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| issue date = 11/26/1997
| issue date = 11/26/1997
| title = LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
| title = LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
| author name = REVELL J, STALL J A
| author name = Revell J, Stall J
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY1SREGULATEYINFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM(RIDS)ACCESSION NBR:9712030199
{{#Wiki_filter:CATEGORY 1 S
,DOC.DATE:
REGULATE Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION               STEM (RIDS)
97/11/26NOTARIZED:
ACCESSION NBR:9712030199           , DOC.DATE:   97/11/26    NOTARIZED: NO              DOCKET  ¹ FACXL:50-335     St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power              & Light  Co.       05000335 AUTH. NAME            AUTHOR AFFILIATION REVELL,J.             Florida Power & Light Co.
NOFACXL:50-335 St.LuciePlant,Unit1,FloridaPower&LightCo.AUTH.NAMEAUTHORAFFILIATION REVELL,J.
STALL,J.A.             Florida Power & Light Co.
FloridaPower&LightCo.STALL,J.A.
RECIP.NAME             RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
FloridaPower&LightCo.RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION DOCKET¹05000335


==SUBJECT:==
==SUBJECT:==
LER97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant corealteration prohibited byTSoccurred.
LER    97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant core alteration prohibited by TS occurred. Caused by CEA failure to detach from UGS.Safety evaluation was performed & procedural rev made to continue UGS move.W/971126 ltr.
CausedbyCEAfailuretodetachfromUGS.Safety evaluation wasperformed
DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T          COPIES RECEIVED:LTR       i  ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
&procedural revmadetocontinueUGSmove.W/971126 ltr.DISTRIBUTION CODE:IE22TCOPIESRECEIVED:LTR iENCLSIZE:l5TITLE:50.73/50.9 LicenseeEventReport(LER),IncidentRpt,etc.NOTES:ERECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME PD2-3PDINTERNAL:
SIZE:  l5 E
ACRSAEOD/SPD/RRAB NRR/DE/ECGB NRR/DE/EMEB NRR/DRCH/HICB NRR/DRCH/HQMB NRR/DSSA/SPLB RES/DET/EIB EXTERNAL:
NOTES:
LSTLOBBYWARDNOACPOORE,W.NRCPDRCOPIESLTTRENCL111111111111111111111111RECIPIENT IDCODE/NAME WIENS,L.ILECENTNRRNRR/DRCH/HHFB NRR/DRCH/HOLB NRR/DRPM/PECB NRR/DSSA/SRXB RGN2FXLE01LITCOBRYCE,JHNOACQUEENER,DS NUDOCSFULLTXTCOPIESLTTRENCL1122111111111111'111111110D0UNOTETOALL"RIDS"RECZPZENTS PLEASEHELPUSTOREDUCEWASTE.TOHAVEYOURNAMEORORGANIZATION REMOVEDFROMDISTRIBUTION LISTSORREDUCETHENUMBEROFCOPIESRECEIVEDBYYOUORYOURORGANIZATION, CONTACTTHEDOCUMENTCONTROLDESK(DCD)ONEXTENSION 415-2083FULLTEXTCONVERSION REQUIREDTOTALNUMBEROFCOPIESREQUIRED:
RECIPIENT              COPIES            RECIPIENT            COPIES                0 ID CODE/NAME           LTTR ENCL        ID  CODE/NAME        LTTR ENCL PD2-3 PD                    1    1      WIENS,L.                  1    1 INTERNAL: ACRS                          1    1                                2    2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB               1    1        ILE  CENT              1    1 NRR/DE/ECGB                 1    1      NRR                      1    1 NRR/DE/EMEB                 1    1      NRR/DRCH/HHFB            1    1 NRR/DRCH/HICB              1    1      NRR/DRCH/HOLB            1    1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB              1    1      NRR/DRPM/PECB             1    1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB              1    1      NRR/DSSA/SRXB             1    1 RES/DET/EIB                1    1      RGN2    FXLE 01        '1    1                D EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD                1    1      LITCO BRYCE,J H          1    1 NOAC POORE,W.              1    1      NOAC QUEENER,DS 0
LTTR25ENCL25 FloridaPower&LightCompany,650tSouthOceanDrive,JensenBeach,FL34957FPLNovember26,1997L-97-29710CFR50.73U.S.NuclearRegulatory Commission Attn:DocumentControlDeskWashington, D.C.20555Re:St.LucieUnit1DocketNo.50-335Reportable Event:97-010DateofEvent:October27,1997Inadvertant CoreAlteration Prohibited byTechnical Specifications DuetoStuckControlElementAssemblCEATheattachedLicenseeEventReportisbeingsubmitted pursuanttotherequirements of10CFR50.73toprovidenotification ofthesubjectevent.Verytrulyyours,J.A.StallVicePresident St.LuciePlantJAS/JWRAttachment cc:RegionalAdministrator, USNRC,RegionIISeniorResidentInspector, USNRC,St.LuciePlant,ijc4/97i2030i'tt9 97ii26PDRADQCK050003358PDRlbltttliltjtlllttltajiNI anFPLGroupcompany NRCFORM366(4.95)U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER){Seereverseforrequirednumberofdigits/characters foreachblock)APPROVEDBYOMBNo.31604I104 EXRRES04I30/SSESTIMATED BURDENPERRESPONSETOCOMPLYWITHTHISMANDATORINFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST:60.0HRS.REPORTEDLESSONLEARNEDAREINCORPORATED INTOTHEUCENSINGPROCESSANDFEBACKTOINDUSTRY.
1    1 NRC PDR                    1    1      NUDOCS FULL TXT          1    1 U
FORWARDCOMMINTSREGARDING BURDENESTIMATTOTHEINFORMATION ANDRECORDSMANAGEMENT BRANCHIT.SF33)US.NUCLEARREGIAATORY COMMISSION.
NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECZPZENTS PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT LISTS THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR                25  ENCL    25
WASHINGTON.
 
