, HDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE

• LCV1530B, HEATER DRAIN PUMPS SUCTION DUMP TO CONDENSER CRS (Step 37) DETERMINE If A Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve Has Failed:

• CHECK HDT level control valve or controller HAS MALFUNCTIONED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 28 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 37.a RNO) IF HDT Level is controlling correctly, THEN OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 40 and GO TO Step 40.

CRS (Step 40) CHECK For Leak CAUSING FW NOTE: The crew may TRANSIENT determine that a FWH Tube Leak exists and that the Train A FWH string must be bypassed/isolated.

• Visual indication of leak

• FW Heater level alarms FW Heater normal and alternate drain valve positions level dump valve positions

• FW Heater #1 & #2 emergency dump valve positions

• Gland Steam Condenser abnormal indications/alarms CRS (Step 41) ISOLATE Leak:

CONSULT with Operations to determine leak isolation strategy

• Isolate in current plant condition OR

• Repair online OR

• Shutdown to repair OR

• Trip Unit Examiner NOTE: The crew should address OP-407 to remove the 5A, 4A, and 3A FWHs from service.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 29 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP-407, HEATER DRAINS AND VENTS SECTION 6.4.5 REMOVING HEATERS 5A, 4A, AND 3A FROM SERVICE CRS (Step 1) To remove Heater 4A from service, perform the following:

• Ensure power is reduced to 659 Mwe Examiner NOTE: The CRS gross (maximum of 20% power conduct a downpower to 659 reduction) MWe using AOP-038 or OP-105.

If AOP-038 is selected, continue below.

If OP-105 is selected, proceed to Page 34.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER CRS (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page likely make this System announcement.

RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST 947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN

• Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min

• Target Power Level ___

• Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 130 Steps.

• Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 306 gallons.

CRS (Step 3) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:

• Reason for downpower

• Target Power Level

• Target Rod Height

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 30 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Rate of load reduction

• Amount of boric acid addition RO (Step 4) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters

• PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control IN AUTO RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action.

RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 31.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 31 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2 RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

• IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

• RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure

• CHECK EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO

• PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:

• CHECK IMP IN ILLUMINATED

• SELECT the desired Load Rate

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 32 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5°F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:

• ADJUST Load Rate OR

• DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons CRS/ (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The NOTE: The CRS may ask BOP Following: SM/WCC/Communicator to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge.

• Load Dispatcher of load reduction

• E&C to control secondary chemistry

• RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley

• Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team

• E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

• E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection

• NRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers AT LEAST ONE OPERATING BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is NOTE: The BOP will dispatch required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least an AO.

one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY Booth Instructor HEATING SYSTEM. acknowledge as AO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 33 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg WITHIN 5°F OF Tref RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution WITHIN TARGET BAND BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following NOTE: This is a Continuous Conditions MET: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

• Target load/power has been reached

• Load reduction is no longer required

• CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction

• STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower CRS (Step 15 RNO) WHEN any of the following conditions are met:

• Target load/power has been NOTE: The target load is 659 reached MWe.

• Load reduction is no longer required

• CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction

• THEN STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower.

CRS

• GO TO Step 16.

RO (Step 16) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN 85%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 34 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) CHECK Heater Drain Pumps TWO RUNNING

• STOP one Heater Drain Pump RO (Step 18) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN 70%

Examiner NOTE: If the crew decides to reduce power using OP-105, Examiners continue HERE.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER CRS (Step 6.1.1.1) Check that an EOOS Risk Assessment has been performed CRS (Step 6.1.1.2) IF an EOOS Risk Assessment has NOT been performed for this Power Reduction, THEN perform one of the following actions:

• Direct the STA or the Work Week NOTE: The CRS may ask Coordinator (WWC) to perform an STA to address.

EOOS Risk Assessment If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as STA.

OR

• Perform a qualitative Risk Assessment per OMM-048, Work Coordination and Risk Assessment BOP (Step 6.1.1.3) Notify the Load Dispatcher that NOTE: The BOP will call Load unit load will be reduced. Dispatcher.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher BOP (Step 6.1.1.4) Notify RC that higher radiation NOTE: The BOP will call RC.

levels should be expected in the CV Pump If so, Booth Instructor Bays and in Pipe Alley due to normal acknowledge as RC shutdown crud bursts

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 35 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6.1.1.5) IF this is a Power Reduction NOTE: The BOP may call greater than 20%, THEN notify Chemistry to Chemistry.

shutdown the RCS Zinc Injection Skid If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry RO (Step 6.1.1.6) Monitor the highest operable Power Range Channel and the highest operable Intermediate Range Channel on NR-45 CRS (Step 6.1.1.7) IF this will be a planned power reduction of greater than 10% power, THEN..

CRS/ (Step 6.1.1.8) IF Reactor Engineering has BOP NOT provided technical guidance, THEN use the most recent OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan data to determine the reactivity change required RO (Step 6.1.2.1) IF additional letdown flow is NOTE: The RO may place desired, THEN perform the following: additional Letdown in service.

• Start additional Charging Pumps per OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System

• Place additional letdown orifice in service per OP-301 RO (Step 6.1.2.2) IF a significant change in RCS Boron concentration is expected or occurs (10 ppm or more), THEN energize additional PZR heaters

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 36 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6.1.2.3) Maintain Tave within 5°F of NOTE: The RO will start a Tref using a combination of Control Rods boration per Section 8.2.8 of and Boron Concentration changes. OP-301.

Examiner Note:

RO Examiner follow actions of OP-301.

CRS/BOP Examiners follow OP-105 Actions, Step 6.1.2.4, on Page 38.

OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

RO (Step 8.2.8.1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.

RO (Step 8.2.8.2) DETERMINE the amount of NOTE: The RO will use Boric Acid to add to the RCS and if Attachment 10.4 of OST-947 applicable, the expected change in RCS and determine that the Target temperature AND Reactor Power Rod Height is 191 and 53.76 gallons of BA will need to be added.

RO (Step 8.2.8.3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of Boric Acid required.

RO (Step 8.2.8.4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR SM to add the amount of boric acid previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

RO (Step 8.2.8.5) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the BORATE position.

RO (Step 8.2.8.6) SET YIC-113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 37 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8.2.8.7) IF desired, THEN PLACE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND ADJUST controller FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons flow rate.

RO (Step 8.2.8.8) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.

RO (Step 8.2.8.9) IF any of the below conditions occur, THEN momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

• Rod Motion is blocked

• Rod Motion is in the wrong direction

• Tavg goes up

• Boric Acid addition exceeds the desired value RO (Step 8.2.8.10) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV-113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV-113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

• IF in Auto, THEN the operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

• The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

RO (Step 8.2.8.11) IF desired, THEN FLUSH the Boric Acid flow..

RO (Step 8.2.8.12) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 38 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments PLACE FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT to the AUTO position.

PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position.

ENSURE FCV-113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, is in AUTO.

Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

RO (Step 8.2.8.13) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 AND Boric Acid TOTALIZER, YIC 113 the total amount of Primary Water AND Boric Acid added during the boration.

RO (Step 8.2.8.14) MONITOR parameters for the Examiner NOTE: If AOP-038 expected change in reactivity AND inform the was used to downpower the CRS OR SM the results of the boration. plant, move forward to Event 4.

Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER BOP (Step 6.1.2.4) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN reduce turbine load as follows:

Ensure the EH Turbine Impulse Pressure NOTE: The BOP will use Control in the desired position using Attachment 6 of OP-105 to Attachment 6, Transferring Control Mode transfer Turbine Control Mode Between IMP-IN and IMP-OUT: from IMP OUT to IMP IN

• IMP IN (preferred)

OR

• IMP OUT (if required for plant conditions)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 39 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER ATTACHMENT 6, TRANSFERRING CONTROL MODE BETWEEN IMP-IN AND IMP-OUT BOP (Step 1) Record the Valve Position Limit reading:

BOP (Step 2) Lower the limiter setting until the turbine is on the limiter BOP (Step 3) Check that the Tracking Meter indicates a nulled condition. (approximately zero)

BOP (Step 4) Press the appropriate pushbutton to change sensing modes:

IMP IN (preferred for load changes)

OR IMP Out (preferred for steady state)

BOP (Step 5) Wait for the Tracking Meter to indicate a nulled condition BOP (Step 6) Return the limiter setting to the value recorded in Step 1 or as directed by CRS/SM.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER BOP (Step 6.1.2.4) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN reduce turbine load as follows:

• Set the desired load in the SETTER

• Select the desired Load Rate NOTE: The BOP will select 1-2%/Minute

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 40 of 68 Event

Description:

Tube Leak in Feedwater Heater 4A/Downpower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Depress the GO pushbutton BOP (Step 6.1.2.5) IF EH Turbine Control is in NOTE: The Turbine is in TURB MANUAL, THEN. OPER AUTO.

BOP (Step 6.1.2.6) Maintain Gland Seal Steam Header Pressure (PI-4004, PI-1382 or ERFIS Point GSP2095A) in the normal operating band (3 to 6 psig)

RO (Step 6.1.2.7) WHEN Reactor Power is less than 90% as indicated on NR-45, THEN check that APP-005-D6 is received.

After a load reduction of 15-20 MWe, or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 41 of 68 Event

Description:

CRDM Fan A Failure During the downpower, the A CRDM Fan will trip. The operator will address APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD, and manually start the B CRDM Fan.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF HVA05A f:MOTOR_SHORT Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator, APP-009-E7, 480V GRD FAULT

• RTGB Annunciator, APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD

• CRDM Fan HVH-5A Green status light LIT, Red status light OFF Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-010-A6, HVH-5A/B AIR FLOW LOST/OVLD BOP (Step 1) EVALUATE CRDM indicating lights to determine affected fan:

• HVH-5A, CRDM COOLING FAN

• HVH-5B, CRDM COOLING FAN BOP (Step 2) MONITOR the following ERFIS points to determine if a single-phase open circuit is present:

• ERFIS point ELV3020A, BUS E1 VOLTAGE.

• ERFIS point ELV3021A, BUS E2 VOLTAGE.

CRS (Step 3) IF a single-phase open circuit NOTE: This will require condition is suspected, THEN GO TO AOP- additional assessment.

026, Grid Instability BOP (Step 4) IF a CRDM COOLING FAN has NOTE: The BOP will start tripped, THEN ENSURE the Standby CRDM HVH-5B.

COOLING FAN is running.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 42 of 68 Event

Description:

CRDM Fan A Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 5) DISPATCH Operator to evaluate NOTE: The CRS will dispatch affected CRDM COOLING FAN supply an AO.

breaker status: If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that there was no apparent reason for the Fan failure.

• Breaker MCC-5(5M), CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING FAN, HVH-5A.

• Breaker MCC-6(4M), CONTROL ROD DRIVE MECHANISM COOLING FAN, HVH-5B.

CRS (Step 6) INITIATE a Work Request to NOTE: The CRS may call investigate the cause of the affected CRDM WCC to address the Fan COOLING FAN alarm. failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

CRS (Step 7) IF RCS temperature is greater than NOTE: The HVH-5B Fan is or equal to 350ºF AND both CRDM running.

COOLING FANs are unavailable, THEN..

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 43 of 68 Event

Description:

Continuous Inward Rod Motion Shortly afterwards, a continuous control rod insertion will occur. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-001, Malfunction of Reactor Control System. The operator will be unable to control the rod insertion and will manually trip the reactor.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CRF06A IMF CRF06B Indications Available:

• Rod Inward Arrow Indicating Light is LIT

• The Tavg-Tref deviation is inconsistent with the control rod movement

• Group Steps Counters and IRPI indication inward control rod motion Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-001, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR CONTROL SYSTEM RO (Step 1) Check Unexpected Rod Motion IN Immediate Action PROGRESS RO (Step 2) Check Reactor Power GREATER Immediate Action THAN 15%

BOP (Step 3) Check Turbine Load Immediate Action

• CONTROL RODS STEPPING IN AND

• UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION IN PROGRESS OR

• UNEXPECTED LOAD REDUCTION HAS OCCURRED RO (Step 3 RNO) Attempt To Stop Rod Motion Immediate Action As Follows:

• IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch NOTE: When the RO places position in A (AUTO), THEN Place the control rods in MANUAL, the ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M rod motion will continue.

(Manual)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 44 of 68 Event

Description:

Continuous Inward Rod Motion Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF ROD BANK SELECTOR Switch in M NOTE: Although control rods (Manual) OR Individual Bank Select, are expected to be in AUTO, if THEN Place the ROD BANK the control rods are in SELECTOR Switch in A (Auto). MANUAL the RO will take this action.

• IF Rod Motion does NOT stop, THEN Trip the Reactor and Go To EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

NOTE:The CRS will enter EOP-E-0 Upon Rx Trip, move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 45 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power On the reactor trip, a 500 gpm Steam Generator Tube Rupture will occur (over 10 minutes) on the C Steam Generator. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. After the Immediate Actions are complete, it is likely that the operator will determine that SI is NOT actuated nor required, and transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. While in this procedure the operator will determine that SI is required, manually actuate SI, and return to EOP-E-0. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, to isolate the flow into and out of the C Steam Generator and then conduct a cooldown of the RCS.

Upon transition into EOP-E-3, a Loss of Off-Site Power will occur. Both EDGs will start and re-power Buses E-1 and E-2. With SI previously reset, the operator will need to address a re-initiation of AFW flow to all Steam Generators, and the restart of the ECCS Pumps. The operator will continue with EOP-E-3 and conduct the RCS cooldown using the A and B Steam Generator PORVs. During the RCS depressurization, the Pzr Spray Valves will not be available. The operator will be required to conduct the depressurization using an available Pzr PORV. The scenario will terminate at Step 23 of EOP-E-3, after the operator has stopped the SI Pumps.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF SGN02F r:10:00 f:500 Indications Available:

• All control rods on the bottom

• RCS pressure is lowering

• RCS Tavg is trending to no load

• RTGB Annunciator APP-036-C7, R24 MONITOR HIGH

• R24 Leakage Recorder indicating S/G leakage greater than TS Limit Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 46 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED RO (Step 4.a RNO) CHECK if SI is required: Immediate Action

• PZR pressure LESS THAN 1715 PSIG OR

• Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4 PSIG OR

• Steam Line P bistables ILLUMINATED OR

• High Steam Flow with Low Tavg OR Low Steam Pressure bistables ILLUMINATED IF SI is required, THEN manually ACTUATE BOTH Trains of SI.

IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 47 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS

• GO TO EOPES0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1.

NOTE: It is expected that SI will not be required, and the CRS will transition to EOP-ES-0.1 NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

EOP-ES-0.1, REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE Examiner NOTE: A large SGTR is occurring. It is expected that the crew will transition back to EOP-E-0.

Because of this, only 5 steps are scripted.

When the crew re-enters EOP-E-0, move forward to EOP-E-0 steps on Page 49.

RO/ Foldout Page BOP SI ACTUATION CRITERIA NOTE: The crew will subsequently transition back to EOP-E-0 based on this criteria.

LOSS OF POWER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA LOSS OF ULTIMATE HEAT SINK CRITERIA RO (Step 1) CHECK RCS Temperature Control:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

• CHECK RCS temperatures:

• With ANY RCP running, CHECK RCS Average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F BOP (Step 2) CHECK Feedwater Status:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 48 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK RCS average temperatures LESS THAN 554°F

• CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Total feed flow to S/Gs GREATER THAN 300 gpm (0.2x106 PPH)

BOP (Step 3.a) CHECK S/G Levels:

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels GREATER THAN 9%

BOP (Step 3.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm AFW OR 0.2x106 pph Main Feedwater UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%

in at least one S/G.

BOP (Step 3.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 9%

AND 50%

BOP (Step 4) CHECK All AC Busses ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR Level Control:

• CHECK PZR level GREATER THAN 14%

RO (Step 5 RNO) PERFORM the following:

ISOLATE Letdown by closing the following valves:

• CLOSE LCV460 A & B, LETDOWN LINE STOP Valves.

CLOSE LTDN LINE ISO Valves:

• CVC204A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 49 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CVC204B CLOSE LTDN ORIFICE Valves:

• CVC200A 45 gpm

• CVC200B 60 gpm

• CVC200C 60 gpm CLOSE CVC387, EXCESS LETDOWN STOP Valve.

TURN OFF ALL PZR Heaters.

WHEN charging is available, THEN NOTE: The crew will likely CONTROL charging to restore PZR level to manual actuate SI and the GREATER THAN 14%. CRS will transition to EOP-E-0.

Examiner NOTE: If the crew proceeds past Step 5 of EOP-ES-0.1, wait here until the crew decides to re-enter EOP-E-0.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 50 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 54.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 51 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 52 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG OR

• High steam flow with:

• S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR

• Tavg LESS THAN 543°F BOP (Step 6.a RNO) GO TO Step 7.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING

• CHECK SW Booster Pumps BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 53 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 54 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may (If the Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary LOOP has occurred) contact (38 KW each): the Inside AO.

If so, Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187 f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c

• If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

• CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump NOTE: The SDAFW Pump is RUNNING OOS.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 55 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper NOTE: The RO/BOP may Emergency Alignment: take a Prudent Action (OMM-

22) to throttle AFW flow to the C S/G and control Narrow Range level between 9-50%.

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG

• CHECK CV Spray NOT ACTUATED RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm EXTINGUISHED OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 56 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE

• Seal Injection flow GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP OR

• Thermal Barrier Ps GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

• With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F OR

• With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

• CHECK SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F[32°F]

CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 57 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:

• Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS

• R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

• S/G levels NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER CRS (Step 15 RNO) PERFORM the following: NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-3.

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

• GO TO EOPE3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture, Step 1.

Booth Instructor: Upon transition to EOP-E-3, IMF EPS13 (Loss of Offsite Power)

Examiner NOTE: The LOOP will cause the AFW valves to fully open and re-initiate AFW flow to all S/Gs.

EOP-E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 58 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Foldout Page)

BOP SI REINITIATION CRITERIA SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA MULTIPLE TUBE RUPTURE CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be NOTE: The RCPs will NOT be Stopped: running.

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.

BOP (Step 2) IDENTIFY Ruptured S/G(s): NOTE: The crew will identify the C S/G as the ruptured S/G.

• CHECK for ANY of the following indications:

• Unexpected rise in ANY S/G Narrow Range level OR

• R31s Steamline Radiation Monitors ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION OR

• R19s SG Blowdown Radiation ANY INDICATE HIGH RADIATION OR

• High radiation reported from ANY S/G sample

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 59 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CONTACT Chemistry to periodically NOTE: The CRS may call sample ALL S/Gs for activity. WCC/Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

BOP (Step 3) ISOLATE Flow From Ruptured S/G(s):

• ADJUST Ruptured S/G(s)Steam Line PORV Controller to 1060 psig

• CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Line PORV CLOSED

• RV13 NOTE: The crew will ensure that the C S/G PORV is CLOSED.

• CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves:

• V18C NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED.

• Locally CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s)Bypass Drn AND Warmup Line To AFW Pump Valve(s)While CONTINUING WITH this procedure:

• MS38 (S/G C)(Pipe Jungle NOTE: The CRS will dispatch above/right of V18C) an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the MS-38 is CLOSED.

IRF MSS051 f:0

• CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) S/G Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves CLOSED

• CLOSE Ruptured S/G(s) MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves:

• S/G C:

• V13C

• MS353C BOP (Step 4) CHECK Ruptured S/G

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 60 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Ruptured S/G FAULTED CRS (Step 4 RNO) GO TO Step 5.

BOP (Step 5) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Level:

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range level GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

RO

• RESET SI

• STOP feed Flow to ruptured S/G(s):

• CLOSE Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valve(s):

• V214C NOTE: Since the SDAFW Pump is OOS, this valve will already be CLOSED.

• CLOSE AFW Header Discharge Valve(s):

• V216C

• PERFORM Supplement D, NOTE: The BOP will use Deenergizing AFW Valves For Attachment D, and call AO for AFFECTED S/G local Actions.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that actions are complete.

IRF EPSMCC9_256 f:0 (Other breakers are already Racked Out)

Critical Task:

Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs Safety Significance: Failure to isolate the ruptured SG causes a loss of differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The fact that the operator allows the differential pressure to dissipate and, as a result, are then forced to transition to a contingency procedure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 61 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure GREATER THAN 500 PSIG BOP (Step 7) CHECK The Following Valves For Ruptured S/G CLOSED

• MSIVs

• MSIV Bypass Valves

• S/G Steam Line PORVs

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves BOP (Step 8) INITIATE RCS Cooldown:

• DETERMINE required Core Exit NOTE: The CRS will temperature: determine the Target temperature to 519°F.

• DUMP steam to Condenser from intact S/G(s) at MAXIMUM rate:

• CHECK Condenser AVAILABLE BOP (Step 8.b RNO) DUMP steam at MAXIMUM NOTE: The crew will dump rate from Intact S/G(s) using S/G Steam Line steam using the A and the PORV(s). B S/G PORVs.

• IF S/G Steam Line PORV(s) can NOT be opened from the Control Room, THEN....

• IF NO intact S/G available, THEN...

BOP (Step 8.c-f) CHECK RCS Tavg LESS THAN 543°F Momentarily PLACE STEAM DUMP MODE Control Switch to BYPASS TAVG INTLK position CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP NOTE: This Annunciator is ARMED alarm ILLUMINATED extinguished (Steam Dumps not available).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 62 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE BOP (Step 8.f RNO) WHEN Core Exit T/Cs are LESS THAN required temperature, THEN PERFORM Steps 8.g and 8.h.

CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 9.

BOP (Step 9) CHECK Intact S/G Levels:

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels NOTE: Narrow Range levels GREATER THAN 9%[18%] may be greater than 9%. If so, perform Step 9.b.

BOP (Step 9.a RNO) MAINTAIN total feed flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%

[18%] in at least one S/G.

BOP (Step 9.b) CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 21%

[21%] AND 50%

RO (Step 10) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:

• CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK PZR PORV Block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN RO (Step 11) RESET SI RO (Step 12) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 63 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 13 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument NOTE: If not already done, the Air Compressor(s)as necessary (38 KW BOP will contact the Inside each): AO.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC5_ 187 f: RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

• WHEN Instrument Air is established, THEN PERFORM Steps 13.b AND 13.c.

CRS

• CONTINUE WITH Step 14.

RO (Step 13.b-c) RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV1716 OPEN RO (Step 14) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RHR Pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• Pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

• Pressure STABLE OR RISING

• STOP RHR Pumps

• CHECK RCS pressure remains GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 64 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 15) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:

• CHECK Charging Pumps AT LEAST NOTE: All Charging Pumps ONE RUNNING are OFF.

CRS (Step 15.a RNO) IF CCW flow to RCP(s) NOTE: CCW flow was Thermal Barrier is lost, THEN GO TO Step momentarily lost on the LOOP,

16. but exists now.

RO (Step 15.b) ALIGN Charging Pump suction to RWST:

• OPEN LCV115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCTION

• CLOSE LCV115C, VCT OUTLET Valve

• PLACE RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Control Switch to STOP ESTABLISH MAXIMUM charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND MAXIMUM Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 65 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16) CHECK If RCS Cooldown Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED CORE EXIT T/C TEMPERATURE FROM STEP 8

• STOP RCS cooldown

• MAINTAIN Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE Critical Task:

While in EOP-E-3, establish/maintain an RCS temperature so that transition from E-3 does not occur because the RCS temperature is in either (1) Too high to maintain 38°F of RCS Subcooling OR (2) below 295°F (RCS Integrity Red path Limit)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish and maintain the correct RCS temperature during a SGTR leads to a transition from E-3 to a contingency procedure. This failure constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would unnecessarily complicate the event mitigation strategy.

BOP (Step 17) CHECK Ruptured S/G(s) Pressure STABLE OR RISING RO (Step 18) CHECK RCS Subcooling Based On Core Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 38°F

[57°F]

RO (Step 19) DEPRESSURIZE RCS To MINIMIZE Break Flow AND Refill PZR:

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray AVAILABLE CRS (Step 19.a RNO) OBSERVE CAUTIONS and NOTE prior to Step 20 AND GO TO Step 20.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 66 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 20) DEPRESSURIZE RCS Using PZR BOP PORV To Minimize Break Flow AND Refill PZR:

• CHECK PZR PORV AT LEAST ONE AVAILABLE

• OPEN one PZR PORV until ANY of the following conditions satisfied:

• BOTH of the following:

• RCS pressure LESS THAN RUPTURED S/G(s)

PRESSURE

• PZR level GREATER THAN 14% [31%]

OR

• PZR level GREATER THAN 73%

[66%]

OR

• RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 18°F [37°F]

• CLOSE PZR PORV RO (Step 21) CHECK RCS Pressure RISING RO/ (Step 22) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be BOP Terminated:

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 18°F

[37°F]

• CHECK Secondary Heat Sink:

• Total feed flow to S/G(s)

GREATER THAN 300 GPM AVAILABLE OR

• S/G Narrow Range level in at least one Intact S/G GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 1 Event # 6&7 Page 67 of 68 Event

Description:

C Steam Generator Tube Rupture/Loss of Off-Site Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK RCS pressure STABLE OR RISING

• CHECK PZR level GREATER THAN 14% [31%]

RO (Step 23) STOP SI Pumps Critical Task:

Depressurize the RCS to meet SI termination criteria before Steam Generator Overfill is reached based on Water in the Steam Lines.

Safety Significance: Failure to stop reactor coolant leakage into a ruptured SG by depressurizing the RCS (when it is possible to do so) needlessly complicates mitigation of the event. It also constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16 1-1 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: MOL b) Reactor Power: 100% Mode 1 c) Turbine Load: 770 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 853 ppm e) Rod Height: 218 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 53.3 %

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 A Restore AFW pump or flow path(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days AND 8 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) SDAFW Pump

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A MDAFW Pump and flowpath b) B MDAFW Pump and flowpath

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) FI-613, CCW System Flow is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-010-B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) Review the OST-947 MOL charts for BA and PW additions

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-2 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111615 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-2

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.5.2, ECCS - Operating (Amendment 176)

2. OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power (Rev 62)

3. OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (Rev 112)

4. AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control (Rev 20)

5. AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction (Rev 33)

6. APP-003, RCS & Makeup Systems (Rev 54)

7. APP-001, Miscellaneous NSSS (Rev 60)

8. AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions (Rev 31)

9. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

(Amendment 223)

10. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure (Rev 24)

11. OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP) (Rev 13)

12. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

13. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

14. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

15. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

16. CSFST, Critical Safety Function Status Trees (Rev 7)

17. EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant (Rev 4)

18. FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure (Rev 10)

19. EOP-ES-1.2, Post-LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization (Rev 1)

Validation Time: 104 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The C Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 - R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 I-RO VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH I-SRO 3 2 C-BOP C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO C-SRO 4 3 C-RO B Charging Pump Trip C(TS)-SRO 5 4 I-BOP Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 6 5 M-RO Cold Leg SBLOCA M-BOP M-SRO 7 6/7 NA 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes 8 6 C-RO C SI Pump fails to Auto Start 9 7 C-RO CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #2 The plant is at 75% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. The C Charging Pump is also OOS. LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating).

The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Next, the C Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and control the C S/G level manually throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Following this, the B Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and/or APP-001-B6, LP LTDN LN HI TEMP, and raise speed of the A Charging Pump and reduce Letdown flow. The operator may enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions. The operator will address 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System.

Shortly afterwards, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP), and restore the A and B Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop. The operator will enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the A EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train A equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the C SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and the break size will become larger. Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the B CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 both SI-880C&D (B CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves.

The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied: SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room.

Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2. (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component.

In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity).

Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 609 T = 0 Malfunctions:

A SI Pump OOS:

• IRF EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT (A SI Pump OOS)

• IRF EPS480E1_124 f: RACK_IN (B SI Pump Racked IN to E-1)

PLACE Red Cap over A SI Pump Control Switch C Charging Pump OOS:

• IRF EPSV480E2_152 f:RACK_OUT PLACE Red Cap over C Charging Pump Control Switch PLACE Green Cap over A and B Charging Pump Control Switch LI-928 C SI Accumulator Level indication OOS

• IOR aoSISAOD021A f:0 Place WHITE DOT on LI-928 RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3 failed OFF

• IMF ANNXN09C03 f:ALARM_OFF Place WHITE DOT on APP-009-C3 Insert the following:

• IRF SIS029 f: NO_AUTO (C SI Pumps fails to AUTO start)

• IRF CNS010 f:NO-AUTO (SI-880C fails to OPEN in AUTO)

• IRF CNS011 f:NO-AUTO (SI-880C fails to OPEN in AUTO)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EPS05A (Normal Supply Breaker to E-1 trips on Rx Trip)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG03A (Diesel Output Breaker to E-1 fails to CLOSE)

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Adjust Steam Dump Potentiometer to 7.28 (Per OP-105)

Ensure B Charging Pump operating AUTO, A Charging Pump operating in MANUAL Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-2.

