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| number = ML17266A145
| number = ML17266A145
| issue date = 02/11/1980
| issue date = 02/11/1980
| title = Updated LER 79-028/01X-1:on 790903,In Cold Shutdown During Hurricane,Cable Fell Into Startup Transformer B.Ac Electrical Sys B de-energized & Diesel Generator Failed to Start.Caused by Delay in B Diesel Binding
| title = Updated LER 79-028/01X-1:on 790903,in Cold Shutdown During Hurricane,Cable Fell Into Startup Transformer B.Ac Electrical Sys B de-energized & Diesel Generator Failed to Start.Caused by Delay in B Diesel Binding
| author name = JAMES D K
| author name = James D
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 14: Line 14:
| document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO,RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| document type = LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO,RO), TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
| page count = 3
| page count = 3
| revision = 0
}}
}}
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Initial            Report-Se                ember 17, 1979 NRC PORI0 260                                                                                                                          U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMAtISSIOI+
P TTt LlCENSEE EYENT REPORT CONTROl BL,CCIC:                        l    l            l      t Ol        =          (PLEASE PAINT OR          YPE    ALLREQUIRED INPORAtATIONI QQIFILI2    9 1115111*1 LICCySEE CODE I
O.                  I-          I  I. I UCMc 5'aIcac SEA I      I-l    3      \ O.16  I    I I.ECca  St  ~
I YPC    10 Q~Q S ~  CAF St CON'T
                  '.;;        LL ca 0 60              6I 51 0 OOCaI 0
                                                                      ~
3 NuaFaSSA I    5    QLAAA 61    cEI 9    OR EVCKA  O*T 71          IQE 15
                                                                                                                                                          . 1    lll AEPDAT OATS l
50 O9 EV ENT 0 ESCR IPTION              ~O PR 0 9 4SLE COaI5 ECU B4CES +Io 0  2          While in the cold shutdown con%Cion during Hurricane David, a cable                                                                                                    fell across lines jnto the "B" S/U transformer, causing a lockout on the
~0 East Bus and de-energizing the "B" S/U transformer. The "B" A.C. electri-cal system was de-energized, and the "B" Diesel Generator (.DG) failed to start. Following an electrical check-out, the "B" DG was manually started
              'Adequate core cooling was maintained                                                      at all times.                        This is the                fifth occurrence of this'type (See                                            LERs        335-76-21, 76-44, 77-3 and 77-]5).
STSTEu              CAVSE            CAVSS                                                            COMP..          VAIVc CODE                CODE SVSCDDS        'CMIOKCKTCDOS                                  SVS    005        SVSCDOc aac 1      6        ':                ~EE 9          IO Q
LEJQ EAJQ ~ll tl,              Il              !2 E  L    11      Yl 3
                                                                                                                              'IS OCCVAAEIICE Q          LAJQ 19
                                                                                                                                                                ~2Q 10 REVISIOK ~
                                                          '+
ScDVCKTIAL                                                      REPORT LcAIEIO        EV EAT YEAA                                AcroATKO,                                  CODE                  TYPE                          .PIO.
QYE>>-Fa        0        ~79 2I          11
                                                                            ~02 '6 26 8              +~
ll
                                                                                                                      ~01 15          29            20                SI IOK PVTVAc                    Clr EC.        Sy VTDDEEa                                      ATT*Caa&SIaT            NPR~          PRIME CI>>MI,            COMPOK cKT TA)CSN    AiTIOac                CK >LrLK~          SIETAOO                    IIOVAS 2'1        SVScaI    ao      PCAM 1 VS,          SV PPLI EA          MAIIVSA ~ VAEA LAaa~ZQ cZQ ~ZQ '~00
                                                                                                                      ~ ~
SS                26.                2I 0
40
                                                                                                                  ~YQ ~AQ 41                  42 13 40 IQ      44 3      3 4    51'c 47 CAUSE OESCRIPTION ANO CORRM'PIV ACTiONS O2l An    investighti on revealed that                                            a  rela          in the auto-start circuitr of the
          ~    "B" DG was mechanically binding. This relay was. replaced. An operational test was then satisfactorily completed whereby the "B" S/U transformer (which had been repaired and tested)                                                      was      intentionally de-energized.                                          The "B"    DG        was observed                    to auto-start                    an                    0' 2    9 P*CIU.Y.
Sa ATVS
            ~~QEZ          ~00
                                  ! POWSA
                                  ~
D CTKEA sTA'555 NA
                                                                                        ~        METIIOO OC olscov EAT 0    erator Observation olscovcAY 05$ cAIpTIDK 'Q~2 l
5 2                  t0                  ll Qc 12                                AI IRAQI 45 20
          *CttVITY CoaITS."IT              ~
ACLSA&0      OIa ASLEASE                      AMOVKTora ACTIVITY OSS                                                            LOCATION oP ASLEASS OSE l
9      ~Z 9
Q22    ~ZQ24 I0              I~
NA
                                                                                          ~ 4,          45 NA 50
                                                                  'II 5
P A505>>Ecii cXrOSVAES
            ~D>>    (P 0          QZF  ~ZQza                                      NA l      5 PcASOaaaa
                            'I I      11 tl. IHJVAIES Il a      ~+5          0 Qa I 'I                            5 1      5    9                          12 LOSS OC CA OCaICCE TO PCCILtTY TTTc LIB 2
OES Aactloaa l0 2
EOOSNIQ                      +Q PVSLIr.tY                                                                                                                                            NRC US= ONLY tSSVEO      OCSCA:PT:Oy          9 0      LlLIO44
                        ~
0'AAIA OP PREPARER D- K. James                                                                  (3051 552-3813
REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE  335-79-.28,  Update 81 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO Additional Event Descri tion    and Probable Conseouences 4
While in the cold shutdown condition (Mode 5) during the passage of Hurricane David, a support cable for the tower crane in th ,Unit 2 construction area fell across 'lines 'into the "B" Start-up 'Trans=ormer. A lockout occurred on the East Bus and.the "B" Start-up Tra .sform r was de-energized.
The "B" side of the electrical system de-energized with the exception of the "B" DC Bus which was carried by the "8" battery. The "B" Inverter failed to respond but the "D" Inverter remained in service.      A blown fuse was discovered later in the "B" Inverter circuit. Tne "AB" A.C. Busses were lost as they were tied to the "B" side. The "AB" D.C. Bus was lost as    it "B" D.C. Bus, which is assumed to have de-energized as a result of the current was tied to transient produced by the event. The SUPS (including instrumentation, annunciation, lighting, communications [except PAX and BELL], NAMAS and Sequence of Events Recorder) was also lost. At this tim i-: was discovered that "B" Diesel Generator was not supplying loads (failed to start). Follovong a visual and electrical check-out of'he "B" Diesel Generator,      'it was manua'}ly started.
Adequate core cooling was maintained and verified >y starting the "A" IPSI pump and manually controlling Shutdown Cooling flow.
Additional  Cause D sc. i~t'.on and Corrective'Action The "A" Diesel Generator was yepified OPERABLE. All of    the electrjca] busses and components lost during event were re-energiz    d. Since the reason fop the "B" Diesel Generator not starting autorqatjc~lly on vndervoltage was not
.known, and the potential for a faulted bus or ground was suspected, a thorough check-out was conducted prior to manually starting and loading the "B" Diesel Generator. Two days following the event, a plant staff review and investigation revealed that the K22 relay in the auto-start circuitry of the "B" was mechanically binding. This relay was replaced.        'Subsequently, Diesel'enerator an operational test was .satisfactorily completed whereby the "8" Start-up Transformer (which was repaired and tested) was intentionally de-ener g'ized, and auto-start and loading of the "B" Diesel Generator was verified to occup,
0 0}}