DC206664001 ANDTOTHEPAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT13160%1041, OFFICEOIMANAGEMENT ANDBUDGET.WASHINGTON.
Florida Power & Light Company, 650t South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957 November 26, 1997                                  L-97-297 FPL                                                                                            10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re:   St. Lucie  Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Reportable Event: 97-010 Date of Event: October 27, 1997 Inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Stuck Control Element Assembl CEA The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements                of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.
DC20603.FACIUTYNAMEHiSTLUCIEUNIT1DOCKETNUMBER12105000335PAGE1311OF4TITLE(41Inadvertant CoreAlteration Prohibited byTechnical Specifications DuetoStuckControlElementAssembly(CEA)MONTHDAY1027OPERATING MODE(9)POWERLEVEL{10)97000SEQUENTIAL REVISIONNUMBERNUMBER97-010-0020.2201(b)20.2203(0)(2)(I)20.2203(a)
Very truly yours, J. A. Stall Vice President St. Lucie Plant JAS/JWR Attachment cc:   Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region II
(2)(iii)20.2203(0)(2)(iv)MONTHOAY112620.2203{a)(2)(v) 20.2203(a)
                                                                                            ,ij Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant c
(3)(ii)50.36(c)(1) 50.36(c)(2)
                                                                                        /4 97i2030i'tt9 97ii26 PDR      ADQCK    05000335 8                        PDR                                                  lbltttliltjtlllttltajiNI an FPL Group company
YEAR97FACILIlYNAMEFACILITYNAME50.73(a)(2)(i)50.73(a)(2)(iii) 50.73(a)(2)(v)50.73(a)(2)(vii)
 
DOCKETNUMBER DOCKETNUMBER 50.73(a)(2)(viii)73.71OTHERSpecifyinAbstractbefoworinNRCForm366ANAMEJackRevell,Licensing EngineerTELEPHONE NUMBERSncludeAreaCode)(561)467-7169CAUSESYSTEM.COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSCAUSESYSTEMCOMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDSACRCTC490XYES{Ifyes,completeEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE).NoEXPECTEDSUBMISSION DATE{15)MONTHOAYYEAR020498ABSTRACT(Limitto1400spaces,i.e.,approximately 15single-spaced typewritten lines){16)OnOctober27,1997,St.LucieUnit1wasinMode6withthereactorheadremovedinpreparation fordefueling.
NRC FORM 366                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION                             APPROVED BY OMB No. 31604I104 (4.95)                                                                                                               EXRRES 04I30/SS ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATOR INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT                        (LER)                        BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMINTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMAT TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT.S F33)
Thecontainment equipment hatchandpersonnel accessairlockwereopen,asallowedbyTechnical Specifications.
US.NUCLEARREGIAATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 206664001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13160%1041, OFFICE OI
Personnel commenced UpperGuideStructure (UGS)withdrawal fromthereactorvesselinaccordance withprocedures.
{See reverse  for required number of                              MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20603.
AstheUGSclearedthealignment pins,aControlElementAssembly(CEA)wasdiscovered attachedtotheUGS,andhadbeenunexpectedly withdrawn fromthecore.Thisconstituted acorealteration withoutthecontainment penetration statusrequiredbyTechnical Specifications.
digits/characters for each block)
Containment integrity wassetwithinabout20minutesofdiscovery ofthestuckCEA.ThecauseoftheCEAremaining attachedtotheUGScouldnotimmediately bedetermined.
FACIUTY NAME Hi                                                                            DOCKET NUMBER 121                      PAGE 131 ST LUCIE UNIT 1                                                                                      05000335                              1 OF4 TITLE (41 Inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Stuck Control Element Assembly (CEA)
Asafetyevaluation wasperformed andaprocedural revisionmadetocontinuetheUGSmove.Reactorcavitywaterlevelwasraisedtoincreaseshielding.
SEQUENTIAL      REVISION FACILIlYNAME                            DOCKETNUMBER MONTH    DAY                                                    MONTH      OAY    YEAR NUMBER        NUMBER FACILITYNAME                            DOCKETNUMBER 10    27      97      97      010              00        11        26      97 OPERATING MODE (9)                 20.2201 (b)                       20.2203{a)(2)(v)                     50.73(a) (2) (i)                   50.73(a) (2) (viii)
Anticipating elevatedcontainment radiation levels,theContainment Isolation System(CIS)wasmanuallyactuatedpriortocontinuing thelift.TheUGSliftrecommenced onOctober28.AremotecamerasituatedbeneaththeUGSmonitored theprogress, andtheCEAremainedattachedthroughout thetransit.Oncethetransittotherefueling cavitywascompleted, theCEAwasrecovered fromtheUGS.Therootcauseoftheeventisstillunderinvestigation.
POWER LEVEL {10)     000        20.2203   (0) (2) (I)             20.2203(a) (3) (ii)                 50.73(a)(2)(iii)                   73.71 OTHER 20.2203(a) (2)(iii)               50.36(c)(1)                         50.73(a) (2)(v)               Specify in Abstract befow or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203 (0) (2) (iv)               50.36(c)(2)                         50.73(a)(2)(vii)
Furthercorrective actionswillbeidentified oncetherootcauseisdetermined.
NAME                                                                                            TELEPHONE NUMBER Snclude Area Code)
NRCFORM366(4-95)
Jack Revell, Licensing Engineer                                                                                      (561) 467-7169 CAUSE      SYSTEM    COMPONENT       MANUFACTURER     REPORTABLE                                                                           REPORTABLE TO NPRDS                CAUSE      SYSTEM    COMPONENT        MANUFACTURER         TO NPRDS AC          RCT                C490 MONTH          OAY        YEAR EXPECTED YES                                                                                              SUBMISSION X {If yes, complete  EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE).                               No                      DATE {15)               02          04          98 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) {16)
NRCFORM366A(4.95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-010-002OF4TEXTilfmorespeceisrequired, useeddnionel copiesofNRCForm366A/I17IDESCRIPTION OFTHEEVENTOnOctober27,1997,St.LucieUnit1wasinMode6withthereactorhead[EIIS:AB:RCT]
On October 27, 1997, St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with the reactor head removed in preparation for defueling. The containment equipment hatch and personnel access airlock were open, as allowed by Technical Specifications. Personnel commenced Upper Guide Structure (UGS) withdrawal from the reactor vessel in accordance with procedures. As the UGS cleared the alignment pins, a Control Element Assembly (CEA) was discovered attached to the UGS, and had been unexpectedly withdrawn from the core. This constituted a core alteration without the containment penetration status required by Technical Specifications. Containment integrity was set within about 20 minutes of discovery of the stuck CEA.
removedinpreparation forreactordefueling.
The cause of the CEA remaining attached to the UGS could not immediately be determined. A safety evaluation was performed and a procedural revision made to continue the UGS move. Reactor cavity water level was raised to increase shielding. Anticipating elevated containment radiation levels, the Containment Isolation System (CIS) was manually actuated prior to continuing the lift.
Thecontainment equipment hatchandpersonnel accessairlock[EIIS:NH]
The UGS lift recommenced on October 28. A remote camera situated beneath the UGS monitored the progress, and the CEA remained attached throughout the transit. Once the transit to the refueling cavity was completed, the CEA was recovered from the UGS. The root cause of the event is still under investigation. Further corrective actions will be identified once the root cause is determined.
wereopen,asallowedbyTechnical Specifications.
NRC FORM 366 (4-95)
ControlElementAssemblies (CEAs)[EIIS:AA]
 