At direction of Event 1 Raise Power examiner At direction of Event 2 examiner VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH ICO CVCXMTLT_115 r:00:30 f:60 At direction of Event 3 C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO examiner IMF CFW17C r:15 f:100 At direction of Event 4 B Charging Pump Trip examiner IMF CVC05B At direction of Event 5 examiner Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW ICO TURXMTPT_447 r:30 f:0 At direction of Event 6 Cold Leg SBLOCA examiner IMF RCS01C r:5:00 f:1000 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Post-Rx Trip Event 7 480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes IMF EPS05A NOTE: E-1 will de-energize on Rx Trip IMF EDG03A

$006_RTA_TRIP IMF EPS05A (Normal Supply Breaker to E-1 trips on Rx Trip)

$006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG03A (Diesel Output Breaker to E-1 fails to CLOSE)

Post-Rx Trip Event 8 C SI Pump fails to Auto Start IRF SIS029 NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 f:NO_AUTO Post-Rx Trip Event 9 CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN IRF CNS010 Automatically f:NO_AUTO NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 IRF CNS011 f:NO_AUTO Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 10 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5°F of Tref using a combination of Control Rods and Boron Concentration changes.

OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.

RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to add to the RCS and if applicable, the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.

RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 11 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.

RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.

RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.

RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, THEN RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.

RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.

RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

• Unanticipated Rod Motion

• Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 12 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops.

• The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

• IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.

RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

• ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO.

• PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position.

• Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.

RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER BOP (Step 6) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER NOTE: Since power is AUTO, THEN raise turbine load as follows: stabilized at 75%, the BOP will perform Step 6 to initiate the load increase. The next applicable Step in Section 6.2.2 of OP-105 is Step 22.

• Adjust the SETTER indication using the REF or REF pushbuttons to the desired load.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 13 of 61 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Use the GO, HOLD, REF , and REF pushbuttons as necessary to continue the rise in load.

BOP (Step 22) WHEN average Reactor Power NOTE: The Turbine is in crosses greater than 90% by Power Range OPER AUTO.

Indications, THEN check that APP-005-D6 is received.

After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 14 of 61 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH During the power increase, VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 will fail HIGH causing all letdown to be diverted to the CVCS HUTs. This failure will result in VCT level lowering without automatic makeup. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO CVCXMTLT_115 r:00:30 f:60 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E3, VCT HI/LO LVL

• VCT Level LI-115 indicates HIGH

• LCV-115 diverting to CVCS HUT

• VCT Level LI-112 on ERFIS indicates lowering VCT Level Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL NOTE: The crew could refer to APP-003-E3 before entering AOP-003.

RO (Step 1) Check For Failure Of A Level Transmitter As Follows:

• Obtain a VCT level for LT115 using ERFIS

• PT ID CHL0115A

• Obtain a VCT level for LT112 using ERFIS

• PT ID CHL0112A

• Check VCT level indicators OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED CRS (Step 1.c RNO) Go To Step 1.e RO (Step 1.e) Check VCT level deviation between LT112 and LT115 GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 15 of 61 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) Check LT115 FAILED NOTE: LT-115 has failed HIGH.

RO (Step 3) Stabilize The RCS Makeup System As Follows:

• Check LT115 FAILED HIGH

• Place LCV115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV, Control Switch to VCT

• Obtain Hagan Racks Key number 10

• Place VCT Level Transmitter Selector NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Switch located in Hagan Rack #19, IN the BOP to the Hagan Racks.

LT112 POSITION Booth Instructor: use IRF CVC 067 f:LT-112.

• Check LT115 FAILED HIGH

• Place the LCV115A Control Switch to AUTO CRS

• Contact I&C to repair fail channel NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the VCT Transmitter failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

CRS

• Go To Step 6 CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement For NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 7) Implement The EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES (21%)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 16 of 61 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 12.5 inches (21%), THEN perform Action. The CRS will make Steps 9 and 10. both board operators aware.

CRS Go To Step 11.

RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)

CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go To Step 21.

RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)

RO (Step 22) Verify Charging And Letdown Flows Are Normal For Plant Conditions RO (Step 23) Check APP003D5, BA FLOW DEV ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go To Step 28.

RO (Step 28) Check APP003E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 28 RNO) Go To Step 34.

RO (Step 34) Check Boration REQUIRED NOTE: The decision point for the CRS is based on the LT-115 failure and its resulting effects, NOT based on the fact that there is an on-going power ascension.

CRS (Step 34 RNO) Go To Step 37.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2 Page 17 of 61 Event

Description:

VCT Level Transmitter LT-115 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 37) Check Dilution REQUIRED NOTE: The decision point for the CRS is based on the LT-115 failure and its resulting effects, NOT based on the fact that there is an on-going power ascension.

CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go To Step 40.

CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, NOTE: Technical Specification Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume LCO 3.4.17 is MET.

Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO CRS (Step 41) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 18 of 61 Event

Description:

C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO Next, the C Feed Regulating Valve Controller will fail such that the valve starts to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and control the C S/G level manually throughout the remainder of the scenario.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CFW17C r:15 f:100 Indications Available:

• C S/G Narrow Range level is rising on FR-498

• C S/G Feed Flow level is rising on FR-498

• FCV-498 Controller Output is rising

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-C1, S/G C FW > STM FLOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): NOTE: FCV-498 in NOT operating properly in AUTO.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL.

• ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control.

• ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow.

• STOP any load change in progress.

• If unable to control S/G level, THEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 19 of 61 Event

Description:

C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BOP BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58 BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM RO (Step 59) CHECK Tavg AT OR TRENDING TO Tref

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 3 Page 20 of 61 Event

Description:

C FRV Controller fails HIGH in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 60) CONTACT Maintenance To NOTE: The CRS may call Troubleshoot And Correct The Feedwater WCC/I&C to address the FRV Problem Controller failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

CRS (Step 61) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 62) CHECK Total Reactor Power NOTE: The power change Change LESS THAN 15% associated with the FRV Failure is less than 15%.

RO (Step 63) CHECK APP005B5, ROD BANKS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 64) MONITOR Axial Flux Difference To Ensure Compliance With TS 3.2.3 BOP (Step 65) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher Of Unit's NOTE: The CRS/BOP will Load Capability contact the Load Dispatcher.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher.

CRS (Step 66) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In Effect NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 21 of 61 Event

Description:

B Charging Pump Trip Following this, the B Charging Pump will trip. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP and/or APP-001-B6, LP LTDN LN HI TEMP, and raise speed of the A Charging Pump and reduce Letdown flow. The operator may enter AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions. The operator will address 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CVC05B Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW

• B Charging Pump Green status light LIT

• FR-124 RCP Seal Injection Flow has lowered to less than Tech Spec value Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-003-F5, CHG PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP RO (Step 1) Ensure at least one Charging Pump NOTE: The RO will raise the running supplying adequate RCP Seal speed of the A Charging Injection flow. Pump.

CRS (Step 2) Dispatch Operator to check the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Charging Pump breaker(s): an AO.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report within 1 minute that there is an acrid odor at E-1.

• Dispatch Operator to check the Charging Pump(s).

CRS (Step 3) Dispatch Operator to check the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Charging Pump(s). an AO.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report within 1 minute that the A Charging Pump is operating normally.

RO (Step 4) IF Seal Injection is lost to any RCP, THEN..

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 22 of 61 Event

Description:

B Charging Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF a single-phase open circuit condition is suspected, THEN..

NOTE: Because letdown flow is higher than Charging flow, it is expected that APP-001-B6 will alarm within 1 minute of the B Charging Pump trip.

APP-001-B6, LP LTDN LN HI TEMP RO (Step 1) IF Charging Flow is low, THEN NOTE: The RO will reduce RAISE Charging Flow OR LOWER Letdown letdown flow to control Flow to clear alarm. Pressurizer Level.

RO (Step 2) IF PT-145 has failed, THEN. NOTE: PT-145 has NOT failed.

RO (Step 3) IF PC-145 has failed, THEN.. NOTE: PC-145 has NOT failed.

CRS (Step 4) IF required, THEN DISPATCH an NOTE: The RO may contact operator to adjust RCP SEAL WATER FLOW the AO to adjust Seal Injection CONTROL VALVEs CVC-297A, CVC-297B, flows.

and CVC-297C per requirements of OP-301.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable NOTE: The CRS will address the Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.17, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

CRS LCO 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection shall be OPERABLE with:

Two Charging Pumps shall be OPERABLE; and

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 23 of 61 Event

Description:

B Charging Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Two makeup water pathways from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: Modes 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that the B A. One required A.1 Restore 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> Charging Pump is one of the charging pump required charging inoperable. pump to two required to be OPERABLE OPERABLE, and enter status. Condition A.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 24 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Shortly afterwards, Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure, and place all Feed Regulating Valves in MANUAL The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP), and restore the A and B Feed Regulating valves to AUTO control. The operator will address 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO TURXMTPT_447 r:30 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD

• PT-447, 1st Stage Pressure starts to lower

• PT-446, 1st Stage Pressure remains constant

• A and B S/G Narrow Range levels will lower Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: With the C FRV in Manual, the C S/G level will remain stable. However, with this failure, the A and B FRVs will auto respond to the failure, and trend toward 39%

NR level. After stabilized there, the BOP will take MANUAL control of both the A and B FRVs and restore S/G level to the normal band.

APP-005-F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD NOTE: The CRS may enter AOP-025 directly (If so, See BELOW).

RO/ (Step 1) CHECK AMSAC Switch position per BOP current plant procedures BOP (Step 2) MONITOR the following parameters:

• PI-446, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESS

• PI-447, TURBINE FIRST STAGE NOTE: The BOP will notice PRESS that PT-447 has failed LOW, the CRS may enter AOP-025.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 25 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• LI-474, CH I SG 1 NAR RANGE LEVEL

• LI-485, CH I SG 2 NAR RANGE LEVEL

• LI-496, CH I SG 3 NAR RANGE LEVEL BOP (Step 3) IF the difference between SG level indicators (LI-474, LI-485, LI-496) is greater than or equal to 25%, THEN..

BOP (Step 4) IF the difference between 1st stage NOTE: The BOP will notice pressure indicators (PI-446, PI-447) is that PT-447 has failed LOW, greater than or equal to 150 psig, THEN: and the CRS will likely enter AOP-025, rather than OWP-033.

• DETERMINE which pressure indicator is suspect.

• REMOVE affected pressure channel from service per OWP-033, First Stage Pressure (FSP).

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section E of AOP-025.

• TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE, (PT-446, 447) - SECTION E AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 1) CHECK Turbine Load Rejection

• IN PROGRESS OR

• HAS OCCURRED CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 26 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) CHECK S/G Level Trend NOTE: FCV-498 is in CONTROLLING IN AUTO TO 39% MANUAL, and the failure has NOT caused C S/G level to change.

BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• ENSURE affected FRV controllers are in MAN:

• FCV478 NOTE: The BOP will place FCV-478 in MANUAL after level reaches 39%.

• FCV488 NOTE: The BOP will place FCV-488 in MANUAL after level reaches 39%.

• FCV498 NOTE: FCV-498 is already in MANUAL.

• CONTROL S/G level between 39% and 52%.

RO (Step 4) CONTROL Reactor Power:

PLACE rod bank selector switch in M NOTE: The RO already has (Manual) the control rods in MANUAL.

OPERATE rods to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) PERFORM The Following: NOTE: The C S/G Level is likely stabilized.

• CHECK S/G Level STABILIZED BETWEEN 39% AND 52%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 27 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6.a RNO) WHEN S/G level is stabilized NOTE: The BOP will be in the between 39% and 52%, THEN CONTINUE process of raising and WITH Step 6.b. stabilizing the A and B S/G Levels.

BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK FRV Controllers ALL IN NOTE: All FRV controllers are MAN: expected to be in MANUAL.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 CRS (Step 7) SELECT Alternate Channel For 1st Stage Pressure Input:

• Failed Channel - PT-447, Alternate Channel - PT-446 BOP (Step 8) ADJUST Each S/G Level To Program Level RO (Step 9) ADJUST Tavg To Within 1.5 TO

+1.5°F Of Tref RO (Step 10) CHECK Reactor Power GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%

BOP (Step 11) RESTORE Each S/G FRV To NOTE: The BOP will NOT Automatic: restore previously failed FRV-498 to AUTO.

• CHECK S/G level WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL BOP (Step 11 RNO) WHEN S/G level is within

+/-1% of programmed level, THEN PLACE affected controller in AUTO.

CRS

• GO TO Step 12.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 28 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) RESTORE Rod Control To NOTE: Since the power Automatic: increase is likely suspended, the RO/CRS may discuss placing the control rods back in AUTO.

• CHECK Tavg WITHIN 0.5 to +0.5°F OF Tref.

• Place Rod Control Selector Switch in AUTO CRS (Step 13) REMOVE Affected Transmitter From Service Using OWP033:

• Channel - PT-447, OWP-FSP-2 NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-033.

OWP-033, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE (FSP)

FSP-2, FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-447 CRS Address FSP-2 BOP Insert Trip Signals NOTE: The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room).

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN

• IRF BST100 f:TRIP

• IRF BST092 f:TRIP

• IRF BST017 f:TRIP

• IRF BST019 f:TRIP

• IRF BST021 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 29 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• B/S 447-2 HAGAN RACK #25 (70%

TURBINE LOAD LIMIT)

• B/S 447-1 HAGAN RACK #25 (PERMISSIVE P-7)

• B/S 475, HAGAN RACK #24 (LOOP 1 HI STM FLOW)

• B/S 485 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 2 HI STM FLOW)

• B/S 495 HAGAN RACK #25 (LOOP 3 HI STM FLOW)

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION E, TURBINE FIRST STAGE PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 14) CHECK TS LCO 3.3.1 And 3.3.2 NOTE: The CRS will address For Applicability Technical Specifications.

CRS (Step 15) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1 The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 30 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 17.e T. One channel T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (Turbine Impulse Pressure, P-inoperable interlock is in required state for 7 Input is affected; and that existing unit Action T.1 or T.2 is required.

conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> 2.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Functions 1.f D. One channel NOTE (SI-High Steam Flow in Two inoperable For Function 4.c, a channel may Steam Lines), 1.g (SI- High be taken out of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Steam Flow in Two Steam the trip condition Lines Coincident with Steam for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for Line Pressure Low), 4.d (MSI -

maintenance.

High Steam Flow in Two D.1 Place channel 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Steam Lines Coincident with in trip. Tavg LOW) and 4.e (MSI -

High Steam Flow in Two OR Steam Lines Coincident with D.2.1 Be in Steam Line Pressure Low),

18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> MODE 3. are affected; and that Actions D.1, or D.2.1 and D.2.2.

AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 31 of 61 Event

Description:

Turbine 1st Stage Pressure Transmitter PT-447 fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 4 Refer to LCO (Safety Injection), is affected, 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," which requires the Action of Function 1, for all LCO 3.3.2.

initiation functions and requirements.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 32 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Subsequently, a Cold Leg Small Break LOCA will occur (over 5 minutes) on the B Loop.

The operator will enter AOP-016, Excessive Primary Plant Leakage. Ultimately, the operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. When the reactor trips, the normal supply breaker to Bus E-1 will trip OPEN, and the A EDG Output Breaker will fail to CLOSE either automatically or manually; and Train A equipment will remain unavailable throughout the event. Additionally, the C SI Pump will fail to automatically start on SI, and the operator will be required to manually start this pump. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and the break size will become larger. Containment pressure will exceed 10 psig creating an Orange Path condition on the Containment Critical Safety Function. When this occurs, the B CV Spray will automatically start on HI-HI Containment Pressure, however, both SI-880C&D (B CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves) will fail to open automatically, and the operator will be required to manually open these valves. The scenario will terminate in EOP-E-1 after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig, or at Step 9 of FRP-J.1, Response to High Containment Pressure, after the operator has taken all necessary steps to reduce Containment pressure.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF RCS01C r:5:00 f:1000 Indications Available:

• Pressurizer level is lowering

• Pressurizer pressure is lowering

• Charging Pump is rising

• Containment pressure is rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: If a reactor trip occurs move forward to EOP-E-0 actions on Page 35.

AOP-016, EXCESSIVE PRIMARY PLANT LEAKAGE RO (Step 1) DETERMINE If Reactor Trip Needed As Follows:

• CHECK RCS Pressure GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG

• CHECK the following:

• PZR Level LESS THAN 14% AND LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 33 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OR

• RCS Subcooling LESS THAN 18°F RO (Step 1.b RNO) IF PZR Level can NOT be NOTE: This is a Continuous maintained greater than 14% OR Subcooling Action. The CRS will make can NOT be maintained greater than 18°F, both board operators aware.

THEN trip the Reactor and GO TO EOPE 0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

CRS

• GO TO Step 2.

CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

RO (Step 3) CONTROL Charging Flow To NOTE: The A Charging Maintain Desired RCS Level. Pump is running a maximum speed.

RO (Step 4) CHECK VCT Level LESS THAN 12.5 INCHES RO (Step 4 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less NOTE: This is a Continuous than 12.5 inches, THEN OBSERVE the Note Action. The CRS will make prior to Step 5 AND PERFORM Step 5. both board operators aware.

CRS

• GO TO Step 6.

RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Pump Status NOTE: Only one Charging LESS THAN TWO RUNNING Pump is available.

RO (Step 7) CHECK Charging Pump Status NONE RUNNING RO (Step 7 RNO) IF an additional Charging Pump is available, THEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 34 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS

• GO TO Step 11.

RO (Step 11) PLACE Running Charging Pump Speed Controller(s) In MAN AND ADJUST Output To Maximum RO (Step 12) CHECK RCS Level LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RO (Step 13) CHECK Any Letdown IN SERVICE RO (Step 14) ENSURE All Letdown Flowpaths Isolated As Follows:

• LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP Valves CLOSED

• HIC142, PURIFICATION FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO 0%

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW Controller ADJUSTED TO 0%

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP CLOSED RO (Step 15) CHECK RCS Level LOWERING NOTE: By this time it is likely IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER that Przr level is lowering uncontrollably.

RO (Step 16) CHECK RCS Pressure GREATER THAN 1000 PSIG RO/ (Step 17) TRIP The Reactor AND GO TO CRS EOPE0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 35 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES: NOTE: Bus E-1 is NOT energized.

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED BOP (Step 3) WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to Immediate Action restore power to deenergized AC Emergency Bus.

RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 36 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING NOTE: The operator has to manually start the C SI Pump.

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: The RCP Trip Criteria will apply in this event.

FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 NOTE: The Instrument FAILURE CRITERIA Bus/MCC-5 Criteria will apply in this event requiring performance of Attachment 2, and will likely be performed prior to Attachment 1.

SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform Attachment 2 with the AO, and then perform Attachment 1.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 2 and 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 43.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 2, DC BUS OR INSTRUMENT BUS FAILURE BOP (Step 1) IF DC Bus Failure Has Occurred, NOTE: A DC Bus failure has THEN NOT occurred.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) IF MCC5 Is NOT Energized, THEN NOTE: The CRS will dispatch PERFORM The Following: an AO, and direct that the AO perform Step 2 of Attachment 2 of EOP-E-0.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 2 minutes that this action is complete.

IRF EPSL005 f:SHDN_BUS IRF EPMSMCC5_187 f:

RACK_IN

• ENSURE DS Bus is ENERGIZED

• TRANSFER power source to DS Bus using the posted instructions at the Kirk Key Interlocked Breakers

• Locally RESET AND LOAD Instrument Air Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

BOP (Step 3) IF Instrument Bus Failure Has NOTE: The failure of Occurred,.. Instrument Bus 1 will be resolved with the restoration of power to MCC-5 (Step 2).

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 43.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as NOTE: There is no power to necessary. the A SI Pump, and the C SI had to be started manually.

Critical Task:

Establish flow from at least one high-head SI pump before transition out of E-0 Safety Significance: Failure to manually start at least one high-head SI pump under the postulated conditions constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity. In this case, at least one high-head SI pump can be manually started from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Additionally, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Finally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually start a high-head SI pump (when it is possible to do so) is a violation of the facility license condition.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A NOTE: Some valves will not Valves CLOSED have power. The BOP may dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) NOTE: Some valves will NOT as necessary. have power to CLOSE, however all CV penetrations will be isolated.

• IF ANY Containment penetration can NOT be isolated, THEN...

BOP

• CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

• CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG OR

• High steam flow with:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR

• Tavg LESS THAN 543°F BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 7.a RNO) Manually START pump(s) NOTE: The C and D SW as necessary. Pumps will be running. The A and B SW Pumps do NOT have power.

BOP (Step 7.b) CHECK SW Booster Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 7.b RNO) Manually START pump(s) NOTE: The B SW Booster as necessary. Pump will be running. The A SW Pump does NOT have power.

BOP (Step 7.c) CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING NOTE: BOTH EDGs are running however, the A EDG Output Breaker cannot be CLOSED.

BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

• CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED

• CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans NOTE: The 3 and 4 CV ALL RUNNING Recirc Fans will be running.

The 1 and 2 SW Fans do NOT have power.

BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 12 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R 11 OR R12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation.

• IF ANY Containment Ventilation NOTE: The BOP may contact Isolation valve does NOT close, THEN an AO to locally close valves.

manually OR locally ISOLATE If so, Booth Instructor AFFECTED penetration outside acknowledge as AO, and Containment while CONTINUING WITH report after 5 minutes that all this procedure.

valves are CLOSED.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation NOTE: If the AO has restored Aligned For Pressurization Mode: power to Instrument Bus 1 (Via restoration of MCC-5), each of these valves will be CLOSED.

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers NOTE: If the AO has restored ENERGIZED: power to MCC-5, each of these will be extinguished.

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may contact Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary the Inside AO.

(38 KW each): Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report that the B IA Compressor is running, and the A IA Compressor is NOT running.

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c

• If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps BOTH RUNNING (Step 6.a) Manually START pump(s). NOTE: The B MDAFW Pump will be running. The A MDAFW Pump does NOT have power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

• CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump NOTE: The SDAFW Pump is RUNNING running.

RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge NOTE: The A and C valves Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP are CLOSED, the B Valve is RUNNING OPEN.

RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS NOTE: Containment pressure REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG has remained < 10 psig.

CRS OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10.

RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm EXTINGUISHED OR

• Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE

• Seal Injection flow GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP OR

• Thermal Barrier Ps GREATER THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures: NOTE: The LOCA may be causing a cooldown. If so, the RNO will be performed.

Otherwise proceed to Step 12.

• With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F OR

• With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:

• STOP dumping steam.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

• CHECK SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core NOTE: Adverse Containment Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F[32°F] Numbers may be required.

• STOP ALL RCPs NOTE: Depending on the timing of mitigation actions, the RCP trip criteria may or may not be met.

If the criteria is NOT met here, the leak degrades after entry into EOP-E-1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied:

SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:

• Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS

• R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

• S/G levels NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER CRS (Step 16) PERFORM the following:

• CHECK If RCS Is Intact:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CV radiation NORMAL

• R2, CV AREA

• R32A, CV HIGH RANGE

• R32B, CV HIGH RANGE

• CV pressure NORMAL

• CV Sump level NORMAL NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-1.

Booth Instructor: The Cold Leg break will degrade IMF RCS01C r:2:00 f:3 NOTE: Shortly after entry into EOP-E-1, it is expected that an Orange path will occur on the Containment CSFST. When the CRS transitions to FRP-J.1, continue with the below actions.

FRP-J.1, RESPONSE TO HIGH CONTAINMENT PRESSURE CRS (Step 1) CHECK CV Spray Operation CONTROLLED BY EOPECA1.1, Loss Of Emergency Coolant Recirculation CRS (Step 1 RNO) GO TO Step 2.

RO (Step 2.a) CHECK Containment Spray NOTE: The A CV Spray Status: Pump has no power.

• CHECK CV Spray pumps BOTH RUNNING RO (Step 2.a RNO) PERFORM the following:

• ENSURE CV Spray Pump Inlet Valves are OPEN:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• SI844A

• SI844B

• Manually START CV Spray Pump(s). NOTE: The A CV Spray Pump has no power.

RO (Step 2.b.1) CHECK CV Spray System PROPER VALVE ALIGNMENT

• CHECK CV Spray Pump Discharge valves OPEN

• SI880A NOTE: SI-880A and B have no power.

• SI880B

• SI880C NOTE: SI-880A and B have failed to Auto Open.

• SI880D RO (Step 2.b.1 RNO) Manually OPEN valve(s) as necessary.

RO (Step 2.b.2) CHECK CV Spray Additive Tank NOTE: SI-845A has no power Discharge Valves OPEN and B has failed to Auto Open.

• SI845A

• SI845B RO (Step 2.b.2 RNO) IF Spray Additive Tank NOTE: The operator will level is GREATER THAN 0%, THEN manually open SI-845B.

manually OPEN valve(s) as necessary.

RO (Step 2.b.3) CHECK Spray Additive Tank flow APPROXIMATELY 12 GPM

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2.b.3 RNO) IF Spray Additive Tank NOTE: SI-845B will be level is GREATER THAN 0%, THEN adjusted such that flow is 12 ADJUST SI845C, SAT THROTTLING gpm.

VALVE, as necessary.

Critical Task:

Manually actuate at least one CV Spray Train before Transitioning to EOP-ES-1.2 Safety Significance: Failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment under the postulated conditions demonstrates the inability of the crew to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. In this case, the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment can be manually actuated from the control room. Therefore, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment also represents a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to effectively direct or manipulate engineered safety feature (ESF) controls that would prevent (degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity). Additionally, under the postulated plant conditions, failure to manually actuate the minimum required complement of containment cooling equipment (when it is possible to do so) results in a failure to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

RO (Step 2.c) CHECK Containment Isolation NOTE: Some valves will NOT Phase B Valves CLOSED have power.

RO (Step 2.c RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as NOTE: The RO may dispatch necessary. an AO to locally check the position of the A Train valves.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

• IF ANY Containment Isolation Phase B valve can NOT be closed, THEN locally ISOLATE AFFECTED penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

RO (Step 2.d) STOP ALL RCPs

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Trip all RCPs within 6 minutes of meeting the EOP-E-0/E-1 RCP Trip Criteria (Containment Isolation Phase B ACTUATED, OR BOTH of the following satisfied:

SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW AND RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]) so that CET temperatures do not become superheated when forced circulation in the RCS stops.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCPs under the postulated plant conditions leads to core uncovery and to fuel cladding temperatures in excess of 2200°F, which is the limit specified in the ECCS acceptance criteria. Thus, failure to perform the task represents mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator has failed to prevent degradation of the fuel cladding barrier to fission product release and which leads to a violation of the facility license condition.

RO (Step 3) MONITOR Spray Additive Tank level GREATER THAN 0%

BOP (Step 4) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass NOTE: depending on the Valves CLOSE timing of mitigation actions, the MSIVs may be open or closed.

If the MSIVs are OPEN, the BOP will perform the Step 4 RNO.

BOP (Step 4 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.

RO (Step 5) CHECK Containment Isolation NOTE: Some valves will NOT Phase A Valves CLOSED have power to CLOSE, however all CV penetrations will either be isolated, or in the process of being isolated from the performance of Attachment 1 of EOP-E-0.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5 RNO) IF valve(s) are NOT CLOSED AND associated flow path(s) are NOT necessary, THEN manually CLOSE AFFECTED valve(s).

• IF AFFECTED valve(s) can NOT be CLOSED, THEN locally ISOLATE affected penetration outside Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation NOTE: Some valves will NOT VALVES CLOSED have power.

BOP (Step 6 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R11 OR R12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation.

• IF ANY Containment Ventilation NOTE: The BOP may dispatch Isolation Valve does NOT CLOSE, an AO to locally check the THEN manually OR locally ISOLATE position of the A Train AFFECTED penetration outside valves.

Containment while CONTINUING WITH If so, Booth Instructor this procedure. acknowledge as AO.

RO (Step 7) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans NOTE: The A Train HVH ALL RUNNING Fans do not have power.

RO (Step 7 RNO) Manually START fan(s) as necessary.

BOP (Step 8) CHECK If Feed Flow Should Be Isolated To ANY S/G:

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs:

• ANY S/G pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner OR

• ANY S/G completely depressurized

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 8 RNO) GO TO Step 9.

CRS (Step 9) PERFORM The Following:

• RESET SPDS

• RETURN TO Procedure AND Step In Examiner NOTE: The CRS Effect will transition back to EOP-E-1 (Go to step that was in effect at the time that FRP-J.1 was entered).