Latest revision as of 10:05, 4 February 2020

Updated LER 79-028/01X-1:on 790903,in Cold Shutdown During Hurricane,Cable Fell Into Startup Transformer B.Ac Electrical Sys B de-energized & Diesel Generator Failed to Start.Caused by Delay in B Diesel Binding
ML17266A145
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 02/11/1980
From: James D
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML17207A841 List:
References
LER-79-028-01X, LER-79-28-1X, NUDOCS 8002220334
Download: ML17266A145 (3)


Text

Initial Report-Se ember 17, 1979 NRC PORI0 260 U S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMAtISSIOI+

P TTt LlCENSEE EYENT REPORT CONTROl BL,CCIC: l l l t Ol = (PLEASE PAINT OR YPE ALLREQUIRED INPORAtATIONI QQIFILI2 9 1115111*1 LICCySEE CODE I

O. I- I I. I UCMc 5'aIcac SEA I I-l 3 \ O.16 I I I.ECca St ~

I YPC 10 Q~Q S ~ CAF St CON'T

'.;; LL ca 0 60 6I 51 0 OOCaI 0

~

3 NuaFaSSA I 5 QLAAA 61 cEI 9 OR EVCKA O*T 71 IQE 15

. 1 lll AEPDAT OATS l

50 O9 EV ENT 0 ESCR IPTION ~O PR 0 9 4SLE COaI5 ECU B4CES +Io 0 2 While in the cold shutdown con%Cion during Hurricane David, a cable fell across lines jnto the "B" S/U transformer, causing a lockout on the

~0 East Bus and de-energizing the "B" S/U transformer. The "B" A.C. electri-cal system was de-energized, and the "B" Diesel Generator (.DG) failed to start. Following an electrical check-out, the "B" DG was manually started

'Adequate core cooling was maintained at all times. This is the fifth occurrence of this'type (See LERs 335-76-21, 76-44, 77-3 and 77-]5).