hadbeenunlatched bypersonnel inaccordance withprocedure OP1-0110022,
NRC FORM 366A                                                                        U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO (4.95)
'Coupling'and Uncoupling ofCEAExtension Shafts'.Atapproximately 1510,thereactorcavitywaterlevelwasraisedto55feet6inchestomaintainadequateshielding inpreparation forliftingtheUpperGuideStructure (UGS)[EIIS:AC].
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT              (LER)
Normallyduringthelift,onlytheUGSliftrigisraisedabovethesurfaceofthewater.Atapproximately 1658,contractpersonnel commenced UGSwithdrawal fromthereactorvesselinaccordance withprocedure 1-M-0015,
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL    REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1                                                        05000335                                2  OF 4 97  010         00 TEXT ilfmore speceis required, use eddnionel copies of NRC Form 366A/ I17I DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On October 27, 1997, St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with the reactor head [EIIS:AB:RCT] removed in preparation for reactor defueling. The containment equipment hatch and personnel access airlock [EIIS:NH] were open, as allowed by Technical Specifications. Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) [EIIS:AA]had been unlatched by personnel in accordance with procedure OP1-0110022, 'Coupling'and Uncoupling of CEA Extension Shafts'.
'ReactorVesselMaintenance
At approximately 1510, the reactor cavity water level was raised to 55 feet 6 inches to maintain adequate shielding in preparation for lifting the Upper Guide Structure (UGS) [EIIS:AC]. Normally during the lift, only the UGS lift rig is raised above the surface of the water.
-SequenceofOperations'.
At approximately 1658, contract personnel commenced UGS withdrawal from the reactor                vessel in accordance with procedure 1-M-0015, 'Reactor Vessel Maintenance - Sequence of Operations'. During the evolution, a camera mounted at the reactor vessel flange level was used to verify lift alignment and clearance. At approximately 1744, as the UGS cleared the alignment pins, a CEA was discovered attached to the UGS, and had been unexpectedly withdrawn from the core. Operations ordered containment integrity to be set, and this was achieved by 1805.
Duringtheevolution, acameramountedatthereactorvesselflangelevelwasusedtoverifyliftalignment andclearance.
The cause of the CEA remaining attached to the UGS could not immediately be determined. A safety evaluation was performed which concluded that there would be no adverse impact on plant safety or operation should the CEA fall onto the core while completing the UGS move. Procedure 1-M-0015, 'Reactor Vessel Maintenance-Sequence of Operations', was revised to accommodate movement of the UGS with a CEA attached. Since the UGS and lift rig were to be lifted much higher than normal, reactor cavity water level was adjusted to 60 feet to increase shielding. This action was completed at approximately 2222 hours.
Atapproximately 1744,astheUGSclearedthealignment pins,aCEAwasdiscovered attachedtotheUGS,andhadbeenunexpectedly withdrawn fromthecore.Operations orderedcontainment integrity tobeset,andthiswasachievedby1805.ThecauseoftheCEAremaining attachedtotheUGScouldnotimmediately bedetermined.
In anticipation of receiving high enough containment radiation levels to initiate a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), unnecessary personnel leA containment and the Containment Isolation System (CIS) [EIIS:JM]
Asafetyevaluation wasperformed whichconcluded thattherewouldbenoadverseimpactonplantsafetyoroperation shouldtheCEAfallontothecorewhilecompleting theUGSmove.Procedure 1-M-0015,
was manually actuated at approximately 0253 on October 28. This was a preplanned actuation performed in accordance with procedure OP1-1600023, 'Refueling Sequencing Guidelines'.
'ReactorVesselMaintenance-SequenceofOperations',
NAC FOAM 366A I4.95)
wasrevisedtoaccommodate movementoftheUGSwithaCEAattached.
 