EOP-E-1, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Examiner NOTE: Terminate the exam AT ANY TIME after Containment pressure has been lowered to less than 10 psig.

RO/ FOLDOUT PAGE:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA SI TERMINATION CRITERIA SI REINITIATION CRITERIA SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA EOPE3 TRANSITION CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA RO (Step 1) CHECK If RCPs Should Be NOTE: The RCPs are OFF.

Stopped:

CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CRS (Step 1.a RNO) GO TO Step 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Intact S/G Levels: NOTE: Adverse Containment Numbers will be required.

CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels GREATER THAN 9% [18%]

CONTROL feed flow to maintain S/G Narrow Range levels BETWEEN 9% [18%] AND 50%

RO (Step 4) RESET SI RO (Step 5) RESET Containment Isolation Phase A BOP (Step 6) CHECK Secondary Radiation:

• CHECK Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS

• R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

• PERFORM the following: NOTE: The CRS may call Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

• REQUEST Chemistry periodically sample ALL S/Gs for activity.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Secondary sample results NORMAL (WHEN RESULTS AVAILABLE)

RO (Step 7) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block NOTE: The A Train Block Valves: Valve does NOT have power.

• CHECK Power to PZR PORV Block Valves AVAILABLE

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK PZR PORV Block valves AT LEAST ONE OPEN RO (Step 8) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

• CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm EXTINGUISHED

• RESET IA PCV1716,INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV1716 OPEN BOP (Step 9) CHECK Power Supply To Charging Pumps OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE RO (Step 10) CHECK If Charging Flow Has Been Established:

• CHECK Charging Pumps AT LEAST NOTE: The A Charging ONE RUNNING Pump is the only Charging Pump available.

• ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves NOTE: The BOP may contact the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: variable IRF CVC031 f: variable IRF CVC032 f: variable

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated RO (Step 11) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core NOTE: Adverse Containment Exit T/Cs GREATER THAN 18°F Numbers will be required.

[37°F]

CRS (Step 11 RNO) GO TO Step 12.

RO (Step 12) CHECK If Containment Spray Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK CV Spray Pumps ANY RUNNING

• CHECK Containment pressure LESS NOTE: CV pressure will likely THAN 4 PSIG be lowering, and may be below 4 psig.

If so, move forward to Step 13.

CRS (Step 12.b) WHEN Containment pressure is NOTE: This is a Continuous LESS THAN 4 psig, THEN PERFORM Steps Action. The CRS will make 12.e. both board operators aware.

• OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 13 AND CONTINUE WITH Step 13.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 57 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 13) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be NOTE: This is a Continuous Stopped: Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• Pressure GREATER THAN 275 PSIG NOTE: Adverse Containment

[325 PSIG] Numbers will be required.

CRS (Step 13.a RNO) GO TO Step 15.

BOP (Step 15) CHECK If Diesel Generators Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK AC Emergency Busses ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER

• Bus E1,BKR 52/18B CLOSED NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-energized. The CRS may stop here and address the possibility of restoring power to Bus E-1.

• Bus E2,BKR 52/28B CLOSED

• CHECK Emergency Diesel Generator(s)

Starting Air annunciators EXTINGUISHED

• APP010B2, EDG A START AIR LO PRESS

• APP010B3, EDG B START AIR LO PRESS

• STOP ANY unloaded Emergency Diesel Generator(s)

CRS (Step 16) INITIATE Evaluation Of Plant Status:

• CHECK Cold Leg Recirculation capability:

• Train A:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 58 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK the following pumps AVAILABLE

• RHR Pump A

• ANY CCW Pump

• ANY two SW Pumps

• CHECK the following valves AVAILABLE

• SI860A, CV SUMP TO RHR

• SI861A, CV SUMP TO RHR

• SI862A, RWST TO RHR

• CC749A, CCW FROM RHR HX

• Train B:

• CHECK the following pumps AVAILABLE

• RHR Pump B

• ANY CCW Pump

• ANY two SW Pumps

• CHECK the following valves AVAILABLE

• SI860B, CV SUMP TO RHR

• SI861B, CV SUMP TO RHR

• SI862B, RWST TO RHR

• CC749B, CCW FROM RHR HX

• CHECK Auxiliary Building Conditions NORMAL

• R3, PASS PANEL AREA

• R4, CHARGING PUMP ROOM

• R6, SAMPLING ROOM

• RI14C, Plant Effluent NGLO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 59 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• LI615A, RHR PIT "A" LEVEL INDICATOR

• LI615B, RHR PIT "B" LEVEL INDICATOR

• Aux Bldg Sump Tank "A" level

• Aux Bldg Sump Tank "B" level

• OBTAIN samples:

• CONTACT Chemistry to obtain the NOTE: The CRS may call following samples: WCC/Chemistry to address the sampling requirements.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

• RCS boron concentration

• RCS activity

• CV atmosphere

• CONSULT Plant Operations Staff as NOTE: The CRS may call necessary to assess additional WCC/Plant Management to sampling requirements for fuel address the sampling damage requirements.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/ Plant Management.

• EVALUATE plant equipment to support long term recovery:

• RHR Pumps

• SI Pumps

• CV Spray Pumps

• CV Fans

• AFW Pumps

• SW System

• CCW System

• IVSW System

• EDG Fuel and Auxiliaries

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 60 of 61 Event

Description:

Cold Leg SBLOCA/480 VAC Bus E-1 De-energizes /C SI Pump fails to Auto Start/ CV Spray Valves SI-880C and D fail to OPEN Automatically Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• START additional plant equipment to assist in recovery as necessary:

• Aux Boiler NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO to start the Aux Boiler.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

• Other plant equipment needed during RCS cooldown to Cold Shutdown RO (Step 17) CHECK If RCS Cooldown AND Depressurization Is Required:

• CHECK RCS pressure GREATER NOTE: Adverse Containment THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] Numbers will be required.

RO (Step 17.a RNO) IF RHR Pump flow is GREATER THAN 1500 gpm, THEN ...

• IF RHR Pump flow is LESS THAN 1500 gpm, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS.

• GO TO EOPES1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown And Depressurization, Step 1.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16 1-2 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 75%

c) Turbine Load: 543 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 1476 ppm e) Rod Height: 172 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 44.2%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1.

b) The C Charging Pump is also OOS.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) B SI Pump from E-1

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-928, C SI Accumulator Level, is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-009-C3, AIR SIDE SEAL OIL BU PMP OVLD, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED (i.e. OFF) condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 100% in accordance with Reactivity Plan

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) will be available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 2100 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch dilutions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100% power

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-3 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111115 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-3

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System (Amendment 203)

2. AOP-024, Loss of Instrument Bus (Rev 41)

3. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating (Amendment 176)

4. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, Distribution System - Operating (Amendment 176)

5. AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction (Rev 33)

6. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure (Rev 24)

7. OWP-026, Feed Flow (FWF) (Rev 14)

8. AOP-038, Rapid Downpower (Rev 3)

9. APP-001 Miscellaneous NSSS (Rev 60)

10. AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS Pressure Control (Rev 20)

11. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System (Amendment 203)

12. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature and Flow Departure From Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits (Amendment 176)

13. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORVs)

(Amendment 203)

14. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

15. EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 7)

16. CSFST, Critical Safety Function Status Trees (Rev 7)

17. FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink (Rev 29)

18. OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System (Rev 96)

Validation Time: 72 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered.

Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, EMERG OIL PMP OVLD, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-RO Loss of Instrument Bus 3 C-BOP C(TS)-SRO 2 2 I-BOP B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW I-SRO 3 NA R-RO Load Decrease N-BOP N-SRO 4 3 C-RO Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED C-SRO 5 4 I-RO PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to I(TS)-SRO fully CLOSE 6 5 M-RO Inadvertent FWIS M-BOP M-SRO 7 6 C-BOP Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate 8 7 NA A & B MDAFW Pump Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #3 The plant is at 68% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The SDAFW Pump is OOS, and has been for 7 days. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.4 ACTION C has just been entered. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, EMERG OIL PMP OVLD, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, Loss of Instrument Bus, and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources -

Operating, and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems-Operating.

Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G B, FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, Feed Flow (FWF).

Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve.

Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS pressure Control, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).

After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur.

Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the A and B MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 operator will direct that AFW Pump C be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, however, the AFW Pump C Diesel will fail to start.

The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control B S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the B S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This effective steamline break is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary.

Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operators having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 610 T = 0 Malfunctions:

SDAFW Pump OOS:

• irf EPSMCC5_189 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8A, A S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC6_226 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8B, B S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC6_227 f: RACK_OUT (V1-8C, C S/G supply to SDAFW)

• irf EPSMCC10_262 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14A, SDAFW discharge to A S/G)

• irf EPSMCC9_254 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14B, SDAFW discharge to B S/G)

• irf EPSMCC10_267 f: RACK_OUT (V2-14C, SDAFW discharge to C S/G)

PLACE RED CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches for the Valves ABOVE Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):

• A MDAFW RTGB Switch

• B MDAFW RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16A RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16B RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-16C RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-20A RTGB Switch

• AFW Valve V2-20B RTGB Switch

• Protected Switchyard TI-471 PRT Temperature indication OOS

• IOR aoPRTAOD30A f:50 Place WHITE DOT on TI-471 RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3 failed on

• IMF ANNXN08C03 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-008-C3 Insert the following:

• IMF TUR02A (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)

• IMF TUR02B (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)

• IMF TUR02C (Turbine fails to AUTO Trip)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IOR diTUREHI029 f:AS-IS (Turbine Fails to Runback on Reactor Trip)

• IRF SGN023 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)

• IRF SGN024 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)

• IRF SGN025 f:NO_AUTO (Auto MSI Fails)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF CFW1A d:45 (A MDAFW Pump Trips after Auto Start)

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF CFW1B d:45 (B MDAFW Pump Trips after Auto Start)

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• OST-947, Operations Reactivity Plan

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-3.

At direction of Event 1 examiner Loss of Instrument Bus 3 IRF EPSIB3_600 f:OPEN At direction of Event 2 B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW examiner ICO CFWXMTFT_487 r:00:30 f:0 At direction of Event 3 Load Decrease examiner NA NOTE: to initiate this event, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that It has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

At direction of Event 4 Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller examiner fails CLOSED IMF CVC07 r:30 f:100 IOR aoCVCAAD046A r:30 f:100

$006_PCV-145_MAN DMF CVC07

$_PCV-145_MAN DOR aoCVCAAD046A Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 5 examiner PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE ICO RPSXMTPT_444 r:01:00 f:2500 IMF PRS03D f:10 when

$006_PCV-455C_OPEN At direction of Event 6 Inadvertent FWIS examiner IMF CFW20A c:20 IMF CFW20B c:20 IMF CFW20C c:20 Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Post-Rx Trip Event 8 A & B MDAFW Pump Trip NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 9 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Shortly after taking the watch, Instrument Bus 3 will de-energize. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-024, Loss of Instrument Bus, and restore power to the Bus. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources - Operating, and Technical Specification LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems-Operating.

Booth Operator Instructions: IRF EPSIB3_600 f:OPEN Indications Available:

• C Feed Regulating Valve Controller in MANUAL

• FR-498 Stem/Feed Flow Recorder for C S/G is de-energized

• Bistable Panel A is de-energized

• PT-445, Pzr Pressure has failed LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-024, LOSS OF INSTRUMENT BUS BOP (Step 1) Place The Main Turbine in Manual Immediate Action BOP (Step 2) Verify S/G(s) Maintained At Program Immediate Action Level RO (Step 3) Place Rods in M (Manual) Immediate Action RO (Step 4) Maintain Reactor Power Less Than OR Equal To 100%

RO (Step 5) Determine If RCS Makeup Needs To Be Stopped:

• Check Auto Makeup, Boration OR Dilution IN PROGRESS OR

• Check Instrument Bus 2 AND Instrument Bus 7 DEENERGIZED RO (Step 5 RNO) IF Auto Makeup is received, THEN Check Auto Makeup, Boration

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 10 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS

• Go To Step 7 RO (Step 7) Control PZR Heaters And Sprays To Restore RCS Pressure To The Desired Control Band CRS (Step 8) Make PA Announcement For NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

RO (Step 9) Control Charging And Letdown Flow To Maintain PZR Level RO (Step 10) Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM BOP (Step 11) Determine Failed Instrument Bus (IB) From Any Of The Following:

• Available indications OR

• Table Below

• 3, FR-498, "C" S/G Level BOP (Step 12) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2 ENERGIZED FROM THE 4160V BUSSES RO/ (Step 13) Check Affected Instrument Bus BOP ENERGIZED CRS (Step 13 RNO) WHEN affected Instrument NOTE: Step 14 will be Bus is Energized, THEN observe the NOTE performed when power to IB-3 prior to Step 14 and perform Step 14 is restored.

CRS

• Go To Step 15.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 11 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 15) Check LCV460A & B, LTDN LINE STOP CLOSED RO (Step 16) Place The Selector Switch For LCV 460A & B In The Closed Position RO (Step 17) Verify only ONE Charging Pump running at minimum speed RO (Step 18) Check RCP Seal Injection Flow Between 8 GPM and 13 GPM RO/ (Step 19) Check Affected Instrument Bus BOP ENERGIZED RO/ (Step 19 RNO) Locally perform the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP applicable step below: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the IB-3 Feeder breaker has tripped, and that there is no apparent reason for the trip (i.e. no acrid odor).

• IB1 through IB4

• IF the cause is known OR NOT a fault NOTE: The CRS will direct the OR suspected damage, THEN attempt AO to attempt to re-close the to reset and close the open IB-3 Feeder Breaker.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use:

IRF EPSIB3_600 f:CLOSE and report after 1 minute that the IB-3 is re-energized.

BOP (Step 20) Stop All Radioactive Batch Releases

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 12 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 21) Check Status Of Local Actions:

• Check Local Actions Of Step 19 RNO REQUIRED

• Check Local Actions Of Step 19 RNO ATTEMPTED RO/ (Step 22) Check Affected Instrument Bus NOTE: IB-3 is energized.

BOP ENERGIZED RO (Step 23) Restore RCS Makeup Control To AUTO

• Place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch in STOP

• Verify the RCS MAKEUP MODE Switch in AUTO

• Momentarily place the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch to START RO (Step 24) Restore Rod Control To Automatic As Follows:

• Check Power GREATER THAN 15%

• Check Automatic Rod Control AVAILABLE

• Place the Rod Control Selector Switch to A (Automatic)

BOP (Step 25) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2 ENERGIZED BOP (Step 26) Check Emergency Busses E1 AND E2 ENERGIZED FROM THEIR 4160V BUSSES

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 13 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 27) Implement The EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

RO/ (Step 28) Check Status Of Instrument Bus 4 BOP ENERGIZED:

BOP (Step 29) Place Turbine Controls In Automatic RO (Step 30) Determine CCW Pump Status As Follows:

• Check CCW Pumps MORE THAN ONE RUNNING

• Check CCW Pumps MORE THAN ONE REQUIRED

• Stop CCW Pumps as necessary using OP306 Section, Operating CCW Pumps, to obtain desired CCW pump status BOP (Step 31) Check RMS1, RMS2, RMS3, AND RMS4 ALL OPEN BOP (Step 32) Check Affected Instrument Bus ENERGIZED RO (Step 33) Check PZR Heater Status DEENERGIZED RO (Step 34) Reset PZR Heaters As Follows:

• Place PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP Control Switch to OFF position AND return to ON position

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 14 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Place PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A Control Switch to OFF position AND return to AUTO OR ON position as desired

• Place PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B Control Switch to OFF position AND return to AUTO OR ON position as desired RO (Step 35) Check Normal Letdown ISOLATED CRS (Step 35 RNO) Go To Step 37.

BOP (Step 37) Check All Radiation Monitor Alarms EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 37 RNO) Reset Radiation Monitor alarms that are illuminated due to loss of Instrument Bus as follows:

• For RMS 1112, 1518, OR 2031, momentarily depress ALARM/RESET Pushbutton.

• For RMS 19 OR 33, momentarily depress the RESET Pushbutton.

• For RMS 14 OR 19, contact E&C NOTE: The CRS may call personnel to reset the monitor(s). WCC/Chemistry to address resetting R-14s.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry and use:

IRF RMS067 f:RESET IRF RMS068 f:RESET IRF RMS069 f:RESET And report that the R-14 monitors have been reset.

• For RMS32, momentarily depress SAFE/RESET Pushbutton.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 15 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 38) Check R11 OR R12 IN SERVICE

• RMS1, RMS2, RMS3, and RMS4 OPEN AND

• R11 and R12 Vacuum Pump Operating BOP (Step 39) Check R20, Fuel Handling Bldg Lower Level Low Range IN SERVICE BOP (Step 40) Check R21, Fuel Handling Bldg Upper Level IN SERVICE BOP (Step 41) Check Control Room Ventilation ALIGNED FOR PRESSURIZATION MODE CRS (Step 41 RNO) Go To Step 43.

RO (Step 43) Check PZR PRV Safety Acoustic Monitor Lights ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 43 RNO) Go To Step 45.

RO/ (Step 45) Check Instrument Busses 1, 2, 3, BOP AND 4 ENERGIZED FROM THEIR NORMAL SOURCE (As Indicated Below):

• IB1: MCC5 (Via E1)

• IB2: INVERTER A

• IB3: INVERTER B

• IB4: MCC6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 16 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 46) Check Status of EDGs START SIGNAL RECEIVED CRS (Step 46 RNO) Observe the NOTE prior to Step 65 and Go To Step 65.

BOP (Step 65) Check ALL Safety Related Electrical Buses ENERGIZED CRS (Step 66) Check Technical Specifications For NOTE: The CRS will address Applicable LCOs the Technical Specifications.

• ITS LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating

• ITS LCO 3.8.7, AC Instrument Bus Sources Operating

• ITS LCO 3.8.9, Distribution Systems Operating RO (Step 67) Check Annunciator APP005A3, PR DROP ROD ILLUMINATED RO (Step 68) Reset Dropped Rod Alarm By Performing The Following:

• Place DROPPED ROD MODE switch for the affected Power Range Drawer to RESET Position

• Place DROPPED ROD MODE switch for the affected Power Range Drawer to NORMAL Position

• Check Annunciator APP005A3, PR DROP ROD EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 69) Check APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 69 RNO) Go To Step 71

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 17 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 71) Check APP005F5, AMSAC TROUB/BYPD ILLUMINATED BOP (Step 72) Reset AMSAC TROUB/BYPD NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Alarm By Depressing The SYSTEM RESET an AO.

Pushbutton On AMSAC Front Panel. If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry and use:

IRF RPS005 f:RESET And report that AMSAC have been reset.

(Step 73) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.7, AC INSTRUMENT BUS SOURCES -

OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.7 The following AC Instrument Bus Power Sources shall be OPERABLE:

• Inverters A and B, and

• Constant Voltage Transformers (CVT) 1 and 2.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 18 of 46 Event

Description:

Loss of Instrument Bus 3 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1 is A. One AC NOTE: Enter 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> required (When Inverter is Instrument Bus applicable power source Conditions and NOT powering IB-3).

inoperable. Required Actions of LCO 3.8.9, "Distribution Systems -

Operating" with any instrument bus de-energized.

A.1 Restore AC Instrument Bus Power Source to OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.8.9, DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS - OPERATING CRS LCO 3.8.9 Train A and Train B AC, DC, and AC instrument bus electrical power distribution subsystems shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION B.1 is B. One AC B.1 Restore AC 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> required (When IB-3 is de-instrument bus instrument bus subsystem subsystem to AND energized).

inoperable. OPERABLE 16 hour1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> from status. discovery of failure to meet LCO At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 19 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Following this, the controlling feed flow channel for S/G B, FT-487, will fail LOW, causing FRV-498 to start to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-026, Feed Flow (FWF).

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO CFWXMTFT_487 r:00:30 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-B1, S/G B FW > STM FLOW

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-B2, S/G B STM > FW FLOW

• B S/G Feed flow lower than Steam flow on FR-488

• FRV-488 controller output at 100%

• FRV-488 Red status light is LIT, Green status light is OFF Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD.

Examiner Note: It is possible that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-010 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first.

If so, proceed to AOP-025 section below.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION NOTE: The BOP will take Immediate Actions to control FCV-488 in MANUAL prior to procedure implementation.

BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):

NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-488 in MANUAL.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 20 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action

• ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control.

• ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow.

• STOP any load change in progress.

• If unable to control S/G level, THEN..

Critical Task:

Manually control B S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the B S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BOP BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 21 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58 BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level AT OR NOTE: The CRS will likely TRENDING TO PROGRAM transition to AOP-025 based on the Note prior to Step 58.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE NOTE: The BOP will take Immediate Actions to control FCV-488 in MANUAL prior to procedure implementation.

CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section D of AOP-025.

• S/G Feed Flow (FT-487) - SECTION D (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

(Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 1) CHECK Affected FRV In MAN: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-488 in MANUAL.

• FCV488 (FRV "B")

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 22 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1 RNO) PLACE affected FRV in Immediate Action manual.

BOP (Step 2) RESTORE Affected S/G Level To Immediate Action Program Critical Task:

Manually control B S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the B S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is NOTE: This is a Continuous approached, THEN TRIP the reactor, Action. The CRS will make Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. both board operators aware.

GO TO Step 5.

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 7) PLACE Affected S/G Feed Flow Selector Switch to the Alternate Channel:

• S/G B FEED FLOW - FR-488

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 23 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Failed Channel FT-487 - Position CH486 BOP (Step 8) RESTORE Affected Controller to Automatic:

• CHECK S/G level - WITHING +/-1% OF NOTE: The BOP may not PROGRAMMED LEVEL have S/G level at programmed, and perform the RNO (Placing affected controller in AUTO when at programmed level).

• PLACE affected controller in AUTO.

BOP (Step 9) REMOVE Affected Transmitter from NOTE: The CRS will address Servicing Using OWP-026: OWP-026.

• CHANNEL FT-487 - OWP FWF-4 OWP-026, FEEDWATER FLOW (FWF)

FWF-4, STEAM GENERATOR B FEEDWATER FLOW TRANSMITTER FT-487 CRS Address FWF-4 BOP FR-488 FEEDWATER FLOW SELECTOR SWITCH - Selected to 486 BOP DELETE INPUT FT-487 FROM CALO PROCESSING. (FWF0424A)

NOTE: The CRS will return to AOP-025, Section D.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 10) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability:

• TS LCO 3.3.1

• TS LCO 3.3.2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 24 of 46 Event

Description:

B Feed Flow Transmitter FT-487 Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 11) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 NOTE: The CRS will return to the main body of AOP-025.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure And Step In NOTE: The CRS will likely Effect conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 25 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Next, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that it has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and that station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

Booth Operator Instructions: Call as the WCCS and state It has been determined that the SDAFW Pump will not be restored to OPERABLE status within the next two hours as expected, and station management has directed that the plant be brought to Mode 3 within the next four hours using AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST 947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN

• Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min

• Target Power Level ___

• Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 130 Steps.

• Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine 350 gallons.

RO (Step 3) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE CRS (Step 4) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 26 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Reason for downpower

• Target Power Level

• Target Rod Height

• Rate of load reduction

• Amount of boric acid addition RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters

• PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control IN AUTO RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action.

RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 27.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 27 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2 RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

• IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

• RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure

• CHECK EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO

• PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:

• CHECK IMP IN ILLUMINATED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 28 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8.b.1 RNO 1) IF Turbine Load reduction is available using IMP IN, THEN PERFORM the following:

• DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton

• CHECK IMP IN light illuminated

• CHECK IMP OUT light extinguished BOP (Step 8.b) SET desired load in the SETTER

• SELECT the desired Load Rate

• DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5°F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:

• ADJUST Load Rate OR

• DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons CRS/ (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The NOTE: The CRS may ask BOP Following: SM/WCC/Communicator to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge.

• Load Dispatcher of load reduction

• E&C to control secondary chemistry

• RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley

• Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team

• E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

• E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3 Page 29 of 46 Event

Description:

Load Decrease Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• NRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers AT LEAST ONE OPERATING BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is NOTE: The BOP will dispatch required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least an AO.

one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY Booth Instructor HEATING SYSTEM. acknowledge as AO.

RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg WITHIN 5°F OF Tref RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution WITHIN TARGET BAND BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions MET:

• Target load/power has been reached

• Load reduction is no longer required

• CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction

• STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 4 Page 30 of 46 Event

Description:

Letdown Line Pressure Control Valve Controller fails CLOSED During the downpower, the Letdown Pressure Control Valve (PCV-145) controller will fail such that the valve will fail closed. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS, and ultimately take manual control of the valve.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CVC07 r:30 f:100 IOR aoCVCAAD046A r:30 f:100

$006_PCV-145_MAN DMF CVC07

$_PCV-145_MAN DOR aoCVCAAD046A Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-E6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS

• PCV-145 CLOSES

• Normal Letdown flow indicates 0 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD.

APP-001-D6, LP LTDN LN HI PRESS RO (Step 1) IF controller PC-145 has NOTE: The RO will take malfunctioned, THEN TAKE manual control Manual control of PC-145 and of PC-145. control letdown pressure manually.

RO (Step 2) IF PT-145 has failed, THEN ... NOTE: PT-145 has NOT failed.

RO (Step 3) IF PCV-145 failed, THEN . NOTE: PCV-145 has NOT failed.

RO (Step 4) IF Letdown is required AND PCV- NOTE: PCV-145 has NOT 145 failed, THEN . failed.

RO (Step 5) IF too many orifices are in service, THEN .

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 31 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Shortly afterwards, PZR Pressure transmitter PT-444 will fail HIGH causing the Pzr Spray valves and Pzr PORV to OPEN. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-019, Malfunction of RCS pressure Control, and/or AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. RCS pressure control will remain in MANUAL for the remainder of the scenario. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System, Technical Specification LCO 3.4.1, RCS Pressure, Temperature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.11, Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs).

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO RPSXMTPT_444 r:01:00 f:2500 IMF PRS03D f:10 when

$006_PCV-455C_OPEN Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-C7, PZR PRESS CONTROLLER HI OUTPUT

• Narrow Range Pressurizer Pressure rising on PR-444

• Master Pressure controller PC-444J demand rising to 100%

• Both Pressurizer Spray valves indicate fully OPEN

• Pressurizer PORV PCV-455C Red status light is LIT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the CRS will place the Turbine in HOLD.

Examiner Note: It is possible that the CRS will respond to the symptoms and enter AOP-019 first. However, the crew may recognize the failure and respond by entering AOP-025 first.

If so, proceed to AOP-025 ,

Step 1, actions on Page 33.

NOTE: The RO will likely take action, including closing the PORV Block before the CRS enters the procedure.

AOP-019, MALFUNCTION OF RCS PRESSURE CONTROL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 32 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming Immediate Action Switches Selected to NORMAL RO (Step 2) Determine If PZR PORVs should be Immediate Action closed:

• Check PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG

• ENSURE both PZR PORVs - CLOSED RO (Step2b RNO) IF any PZR PORV can NOT Immediate Action be closed THEN close its PORV BLOCK NOTE: PCV-455C will OPEN Valve. in about 1 minute.

RO (Step 3) Control the Normal PZR Spray Immediate Action Valves AND PZR Heaters to Restore RCS Pressure to the desired control Band.

CRS (Step 4) Make PA Announcement for NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

RO (Step 5) Check PZR Pressure - UNDER OPERATOR CONTROL Critical Task:

Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 33 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 6) Check Pressurizer Pressure Transmitter PT-444 OR PT-445 - FAILED.

CRS (Step 7) Go To AOP025, RTGB Instrument NOTE: The CRS will transition Failure to AOP-025.

Examiner Note: If the CRS addresses AOP-025 rather than AOP-019, follow actions here.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For Failed Instrument:

• PZR PRESSURE (PT-444) - Section C NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section C of AOP-025.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION C, PZR PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE RO (Step 1) CHECK Both LTOPP Arming Immediate Action Switches - SELECTED TO NORMAL RO (Step 2) DETERMINE If PZR PORVs should Immediate Action be closed:

• CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG

• CHECK both PZR PORVs CLOSED RO (Step 2b RNO) IF any PZR PORV can NOT Immediate Action be closed, THEN CLOSE associated PORV BLOCK valve.

NOTE: The RO will have previously determined that PCV-455C has failed to CLOSE, and Close the Block Valve.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 34 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) CONTROL PZR Heaters and Spray Immediate Action to restore RCS Pressure to desired Control Band CRS (Step 4) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

RO (Step 5) CHECK PT-445 - FAILED RO (Step 5 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• ENSURE PC-444J in MAN.

• ENSURE PZR SPRAY VALVEs are in AUTO.

• CONTROL PZR pressure with PC-444J.

Critical Task:

Manually close the OPEN Pzr Spray Valve(s) and PORV before the Reactor trips based on low pressurizer pressure.

Safety Significance: failure to close the Spray Valves/PORV and stop the pressure transient, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the pressure transient. A failure to stabilize the pressure transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS pressure control.

RO (Step 6) CHECK Selector Switch PM-444 -

SELECTED TO THE OPERABLE CHANNEL

• REC 445 RO (Step 6 RNO) SELECT operable channel

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 35 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 7) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability: NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the instrument failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

• TS LCO 3.3.4

• TS LCO 3.4.1

• TS LCO 3.4.11 CRS (Step 8) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step NOTE: The CRS will return to 2 the main body of AOP-025.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 2) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 3) RETURN TO Procedure and Step in Effect NOTE: The CRS will address Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.4, REMOTE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Function shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3. NOTE: The CRS will determine that only one Pressurizer Pressure instrument is required, and that the other channel is OPERABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 36 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.1, RCS PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE AND FLOW DEPARTURE FROM NUCLEATE BOILING (DNB) LIMITS CRS LCO 3.4.1 RCS DNB parameters for pressurizer pressure, RCS average temperature, and RCS total flow rate shall be within the limits specified below:

• Pressurizer Pressure 2205 psig CRS APPLICABILITY: Mode 1 CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: If RCS pressure ACTION TIME lowered to less than 2205 A. One or more A.1 Restore RCS psig, the CRS will determine RCS DNB DNB parameter(s) to within limit. 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> that ACTION A.1 is required.

parameters not within limits.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.11, PRESSURIZER POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVES (PORVS)

CRS LCO 3.4.11 Each PORV and associated block valve shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 Page 37 of 46 Event

Description:

PZR Pressure Transmitter PT-444 Fails HIGH/PCV-455C fails to fully CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION B.1, B. One PORV B.1 Close B.2 and B.3 is required.

inoperable associated block valve. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and not capable of being AND manually cycled. B.2 Remove power from 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> associated bock valves.

AND B.3 Restore PORV 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> to OPERABLE status.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-8.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 38 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip After the Pressure Transmitter has been removed from service, an inadvertent FWIS will occur. Simultaneously with the Rx Trip, the Turbine will fail to TRIP, the Governor Valves will fail to CLOSE manually, and the Main Steamline Isolation signal will fail to auto actuate. The operator will be required to manually CLOSE the MSIVs. Additionally the A and B MDAFW Pumps will trip immediately after auto start. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. However, this transition will be delayed due to a RED condition on the Heat Sink CSF. The operator will perform FRP-H.1, Response to Loss of Secondary Heat Sink. The operator will direct that AFW Pump C be placed in service in accordance with OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, however, the AFW Pump C Diesel will fail to start. The scenario will terminate at Step 7 RNO 2.b of FRP-H.1, after the operator has restored feedwater flow from the Main Feedwater System.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CFW20A c:20 IMF CFW20B c:20 IMF CFW20C c:20 Indications Available:

• All Feed Regulating Valves have CLOSED

• The A and B Main Feedwater Pumps have tripped

• The AFW Pumps have started Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers -

OPEN

• Rod position indicators - FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights - ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux - LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED BOP (Step 2a RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 39 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF Turbine will NOT trip, THEN manually RUNBACK Turbine at maximum rate UNTIL ALL Governor valves are CLOSED.

• IF Turbine can NOT be runback, THEN manually CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

BOP (Step 2.b) All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves - CLOSED Critical Task:

Manually Close the MSIVs Before an ORANGE Path Challenge Develops to Either the Subcriticality or the Integrity CSF or Before Transition to ECA-2.1, Whichever Happens First Safety Significance: Failure to trip the main turbine under the postulated plant conditions causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, such an omission constitutes a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. The situation described in the plant conditions is effectively a large steamline break downstream of the MSIVs. This effective steamline break is also located downstream of the main turbine stop valves, which cannot be closed by manually tripping the turbine. Failure to perform the critical task results in uncontrolled depressurization of all SGs and in uncontrolled cooldown of the RCS, both of which are unnecessary.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power to AC EMERGENCY Immediate Action BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E-1 OR E AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E-1 AND E BOTH ENERGIZED RO/ (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action BOP

• CHECK if SI is actuated:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 40 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• SI annunciator - ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment - AUTO STARTED (Step 4a RNO) CHECK if SI is required: Immediate Action

• PZR pressure LESS THAN 1715 PSIG OR

• Containment pressure GREATER THAN 4 PSIG OR

• Steam Line P bistables ILLUMINATED OR

• High Steam Flow with Low Tavg OR Low Steam Pressure bistables ILLUMINATED

• IF SI is required, THEN manually ACUTATE BOTH Trains of SI.

• IF SI is NOT required, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

• GO TO EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip NOTE: The CRS will transition Response, Step 1. to FRP-H.1 due to the Red Path on Heat Sink.

FRP-H.1, RESPONSE TO LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK RO/ (Step 1) CHECK If Secondary Heat Sink is BOP required:

• CHECK RCS pressure - GREATER THAN ANY NON-FAULTED S/G PRESSURE

• CHECK RCS Hot Leg temperatures -

GREATER THAN 350°F

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 41 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 2) CHECK If RCS Bleed AND Feed is BOP required:

• CHECK S/G Wide Range level in ANY TWO S/Gs -LESS THAN 13% [16%]

CRS (Step 2a RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 3 AND GO TO Step 3.

BOP (Step 3) TRY to establish AFW Flow to at least one S/G:

• CHECK S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED

• CHECK Control Room indications for cause of AFW failure:

• CST level

• Steam Driven AFW pump, Steam Shutoff valves

• Motor Driven AFW pump

• AFW valve alignment BOP (Step 3.c) TRY to restore AFW flow:

• CHECK CST level - AVAILABLE AND GREATER THAN 13%

• CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump - NOTE: The CRS will dispatch RUNNING an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. The SDAFW Pump will NOT be restored. Provide cues as required.

BOP (Step 3.c.2 RNO) Manually OPEN Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valve(s):

• V1-8A

• V1-8B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 42 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• V1-8C If Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valves can NOT be opened manually, THEN locally OPEN valves while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.c.3) CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) - RUNNING BOP (Step 3.c.3 RNO) IF power is available, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SI.

• IF SI will NOT RESET, THEN NOTE: SI will RESET.

• PLACE available Motor Driven AFW Pump control switch(es) to STOP.

• START available Motor Driven AFW Pump(s).

• IF available Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch is NOT running, THEN DISPATCH an AO.

Operator to perform Attachment 2, Local If so, Booth Instructor Start of Motor Driven AFW Pump. acknowledge as AO. The MDAFW Pump will NOT be restored. Provide cues as required.

• IF pump(s) NOT available, THEN TRY to restore Motor Driven AFW Pump(s) while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

BOP (Step 3.c.4) CHECK AFW Valves - PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT

• AFW Header Discharge valves - FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section valves - FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW pump Discharge valves - FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 43 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3.c.5) CHECK total feed flow to S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 300 GPM CRS (Step 3.c.5 RNO) GO TO Step 3.c.7 CRS/ (Step 3.c.7) PLACE AFW Train C in service NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP using OP-402, Auxiliary Feedwater System, an AO.

Section titled Rapid Alignment of AFW Pump If so, Booth Instructor C as Directed by FRP-H.1 acknowledge as AO. Wait 5 minutes and report that the Train C AFW Diesel Generator will NOT start.

BOP (Step 3.d) CHECK total feed flow to S/Gs -

GREATER THAN 300 GPM BOP (Step 3.d RNO) IF ANY feed flow to at least one S/G is verified, THEN.

CRS IF feed flow is NOT verified, THEN GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) STOP ALL RCPs RO (Step 5) ESTABLISH Instrument Air to CV:

• CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm - EXTINGUISHED

• RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISO TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN RO (Step 5 RNO) PLACE IA PCV-1716 in OVERRIDE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 44 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) TRY to establish Main Feedwater Flow to at least one S/G:

• CHECK Condensate System - IN SERVICE

• CHECK Feed Reg Bypass Valves -

OPEN

• FCV-479

• FCV-489

• FCV-499 BOP (Step 6.b RNO) PERFORM the following:

• RESET Feedwater Isolation:

• RESET SI.

• IF SI will NOT RESET, THEN

• PLACE ALL Feedwater Isolation Key Switches to OVRD/RESET.

• OPEN Feed Reg Bypass Valves:

• FCV-479

• FCV-489

• FCV-499 BOP IF Feed Reg Bypass valves can NOT be OPENED, THEN (Step 6.c) ESTABLISH Main Feedwater flow:

• CHECK FW HDR SECTION valves -

CLOSED

• V2-6A

• V2-6B

• V2-6C BOP (Step 6.c.1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 3 Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 45 of 46 Event

Description:

Inadvertent FWIS/ Turbine fails to Trip/GV Valves fail to Runback/MSI fails to AUTO Actuate/ A & B MDAFW Pump Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments (Step 6.c.2) START one Main Feedwater Pump

• CHECK Feedwater Flow -

ESTABLISHED TO AT LEAST ONE S/G BOP (Step 7) CHECK S/G Levels:

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range level in at least one S/G - GREATER THAN 9%

[18%]

BOP (Step 7.a RNO) IF feed flow to at least on S/G is established, THEN PERFORM the following:

• MAINTAIN feed flow to restore S/G Narrow Range level to GREATER THAN 9% [18%].

• PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS.

• RETURN TO procedure AND step in effect.

Critical Task:

Establish Feedwater Flow Into at Least One S/G Before RCS Bleed and Feed is Required Safety Significance: Failure to establish feedwater flow to any SG results in the operators having to rely upon the lower-priority action of establishing RCS bleed and feed to minimize core uncovery. This constitutes incorrect performance that fails to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16-1-3 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 68% for the past 13 hours1.50463e-4 days <br />0.00361 hours <br />2.149471e-5 weeks <br />4.9465e-6 months <br /> c) Turbine Load: 502 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 144 ppm e) Rod Height: 135 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 41.8%

h) Xenon: Peak

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.7.4 Condition C

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The SDAFW Pump is OOS. Maintenance reports that this pump will be OPERABLE in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and station management has directed that the initiation of the shutdown be delayed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A & B MDAFW pump

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) TI-471, PRT Temperature is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-008-C3, "EMERG OIL PMP OVLD," has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions b) Monitor the completion of Maintenance of the SDAFW Pump

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) IAW OST-947 data

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-4 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111815 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-4

REFERENCES:

1. OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power (Rev 62)

2. OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) (Rev 112)

3. APP-001, Miscellaneous NSSS (Rev 60)

4. AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure (Rev 24)

5. OWP-025, Steam Generator Pressure (SGP) (Rev 15)

6. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

7. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation (Amendment 203)

8. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

9. OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) (Rev 24)

10. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

11. AOP-007, Turbine Trip Below P-8 (Rev 16)

12. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

13. CSFST, Critical Safety Function Status Trees (Rev 7)

14. FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power generation- ATWS (Rev 22)

15. EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev 3)

Validation Time: 84 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 4 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Raise Power N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-RO Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert C-SRO Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT 3 2 I-BOP Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW I(TS)-SRO 4 3 N-BOP Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH I(TS)-SRO 5 4 C-RO Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control C-BOP Rods Fail in AUTO C-SRO 6 5/6 M-RO ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV M-BOP M-SRO 7 7 C-BOP MOV-350 fails to OPEN

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #4 The plant is at 25% power (BOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1. PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 100%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD, divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT.

Following this, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, Steam Generator Pressure (SGP). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation.

Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, Turbine Trip Below P-8. When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. The Control Rods will fail to operate in AUTO and the operator will need to insert rods in MANUAL.

Subsequently, the B Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes).

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS). The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS. While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Upon completion of FRP-S.1, the operator will return to EOP-E-0. Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the flow into and out of the B Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection.

The scenario will terminate at Step 16.b of EOP-E-2, when the operator prepares to restore normal letdown.

Critical Tasks:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operators failure to insert negative reactivity.

Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 611 T = 0 Malfunctions:

A SI Pump Pump OOS:

• IRF EPS480E1_130 f: RACK_OUT (A SI Pump OOS)

• IRF EPS480E1_124 f: RACK_IN (B SI Pump Racked IN to E-1)

PLACE CAPs as follows:

• RED Cap over A SI Control Switch

• GREEN Cap over C SI Pump Control Switch PI-1616 SW North Header Pressure indication OOS

• IOR aoSWSDOD024A f:0 Place WHITE DOT on PI-1616 RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3 failed OFF

• IMF ANNXN07C03 f:ALARM_OFF Place WHITE DOT on APP-007-C3 Insert the following:

• $006_MANUAL_TURB_TRIP DMF TUR05B (Stop Valve closes on Manual Turb Trip)

• $006_MANUAL_TURB_TRIP DMF TUR05C (Gov Valve closes on Manual Turb Trip)

• $006_TURBINE_TRIP IMF CRF02 (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)

• IMF ANNXN05E02 f:ALARM_OFF (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)

• $006_RODS_IN_MAN DMF CRF02 (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)

• $006_RODS_IN_MAN IOR diRPSBOI063 c:1 f:DE_PRSSD (Rods Fail in AUTO on Turbine Trip)

• IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH (ATWS on SLB)

• IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, BOTH (ATWS on SLB)

• IOR diCVCAOI731 f:AS-IS (MOV-350 fails to OPEN)

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-4.

At direction of Event 1 Raise Power examiner At direction of Event 2 examiner Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT IMF CCW08 r:01:00 f:85 IOR diCVCAAI047 Note: The Booth Instructor will need to DOR f:DEMIN diCVCAAI047 when the operator places TCV-

$006_TC-144_MAN 143 Control Switch to VCT.

DMF CCW08 At direction of Event 3 Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails examiner LOW ICO SGNXMTPT_495 r:01:15 f:0 At direction of Event 4 Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH examiner IMF NIS07G f:70 At direction of Event 5 examiner Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO IMF TUR14 r:01:00 f:100 IMF TUR05B f:100 IMF TUR05C f:AS-IS Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 6 ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV examiner IMF MSS01B NOTE: The ATWS is inserted at T=0 r:10:00 f:9.95E6 Post-Rx Trip Event 7 MOV-350 fails to OPEN IOR diCVCAOI731 f:AS-IS NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 9 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 100% using OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater than 25% Power, and OP-301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER RO (Step 5) Maintain Tave within 5°F of Tref NOTE: The RO will likely place using a combination of Control Rods and Control Rods in MANUAL.

Boron Concentration changes.

OP-301, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

SECTION 8.2.7, RCS QUICK DILUTION CHECKLIST RO (Step 1) This revision has been verified to be the latest revision available.

RO (Step 2) DETERMINE the amount of water to NOTE: The RO will determine add to the RCS and if applicable, the that several 200-300 gallon expected change in RCS temperature AND batches of water must be Reactor Power. added.

RO (Step 3) OBTAIN an independent check of the volume of water required.

RO (Step 4) OBTAIN permission from the CRS OR the SM to add the amount of water previously determined, including the expected change in RCS temperature AND Reactor Power.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 10 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5) IF flow adjustment is desired, THEN adjust FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE, potentiometer to obtain desired flow rate.

RO (Step 6) PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE selector switch in the DILUTE position.

RO (Step 7) SET YIC-114, PRIMARY WTR TOTALIZER to the desired quantity.

RO (Step 8) IF two letdown orifices are in service NOTE: Two orifices will be in and it is desired to divert flow to the HUT, service.

THEN RO (Step 9) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to the START position.

RO (Step 10) IF LCV-115A is in AUTO, THEN ENSURE proper operation of LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve.

RO (Step 11) IF any of the following conditions occur, THEN momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the STOP position:

• Unanticipated Rod Motion

• Primary Water addition exceeds the desired value RO (Step 12) WHEN the desired amount of Primary Water has been added to the RCS, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV-114A, PW TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV-114B, BLENDED MU TO VCT, closes.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 11 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF in Auto, THEN the operating Primary Water Pump stops.

• The RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

• IF desired, THEN ENSURE LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV valve control switch in AUTO.

RO (Step 13) RETURN the RCS Makeup System to automatic as follows:

• ENSURE FCV-114A, PRIMARY WTR FLOW DILUTE MODE is in AUTO.

• PLACE the RCS MAKEUP MODE switch in the AUTO position.

• Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch in the START position.

RO (Step 14) RECORD, in AUTO LOG, as indicated by PRIMARY WATER TOTALIZER, YIC-114 total amount of Primary Water added during the dilution.

RO (Step 15) MONITOR parameters for the expected change in reactivity AND inform the CRS OR the SM the results of the dilution.

OP-105, MANEUVERING THE PLANT WHEN GREATER THAN 25% POWER BOP (Step 6) IF EH Turbine Control is in OPER AUTO, THEN raise turbine load as follows:

• Adjust the SETTER indication using the REF or REF pushbuttons to the desired load.

• Use the GO, HOLD, REF , and REF pushbuttons as necessary to continue the rise in load.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 12 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 7) IF EH Turbine Control is in TURB NOTE: The Turbine is in MANUAL, THEN.. OPER AUTO.

CRS (Step 8) IF Heater Drain Tank suspended NOTE: From Turnover it is solids are greater than 25 ppb, THEN.. noted that HDT Suspended Solids are < 25 ppb.

CRS (Step 9) WHEN Heater Drain Tank suspended solids are less than or equal to 25 ppb, THEN perform the following while continuing with this procedure:

BOP

• Start a Heater Drain Pump. NOTE: The BOP will start one HDP.

• Ensure Quenching Valve control NOTE: The CRS/BOP may switches on QUENCHING VALVES contact an AO.

CONTROL PANEL are placed in AUTO: If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use IRF CFW102 f:AUTO and report after 1 minute that the BOTH valves are in AUTO.

• FCV-1597

• FCV-1596

• Locally check Quenching Valves are NOTE: The CRS/BOP may CLOSED: contact an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the BOTH valves are CLOSED.

• FCV-1597

• FCV-1596

• Check proper operation of the following: NOTE: The CRS/BOP may contact an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the ALL valves are operating properly.

• LC-1530

• LCV-1530A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 1 Page 13 of 51 Event

Description:

Raise Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• LCV-1530B After the 1st Dilution and MWe raised by 15-20 MWe, and at the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 14 of 51 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT During the power increase Letdown Temperature Controller, TCV-144, will fail CLOSED causing letdown temperature to rise above 135°F. Simultaneously, Divert Valve TCV-143, will fail to divert letdown flow to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD, divert letdown flow to the VCT, take MANUAL control of TCV-144 to stabilize letdown temperature, and return letdown to the VCT.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CCW08 r:01:00 f:85 IOR diCVCAAI047 f:DEMIN

$006_TC-144_MAN DMF CCW08 NOTE: The malfunction takes 2-3 minutes to fully develop NOTE: The Booth Instructor will need to DOR diCVCAAI047 when the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT.

Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD

• TCV-144 Controller demand is rising

• NRHX Outlet Temperature (TI-144) is rising

• TCV-143 Red status light is LIT with Control Switch in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

APP-001-A6, LTDN FLOW HI TEMP DEMIN BYPD RO (Step 1) IF Letdown Temperature is greater NOTE: The RO will divert than 135°F, THEN ENSURE controller TC- TCV-143 to the VCT.

143 is diverted to the VCT.

Booth Instructor use DOR diCVCAAI047 WHEN the operator places TCV-143 Control Switch to VCT.

RO (Step 2) IF CCW flow to the Non- NOTE: The RO will manually regenerative Heat Exchanger is low, THEN adjust controller to maintain RAISE Component Cooling Water flow using temperature at 105-110°F on TC-144. TI-143.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 2 Page 15 of 51 Event

Description:

Letdown Temperature Controller TCV-144 fails CLOSED/Divert Valve TCV-143 Fails to DIVERT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) IF letdown flow is high, THEN NOTE: It is likely that control REDUCE Letdown flow. of control of TCV-144 will stabilize the event, and Letdown will NOT need to be reduced.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/Chemistry to request a Demin effluent sample prior to placing TCV-143 back to the DEMIN position.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/CHEMISTRY, wait 20 minutes and report that the Demin effluent is acceptable to be placed in operation.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the Controller failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief, and THEN re-commence the up-power.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 16 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Following this, Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter, PT-495, will fail LOW. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-025, RTGB Instrument Failure. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-025, Steam Generator Pressure (SGP). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, Technical Specification LCO 3.3.3, Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation, and Technical Specification LCO 3.3.6, Containment Ventilation Isolation Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO SGNXMTPT_495 r:01:15 f:0 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-006-A4, STM LINE HI P

• Main Steam Pressure indicator PI-945 is lowering

• C FRV controller output is lowering

• Feed Flow to C S/G is lowering

• Steam Flow to C S/G is lowering

• C S/G Narrow Range Level is lowering Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION Examiner NOTE: The CRS go to AOP-025 directly.

If so, go to AOP-025 Step 1 actions on Page 18.

BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING Immediate Action PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO): NOTE: FCV-498 in NOT operating properly in AUTO.

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action NOTE: The BOP will control FCV-498 in MANUAL.

• ENSURE FRV for affected S/G(s) in manual control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 17 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• ATTEMPT to stabilize S/G level using FRV and/or FRV Bypass Valves by matching steam flow with feed flow.

• STOP any load change in progress.

• If unable to control S/G level, THEN Critical Task:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint BOP BEING APPROACHED CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

• FRV Failure To Control - OBSERVE NOTE 58

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 18 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level AT OR NOTE: The CRS go to AOP-TRENDING TO PROGRAM 025 based on the Note prior to Step 58.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE CRS (Step 1) GO TO Appropriate Section For NOTE: The CRS will select Failed Instrument: Section D of AOP-025.

• S/G STEAM PRESSURE, (PT-495) -

SECTION D AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE BOP (Step 1) CHECK affected FRV in MAN: Immediate Action NOTE: FCV-498 will likely be in MANUAL by this Step.

• FCV-498 (FRV C)

BOP (Step 2) RESTORE affected S/G level to Immediate Action program NOTE: The C S/G Narrow Range level will likely be at programmed level by this Step.

Critical Task:

Manually control C S/G Narrow Range Level before a Reactor Trip occurs on low S/G level or a Protective Action occurs on high S/G Level.

Safety Significance: failure to take manual control of the C S/G Feed Reg Valve and control Narrow Range S/G level, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary transient to the plant and challenge to the Reactor Protection/Engineered Safeguards Actuation System. Performance of the critical task would stabilize the S/G level transient. A failure to stabilize the S/G level transient, when able to do so, constitutes a mis-operation or incorrect crew performance which leads to incorrect RCS temperature/pressure control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 19 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/ (Step 3) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint - NOTE: This is a Continuous CRS BEING APPROACHED Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 3 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is approached, THEN GO TO Step 5 CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using PA System likely make this announcement.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK Failure - FEED FLOW INSTRUMENT FAILURE BOP (Step 6 RNO) IF failure was a steam flow NOTE: The BOP/CRS could instrument, THEN go to Step 12 incorrectly believing that it is the Steam Flow instrument that has failed.

CRS IF failure was a steam pressure instrument, THEN GO TO Step 17.

BOP (Step 17) PLACE S/G Steam Flow Selector Switch affected by Failed Pressure Instrument to Alternate Channel Below:

• S/G C STEAM FLOW - FR-498

• FAILED CHANNEL (PT-495) AFFECTED CHANNEL (FI-494) SELECTED POSITION (CH 495)

BOP (Step 18) RESTORE affected Controller to Automatic:

• CHECK S/G level - WITHIN +/-1% OF PROGRAMMED LEVEL

• PLACE affected controller in AUTO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 20 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 19) REMOVE affected Transmitter from Servicing Using OWP-025:

CHANNEL (PT-495) OWP (SGP-12) NOTE: The CRS will address OWP-025.

OWP-025, STEAM GENERATOR PRESSURE (SGP)

SGP-11, MAIN STEAM LINE C PRESSURE TRANSMITTER PT-495 BOP FR-498 (STM) - SELECTED TO 495 BOP DELETE INPUT PT-495 FROM CALO PROCESSING. (MSP0441A)

BOP BISTABLE SWITCH B/S 495 RACK #17 NOTE: The will enter the Simulator Booth (Simulating the Hagan Room).

Booth Instructor coordinate with BOP to insert Trip Signals:

OPEN Protection Racks Door:

IRF BST101 f:D_OPEN

• IRF BST014 f:TRIP CLOSE Protection Racks Door: IRF BST101 f:D_CLOSED NOTE: The CRS will return to Section D of AOP-025.

AOP-025, RTGB INSTRUMENT FAILURE SECTION D, S/G FEED FLOW, STEAM FLOW OR STEAM PRESSURE TRANSMITTER FAILURE CRS (Step 20) REVIEW TS LCOs for applicability: NOTE: The CRS will address Technical Specifications.

• TS LCO 3.3.1

• TS LCO 3.3.2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 21 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• TS LCO 3.3.3

• TS LCO 3.3.4 CRS (Step 21) GO TO Procedure Main Body, Step 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM (ESFAS) INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.2 The ESFAS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.2-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.2-1.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 1.e D. One channel NOTE (Steam Line High Differential inoperable For Function 4.c, a channel may Pressure Between Steam be taken out of 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Header and Steam Lines) is the trip condition affected, and ACTION D.1 or for 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> for D.2 and D.3 are required.

maintenance.

D.1 Place channel 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> in trip.

OR D.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 18 hours2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br /> AND D.2.2 Be in MODE 4.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.3, POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM)

INSTURMENTATION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 22 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITON REQUIRED COMPLETION ACTION TIME F. As required F.1 Be in MODE 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will by Required 3.

determine that Function 20 Action E.1 and AND referenced in (Steam Generator Pressure) is Table 3.3.3-1 F.2 Be in MODE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> affected, and ACTION F.1 and 4.

F.2 are required.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.6, CONTAINMENT VENTILATION ISOLATION INSTRUMENTATION CRS The Containment Ventilation Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 3 Page 23 of 51 Event

Description:

Main Steam Line C Pressure Transmitter Fails LOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Function 4 Refer to LCO (Safety Injection), is affected.

3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation,"

Function 1, for all initiation functions and requirements.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief, and THEN re-commence the up-power.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 24 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH Next, Power Range, NI-44, Upper Detector will fail HIGH. The operator will remove the failed instrument from service in accordance with OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF NIS07G f:70 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV

• Power Range N44 is indicating Off-Scale HIGH

• Delta-Flux Power Range N44 is Off-Scale HIGH

• RTGB Annunciator APP-005-D6, FLUX WARNING/STATUS (30 seconds delayed)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: It is likely that the BOP will go to HOLD on the Turbine.

APP-005-C3, PR CHANNEL DEV RO (Step 1) MONITOR the following parameters:

• Reactor power

• Control rod position RO (Step 2) IF a Control Rod is misaligned, NOTE: There is NO THEN. misaligned Control Rod.

RO (Step 3) IF indications of a radial flux tilt are present, THEN PERFORM a Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio per FMP-007, Quadrant Power Tilt.

RO/ (Step 4) IF a Power Range detector has CRS failed, THEN REMOVE failed Power Range Detector from service per OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).

CRS (Step 5) REFER TO TS:

• 3.2.4, Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) .

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 25 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection NOTE: The CRS will address System Instrumentation. OWP-011.

OWP-011, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI)

BOP REMOVE NI-44 from ERFIS SCAN:

NIN0044A BOP DROPPED ROD MODE Switch BOP NI-44 OUT OF SERVICE TRIP SWITCH BOP ROD STOP BYPASS Switch BOP COMPARATOR CHANNEL DEFEAT Switch BOP DETECTOR CURRENT COMPARATOR Drawer:

• UPPER SECTION Switch

• LOWER SECTION Switch NOTE: The CRS will address the Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1, The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS ACTIONS NOTE: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 4 Page 26 of 51 Event

Description:

Power Range NI-44 Upper Detector fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that Functions 2 D. One Power D.1.1 Place 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> (Power Range Neutron Flux, Range Neutron channel in trip.

Flux-High AND a. High, b. Low), 17.c (RPS channel D.1.2 Reduce 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Interlocks - P8) and 17.d inoperable. THERMAL (RPS Interlocks - P10) are POWER to 75% affected, and:

RTP.

OR ACTION D.1.1 and D.1.2 or D.2.1 Place 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> D.2.1 and D.2.2 or D.3 are channel in trip. required; AND ACTION E.1 or E.2 is required; NOTE: Only required to be ACTION S.1 or S.2 is performed when required; the Power Range Neutron Flux input ACTION T.1 or T.2 is to QPTR is required.

inoperable.

D.2.2 Perform SR Once per 12 3.2.4.2.

hours OR D.3 Be in MODE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.

E. One channel E.1 Place channel 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> inoperable. in trip.

OR E.2 Be in MODE 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> 3.

