ML18026A535

SSES Unit 1 & 2 MSIV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method Seismic Evaluation. W/One Oversize Drawing

ML18026A535
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Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	10/31/1994
From:	PENNSYLVANIA POWER & LIGHT CO.
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ML17164A434	List: ML17164A433 ML17164A435 ML18026A448 ML18026A535
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ATTACHMENTTO PLA-4228 ENCLOSURE2 MSIV LEAKAGEALTERNATETREATMENT METHOD SEISMIC EVALUATION 94112'Pat42 941i21 PDR noacK osooozs7 pnR

SUSQUEHANNA STFAM ELECTRIC STATION UNIT 1 AND 2 MSIV LEAKAGEALTERNATETREATMENTMETHOD SEISMIC EVALUATION OCTOBER 19, 1994

TABLE OF CONTENTS

~Pa e COVER SHEET TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

1. SCOPE OF REVIEW TURBINE BUILDING 2.1 Lateral Force Resisting Systems 2.2 Seismic Design Codes 2.3 Seismic Design Basis 2.4 Wind Design Codes 2.5 Wind Design Basis MAINTURBINE CONDENSERS 10 3.1 General Description of Susquehanna Condensers 10 3.2 Comparison of Susquehanna Condensers with Database Condensers 10 3.3 Capability of Anchors to Withstand Design Basis Earthquake Loads 18 MSIV LEAKAGE CONTROL PIPING 20 4.1 Main Steam and Turbine Bypass 20 4.1.1 Design Basis 21 4.1.1.1 Piping Design Code 21 4.1.1.2 Piping Design 21 4.1.1.3 Pipe Support Design Code 22 4.1.2 Margin Assessment 22 4.1.3 Verification Walkdown Results 22 4.2 Main Steam Drains to Condenser 22 4.2.1 Design Basis 23 4.2.1.1 Piping Design Code 23 4.2.1.2 Piping Design 23 4.2.1.3 Piping Support Design Code 23 4.2.2 Margin Assessment 23 4.2.2.1 Seismic Demand 24 4.2.2.2 Pipe Support Component Capacities 25 4.2.3 Verification Walkdown Results 25

TABLE OF CONTENTS

~Pa e 4.3 Interconnected Systems 26 4.3.1 Design Basis 26 4.3.2 Margin Assessment 26 4.3.3 Verification Walkdown Results 26

5. BLOCKWALLS 27

INTROD I N The evaluation in this report was performed to document the seismic design adequacy of the "Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Alternate Treatment Method". This method is being evaluated for replacing the design function of the MSIV-Leakage Control System (LCS).

The MSIV-LCS licensed based design function is'to serve to redirect MSIV leakage back into secondary containment, where it can be processed as a filtered release and reduce the potential contribution to off-site and control room dose.

Historically, the MSIV-LCS has been susceptible to numerous failures and costly repairs. In order to improve the performance of the power plant, both from a nuclear safety viewpoint and elimination of a high cost and high maintenance system, the "MSIVLeakage Alternate Treatment Method" has been established, which willserve to provide a more effective means to process the MSIV leakage.

The primary components to be relied upon, for pressure boundary integrity, in resolution of the BWR MSIV leakage issue are: (1) the main turbine condensers, (2) the main steam lines to the turbine stop and bypass valves, and (3) the main steam turbine bypass and drain line piping to the condensers.

Earthquake experience has demonstrated that the welded steel piping and anchored condensers in similar systems are seismically rugged. The earthquake experience is derived from an extensive database on the seismic performance of over 100 power plant units and industrial facilities in actual recorded earthquakes. Based on this post-earthquake reconnaissance, the BWR Owners Group (BWROG) seismic experience study has identified limited realistic seismic hazards, including support design attributes and proximity interaction issues, as potential sources of damage on a limited number of components. The BWROG's study is documented in NEDC-31858P, "BWROG Report for Increasing MSIV Leakage Rate Limits and Elimination of Leakage Control Systems". A review and evaluation was performed for Pennsylvania Power and Light, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station (SSES), Units 1 and 2, to ensure that no such issues are present, thus providing reasonable assurance of the integrity of these systems and components.

This report summarizes the methodology used and some of the results of the seismic adequacy review of the MSIV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method.

1.0 OPE F REVIEW The main turbine condensers form the ultimate boundary of the "Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Alternate Treatment Method". Boundaries were established upstream of the condensers by utilizing existing valves to limit the extent of the seismic verification walkdown. The boundaries are shown in Figure 1 of this evaluation.

The boundary valves were selected using the criteria outlined in NEDC-31858P and documented in PP&L Engineering Studies, Analyses, and evaluations (SEA), SEA-ME423, "MSIVLeakage Seismic VeriGcation Boundary Determination Study, SSES Unit 1" and SEA-ME424, "MSIV Leakage Seismic Verification Boundary Determination Study, SSES Unit 2 . The following criteria was used in selecting the boundary valves:

1. Normally open valve, automatically closes as a result of MSIV isolation signal

2. Normally open valve, which can be remotely closed from control room

3. Normally locked closed, manually operated valve

4. Normally closed, manually operated valve

5. Automatically or remotely operated valves that fail closed, as a result of loss of power or air (pneumatic operators) to the valve operator

6. Normally closed valve, which can be remotely closed from the control room

7. Normally closed valve, which can be remotely dosed from a control panel outside the control room In NEDC-31858P, a seismic database was assembled. 'Ms database served as historical documentation of the performance of non-seismic designed piping systems and main turbine condensers, at various power plants throughout the world, which have gone through varying levels of seismic events. This database provided the basis for demonstration of seismic adequacy of non-designed systems. In order to demonstrate that SSES piping and components fall 'eismically within the bounds of the experience database, two reviews were performed.

The Qrst review consisted of reviewing the construction codes to demonstrate that the designated piping and components were built to standards similar to those plants identified in the experience database of NEDC-31858P.

The second review consisted of seismic verification walkdowns to assure that the condensers and piping systems fall within the bounds of the design characteristics of the seismic experience database contained in NEDC-31858P. Conditions that might lead to piping configurations which are outside the bounds of the experience database were noted during the walkdowns. Tables-5 and

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1 AT7g, Pipgze 8.'f,BC'L2

6 of this report summarize the identified conditions (termed'"outliers"), and their resolution status.

Note that the outliers are being resolved by demonstrating analytically that they did not create hazards beyond the seismic inertial loading. These hazards include interaction, differential displacement, and/or failure/falling. Ifevaluation can not qualify some outliers, modiTications will be designed to provide seismically acceptable conQgurations.

