ML17228B181

Proposed Tech Specs Re Time Allowed to Restore Inoperable LPSI Train to Operable Status

ML17228B181
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	06/21/1995
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17228B182	List: ML17228B181 ML17228B183 ML17309A792
References
NUDOCS 9506230234
Download: ML17228B181 (17)

Text

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T > 325'F LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent ECCS subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each sub-system comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE high- ressure safest injection (HPSI) um,Qne-C~cE u sys- em-s i-nc um -an - e-seeon Vp.C 4OOSI:l. ~bsystem-shQ-1 Hict-ude-m-therHRS-I-pum soBAut<SP Sf aei H. L-9f-t b. One OPERABLE low-pressure safety injection pump, and (s/<Vvv)

c. An independent OPERABLE flow. path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.".

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperable subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s+or be in HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. ,$"v'gSaf

b. In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commissi.on pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days describing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date.

"With pressurizer pressure > 1750 psia.

Zf the ECCs subsystem is inoperable only because the LpSI train is inoperable<,

the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit may be extended to a maximum of 7 days from initial" discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-3 Amendment No .

'7506230234 '750621 PDR ADaCK 05000335 p PDR

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RK UIREMENTS (Continued

e. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

l. Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal.

2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Signal;

a. High-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

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3. Veri fying on a Recircul ation Actuation Test Signal, the containment sump isolation valves. open and the recirculation valv 5 o the refueling water tank close . ygQ'Te PEP

f. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the specified total developed head on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

1. High-Pressure Safety Injection pumps: greater than or equal to 2571 ft.

2. Low-Pressure Safety Injection pumps: greater than or equal to 350 ft.

ST. LUG IE - UNIT 1 3/4 5-5 Amendment No. gg, p(f

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St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Proposed License Amendments LPSI S stem AOT Extension ATTACHMENT 4 ST ~ LUCIE UNIT 2 MARKED-UP TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES Page 3/4 5-3 Page 3/4 5-5

EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS 3/4.5.2 ECCS SUBSYSTEMS - T GREATER THAN OR E UAL TO 325 F

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LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.5.2 Two independent Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) subsystems shall be OPERABLE with each subsystem comprised of:

a. One OPERABLE high pressure safety injection pump,

b. One OPERABLE low pressure safety injection pump, and

c. An independent OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the refueling water tank on a Safety Injection Actuation Signal and automatically transferring suction to the containment sump on a Recirculation Actuation Signal, and

d. One OPERABLE charging pump.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3".

ACTION:

a. With one ECCS subsystem inoperable, restore the inoperabl'e subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s~or be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours. S erscri'.

In the event the ECCS is actuated and injects water into the Reactor Coolant System, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 90 days des-cribing the circumstances of the actuation and the total accumulated actuation cycles to date. The current value of the usage factor for each affected safety injection nozzle shall be provided in this Special Report whenever its value exceeds 0.70.

With pressurizer pressure greater than or equal to 1750 psia.

If the ECCS subsystem is inoperable only because the LPSI train is inoperable, the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit may be extended to a maximum of 7 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

initial ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-3

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EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS (Continued)

2. A visual inspection of the containment sump and verifying that the subsystem suction inlets arh not restricted by debris and that the sump components (trash racks, screens, etc.) show no evidence of structural distress or corrosion.

3. Verifying that a minimum total of 173 cubic feet of solid granular trisodium phosphate dodecahydrate (TSP) is contained within the TSP storage baskets.

4. Verifying that when a representative sample of 70.5 + 0.5 grams of TSP from a TSP storage basket is submerged, without agitation, in 10.0 + O.l gallons of 120 + 10'F borated water from the RWT, the pH of the mixed solution is raised to greater than or equal to 7 within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.

f. At least once per 18 months, during shutdown, by:

Verifying that each automatic valve in the flow path actuates to its correct position on SIAS and/or RAS test signals.

2. Verifying that each of the following pumps start automatically upon receipt of a Safety Injection Actuation Test Signal:

a. High-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

b. Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump.

3: Verifying that on a m Recirculation Actuation Test Signal, the containmen sump isolation valves open and the valv to the refueling water tank clos~ 'ecirculation

g. By verifying that each of the following pumps develops the specified total developed head on recirculation flow when tested pursuant to Specification 4.0.5:

High-Pressure Safety Injection pumps: greater than or equal to 2854 ft.

2. Low-Pressure Safety Injection pump: greater than or, equal to 374 ft.

h. By verifying the correct position of each electrical and/or mechanical position stop for the following ECCS throttle valves:

l. During valve stroking operation or following maintenance on the valve and prior to declaring the valve OPERABLE when the ECCS subsystems are required to be OPERABLE.

ST. LUCIE - UNIT 2 3/4 5-5

St. Lucie Unit 1 and Unit 2 L-95-133 Docket Nos. 50-335 and 50-389 Proposed License Amendments LPSI S stem AOT Extension ENCLOSURE'oint Applications Report for LOW PRESSURE SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM AOT EXTENSION (CE NPSD-995, Final Report CEOG Task 836; May, 1995)

ATTAABVQ~22TA "Mark-up" of NUREG-1432 SECTIONS 3.5.2 & 8 3.52

ECCS Operating 3.5.2 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEHS (ECCS) 3.5.2 ECCS Operating LCO 3.5.2 Two ECCS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1 and 2, HODE 3 with pressurizer pressure ~ f1700] psia.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIHE A. l One or more trains ino rable.

A. 1 Restore OPERABLE

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to 7 dLo y's AND At lea 100~ f the ECC low equiv nt t a single OPERA

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P'.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion

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Time not met. AND

.2 Reduce pressurizer 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> pressure to

< [1700] psia.

GEOG STS 3.5-4 Rev. 0, 09/28/92

INSERT A One LPSI subtrain inoperable.

INSERT B B. One or more ECCS B.1 Restore ECCS train(s) to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> trains inoperable due to OPERABLE status.

condition(s) other than Condition A.

AND At least 100%%uo of the ECCS Qow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train available.

ECCS Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS A.l Time con inued)

OPERABLE sta is based evaluation an

'2 on an NRC s

'asonable hours. The 4

amount o using a ompletion reliability feet many r

An ECCS train is inoperable if it is not capable of delivering the design flow to the RCS. The individual components are inoperable if they are not capable of if performing their design function, or supporting systems are not available.

The LCO requires the OPERABILITY of a number of independent subsystems. Oue to the redundancy of trains and the diversity of subsystems, the inoperability of one component in a train does not render the ECCS incapable of performing its function. Neither does the inoperability of two different components, each in a different train, necessaril result in a loss of function for the ECCS. The inten f to maintain a combination of OPERABLE equipment such that 1008 of the ECCS flow equivalent to 1008 of a single OPERABLE train remains available. This allows increased flexibility in plant operations when components in opposite trains are inoperable.

ZQSE%'T An event accompanied by a loss of offsite power and the RE failure of an emergency OG can disable one ECCS train until power is restored. A reliability analysis (Ref. 4) has shown that the impact with one full ECCS train inoperable is sufficiently small to justify continued operation for 72 hours.

Reference 5 describes situations in which one component, disable both ECCS trains.

ln single OPERABLE in a conditi h t at 100~ of the e e the acci en u'w such as a shutdown cooling total flow control valve, can i one or more compon available, the to a facility Therefore, is must be imediatel entered.

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.1 and .2 If the inoperable train cannot be restored to 'OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must (continued)

CEOG STS B 3.5-15 Rev. 0, 09/28/92

INSERT AA each of Condition A and Condition B are INSERT AB Each of Condition A and Condition B includes a combination of OPERABLE equipment such that at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train remains available.

Condition A addresses the speciQc condition where the only affected ECCS subsystem is a single LPSI subtrain. The availability of at least 100% of the ECCS Qow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train is implicit in the deQnition of Condition A.

If LCO 3.52 requirements are not met due only to the existence of Condition A, then the inoperable LPSI subtrain components must be returned to OPERABLE status within seven (7) days of discovery of Condition A. This seven (7) day Completion Time is based on the Qndings of the deterministic and probabilistic analysis that are discussed in Reference 6. Seven (7) days is a reasonable amount of time to perform many corrective and preventative maintenance items on the affected LPSI subtrain. Reference 6 concluded that the overaH risk impact of this Completion Time was either risk-beneQcial or risk-neutral.

Condition B addresses other scenrarios where the availability of at least 100% of the ECCS Qow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train exists but the full requirements of LCO 352 are not met. If Condition B exists, then inoperable components must be restored such that Condition B does not exist with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of discovery. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time is based on an NRC reliability study (Ref. 4) and is a reasonable amount of time to effect many repairs.

INSERT AC With one or more components inoperable such that 100% of the equivalent Qow to a single OPERABLE ECCS is not available, the facility is in a condition outside of the accident analyses. In such a situation, LCO 3.03 must be immediately entered.

ECCS Operating B 3.5.2 BASES ACTIONS .1 and .2 (continued) be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and pressurizer pressure reduced to

< 1700 psia within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2.1 REQUIREMENTS Verification of proper valve position ensures that the flow path from the ECCS pumps to the RCS is maintained.

Misalignment of these valves could render both ECCS trains inoperable. Securing these valves in position by removing power or by key locking the control in the correct position ensures that the valves cannot be inadvertently misaligned or change position as the result of an active failure.

These valves are of the type described in Reference 5, which can disable the function of both ECCS trains and invalidate fhe accident analysis. A 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Frequency is considered reasonable in view of other administrative controls ensuring that a mispositioned valve is an unlikely possibility.

SR 3.5.2.2 Verifying the correct alignment for manual, power operated, and automatic valves in the ECCS flow paths provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for ECCS operation. This SR does not apply to valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, since these valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. A valve that receives an actuation signal is allowed to be in a nonaccident position provided the valve automatically repositions within the proper stroke time. This Surveillance does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned are in the correct position.

(continued)

CEOG STS 8 3.5-16 Rev. 0, 09/28/92

ECCS-Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5.2. 10 (continued)

RE(UIREMENTS outage, on the need to have access to the location, and on the potential for unplanned transients if the Surveillance were performed with the reactor at power. This Frequency is sufficient to detect abnormal degradation and is confirmed by operating experience.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 35.

2. 10 CFR 50.46.

3. FSAR, Chapter [6] .

4. NRC Memorandum to V. Stello, Jr., from R. L. Baer, "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.

~ScRT 5. IE Information Notice No. 87-01, January 6, 1987.

RD CEOG STS B 3.5-19 Rev. 0, 09/28/92

INSERT AD

6. CE NPSD-995, "CEOG Joint Applications Report for Low Pressure Safety Injection System AOT Extension," April 1995.