SincetheUGSandliftrigweretobeliftedmuchhigherthannormal,reactorcavitywaterlevelwasadjustedto60feettoincreaseshielding.
NRC FORM 366A                                                                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4.96)
Thisactionwascompleted atapproximately 2222hours.Inanticipation ofreceiving highenoughcontainment radiation levelstoinitiateaContainment Isolation Actuation Signal(CIAS),unnecessary personnel leAcontainment andtheContainment Isolation System(CIS)[EIIS:JM]
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT                (LER)
wasmanuallyactuatedatapproximately 0253onOctober28.Thiswasapreplanned actuation performed inaccordance withprocedure OP1-1600023,
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR  SEQUENTIAL    REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1                                                        05000335                                    3  OF  4 97    010           00 TEXT flfmore speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366A/ I17)
'Refueling Sequencing Guidelines'.
The UGS lift recommenced at approximately 0320 with only essential personnel in containment. A remote camera situated beneath the UGS monitored the progress, and the CEA remained firmly attached throughout the transit.
NACFOAM366AI4.95)
At approximately 0324, CIAS channels indicated that containment radiation levels had reached the CIAS initiation threshold. Channel MD, with the most direct exposure to the UGS, registered an area radiation rate of approximately 7 REM per hour, while the other three channels indicated approximately 100 millirem per hour.
NRCFORM366AI4.96)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-010-003OF4TEXTflfmorespeceisrequired, useedditionel copiesofNRCForm366A/I17)TheUGSliftrecommenced atapproximately 0320withonlyessential personnel incontainment.
CIS actuates automatically with two channels greater than or equal to 90 millirem per hour.
AremotecamerasituatedbeneaththeUGSmonitored theprogress, andtheCEAremainedfirmlyattachedthroughout thetransit.Atapproximately 0324,CIASchannelsindicated thatcontainment radiation levelshadreachedtheCIASinitiation threshold.
Once the transit to the refueling cavity was completed, attempts were made to free the CEA but were initially unsuccessful. Subsequently, the CEA was disengaged by operating personnel. The CEA was retrieved and moved to the spent fuel pool for storage. It was identified as CEA 24, a Type 1, full length CEA manufactured by Combustion Engineering.
ChannelMD,withthemostdirectexposuretotheUGS,registered anarearadiation rateofapproximately 7REMperhour,whiletheotherthreechannelsindicated approximately 100milliremperhour.CISactuatesautomatically withtwochannelsgreaterthanorequalto90milliremperhour.Oncethetransittotherefueling cavitywascompleted, attemptsweremadetofreetheCEAbutwereinitially unsuccessful.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause of the event was failure of the CEA to detach from the UGS. It is currently undetermined whether the CEA was partially latched or friction fit to the CEA Extension Shaft. The root cause is still under investigation.
Subsequently, theCEAwasdisengaged byoperating personnel.
A supplement to this LER will be          issued describing the findings    of root cause evaluation for the stuck CEA.
TheCEAwasretrieved andmovedtothespentfuelpoolforstorage.Itwasidentified asCEA24,aType1,fulllengthCEAmanufactured byCombustion Engineering.
ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." The Technical Specification violated is Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.9.4:
CAUSEOFTHEEVENTThecauseoftheeventwasfailureoftheCEAtodetachfromtheUGS.Itiscurrently undetermined whethertheCEAwaspartially latchedorfrictionfittotheCEAExtension Shaft.Therootcauseisstillunderinvestigation.
        "The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:
Asupplement tothisLERwillbeissueddescribing thefindingsofrootcauseevaluation forthestuckCEA.ANALYSISOFTHEEVENTThiseventisreportable under10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as"Anyoperation orcondition prohibited bytheplant'sTechnical Specifications."
: a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum            of four bolts,
TheTechnical Specification violatedisUnit1Technical Specification 3.9.4:"Thecontainment penetrations shallbeinthefollowing status:a.Theequipment doorclosedandheldinplacebyaminimumoffourbolts,b.Aminimumofonedoorineachairlockisclosed,andC.Eachpenetration providing directaccessfromthecontainment atmosphere totheoutsideatmosphere shallbe...(severalconfigurations given).APPLICABILITY:
: b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed,           and C. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be... (several configurations given).
DuringCOREALTERATIONS ormovementofirradiated fuelwithinthecontainment."
APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment."
NRCFORM366AI4.96)
NRC FORM 366A I4.96)
NRCFORM366AI4-95)LICENSEEEVENTREPORT(LER)TEXTCONTINUATION U.S.NUCLEARREGULATORY COMMISSIO STLUCIEUNIT105000335YEARSEQUENTIAL REVISION97-010-004OF4TEXTllfmorespaceisrequired, useadditional copiesofNRCForm366A/I17ITheTechnical Specifications define"corealteration" as"movement ormanipulation ofanyfuel,sources,reactivit controlcomponents, orothercomponents affecting reactivity withinthereactorvesselwiththevesselheadremovedandfuelinthevessel."Normally, liftingaUGSisnotacorealteration, sincetheUGSdoesnotcontainfuel,sources,orcomponents thatcontroloraffectreactivity.
 