Where analysis was used to resolve the walkdown outliers, the 5% damped conservative Qoor curves are extrapolated from the existing 1/2% and 1% damped Qoor curves that were based on the SSES ground design basis earthquake (DBE) anchored at 0.1g peak ground acceleration.

As an alternate method for generation of seismic input, 5.0% damped realistic median-centered, with no intentional conservative bias, Qoor curves willbe developed, ifjudged to be necessary, based on the NUREG/CR-0098 median ground spectra anchored at 0.1g and 0.067g peak ground accelerations for horizontal and vertical directions, respectively. Variabilities associated with structure frequency, structure damping, and rock modulus are significant in the development of the seismic Qoor curves. Mesc model parameters willbe selected in a random process. A number of earthquake time histories willbe utilized with the randomly selected sets of model parameter values.

To account for the uncertainty in the structural frequency calculations, the peaks of the seismic Qoor curves are shifted rather than be broadened.

In addition to the ongoing resolution of the walkdown outliers, seismic margin assessment of a representative bounding sample of pipe supports on the main drain line willbe conducted. This assessment is more conservative and more restrictive than the evaluation referenced in NEDC-31858P.

0 2.0 INEB ILDING Performance of the turbine building during a seismic event is of interest to the issue of MSIV leakage to the extent that non-seismically designed structures and components should survive and not degrade the capabilities of the selected main steam and condenser Quid pathways. A BWROG survey of this type of structure has, in general, confirmed that excellent seismic capability exists.

There are no known cases of structural collapse of either turbine buildings at power stations or structures of similar construction.

'he SSES turbine building houses two in-line about 1100 megawatt turbine generators with all auxiliary equipment including two 220 ton overhead service cranes. 'Ihe building is entirely founded on rock with reinforced concrete retaining walls extending up to grade level. The superstructure is framed with structural steel and reinforced concrete. Exterior walls are pre-cast reinforced concrete panels except for the upper 30 feet, which is metal siding. 'Ihe roof has metal decking with built-up roofing. Each of the two turbine generator units is supported on a free standing reinforced concrete pedestal extending down to rock. Separation joints are provided between the pedestals and the turbine building Qoors and slabs to prevent transfer of vibration to the building. The operating Qoor is supported on vibration damping pads at the top edge of the pedestals. A seismic separation gap is provided near the center of the building between the two units. A seismic separation gap is also provided against the reactor building.

The design of the SSES turbine building includes both seismic and tornado loadings. The turbine building is designed to prevent collapse under both the DBE and tornado load conditions. The deQections from these loadings have been kept to a value such that interaction with Category I structures is avoided. The ground acceleration associated with the DBE is 0.10g. The turbine building horizontal shears resulting from the DBE are presented in Figure 2. Based upon the above, it is concluded that the SSES turbine building is a seismically robust structure with little risk of damage to the structure that would degrade the capability of the main steam and condenser fluid pathways. Specific parameters included in the evaluation are presented below.

2.1 Lateral Force Resisting Systems The lateral load resisting system superstructure type, above the turbine Qoor, is a braced or rigid frame structure depending on the direction of lateral load consists of the following:

Column lines G and K comprise alternating bays of cross-bracing that resist N-S wind or seismic lateral loading conditions.

E-W lateral forces are resisted by rigid frame bents from column line 12 to 29 (Unit 1).

Lateral force resisting system substructure, below the turbine Qoor:

Concrete walls serve as shear walls for lateral loads in the NC directions.

FIGURE 2A Seismic Design Forces for the SUSQUEHANNA Turbine Building In the East-West Direction Hev.

762'ev.

729'ev.

699'ev.

676'lev.

656' 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 East-West DBE (Klps)

FIGURE 28 Seismic Design Forces for the SUSQUEHANNA Turbine Building ln the North-South Direction Elev.

787'ev.

762'lev.

699'ev.

676'lev.

656' 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 North-South DBE (Klps)

22 Seismic Design Codes

'Allnon-category I structures are designed to conform to the requirements of:

American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Speci6cation for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Steel Buildings.

American Concrete Institute (ACI) Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete (ACI 318-71).

American Welding Society (AWS) Structural Welding Code AWS D1.1-72.

23 Seismic Design Basis A seismic analysis of the turbine building was performed for the DBE loading in the north-south, east-west, and vertical directions in order to assure that the building willnot collapse. The resulting deQections were also utilized to confirm that there is no interaction with the reactor, building.

2.4 Wind Design Codes The turbine building is designed to conform to the requirements of:

American Society of CivilEngineers, paper number 3269, Wind Design Requirements.

American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Specification for the Design, Fabrication, and Erection of Steel Buildings.

American Concrete Institute (ACI) Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete (ACI 318-71).

American Welding Society (AWS) Structural Welding Code AWS D1.1-72.

25 Wind Design Basis The dynamic, wind pressures used in the design of SSES are derived from the ASCE Publication No. 3269 using the following equation.

q =

0.002558'here q is the velocity pressure in psf, and V is the wind velocity (mph). It was

assumed that 80% of q is acting on the windward side and 50% is suction on the leeward side of the building.

The local pressure at any point on the surface of the building is equal to:

p=qCp where p is the pressure and C is the pressure coefficient.

The total pressure on the building is equal to:

p=qCO where Co is the shape coefficient and is equal to 1.3. The wind loads are provided in Table 1.

The turbine building frame is designed to resist tornado wind forces assuming that two thirds of the siding is blown away. In addition, each exterior column and its connections are designed for the full tornado wind in the event that no siding blows away in the tributary area of the column.

The maximum interaction ratio for the structural steel, resulting from the case with no failure of the siding, is approximately the same as that obtained from the DBE load. The load combinations utilized for the design of the turbine building are presented in Table 2.

TABLE 1 Tornado Wind Loads Wall Load Roof Load Dynamic Pressure Total Basic with 1.1 Design Height Velocity Gust Factor Pressure Suction Pressure Suction (ft) (mph) 0.8q 0.5q 1.3q 0.6q 0-50 80 20 16 10 26 12 50-150 95 30 24 15 39 18 150<00 110 40 32 20 52 24 Over 400 120 45 36 23 59 27 TABLE 2 Load Combinations D+ L+ E'+

Note 1 L+W See Note 1 D+ L+W'+L+E'ee USD USD D = Dead Load L = Live Load W = WindLoad W' Tornado Wind E' Design Basis Earthquake (1) In no case shall the allowable base metal stress exceed 0.9Fy in bending, 0.85Fy in axial tension or compression, and 0.5Fy in shear.

Where Fs is governed by requirements of stability (Local or lateral buckling),

fs shall not exceed 1.5Fs.