STSTEu CAVSE CAVSS COMP.. VAIVc CODE CODE SVSCDDS 'CMIOKCKTCDOS SVS 005 SVSCDOc aac 1 6 ': ~EE 9 IO Q

LEJQ EAJQ ~ll tl, Il !2 E L 11 Yl 3

'IS OCCVAAEIICE Q LAJQ 19

~2Q 10 REVISIOK ~

'+

ScDVCKTIAL REPORT LcAIEIO EV EAT YEAA AcroATKO, CODE TYPE .PIO.

QYE>>-Fa 0 ~79 2I 11

~02 '6 26 8 +~

ll

~01 15 29 20 SI IOK PVTVAc Clr EC. Sy VTDDEEa ATT*Caa&SIaT NPR~ PRIME CI>>MI, COMPOK cKT TA)CSN AiTIOac CK >LrLK~ SIETAOO IIOVAS 2'1 SVScaI ao PCAM 1 VS, SV PPLI EA MAIIVSA ~ VAEA LAaa~ZQ cZQ ~ZQ '~00

~ ~

SS 26. 2I 0

40

~YQ ~AQ 41 42 13 40 IQ 44 3 3 4 51'c 47 CAUSE OESCRIPTION ANO CORRM'PIV ACTiONS O2l An investighti on revealed that a rela in the auto-start circuitr of the

~ "B" DG was mechanically binding. This relay was. replaced. An operational test was then satisfactorily completed whereby the "B" S/U transformer (which had been repaired and tested) was intentionally de-energized. The "B" DG was observed to auto-start an 0' 2 9 P*CIU.Y.

Sa ATVS

~~QEZ ~00

! POWSA

~

D CTKEA sTA'555 NA

~ METIIOO OC olscov EAT 0 erator Observation olscovcAY 05$ cAIpTIDK 'Q~2 l

5 2 t0 ll Qc 12 AI IRAQI 45 20

  • CttVITY CoaITS."IT ~

ACLSA&0 OIa ASLEASE AMOVKTora ACTIVITY OSS LOCATION oP ASLEASS OSE l

9 ~Z 9

Q22 ~ZQ24 I0 I~

NA

~ 4, 45 NA 50

'II 5

P A505>>Ecii cXrOSVAES

~D>> (P 0 QZF ~ZQza NA l 5 PcASOaaaa

'I I 11 tl. IHJVAIES Il a ~+5 0 Qa I 'I 5 1 5 9 12 LOSS OC CA OCaICCE TO PCCILtTY TTTc LIB 2

OES Aactloaa l0 2

EOOSNIQ +Q PVSLIr.tY NRC US= ONLY tSSVEO OCSCA:PT:Oy 9 0 LlLIO44

~

0'AAIA OP PREPARER D- K. James (3051 552-3813

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-79-.28, Update 81 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO Additional Event Descri tion and Probable Conseouences 4

While in the cold shutdown condition (Mode 5) during the passage of Hurricane David, a support cable for the tower crane in th ,Unit 2 construction area fell across 'lines 'into the "B" Start-up 'Trans=ormer. A lockout occurred on the East Bus and.the "B" Start-up Tra .sform r was de-energized.

The "B" side of the electrical system de-energized with the exception of the "B" DC Bus which was carried by the "8" battery. The "B" Inverter failed to respond but the "D" Inverter remained in service. A blown fuse was discovered later in the "B" Inverter circuit. Tne "AB" A.C. Busses were lost as they were tied to the "B" side. The "AB" D.C. Bus was lost as it "B" D.C. Bus, which is assumed to have de-energized as a result of the current was tied to transient produced by the event. The SUPS (including instrumentation, annunciation, lighting, communications [except PAX and BELL], NAMAS and Sequence of Events Recorder) was also lost. At this tim i-: was discovered that "B" Diesel Generator was not supplying loads (failed to start). Follovong a visual and electrical check-out of'he "B" Diesel Generator, 'it was manua'}ly started.

Adequate core cooling was maintained and verified >y starting the "A" IPSI pump and manually controlling Shutdown Cooling flow.

Additional Cause D sc. i~t'.on and Corrective'Action The "A" Diesel Generator was yepified OPERABLE. All of the electrjca] busses and components lost during event were re-energiz d. Since the reason fop the "B" Diesel Generator not starting autorqatjc~lly on vndervoltage was not

.known, and the potential for a faulted bus or ground was suspected, a thorough check-out was conducted prior to manually starting and loading the "B" Diesel Generator. Two days following the event, a plant staff review and investigation revealed that the K22 relay in the auto-start circuitry of the "B" was mechanically binding. This relay was replaced. 'Subsequently, Diesel'enerator an operational test was .satisfactorily completed whereby the "8" Start-up Transformer (which was repaired and tested) was intentionally de-ener g'ized, and auto-start and loading of the "B" Diesel Generator was verified to occup,

0 0