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| | author name = Matharu G | | | author name = Matharu G |
| | author affiliation = NRC/NRR | | | author affiliation = NRC/NRR |
| | addressee name = Sahay P P | | | addressee name = Sahay P |
| | addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR | | | addressee affiliation = NRC/NRR |
| | docket = 05000482 | | | docket = 05000482 |
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| | document type = E-Mail | | | document type = E-Mail |
| | page count = 3 | | | page count = 3 |
| | project = TAC:ME8004, TAC:ME8004 | | | project = TAC:ME8004 |
| | stage = Other | | | stage = Other |
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| =Text= | | =Text= |
| {{#Wiki_filter:ICIAndersen, JamesFrom:Sent:To:Cc:Subject:Matharu, GurcharanWednesday, October 24, 2012 9:03 AMSahay, PremRobles, Jesse; Andersen, James; Mathew, RoyRE: Wolf Creek IFR 2012-04 -TAC ME8004Outside of ScopeSinghFrom: Matharu, GurcharanSent: Wednesday, October 24, 2012 8:50 AMTo: Sahay, PremCc: Robles, Jesse; Andersen, James; Mathew, RoySubject: FW: Wolf Creek IFR 2012-04 -TAC ME8004Prem,In the Wolf Creek event, root cause for LOOP was the transformer wiring and inadequate attention to detailduring the modification process.I44 Outside of ScopeSingh .eFrom: Robles, JesseSent: Friday, October 19, 2012 1:53 PMTo: Matharu, GurcharanSubject: FW: Wolf Creek IFR 2012-04 -TAC ME8004I also forgot to mention that the transformer issue resulted in a Yellow Finding:Apparent ViolationInitiating Events 01/13/2012 WC Yellow *SC WE N *HP: Y *PJR: NDocket/Status: 05000482 (0)Open: ML12227A919(PIM) Failure to provide adequate oversight of contractors during maintenance on the Startup TransformerThe team reviewed a self-revealing apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.l.a and Regulatory Guide1.33 for the failure to follow procedures. Specifically, the electrical penetration seal and wiring assemblyassociated with the HI /CT4 and H2/CT5 current transformers installed in the startup transformer (XMRO 1)were replaced without insulating two of the splices, as required by Work Order 11-240360-006, Revision 3.This affected safety-related equipment on January 13, 2012, when the startup transformer experienced aspurious trip and lockout during a plant trip because the two uninsulated wires touched and provided a falsehigh phase differential signal to the protective relaying circuit. The protective lockout caused a prolonged lossof offsite power to Train B equipment. The licensee's root cause analysis concluded that the StartupTransformer failure on January 13, 2012, was caused by the failure to provide adequate oversight of contractors.As a result, the licensee failed to identify that electrical maintenance contractors had failed to install insulatingsleeves on wires that affected the differential current protection circuit. This issue was entered into thecorrective action program as Condition Report 47653. The licensee's corrective actions included reworking thecurrent transformer junction block to correct the missing insulation sleeves and updating station procedures torequire oversight of contractors performing work on risk significant components. This finding was more thanminor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected thecornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge criticalsafety functions. This deficiency resulted in the failure of the fast bus transfer and the failure to maintain offsitepower to safety-related loads during a reactor/turbine trip. The team performed the significance determinationusing NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, "Phase 1 -Initial Screening andCharacterization of Findings," dated January 10, 2008, because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstonewhile the plant was at power. The Phase 1 screened to a Phase 3 because the finding contributed to both thelikelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available; it was alsopotentially risk significant due to seismic external initiating event core damage sequences. A Senior Reactor2 I ,kA nalyst performed a Phase 3 analysis using the Wolf Creek SPAR model, Revision 8.20. The performance'deficiency was determined to impact all transient sequences, particularly those involving losses of essential'service water and/or component cooling water that led to a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident.The loss of cooling water prevented successful room cooling for mitigation equipment as well as loss ofcontainment recirculation phase cooling. The analyst used half (98.5 days) of the period since the last successful* load transfer, since the actual time of failure could not be determined from the available information. Credit for* recovery of limited non-vital loads on the startup transformer was given based on licensee troubleshootingresults, however no recovery credit was available for room cooling, since the licensee had no preplannedalternate room cooling measures. The evaluation of external events showed a small contribution due to fires.