However,sinceareactivity controlcomponent (aCEA)wasmovedwiththeUGSinthisevent,acorealteration wasperformed.
NRC FORM 366A                                                                              U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-95)
: Moreover, thecorealteration wasperformed withoutthecontainment penetration statusrequiredbytheTechnical Specification.
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT                (LER)
Penetrations wereplacedintherequiredstatewithinapproximately 20minutesofdiscovery ofthestuckCEA.TheCISactuation wasnotreportable under10CFR50.72,sincetheactuation waspartofapreplanned sequenceaddressed byprocedure.
TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR  SEQUENTIAL    REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1                                                          05000335                                    4  OF  4 97  010           00 TEXT llfmore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/ I 17I The Technical Specifications define "core alteration" as "movement or manipulation of any fuel, sources, reactivit control components, or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel." Normally, lifting a UGS is not a core alteration, since the UGS does not contain fuel, sources, or components that control or affect reactivity. However, since a reactivity control component (a CEA) was moved with the UGS in this event, a core alteration was performed. Moreover, the core alteration was performed without the containment penetration status required by the Technical Specification. Penetrations were placed in the required state within approximately 20 minutes of discovery of the stuck CEA.
TheCISisdesignedtomitigatetheconsequences ofaccidents whichreleaselargeamountsofenergywithinthecontainment structure.
The CIS actuation was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72, since the actuation was part of a preplanned sequence addressed by procedure. The CIS is designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents which release large amounts of energy within the containment structure. There was no such accident in this case, and the CIS actuation was intentional rather than the result of accident conditions.
Therewasnosuchaccidentinthiscase,andtheCISactuation wasintentional ratherthantheresultofaccidentconditions.
Withdrawal of the stuck CEA from the reactor core did not place the plant in an unanalyzed condition, nor did it place the plant in a condition outside its design basis. Plant procedures address the case of a single CEA not inserted in the core, and substantial shutdown margin was maintained during the course of this event.
Withdrawal ofthestuckCEAfromthereactorcoredidnotplacetheplantinanunanalyzed condition, nordiditplacetheplantinacondition outsideitsdesignbasis.Plantprocedures addressthecaseofasingleCEAnotinsertedinthecore,andsubstantial shutdownmarginwasmaintained duringthecourseofthisevent.LER97-001-00 forSt.LucieUnit2documented aneventwithradiological conditions similartothisevent.IntheUnit2event,anexpectedCISactuation occurredastheUGSwaswithdrawn fromthereactor.Theelevatedradiation levelswerecausedbyirradiated incoreinstrumentation segments[EIIS:IG]
LER 97-001-00 for St. Lucie Unit 2 documented                  an event with radiological conditions similar to this event. In the Unit 2 event, an expected CIS actuation occurred              as the UGS was withdrawn from the reactor. The elevated radiation levels were caused by irradiated incore instrumentation segments [EIIS:IG] which had broken during removal of incores. The Unit 2 event, however, was unlike this event in that there was no core alteration.
whichhadbrokenduringremovalofincores.TheUnit2event,however,wasunlikethiseventinthattherewasnocorealteration.
I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Immediate corrective actions included stopping the UGS lift and evaluating dose rates. A condition report was issued and a team was designated to determine the cause of the stuck CEA. The team reviewed potential failure modes and related industry experience, but has not had access to the CEA's extension shaft for evaluation. The unlatch procedure was also reviewed and verified to have been properly performed. Further corrective actions for the stuck CEA will be identified in a supplement to this LER once the root cause has been determined.
ICORRECTIVE ACTIONSImmediate corrective actionsincludedstoppingtheUGSliftandevaluating doserates.Acondition reportwasissuedandateamwasdesignated todetermine thecauseofthestuckCEA.Theteamreviewedpotential failuremodesandrelatedindustryexperience, buthasnothadaccesstotheCEA'sextension shaftforevaluation.
NAC FOAM 366A I4.95)}}
Theunlatchprocedure wasalsoreviewedandverifiedtohavebeenproperlyperformed.
Furthercorrective actionsforthestuckCEAwillbeidentified inasupplement tothisLERoncetherootcausehasbeendetermined.
NACFOAM366AI4.95)}}

Latest revision as of 13:21, 4 February 2020

LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by TS Occurred.Caused by CEA Failure to Detach from Ugs.Safety Evaluation Was Performed & Procedural Rev Made to Continue Upper Guide Structure move.W/971126 Ltr
ML17229A539
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 11/26/1997
From: Revell J, Stall J
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
L-97-297, LER-97-010, LER-97-10, NUDOCS 9712030199
Download: ML17229A539 (6)


Text

CATEGORY 1 S

REGULATE Y INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION STEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9712030199 , DOC.DATE: 97/11/26 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET ¹ FACXL:50-335 St. Lucie Plant, Unit 1, Florida Power & Light Co. 05000335 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION REVELL,J. Florida Power & Light Co.

STALL,J.A. Florida Power & Light Co.

RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION

SUBJECT:

LER 97-010-00:on 971027,inadvertant core alteration prohibited by TS occurred. Caused by CEA failure to detach from UGS.Safety evaluation was performed & procedural rev made to continue UGS move.W/971126 ltr.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22T COPIES RECEIVED:LTR i ENCL TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

SIZE: l5 E

NOTES:

RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES 0 ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD2-3 PD 1 1 WIENS,L. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS 1 1 2 2 AEOD/SPD/RRAB 1 1 ILE CENT 1 1 NRR/DE/ECGB 1 1 NRR 1 1 NRR/DE/EMEB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HHFB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HICB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HOLB 1 1 NRR/DRCH/HQMB 1 1 NRR/DRPM/PECB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SPLB 1 1 NRR/DSSA/SRXB 1 1 RES/DET/EIB 1 1 RGN2 FXLE 01 '1 1 D EXTERNAL: L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LITCO BRYCE,J H 1 1 NOAC POORE,W. 1 1 NOAC QUEENER,DS 0

1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 1 U

NOTE TO ALL "RIDS" RECZPZENTS PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE. TO HAVE YOUR NAME OR ORGANIZATION REMOVED FROM DISTRIBUTION OR REDUCE THE NUMBER OF COPIES RECEIVED BY YOU OR YOUR ORGANIZATION, CONTACT LISTS THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK (DCD) ON EXTENSION 415-2083 FULL TEXT CONVERSION REQUIRED TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 25 ENCL 25