In no case shall be allowable bolt or weld stress exceed 1.7Fs.

3. MAINTURBINE CONDEN ERS 3.1 General Description of Susquehanna Condensers The main turbine condenser is a triple shell multipressure surface condenser which consists of three (3) rectangular shaped welded steel plate condensers of the single pass quad-divided type.

The circulating water low is 448,000 gallon per minute. The heat exchange area of the high pressure shell consists of 28,040 1-inch diameter tubes, approximately 50 foot long, giving a heat transfer area of 367,000 square feet. The heat exchange area of the intermediate pressure shell consists of 28,008 1-inch diameter tubes, approximately 40 foot long, giving a heat transfer area of 293.300 square feet. The heat exchange area of the low pressure shell consists of 27,972 1-inch diameter tubes, approximately 30 foot long, giving a heat transfer area of 219,700 square feet. The dry weight and the operating weight of the three shells are a s follows:

Dr Wei ht Ib 0 eratin Wei ht Ib High Pressure Condenser 678,200 2,132,700 Intermediate Pressure Condenser 643,000 1,984,300 Low Pressure Condenser 567,800 1,572,700 The base of the condenser (hotbox shell) is 29'x49', 29'x39', and 29'x29'n plan for the high, intermediate, and low pressure condensers, respectively.

Each condenser shell is supported from the concrete base slab of the turbine pedestal on 6 embedded plate assemblies. Positive attachment is provided by anchor bolts and welds to the embedded plate assemblies. The embedded plates assemblies only project their plate thickness above the base slab, so there are no legs or piers between the condenser and the base slab. The condenser shells neck down at the top where they weld to the turbine. The necks include a rubber expansion joint which structurally isolates the condenser shell from the turbine, so that the anchors to the base slab provide the entire support for the condenser shell. The height of each shell to the expansion joint is approximately 56'.

The condensers were tested by fillingthe shell with water. The design conditions for the condensers include a vacuum pressure of 26" of Mercury, and "zone 1" seismic coefficients of 0.03g vertical and 0.05g horizontal.

The .75" thick shells of the condensers are stiffened by the tube support plates and by struts that connect the tube support plates to the sidewalls and to the condenser bottom. Plate dividers, which separate each shell into four flow paths, also serve to stiffen the shell.

3.2 Comparison of Susquehanna Condensers with Database Condensers This report will show that each SSES condenser shell is comparable to the database condensers in its capability to resist seismic forces. In addition, this report will also show that each shell anchor 10

systems have the capability to withstand the forces associated with DBE in combination with operating loads.

Since each condenser (high, intermediate, and low pressure) is independently supported from the other shells we can compare its structural. characteristics to the similar condensers addressed in NEDC-31858P, "BWROG Report for Increasing MSIV leakage Rate Limits and Elimination of Leakage Control System". Comparable condensers that have experienced significant earthquakes as identified in NEDC-31858P will be hereafter called "database" condensers.

Each SSES condenser shell is specifically compared to the database condensers from Moss Landing, Units 6 and 7, and from Ormond Beach, Units 1 and 2. These condensers have similar physical arrangements of components and construction details to the SSES condenser, and would function similarly to resist seismic forces. From Table 3 and from Figures 3 through 5, it is apparent that most of the physical features of the SSES condenser that would be significant in seismic considerations, are either enveloped by the database condensers, or would be less critical than the database condensers. One possible exception is the greater height of the SSES condensers. Another is the capacity to demand ratio (Figure 5) for the intermediate pressure shell. Thesignificanceof thisgreater height is discussed in theparagraph below. Thecapabilityof the anchors for all three shells is discussed in subsection 3.3.

The SSES condenser is higher than the database condensers (See Figure 4a). This feature cannot be considered as either enveloped by or less critical than the database condensers, since larger ratios of height to base width tend to give larger overturning forces. In the case of the SSES condenser shells, we can say that this greater height is not that significant for three reasons. The first reason is that the operating weight of each shell in comparison to the shell side area is comparable to that of the database condensers; therefore the shear stresses in the shell plate would not be any higher than the database condensers for the same "g" load. This is apparent from the data in Table 3. The second reason is that the anchor bolt shear areas in comparison to operating weights are comparable to the database condensers for all shells except the intermediate pressure shell. This is illustrated in Figure 5 in which the SSES condenser anchors are actually less critical than the anchors of the database condensers except for the intermediate pressure shell, The third reason is that the anchors for the SSES condenser have more than enough capacity to withstand the forces from a DBE event in combination with operating loads. This specific anchor capability is discussed in subsection 3.3.

The anchor configuration for the SSES condenser shells is not necessarily the same as that of the d database condensers. For the SSES condenser shells, base shear loads are taken by welds of the condenser to embedded plates at locations 1 and 4 of Figure 7. The anchor bolts are not designed for shears because the holes in the condenser base are oversized, and the welds and guides are a stiffer load path for shear loads. Since the anchor at location 4 is a guide in one direction, the welds at location 1 are sized to take all the shear in the direction parallel to the turbine axis. For loads perpendicular to the turbine axis the anchors at location 1 and 4 both contribute to resisting shears. In Figure 5 the "lower bound" anchor area is only the root area of the welds active in the given directions. The "upper bound" area is the total of anchor bolts area only. This conservatively

<<ssumes that the welds fail before the anchor bolts are effective in resisting shears. The capacity to 11

TABLE 3 Comparison of SUSQUEHANNA Condenser to Database'ondensers Horizontal Manufacture Width x Length x Height Heat Exchange Operating Shell Tube Supports Tube Sheets Tube Plant Name g Level Weight Thickness / Thickness / Thickness Size Experienced Mateial Number Diameter (ln) /

(Ft) (Ft"2) (Lbs) (In) / (ASTM) (tn) (In) Length (Ft)

Moss Landing 0.40 Ingersoll Rand 36x65x47 435000 3115000 3/4 3/4 -15 1 A-285 C

/65'rmond Beach 0.20 South. Western 27x52x20 210000 1767500 3/4 5/8 -14 1.25 1"

/

A-285 C 53'USQUEHANNA 0.21 "~ Ingersoll Rand 29x49x56 2132700 3/4 5/8 -14 1.50 1 (High Pressure) A-285 C

/50'USQUEHANNA 0,21 '0 Ingersoll Rand 29x39x56 1984300 3/4 5/8 -11 1 (Intermediate Pressure) A-285 C

/40'USQUEHANNA 0.21 *'ngersoll Rand 29x 29x 56 219700 1572700 3/4'-285 5/8 W 1 (Low Pressure) C