S. One channel S.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.

OR S.2 Be in MODE

3. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> T. One channel T.1 Verify 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> inoperable. interlock is in required state for existing unit conditions.

OR T.2 Be in MODE

2. 7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br /> NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 27 of 51 Event

Description:

Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO Shortly afterwards, an oil leak will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008, SW, CW & TURB GEN AUX, alarms, and ultimately enter AOP-007, Turbine Trip Below P-8. When the Main Turbine Trips one Turbine Stop Valve and one Turbine Governor Valve will remain OPEN, and the operator will need to manually TRIP the Turbine. The Control Rods will fail to operate in AUTO and the operator will need to insert rods in MANUAL.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF TUR14 r:01:00 f:100 IMF TUR05B f:100 IMF TUR05C f:AS-IS NOTE: The malfunction takes 1 minute to fully develop Indications Available:

• Turbine Bearing Oil pressure is lowering

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-A4, TURB BRG OIL LO PRESS

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-B4, LO BRG OIL PRESS TURB TRIP Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-007, TURBINE TRIP BELOW P-8 BOP (Step 1) CHECK turbine stop valves -

CLOSED

• BOTH turbine stop valves - CLOSED OR

• ALL governor valves - CLOSED BOP (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• Manually TRIP the turbine by simultaneously depressing the THINK and TURBINE TRIP pushbuttons.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK MSR PURGE and SHUTOFF VALVES - CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Steam Dump Control - IN PRESSURE MODE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 28 of 51 Event

Description:

Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3 RNO) PLACE steam dumps in pressure control mode:

• ENSURE STEAM HEADER PRESS Controller PC-464B is in AUTO.

• ENSURE PC-464B pot setting is 7.28.

• IF PC-464B has a demand output greater than 1, THEN PERFORM the following:

• PLACE PC-464B in MAN.

• SET PC-464B demand output to 0.

• PLACE PC-464B in AUTO.

• SELECT STEAM DUMP MODE Switch to STEAM PRESS.

• Slowly ADJUST PC-464B pot setting to 7.17.

BOP (Step 4) CHECK Steam Dump Operation -

STEAM DUMP OPEN RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters RO (Step 6) CHECK Control Rods - INSERTING NOTE: The rods will fail to IN AUTO insert in AUTO, however, it is likely that the Control Rods would have been in MANUAL for the up-power.

RO (Step 6 RNO) Manually INSERT control rods to achieve Tavg between 547F and 551F AND reactor power between 5 and 10%.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Main FW Status:

• CHECK MFPs - ANY RUNNING NOTE: The A MFWP is RUNNING.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 29 of 51 Event

Description:

Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK FRVs - IN SERVICE

• CHECK FRVs - IN AUTOMATIC RO (Step 8) CHECK Reactor Power - LESS THAN 15%

BOP (Step 9) PLACE FRV Bypass Valves in Service:

• MAINTAIN S/G level between 35 to 44%

• Slowly OPEN FRV bypass valves

• CHECK FRVs - INDICATE CLOSED

• PLACE FRV controllers in MAN

• FCV-478

• FCV-488

• FCV-498

• CLOSE FW HDR SECTION valves

• V2-6A

• V2-6B

• V2-6C RO (Step 10) CHECK PZR PORVs - CLOSED BOP (Step 11) CHECK the following Breakers -

OPEN

• NORTH OCB BKR 52/9

• SOUTH OCB BKR 52/8

• EXCITER FIELD BREAKER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 5 Page 30 of 51 Event

Description:

Low Turbine Oil Pressure/Failure of Auto Turbine Trip/Control Rods Fail in AUTO Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK Reactor - CRITICAL Examiner NOTE: Because of the development time for Event 6, direct the Booth operator to move to Event 6 now.

RO (Step 13) STABILIZE Reactor Power Below 10% By One Or Both Of The Following:

• Manual control of control rods

• Adjusting Boron concentration using OP 301, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) Section "RCS Boration Quick Checklist" or "RCS Dilution Quick Checklist" BOP (Step 14) STABILIZE Plant Conditions:

• ADJUST PC464B to maintain Tavg 547°F to 551°F

• CONTROL feedwater (AFW or MFW) to maintain S/G levels 35 to 44%

• CONTROL PZR heaters and sprays to maintain PZR pressure between 2225 psig and 2250 psig

• CONTROL charging and letdown flows to maintain PZR level within 5% of program level At the discretion of the Lead Examiner, move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 31 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Subsequently, the B Steam Line will rupture inside Containment (over 10 minutes).

Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP both automatically and manually (ATWS).

The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and attempt to manually trip the reactor. When this fails, the operator will enter FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation- ATWS. While in FRP-S.1, Boric Acid to Charging Pump Suction Valve MOV-350 will fail CLOSED. The operator will direct a local trip of the reactor, drive rods in manually, and align the suction of the Charging Pumps to the RWST. Upon completion of FRP-S.1, the operator will return to EOP-E-0. Ultimately, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, to isolate the flow into and out of the B Steam Generator and then terminate Safety Injection. The scenario will terminate at Step 16.b of EOP-E-2, when the operator prepares to restore normal letdown.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF MSS01B r:10:00 f:9.95E6 Indications Available:

• Rx Trip First Out LIT, without Rx Trip

• Pressurizer level is lowering

• Pressurizer pressure is lowering

• Charging Pump speed is rising

• Containment pressure is rising Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED RO (Step 1 RNO) Manually TRIP Reactor Immediate Action IF reactor power is GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 5% OR Intermediate Range SUR is positive, THEN GO TO FRP-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation 0 ATWS, Step 1.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to FRP-S.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 32 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron flux - LOWERING RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following: Immediate Action

• Manually TRIP Reactor.

• IF Reactor will NOT trip, THEN INSERT Control Rods.

Critical Task:

Insert Negative Reactivity into the Core by Inserting Control Rods Manually Prior to Locally Tripping the Reactor (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to insert negative reactivity, under the postulated plant conditions, results in an unnecessary situation in which the reactor remains critical or returns to a critical condition. Performance of the critical task would make the reactor subcritical and provide sufficient shutdown margin to prevent (or at least minimize the power excursion associated with) any subsequent return to criticality. Failure to insert negative reactivity constitutes mis-operation or incorrect operator performance which fails to prevent incorrect reactivity control. In the scenario postulated by the plant conditions, failure to insert negative reactivity by inserting control rods can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF.

Although the challenge was not initiated by the operator (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the operators failure to insert negative reactivity.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 33 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• DISPATCH operator to locally open the NOTE: The CRS will dispatch following breakers: both the Inside and Outside AO.

Booth Instructor:

Acknowledge as each AO, and report after 2 minutes use:

IRF EPSV480B3_104 f:RACK_OUT IRF EPSV480B2B_097 f:RACK_OUT and report that the Rx has been locally tripped.

• Reactor Trip breakers

• Reactor Trip Bypass breakers

• BOTH MG Set Generator Output breakers

• BOTH MG Set Motor Input breakers BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED

• CLOSE MSR Purge and Shutoff valves NOTE: With the Immediate Actions complete the BOP may take Prompt/Prudent action to Close the B MSIV and/or stop AFW flow to the B S/G.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps -

BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels -

TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

BOP/ (Step 3b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level CRS lowers to less than 16% on two S/Gs THEN PERFORM Step3.c.

CONTINUE WITH Step 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 34 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/ (Step 4) INITIATE Emergency Boration:

RO

• START two Charging Pumps at maximum speed

• ALIGN Boration Flow Path:

• OPEN MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT BOP/ (Step 4.b.1 RNO) ALIGN suction from RO RWST:

• OPEN LCV-115B, EMERG MU TO CHG SUCT.

IF LCV-115B can NOT be opened THEN

• CLOSE LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET Valve.

BOP/ (Step 4.b.2) START Boric Acid Pump RO ALIGNED for BLEND BOP/ (Step 4.b.3) CHECK for Boric Acid flow on RO FI-110 BOP/ (Step 4.c) ALIGN Charging flow path:

RO

• OPEN CVC-310B, LOOP 2 COLD LEG CHG Valve

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection and MAXIMUM Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm and 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 35 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• MAINTAIN Charging flow on FI-122A -

GREATER THAN BORIC ACID FLOW

• CHECK PZR pressure - LESS THAN 2335 PSIG BOP/ (Step 5) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation RO Valves - CLOSED BOP/ (Step 6) CHECK NO SI Signal Exists RO BOP/ (Step 6 RNO) PERFORM Attachment 3, Examiner NOTE: The CRS RO Auto Action Verification while CONTINUING may assign the BOP to WITH this procedure. perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 3.

Other Examiners follow FRP-S.1 Actions, Step 7, on Page 39.

FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS ATTACHMENT 3, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 36 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

• CHECK Containment pressure GREATER THAN 10 PSIG

• CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING

• CHECK SW Booster Pumps - BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 37 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG] Numbers will be required.

• CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED

• CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 275 PSIG [325 PSIG] Numbers will be required.

BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 38 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP may contact Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary the Inside AO.

(38 KW each): Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge and report that the B IA Compressor is running, and the A IA Compressor is NOT running.

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c FRP-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION-ATWS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 39 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

RO (Step 7) CHECK IF the Following Trips Have Occurred:

• Reactor - TRIPPED

• Turbine - TRIPPED RO (Step 8) CHECK IF Reactor is Subcritical:

• Power Range channels - LESS THAN 5%

• Intermediate Range channels -

NEGATIVE STARTUP RATE

• OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 18 and GO TO Step 18 RO (Step 18) CHECK ARPI - LESS THAN TWO RODS STUCK OUT RO (Step 19) STOP RCS Boration:

• CHECK MOV-350, BA TO CHARGING PMP SUCT - CLOSED

• CHECK Boric Acid Pump Control Switch aligned for blend - IN AUTO

• CHECK Emergency Boration -

PERFORMED USING MOV-350 FLOWPATH CRS (Step 19.c RNO) GO TO Step 19e)

RO (Step 19.c) CHECK BOTH of the following conditions - EXIST:

• Emergency Boration performed using RWST flowpath AND

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 40 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Charging Pump suction aligned to the VCT is desired

• CHECK VCT Level - GREATER THAN 20 INCHES

• OPEN LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET

• CLOSE the RWST supply valve previously opened:

• LCV-115B, EMERG TO CHG SUCT

• REDUCE Charging Pump speed as desired RO/ (Step 20) PERFORM the following:

CRS

• RESET SPDS

• RETURN TO Procedure AND Step in Effect NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-E-0.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 41 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action RO CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA NOTE: The condition is MET, and the RCPs have been tripped.

FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA NOTE: The condition is MET, and the AFW flow to the B S/G is isolated.

• PERFORM Supplement D, De- NOTE: The CRS will dispatch energizing AFW Valves For an AO.

AFFECTED S/G. Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF EPSMCC9_254 f: RACKED_OUT IRF EPSMCC10_266 f: RACKED_OUT As AO, report after 3 minutes that the Supplement D is complete.

AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 42 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto NOTE: It is likely that this will Action Verification, While CONTINUING NOT be completed because WITH This Procedure the equivalent Attachment (Attachment 3) in FRP-S.1 has already been completed.

RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels -

TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

BOP (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, THEN PERFORM Step 6.c.

CRS CONTINUE WITH Step 7 RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP RUNNING RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 43 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact NOTE: Adverse Containment S/G Narrow Range level between Numbers will be required.

9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG RO (Step 9 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• CHECK CV Spray actuated.

• IF CV Spray is NOT actuated, THEN.

• ENSURE BOTH CV Spray Pumps are running.

• ENSURE CV Spray Pump Discharge Valves are OPEN:

• SI880A

• SI880B

• SI880C

• SI880D

• ENSURE CV Spray Additive Tank Discharge Valves are OPEN:

• SI845A

• SI845B

• ADJUST Spray Additive Tank flow using SI845C,SAT THROTTLING VALVE to approximately 12 gpm.

• ENSURE Containment Isolation Phase B Valves are closed.

• STOP ALL RCPs.

CRS

• OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 10 AND GO TO Step 10.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 44 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 10 RNO) IF CCW to ANY RCP Motor OR ALL Seal Cooling to ANY RCP has been lost, THEN

• IF ALL Charging Pumps are STOPPED, THEN RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

• With ANY RCP running,..

OR

• With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg temperatures STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN PERFORM the following:

• STOP dumping steam.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.

• MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER NOTE: Adverse Containment THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Numbers will be required.

Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 45 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be NOTE: It is likely that the Stopped: RCPs are already OFF.

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED CRS (Step 14 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

• GO TO EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1.

EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves for Faulted S/G(s) - CLOSED

• S/G B

• V1-3B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 46 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• MS-353B BOP (Step 2) CHECK IF ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary is Intact

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs -

ANY STABLE OR RISING BOP (Step 3) IDENTIFY Faulted S/G(s): NOTE: The B S/G is Faulted.

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs

• ANY S/G PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER OR

• ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED (Step 4) ISOLATE Faulted S/G(s):

• CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valve, Reg Bypass Valve AND Header Section Valve to Faulted S/G(s) shut:

• S/G B valves - CLOSED

• FCV-488

• FCV-489

• V2-6B

• RESET SI

• CLOSE AFW Discharge Valve(s) to Faulted S/G(s):

• S/G B valves - CLOSED

• V2-14B

• V2-16B

• CLOSE Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff valve(s) from Faulted S/G(s);

• V1-8B

• CHECK Faulted S/G(s) Steam Line PORV - CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 47 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• RV1-2

• PERFORM Supplement D, De-energizing NOTE: If not already done, the AFW Valves for AFFECTED S/G CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF EPSMCC9_254 f: RACKED_OUT IRF EPSMCC10_266 f: RACKED_OUT As AO, report after 3 minutes that the Supplement D is complete.

• Locally CLOSE Faulted S/G(s) Bypass Drn AND Warmup line to AFW Pump Valve(s) while CONTINUING WITH this procedure:

• MS-29 (S/G B) (Pipe Jungle NOTE: The CRS will dispatch above/right of V1-8B) an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF MSS048, f: 0 As AO, report after 3 minutes that MS-29 IS closed.

• CHECK Faulted S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED Critical Task:

Isolate Feedwater Flow Into and Steam Flow From the Faulted S/G Before a Transition Out of E-2 Occurs (EOP-Based)

Safety Significance: Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

Also, depending upon the plant conditions, it could constitute a failure by the operator to demonstrate the ability to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the Integrity, Subcriticality and Containment CSFs.

RO (Step 5) CHECK CST Level - GREATER THAN 13%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 48 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) CHECK Secondary Radiation:

• REQUEST Chemistry periodically sample NOTE: The CRS may call ALL S/Gs for activity Chemistry to request samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Chemistry.

• CHECK unisolated Secondary Radiation Monitors - HAVE REMAIND NORMAL

• R-15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR RADIATON

• R-19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R-31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs CRS

• CHECK Secondary sample results -

NORMAL (WHEN RESULTS AVAILABLE)

RO/ (Step 7) Check If ECCS Flow Should Be BOP Terminated

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core NOTE: Adverse Containment Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18°F [37°F] Numbers will be required.

• CHECK Secondary Heat Sink -

AVAILABLE

• Total AFW flow to Intact S/G(s) - AT LEAST 300 GPM OR

• S/G Narrow Range level in at least one NOTE: Adverse Containment Intact S/G - GREATER THAN 9% Numbers will be required.

[18%]

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• RCS Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

AND

• RCS Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

• CHECK PZR level - GREATER THAN NOTE: Adverse Containment 14% [31%] Numbers will be required.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 49 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8) RESET SI RO (Step 9) RESET Phase A Containment Isolation RO (Step 10) ESTABLISH Instrument Air to CV:

• CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR LO PRESS alarm - EXTINGUISHED

• RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN RO (Step 11) STOP ECCS Pumps:

• STOP SI Pumps

• CHECK RHR Pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

• STOP RHR Pumps RO (Step 12) CHECK Charging Flow NOTE: There are two Established: Charging Pumps running.

• CHECK Charging Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

• ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following a necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 4 Event # 6&7 Page 50 of 51 Event

Description:

ATWS/B SG SLB Inside CV/ MOV-350 fails to OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 13) CHECK ECCS Flow NOT NOTE: Adverse Containment Required: Numbers will be required.

• RC Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs

- GREATER THAN 18°F [37°F]

• PZR level - GREATER THAN 14% [31%]

BOP (Step 14) TRANSFER Steam Dumps to Pressure Control Mode:

• CHECK Condenser - AVAILABLE NOTE: The Condenser is NOT available.

BOP (Step 14a RNO) If Condenser Steam Dumps are NOT available, THEN USE S/G Steam Line PORVs.

RO (Step 15) CHECK RCS Hot Let Temperatures - STABLE RO (Step 16) CHECK if Letdown Can Be Established:

• PZR Level - GREATER THAN 27%

[44%]

• ESTABLISH Letdown using Supplement L, Establishing Letdown At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16-1-4 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: BOL b) Reactor Power: 25%

c) Turbine Load: 129 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 1598 ppm e) Rod Height: 147 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 28.5%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The A SI Pump is OOS. The B SI Pump has been aligned to 480 VAC ESF Bus E-1.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) C SI Pump

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) PI-1616, SW North Header Pressure, is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-007-C3, FW PMP A LO FLOW TRIP, has failed to the EXTINGUISHED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (NOT-PROTECTED)

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 100% at 1%/minute.

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

b) Chemistry reports that Heater Drains tank suspended solids is < 25 ppb.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) is available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a 6300 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch additions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately 200 steps upon achieving 100%

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-5 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111915 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-5

REFERENCES:

1. GP-005, Power Operation (Rev 128)

2. AOP-006, Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration (Rev 21)

3. APP-005, NIS & Reactor Control (Rev 39)

4. OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI) (Rev 24)

5. Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation (Amendment 176)

6. AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control (Rev 20)

7. APP-001, Miscellaneous NSSS (Rev 60)

8. AOP-014, Component Cooling Water Malfunction (Rev 37)

9. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Containment (Amendment 176)

10. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves (Amendment 176)

11. OMM-001, RNP Conduct of Operations (Rev 67)

12. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

13. EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation (Rev 3)

14. EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators (Rev 1)

Validation Time: 117 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 5 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 NA R-RO Roll Turbine N-BOP N-SRO 2 1 C-BOP High Turbine Eccentricity C-SRO 3 2 I-BOP Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 I(TS)-SRO 4 3 I-RO VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH I-SRO 5 4 C-RO B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to C(TS)-SRO CLOSE 6 5 M-RO Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to M-BOP CLOSE M-SRO 7 6 C-RO Failure of Automatic Rx Trip

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #5 The plant is at 3-5% power (EOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The B Condensate Pump is OOS. LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The crew will be directed to raise power to 30%.

Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, Power Operation.

When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine.

The operator will respond using AOP-006, Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration, and place the Turbine startup on HOLD.

Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail.

The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS) Instrumentation, and determine to continue with the power increase.

Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the B RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, and AOP-014, Component Cooling Water Malfunction. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Containment, and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically.

The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and manually trip the reactor.

Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization of All Steam Generators, and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm.

While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the A MSIV will close and the A S/G pressure is expected to rise higher than that of the B and C S/Gs. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the B and C Steam Generators. Depending on the timing of the actions taken by the crew when the A MSIV is closed, the A S/G pressure may not rise significantly higher than that of the B and C S/Gs, and the crew will remain in EOP-ECA-2.1 past the SI termination steps (i.e. Step 19). If this situation occurs, the scenario will terminate at Step 20 of EOP-ECA-2.1.

Critical Tasks:

Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1 Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 612 T = 0 Malfunctions:

B Condensate Pump OOS:

• IRF EPSV4160B4_069 f: RACK_OUT (B Condensate Pump Breaker Racked Out)

PLACE RED CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for the B Condensate Pump PLACE GREEN CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for the A Condensate Pump LI-1417A Hotwell Level Indication OOS

• IOR aoCFWDOD035B f:2 Place WHITE DOT on LI-1417A RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7 failed ON

• IMF ANNXN06f07 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-006-F7 Insert the following:

• $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR diCVCAAI103 d:9 f:OPEN (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)

• $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR doCVCAAO103O d:10 f:ON (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)

• $006_FCV_626_TRIP IOR doCVCAAO103S d:10 f:ON (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)

• $006_FCV_626_TRIP IRF EPSMCC6_221 d:11 f:RACK_OUT (FCV-626 fails to auto CLOSE)

• IMF MSS03A f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE (A MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IMF MSS03B f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE (B MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IMF MSS03C f:FAIL_TO_CLOSE (C MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IOR diMSSDDI049 f:OPEN (A MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IOR diMSSDDI050 f:OPEN (B MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IOR diMSSDDI051 f:OPEN (C MSIV fails to CLOSE)

• IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO

• IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• Copy of OP-105 marked up for power increase

• Attachment 8, Turbine Recommended Start-Up and Loading Times, of GP-005

• Attachment 10, Condenser Backpressure Limit Curve, of GP-005

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-5.

At direction of Event 1 Roll Turbine examiner Turbine RPM Event 2 reaches 150 High Turbine Eccentricity RPM $006_ECC_RPM ICO TURXMTET_HP r:15 NOTE: This malfunction will occur when the f:3.3 Turbine speed reaches 150 RPM At direction of Event 3 examiner Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 IMF NIS06A f:4.4E-7 At direction of Event 4 VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH examiner ICO CVCXMTLT_112 r:01:00 f:100 At direction of Event 5 B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve examiner FCV-626 fails to CLOSE IMF RCS12B r: 01:00 f:40 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 5 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION At direction of Event 6 Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs examiner w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE IMF MSS09 f:855700 Post-Rx Trip Event 7 Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Signal IMF RPS01A f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, NOTE: These malfunctions are inserted at T=0 AUTO IMF RPS01B f:FAILURE_TO_OPEN, AUTO Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 9 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Shortly after taking the watch, the operator will raise power to 5-8% and startup the Turbine using GP-005, Power Operation.

Booth Operator Instructions: NA Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments GP-005, POWER OPERATION SECTION 6.3, ROLLING THE TURBINE Examiner NOTE: Procedure Steps are NOT numbered in a continuous manner because some Steps in GP-005 have been previously signed off/completed.

RO (Step 8) WHEN Reactor Power approaches 5% THEN perform the following:

• Make a plant announcement that MODE 1 has been entered

• Record time MODE 1 entered

• Change ERFIS Mode Indication to display MODE 1 RO (Step 9) Adjust Control Rods to maintain Reactor Power between 5% and 8% while continuing with this procedure RO/ (Step 10) Ensure the ERFIS Calorimetric BOP (CALO) program is properly configured for the current plant operation:

• Current Excess Letdown operation

• Current AFW Pump operation

• Current Steam Generator Blowdown (SGBD) operation.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 10 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 11) Ensure cooling water is being supplied to the following components per OP-903, Placing Secondary Coolers in Service:

• Generator Hydrogen Coolers.

• H2 Seal Oil Coolers.

• Turbine Lube Oil Coolers.

• Exciter Air Coolers.

BOP (Step 12) Equalize hydrogen and air side seal oil temperatures per OP-505, Hydrogen Seal Oil System, Section titled Equalizing Hydrogen Side and Air Side Seal Oil Temperatures Prior to Rolling Turbine.

BOP (Step 13) IF the Generator Temperature Recorder is shutdown, THEN..

BOP (Step 14) Ensure the following recorders and associated instruments monitoring the Turbine Generator are energized and functional to the point necessary to support Turbine operation:

• Turbine Generator Supervisory Recorder.

• Turbine MSR Temperature Recorder (MSR-TEMP-REC).

• Turbine Supervisory Alarm Mimic Display.

• Generator Temperature Recorder.

BOP (step 15) Record the As Found turbine eccentricity (ECC) as indicated on the Turbine Supervisory Instrument Recorder.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 11 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 16) IF turbine rotor eccentricity (ECC) is greater than or equal to three mils (0.003 inches) as indicated on the Turbine Supervisory Instrument Recorder OR is in alarm on the RTGB Mimic Display, THEN BOP (Step 17) Using Curve 7.8 or Attachment 8, Turbine Recommended Start-Up And Loading Times, determine the Time Required to Accelerate to Sync Speed based on point TC-MTL-IMP-CHMBR indicated temperature and record.

BOP (Step 18) Depress the Valve Position Limit (lower) pushbutton until the Valve Position Limit indicator registers 0% Valve Limit Position.

BOP (Step 19) IF this is a turbine startup following replacement OR repair of any turbine shaft components or bearings, THEN..

BOP (Step 20) IF AT ANY TIME during turbine NOTE: This Attachment startup it is required to stop turbine rolling provides steps for securing the activities, THEN perform Attachment 6, Turbine Startup.

Securing Turbine During Startup BOP (Step 21) Monitor EH oil pressure during latching using ERFIS BOP (Step 22) Latch the Turbine using one of the following methods:

• Depress and hold the Turbine NOTE: The BOP will contact pushbutton until local indication PI- the AO at the Turbine 63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is Standard, and direct that greater than 80 psig pressure on PI-63ASO be reported.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report > 80 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 12 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 23) WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig, THEN perform the following:

• Ensure SL and SR Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED

• Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 24) Record the following data from the NOTE: The BOP will contact EH Pump (Governor Fluid Pump) local flow the AO, and direct that the EH indications Pump local flow indications be reported.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report:

FI-4428A - 5 gpm FI-4427A - 3 gpm FI-4428B - 5 gpm FI-4427B - 3 gpm BOP (Step 25) IF either EH Pump Discharge Flow NOTE: No EH Pump reads greater than 6 gpm OR IF either Eh Discharge Flow is greater than Pump Drain Flow indicated greater that 4 6 gpm.

gpm, THEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 13 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 26) IF the Turbine has rolled off the NOTE: The Turbine has NOT Turning Gear AND it is desired to place the rolled off the Turning Gear.

Turbine back on the Turning Gear, THEN BOP (Step 27) PERFORM the Turbine Valve/Trip Test

• Trip the Turbine by simultaneously depressing the Thing and Turbine Trip pushbuttons

• CHECK the following Valves:

• SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves -

CLOSED

• 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves - CLOSED

• 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves -

CLOSED

• Monitor EH pressure during latching using ERFIS

• Latch the Turbine using one of the following methods:

• Depress and hold the Turbine Latch NOTE: The BOP will contact pushbutton until local indication PI- the AO at the Turbine 63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is Standard, and direct that greater than 80 psig pressure on PI-63ASO be reported.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report > 80 psig.

• WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil Press) is greater than 80 psig THEN perform the following:

• Ensure SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 14 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED

• Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED

• Direct an Operator to trip the Turbine NOTE: The BOP will contact locally at the Turbine Front Standard the AO at the Turbine by positioning the Turbine Trip Lever Standard, and direct that the to the TRIP Position Turbine be tripped.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF TUR004 f:TRIPPED and report that the Turbine has been tripped.

• Check the following:

• SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves -

CLOSED

• 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves - CLOSED

• 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves

- CLOSED

• Direct the Operator at the Turbine NOTE: The BOP will contact Front Standard to reset the Turbine the AO at the Turbine locally by placing the Turbine Trip Standard, and direct that the Lever to RESET and holding (lever Turbine be latched.

will be released in Section 6.3 Step Booth Instructor 27.j) acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF TUR004 f:RESET_HOLD And report that the Turbine has been reset.

• Check the following:

• Ensure SL and SR, Turbine Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 15 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Ensure 1RL, 2RL, 1RR, 2RR, Reheat Stop Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure 1IL, 2IL, 1IR, 2IR, Intercept Valves indicate OPEN on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Ensure GLU, GLL GRU, GRL Governor Valves indicate CLOSED on the EH Turbine Control Panel

• Check green Latch Light is ILLUMINATED

• Ensure Unit Trip Light is EXTINGUISHED

• (Operator at the Front Standard) NOTE: The BOP will contact WHEN PI-63ASO (Auto Stop Oil the AO at the Turbine Press) indicates greater than 80 Standard, and direct that the psig, THEN position the Turbine Trip Turbine Trip Lever to Normal Lever to NORMAL. when PI-63ASO is greater than 80 psig.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF TUR004 f:NORMAL And report the Turbine Trip Lever has been returned to Normal.

BOP (Step 30) Depress the Valve Position Limit (raise) pushbutton until the Valve Position Limit indicator stops rising.

BOP (Step 31) Depress the Oper Auto pushbutton BOP (Step 33) Set a speed of 490 rpm to 510 rpm in the Setter display using the REF and/or REF pushbuttons.

