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| issue date = 05/18/2017
| issue date = 05/18/2017
| title = 2016 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Initial License Examination Outline ES-D-1
| title = 2016 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Initial License Examination Outline ES-D-1
| author name = Reeser D W
| author name = Reeser D
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
| author affiliation = NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  
Line 16: Line 16:


=Text=
=Text=
{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1   Facility:
{{#Wiki_filter:Appendix D                               Scenario Outline                                       Form ES-D-1 Facility: MONTICELLO                   Scenario No.: 1                         Op-Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners:                                         Operators:
MONTICELLO Scenario No.:
Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with slow scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); HPCI is in PTL due to inadvertent initiation on the previous shift.
1 Op-Test No.:
Turnover: 12 EDG Monthly Surveillance test in progress, ready to unload.
2016-301   Examiners:
Event         Malf. No. Event Type*                                     Event No.                                                                    Description 1                             N (BOP)           EDG 12 Shutdown at completion of Surveillance Test 2                             C (BOP)           Main Seal Oil Pump (MSOP) trip with Emergency Seal Oil Pump (ESOP) Auto Start Failure.
Operators:
3                             TS (SRO)         #10 Transformer Lockout/Loss of 1AR 4                             I (OATC)         CRD Flow Control Valve - Fails Open; One Control Rod will partially insert; Place standby FCV in service.
Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with "slow" scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); HPCI is in PTL due to inadvertent initiation on the previous shift.
 
Turnover: 12 EDG Monthly Surveillance test in progress, ready to unload.
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description 1 N (BOP) EDG 1 2 Shutdown at completion of Surveillance Test 2 C (BOP) Main Seal Oil Pump (MSOP) trip with Emergency Seal Oil Pump (ESOP) Auto Start Failure.
3 TS (SRO) #10 Transformer Lockout/Loss of 1AR 4 I (OATC) CRD Flow Control Valve  
- Fails Open; One Control Rod will partially insert; Place standby FCV in service.
Alarm 5-A-27 (ROD DRIFT)
Alarm 5-A-27 (ROD DRIFT)
Ops Man B.01.03
Ops Man B.01.03-05 Ops Man C.4-B.01.03.C 5                             R (SRO, OATC)     Reduce power by 2-3% with Recirc Flow per Nuclear Engineer Instructions to restore control rod to original position.
-05 Ops Man C.4
6                             C (OATC)         Uncoupled Control Rod (TS 3.1.3; TS 3.1.6)
-B.01.03.C 5 R (SRO, OATC)   Reduce power by 2-3% with Recirc Flow per Nuclear Engineer Instructions to restore control rod to original position
TS (SRO)                                     ARP 5-A-11 (ROD OVERTRAVEL)
. 6 C (OATC) TS (SRO) Uncoupled Control Rod (TS 3.1.3; TS 3.1.6
Ops Man B.01.03-05 Ops Man B.05.05-05 7                             M (CREW)         Loss of 345KV
) ARP 5-A-11 (ROD OVERTRAVEL)
* Lockout of 345KV (Loss of 2R)
Ops Man B.01.03
* Loss of RR Pumps and Circ Water Pumps requiring SCRAM C (SRO, OATC)     RPS Failure; ARI Inserts control rods [CT1]
-05 Ops Man B.05.05
8                             M (BOP)           HPCI Steam Line Break in Reactor Building (Auto Isolation Failure; Approximately 5 minutes post SCRAM) [CT2]
-05 7 M (CREW) Loss of 345KV Lockout of 345KV (Loss of 2R)
9                             M (CREW)         Loss of 115KV with EDG 12 Auto Start Failure (approximately 10 minutes post SCRAM)
Loss of RR Pumps and Circ Water Pumps requiring SCRAM C (SRO, OATC)
* Lockout of 115KV Bus 1 (Loss of 1R)
RPS Failure; ARI Inserts control rods
* Loss of Feedwater C (BOP)           12 EDG Auto Start Failure
[CT1] 8 M (BOP) HPCI Steam Line Break in Reactor Building (Auto Isolation Failure; Approximately 5 minutes post SCRAM)
[CT3]
[CT2] 9 M (CREW) Loss of 115KV with EDG 12 Auto Start Failure (approximately 10 minutes post SCRAM)
C (BOP)           11 ESW Pump Auto Start Failure
Lockout of 115KV Bus 1 (Loss of 1R)
      *       (N)ormal,   (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,       (M)ajor
Loss of Feedwater C (BOP) 12 EDG Auto Start Failure
[CT 3] C (BOP) 11 ESW Pump Auto Start Failure
    * (N)ormal, (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor


Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1   Facility:
Appendix D                                 Scenario Outline                                   Form ES-D-1 Facility: MONTICELLO                     Scenario No.: 2                       Op-Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners:                                         Operators:
MONTICELLO Scenario No.:
Initial Conditions: Plant Start-up in progress (38% power) following a forced outage. There are 4 control rods with slow scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31)
2 Op-Test No.:
Turnover: Continue the start-up, raise power to 40% using control rod withdrawal stating at step 30 of ASR5. At 40%, place 12 Condensate Pump in service. Once 12 Condensate Pump is in service, raise power to 45% using recirculation pumps.
2016-301   Examiners:
Event         Malf. No.     Event Type*                                   Event No.                                                                  Description 1                             R (OATC)           Raise Power with Control Rods I (OATC)           Stuck control rod; raise drive pressure.
Operators:
2                             N (BOP)           Place second Condensate pump in service.
Initial Conditions: Plant Start
3                             R (OATC)           Raise power from 40% to 45% with Recirc Flow C (OATC)           12 Recirc Pump speed control failure TS (SRO) 4                             C (BOP)           Loss of MCC-131 TS (SRO) 5                             C (BOP)           SRV D seat leakage ARP 3-A-9 (AUTO BLOWDOWN RELIEF VLV LEAKING)
-up in progress (38% power) following a forced outage. There are 4 control rods with "slow" scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50
C.4-B.03.03.B (RELIEF VALVE LEAKING) 6                             C (BOP)           SRV D fails open ARP 5-A-46 (SRV OPEN)
-31)
C.4-B.03.03.A (STUCK OPEN RELIEF VALVE)
Turnover: Continue the start
M (CREW)           Efforts to close SRV D will be unsuccessful requiring a Manual Reactor SCRAM
-up, raise power to 40% using control rod withdrawal stating at step 30 of ASR5. At 40%, place 12 Condensate Pump in service. Once 12 Condensate Pump is in service, raise power to 45% using recirculation pumps
[CT1 - Manual Reactor SCRAM prior to Torus Temp of 110°F]
. Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*
7                             M (CREW)           Main Steam Line break inside Containment C (BOP)           LPCI Initiation Bypass fails for 1st Division of Drywell Spray/Alignment to 2nd Division will be successful.
Event Description 1 R (OATC) Raise Power with Control Rods I (OATC) Stuck control rod; raise drive pressure. 2 N (BOP) Place second Condensate pump in service.
[CT2 - Emergency Depressurization (DW Temp/Pressure)]
3 R (OATC) Raise power from 40% to 45% with Recirc Flow C (OATC) TS (SRO) 12 Recirc Pump speed control failure 4 C (BOP) TS (SRO) Loss of MCC
      *       (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument, (C)omponent,     (M)ajor
-131 5 C (BOP) SRV 'D' seat leakage ARP 3-A-9 (AUTO BLOWDOWN RELIEF VLV LEAKING) C.4-B.03.03.B (RELIEF VALVE LEAKING) 6 C (BOP) SRV 'D' fails open ARP 5-A-46 (SRV OPEN)
C.4-B.03.03.A (STUCK OPEN RELIEF VALVE
M (CREW) Efforts to close SRV 'D' will be unsuccessful requiring a Manual Reactor SCRAM [CT1 - Manual Reactor SCRAM prior to Torus Temp of 110F] 7 M (CREW) Main Steam Line break inside Containment C (BOP) LPCI Initiation Bypass fails for 1 st Division of Drywell Spray/Alignment to 2 nd Division will be successful
. [CT2 - Emergency Depressurization (DW Temp/Pressure)]
* (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor


Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1   Facility:
Appendix D                               Scenario Outline                                   Form ES-D-1 Facility: MONTICELLO                   Scenario No.: 3                         Op-Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners:                                         Operators:
MONTICELLO Scenario No.:
Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with slow scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); 1AR Transformer OOS.
3 Op-Test No.:
Turnover: OATC to perform Part A and B of 0010 (RX SCRAM Functional)
2016-301   Examiners:
Event         Malf. No. Event Type*                                   Event No.                                                                  Description 1           03-S37-01       N (OATC)         Perform 0010 (Reactor SCRAM Functional) -- Manual 03-S37-02                          SCRAM Only 2           RW01 & C-       I (OATC)         RWM Self-Test Failure 05-A03          TS (SRO) 3           HP01             C (BOP)           HPCI Inadvertent Initiation/Reactor Power > 100%
Operators:
TS (SRO) 4           MC03 &           C (BOP)           SJAE Failure resulting in degrading vacuum and power MC04B            R (OATC)          reduction.
Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with "slow" scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); 1AR Transformer OOS
5           ED12             M (Crew)         Feedwater Line Break inside the Drywell (trip of both FW Pumps and Reactor SCRAM) 6           RC01             C (OATC)         RCIC Auto Initiation Failure 7                             C (Crew)         RCIC injection is in-effective; Restore HPCI [CT - RCIC injection is in-effective due since RCIC is aligned to the same line as where the feed line break is located. Failure to restore HPCI will cause RPV level to drop below TAF.]
.
CONTIGENCY - If crew fails to restore HPCI and RPV drops to TAF, then BEFORE RPV level drops to -149 Emergency Depressurize (Blowdown) and restore RPV level above TAF using Low Pressure ECCS.
Turnover: OATC to perform Part A and B of 0010 (RX SCRAM Functional)
      *       (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,       (M)ajor
Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*
Event Description 1 03-S37-01 03-S37-02 N (OATC) Perform 0010 (Reactor SCRAM Functional) -- Manual SCRAM Only 2 RW01 & C-05-A03 I (OATC) TS (SRO) RWM Self-Test Failure 3 HP01 C (BOP) TS (SRO) HPCI Inadvertent Initiation/Reactor Power > 100%
4 MC03 & MC04B C (BOP) R (OATC) SJAE Failure resulting in degrading vacuum and power reduction.
5 ED12 M (Crew) Feedwater Line Break inside the Drywell (trip of both FW Pumps and Reactor SCRAM
) 6 RC01 C (OATC) RCIC Auto Initiation Failure 7 C (Crew) RCIC injection is in
-effective; Restore HPCI [CT - RCIC injection is in
-effective due since RCIC is aligned to the same line as where the feed line break is located. Failure to restore HPCI will cause RPV level to drop below TAF.]
CONTIGENCY  
- If crew fails to restore HPCI and RPV drops to TAF, then BEFORE RPV level drops to  
-149" Emergency Depressurize (Blowdown) and restore RPV level above TAF using Low Pressure ECCS.
        * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,   (M)ajor


Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1   Facility:
Appendix D                               Scenario Outline                               Form ES-D-1 Facility: MONTICELLO                   Scenario No.: 4 (SPARE)             Op-Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners:                                       Operators:
MONTICELLO Scenario No.:
Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with slow scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); HPCI OOS.
4 (SPARE) Op-Test No.:
Turnover: Restore HPCI to service.
2016-301   Examiners:
Event         Malf. No. Event Type*                                 Event No.                                                                Description 1                             N (SRO, BOP)     Return HPCI to Standby 2           C-05-B20         I (OATC)         Condenser Vacuum Switch Failure with failure of 1/2 TS (SRO)          SCRAM to actuate (TS LCO 3.3.1.1) 3           AP07             C (BOP)           ADS Timer Failure (TS LCO 3.3.5.1 & 3.5.1)
Operators:
TS (SRO) 4           04-A2S70-04     C (BOP)           EPR Fails High with MPR Locked necessitating a power TS (SRO)          reduction.
Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with "slow" scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); HPCI OOS.
R (OATC) 5           NI14C           I/C (OATC)       APRM Upscale TS (SRO) 6           04-A2S59-02     M                 MPR lowers pressure, requiring SCRAM 7           CH22A/B         M                 Torus water leak requiring Emergency Depressurization 8           AP08D           C (BOP)           Failure of one ADS Valve to Open.
Turnover: Restore HPCI to service
      *       (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent,    (M)ajor}}
. Event No. Malf. No. Event Type*
Event Description 1 N (SRO, BOP) Return HPCI to Standby 2 C-05-B20 I (OATC) TS (SRO) Condenser Vacuum Switch Failure with failure of 1/2 SCRAM to actuate (TS LCO 3.3.1.1) 3 AP07 C (BOP) TS (SRO) ADS Timer Failure (TS LCO 3.3.5.1 & 3.5.1) 4 04-A2S70-04 C (BOP) TS (SRO) R (OATC) EPR Fails High with MPR Locked necessitating a power reduction.
5 NI14C I/C (OATC)
TS (SRO) APRM Upscale 6 04-A2S59-02 M MPR lowers pressure, requiring SCRAM 7 CH22A/B M Torus water leak requiring Emergency Depressurization 8 AP08D C (BOP) Failure of one ADS Valve to Open.
            * (N)ormal,    (R)eactivity,   (I)nstrument,   (C)omponent,    (M)ajor}}

Latest revision as of 03:55, 30 October 2019

2016 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Initial License Examination Outline ES-D-1
ML17142A448
Person / Time
Site: Monticello Xcel Energy icon.png
Issue date: 05/18/2017
From: David Reeser
NRC/RGN-III/DRS/OLB
To:
Nuclear Management Co
Shared Package
ML15274A421 List:
References
Download: ML17142A448 (4)


Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: MONTICELLO Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with slow scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); HPCI is in PTL due to inadvertent initiation on the previous shift.

Turnover: 12 EDG Monthly Surveillance test in progress, ready to unload.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 N (BOP) EDG 12 Shutdown at completion of Surveillance Test 2 C (BOP) Main Seal Oil Pump (MSOP) trip with Emergency Seal Oil Pump (ESOP) Auto Start Failure.

3 TS (SRO) #10 Transformer Lockout/Loss of 1AR 4 I (OATC) CRD Flow Control Valve - Fails Open; One Control Rod will partially insert; Place standby FCV in service.

Alarm 5-A-27 (ROD DRIFT)

Ops Man B.01.03-05 Ops Man C.4-B.01.03.C 5 R (SRO, OATC) Reduce power by 2-3% with Recirc Flow per Nuclear Engineer Instructions to restore control rod to original position.

6 C (OATC) Uncoupled Control Rod (TS 3.1.3; TS 3.1.6)

TS (SRO) ARP 5-A-11 (ROD OVERTRAVEL)

Ops Man B.01.03-05 Ops Man B.05.05-05 7 M (CREW) Loss of 345KV

  • Lockout of 345KV (Loss of 2R)

8 M (BOP) HPCI Steam Line Break in Reactor Building (Auto Isolation Failure; Approximately 5 minutes post SCRAM) [CT2]

9 M (CREW) Loss of 115KV with EDG 12 Auto Start Failure (approximately 10 minutes post SCRAM)

  • Lockout of 115KV Bus 1 (Loss of 1R)

[CT3]

C (BOP) 11 ESW Pump Auto Start Failure

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: MONTICELLO Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: Plant Start-up in progress (38% power) following a forced outage. There are 4 control rods with slow scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31)

Turnover: Continue the start-up, raise power to 40% using control rod withdrawal stating at step 30 of ASR5. At 40%, place 12 Condensate Pump in service. Once 12 Condensate Pump is in service, raise power to 45% using recirculation pumps.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 R (OATC) Raise Power with Control Rods I (OATC) Stuck control rod; raise drive pressure.