/30'atabase information from NEDC-31858P Revision 2, September 1993. Appendix D, Table 4-1 and Table 4-3 DBE design basis is 0.21g horizontal for 5h damping, peak of ground response curve, at condenser base (See Figure 6)

FIGURE 3 Size Comparison of the SUSQUEHANNA Condenser (Unit 1 or2) with Representative Condensers from Earthquake Experience Ormond Beach SUSQUEHANNA High Pressure SUSQUEHANNA Intermediate Pressure SUSQUEHANNA Low Pressure Moss Landing 100000 200000 300000 400000 500000 Heat Transfer Area (Sq. Ft. Per Shell)

Ormond Beach SUSQUEHANNA High Pressure SUSQUEHANNA intermediate Pressure SUSQUEHANNA Low Pressure Moss Landing 0 500000 1000000 1500000 2000000 2500000 3000000 3500000 Operating Weight (Lbs Per Shell) 13

FIGURE 4 Dimensional Comparison of SUSQUEHANNA Condenser (Unit 1or 2) and Representative Condensers from the Earthquake Experience Database

~

50

~ 40 C

QP 30 20 10 Ormond Beach SUSQUEHANNA Moss Landing (a) Height Comparison (Base To Expansion Joint) 40'igh Preeeure 39'termedlate Preeeure 29'ow Preeeure

~ MossLandlng6&7 (65'x36')

~ SUSQUEHANNA Unlt1 High Pressure or2 (49' 29')

Intermedhte Pressure (89' 29')

Low Pressure (29' 29')

mm Ormond Beach t &2 (52' 2T )

(b) Shell Footprint Comparison 14

FIGURE 5A Anchorage Capacity-to-Demand Ratio: Parallel to Turbine Generator Axis Comparison of SUSQUEHANNA Condenser (Unit 1 or 2) with Representative Condensers from Earthquake Experience Database Q Upper Bound g Lower Bound 0.0002 0.00018 0.00016 E

0.00014 O

0.00012 E

0.0001 V) 0.00008 0.00006 0.00004 ~

f) 0.00002 Moss Landing EI Centro SUSQUEHANNA SUSQUEHANNA SUSQUEHANNA High Pressure Intermediate Pressure Low Pressure FlGURE 5B Anchorage Capacity-to-Demand Ratio: Perpendicular to Turbine Generator Axis Comparison of SUSQUEHANNA Condenser (Unit 1 or 2) with Representative Condensers from Earthquake Experience Database Q Upper Bound 0.0002 g Lower Bound 0.00018 0.00016 a 0.00014 0.00012 0.0001 M

0.00008 0.00006 a) 0.00004 0.00002 Moss Landing EI Centro SUSQUEHANNA SUSQUEHANNA SUSQUEHANNA High Pressure Intermediate Pressure Low Pressure 15

lAO IAO

~

~

~

LEGEND EL CENTRO STEhM PLhHT, 1979 IMPERIhL VhLLEY EQ UhLLEY STEAM PLhHT, 1971 ShN FERNANDO EQ HOSS LhHDING STEhM PLhNT, 1989 LOMh PRETh EQ SUSQUEEOBfh DESIGN BhSIS EhRTHQUhKE ORMOND BEhCH STEhM PLhNT,1973 PT. MhGU EQ PGh~0.208 FUKhSHMl NUCLEhR PLhNT,1978 MIYhGI KEN-OKI EQ. PGh~0.138 l.iO PI.OTTED AT 5% DAMPING b0 l.00 0

O.IO t5 I

O OAO Cl 0

OAO 040 0.00 0.0 5.0 IO.O l5.0 f0.0 30.0 Frequency (Hz)

Figure 6: Comparison of Susquehanna Ground Response Spectrum to Data Base Spectra

FlGVRE 7 Anchor System for SUSQUEHANNA Condenser Unit 0 or 2 Dhtributloo of Anchor Bolts by

/

Tensile Area Location Shell Unit Intermediate Location Pre aaure Axle of (ln"2) (In"2)

Turbine Generator 7.60 7.60 7.60 Variea 3.80 20.00 9.50 3.80 7.60 7.60 7.60 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 3.80 Total 4S.80 30AO 62.80 3

29I Anchor bolts resist load In vertical dlrectlon.

Welds to embedded plate assembly resist loads ln horizontal dlrectlonL O Anchor Bolts resist load ln vertical direction.

No hard restraint in horizontal directions (sliding friction only).

O Anchor Bolts resist load ln vertical dlrecthn.

Guide bars resist load ln direction perpendicular to axis of turbine generator.

No hard restraint perallel to axis of turbine generator (sliding friction only).

17

demand ratios for the intermediate pressure coridenser are lower than the comparable database condensers. This does not represent a concern when the actual anchor capacity is compared to the seismic loads in subsection 3.3.

33 Capability of Anchors to Withstand Design Basis Earthquake Loads.

High Pressure Condenser:

The maximum tension from the DBE forces in combination with the operating loads is'estimated to be 493.4 kips at locations 2 or 3 compare to the anchor bolts capacity of about 897 kips.

The maximum base shear from DBE is 448 kips. This shear would be resisted in a number of ways: friction, shear in the welds to the embedded plates, and finally by anchor bolts assuming small movements to develop bolt shears. It would be unconservative to assume that the welds and anchor bolts act concurrently to resist shear since the bolt holes are oversize. Capacities of the three shear resistant phenomenon are as follows:

friction from resultant normal forces between condenser and embedded plate using a 0.10 friction factor = 183 kips weld capacity = 445 kips shear capacity of anchor bolts not in tension = 1814 kips It is reasonable to assume that the friction is available in combination with weld capacity or in combination with bolt capacity. It is apparent that the anchor system has more than enough capacity to resist base shears from DBE.

Intermediate Pressure Condenser:

The maximum tension from the DBE forces in combination with the operating loads is estimated to be 91 kips at locations 2 or 3 compare to the anchor bolts capacity of about 359 kips.

The maximum base shear from DBE is 417 kips. This shear would be resisted in a number of ways: friction, shear in the welds to the embedded plates, and finally by anchor bolts assuming small movements to develop bolt shears. It would be unconservative to assume that the welds and anchor bolts act concurrently to resist shear since the bolt holes are oversize. Capacities of the vzv

/XJ tt s three shear resistant phenomenon are as follows:

Tttnc O.lo friction from resultant normal forces between condenser and embedded plate using friction factor = 171 kips a~

18

weld capacity = 284 kips shear capacity of anchor bolts not in tension = 1814 kips It is reasonable to assume that the friction is available in combination with weld capacity or in combination with bolt capacity. It is apparent that the anchor system has more than enough capacity to resist base shears from DBE.