Florida Power & Light Company, 650t South Ocean Drive, Jensen Beach, FL 34957 November 26, 1997 L-97-297 FPL 10 CFR 50.73 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555 Re: St. Lucie Unit 1 Docket No. 50-335 Reportable Event: 97-010 Date of Event: October 27, 1997 Inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Stuck Control Element Assembl CEA The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours, J. A. Stall Vice President St. Lucie Plant JAS/JWR Attachment cc: Regional Administrator, USNRC, Region II

,ij Senior Resident Inspector, USNRC, St. Lucie Plant c

/4 97i2030i'tt9 97ii26 PDR ADQCK 05000335 8 PDR lbltttliltjtlllttltajiNI an FPL Group company

NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB No. 31604I104 (4.95) EXRRES 04I30/SS ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATOR INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST: 60.0 HRS. REPORTED LESSON LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE UCENSING PROCESS AND FE LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMINTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMAT TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH IT.S F33)

US.NUCLEARREGIAATORY COMMISSION. WASHINGTON. DC 206664001 AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT 13160%1041, OFFICE OI

{See reverse for required number of MANAGEMENTAND BUDGET. WASHINGTON. DC 20603.

digits/characters for each block)

FACIUTY NAME Hi DOCKET NUMBER 121 PAGE 131 ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 1 OF4 TITLE (41 Inadvertant Core Alteration Prohibited by Technical Specifications Due to Stuck Control Element Assembly (CEA)

SEQUENTIAL REVISION FACILIlYNAME DOCKETNUMBER MONTH DAY MONTH OAY YEAR NUMBER NUMBER FACILITYNAME DOCKETNUMBER 10 27 97 97 010 00 11 26 97 OPERATING MODE (9) 20.2201 (b) 20.2203{a)(2)(v) 50.73(a) (2) (i) 50.73(a) (2) (viii)

POWER LEVEL {10) 000 20.2203 (0) (2) (I) 20.2203(a) (3) (ii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 OTHER 20.2203(a) (2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a) (2)(v) Specify in Abstract befow or in NRC Form 366A 20.2203 (0) (2) (iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50.73(a)(2)(vii)

NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER Snclude Area Code)

Jack Revell, Licensing Engineer (561) 467-7169 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE REPORTABLE TO NPRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPRDS AC RCT C490 MONTH OAY YEAR EXPECTED YES SUBMISSION X {If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). No DATE {15) 02 04 98 ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) {16)

On October 27, 1997, St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with the reactor head removed in preparation for defueling. The containment equipment hatch and personnel access airlock were open, as allowed by Technical Specifications. Personnel commenced Upper Guide Structure (UGS) withdrawal from the reactor vessel in accordance with procedures. As the UGS cleared the alignment pins, a Control Element Assembly (CEA) was discovered attached to the UGS, and had been unexpectedly withdrawn from the core. This constituted a core alteration without the containment penetration status required by Technical Specifications. Containment integrity was set within about 20 minutes of discovery of the stuck CEA.

The cause of the CEA remaining attached to the UGS could not immediately be determined. A safety evaluation was performed and a procedural revision made to continue the UGS move. Reactor cavity water level was raised to increase shielding. Anticipating elevated containment radiation levels, the Containment Isolation System (CIS) was manually actuated prior to continuing the lift.

The UGS lift recommenced on October 28. A remote camera situated beneath the UGS monitored the progress, and the CEA remained attached throughout the transit. Once the transit to the refueling cavity was completed, the CEA was recovered from the UGS. The root cause of the event is still under investigation. Further corrective actions will be identified once the root cause is determined.

NRC FORM 366 (4-95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO (4.95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 2 OF 4 97 010 00 TEXT ilfmore speceis required, use eddnionel copies of NRC Form 366A/ I17I DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT On October 27, 1997, St. Lucie Unit 1 was in Mode 6 with the reactor head [EIIS:AB:RCT] removed in preparation for reactor defueling. The containment equipment hatch and personnel access airlock [EIIS:NH] were open, as allowed by Technical Specifications. Control Element Assemblies (CEAs) [EIIS:AA]had been unlatched by personnel in accordance with procedure OP1-0110022, 'Coupling'and Uncoupling of CEA Extension Shafts'.

At approximately 1510, the reactor cavity water level was raised to 55 feet 6 inches to maintain adequate shielding in preparation for lifting the Upper Guide Structure (UGS) [EIIS:AC]. Normally during the lift, only the UGS lift rig is raised above the surface of the water.

At approximately 1658, contract personnel commenced UGS withdrawal from the reactor vessel in accordance with procedure 1-M-0015, 'Reactor Vessel Maintenance - Sequence of Operations'. During the evolution, a camera mounted at the reactor vessel flange level was used to verify lift alignment and clearance. At approximately 1744, as the UGS cleared the alignment pins, a CEA was discovered attached to the UGS, and had been unexpectedly withdrawn from the core. Operations ordered containment integrity to be set, and this was achieved by 1805.