2 N (BOP) Place second Condensate pump in service.

3 R (OATC) Raise power from 40% to 45% with Recirc Flow C (OATC) 12 Recirc Pump speed control failure TS (SRO) 4 C (BOP) Loss of MCC-131 TS (SRO) 5 C (BOP) SRV D seat leakage ARP 3-A-9 (AUTO BLOWDOWN RELIEF VLV LEAKING)

C.4-B.03.03.B (RELIEF VALVE LEAKING) 6 C (BOP) SRV D fails open ARP 5-A-46 (SRV OPEN)

C.4-B.03.03.A (STUCK OPEN RELIEF VALVE)

M (CREW) Efforts to close SRV D will be unsuccessful requiring a Manual Reactor SCRAM

[CT1 - Manual Reactor SCRAM prior to Torus Temp of 110°F]

7 M (CREW) Main Steam Line break inside Containment C (BOP) LPCI Initiation Bypass fails for 1st Division of Drywell Spray/Alignment to 2nd Division will be successful.

[CT2 - Emergency Depressurization (DW Temp/Pressure)]

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: MONTICELLO Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with slow scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); 1AR Transformer OOS.

Turnover: OATC to perform Part A and B of 0010 (RX SCRAM Functional)

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 03-S37-01 N (OATC) Perform 0010 (Reactor SCRAM Functional) -- Manual 03-S37-02 SCRAM Only 2 RW01 & C- I (OATC) RWM Self-Test Failure 05-A03 TS (SRO) 3 HP01 C (BOP) HPCI Inadvertent Initiation/Reactor Power > 100%

TS (SRO) 4 MC03 & C (BOP) SJAE Failure resulting in degrading vacuum and power MC04B R (OATC) reduction.

5 ED12 M (Crew) Feedwater Line Break inside the Drywell (trip of both FW Pumps and Reactor SCRAM) 6 RC01 C (OATC) RCIC Auto Initiation Failure 7 C (Crew) RCIC injection is in-effective; Restore HPCI [CT - RCIC injection is in-effective due since RCIC is aligned to the same line as where the feed line break is located. Failure to restore HPCI will cause RPV level to drop below TAF.]

CONTIGENCY - If crew fails to restore HPCI and RPV drops to TAF, then BEFORE RPV level drops to -149 Emergency Depressurize (Blowdown) and restore RPV level above TAF using Low Pressure ECCS.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: MONTICELLO Scenario No.: 4 (SPARE) Op-Test No.: 2016-301 Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% Power; There are 4 control rods with slow scram times (38-47, 42-43, 46-39, and 50-31); HPCI OOS.

Turnover: Restore HPCI to service.

Event Malf. No. Event Type* Event No. Description 1 N (SRO, BOP) Return HPCI to Standby 2 C-05-B20 I (OATC) Condenser Vacuum Switch Failure with failure of 1/2 TS (SRO) SCRAM to actuate (TS LCO 3.3.1.1) 3 AP07 C (BOP) ADS Timer Failure (TS LCO 3.3.5.1 & 3.5.1)

TS (SRO) 4 04-A2S70-04 C (BOP) EPR Fails High with MPR Locked necessitating a power TS (SRO) reduction.

R (OATC) 5 NI14C I/C (OATC) APRM Upscale TS (SRO) 6 04-A2S59-02 M MPR lowers pressure, requiring SCRAM 7 CH22A/B M Torus water leak requiring Emergency Depressurization 8 AP08D C (BOP) Failure of one ADS Valve to Open.

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor