ML19210B750

Addl Draft Contentions,Per ASLB 790921 Memorandum & Order, Supplementing 790329 & 0629 Petitions.Alleges Inadequacy & Vulnerability of Facility Design,Const,Mgt,Operation,Maint & Emergency Response Sys.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML19210B750
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	10/05/1979
From:	Johnsrud J, Kepford C Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
NUDOCS 7911120245
Download: ML19210B750 (6)

Text

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ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR POWER Co Owoetors: Mr. George 8comsme-R.D. et,Peoch Bottom,Pa.17563 737 548-2836

p3 ] = Dr. Judith Johnsrud-433 orfendo Avenue, State College, Pa.16801 814 2374900 t q, -

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. p ,e3 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA f [p ~

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

/* 5 In the Matter of  :

' g^ METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY, et al.

(Three Mile Island Nuclear Statioii, ,p Docket No. 50-289 g Unit 1) '

ADDITIONAL DRAFT CONTENTIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEA;! POWER The Environmental Coalition on Nuclear Power (ECNP), in compliance with the September 21, 1979 Memorandum and Order of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board (Board), submits the following draft contentions. These draft conteations supplement the contegtions already raised and dis' cussed -

in the June 29 and March 29[l 79, ECNP Petitions to NRC incorporated in the ECNP Petition to Intervene. ,,

These two sets of contentions maf be supplemented 4with additional contentions that may be raised in the October 22, 1979 ECNP filing of final contentions. For example, these Petitioners have only ir. the last few days received NUREG-0600, the NRC Staff Report on the THI-2 accident, and the Suspended Licensee's Report inlCesponse to NRC Staff Recommended Requirements for Restart of Three Mile-Island Nuclear Station Unit 1; -

we have had, therefore, no opportunity. to review those docun.3nts wiich l .

may contain information pertinent to additional issues which we wifl need to litigate in this proceeding on the proposed reopening of TMI-1. In addition, the ECNP legal representatives in this proceeding have requested from the Staff documents and data pertaining to THI-2 during the early weeks of the accident and subsequently. Although the ECNP representatives had made these requests'in their capacity as the legal representatives of the 1312 271

?onnost/C 9 L 'd- h/yu

public-interest intervening organizations (member grcups ECNP) in the still ongoing Operating License proceedings for TMI-2, their requests have been totally ignored by the NRC Staff in the six months since the accident began. The information requested--when and if the NRC Staff deigns to respond to these Intervenors in TMI-21'may also lead to additional con-tentions in these THI-1 proceedings. ,

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1. Pursuant to the April 11, 1978, Order of the Comissioners which voided the 14.5 curies per year value of emissions of radon-222 in Table S-3 (10 CFR 51.20(e)) and opened all reactor licenses to litiga-tion on radon and its health effects, the ECNP Petitioners contend that TMI-1. should n3t be allowed to operate until Table S-3 contains a value of radon-222 emissions consistent with NRDC v. USNRC,547 F.2d 633, 639, at n.12 (which requires that the Comission evaluate the full period .

of toxicity of residual by-products of the nuclear fuel cycle). Since radon-222 emissions from abandoned mines, mill tailings, and depleted uranium have the potential for being far larger a source of radioactivity ta the environment than all other sources of radioactivity combined (all per annual fuel requirement), this suspended Operating License should not be reinstated; the Operating License was granted in tha first place by ignoring these prodigious emissions of radon-222, in violation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Furthermore, ignoring the radon eaissions is inconsistent with the Comission's legal obligation to protect the health and safety of the public.

2. The Operating License of THI-1 should not be reinstated -- if at all -- until Table S-3 (10 CFR 51.20(e)) is full and complete, which it now is not. For example, one large source of environmental contamination in the fuel cycle comes from technetium-99, which has until recently also been ignored by the Staff. In addition, the Staff has seriously and irresponsibly underestimated the hazards to human beings resulting from the ingestion of technetium-99.

3. The Staff of the Commission, in i ts publication Regulatory -

Guide 1.109, sets forth conversion factors for calculating exposures to humans as a result of ingestion of, inhalation of, or imersion in a cloud of radioisotopes. For a number of radioisotopes of biological importance, these conversion factors have been underestimated by factors ranging from 10 to over 1000. The Operating License for TMI-1 should not be reinstated until the true and full environmental effects for the entire fuel cycle have been properly, fully, and accurately detemined, without omission or s0bterfuge.

4. The Operating License for TMI-1 should remain in suspension until the full range of accidents, including risk (sequences and consequences 1312 272

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4. (cont'd.) of events) of Class 9 accidents, has been fully -

analyzed for the TMI site, with due consideration to the applicable populations, previous accident experience, local weather conditions, and local geography. ECNP contends that there can be no justification for further jeopardizing the lives, the mental, physical, and genetic health, and the properties and economic security of all individuals -

within the lethal zone of THI.