The cause of the CEA remaining attached to the UGS could not immediately be determined. A safety evaluation was performed which concluded that there would be no adverse impact on plant safety or operation should the CEA fall onto the core while completing the UGS move. Procedure 1-M-0015, 'Reactor Vessel Maintenance-Sequence of Operations', was revised to accommodate movement of the UGS with a CEA attached. Since the UGS and lift rig were to be lifted much higher than normal, reactor cavity water level was adjusted to 60 feet to increase shielding. This action was completed at approximately 2222 hours0.0257 days <br />0.617 hours <br />0.00367 weeks <br />8.45471e-4 months <br />.

In anticipation of receiving high enough containment radiation levels to initiate a Containment Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS), unnecessary personnel leA containment and the Containment Isolation System (CIS) [EIIS:JM]

was manually actuated at approximately 0253 on October 28. This was a preplanned actuation performed in accordance with procedure OP1-1600023, 'Refueling Sequencing Guidelines'.

NAC FOAM 366A I4.95)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4.96)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 3 OF 4 97 010 00 TEXT flfmore speceis required, use edditionel copies of NRC Form 366A/ I17)

The UGS lift recommenced at approximately 0320 with only essential personnel in containment. A remote camera situated beneath the UGS monitored the progress, and the CEA remained firmly attached throughout the transit.

At approximately 0324, CIAS channels indicated that containment radiation levels had reached the CIAS initiation threshold. Channel MD, with the most direct exposure to the UGS, registered an area radiation rate of approximately 7 REM per hour, while the other three channels indicated approximately 100 millirem per hour.

CIS actuates automatically with two channels greater than or equal to 90 millirem per hour.

Once the transit to the refueling cavity was completed, attempts were made to free the CEA but were initially unsuccessful. Subsequently, the CEA was disengaged by operating personnel. The CEA was retrieved and moved to the spent fuel pool for storage. It was identified as CEA 24, a Type 1, full length CEA manufactured by Combustion Engineering.

CAUSE OF THE EVENT The cause of the event was failure of the CEA to detach from the UGS. It is currently undetermined whether the CEA was partially latched or friction fit to the CEA Extension Shaft. The root cause is still under investigation.

A supplement to this LER will be issued describing the findings of root cause evaluation for the stuck CEA.

ANALYSIS OF THE EVENT This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) as "Any operation or condition prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications." The Technical Specification violated is Unit 1 Technical Specification 3.9.4:

"The containment penetrations shall be in the following status:

a. The equipment door closed and held in place by a minimum of four bolts,
b. A minimum of one door in each airlock is closed, and C. Each penetration providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere shall be... (several configurations given).

APPLICABILITY: During CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment."

NRC FORM 366A I4.96)

NRC FORM 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIO I4-95)

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

TEXT CONTINUATION YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION ST LUCIE UNIT 1 05000335 4 OF 4 97 010 00 TEXT llfmore space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A/ I 17I The Technical Specifications define "core alteration" as "movement or manipulation of any fuel, sources, reactivit control components, or other components affecting reactivity within the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and fuel in the vessel." Normally, lifting a UGS is not a core alteration, since the UGS does not contain fuel, sources, or components that control or affect reactivity. However, since a reactivity control component (a CEA) was moved with the UGS in this event, a core alteration was performed. Moreover, the core alteration was performed without the containment penetration status required by the Technical Specification. Penetrations were placed in the required state within approximately 20 minutes of discovery of the stuck CEA.

The CIS actuation was not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72, since the actuation was part of a preplanned sequence addressed by procedure. The CIS is designed to mitigate the consequences of accidents which release large amounts of energy within the containment structure. There was no such accident in this case, and the CIS actuation was intentional rather than the result of accident conditions.

Withdrawal of the stuck CEA from the reactor core did not place the plant in an unanalyzed condition, nor did it place the plant in a condition outside its design basis. Plant procedures address the case of a single CEA not inserted in the core, and substantial shutdown margin was maintained during the course of this event.

LER 97-001-00 for St. Lucie Unit 2 documented an event with radiological conditions similar to this event. In the Unit 2 event, an expected CIS actuation occurred as the UGS was withdrawn from the reactor. The elevated radiation levels were caused by irradiated incore instrumentation segments [EIIS:IG] which had broken during removal of incores. The Unit 2 event, however, was unlike this event in that there was no core alteration.

I CORRECTIVE ACTIONS Immediate corrective actions included stopping the UGS lift and evaluating dose rates. A condition report was issued and a team was designated to determine the cause of the stuck CEA. The team reviewed potential failure modes and related industry experience, but has not had access to the CEA's extension shaft for evaluation. The unlatch procedure was also reviewed and verified to have been properly performed. Further corrective actions for the stuck CEA will be identified in a supplement to this LER once the root cause has been determined.

NAC FOAM 366A I4.95)