Low Pressure Condenser:

The maximum tension from the DBE forces in combination with the operating loads is estimated to be 905 kips at locations 2 or 3 compare to the anchor bolts capacity of about 1890 kips.

The maximum base shear from DBE is 330 kips. This shear would be resisted in a number of ways: friction, shear in the welds to the embedded plates, and finally by anchor bolts assuming small movements to develop bolt shears. It would be unconservative to assume that the welds and anchor bolts act concurrently to resist shear since the bolt holes are oversize. Capacities of the three shear resistant phenomenon are as follows: W t</tf4y.

Typo CLIO friction from resultant normal forces between condenser and embedded plate using a+28 friction factor = 135 kips weld capacity = 445 kips shear capacity of anchor bolts not in tension = 1814 kips lt is reasonable to assume that the friction is available in combination with weld capacity or in combination with bolt capacity. It is apparent that the anchor system has more than enough capacity to resist base shears from DBE.

19

,

4.0 IVLEAKA E ONYR L PIPIN Seismically analyzed piping within the MSIV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method includes the main steam line from containment isolation valves to the turbine stop valves, the bypass piping from the main steam line to the main condensers, the main steam drain line header from containment isolation valves to in-line pipe anchors, and portions of main steam branch connection lines to in-line pipe anchors. Design methods for these analyzed lines are consistent with seismic category I qualification methods for the SSES and design margins are accordingly adequate to assure acceptable seismic performance.

Portions of these main steam and drain line piping systems have not been seismically analyzed.

Since system redesign to seismic category I requirements would be exceedingly costly, an alternate evaluation method has been utilized to demonstrate seismic adequacy. Non seismically analyzed piping systems were assessed to demonstrate that SSES piping and pipe supports fall within the bounds of a "seismic experience database". Section 1.0 details the background for this historical database as well as the construction code and seismic walkdown reviews performed to demonstrate seismic adequacy. The code review purpose was to insure adequate dead load support margin and ductile support behavior when subjected to lateral loads. Seismic walkdowns were performed to verify that SSES piping and instrumentation are free of impact interactions from falling and the proximity or differential motion hazards. Conditions outside the experienced database boundary (outliers) are being reviewed to demonstrate reasonable assurance of the integrity of the associated piping systems and components under normal and earthquake loading. In addition, a representative bounding pipe support sample on the 4" main drain line willbe evaluated to demonstrate anchorage margins.

These reviews demonstrated that the non-seismic analyzed piping systems consist of welded steel pipe and standard support components, consistent with the construction standards associated with the seismic experience database piping systems. Reviews also demonstrated that adequate design margins exist for typical or bounding piping system supports. Specific data used in the evaluations is summarized below. For the main steam drain interconnected piping, it was demonstrated that adequate design margins exist to provide reasonable assurance that piping position retention will be maintained by the piping system dead weight supports under normal as well as earthquake loadings. Walkdown results indicated that additional supports would be required to eliminate the potential for piping system interactions.

4.1 Main Steam and Turbine Bypass No failures of main steam piping were found in the earthquake experience database as documented in NEDC-31858P.

These piping systems at SSES were designed in accordance with the ASME Code Section III, Class 2 and ANSI B31.1 requirements, using response spectrum analysis techniques. The analysis models included the main steam piping, the bypass lines, and branch piping up to seismic anchors.

20

The main steam lines envelop the piping from containment isolation valves FO28A/B/C/D to the turbine stop valves MSV-1/2/3/4 and include the drip legs plus portions of the supply lines to the steam seal evaporators up to in-line pipe anchors. The turbine bypass analysis includes piping from the main steam lines to the condenser plus portions of the steam supply lines to the reactor feed pump turbines and steam air ejectors up to in-line anchors. These piping systems were designed using reactor and turbine building response spectra inputs to perform dynamic seismic analysis to withstand the OBE and DBE loadings in combination with other applicable design loads in accordance with the SSES defined loading combinations. Design margins for the referenced main steam and turbine bypass piping systems are those inherent by application of the seismic design codes.

4.1.1 Design Basis 4.1.1.1 Piping Design Code ASME III, Class 2, 1971 Edition including Winter 1972 Addenda and B31.1, 1973 Edition 4.1.1.2 Piping Design A. Design Temperature: 585 F Design Pressure: 1350 psi - main steam 1350 psi - turbine bypass Quickness B. Pipe size, schedule, and D/t Size NPS ~Dt 24 1.076 24 0.941 25 18 1.156 16 10.75 0.719 15 10.75 0.594 18 8.625 0.594 14 4.500 OA38 10 C, Typical Support Spacing: B31.1 suggested span D. Support Types: springs, struts, snubbers, box type, E. Design Loading: weight, thermal, seismic, steam hammer F. Analysis Method: linear elastic, seismic response spectrum, steam hammer time history 21

G. Seismic and Dynamic Design Basis: response spectra analyses using Qoor response spectra that were derived based on the ground DBE with a peak ground acceleration of 0.10g.

4.1.13 Pipe Support Design Code AISC and ANSI B31.1 4.1.2 Margin Assessment Design methods for the analyzed main steam and turbine bypass piping are consistent with seismic Category I qualification methods for SSES. The seismic walkdowns identified minor interaction issues that could be potential source of damage. Actions have been initiated to resolve these issues. Based on action implementation, the design margins associated with these systems and their supporting structures willbe adequate to insure piping system integrity under projected seismic performance.

4.1.3 VeriTication Walkdown Results The walkdown results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.

42 Main Steam Drains to Condenser The main steam drain line to the condenser consists of safety (Class 2) and non-safety related piping. The safety related pipe and portions of the non-safety piping up to in-line pipe anchors downstream of isolation valves HV-1/241F019 and F020 were seismically analyzed. These piping systems were designed in accordance with the ASME Code,Section III, Class 2 and ANSI B31.1 requirements, using response spectra analysis techniques. The remaining main steam drain and associated piping were analyzed for dead weight and thermal loads using computer analysis and spacing criteria. This piping is similar to piping found in the seismic experience database. The seismic verification walkdowns identified minor interaction issues that could be potential sources of damage. Actions have been initiated to resolve these issues.

22

4.2.1 Design Basis 4.2.1.1 Piping Design Code s

ASME III, Class 2, 1971 Edition including Winter 1972 Addenda and B31.1, 1973 Edition 4.2.1.2 Piping Design A. Design Temperature: 585 F Design Pressure: 1350 psi B. Pipe size, schedule, and D/t S~ize NPS 'iisickness ~t

'4.5 0.438 10 3.5 0.438 8 1315 0.250 5 1315 0.358 4 C. Typical Support Spacing: B31.1 suggested span D. Support Types: springs, struts, snubbers E. Design Loading: weight, thermal, seismic F. Analysis Method: linear elastic, seismic response spectrum G. Seismic and Dynamic Design Basis: response spectra analyses using Qoor response spectra that were derived based on the ground DBE with a peak ground acceleration of 0.1g.

