ML17352A437

Proposed TS Tables 3.3-2,3.3-3,4.3-2 & Associated Bases for Addition of SG Water Level - high-high Protection

ML17352A437
Person / Time
Site:	Turkey Point
Issue date:	12/28/1993
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17352A436	List: ML17352A435 ML17352A437
References
NUDOCS 9402080244
Download: ML17352A437 (15)

Text

ATTACHMENT 3 PROPOSED TECHNZCAL SPECZFZCATZONS Marked up Technical Specification Pages 3/4 3-18 3/4 3-19 (For information only) 3/4 3-21 3/4 3-2t 3/4 3-27 (For information only) 3/4 3-33 B 3/4 3-1 (For information only)

B 3/4 3-la (For information only)

B 3/4 3-2 02080244 931278 05000250 PDR ADOCK PDR p

\ Eip C TABLE 3.3-2 Continued ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRNENTATION HINIMN TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

4. Steaa Line Isolation (Continued)

d. Steaa Line Flow-High 2/steaa linc 1/steal line 1/steam line 1, 2, 3 15 Coincident with: in any two in any two Steaa Generator steaa lines steal lines Pressure-"Low 1/steam 1/steaa 1/steam 1, 2, 3 generator generator generator in any two sn any two steaa lines stela lines or T Low 1/loop 1/loop in any two 1/loop in any two 1, 2, 3 25 loops loops

5. Feedwater Isolation

a. Autoaatic Actua- 1, 2 22 tion Logic and Actuation Relays

b. Safety-In)ection See Itea 1. above for all Safety In)ection initiating functions and requireaents.

6. Auxiliary FeedwaterHf

>/saba~

a. Autoeatic Actua- 1, 2, 3 2Q tion Logic and Actuation Relays a/s~~~

)e~N-a%< gee.~~ I'~ ge~ev-o Hick - Hi'ph. 4kkOW ap~+ ~p iA geaaroA 4)v- 5 Wa.~

TABLE 3.3-2 Continued ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION MINIMUM TOTAL NO. CHANNELS CHANNELS APPLICABLE FUNCTIONAL UNIT OF CHANNELS TO TRIP OPERABLE MODES ACTION

6. Auxiliary FeedwaterNN (Continued)

b. Stm. Gen. Mater Level 3/steam 2/steam 2/steam 1, 2, 3 15 Low-Low generator generator generator

)n any steam generator

c. Safety Injection See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions and requirements.

d. Bus Stripping 1/bus 1/bus 1/bus 1, 2, 3 23

e. Trip of All Main Feed-water Pumps Breakers 1/breaker 1/breaker) (1/breaker) 1, 2 23.

5 operating /operating pump pump

7. Loss of Power

a. 4.16 kV Busses A and B 2/bus 2/bus 2/bus 1, 2, ), 4 18 (Loss of Voltage)

b. 480 V Load Centers 2 per load 2 on any 2 per load 1, 2, 3, 4 18 3A, 3B, 3C, 3D and center load center center 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D Degraded Voltage Coincident with: See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection initiating functions Safety Injection and requirements

TABLE 3. 3-2 Continued TABLE NOTATION

¹Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the Pressurizer Pressure Interlock Setpoint of 2000 psig.

¹¹Channels are for particulate radioactivity and for gaseous radioactivity.

¹¹¹Auxiliary feedwater manual initiation is included in Specification 3.7. 1.2.

"Trip function may be blocked in this MODE below the T --Low Interlock Setpoint.

""Only during CORE ALTERATIONS or movement of irradiated fuel within the containment.

ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 14- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, be in at least HOT STANDBY within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />; however, one channel may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing per Specification 4.3.2. 1, provided

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the other channel is OPERABLE.

ACTION 15- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Total Number of Channels, operation may proceed until performance of the next required ANALOG CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST or TRIP ACTUATING DEVICE OPERATIONAL TEST provided the inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

ACTION 16- With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, comply with the ACTION statement requirements of Specifica-tion 3.3.3:1 Item la of Table 3.3-4.

ACTION 17- With the number of OPERABLE channels one less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirement, restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

Steam Generator overfill protection is not part of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS), and is added to the Technical Specifications only in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 89-19.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8( 4 3/4 3"21 AMENDMENT NOS 137AND 132

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TABLE 3.3-3 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATIOH SYSTEN TRIP FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLOWANCE TA Z S SETPOINT ALLONBLE VALUES

4. Steaa Line Isolation (Continued)

b. Autoaatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. H.A. N.A. H.A.

and Actuation Relays c Containaent Pressure-High- 21. 3 2.7 0.0 <20.0 psig <22.6 psig High Coincident with:

Contaireent Pressure-High 13. 3 10.3 0.0 <4.0 psig <4.5 psig

.d. Steam Line Flow-"High 16.7 2.86 3.9 <A function defined <<A function defined as follows: A hp as follows: A hp corresponding to corresponding to 40K steam flow at 42.6X steaa flow at OX load increasing OX load increasing linearly froa 20K linearly froa 20K load to a value load to a value corresponding to corresponding to 120K steaa flow 122.6X steam flow at full load. at full load.