* The increase in the core damage probability (ICCDP) was determined to be 2.59E-5. This was a YELLOWsignificance. The evaluation of large early release failures resulted in an ICLERP of 1.62E-7. This was aWHITE significance, which is superseded by the YELLOW significance of the ICCDP. This finding had a*human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with the work control component in that licensee personnelassociated with the oversight of the work did not appropriately coordinate work activities, and address the*impact of changes to the work scope consistent with nuclear safety [H.3(b)] (Section 40A5.2).From: Robles, JesseSent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 1:47 PMTo: Matharu, GurcharanSubject: Wolf Creek IFR 2012-04 -TAC MEB004Attached is the information for IFR 2012-04. You can see some examples of IFR evaluation memos here. Ifyou have any questions, please let me know. Thank you.Jesse E. RoblesU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionReactor Systems EngineerNRR/DIRS/IOEB301-415-2940301-415-3061 (fax)Jesse. Robles.56irc.gyo3 | | {{#Wiki_filter:ICI Andersen, James From: Matharu, Gurcharan Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2012 9:03 AM To: Sahay, Prem Cc: Robles, Jesse; Andersen, James; Mathew, Roy |
| }} | | |
| | ==Subject:== |
| | RE: Wolf Creek IFR 2012 TAC ME8004 Outside of Scope Singh From: Matharu, Gurcharan Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2012 8:50 AM To: Sahay, Prem Cc: Robles, Jesse; Andersen, James; Mathew, Roy |
| | |
| | ==Subject:== |
| | FW: Wolf Creek IFR 2012 TAC ME8004 Prem, In the Wolf Creek event, root cause for LOOP was the transformer wiring and inadequate attention to detail during the modification process. |
| | I 44 |
| | |
| | Outside of Scope Singh .e From: Robles, Jesse Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 1:53 PM To: Matharu, Gurcharan |
| | |
| | ==Subject:== |
| | FW: Wolf Creek IFR 2012 TAC ME8004 I also forgot to mention that the transformer issue resulted in a Yellow Finding: |
| | Apparent Violation Initiating Events 01/13/2012 WC Yellow *SC WE N *HP: Y *PJR: N Docket/Status: 05000482 (0) |
| | Open: ML12227A919 (PIM) Failure to provide adequate oversight of contractors during maintenance on the Startup Transformer The team reviewed a self-revealing apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.l.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33 for the failure to follow procedures. Specifically, the electrical penetration seal and wiring assembly associated with the HI /CT4 and H2/CT5 current transformers installed in the startup transformer (XMRO 1) were replaced without insulating two of the splices, as required by Work Order 11-240360-006, Revision 3. |
| | This affected safety-related equipment on January 13, 2012, when the startup transformer experienced a spurious trip and lockout during a plant trip because the two uninsulated wires touched and provided a false high phase differential signal to the protective relaying circuit. The protective lockout caused a prolonged loss of offsite power to Train B equipment. The licensee's root cause analysis concluded that the Startup Transformer failure on January 13, 2012, was caused by the failure to provide adequate oversight of contractors. |
| | As a result, the licensee failed to identify that electrical maintenance contractors had failed to install insulating sleeves on wires that affected the differential current protection circuit. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 47653. The licensee's corrective actions included reworking the current transformer junction block to correct the missing insulation sleeves and updating station procedures to require oversight of contractors performing work on risk significant components. This finding was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. This deficiency resulted in the failure of the fast bus transfer and the failure to maintain offsite power to safety-related loads during a reactor/turbine trip. The team performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," dated January 10, 2008, because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The Phase 1 screened to a Phase 3 because the finding contributed to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available; it was also potentially risk significant due to seismic external initiating event core damage sequences. A Senior Reactor 2 |
| | |
| | I, kA nalyst performed a Phase 3 analysis using the Wolf Creek SPAR model, Revision 8.20. The performance |
| | 'deficiency was determined to impact all transient sequences, particularly those involving losses of essential |
| | 'service water and/or component cooling water that led to a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident. |
| | The loss of cooling water prevented successful room cooling for mitigation equipment as well as loss of containment recirculation phase cooling. The analyst used half (98.5 days) of the period since the last successful |
| | *load transfer, since the actual time of failure could not be determined from the available information. Credit for |
| | *recovery of limited non-vital loads on the startup transformer was given based on licensee troubleshooting results, however no recovery credit was available for room cooling, since the licensee had no preplanned alternate room cooling measures. The evaluation of external events showed a small contribution due to fires. |