4.2.1.3 Pipe Support Design Code AISC, ANSI B31.1, and MSS SP58 4.2.2 Margin Assessment Design methods for the seismically analyzed drain piping are consistent with seismic Category I qualification methods for SSES. Therefore, the design margins associated with these systems and their supporting structures willbe adequate to insure piping system integrity under projected seismic performance.

23

The objective of the assessment of the non-seismic Main Steam Drain piping is to demonstrate that piping position retention willbe maintained during a seismic event plus provides assurance that the pipe supports willbehave in a ductile manner and that all lines are free of known seismic hazards. In addition, it willestablish that these SSES piping systems willperform in a manner similar to piping and supports that have been observed to demonstrate good seismic performance.

The methodology utilized to demonstrate the margins inherent in the SSES non-seismic piping support designs is based on:

The ground seismic input is based on the ground DBE which is conservatively defined.

The calculated piping seismic response is based on 5% damped in-structure response spectra as recommended in EPRI NP-6041. The reader is referred to the foHowing subsection 4.2.2.1 for more details.

~ The component support capacity is conservatively estimated based on the vendor rated values.

The evaluations'oal is to produce a High-Confidence-Low -Probability of Failure (HCLPF) for the walkdown outliers and a representative pipe support sample. This should provide the desired reasonable assurance of good seismic performance.

4.2.2.1 Seismic Demand The original seismic design of the Turbine Building included the development of three lumped mass models for the east-west, north-south, and vertical directions. The seismic Qoor curves were generated to determine seismic anchor forces and displacements for the piping systems that are attached to the Turbine Building. The seismic Qoor curves were only generated for 1/2% and 1.0% equipment damping values. The existing 1/2% and 1% damped Qoor curves willbe extrapolated to generate 5% damped DBE Qoor curves for the evaluation of the walkdown outliers and a representative pipe support sample.

During the margin assessment, 5.0% damped realistic median-centered, with no intentional conservative bias, Qoor curves willbe developed, ifnecessary, based on the NUREG/CR-0098 median ground spectra anchored at 0.1g and 0.067g peak ground accelerations for horizontal and vertical directions, respectively. Variabilities associated with structure frequency, structure damping, and rock modulus are signiQcant in the development of the seismic Qoor curves. These model parameters willbe selected in a random process. A number of earthquake time histories willbe utilized with the randomly selected sets of model parameter values.

To account for the uncertainty in the structural frequency calculations, the peaks of the seismic Qoor curves are shifted rather than be broadened.

24

It should be noted that the identified items during the seismic verification walkdowns are tagged as outliers since they did not fall within the bounds of the earthquake experience database. The peak acceleration values of the data base ground spectra are usually greater than 0.9g while the peak acceleration value for the DBE at SSES is about 0.21g for 5% equipment damping as shown in Figure 6.

In addition to the seismic DBE loads, dead weight and operating mechanical loads are accounted for. Operating mechanical loads for this system are thermal expansion loads and design dead weight support loads are consistent with tributary area weight procedures.

4.2.2.2 Pipe Support Component Capacities The supplemental field verification determined that the support types used are considered to have good seismic performance. The system is predominantly supported for dead weight utilizing rod hangers.'omponent designs are constructed from standard support catalog parts typically consisting of clamps, threaded rods, weldless eye nuts, turnbuckles, welding lugs and are attached to either concrete or structural steel. These support types are designed to resist vertical loads in tension. Design capacities are provided by manufactures'oad rating data sheets.

Load capacity ratings for component standard supports are typically based on testing and utilize a factor of safety of five in accordance with MSS SP-58. The load on which the load capacity data (LCD) is based is therefore a factor of five higher than the catalog load rating. The margin capacities for each support component are taken as the LCD x 5 x 0.7 (EPRI NP-6041).

Including thermal effects on allowable loads, component standard supports designed by load rating is calculated as follows:

TLx 0.7Su/Su'here:

TL: Support test load is less than or equal to load under which support fails to perform its intended function; TL = LCD x 5 Su: Material ultimate strength at temperature Su: Material ultimate strength at test temperature Structural steel support members are evaluated using section strength based on the plastic design methods in Part 2 of AISC or 1.7 times the AISC working stress allowables. Concrete anchor bolts are evaluated using data from the A46/SQUG criteria, Appendix C.

4.2.3 Verification Walkdown Results The walkdown results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.

25

43 Interconnected Systems The interconnected systems consist of the remaining piping within the MSIV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method that was not seismically analyzed. These systems are composed of welded steel piping and standard support components. Analyzed by rule and approximate methods, these piping systems are similar to the piping found in the seismic experience database that have experienced seismic events in excess of the SSES design basis earthquake. Interaction issues identified in the walkdown that could be potential sources of damage were evaluated, and, where necessary, actions have been initiated to eliminate this potential. It willbe demonstrated that adequate design margins exist for these interconnected systems to provide reasonable assurance that piping position retention willbe maintained by the piping system dead weight supports under normal and DBE loadings.

4.3.1 Design Basis Table 4 lists the design parameters associated with these interconnected piping systems.

4.3.2 Margin Assessment Same as for Main Steam Drains to Condenser, Section 4.2.2.

Based on the piping system construction material reviews, seismic walkdowns performed for impact interaction assessment, and the representative system evaluations, interconnected system piping position retention willbe insured and system similarity to the seismic experience database willbe demonstrated. The goal is to demonstrate that the interconnected systems are capable of functioning to support the operation of the MISV Leakage Alternate Treatment Method during and following the applicable SSES DBE.

4.3.3 Verification Walkdown Results The walkdown results are presented in Tables 5 and 6 for Units 1 and 2, respectively.

M Block walls in the Turbine Building have been designed using the working stress method of reinforced concrete design in accordance with the 1973/1976 UBC. The walls have been rechecked for seismic loads using the 1979 UBC with a resulting seismic loading of 0.084g

. minimum. In addition some of the walls have been designed for a pipe rupture pressure of 480 lb/ft> and large bore (4" diameter and larger) pipe support loads. Allof the walls have been designed for the maximum loads from field run attachments. Field run attachments have been controlled and documented . Cutting of reinforcing steel in the block walls has been controlled and documented. Construction of the walls per the civil drawings and specifications has assured compliance with the block wall design requirements.