Coincident with: 13.0 1.16 2.3 >614 psig >588 psig Stems Line Pressure-Low or T Low 4.0 2.0 1.0 >543'F )542. 54F

5. Feedwater Isolation

a. 'Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A H.A. N.A. H.A.

and Actuation Relays

b. Safety In)ection see itee 1 See Itea 1. above for all Safety Injection TNp Setpoints and S4~. G,e~, ~ Le~e I l 8.otl 11

+So bl Values og 8 (. 90(o o4 Aigk- Ao. o g.<>

thigh tn err ovJ AAceM @age rage l Ag+QN.en~ $ pah l<S4s u,me& Sp~

TABLE 3'.8-3 (Continued)

ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH TRIP FUNCTIONAL UNIT ALLOWANCE TA S SETPOINT ALLOWABLE VALUES

6. Auxiliary Feedwater (3)

a. Automatic Actuation Logic N.A. N.A. N.A. N- A. N.A.

and Actuation Relays

b. Steam Generator Water 5.0 2.33 1.9 )15X of narrow of narrow Level Low-Low range instrument (13%

range instrument

[

span. span.

c. Safety Injection see item 1 See Item 1. above for all Safety Injection Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

d. . Bus Stripping see stem 7 See Item 7. below for all Bus Stripping Trip Setpoints and Allowable Values.

e. Trip of All Nain Feedwater N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.

Pump Breakers

7. Loss of Power

a. 4.16 kV Busses A and B N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.

(Loss of Voltage)

g% j TABLE 4.3-2 (Continued)

ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEH INSTRNENTATION TRIP '

ANALOG ACTUATING NODES E CHANNEL DEVICE FOR WHICH CHANNEL CHANNEL CHANNEL OPERATIONAL OPERATIONAL ACTUATION SURVEILUNCE FUNCTIONAL UNIT CHECK CALIBRATION TEST TEST T T I EIE E

4. Steaa Line Isolation (Continued)

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c. Containment Pressure- N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3 Hi gh-High Coincident with:

Containment Pressure- H.A; N.A. 1, 2, 3 High

d. Steaa Line Fl~-High S(3) H(5) N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3 Coincident Ath:

Steam Generator Pressure-Low S(3) H(5) N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3 or'

"-Let S(3) C(5) N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3

5. Feecbater Isolation

a. Autoaatic Actuation H.A. H.A. H.A. H.A. 1, 2 ED Logic and Actuation Relays

b. Safety Infection See Itea 1. above for all Safety In]ection Surveillance Requirements.

C)

CA Auxi l iary Feaster (2)

CD

a. Automatic Actuation N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 1, 2, 3 Logic and Actuation Relays

b. Steam Generator N.A. N.A. le 2E 3 Mater evel-"Low-Let C. %&a~ Q~~~

~o~ L~cl 4.A.

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3/4. 3 INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4. 3. I and 3/4. 3. 2 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES AC A N S S EH NS RUHENTATI N The OPERABILITY of the Reactor Trip System and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System instrumentation and interlocks ensures that: (1) the associated ACTION and/or Reactor trip will be initiated when the parameter monitored by each channel or combination thereof reaches its Setpoint (2) the specified coincidence logic is maintained, (3) sufficient redundancy is main-tained to permit a channel to be out-of-service for testing or maintenance (due to plant specific design, pulling fuses and using jumpers may be used to place channels in trip), and (4) sufficient system functional capability is available from diverse parameters.

The OPERABILITY of these systems is required to provide the overall reliability, redundancy, and diversity assumed available in the facility design for the protection and mitigation of accident and transient conditions.

The integrated operation of each of these systems is consistent with the assumptions used in the safety analyses. The Surveillance Requirements speci-fied for these systems ensure that the overall system functional capability is maintained comparable to the original design standards. The periodic surveil-lance tests performed at the minimum frequencies are sufficient to demonstrate this capability.

Under some pressure and temperature conditions, certain surveillances for Safety Injection cannot be performed because of the system design. Allowance to change modes is provided under these conditions as long as the surveillances are completed within specified time requirements.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation Trip Setpoints specified in Table 3.3-3 are the nominal values at which the bistables are set for each functional unit. The set~oint is considered to be adjusted consistent with the nominal value when the 'as measured" setpoint is within the band allowed for calibration accuracy.

To accommodate the instrument drift that may occur between operational tests and the accuracy to which Setpoints can be measured and calibrated, Allowable Values for the Setpoints have been specified in Table 3.3-3; Opera-tion with Setpoints less conservative than the Trip Setpoint but within the Allowable Value is acceptable since an allowance has been made in the safety analysis to accommodate this error. If no value is listed in the Allowable column, the Setpoint value is the limiting setting.