5. ~ ECNP contends that the suspension of the Operating Libense for THI-l should remain in effect until 'a full and unbiased investigation has been completed to answer the question: Was perjury comitted by- -

witnesses for the Applicant, the NRC Staff, or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania during the evidentiary proi:eedings which led to the licensing of either TMI-l or TMI-27. ECNP believes that perjury.kas comitted by witnesses for the above mentioned parties. A refusal ,-

by the Comnission to investigate this matter would further undermine' public confidence in the Commission's objectivity and would also represent a violation of the Comission's legal obligation to protect the heal.th and safety of the public above all else. - -

6. ECNP contends, that the emissions from the normal operation of THI-l have had an obsenable and adverse effect on the reproductive success of farm animals and domestic pets (notably cats) in certain areas around the facility. These problems with fauna have been sub-stantially worsened by the accident at TMI-2 which has also been followed by observable damage to local! flora, including, but not limited to,?

the deaths of local apple, pear, and pjne trees. No further operation of this facility should be pennitted, 'as'it may lead to the economic-decline of the local agricultural comunity.  !

_ 7. The recent Class 9 accident at TMI-2 vividly demonstrated the inability of all parties involved -- Met. Ed. management and station operators, state and local Civil Defense personnel, and NRC personnel at n any and all levels -- to comprehend the nature of the TMI-2 accident as it unfolded, to comunicate the necessary informatica to one another, the public, and the President in an honest, accurate, and timely manner, ,

and to decide in a timely manner what course to take to protect the health and safety of the public. ECNP' contends that timely evacuation of large populations to areas which would not be threatened by changing weather conditions is a physical impossibility. Furthermore, ECNP believes that any reprssentation by th6se parties that evacuation in the event of a Class.9. accident -- as THI-2 was -- is a possible or practical preventative measure lies somewhere among self-delusion, falseMod, and willful deception.

In addition, we note that the only way to a:sure 2e safety.of the residents of the area around TMI from future 'tecidents at either reactor is to remove permanently the THI nuclear i ctlities tnemselves. It is these facilities, in conjunction wi.th the slipshod management, operation, and regulation of them, which pose the threat to this area and its residents.

8. ECNP contends that any representation by any Met. Ed. official averring that emergency preparedness or emergency procedures have been adequately augmented since the TMI-2 accident must be viewed with extreme skepticism.

Similar assurances of the adequacy of emergency preparedness and emergency procedures were testified to under oath at the TMI-2 Operating License 1312 273

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8. (cont'd.) hearings in 1977 and were found to be wholly with-out m&it in March and April,1979, when the accident tooE11 ace. Further assurances under cath at this time in this WI-l proceeding that problems have been solved must be viewed in conjunction with past assurances also made under oath that problems could not exist. In addition, the credibility of the officials of Met Ed has been destrtyed by tne public statements of these officials throughout the course of the TMI-2 accident which is still in progress. Therefore, the testimony under oath of the Suspended Licensee in this proceeding cannot be accepted as credible by the Licensing Board in reaching its decision concerning the possibility of reopening TMI-1 or the permanent revocation of the Operating License for TMI-1. . ...-

9. ECNP contends that TMI-l cannot be operated with . reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public can be adequately protected because of the possibility of further radiological contamination of the THI plant site durirg the clean-up and decomissioning of the damaged THI-2 reactor. The very presence of the damaged reactor and the experimental nature of all decontamination and repair operations at the damaged 1MI-2 preclude reasonable assurance of safe operation of TMI-1. Unforeseen problems, difficulties, and accidents at TMI-2 at unpredictable times in the future may require emergency use of the TMI-l facility to prevent release of radioactive traterials into the offsite environment. The present uncertainty concerning the safe operability of the experimental Epicor II deconta:nination system, plus the pending overflow of intermediate and high-level radioactive waste water, and the potential for increased leakage of reactor coolant or other contaminated water in quantities requiring utilization of THI-l for storage purposes exemplify the issue raised in this contention.

10. ECNP contends that THI-l is presently as vulnerable to the crash of a larger-than-design-basis aircraft as was TMI-2 prior to the accident.

In the TMI-2 eYidentiary proceeding the potential crash of a larger-than-design-basis aircraft into TMI-2 was conceded by all parties to lead to offsite consequences greater than those allowed under 10 CFR 100. Even though TMI-2 is disabled and inoperable at the present time, the Unit and THI-l tray be even more susceptible to any aircraft crash now than was the case before the accident. This increased susceptibility is due to the successive loss of protective barriers between the fission and activation products and the outside environment as a result of the TMI-2 accident.