| | *The increase in the core damage probability (ICCDP) was determined to be 2.59E-5. This was a YELLOW significance. The evaluation of large early release failures resulted in an ICLERP of 1.62E-7. This was a WHITE significance, which is superseded by the YELLOW significance of the ICCDP. This finding had a |
| | *human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with the work control component in that licensee personnel associated with the oversight of the work did not appropriately coordinate work activities, and address the |
| | *impact of changes to the work scope consistent with nuclear safety [H.3(b)] (Section 40A5.2). |
| | From: Robles, Jesse Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 1:47 PM To: Matharu, Gurcharan |
| | |
| | ==Subject:== |
| | Wolf Creek IFR 2012 TAC MEB004 Attached is the information for IFR 2012-04. You can see some examples of IFR evaluation memos here. If you have any questions, please let me know. Thank you. |
| | Jesse E. Robles U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reactor Systems Engineer NRR/DIRS/IOEB 301-415-2940 301-415-3061 (fax) |
| | Jesse.Robles.56irc.gyo 3}} |
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MONTHYEARML13246A3702012-02-22022 February 2012 Email from K. Gray, NRR to J. Robles, NRR FW: Matharu, Gurcharan Has Completed the Green from for TAC ME8004 Project stage: Other ML13246A3732012-10-23023 October 2012 Email from J. Andersen, NRR to P. Sahay, NRR FW: Wolf Creek Ifr 2012-04 - TAC ME8004 Project stage: Other ML13246A3812012-10-24024 October 2012 Email from G. Matharu, NRR to P. Sahay, NRR FW: Wolf Creek Ifr 2012-04 - TAC ME8004 Project stage: Other ML13109A2342013-07-12012 July 2013 Safety Evaluation Regarding Wolf Creek Generating Station - Loss of Offsite Power and Augmented Inspection, Issue for Resolution 2012-004 Project stage: Approval 2012-10-24
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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML23360A1562023-12-26026 December 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Wolf Creek Request to Revise the Ventilation Filter Testing Program in Technical Specifications ML23166A0622023-06-15015 June 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Third Containment Inservice Inspection Program Interval for Proposed Alternative Frequency to Containment Unbonded post-tensioning System Components ML23090A1042023-03-31031 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Wolf Creek Request for Removal of the Power Range Neutron Flux Rate - High Negative Rate Trip Function from Technical Specifications ML23090A0072023-03-31031 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Wolf Creek Request for Relief for Follow-Up Examination Requirements for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles with Peened Surface ML23080A0652023-03-21021 March 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Wolf Creek Generating Station Evacuation Time Estimate Analysis Review ML23026A0222023-01-25025 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Wolf Creek Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-554-A, Revision 1, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements ML23009A4082023-01-0909 January 2023 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review Wolf Creek Request to Revise TS to Adopt Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-577-A, Revision 1, Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML22361A0052022-12-27027 December 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information Wolf Creek Request for Deviation from Fire Protection Program Requirements ML22321A2662022-11-16016 November 2022 January 2023 Emergency Preparedness Program Inspection - Request for Information ML22307A1372022-11-0202 November 2022 August 2022 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection Unresolved Item - Request for Information ML22251A1312022-09-0808 September 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Request for Deviation from Fire Protection Program Requirements to Allow Use of Portable Lighting ML22215A2742022-08-0202 August 2022 Inservice Inspection Request for Information ML22208A1322022-07-27027 July 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Wolf Creek Table of Contents LAR ML22166A3222022-06-14014 June 2022 August 2022 Emergency Preparedness Exercise Inspection - Request for Information ML22131A0522022-05-11011 May 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance - Wolf Creek Inservice Inspection Relief Request for Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Penetration Nozzles with Peened Surface ML22055A1142022-02-23023 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Wolf Creek Request to Revise Diesel Generator Completion Time ML22045A4512022-02-14014 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Wolf Creek Steam Generator Inspection Report 24th Refueling ML22026A4392022-01-26026 January 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Wolf Creek Acceptance Review Results - Removal of TS Table of Contents (L-2022-LLA-0008) ML22025A3612022-01-21021 January 2022 PI&R RFI Final ML21327A2602021-11-23023 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Wolf Creek Revision of Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation ML21309A0332021-11-0505 