For some functions, an optional provision has been included for determining the OPERABILITY of a channel when its trip setpoint is found to exceed the Allowable Value. The methodology of this option utilizes the "as measured" deviation from the specified calibration point for rack and sensor components in conjunction with a statistical combination of the other uncer-tainties of the instrumentation to measure the process variable and +the +uncer-tainties in calibrating the instrumentation. In Equation 2.2-1, Z R S "as TA, (

the interactive effects of the errors in the rack and the sensor, and the measured" TURKEY POINT " UNITS 3 Ec 4 B 3/4 3"1 AMENDMENT NOS. 140AND 135

INSTRUMENTATION BASES REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION Continued values of the errors are considered. Z, as specified in Table 3.3"3, in percent span, is the statistical summation of errors assumed in the analysis excluding those associated with the sensor and rack drift and the accuracy of their measurement. TA or Total Allowance is the difference, in percent span, between the trip setpoint and the value used in the analysis for actuation. R or Rack Error is the "as measured" deviation, in percent span, for the affected channel from the specified trip setpoint. S or Sensor Drift is either the "as measured" deviation of the sensor from its calibration point or the value speci-fied in Table 3.3-3, in percent span, from the analysis assumptions. Use of Equation 2.2-1 allows for a sensor drift factor, an increased rack drift factor, and provides a threshold value for REPORTABLE EVENTS.

The methodology to derive the Trip Setpoints includes an allowance for instrument uncertainties. Inherent to the determination of the Trip Setpoints are the magnitudes of these channel uncertainties. Sensor and rack instrumenta-tion utilized in these channels are expected to be capable of operating within the allowances of these uncertainty magnitudes.

Rack drift in excess of the Allowable Value exhibits the behavior that the rack has not met its allowance. Being that there is a small statistical chance that this will happen, an infrequent excessive drift is expected. Rack or sensor drift, in excess of the allowance that is more than occasional, may be indicative of more serious problems and should warrant further investigation.

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System senses selected plant parameters and determines whether or not predetermined limits are being exceeded.

If they are, the signals are combined into logic matrices sensitive to combina-tions indicative of various accidents events, and transients. Once the required logic combination is completed, the system sends actuation signals to TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 5 4 B 3/4 3-la AMENDMENT NOSZ40 AND 135

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INSTRUMENTATION BASES REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM and ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM N ontlnued those Engineered Safety Features components whose aggregate function best serves the requirements of the condition. As an example, the following actions may be initiated by the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System to mitigate the consequences of a steam line break or loss-of-coolant accident: (1) Safety Injection pumps start and automatic valves position, (2) Reactor trip, (3) feed water isolation, (4) startup of the emergency diesel generators, (5) containment spray pumps start and automatic valves posi'tion (6) containment ventilation isolation, (7) steam line isolation, (8) turbine trip, (9) auxiliary feedwater pumps start and automatic valves position, (10) containment cooling fans start and automatic valves position, (11) intake cooling water and component cooling water pumps start and automatic valves position, and (12) Control Room Isolation and Ventilation Systems start.

( (ws<r-v)

The Engineered Safety Features Actuation System interlocks perform the following functions:

HIGH STEAM FLOW SAFETY INJECTION BLOCK

- This permissive is used to block the safety injection (SI) signal generated by High Steam Line Flow coincident with Low Steam Line Pressure or Low T The permissive is generated when two out of three Low T below their setpoints and the manual channels drop SI Block/Unblock switch is momentarily placed in the block position. This switch is a spring return to the normal. position type. The permissive will automatically be defeated if two out of three Low T channels rise above their setpoints. The permissive may be manually defeated when two out of three Low T channels are below their setpoints and the manual SI Block/

avg Unblock switch is momentarily placed in the unblock position.

LOW PRESSURIZER PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION BLOCK - This permissive is used to block the safety injection signals generated by Low Pressurizer Pressure and High Differential Pressure between the Steam Line Header and any Steam Line. The permissive is generated when two out of three pressurizer pressure permissive channels drop below their setpoints and the manual SI Block/Unblock switch is momentarily placed in the block:position. This is the same switch that is used to manually block the High Steam Flow Safety Injection signals mentioned above. This permissive will automatically be defeated if two out of three pressurizer pressure permissive channels rise above their setpoints.

The permissive may be manually defeated when two out of three pressurizer pressure permissive channels are below their setpoints and the manual SI Block/Unblock switch momentarily placed in the Unblock position.

This system also provides a feedwater system isolation to prevent SG overfill. Steam Generator overfill protection is not part of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS), and is added to the Technical Specifications only in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 89-19.

TURKEY POINT - UNITS 3 8( 4 B 3/4 3-2 AMENDMENT NOS237 AND 132

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