We note too that a system called Epicor II has been designed and built in order to decontaminate the approximately one million gallons of highly contaminated water at TMI-2. We are unable to detennine whether or not this system is protected against any aircraft crash, because ECNP, although represented by the same Intervenors as in the TMI-2 proceeding, has not yet been served any information whatsoever concerning Epicor II, despite the relevance of such infonnation to the still unresolved aircraft crash issues in the ongoing TMI-2 Operating License proceeding.

11 . ECNP contands that concrete of the TMI-1 containment building is of uncertain quality and has not been appropriately tested to ascertain the 1312 274

capability of the TMI-1 containment to withstand either externally or internally propagated events (e.g., aircraft crash, hydrogen explosion, or static design basis pressure). Construction irregularities contribute to the uncertainty that the THI-1 contairraent is capable of withstanding a Class 9 accident sequence equal to or greater than the Class 9 accident that occurred at the .

adjacent TMI-2 reactor. For these reasons, the TTiI-1 reactor should not be pensitted to operate. .

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i2. In consequence of the denonscrated deficiencies of design, cow struction, management, operation, maintenance, monitoring, energency resionse, evacuation capabili>y, licensing, inspection, and other regulation by al'1 parties associated with the Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 ECNP contends that the licenses to operate either nuclear reactor should be permanently revoked, in order to protect the health, safety, psychological, economic, and political well-being of the people of Central Pennsylvania.

The Suspended Licensee, Met Ed, has demonstrated conclusively that it has no concern for the safety or the health or the very lives of members of the public. ,

ECNP reserves the right to alter, amend, or add to this list of draft contentions as well as the contentions raised in the June 29 and March 29, 1979, petitions when the final contentions are submitt'ed on October 22, 1979.

Respectfully submitted, usei A Chauncey KepoV4"/'

and

/.i/2d /kie0 Jddith Johnsrud Representatives of the ECNP Petitioners of October,1979 1 M 2175

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n O CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ss s , .: h I certify that copies of ADDITIONAL DRAFT CONTENTIONS OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL COALITION ON NUCLEAR POWER have bepenerved on the folloding by deposit in the US Mail, postage paid, this g day of October,1979 u/M R

. . . . . aVni:ey KepKd f_.,'

Co m el for NRC S f H norable Mark Cohen

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office of the Executive Legal Director 512 E-3 Main Capital Buf Tding Barrisburg, Pennsylv=2,4m - 17120 U.S. Eclear Regulatory C**sion Washington, D.C. 20555 -

Robert Q. Pollard Esl. -

• Chesapeake Energy Alliance George 7. Trowbridge, Esq. 609 Montpelier Street Shav Pittnan, Potts & Trowbridge

• re, Madand U2 1800 M Street, N.W. - ' , ,

Washington, D.C. 20006

- Walter' W. Cohen, Cons-smer* Advocata

. T.arin U. Carter, Esq.

Assistzsc J.ctorney General, Department of Justice r 4 Deparrnent of Environnental Resources Strawberry Square,14M Floor 709 Health and Welfare Building Harrisburg, Pa. 1712"7 '

Earrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 d

- Ms. Jane Lee R.7. 3, Box 3521 Ellyn veiss, Esq.

Sheldon, Har .on, Reis=an and Etters, Pennsylvania 17319 reiss .

Robert L. Knupp. Esq.

102515ch Screets J.W. ..

hshington, D.C. 20005 Assistant Solicitor

~ Knupp and Andrevs P.O. Box ? -

Harrisburg, Pennsylv:mia 17108 President's Co---4 ssion on the '

Accident at Three Mile Island

• Mrs. Barbara J. HeivLy

- 2200 M Street, N.W.

15 Redwood Building Eashington, D.C. 20037 -

. Middleto.n, Pennsylv= min 17057

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Mr. Thenas Gerusky

- Bureau of Radiation Protection' Dr. Walter E. Jordan . ,

Department of Invironnental Resources 881 West Outer Drive -

Oak Ridge,'renne.ssee 37830

. P.O. Box 2063 -

Earrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 Dr. Linda W. Little 5000 Her=itage Drive Ivan W. S=ith, Isq. , Chair =an a 27612 Ato_-ic Safety and Licensing Board Raleigh, { orth Car I

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ce '=sion Mr. John E. Minnich

$ Washington, D.C. 20555 . Dauphin County Board of Comissioners Ms. Frieda Berryhill - - -

f- , Ccalition for Nuclear Power Plant Dauphin County Courthouse

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.; Postpone:ent Front and Market Streets 2610 Grendon Drive - Harrisburg; Pennsylvania-17iO1---

'$2 Wilmington, DE 19808 i

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• 1312 -

J rdan D. Cunningham, Esq.

DN Hs. Holly S. Keck - Fox, Farr and Cunningham

.(.I Legislation Chair =an - 2320 North Second Street

.g: NY 9. em ania M f 2t.5 West Philadciphia Street i Tork. Pe=ns71vania 17404 - - - . - ~ .. .- ._- _ _ .