All of the block walls which are of concern for the MSIV LCS Elimination Project have been designed as composite walls constructed as double wythe reinforced concrete block walls with 3000 psi fillconcrete between the wythe's with all open cells grouted. The thickness of these walls varies from 2'-0" minimum to 4'06" maximum. One wall located in the Reactor Building which was designed for OBE/DBE, SRV and LOCA loads is only 1'-9" thick.

The block walls which are of concern for the MSIV LCS Elimination Project are evaluated with seismic loads using the DBE Qoor spectra.

27

TABLE 4 INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS UNIT 1 AND 2 Plplng Temp Pres. Supports Support Design Loading Selsmlo Deal n Basis System Deslgnatlon Design t'F) (pslg) Sze D/t Spacing Types Code (Note 1) To Anchor Remainder Main Steam Drains From ASME 40 19 ANSI Rcd Hangers AISC DW 8'Drip Legs 8 12'Drip Secthn 831.1 MSS Thermal Leg Ia 160 7 Springs SP58 Hydro xxs 4.8 Concrete 831.1 Anchors xxa 3.7 Pipe Straps 160 53 StrucL Memb.

160 4$

Main Steam Drip Leg ASME ANSI Rod Hangers AISC DW None Level Instrumentatlon Section 831.1 Springs MSS Thefnlal III Conc. Anch. SP58 Hydro Pipe Straps Struct. Memb.

Struts Main Steam Averaging ASME 120 118 ANSI Rod Hangers HSC DW None Manifold to Pressure Sect III 831.1 Sprtngs MSS Thenllal Transducer Panels ANSI xxa 4.8 Struts SP58 Hydro 831.1 Conc. Anch.

xxa 3.'7 Rpe Straps StrucL Memb 80 78 Main Steam Turbine Stop 160 7 ANSI Rcd Hangers AISC OW None None Valve Drains 831.1 831.1 Springs MSS TheBllal 160 53 Box Type SP58 Hydro Struct. Memb

TABLE 4 ~

INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS UNIT1 AND 2 Selsmlo Deal n Basis I'03 Temp PreL Supports Support Design Loading t F) (pslg) Sae 0/t Spacing Types Code (Note 1) To Anchor Remainder MSIVDrain h4lne ANQ 585 1350 ANSI Rod Hangers None Anchors to HP Condenser 831.1 831.1 Springs Ilncludas Drain to UIW8 Struct Memb.

Bypass from HV1/2lf- Cono. Anch.

F021) 184 HPCI Turbine Steam ANSI 585 1350 xxa" ANS AISC Drain from In4lne Anchor 831.1 831.1 MSS to M.L Drain Header SPSS RCC Turbine Steam ANSI 585 1350 ANS Rod Hangers AISC Drain from h4lne Anchor 831.1 831.1 PIpe Straps MSS to M.S. Drain Hdr. 1'85 Cono. Anch. SP58 Steam Supply to ANSI 1350 103 ASME Snubbers AISC OW R. L Analyshuslng Alr Ejector Beyond 831.1 Sect. Ill Struct. Memb. MSS Thermal OBE HV-1/2010'o first ANS SP58 Hydro aehmlo anchor 831.1 Selsmlo RFPT Supply Beyond 1I.S ASME AISC DW R S. Analysts Using Valve HV-t/20111 to first 831.1 Sect. III MSS Thermal DBE selsmh anchor ANSI SP58 Hydro 831.1 Selsmlc (Note 2)

Steam Seal Evaporator ANSI ASME Spdngs ASC OW RL Analysis using Vne Beyond HV-1/20109 831.1 Sect III Snub bere MSS Thermal DBE to first aelsmh anchor ANSI Struck Memb. SP58 Hydro 831.1 Selsmh INote 2)

TABLE 4 INTERCONNECTED SYSTEM DESIGN PARAMETERS UNIT 1 AND 2 NOTES:

1. ANALYSS METHOD IS UNEAR EIASTIC FOR BOTH HAND CALCULATIONSUSING SPACING CRITERIAAND ME101 COMPUTER ANALYSS.

2. SHSMICAU.YANALYZEDFROM THE MAINSTEAM BRANCH CONNECTION TO THE FIRST IN-UNE ANCHOR.

7 TABLE d Outller ldentltlcathn and Resolution Status UNIT iyDCESCXAI. TAfIJDIE WOE>

A y y fn Stean Drain to Coadcnser SS 1 5upyort ESD-LLt-big nay slide oCC yfpe sefsnfo oovenent fs heing evaluated t ESD-lit fn proxfnfty to block wall fs evaluated an4 Cound acceptable as-ls block eall Support ESD-LLi-Sg f 5 DLCCerentfal sefsnfo anm<<at between Reactor Sy-ESD-fit-58$ <<cy slide oCC Suffdfng and Turbine Sufldlng la befng evaluated Sf-i Valve SVfaf-7011 outside Igbgf Valve sefssLfo oyerabflfty and pipe integrity Criteria are being evaluated fn Stean Crc<<NIT to stop Tafn Al 1 0 ESD 115 attache4 to block eall block wall sefsafa capacity fs being evaluate4 A 0" Drip Legs Al 5 Sof ate above WLT A thru D Soiats ere heing evaluated for position retention Hain Stean 57pacs to Coodasor lnterectfon between ESD-102-Sag 5ef solo prying ection oC ib line on suppoct A 05 cross around pipe fs being evaluated DES-105-55, S7 fn pro@Lofty to block wall is evaluated and Cound acceptable as is block eall AS-5 055-105-55, ESD-L 00-55, block well fs evaluated end found acceptable es-fs 055-105-ELE attached to block wall Hcfn Stoa to EV 10107 AS-I Talve SV-LOL07 fn yroxfnfty to block wall fs evaluated snd Cound acceptable aa-fs Stean Jct Afr +actor block eall AS 5 Valve ET-10107 in yrorfnfty to TaIn fs hefng evaluated Cor Call saCe position tire protection 5yra7

TABLE 5 Outller MentNcatlon Ind Resolution Statue llHIT (FOIESIIAL yAIUJEE IEOE)

A y p In Stoa to Stem Jet Air EJector Ci-1 2$ 0-100 in proxinity to Acceptable as-ie

{frm IT-10101 to ET-I0701$ ) block <<cLL Cl 2 A~ ESD-100 Stenchicas nay X Acceptable as is slide off Tales ST-10701$ in prorinlty te X Acceptable as-ls piro protection Spray ln Ste>> Drip Lag Drains $ 11 I I/2 Dbb-101,2 g a <<ndor Ado0<<acy of cable trey s<<pporte la being a<<el<<at<<4 Cable Trey