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Revision of Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating ML21307A4202021-11-0303 November 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Revision of Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation ML21271A1952021-09-28028 September 2021 E-mail 9-28-21 RFI for Wc EP Inspection Nov 2021 ML21259A0652021-09-16016 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Draft Supplemental Information Needed for Acceptance - Wolf Creek License Amendment and Exemption Requests Regarding GSI-191 (EPIDs L-2021-LLA-0152 and L-2021-LLE-0039) ML21221A1282021-08-0505 August 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Urgent: Draft Request for Additional Information - Wolf Creek one-time Request for Exemption from the Biennial Emergency Preparedness Exercise ML21189A0252021-07-0101 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Request Revision to the Emergency Plan Related to on-shift Staffing ML21230A3922021-05-19019 May 2021 May 19, 2021 Dricks Response to Gurdziel Letter Dated May 13, 2021 - August 17, 2021 ML21102A3342021-04-12012 April 2021 Email 4-12-21 RFI for In-Office Rvw of Recent RERP and a Related EPIP Change ML21064A0342021-03-0404 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Wolf Creek Generating Station Upcoming Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspection ML20353A2712020-12-18018 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.6.3 and Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.1 to Allow Use of a Blind Flange ML20349A3092020-12-14014 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek License Amendment Request for Change to Owner Licensee Names ML20297A3022020-10-22022 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI ML20262A7512020-09-17017 September 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Requests for Additional Information: Wolf Creek Amendment Request to Modify Technical Specification Surveillance Frequency Consistent with TSTF-425 ML20191A0222020-07-0606 July 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Request in Support of Replacement Engineered Safety Features Transformers with Load Tap Changers ML20162A1642020-06-0909 June 2020 Email June 9, 2020 - RFI in Preparation for Wolf Creek EP Program Inspection ML20149K4272020-05-22022 May 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek License Amendment Request Risk-Informed Justification for the Relocation of Specific Surveillance Frequency Requirements to a Licensee Controlled Program (TSTF-425) ML20133J8972020-05-12012 May 2020 12 May 2020 E-mail - RFI for NRC In-Office Inspection of Recent Wcngs Eplan_Eal Changes ML20132A3442020-05-11011 May 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek Generating Station License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 5.5.16 for Permanent Extension of Type a and Type C Leak Rate Test Frequencies ML20009E4802020-01-0909 January 2020 Relief Request to Utilize Code Case N-666-1 for Wolf Creek Generating Station - Request for Additional Information ML19273A0232019-09-30030 September 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System, ML19268B7172019-09-25025 September 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program Relief Request to Use Code Case N-666-1 ML19261A2272019-09-18018 September 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Regulatory Audit Plan - Wolf Creek Generating Station License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5 ML19255H3032019-09-12012 September 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Relief Request I4R-07 to Utilize Code Case N-513-4 ML19224A5242019-08-12012 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - License Amendment Request to Revise Wolf Creek Generating Station Technical Specification 3.3.5 ML19274D2752019-07-31031 July 2019 Request for Information-IR 05000482 2019-004, Dated 7/31/2019 ML19203A2362019-07-19019 July 2019 LTR-19-0291 Tom Gurdziel, E-mail July 18, 2019, Confirmatory Order on Wolf Creek ML19112A1772019-04-22022 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.3.5, Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation ML19091A0362019-03-29029 March 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification 3.6.3 and Surveillance Requirement 3.6.3.1 to Remove Use of a Blind Flange ML19065A0982019-03-0606 March 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Wolf Creek License Amendment Request for Revision to Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-529 ML19036A6832019-02-0505 February 2019 LTR-18-0498 - Email Response - Sheryl Sweet, Licensing Engineer, Wolf Creek Nuclear, E-mail Acronyms for NRC Personnel 2023-06-15
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Text
ICI Andersen, James From: Matharu, Gurcharan Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2012 9:03 AM To: Sahay, Prem Cc: Robles, Jesse; Andersen, James; Mathew, Roy
Subject:
RE: Wolf Creek IFR 2012 TAC ME8004 Outside of Scope Singh From: Matharu, Gurcharan Sent: Wednesday, October 24, 2012 8:50 AM To: Sahay, Prem Cc: Robles, Jesse; Andersen, James; Mathew, Roy
Subject:
FW: Wolf Creek IFR 2012 TAC ME8004 Prem, In the Wolf Creek event, root cause for LOOP was the transformer wiring and inadequate attention to detail during the modification process.
I 44
Outside of Scope Singh .e From: Robles, Jesse Sent: Friday, October 19, 2012 1:53 PM To: Matharu, Gurcharan
Subject:
FW: Wolf Creek IFR 2012 TAC ME8004 I also forgot to mention that the transformer issue resulted in a Yellow Finding:
Apparent Violation Initiating Events 01/13/2012 WC Yellow *SC WE N *HP: Y *PJR: N Docket/Status: 05000482 (0)
Open: ML12227A919 (PIM) Failure to provide adequate oversight of contractors during maintenance on the Startup Transformer The team reviewed a self-revealing apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.4.l.a and Regulatory Guide 1.33 for the failure to follow procedures. Specifically, the electrical penetration seal and wiring assembly associated with the HI /CT4 and H2/CT5 current transformers installed in the startup transformer (XMRO 1) were replaced without insulating two of the splices, as required by Work Order 11-240360-006, Revision 3.
This affected safety-related equipment on January 13, 2012, when the startup transformer experienced a spurious trip and lockout during a plant trip because the two uninsulated wires touched and provided a false high phase differential signal to the protective relaying circuit. The protective lockout caused a prolonged loss of offsite power to Train B equipment. The licensee's root cause analysis concluded that the Startup Transformer failure on January 13, 2012, was caused by the failure to provide adequate oversight of contractors.
As a result, the licensee failed to identify that electrical maintenance contractors had failed to install insulating sleeves on wires that affected the differential current protection circuit. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 47653. The licensee's corrective actions included reworking the current transformer junction block to correct the missing insulation sleeves and updating station procedures to require oversight of contractors performing work on risk significant components. This finding was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. This deficiency resulted in the failure of the fast bus transfer and the failure to maintain offsite power to safety-related loads during a reactor/turbine trip. The team performed the significance determination using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 0609.04, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," dated January 10, 2008, because it affected the Initiating Events Cornerstone while the plant was at power. The Phase 1 screened to a Phase 3 because the finding contributed to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available; it was also potentially risk significant due to seismic external initiating event core damage sequences. A Senior Reactor 2
I, kA nalyst performed a Phase 3 analysis using the Wolf Creek SPAR model, Revision 8.20. The performance
'deficiency was determined to impact all transient sequences, particularly those involving losses of essential
'service water and/or component cooling water that led to a reactor coolant pump seal loss of coolant accident.
The loss of cooling water prevented successful room cooling for mitigation equipment as well as loss of containment recirculation phase cooling. The analyst used half (98.5 days) of the period since the last successful
- load transfer, since the actual time of failure could not be determined from the available information. Credit for
- recovery of limited non-vital loads on the startup transformer was given based on licensee troubleshooting results, however no recovery credit was available for room cooling, since the licensee had no preplanned alternate room cooling measures. The evaluation of external events showed a small contribution due to fires.
- The increase in the core damage probability (ICCDP) was determined to be 2.59E-5. This was a YELLOW significance. The evaluation of large early release failures resulted in an ICLERP of 1.62E-7. This was a WHITE significance, which is superseded by the YELLOW significance of the ICCDP. This finding had a
- human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with the work control component in that licensee personnel associated with the oversight of the work did not appropriately coordinate work activities, and address the
- impact of changes to the work scope consistent with nuclear safety H.3(b) (Section 40A5.2).
From: Robles, Jesse Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2012 1:47 PM To: Matharu, Gurcharan
Subject:
Wolf Creek IFR 2012 TAC MEB004 Attached is the information for IFR 2012-04. You can see some examples of IFR evaluation memos here. If you have any questions, please let me know. Thank you.
Jesse E. Robles U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Reactor Systems Engineer NRR/DIRS/IOEB 301-415-2940 301-415-3061 (fax)
Jesse.Robles.56irc.gyo 3