BOP (Step 34) Set the Acceleration Rate thumbwheel to 50 rpm/minute

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 1 Page 16 of 54 Event

Description:

Roll Turbine Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 35) Record steam inlet pressure as indicated on PI-1304 (HP Turb Throttle Press)

BOP (Step 36) Record Condenser back pressure as indicated on PI-1310 (LP Turb A Cond Press Indicator) and PI-1311 (LP Turb B Cond Press Indicator)

BOP (Step 37) WHEN steam inlet pressure is at least 600 psig as indicated on PI-1304 (HP Turb Throttle Press) [Step 35] AND Condenser back pressure is less than or equal to 3.8 inches Hg Abs on PI-1310 (LP Turb A Cond Press Indicator) and PI-1311 (LP Turb B Cond Press Indicator) [Step 36]

THEN depress the Go pushbutton to raise speed.

BOP (Step 38) Perform the following as turbine speed raises;

• Ensure turning gear disengages

• IF governor valve leakage is causing turbine speed to raise above the speed into the Setter, THEN

• IF Turbine speed stabilizes in resonant speed range, THEN

• IF Turbine speed exceeds 1395 rpm AND is NOT under positive control of the Operator, THEN When the Turbine Eccentricity Alarms move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 17 of 54 Event

Description:

High Turbine Eccentricity When the Turbine is rolling, a HIGH Eccentricity condition will develop on the Main Turbine. The operator will respond using AOP-006, Turbine Eccentricity/Vibration, and place the Turbine startup on HOLD.

Booth Operator Instructions: $006_ECC_RPM ICO TURXMTET_HP r:15 f:3.3 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-A8, TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT

• Red ECC status light on Turbine Status Light Panel is LIT

• Turbine Supervisory Instrumentation Recorder indicates Turbine Eccentricity at 3.3 mils (If/When selected)

Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-008-A8, TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT BOP (Step 1) IF caused by High Rotor Eccentricity, THEN REFER TO AOP-006 AOP-006, TURBINE ECCENTRICITY/VIBRATION BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Speed LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 600 RPM BOP (Step 3) CHECK Turbine Eccentricity On TURBINE SUPERVISORY INSTRUMENT RECORDER LESS THAN 3 MILS BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• DEPRESS turbine HOLD pushbutton.

• CONTACT Engineering to evaluate conditions and to provide recommended actions.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 2 Page 18 of 54 Event

Description:

High Turbine Eccentricity Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• MAINTAIN turbine speed less than 600 NOTE: The BOP will suspend rpm until Engineering provides the Turbine Startup.

recommended actions.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the abnormal Turbine condition.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 19 of 54 Event

Description:

Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 Shortly afterwards, the compensating voltage on Intermediate Range Channel N-35 will fail. The operator will remove the instrument from service using OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI). The failed channel will require that the Source Range instruments be manually re-energized in the subsequent post-trip conditions. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.3.1, Reactor Protection System (RPS)

Instrumentation, and determine to continue with the power increase.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF NIS06A f:4.4E-7 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-005-B2, N-35 LOSS OF COMP VOLT

• N35 indication changed slightly on NR-45 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-005-B2, N-35 LOSS OF COMP VOLT RO (Step 1) MONITOR Intermediate Range amps.

RO (Step 2) IF NI-35 has failed, THEN REMOVE NI-35 from service per OWP-011, Nuclear Instrumentation (NI).

RO (Step 3) IF a Reactor shutdown occurs, NOTE: This is a Continuous THEN manually ACTIVATE Source Range Action. The CRS will make NIS. both board operators aware.

CRS (Step 4) REFER TO TS Table 3.3.1-1, Reactor Protection System Instrumentation.

OWP-011, NUCLEAR INSTRUMENTATION (NI)

NI-7, NI-35 INTERMEDIATE RANGE BOP REMOVE NI-35 from ERFIS SCAN:

NIN0035A BOP START UP RATE CHANNEL SELECT Switch - N36

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 3 Page 20 of 54 Event

Description:

Loss of Compensation Voltage to Intermediate Range N-35 Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP LEVEL TRIP Switch - Bypass TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.3.1, REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM (RPS)

INSTRUMENTATION CRS LCO 3.3.1: The RPS instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.1-1 shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.1-1.

CRS NOTE: Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION F.1or F. THERMAL F.1 Reduce 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> F.2 must be entered.

POWER > P- THERMAL 6 and < P-10, POWER to < P-6.

one Intermediate OR 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> Range F.2 Increase Neutron Flux THERMAL channel POWER to > P-inoperable. 10.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 21 of 54 Event

Description:

VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH Following this, VCT Level Transmitter LT-112 will fail HIGH causing LCV-115A to divert all letdown flow to the CVCS HUTs and result in an automatic makeup to the VCT. The operator will respond in accordance with AOP-003, Malfunction of Reactor Makeup Control. After this, the power increase will continue.

Booth Operator Instructions: ICO CVCXMTLT_112 r:01:00 f:100 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-003-E3, VCT HI/LO LVL

• LT-112 indicates HIGH on ERFIS

• LCV-115 Amber status light is LIT (indicating full divert to CVC HUT)

• Auto Makeup occurs Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-003, MALFUNCTION OF REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL RO (Step 1) Check for Failure of A Level NOTE: An Auto Makeup is Transmitter as follows: likely to occur due to Letdown being diverted to the radwaste system.

• Obtain a VCT level for LT-115 using ERFIS

• PT ID CHL0115A

• Obtain a VCT level for LT-112 using ERFIS

• PT ID CHL0112A

• Check VCT level indicator -

OSCILLATING LEVEL DEVIATION OBSERVED CRS (Step 1.c RNO) GO to Step 1.e RO

• CHECK VCT level deviation between LT-112 and LT-115 - GREATER THAN 8 INCHES (13%)

CRS (Step 2) CHECK LT-115 - FAILED NOTE: LT-115 is NOT failed.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 22 of 54 Event

Description:

VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 2 RNO) GO to Step 4 RO (Step 4) CHECK LT-112 - FAILED RO (Step 5) Stabilize the RCS Makeup System as follows:

• Check LT-112 - FAILED HIGH

• Place LCV-115A, VCT/HLDP TK DIV, Control Switch to VCT

• Obtain Hagan Racks Key number 10

• Place VCT Level Transmitter Selector NOTE: The BOP will go to the Switch located in Hagan Rack #19, IN Hagan Room.

LT-115 POSITION Booth Instructor use IRF CVC067 f:LT-115.

• Place the LCV-115A Control Switch to AUTO

• Contact I&C to repair failed channel NOTE: The CRS may call WCC/I&C to address the failed channel.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

CRS (Step 6) Make PA Announcement for NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 7) Implement the EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

RO (Step 8) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN Examiner NOTE: All required 12.5 INCHES (21%) actions have been completed for this failure. Move to the next event as desired.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 23 of 54 Event

Description:

VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 8 RNO) IF VCT level lowers to less than 12.5 inches (21%) THEN perform Steps 9 and 10.

CRS

• Go to Step 11.

RO (Step 11) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 20 INCHES (33%)

CRS (Step 11 RNO) Go to Step 21 RO (Step 21) Check VCT Level - LESS THAN 51.5 INCHES (86%)

RO (Step 22) Verify Charging and Letdown Flows are Normal for Plant Conditions RO (Step 23) Check APP-003-D5, BA FLOW DEV - ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 23 RNO) Go to Step 28.

RO (Step 28) Check APP-003-E5, MAKEUP WATER DEV - ILLUMINATED CRS (Step 28 RNO) Go to Step 34 RO (Step 34) Check Boration - REQUIRED CRS (Step 34 RNO) GO to Step 37 RO (Step 37) Check Dilution - REQUIRED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 4 Page 24 of 54 Event

Description:

VCT Level transmitter LT-112 fails HIGH Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 37 RNO) Go to Step 40.

CRS (Step 40) Check Technical Specifications, Section 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS), For Applicable LCO CRS (Step 41) Return to Procedure and Step in Effect At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 25 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Next, a Thermal barrier leak will develop on the B RCP and Flow Control Valve FCV-626 will fail to CLOSE. The operator will respond in accordance with APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, and AOP-014, Component Cooling Water Malfunction. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1, Containment, and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.3, Containment Isolation Valves.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF RCS12B r: 01:00 f:40 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B2, RCP LABYRTH LO P

• Seal Injection flow on B RCP rising

• B RCP Thermal Barrier P, PI-123A indicating 0

• CCW Surge Tank Level rising

• RTGB Annunciator APP-036-D8, PROCESS MONITOR HI RAD Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW RO (Step 1) IF CCW AND Seal Injection are lost to any RCP, THEN RO (Step 2) IF result of CCW Pump start only, THEN CRS (Step 3) IF a failure of an RCP Thermal NOTE: The CRS will transition Barrier has occurred, THEN REFER to AOP- to AOP-014.

014.

RO (Step 4) IF a RCP Number 1 Seal failure has occurred, THEN AOP-014, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 26 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 1) IMPLEMENT The EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 2) NOTIFY Plant Personnel of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 3) GO TO Appropriate Section for Indicated Malfunction:

• Rising CCW inventory OR R-17 NOTE: The CRS will address Alarming - Go to Section B Section B of AOP-014.

AOP-014, COMPONENT COOLING WATER MALFUNCTION SECTION B, RISING CCW INVENTORY OR R-17 ALARMING RO (Step 1) CHECK FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT - AUTO CLOSED RO (Step 1 RNO) PERFORM the following:

IF APP-001-C1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW, is ILLUMINATED, THEN PERFORM ONE of the following:

• ENSURE FV-626 is CLOSED AND GO NOTE: FCV-626 will fail to TO Step 2. (RTGB) CLOSE.

OR

• IF FCV-626 will NOT close, THEN NOTE: CC-735 will be COSE CC-735, THERM BAR OUT ISO, CLOSED.

AND GO TO Step 2.

RO (Step 2) CHECK RCP Seal Leakoff - ANY GREATER THAN 5 GPM CRS (Step 2 RNO) GO TO Step 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 27 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 4) CHECK the following indications of an RCP Thermal Barrier Failure - BOTH EXIST

• RCP Thermal Barrier Cooling - NOTE: Thermal Barrier is ISOLATED DUE TO HIGH FLOW isolated by CC-735.

AND

• R-17, COMPONENT COOLING NOTE: R-17 is in alarm.

WATERRADIOACTIVE LIQUID -

RISING TREND OR ALARM RO (Step 5) CHECK Seal Injection Flow to the Affected RCP(s) - LOST CRS (Step 5 RNO) GO TO Step 7.

CRS (Step 7) DISPATCH Operator to NOTE: The CRS may call Containment to Perform Attachment 6, RCP WCC to address the Thermal Barrier Isolation performance of Attachment 6.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

RO (Step 8) CHECK RCP Status as follows:

• CHECK RCP B OR C - RUNNING

• CHECK RCP B - RUNNING

• CHECK RCP C - RUNNING CRS (Step 9) WHEN Attachment 6 is completed, NOTE: This Attachment will THEN GO TO Step 23 require a Containment Entry, and will not be completed within the remainder of the Scenario.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 28 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Examiner NOTE: Because of the dynamic nature of the this event , and the response, the CRS may NOT check the Tech Specs. If not, evaluate the Technical Specification after the Scenario is complete.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.3, CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES CRS LCO 3.6.3 Each containment isolation valve shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 AND 4.

CRS ACTIONS NOTES

1. Penetration flow path(s) may be unisolated intermittently under administrative controls.

2. Separate Condition entry is allowed for each penetration flow path.

3. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions for systems made inoperable by containment isolation valves.

4. Enter applicable Conditions and NOTE: When FCV-626 is Required Actions of LCO 3.6.1, unisolated and failed OPEN, Containment, when isolation valve Technical Specification LCO leakage results in exceeding the overall 3.6.1 is NOT met.

containment leakage rate acceptance criteria.

5. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.8, Isolation Valve seal Water (IVSW)

System when required IVSW supply to a penetration flowpath is isolated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 29 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1, A. One or more A.1 Isolate the 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and A.2 must be entered.

penetration affected flow paths penetration flow with one path by use of at containment least one closed isolation and de-activated valve automatic valve, inoperable. closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured.

AND A.2 NOTE: Isolation devices in high radiation areas may be verified by Once per 31 use of days for administrative isolation means. devices outside containment Verify the affected penetration flow AND path is isolated. Prior to entering MODE 4 from MODE 5 if not performed within the previous 92 days for isolation devices inside containment.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.1, CONTAINMENT CRS LCO 3.6.1: Containment shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 5 Page 30 of 54 Event

Description:

B RCP Thermal Barrier Leak/Flow Control Valve FCV-626 fails to CLOSE Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1 A. Containment A.1 Restore 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> must be entered until FCV-626 inoperable. containment to is isolated.

OPERABLE status.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Events #6-7.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 31 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Subsequently, a Steam Rupture will occur downstream of the MSIVs and the MSIVs will fail to CLOSE automatically and manually. Simultaneously, the Reactor will fail to TRIP automatically. The operator will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and manually trip the reactor. Upon completion of EOP-E-0, the operator will transition to EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, and then when it is realized that all Steam Generators are faulted, transition to EOP-ECA-2.1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, and lower AFW flow to each Steam Generator to 60 gpm. While terminating Safety Injection in EOP-ECA-2.1, the A MSIV will close and the A S/G pressure will rise higher than that of the B and C S/Gs. Since the crew will be in the process of terminating SI in EOP-ECA-2.1, the crew will continue to complete the SI termination steps before transitioning back to EOP-E-2. The scenario will terminate at Step 4.c of EOP-E-2, after the operator has closed the AFW Discharge valves to the B and C Steam Generators.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF MSS09 f:855700 Indications Available:

• Steam noise heard in the Control Room

• Lowering pressure in all Steam Generators

• Rising level in all Steam Generators

• Rising steam flowing all Steam Generators

• RCS pressure is lowering Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers NOTE: The operator will need OPEN to trip the Reactor Manually.

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 32 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually trip the reactor from the control room before entry into FRP-S.1 Safety Significance: Failure to manually trip the reactor causes a challenge to the subcriticality CSF beyond that irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions.

Additionally, it constitutes an incorrect performance that necessitates the operator taking compensating action that would complicate the event mitigation strategy and demonstrates the inability of the operator to recognize a failure or an incorrect automatic actuation of an ESF system or component. The ERG Background Document for E-0 states that one function of E-0 is to verify that all required automatic protective actions occur before transitioning the crew to the appropriate ORG. The verification is important because the subsequent ORGs are based on the assumption that protective systems will protect all CSFs while the ORG is implemented. Not tripping the reactor when it is possible to do so (as in the postulated conditions) forces an immediate extreme challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Additionally, the incorrect performance of failing to trip the reactor necessitates the operator taking compensating action that seriously complicates the event mitigation strategy. This mis-operation constitutes a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED RO/ (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action BOP CHECK if SI is actuated:

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 33 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 37.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 34 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST NOTE: The A CCW Pump is ONE RUNNING running.

BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED BOP

• CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

• High steam flow with: NOTE: The High Steam Flow criteria will be met.

• S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR

• Tavg LESS THAN 543°F

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 35 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6.b) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass NOTE: The valves have failed Valves CLOSED OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.

BOP (Step 6.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING

• CHECK SW Booster Pumps BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure Alarms EXTINGUISHED

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

• CHECK SI Pumps - FLOW INDICATED NOTE: Based on event timing the SI Pumps may or may not be indicating flow.

• CHECK RCS pressure - LESS THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.c RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans ALL RUNNING BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 36 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN STOPPED

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 37 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: This step is NOT Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary necessary.

(38 KW each):

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c

• If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running: NOTE: Based on timing of events, and response actions to these events, the operator may not perform the RNO.

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps -

BOTH RUNNING

• CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels -

TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

RO (Step 6b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level NOTE: This is a Continuous lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, Action. The CRS will make THEN PERFORM Step 6.c. both board operators aware.

CONTINUE WITH Step 7.

RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment:

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 38 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge NOTE: it is likely that the Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP SDAFW Pump is running.

RUNNING RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 GPM RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG

• CHECK CV Spray - NOT ACTUATED RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR NOTE: APP-001-D1 is LIT COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm because CC-735 is CLOSED.

EXTINGUISHED OR

• Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE

• Seal Injection flow GREATER THAN 6 GPM PER RCP RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 39 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• With ANY RCP running, RCS average temperature STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS NOTE: Due to the unisolable THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN Steam Rupture the RCS PERFORM the following: temperature is lowering.

• STOP dumping steam.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN REDUCE total AFW flow to minimum for decay heat removal.

• MAINTAIN total AFW flow GREATER THAN 300 gpm UNTIL S/G Narrow Range level is GREATER THAN 9%[18%] in at least one S/G.

• IF RCS cooldown continues, THEN NOTE: The valves have failed CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass OPEN and cannot be Valves. CLOSED from the RTGB.

RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING

• CHECK SI Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING FLOW

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs LESS THAN 13°F[32°F]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 40 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 13.c RNO) GO TO Step 14.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure NOTE: All Steam Generator Boundaries Are Intact: pressures are lowering uncontrollably.

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED CRS (Step 14 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE NOTE: The Red Path on monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Subcriticality is due to the IR Status Trees. failure.

• GO TO EOP-E-2, Faulted Steam NOTE: The CRS will transition Generator Isolation, Step 1. to EOP-E-2.

EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves For Faulted S/G(s) CLOSED:

• S/G A:

• V13A

• MS353A

• S/G B:

• V13B

• MS353B

• S/G C:

• V13C

• MS353C

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 41 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as NOTE: The valves have failed necessary. OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK If ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs ANY NOTE: All Steam Generator STABLE OR RISING pressures are lowering uncontrollably.

BOP (Step 2 RNO) IF ALL S/G pressures are lowering in an uncontrolled manner, THEN PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS.

• GO TO EOPECA2.1, Uncontrolled Depressurization Of All Steam Generators, Step 1.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ECA-2.1.

EOP-ECA-2.1, UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP SI REINITIATION CRITERIA EOP-E-2 TRANSITION CRITERIA

• IF ANY S/G pressure rises at ANYTIME, NOTE: This criteria is EXCEPT while performing SI expected to be applicable Termination in Steps 10 THROUGH 19, while in EOP-ECA-2.1.

THEN GO TO EOPE2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION, Step 1.

EOP-E-3 TRANSITION CRITERIA COLD LEG RECIRCULATION SWITCHOVER CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 42 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 1) CHECK Secondary Pressure NOTE: The valves have failed Boundary: OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.

• CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves

- CLOSED BOP/ (Step 1.a RNO) Manually OR locally CLOSE CRS valve(s) as necessary, ONE S/G loop at a time:

• S/G A NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO. This action will NOT be taken until Step 11 of EOP-ECA-2.1, AFTER Phase A Containment Isolation is RESET.

• V1-3A

• MS-353A

• S/G B

• V1-3B

• MS-353B

• S/G C

• V1-3C

• MS-353C BOP

• CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• FW Reg valves - CLOSED

• FW Reg Bypass valves - CLOSED

• FW Header Section valves -

CLOSED BOP

• CHECK Steam Driven AFW Pump Steam Shutoff Valves - CLOSED:

• V1-8A, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-5, CMPT-16F)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 43 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• V1-8B, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-6, CMPT-16M)

• V1-8C, SDAFW PUMP STEAM ISOLATION (MCC-6, CMPT-18M)

BOP

• CHECK S/G Steam Line PORVs -

CLOSED BOP

• CHECK Faulted S/G(s) Blowdown AND Blowdown Sample Valves - CLOSED

• CHECK valve status using ERFIS/SPDS.

BOP

• Locally ENSURE the following valves NOTE: The CRS will dispatch CLOSED: (pipe jungle above/right of an AO.

associated V1-8 valves): Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the area has too much steam, and that entry cannot be made.

• BYPASS DRN & WARM-UP LINE TO AFW PUMP

• MS-20

• MS-29

• MS-38

• STEAM LINE BEFORE SEAT DRAIN ROOT ISOL

• MS-19

• MS-28

• MS-37

• STEAM LINE AFTER SEAT DRAIN ROOT ISOL

• MS-21

• MS-30

• MS-39

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 44 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/ (Step 2) CHECK for adequate Shutdown NOTE: The CRS may call CRS Margin: WCC/Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/Chemistry.

• SAMPLE RCS for boron

• SAMPLE PZR for boron

• CHECK Shutdown Margin -

ADEQUATED FOR COLD SHUTDOWN (When results available)

RO/ (Step 3) CONTROL Feed Flow to MINIMIZE BOP RCS Cooldown:

• CHECK cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs

- LESS THAN 100°F in the last 60 minutes BOP (Step 3.a RNO) LOWER feed flow to 60 gpm NOTE: The crew may take to each S/G. various actions to reduce FW flow to 60 gpm to each S/G, including stopping AFW Pump(s), adjusting Pump discharge valves and/or directing that the AO locally adjust flow (If so, Booth Instructor use codes listed BELOW).

BOP (Step 3.b) CHECK S/G Narrow Range level in ALL S/Gs - LESS THAN 50%

• CHECK RCS Hot Leg temperatures -

STABLE OR LOWERING

• CHECK ANY S/G Narrow Range Level -

LESS THAN 9% [18%]

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 45 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP/

• OPEN MDAFW HEADER DISCHARGE NOTE: The CRS will dispatch CRS Valve breakers: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use codes listed BELOW.

• V2-16A, MCC-9, CMPT-2ML IRF EPSMCC9_255 f:RACK_OUT

• V2-16C, MCC-9, CMPT-3J IRF EPSMCC9_256 f:RACK_OUT

• V2-16A, MCC-10, CMPT-4C IRF EPSMCC10_264 f:RACK_OUT

• V2-16B,MCC-10, CMPT-4F IRF EPSMCC10_266 f:RACK_OUT BOP/

• THROTTLE AFFECTED S/G MDAFW NOTE: The CRS will dispatch CRS HDR DISCH valve to establish a an AO.

MINIMUM of 60 gpm to the AFFECTED S/G

• S/G A - V2-16A IRF CFW009 r: 35 f:2.2

• S/G B - V2-16B IRF CFW010 r: 33 f:2

• S/G C - V2-16C IRF CFW011 r: 31 f:2 Examiner NOTE: When AFW flow is throttled to 60 gpm to each S/G a Red Path will exists on the HEAT SINK CSFST. The operator will address FRP-H.1 and immediately return to EOP-ECA-2.1.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 46 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Control the AFW flow rate to not less than 60 gpm per SG in order to minimize the RCS cooldown rate before an EXTREME (Red Path) challenge develops to the RCS Integrity CSF Safety Significance: Failure to control the AFW flow rate to the SGs leads to an unnecessary and avoidable extreme challenge to the integrity CSF. Also, failure to perform the critical task increases the challenges to the subcriticality CSF beyond which is irreparably introduced by the postulated plant conditions. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes a demonstrated inability by the operator to take one or more actions that would prevent a challenge to plant safety. It also fails to prevent a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario.

RO (Step 4) CHECK if RCPs Should be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs - ANY RUNNING

• CHECK SI Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING AND CAPABLE Of DELIVERING FLOW

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - LESS THAN 13°F [32°F]

CRS (Step 4.c RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior to Step 5 AND GO TO Step 5 RO (Step 5) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Block Valves:

• CHECK power to PORV Block Valves -

AVAILABLE

• CHECK PORVs - CLOSED

• CHECK PORV Block Valves - AT LEAST ONE OPEN BOP (Step 6) Check Secondary Radiation:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 47 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• REQUEST periodic activity samples of NOTE: The CRS may call ALL S/Gs RP/Chemistry to address the samples.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as RP/Chemistry.

• CHECK unisolated secondary radiation monitors - HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R-15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR GAS

• R-19s S/G Blowdown Radiation

• R-31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORS CRS

• CHECK secondary sample results -

NORMAL (When results available)

RO (Step 7) CHECK If RHR Pumps Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RHR pumps - ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• Pressure - GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

• Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

• RESET SI

• STOP RHR pumps

• CHECK RCS pressure remains -

GREATER THAN 275 PSIG [325 PSIG]

RO (Step 8) CHECK IF CV Spray Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK CV Spray Pumps - ANY RUNNING CRS (Step 8.a RNO) GO TO Step 9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 48 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 9) CHECK RWST Level - GREATER THAN 27%

RO (Step 10) RESET SI RO (Step 11) RESET Containment Isolation:

• PHASE A NOTE: The CRS has previously dispatched an AO to locally CLOSE an MSIV.

Booth Instructor: AFTER Phase A Containment Isolation is RESET in Step 11, use:

DMF MSS03A DOR diMSSDDI049 To locally CLOSE the A MSIV.

30 seconds later report that the A MSIV has been CLOSED.

NOTE: The A S/G will rise in comparison to the B and C S/Gs and the criteria for item

1. 2 on the Foldout Page will be met. However, the transition back to EOP-E-2 cannot take place until the SI Termination Step is complete (Step 19).

• PHASE B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 49 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) RESET IVSW System: NOTE: The CRS will dispatch an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF SIS026 f:RESET IRF SIS027 f:RESET and report after 1 minute that the IVSW System has been reset.

• IVSW RESET PCV-1922A (In Relay Cabinet ARP-1)

• IVSW RESET PCV-1922B (In Relay Cabinet ARP-2)

RO (Step 13) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

• CHECK APP-002-F7, INSTR AIR HDR O PRESS alarm -

EXTINGUISHED

• RESET IA PCV-1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV-1716 - OPEN RO (Step 14) CHECK if SI Accumulators Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK at least two RCS Hot Leg temperatures -LESS THAN 430°F

• CHECK power to Accumulator Discharge Valves - ENERGIZED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 50 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 14.b RNO) RESTORE power to NOTE: The CRS/RO will Accumulator Discharge Valves by closing the dispatch an AO to CLOSE the following: Accumulator Isolation Valve motor breakers.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF EPSMCC5_204 f:RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC5_205 f:RACK_IN IRF EPSMCC6_232 f:RACK_IN report after 2 minutes that the breakers are CLOSED.

• MCC-5 CMPT 9F (SI-865C)

• MCC-5 CMPT 14F (SI-865A)

• MCC-6 CMPT 10J (SI-865B)

• CLOSE ALL Accumulator Discharge Valves BOP (Step 15) CHECK Power Supply to Charging Pumps - OFFSITE POWER AVAILABLE RO (Step 16) ESTABLISH Charging Flow:

• CHECK Charging Pumps - AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

• ESTABLISH desired charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND desired Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 51 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Seal Water Flow Control Valves

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated RO (Step 17) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated:

• CHECK SI pumps - ANY RUNNING

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18°F [37°F]

• Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG CRS (Step 17.c RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION prior NOTE: Based on the EOP-to STEP 3 AND RETURN TO Step 3. ECA-2.1 Foldout Page criteria being met, the CRS will transition back to EOP-E-2, and isolate the B and C S/Gs.

EOP-E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass valves For Faulted S/G(s) CLOSED:

• S/G A: NOTE: The A MSIV and Bypass Valves are CLOSED.

• V13A

• MS353A

• S/G B: NOTE: The B MSIV is failed OPEN.

• V13B

• MS353B

• S/G C: NOTE: The C MSIV is failed OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 52 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• V13C

• MS353C BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as NOTE: The valves have failed necessary. OPEN and cannot be CLOSED from the RTGB.

The CRS may dispatch an AO to locally CLOSE one of the two failed OPEN MSIVs.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK If ANY S/G Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs ANY NOTE: The A S/G pressure STABLE OR RISING is stable for plant conditions.

BOP (Step 3) IDENTIFY Faulted S/G(s):

• CHECK pressures in ALL S/Gs

• ANY S/G PRESSURE LOWERING NOTE: The B and C S/Gs IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER are still faulted.

OR

• ANY S/G COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED BOP (Step 4) ISOLATE Faulted S/G(s):

• CHECK Main Feedwater Reg Valve, Reg Bypass Valve AND Header Section Valve to Faulted S/G(s) shut:

• S/G B valves CLOSED

• FCV488

• FCV489

• V26B

• S/G C valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 5 Event # 6&7 Page 53 of 54 Event

Description:

Steam Rupture downstream of the MSIVs w/failure of the MSIVs to CLOSE/ Failure of Automatic Rx Trip Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• FCV498

• FCV499

• V26C

• RESET SI

• CLOSE AFW Discharge Valve(s) to Faulted S/G(s):

• S/G B valves CLOSED

• V214B

• V216B NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that V2-16B be locally CLOSED.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use IRF CFW010 f:0.

• S/G C valves CLOSED

• V214C

• V216C NOTE: The BOP will contact the AO and direct that V2-16C be locally CLOSED.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use IRF CFW011 f:0.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16-1-5 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: EOL b) Reactor Power: 3%

c) Turbine Load: 0 MWe d) Boron Concentration: 158 ppm e) Rod Height: 127 CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 22.2%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description None

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The B Condensate Pump is OOS.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) A Condensate Pump

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) LI-1417A, Hotwell Level Indication is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-006-F7, PWST HI/LO LVL, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) Unrestricted (NOT-PROTECTED)

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Raise power to 30% IAW GP-005 starting with Section 6.3

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) The Reactor Engineer (RE) is available in the Control Room b) The RE recommends a __00 gallon dilution, made in several 200-300 gallon batch additions c) The RE recommends that Control Bank D be at approximately __ steps upon achieving 30%

11. RISK a) GREEN

Nuclear Training Committed to Excellence OPERATIONS TRAINING N16-1-6 Initial Licensed Operator Training Rev 111915 THIS EXERCISE GUIDE DOES NOT IMPLEMENT ANY COMMITMENTS Developed By: Date:

Instructor/Developer Concurred By: Date:

Line Superintendent/Supervisor/SRO Approved By: Date:

Superintendent/Supervisor Training PROGRAM: H B Robinson Operations Training MODULE: Initial License Operator Training Class 15-1 TOPIC: NRC Simulator Exam Scenario N16-1-6

REFERENCES:

1. Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating (Amendment 203)

2. AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction (Rev 33)

3. OP-105, Maneuvering the Plant When Greater Than 25% Power (Rev 62)

4. OP-301, Chemical And Volume Control System (Rev 112)

5. APP-008 SW, CW, & TURB GEN AUX (Rev 67)

6. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS) (Amendment 176)

7. Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems (Amendment 176)

8. AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions (Rev 31)

9. Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System (Amendment 176)

10. Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS)

(Amendment 223)

11. EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection (Rev 6)

12. EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power (Rev 4)

13. EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination (Rev 2)

14. EOP-ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response (Rev 7)

Validation Time: 100 minutes Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Facility: H B Robinson Scenario No.: 6 Op Test No.: N16-1 Examiners: Operators: (SRO)

(RO)

(BOP)

Initial Conditions: The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

Turnover: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

Event Malf. Event Type* Event No. No. Description 1 1 C-BOP Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN C-SRO 2 NA R-RO Lower Power N-BOP N-SRO 3 2 C-BOP C Service Water Pump Trips C(TS)-SRO 4 3 C-RO DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start C(TS)-SRO 5 4 C-RO A RCP Seal Failure C-SRO 6 5 M-RO Loss of Offsite Power M-BOP M-SRO 7 5 C-BOP B EDG Fails to Start 8 6 NA DSDG Trips 9 7 C-BOP D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 H B Robinson 2016 NRC Scenario #6 The plant is at 100% power (MOL). The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The following equipment is Out-Of-Service: The A EDG is OOS. ACTION has been taken in accordance with Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 ACTION B.1, B.2, B.3.2.1 and B.3.2.2, and B.4. R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating). RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating). The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and close the valve.

After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

After the power reduction is in progress, the C Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW, and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS), and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.

Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, or various APPs to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the C CCW Pump will trip, and only the B CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the A RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.

Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The operator will subsequently start the B EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the D Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started.

Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1.

Critical Tasks:

Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0 Safety Significance: Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals.

Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.

Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling Prior to the EDG Failing Due to Overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of engine high temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 SIMULATOR OPERATOR INSTRUCTIONS Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Sim. Setup Reset to Temp IC 613 T = 0 Malfunctions:

EDG A OOS:

• IRF EPSV480E1_120, d:0 f: RACK_OUT (EDG BKR Racked Out)

• IRF EDG01A, d:0 (EDG A OOS)

• IRF EDG003, d:0 f: Local (EDG A OOS)

PLACE RED CAP on the RTGB Control Switch for EDG A Place GREEN CAPS on the RTGB Control Switches BELOW (See OMM-048, Attachment 9):

• HVS-5 RTGB Switch

• HVE-17 RTGB Switch

• 52/27B RTGB Switch

• 52/28B RTGB Switch

• B EDG RTGB Switch

• V1-8A RTGB Switch

• V1-8B RTGB Switch

• V1-8C RTGB Switch

• V2-14A RTGB Switch

• V2-14B RTGB Switch

• V2-14C RTGB Switch

• Protected Switchyard Place WHITE DOT on APP-010-D2 R-15 OOS

• IRF RMS049 f:PWR_OFF Place WHITE DOT on R-15 Place WHITE DOT on APP-036-D8 Place WHITE DOT on APP-036-E7 RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8 failed ON

• IMF ANNXN02F08 f:ALARM_ON Place WHITE DOT on APP-002-F8 Insert the following:

• $006_RTA_TRIP IMF EDG01B (B EDG fails to START on Rx Trip)

• IMF EDG04E f:TRAIN_B (D SW Pump fails to Sequence ON when E-2 re-energized)

Verify that the A Charging Pump is RUNNING and the B and C Charging Pumps are OFF.

Place the Simulator in RUN and ACKNOWLEDGE all alarms.

Perform Attachment 2 (Simulator Setup For Exams) of TAP-411.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Crew Briefing

1. Assign Crew Positions based on evaluation requirements

2. Review the Shift Turnover Information with the crew.

3. Provide the crew with the following:

• Copy of Technical Specifications/Basis

4. Direct the crew to Review the Control Boards taking note of present conditions, alarms.

T-0 Begin Familiarization Period At direction of Execute Lesson Plan examiner for Simulator Scenario N16-1-6.

At direction of Event 1 Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN examiner IMF CFW36 At direction of Event 2 examiner Lower Power NOTE: to initiate this event, the WCCS will call and inform the operator that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service.

At direction of Event 3 C Service Water Pump Trips examiner IMF SWS01C At direction of Event 4 DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on examiner Start IRF EPSV480DS_063 f:TRIP IMF CCW01C d:10 At direction of Event 5 examiner A RCP Seal Failure IMF RCS13A r:2:00 f:50 Post-Rx Trip Event 6 Loss of Offsite Power IMF EPS13 NOTE: This event occurs on the Rx Trip Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 6 Bench Mark ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION Post-Rx Trip Event 7 B EDG Fails to Start NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Post-Rx Trip Event 8 DSDG Trips IMF EDG01C d:2 NOTE: This event occurs on the Rx Trip Post-Rx Trip Event 9 D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start NOTE: Failure is inserted at T=0 Terminate the scenario upon direction of Lead Examiner Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 9 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Shortly after taking the watch, HCV-1459, Heater Bypass Valve will fail OPEN. The crew will implement AOP-010, Main Feedwater/Condensate Malfunction, and close the valve.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF CFW36 Indications Available:

• Rx Power starts to RISE

• RTGB Annunciator APP-007-D7, HTR 3A HI/LO LVL

• RTGB Annunciator APP-007-D8, HTR 3B HI/LO LVL

• HCV-1459 Red and Green status lights are LIT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION BOP (Step 1) CHECK FRVs OPERATING PROPERLY (MANUAL OR AUTO):

• FCV478

• FCV488

• FCV498 RO/ (Step 2) CHECK Reactor Trip Setpoint NOTE: A Power Limit Warning BOP BEING APPROACHED is possible during this event which will require a reduction in power.

CRS (Step 2 RNO) IF a reactor trip setpoint is NOTE: This is a Continuous approached, THEN TRIP the reactor and GO Action. The CRS will make TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety both board operators aware.

Injection.

GO TO Step 4.

RO (Step 4) CHECK Reactor Power LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 10 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO/ (Step 4 RNO) IF reactor power exceeds BOP 100%, THEN REDUCE turbine load as necessary using turbine valve limiter to maintain reactor power less than or equal to 100%.

CRS (Step 5) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry Using Plant Page System likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 6) GO TO Appropriate Step From Table Below:

• Other -Step 35 BOP (Step 35) REDUCE Turbine Load Using NOTE: The CRS may assign Attachment 1 to Match Feedwater And the BOP to perform this action.

Steam Flows WHILE CONTINUING WITH BOP Examiner follow actions This Procedure. of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-010 Actions, Step 36, on Page 11.

AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION ATTACHMENT 1, REDUCING TURBINE LOAD BOP (Step 1) REDUCE Turbine Load at 1%/MIN to 5%/ MIN to achieve Goal Specified in Procedure Body:

• CHECK control rods - IN AUTOMATIC

• CHECK turbine mode - AUTOMATIC

• DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton

• SET desired load rate

• DEPRESS GO or HOLD pushbutton as needed to reduce turbine load

• BORATE using OP-301, RCS Boration Quick Checklist, as necessary to maintain AFD within the operating band

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 11 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2) CHECK Goal of Load Reduction -

REACHED

• To achieve a target power level OR

• To match steam flow with feed flow OR

• To raise MFP suction pressure BOP (Step 3) CHECK Current Loading for the NOTE: The BOP will contact following Pumps - LESS THAN MAXIMUM the Outside AO to check associated parameters.

Booth Instructor report data from Attachment 10.2 of OST-013 (See Below).

• MFP - 0.710 KILOAMPS A MFP - .60 KAMPs B MFP - .59 KAMPs

• Condensate Pump - 370 AMPS A MCP - 360 AMPs B MCP - 350 AMPs

• HDP - 90 AMPS A HDP - 79 AMPs B HDP - 78 AMPs BOP (Step 4) Stop Load Reduction BOP (Step 5) NOTIFY CRS/SM that Load Reduction is Complete AOP-010, MAIN FEEDWATER/CONDENSATE MALFUNCTION Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 12 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 36) DISPATCH an Operator to NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Observe Valve positions: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the LCV-1530A and B are operating normally.

• LCV-1530A, HDT LEVEL CONTROL VALVE

• LCV-1530B, HEATER DRAIN PUMPS SUCTION DUMP TO CONDENSER BOP (Step 37) DETERMINE If a Heater Drain Tank Level Control Valve has Failed:

• CHECK HDT level control valve or controller - HAS MALFUNCTIONED CRS (Step 37.a RNO) IF HDT Level is controlling correctly, THEN OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 40 and GO TO Step 40.

CRS (Step 40 ) CHECK for Leak - CAUSING FW NOTE: The CRS may dispatch TRANSIENT an AO to look for leaks, however, the reason for being in the AOP is because the Heater Bypass valve has opened.

• Visual indication of leak

• FW Heater level alarms

• FW Heater normal and alternate drain valve positions level dump valve positions

• FW Heater #1 & #2 emergency dump valve positions

• Gland Steam Condenser abnormal indications/alarms

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 13 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 40 RNO) OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 43 and GO TO Step 43.

CRS (Step 43) DETERMINE If a HDP has malfunctioned:

• DISPATCH an operator to evaluate NOTE: The CRS will dispatch HDPs for damage: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the HDPs are operating normally.

• LISTEN for unusual noise

• OBSERVE pump shaft for breakage

• OBSERVE for abnormal running current:

• A - 4KV Bus 1 CMPT-5

• B - 4KV Bus 4 CMPT-25

• CHECK pump damage - INDICATED CRS (Step 43.b RNO) OBSERVE NOTE prior to Step 46 and GO TO Step 46.

CRS (Step 46) DETERMINE if a Condensate Pump has malfunctioned:

• DISPATCH an operator to evaluate NOTE: The CRS will dispatch Condensate Pumps for damage: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the Condensate Pumps are operating normally.

• LISTEN for unusual noise

• OBSERVE pump shaft for breakage

• OBSERVE for abnormal running current:

• A - 4KV Bus 1 CMPT-6

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 14 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• B - 4KV Bus 4 CMPT-22

• CHECK pump damage - INDICATED CRS (Step 46.b RNO) OBSERVE CAUTION and NOTE prior to Step 49 and GO TO Step 49.

BOP (Step 49) CHECK for HCV-1459 Failure:

• CHECK HCV-1459, LP HEATERS BYP

- OPEN CRS/ (Step 50) DISPATCH an Operator to monitor NOTE: The CRS will dispatch BOP MFP Suction Pressures: an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, read indications from CFW3 and after 1 minute report the suction pressure for both pumps.

• PI-1433 - A FW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE

• PI-1434 - B FW PUMP SUCTION PRESSURE CRS/ (Step 51) CHECK MFP Suction Pressures -

BOP LESS THAN 400 PSIG CRS (Step 51 RNO) GO TO Step 54.

BOP (Step 54) CLOSE HCV-1459 CRS (Step 55) CONTACT I&C to Troubleshoot NOTE: The CRS may call and Correct HCV-1459 Problem WCC/I&C to address the Valve failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 15 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 56) GO TO Step 58 BOP (Step 58) CHECK S/G Level - AT OR TRENDING TO PROGRAM RO (Step 59) CHECK Tavg - AT OR TRENDING TO Tref CRS (Step 60) CONTACT Maintenance to NOTE: The CRS may call Troubleshoot and Correct the Feedwater WCC/I&C to address the Valve Problem failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC/I&C.

CRS (Step 61) IMPLEMENT EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

RO (Step 62) CHECK Total Reactor Power Change - LESS THAN 15%

RO (Step 63) CHECK APP-005-B5, ROD BANDS A/B/C/D LO LIMIT -

EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 64) MONITOR Axial Flux Difference to Ensure Compliance with TS 3.2.3 BOP (Step 65) NOTIFY Load Dispatcher of Units NOTE: The BOP will call Load Load Capability Dispatcher.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as Load Dispatcher.

CRS (Step 66) RETURN TO Procedure and Step In Effect

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 1 Page 16 of 57 Event

Description:

Feedwater Heater Bypass Valve fails OPEN Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 17 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power After the overpower transient is stabilized, the WCCS will call the control room and direct that reactor power be lowered to 50% for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service. The operator will lower power in accordance with AOP-038, Rapid Downpower.

Booth Operator Instructions: As WCCS, call Control Room and state the following:

A step change has occurred on the B Main Feedwater Pump vibrations, and station management has directed that reactor power be lowered to 50% using AOP-038 at 1-2%/minute for the purpose of removing the B Main Feedwater Pump from service.

Indications Available: NA Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER BOP (Step 1) NOTIFY Plant Personnel Of Procedure Entry Using The Plant Page System RO (Step 2) DETERMINE Corrected Boration And Target Rod Height For Target Power Level Using Most Recently Performed OST 947, OPERATIONS REACTIVITY PLAN

• Target Load Reduction Rate __%/min

• Target Power Level ___

• Target Rod Height ___ NOTE: The RO will determine

__ Steps.

• Corrected Boration ___ NOTE: The RO will determine

__ gallons.

RO (Step 3) CHECK Required Power Reduction Rate LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%/MINUTE CRS (Step 4) PERFORM Brief Of Control Room Personnel To Include The Following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 18 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Reason for downpower

• Target Power Level

• Target Rod Height

• Rate of load reduction

• Amount of boric acid addition RO (Step 5) ENERGIZE All Available PZR Heaters

• PZR HTR CONTROL GROUP

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP A

• PZR HTR BACKUP GROUP B RO (Step 6) CHECK Rod Control IN AUTO RO (Step 7) INITIATE Boration Using Attachment 1, RCS Boration, While Continuing With This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will assign the RO to perform this action.

RO Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

Other Examiners follow AOP-038 Actions, Step 8, on Page 19.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER ATTACHMENT 1, RCS BORATION RO (Step 1) PLACE The RCS MAKEUP MODE Selector Switch In BORATE RO (Step 2) IF Frequent Boric Acid Transfer Pump Starts Are Anticipated, THEN PLACE Boric Acid Transfer Pump Switch Aligned To BLEND To ON.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 19 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 3) SET YIC113, BORIC ACID TOTALIZER to amount determined in Main Body Step 2 RO (Step 4) Momentarily PLACE the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM switch to START RO (Step 5) IF Boric Acid flow is NOT achieving the desired effect, THEN PLACE FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, in MAN AND manually Adjust controller FCV113A, BORIC ACID FLOW, using the UP and DOWN pushbuttons RO (Step 6) WHEN the desired amount of Boric Acid has been added to the RCS OR the RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM Switch is placed in STOP, THEN ENSURE the following:

• FCV113A, BA TO BLENDER, closes.

• FCV113B, BLENDED MU TO CHG SUCT, closes.

• IF in AUTO, THEN operating Boric Acid Pump stops.

• RCS MAKEUP SYSTEM is OFF.

AOP-038, RAPID DOWNPOWER Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/BOP continue HERE.

BOP (Step 8) INITIATE Turbine Load Reduction While Continuing With This Procedure

• CHECK EH Turbine Control IN OPER AUTO

• PREPARE For Turbine Load Reduction As Follows:

• CHECK IMP IN ILLUMINATED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 20 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 8.b.1 RNO 1) IF Turbine Load reduction is available using IMP IN, THEN PERFORM the following:

• DEPRESS IMP IN pushbutton

• CHECK IMP IN light illuminated

• CHECK IMP OUT light extinguished BOP (Step 8.b) SET desired load in the SETTER

• SELECT the desired Load Rate

• DEPRESS the GO pushbutton to initiate Turbine Load reduction BOP (Step 9) ADJUST Turbine Load To Control Tavg Within 5°F Of Tref Using One Of The Following:

• ADJUST Load Rate OR

• DEPRESS GO and HOLD pushbuttons CRS/ (Step 10) INITIATE Notification of The NOTE: The CRS may ask BOP Following: SM/WCC/Communicator to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge.

• Load Dispatcher of load reduction

• E&C to control secondary chemistry

• RC for elevated radiation levels in CV Pump Bays and Pipe Alley

• Oncall Duty Manager to activate the Event Response Team

• E&C for impending 15% power change for I131 sampling within 2 to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

• E&C for impending power reduction greater than 20% terminate zinc injection

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 2 Page 21 of 57 Event

Description:

Lower Power Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• NRC within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> BOP (Step 11) CHECK Auxiliary Boilers AT LEAST ONE OPERATING BOP (Step 11 RNO) IF Plant Shutdown is NOTE: The BOP will dispatch required, THEN NOTIFY AO to start at least an AO.

one Auxiliary Boiler per OP401, AUXILIARY Booth Instructor HEATING SYSTEM. acknowledge as AO.

RO (Step 12) CHECK Tavg WITHIN 5°F OF Tref RO (Step 13) CHECK Axial Flux Distribution WITHIN TARGET BAND BOP (Step 14) CHECK APP006F5, STEAM DUMP ARMED EXTINGUISHED RO (Step 15) CHECK Any Of The Following Conditions MET:

• Target load/power has been reached

• Load reduction is no longer required

• CRS/SM directs termination of load reduction

• STOP Rapid Downpower using Attachment 3, Termination Of Rapid Downpower At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 22 of 57 Event

Description:

C Service Water Pump Trips After the power reduction is in progress, the C Service Water Pump will trip on overload. This will cause the running Service Water Booster Pump to trip as well. The operator will respond in accordance with various APP-008 annunciators and start a standby Service Water Pump; and then respond in accordance with APP-002-A through D8, HVH WTR OUTLET LO FLOW, and re-start a Service Water Booster Pump. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.7, Service Water System (SWS),

and Technical Specification LCO 3.6.6, Containment Spray and Cooling Systems.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF SWS01C Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F4, SW PMP A/B/C/D OVLD

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F7, SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• RTGB Annunciator APP-008-F8, NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• SW North Header Pressure PI-1616 indicating 12 psig

• SW South Header Pressure PI-1684 indicating 13 psig

• C SW Pump Green and Red status lights LIT

• A SW Booster Pump trips

• RTGB Annunciator APP-002-A8 THROUGH D8, HVH-1(2-4) WTR OUTLET LO FLOW Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The crew will likely place the Turbine in HOLD.

APP-008-F4, SW PMP A/B/C/D OVLD BOP (Step 1) IF an operating SW Pump has tripped, THEN PERFORM the following:

• START a Standby Pump.

• DISPATCH operator to check breaker(s) NOTE: The CRS will dispatch AND Current Limiter Fuses: SW Pump an AO.

C - 480V Bus E2 (CMP 24A) If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 10 minutes that the C SW Pump motor is Hot to the touch.

• THROTTLE CCW Heat Exchanger NOTE: This action is NOT Return Valves, as necessary, to needed (Starting the D SW maintain 40 to 50 psig in the SW Pump will restore system Headers. pressure).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 23 of 57 Event

Description:

C Service Water Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CRS (Step 2) IF a single-phase open circuit NOTE: This action will need condition is suspected ENTER AOP-026. further investigation.

APP-002-A8, HVH-1 WTR OUTLET LO FLOW BOP (Step 1) IF the operating Service Water Booster Pump has tripped, THEN start Standby Service Water Booster Pump.

BOP (Step 2) IF no Service Water Booster Pump NOTE: The Standby SW can be started, THEN.. Booster Pump will start.

BOP (Step 3) IF V6-33A (SW Booster Pump 'A' NOTE: V6-33A has NOT Supply to HVH-1) has closed, THEN. CLOSED.

BOP (Step 4) IF a Service Water rupture outside NOTE: There is no SW Piping of the HVH boundaries is indicated, Rupture.

THEN..

BOP (Step 5) IF required, THEN dispatch NOTE: The CRS/BOP may personnel to check local indications: dispatch an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the system flows/pressures are normal and that the standby SW Booster Pump is NOT rotating in reverse.

• FI-1698A (HVH-1 Outlet Flow).

• PI-1646A (HVH-1 Outlet Pressure).

• Standby Service Water Booster Pump rotation.

BOP (Step 6) IF standby Service Water Booster NOTE: The standby SW Pump check valve is stuck open, THEN.. Booster Pump Check Valve is NOT stuck OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 24 of 57 Event

Description:

C Service Water Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 7) IF a SW leak exists inside the CV, NOTE: There is no SW leak in THEN.. the CV.

CRS (Step 8) IF at least 800 gpm flow through NOTE: Once the standby SW HVH-1 can NOT be established, THEN Booster Pump is started LCO declare HVH-1 inoperable and refer to ITS 3.6.6 will be met.

LCO 3.6.6.

BOP (Step 9) IF required, THEN ensure correct NOTE: This action will not be valve alignment in accordance with OP-903, required.

Service Water System.

BOP (Step 10) IF alarm is invalid, THEN . NOTE: The alarm is valid.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the C SW Pump failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: The CRS may address Technical Specifications.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.7, SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS)

CRS LCO 3.7.7: Two SWS trains and the Turbine Building loop isolation valves shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 3 Page 25 of 57 Event

Description:

C Service Water Pump Trips Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1 A. One SWS A.1 NOTES: Enter must be entered.

train applicable inoperable. Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC NOTE: The A and B SW Sources- Pumps must declared Operating," for inoperable within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> emergency diesel because the A EDG is generator made inoperable by inoperable.

SWS.

Restore SWS train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.6.6, CONTAINMENT SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS CRS LCO 3.6.6: Two containment spray trains and two containment cooling trains shall be OPERABLE.

CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

CRS ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION D.1 D. Two D.1 Restore one must be entered.

containment containment cooling trains cooling train to inoperable. OPERABLE 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> status.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

NOTE: The crew will likely continue to down power.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 26 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Following this, Breaker 52/32A will Trip de-energizing the DS Bus, and stopping the only running Charging Pump and CCW Pump. The operator may address AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, or various APPs to restore Charging and Seal Injection flow; and then APP-001-F5, CCW PMP LO PRESS, and ensure that the standby CCW Pump started. 10 seconds after the Standby CCW Pumps start, the C CCW Pump will trip, and only the B CCW will be left running. The operator will address Technical Specification LCO 3.7.6, Component Cooling Water (CCW) System, and Technical Specification LCO 3.4.17, Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS).

Booth Operator Instructions: IRF EPSV480DS_063 f:TRIP IMF CCW01C d:10 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW

• A Charging Pump trips

• FR-124 indicates no Seal Injection flow

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-F4, CCW PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP

• A CCW Pump trips

• B and C CCW Pump auto start

• C CCW Pump trips 10 seconds after start (Green and Red status lights are LIT)

• RTGB Annunciator APP-036-H6, DS BUS SUPPLY BKR 52/32A TRIP

• RTGB Annunciator APP-036-H8, DS BUS UNDER VOLT Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments NOTE: The CRS will enter AOP-018.

AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS CRS (Step 1) MAKE PA announcement for NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:

• Loss of Seal Injection - Section C NOTE: The CRS will transition to Section C of AOP-018.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 27 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS SECTION C, LOSS OF SEAL INJECTION NOTE: Power will be automatically restored to the DS Bus in 95 seconds.

RO (Step 1) CHECK APP-001-D1, RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm -

ILLUMINATED RO (Step 1 RNO) IF APP-001-D1 NOTE: This is a Continuous ILLUMINATES, THEN GO TO Step 2. Action. The CRS will make both board operators aware.

CRS

• OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 11 AND GO TO Step 11.

RO (Step 11) DETERMINE if a Charging Pump Can be Started:

• CHECK Charging System Piping -

RUPTURED CRS (Step 11.a RNO) GO TO Step 12 RO (Step 12) CHECK SI - INITIATED CRS (Step 12 RNO) GO TO Step 14 RO (Step 14) ENSURE at Least ONE Charging NOTE: The RO will start the Pump - RUNNING B and/or the C Charging Pump.

RO (Step 15) CHECK Seal Injection to RCPs:

• ANY Seal Injection flow - LESS THAN 6 GPM AND

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 28 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• ANY Thermal Barrier P - LESS THAN 5 inches CRS (Step 15 RNO) GO TO Step 47 (Step 47) ESTABLISH Charging Flow on FI-122A, CHARGING LINE FOW- GREATER THAN 40 GPM RO (Step 48) CHECK Normal Letdown - IN SERVICE RO (Step 49) CONTROL charging and Letdown Flow to Maintain Pressurizer Level as follows:

• Within +/- 5% Of Reference Level RO (Step 50) ESTABLISH Normal Seal Injection

• CHECK RCP Seal Injection - ALIGNED

• CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow -

BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM RO (Step 51) CHECK Seal Injection Flow -

ESTABLISH TO ALL RCPs CRS (Step 52) IMPLEMENT the EALs NOTE: The CRS may ask SM to address.

If so, Floor Instructor acknowledge as SM.

CRS (Step 53) REFER to Technical Specification for any applicable LCOs

• 3.4.13 - RCS Operational Leakage

• 3.4.17 - CVCS

• 3.4.9 - PZR Level

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 29 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• 3.4.4, 3.4.5, & 3.4.6 - RCS Loops RO (Step 54) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling -

ISOLATED CRS (Step 54 RNO) OBSERVE the NOTE prior to Step 2 AND GO To the Main Body, Step 2 of this procedure.

AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:

CRS (Step 2 RNO) RETURN TO procedure and step in effect.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the failure of the DS Bus normal supply breaker.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

NOTE: While both the B and the C CCW Pump started on low system pressure, the C CCW Pump has tripped shortly after start.

The CRS will address the APP.

APP-001-F4, CCW PMP MOTOR OVLD/TRIP RO (Step 1) IF alarm is due to intentional operator action, THEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 30 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 2) IF the running CCW Pump has NOTE: Both the B and the tripped, THEN ENSURE Standby CCW C CCW Pump started on low Pump STARTED system pressure, however, the C CCW Pump has tripped shortly after start.

RO (Step 3) IF Standby CCW Pump can NOT be started, THEN RO (Step 4) IF FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW NOTE: FCV-626 is OPEN.

CONT, closes due to pump start, THEN (Step 5) IF CCW Pump tripped due to NOTE: The CRS will dispatch electrical fault, THEN DISPATCH an an AO.

operator to check breaker and Current Booth Instructor Limiter Fuses (E-1/E-2 breakers only) acknowledge as AO, and report after 1 minute that the C CCW Pump motor has an acrid smell.

CRS (Step 6) IF a single phase open circuit NOTE: This action will need condition is suspected ENTER AOP-026 further investigation.

NOTE: The CRS may call WCC to address the C CCW Pump failure.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as WCC.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.6, COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)

SYSTEM CRS LCO 3.7.6 Two CCW trains powered from emergency power supplies shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4.

CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 31 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that ACTION A.1 A. One required NOTE: Enter must be entered.

CCW train applicable inoperable. Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, NOTE: The B CCW Pump RCS Loops - must declared inoperable MODE 4, for within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> because the A residual heat EDG is inoperable.

removal loops made inoperable by CCW.

A.1 Restore required CCW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.4.17, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM (CVCS)

CRS LCO 3.4.17 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection shall be OPERABLE, with :

• Two charging pumps shall be OPERABLE

• Two Makeup Water Pathways from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) shall be OPERABLE CRS APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4 CRS ACTIONS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 4 Page 32 of 57 Event

Description:

DS Bus De-energizes/C CCW Pump Trips on Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments CONDITION REQUIRED COMPLETION NOTE: The CRS will ACTION TIME determine that because all E. Seal E.1 Initiate action Immediately Charging Pumps were OFF, injection to any to restore seal RCP not within injection to ACTION E.1, E.2 and E.3 limit. affected RCP(s) were entered; and that these ACTIONS were exited upon AND AND restoration of Seal Injection At least one Flow.

charging pump E.2 Be in MODE 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> OPERABLE. 3.

AND E.3 Be in MODE 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> 5.

NOTE: The CRS will likely conduct an Alignment Brief.

At the discretion of the Lead Examiner move to Event #5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page 33 of 57 Event

Description:

A RCP Seal Failure Next, a #1 Seal Failure will occur on the A RCP. The crew will implement AOP-018, Reactor Coolant Pump Abnormal Conditions, trip the reactor, stop the pump, and three minutes after the pump is stopped, CLOSE the Seal Leakoff Valve. The crew will enter EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. Simultaneously, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur on the reactor trip, and the B Emergency Diesel Generator will fail to automatically start. Additionally, the DS DG will trip.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF RCS13A r:2:00 Indications Available:

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-B4, RCP SEAL INJ HI/LO FLOW

• RTGB Annunciator APP-001-D2, RCP #1 SEAL LEAKOFF HI FLOW

• FR-124 indicates that A RCP Seal injection flow is rising

• FR-124 indicates that B and C RCP Seal injection flow is lowering

• FR-154 indicates that A RCP seal leakoff flow is rising

• Charging Pump speed is increasing Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS CRS (Step 1) MAKE PA announcement for NOTE: The CRS will most Procedure Entry likely make this announcement.

CRS (Step 2) EVALUATE Plant Conditions AND GO to the Appropriate Section for RCP Malfunction Not Yet Addressed:

• Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Failure - NOTE: The CRS will transition Section A to Section A of AOP-018.

AOP-018, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP ABNORMAL CONDITIONS SECTION A, REACTOR COOLANT PUMP SEAL FAILURE RO (Step 1) CHECK Any RCP #1 Seal Leakoff Flow - GREATER THAN 5.7 GPM RO (Step 2) CHECK Either of the following Conditions Exist:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 5 Page 34 of 57 Event

Description:

A RCP Seal Failure Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• RCP #1 Seal Leakoff Flow On Unaffected RCP(s) - REDUCED OR

• RCP Thermal Barrier P On Affected RCP(s) - REDUCED RO (Step 3) CHECK Plant Status - MODE 1 OR MODE 2 RO (Step 4) PERFORM the following:

• TRIP the reactor

• TRIP the affected RCP(s)

• GO TO EOP-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, while continuing with this procedure.

RO (Step 5) CHECK Time Elapsed Since NOTE: This action will be Stopping the Affected RCP(s) - GREATER taken post-reactor trip.

THAN 3 MINUTES.

RO (Step 6) CLOSE Seal Leakoff Valve(s) for Affected RCP(s):

• RCP - A, VALVE - CVC-303A RO (Step 7) CHECK SI ACTUATED CRS (Step 7 RNO) GO TO Step 30 NOTE: The CRS will likely perform this procedure concurrently with the EOPs.

When the Operator Trips the Reactor, move to Events #6-9.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 35 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Upon entry into EOP-E-0, the operator will determine that both ESF buses are de-energized and transition to EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The operator will subsequently start the B EDG by depressing the SI Actuate Pushbutton, restore power to Bus E-2, and transition back to EOP-E-0. When Bus E-2 is re-energized, the D Service Water Pump will fail to sequence automatically and will need to be manually started. Upon transition back to EOP-E-0, the crew will complete the immediate actions of EOP-E-0, and continue with AOP-018. The scenario will terminate when the crew has terminated Safety Injection and re-established Charging/Seal Injection in Step 6 of ES-1.1.

Booth Operator Instructions: IMF EPS13 IMF EDG01C d:2 (Occurs on Rx Trip)

Indications Available:

• Indications of Reactor Trip

• Control Room lights dim

• Bus E-1 is de-energized

• Bus E-2 is de-energized

• DS Bus is de-energized

• B EDG RUNNING Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 2.a RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action NOTE: No power to the Turbine Control status lights.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 36 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• IF Turbine will NOT trip, THEN manually RUNBACK Turbine at maximum rate UNTIL ALL Governor valves are CLOSED.

• IF Turbine can NOT be runback, THEN manually CLOSE MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

BOP (Step 2.b) All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Immediate Action Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED CRS (Step 3 RNO) GO TO EOP-ECA-0.0, Loss Of Immediate Action All AC Power, Step 1

• WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus.

NOTE: The CRS will transition to EOP-ECA-0.0.

EOP-ECA-0.0, TOTAL LOSS OF AC POWER RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass breakers -

OPEN

• Neutron flux - LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• BOTH Turbine Stop Valves - CLOSED

• MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves -

CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 37 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually TRIP Turbine. Immediate Action NOTE: No power to the Turbine Control status lights.

• If Turbine will NOT trip, THEN CLOSE MSIV AND MSIV Bypass Valves.

CRS/ (Step 3) DISPATCH an Operator to Perform Immediate Action BOP Attachment 1, Restoring AC Power From NOTE: The CRS will dispatch The DSDG an AO.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and report after 5 minutes that the DSDG will NOT start.

RO (Step 4) CHECK if RCS is isolated:

CHECK LTDN LINE STOP Valves -

CLOSED

• LCV-460A

• LCV-460B CHECK PRZR PORVs - CLOSED CHECK CVC-387, EXCESS LTDN STOP Valve - CLOSED CHECK RCS Vent System Valves -

CLOSED OR DEENERGIZED

• RC-567, HEAD VENT

• RC-568, HEAD VENT

• RC-569, PZR VENT

• RC-570, PZR VENT

• RC-571, PRT ISO

• RC-572, CV ATMOS RO (Step 5) CHECK CCW Pump Running for RCP Seal Cooling

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 38 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 5 RNO) IF LESS THAN 15 minutes NOTE: The DS Bus is de-elapsed since RCP SEAL Cooling lost, energized.

THEN START CCW Pump A.

IF RCP SEAL Cooing can NOT be restored WITHING 15 minutes, THEN PERFORM the following prior to starting a CCW Pump

• OPEN breaker for FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT Valve (MCC-6 CMPT 8F)

• Locally CLOSE FCV-626, THERM BAR FLOW CONT Valve.

BOP (Step 6) CHECK AFW Flow

• CHECK AFW flow- GREATER THAN 300 GPM

• DISPATCH an Operator to locally NOTE: The CRS will dispatch perform Attachment 4, Local Control Of an AO.

S/G Level and Pressure If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, and use:

IRF CFW 012, f:100 IRF CFW 013, f:100 IRF CFW 014, f:100 And report after 5 minutes that the Attachment 4 is complete.

• CONTROL S/G WR level BETWEEN 60% and 67%

BOP (Step 7) TRY To Restore Power to ANY AC Emergency Bus:

• Energize AC Emergency Bus with EDG:

• CHECK EDG-A AND EDG-B - NOTE: The A EDG is OOS.

RUNNING The B EDG is NOT running.

BOP (Step 7.a.1 RNO) DEPRESS BOTH SAFETY INJECTION pushbuttons

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 39 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• If NO EDG started, THEN

• IF ANY EDG is running AND its output NOTE: The B EDG will start breaker is open, THEN and close in on Bus E-2.

BOP (Step 7.a.2) CHECK BOTH AC Emergency NOTE: Bus E-2 is energized.

Busses AUTOMATICALLY ENERGIZED

• E-1

• E-2 BOP (Step 7.a.2 RNO) IF ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker is open, THEN

• If ANY EDG is running AND its output breaker can NOT be closed from the Control Room, THEN

• If an AC Emergency Bus can NOT be NOTE: The D SW Pump has energized OR SW Cooling is NOT failed to auto-start; and the available to ANY running EDG, BOP will need to start this THEN. pump manually.

BOP

• CHECK AC Emergency Busses - AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• E-1 OR

• E-2 NOTE: E-2 is energized.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 40 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Energize at Least One AC Emergency Bus Before Defeating the Auto Loading of the Safeguards Equipment in EOP-ECA-0.0 Safety Significance: Failure to energize an ac emergency bus constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Additionally, failure to perform the critical task results in the unnecessary continuation of a situation in which RCS inventory is being lost uncontrollably and cannot be replaced. This situation is equivalent to mis-operation or incorrect operator performance in which the operator does not prevent degraded emergency core cooling system (ECCS) capacity at a time when a small-break LOCA is in progress. In this case, at least one ac emergency bus can be energized from the control room. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.

RO

• Establish Seal Injection flow

• CHECK adequate DSDG OR EDG capacity to run one Charging Pump (108 KW each) (DSDG preferred)

• RESET SI

• ESTABLISH Charging flow NOTE: The RO will start the C Charging Pump.

• CHECK Charging Pumps - ANY RUNNING RO (Step 7.c.3.a RNO) IF RCP Seal Cooling has NOTE: It is expected that RCP been lost for LESS THAN 15 minutes, THEN Seal Cooling will be lost for START Charging Pumps as necessary less than 15 minutes.

• If ALL Seal Cooling to ANY RCP can NOT be restored within 15 minutes, THEN RO (Step 7.c.3.b) DISPATCH an operator to NOTE: These valves can be perform the following: controlled from the RTGB.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 41 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• OPEN CVC-358, RWST TO NOTE: The CRS may dispatch CHARGING PUMP SUCTION Valve an AO.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO, use:

IRF CVC048 f:100 IRF CVC059 f:0 and report after 3 minutes that the Charging Pump suction is aligned to the RWST.

• CLOSE LCV-115C, VCT OUTLET Valve RO (Step 7.c.3.c) ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain proper Seal Injection AND Charging flow:

• Charging Pump Speed Controller(s)

• HIC-121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• Sea Water Flow Control Valves RO/ (Step 7.c.3.d) MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow BOP between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated CHECK the applicable EDG has loaded required equipment

• SW Pumps NOTE: The D SW Pump had to be manually started.

• MDAFW Pump NOTE: The B MDAFW Pump is running.

• CCW Pump (as needed) NOTE: The C CCW Pump has previously failed.

• SW Booster Pump NOTE: The B SW Booster Pump has started on the SI.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 42 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments Critical Task:

Manually Start SW Pump for EDG Cooling Prior to the EDG Failing Due to Overheating Safety Significance: Failure to manually start the SW pump under the postulated plant conditions means that the EDG is running without SW cooling. Running the EDG without SW cooling leads to a high-temperature condition that can result in EDG failure due to damage caused by engine overheating. Under the postulated plant conditions, the running EDG is the only operable EDG. Thus, failure to perform the critical task constitutes mis-operation or incorrect crew performance in which the crew does not prevent degraded emergency power capacity. Even if the crew does not start the SW pump until receipt of engine high temperature alarm(s), the critical task is performed satisfactorily, provided that the EDG does not fail because of damage caused by engine overheating.

RO (Step 7.c.3.e) PERFORM the following:

• RESET SPDS AND Initiate MONITORING Critical Safety Function Status Trees.

• IMPLEMENT FRPs as necessary CRS

• RETURN TO procedure AND step in NOTE: The CRS will transition effect to EOP-E-0.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: Immediate Action

• Reactor Trip AND Bypass Breakers OPEN

• Rod position indicators FULLY INSERTED

• Rod Bottom Lights ILLUMINATED

• Neutron Flux LOWERING BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: Immediate Action

• Both Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 43 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• All MSR Purge AND Shutoff Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 3) CHECK Power To AC Immediate Action EMERGENCY BUSSES:

• CHECK Bus E1 OR E2 AT LEAST NOTE: Bus E-2 is energized.

ONE ENERGIZED

• CHECK Bus E1 AND E2 BOTH ENERGIZED CRS (Step 3 RNO) WHEN time permits, THEN TRY to restore power to de-energized AC Emergency Bus.

RO (Step 4) CHECK SI Status: Immediate Action CHECK if SI is actuated: NOTE: SI was manually actuated in EOP-ECA-0.0.

• SI annunciators ANY ILLUMINATED OR

• SI equipment AUTO STARTED RO CHECK BOTH trains of SI actuated:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING

• RHR Pumps BOTH RUNNING RO (Step 4.b) Manually ACTUATE SI by NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-depressing BOTH SI pushbuttons. energized and the A Train ECCS Pumps cannot be started.

RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP RCP TRIP CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 44 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments FAULTED S/G AFW ISOLATION CRITERIA AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA DC BUS, INSTRUMENT BUS, OR MCC5 FAILURE CRITERIA SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING CRITERIA CRS (Step 5) PERFORM Attachment 1, Auto Action Verification, While CONTINUING WITH This Procedure Examiner NOTE: The CRS will likely assign the BOP to perform this action.

If so, BOP Examiner follow actions of Attachment 1.

CRS/RO follow E-0 Actions, Step 6, on Page 50.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION ATTACHMENT 1, AUTO ACTION VERIFICATION BOP (Step 1) CHECK ECCS Pumps Running:

• SI Pumps TWO RUNNING BOP (Step 1 RNO) Manually START pump(s) as NOTE: Bus E-1 is de-necessary energized and the A Train ECCS Pumps cannot be started.

BOP (Step 2) CHECK ECCS Valves In Proper Emergency Alignment BOP (Step 2 RNO) Manually ALIGN valve(s) as NOTE: A Train valves cannot necessary. be aligned from the RTGB.

BOP (Step 3) CHECK CCW Pumps AT LEAST NOTE: The only available ONE RUNNING CCW Pump has previously tripped.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 45 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 3 RNO) PERFORM the following:

• IF NO CCW Pump is RUNNING AND CV Spray is NOT actuated, THEN START one CCW Pump on Emergency Bus energized by EDG (246 Kw)

• IF NO CCW Pump can be started, THEN TRIP ALL RCPs.

BOP (Step 4) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A:

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A ACTUATED

• CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A Valves CLOSED BOP (Step 4.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as NOTE: Some valves will need necessary to be closed manually.

BOP (Step 4.c) CHECK Excess Letdown ISOLATED

• CVC387, EXCESS LTDN STOP VALVE CLOSED

• HIC137, EXCESS LTDN FLOW CONTROLLER AT 0% DEMAND BOP (Step 5) CHECK Feedwater Isolation:

• CHECK Main Feed Pumps BOTH TRIPPED

• CHECK Main Feedwater isolated:

• Feedwater Reg Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves CLOSED

• Feedwater Header Section Valves NOTE: V2-6A has no CLOSED indication no power.

BOP (Step 5.b RNO) Manually CLOSE valve(s) as necessary

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 46 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 6) CHECK If Main Steam Lines Should Be Isolated:

• CHECK Main Steam Line Isolation REQUIRED

• High steam flow with:

• S/G pressure LESS THAN 614 PSIG OR

• Tavg LESS THAN 543°F

• CHECK MSIVs AND MSIV Bypass NOTE: The MSIVs are Valves - CLOSED already CLOSED.

BOP (Step 7) CHECK Proper Service Water System Operation:

• CHECK SW Pumps ALL RUNNING NOTE: The A and B SW Pumps have no power, the C Pump has previously tripped, and the D SW Pump has failed to auto start.

BOP (Step 7.a RNO) Manually START pump(s) as NOTE: If the D SW Pump necessary has NOT been manually started, it will be started here.

BOP (Step 7.b) CHECK SW Booster Pumps NOTE: The B SW Booster BOTH RUNNING Pump has started on the SI, the A SW Booster Pump has no power.

BOP (Step 7.b RNO) Manually START pump(s) as necessary

• CHECK Both SW Header Low Pressure NOTE: BOTH alarms will be Alarms EXTINGUISHED LIT.

• APP008F7,SOUTH SW HDR LO PRESS

• APP008F8,NORTH SW HDR LO PRESS BOP (Step 7.c RNO) PERFORM the following:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 47 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• ISOLATE SW to the Turbine Building: NOTE: BOTH valves are already CLOSED.

• CLOSE V6-16C, SW Turbine Building Isolation valve.

OR

• CLOSE V6-16A and V6-16B, SW Turbine Building Supply valves

• WHEN this Attachment is complete, NOTE: The BOP will contact THEN PERFORM Supplement M, an AO and direct performance Component Alignment For Loss Of SW of Supplement M.

To Turbine Building, as time permits.

Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO.

BOP (Step 8) CHECK BOTH EDGs RUNNING NOTE: The B EDG is running.

BOP (Step 8 RNO) Manually START Emergency NOTE: The A EDG is OOS.

Diesel(s) as necessary.

BOP (Step 9) CHECK ECCS Flow:

• CHECK RCS pressure LESS THAN 1650 PSIG [1725 PSIG]

BOP (Step 9.a RNO) GO TO Step 10.

BOP (Step 10) CHECK CV Recirculation Fans NOTE: The 3 and 4 HVH ALL RUNNING Fans are running (With Hi Vibration).

BOP (Step 10 RNO) Manually START fan(s). NOTE: The 1 and 2 HVH Fans are unavailable (No power).

BOP (Step 11) CHECK IVSW System Actuated:

• PCV1922A, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 48 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• PCV1922B, AUTOMATIC HEADER PRESSURE CONTROL VALVE OPEN BOP (Step 12) CHECK CV Ventilation Isolation:

• CV Ventilation Isolation Valves NOTE: The A Train valves CLOSED have no power or indication.

BOP (Step 12 RNO) DEPRESS H.V. OFF on R-11 OR R-12 to initiate Containment Ventilation Isolation.

• IF ANY Containment Ventilation NOTE: The BOP will contact Isolation valve does NOT close, THEN an AO and direct local action.

manually OR locally ISOLATE Booth Instructor AFFECTED penetration outside acknowledge as AO.

Containment while CONTINUING WITH this procedure.

BOP (Step 13) CHECK Control Room Ventilation Aligned For Pressurization Mode:

• HVA1A OR HVA1B,CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLING FAN RUNNING

• HVE19A OR HVE19B,CONTROL ROOM AIR CLEANING FAN RUNNING

• HVE16, CONTROL ROOM AIR NOTE: No Indication. The EXHAUST FAN STOPPED BOP will take the Control Switch to STOP

• Control Room HVAC Outside Air Damper A OR B OPEN

• CRD1ASA, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

• CRD1BSB, CONTROL ROOM AIR EXHAUST FAN DISCHARGE DAMPER CLOSED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 49 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments BOP (Step 14) CHECK DS Bus ENERGIZED NOTE: The DS Bus is NOT energized. An attempt has already been made to start the DSDG and re-energize the DS Bus.

BOP (Step 14 RNO) Locally PLACE DSDG in service using EPP-25, Energizing Supplemental Plant Equipment Using the DSDG.

BOP (Step 15) CHECK Battery Chargers ENERGIZED:

• APP036D1, BATT CHARGER A/A1 NOTE: The A Train DC Bus TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED is on the Battery.

• APP036D2, BATT CHARGER B/B1 TROUBLE Alarm EXTINGUISHED BOP (Step 15 RNO) RESTART Battery Chargers NOTE: The B Train DC Bus within 30 minutes of power loss using OP- is on the Battery Chargers.

601, DC Supply System. (46 KW each)

BOP (Step 16) STOP R11/12 Sample Pump BOP (Step 17) Locally RESET AND LOAD NOTE: The BOP will contact Instrument Air Compressor(s) As Necessary the Inside AO about locally (38 KW each): resetting and starting the B IA Compressor.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN

• Compressor A (MCC5 CMPT 7M)

• Compressor B (MCC6 CMPT 3G)

BOP (Step 18) PERFORM Crew Update To Include The Following:

• Attachment completion

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 50 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Manual actions taken

• Failed equipment status

• SW status per Step 7.c

• If applicable, PERFORM Supplement M, Component Alignment For Loss Of SW To Turbine Building, as time permits Examiner NOTE: Examiners following the CRS/RO continue HERE.

EOP-E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION RO (Step 6) CHECK AFW Pumps Running:

• CHECK Motor Driven AFW Pumps NOTE: The B MDAFW Pump BOTH RUNNING is likely running.

(Step 6.a RNO) Manually START pump(s). NOTE: The A MDAFW Pump is unavailable (No power).

RO (Step 6.b) CHECK S/G Narrow Range levels TWO S/Gs LESS THAN 16%

RO (Step 6.b RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level NOTE: This is a Continuous lowers to LESS THAN 16% on Two S/Gs, Action. The CRS will make THEN PERFORM Step 6.c both board operators aware.

CRS

• CONTINUE WITH Step 7.

RO (Step 7) CHECK AFW Valves In Proper NOTE: These valves are Emergency Alignment: under local control.

• AFW Header Discharge Valves FULL OPEN

• AFW Header Section Valves FULL OPEN

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 51 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Steam Driven AFW Pump Discharge NOTE: The SDAFW Pump is Valves FULL OPEN IF PUMP likely to be NOT running.

RUNNING RO (Step 8) CHECK Total AFW Flow:

• RESET SI

• CONTROL AFW flow to maintain Intact S/G Narrow Range level between 9%[18%] AND 50%

• CHECK total AFW flow GREATER NOTE: It is likely the S/G THAN 300 GPM levels are high, and that AFW flow has been throttled to little or no flow.

RO (Step 8.c RNO) IF S/G Narrow Range level is NOTE: S/G levels are likely GREATER THAN 9% [18%] in ANY S/G, high in the band, but under THEN CONTROL AFW flow to maintain S/G operator control.

Narrow Range level.

• IF S/G Narrow Range level is LESS THAN 9% [18%] in ALL S/Gs, THEN RO (Step 9) CHECK CV Spray NOT Required:

• CHECK Containment Pressure HAS REMAINED LESS THAN 10 PSIG

• CHECK CV Spray NOT ACTUATED RO (Step 10) CHECK RCP Seal Cooling:

• CCW flow to RCP(s) Thermal Barriers NORMAL

• APP001C1,RCP THERM BAR COOL WTR HI FLOW ALARM EXTINGUISHED

• APP001D1,RCP THERM BAR NOTE: The LO Flow alarm COOL WTR LO FLOW alarm will be LIT.

EXTINGUISHED OR

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 52 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• Seal Injection flow ADEQUATE

• Seal Injection flow GREATER NOTE: It is likely that Seal THAN 6 GPM PER RCP Injection flow is > 6 to each RCP.

OR

• Thermal Barrier Ps GREATER NOTE: Thermal Barrier flow is THAN 5 INCHES WATER PER RCP NOT > 5 inches H 2 O to each RCP.

RO (Step 11) CHECK RCS Temperatures:

• With NO RCPs running, RCS Cold Leg NOTE: It is likely that Tcolds temperatures STABLE AT OR are >547°F.

TRENDING TO 547°F RO (Step 11 RNO) IF temperature is LESS THAN 547°F AND lowering, THEN IF temperature is GREATER THAN 547°F NOTE: Although Tcolds are AND rising THEN >547°F, they are most likely stable.

If Tcolds are rising, the CRS will contact the AO to locally dump steam steam using the S/G Steam Line PORVs.

If so, Booth Instructor use:

IRF MSS097 f:15:00 IRF MSS091 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS094 f:MANUAL IRF MSS098 f:15:00 IRF MSS092 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS095 f:MANUAL IRF MSS099 f:15:00 IRF MSS093 f:DEFEAT IRF MSS096 f:MANUAL IRF AIR027 f:N2_SUPPLY IRF MSS099 r:25 f:1022 IRF MSS098 r:25 f:1022 IRF MSS097 r:25 f:1022

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 53 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments RO (Step 12) CHECK PZR PORVs AND Spray Valves:

• CHECK PZR PORVs CLOSED

• CHECK Normal PZR Spray Valves CLOSED

• CHECK Aux PZR Spray Valve CLOSED RO (Step 13) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped:

• CHECK RCPs ANY RUNNING NOTE: All RCPs are OFF.

CRS (Step 13.a RNO) GO TO Step 14.

RO (Step 14) CHECK If S/G Secondary Pressure Boundaries Are Intact:

• NONE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER

• NONE COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED RO (Step 15) CHECK If S/G Tubes Are Intact:

• Secondary Radiation Monitors HAVE REMAINED NORMAL

• R15, CONDENSER AIR EJECTOR NOTE: R-15 is OOS.

GAS

• R19s, S/G Blowdown Radiation NOTE: R-19 is de-energized.

• R31s, STEAMLINE RADIATION MONITORs

• S/G levels NONE RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER RO (Step 16) CHECK if RCS is Intact:

• CV radiation - NORMAL

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 54 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• R-2,CV AREA

• R-32A, CV HIGH RANGE

• R-32B, CV HIGH RANGE

• CV pressure - NORMAL

• CV Sump level - NORMAL RO/ (Step 17) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be BOP Terminated:

• CHECK RCS Subcooling based on Core Exit T/Cs - GREATER THAN 18°F

• CHECK Secondary Heat Sink level

• Total AFW flow to S/G(s) -

GREATER THAN 300 GPM OR

• S/G Narrow Range level in at least NOTE: It is likely that all S/G one S/G - GREATER THAN 9% Narrow Range levels are >

9%.

• CHECK RCS pressure:

• Pressure - GREATER THAN 1650 PSIG

• Pressure - STABLE OR RISING

• CHECK PZR level - GREATER THAN 14%

• RESET SPDS AND INITIATE monitoring of Critical Safety Functions Status Trees.

• GO TO EOP-ES-1.1, SI Termination, NOTE: The CRS will transition Step 1 to EOP-ES-1.1.

EOP-ES-1.1, SI TERMINATION RO/ Foldout Page:

BOP

• SI REINITIATION CRITERIA

• SECONDARY INTEGRITY CRITERIA

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 55 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• AFW SUPPLY SWITCHOVER CRITERIA RO (Step 1) RESET SI RO (Step 2) RESET Containment Isolation PHASE A RO (Step 3) ESTABLISH Instrument Air To CV:

• CHECK APP002F7, INSTR AIR HDR NOTE: If not previously done, LO PRESS alarm EXTINGUISHED the BOP will contact the Inside AO about locally resetting and starting the B IA Compressor.

Booth Instructor: as AO, acknowledge IRF EPSMCC6_ 218 f: RACK_IN

• RESET IA PCV1716, INSTRUMENT AIR ISOLATION TO CV

• CHECK IA PCV1716 OPEN BOP (Step 4) CHECK DC Busses A AND B NOTE: Both DC Busses are ENERGIZED energized, although the A DC Bus is on the Battery.

RO (Step 5) STOP ECCS Pumps:

• STOP SI Pumps

• CHECK RHR Pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST

• STOP RHR Pumps RO (Step 6) CHECK Charging Flow Has Been ESTABLISHED

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: N16-1 Scenario # 6 Event # 6, 7, 8 & 9 Page 56 of 57 Event

Description:

Loss of Offsite Power/B EDG Fails to Start/DSDG Trips/D Service Water Pump fails to Auto Start Time Pos. Expected Actions/Behavior Comments

• CHECK Charging Pumps AT LEAST ONE RUNNING

• ESTABLISH desired Charging flow:

• START additional Charging Pump(s) as necessary

• ADJUST the following as necessary to maintain Charging flow AND Seal Injection:

• Charging Pump speed controller

• HIC121, CHARGING FLOW Controller

• RCP Seal Water Flow Control NOTE: The RO may contact Valve the AO to adjust Seal Injection flows.

If so, Booth Instructor acknowledge as AO; and use:

IRF CVC030 f: 100 IRF CVC031 f: 100 IRF CVC032 f: 100

• MAINTAIN Seal Injection flow between 6 gpm AND 20 gpm per RCP UNLESS Seal Injection isolated At the discretion of the Lead Examiner terminate the exam.

NRC SCENARIO N16 1-6 TURNOVER SHEET

1. INITIAL CONDITIONS a) Time in Core Life: MOL b) Reactor Power: 100%

c) Turbine Load: ____ MWe d) Boron Concentration: ____ ppm e) Rod Height: ____ CB D f) RCS Pressure: 2235 psig g) PZR Level: 53.3%

h) Xenon: Equilibrium

2. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LCO ACTIONS STATEMENTS IN EFFECT T.S. # Description LCO 3.8.1 Condition B1, B.2, B.3.2.2 and B4

3. CLEARANCES IN EFFECT a) The A EDG is OOS.

4. CAUTION CAPS IN EFFECT a) None

5. PROTECTED EQUIPMENT a) B EDG

6. DEGRADED EQUIPMENT a) R-15, Condenser Air Ejector Gas Radiation Monitor is OOS (I&C Investigating).

b) RTGB Annunciator APP-002-F8, STA AIR HDR LO PRESS, has failed to the ILLUMINATED condition (I&C is investigating).

7. SWITCHYARD ACCESS a) PROTECTED

8. PLANNED EVOLUTIONS a) Maintain Steady-State conditions

9. TURNOVER INFORMATION a) The area has experienced steady light rain for the past 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, with light wind from the South at 5-10 mph, and this is expected to continue throughout the shift.

b) The B MFWP has experienced high noise/vibration over the last two hours (Maintenance is investigating).

c) SR 3.8.1.1, Offsite Power Checks were last completed 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> ago.

10. REACTIVITY INFORMATION a) IAW OST-947 data

11. RISK a) GREEN