$ 12 Iatoracticn bot<<om 1-1/2 NS-1st Soimio no@ments of both lines are being ecslnatod A 10" Bl line

$ 1-5 iaterectice bot<<oen 1-1/2" N$ 101 Seimio novmonts of both lines are bolas eeaL<<atod 0 10 W line DI-a Interaction bot<<ocn 1-1/2" NS-102 Seimie awmmts of both Linea aro being eoalaated C" Acr. Stem line

$ 15 Interaction betcem 1" DS$ 105, Slack <<alL is eeelnated ond fo<<nd acceptable ea-is ESD-I00 4 block <<all Solsaie no<<mont of I" pipe is being oval<<atod

$ 1-0 I Nb-105, 17'pan 5<<pport evercpen is being eealnatod bct<<ecn sepports

$ 17 OAD-LIS, 0$ 0-125 endor Adagaacy of cable tray sepporta is being e<<elected cable trey in Stem Drip Leg Le<<el $2 1 I DSS-105 in presiaity te block <<alL is oval<<ated end fo<<nd acceptable es-is Instr<<aoatcticn block <<cLL

TABLE I Outllar Mentlflcatlon and Reiolutlan Status UNIT

{ICTESTIAL FAILIE WDE)

P D V Stem Averaging Manifold to S5-I 1" OCO-LLS in proriaity to Slock <<aLL seimio capacity io being oealnated pressers traedncer panoL block <<aLL Stop Tales Soa't Oscine to Condanset Si-l Pelves SV-LOLOL A,S,C,D my Seimio loads fras valves are being ovslnated require aeimio restraints Si 1 5MD lii SgiS10 A SLL Pilw seimla aement ls being ovelnated 5tanchions nay slide oTE HICI Stem Drain to this Stem SS 1 1" ESO ill in prnrinity to Slack <<aLL ls oealnated and Tonnd acceptable as-is Drain Seeder block <<elL SS S 5P ESD Lli-S55,SSi A S55 Pipe soimia nnement ls being ovsinated 5tanchions nay slide ofT Ln Stem pressers easing Lines 00-2 1" Pipe A 5/0 To@fag ln proxiaity Slack <<aLL seimia capacity la being a%sleeted to block <<all Eey to oatlier typcsi A Ancbcrage or Snpport Capacity F - Fallnre and Falling {IIII)

P Prorinity and Iopsot D Ditferential Dlsplacment 0 - Paleo Operator Screening

)

TABLE I OuNerldentlcathnand Reeotuthn Statue UNlf 2 (PDIESIIAL PAILDSE IKIE) y p D Stem Drain to Cond<<ver AS-I 2 ESD-Sf i 4 20 JED-22$ interaatfon Sefmfo <<ovments oE both Lines are befnS evaluated SS-L r ESD-Sfa Supports bl A E2 attached Differential seimfo novment between Reactor to tcco different buffdfns Suildins A.turbfne Sulldlna fs belnS evaluated

'IS-1 Talve ST2if7021 outside SQQO Valve eefsafo operability a pipe fntesrity ese orlterie belnS evaluated SS 2 r ESD-Sli fn prosfofty to bleak <<all Sfoek walL fs evaluated and !ound acceptable as is SS a ESD-Sfa-a10,17,14,10 stanchion pf pe s of mf 0 mvmeut fa bef nS evaluated

~ uyports ne7 slide off Stem Eron IOIT to stop Al 1 Sofsts above tOIT A thru D Hoists ars belns evaluated !or position retention valve A 0" Drip Less Al-2 r ESD-LLS fn ~ty to bm waLL block waLL sefmfo oapaoftp ls befnS evaluated Stem S7pess to Condenser AS-L lntereation between ESD-202-Sa2 Sefmfo pryfnS aotlen oE 02 lfne on support ls A a2 arses around pipe beinS evaluated AS-S 2i NS-205 4 0 ESD-200 Sleek walL fs evaluated and found eooepteble as-ls

~ uyyorts attacbed to Sloek <<all AS-5 2" EE line and steel. pfatfora Steel platfox<<was nodf fied to oleer tbe 2 line interaotlon Stem te ST 20107 ASH Valve ST-20107 end brpcls supports Sfook welL ls evaluated snd Sound aoeeyteble as-is Stem Jet Air Ef eater fu proxfnftr to block weLL AS S Valve ST-20107 fn prorfnfty to VaLve ls beins evaluated for Sall sate positfm Tire Proteetlon Spray

TABLE 6 OuNer ldenttftcathn and Raeotuthn Statue UNIT

{ICIESIIAL PAILIE )ER)2) t O T n Stem to Stem Jet Alr Meet Cl-1 i" ESD-200 ln prcnchslty to bloch oeLL Aoeeptable u"ls (fsm HT-20107 to HT-207015) Cl-2 Talves HT-2070)A/S lspeat cclth MaLL Aooepteble u ls Cl-5 Telve HT-2470LS ln prorlcclty to Aooeptebg ss-ls tire Protection Spray Step Talvo Seat Drains to Si-I Talves HT-2010)A,S,C,D nsp re@cire Selmle loads frere valves are l>>lnS evalnatod

~ elmlo restraints SCIC Stem Drain to Hain Stem S'7 1 L" EAD Rli a i" ESD-227 lnteraetlan Selmio adam<<ct of i" line ls belnS evaluated Drain Header SICI Stean Drain to )4aln Stem 50-1 1" ERD.Rli 4 i HSD-227 lntereetlon Solmle ncvment of i" line ls beins evslnated Drain Header ln Stem Drip Laa Ora)ns Sl-1 Talves HT-20104A a S nay roqalre Sccpyorts for HT-20105A ~ S aro boln0 evalsatod aelsnia restraint SL-R 1 GSD-250 a i ESD-RLRi lntereetlon 5elsala <<wments of both linn are belnS evalnated Si-5 1 CSD-250 a ERD-202-HIf lnteraotion Selmle novments of both Lines are belnS evalnated Sl-i 1-1/2" Nl-202 a 10 IW line Lnteraetlca Selmle novments of both lines aro bolnS evalsated Sl 5 Talvs HT-ROLLRAL a i Aces, Stoa Line Selmle <<vvments of HT-ROLLRAL 4 i Line lnteraetlan are belnS evalsated S1-0 i" CRD-250 ccader 0 tire Protection line Tlr~ Proteetlon line eccpperts are belnS evalnated Sl-7 TaLves HT-2011251 A 52 ney r<<pclre 5ccpporta for HT-ROLLRSL a SR a ealmle mvment

~ elm)a restraint. Also lntereatlen <<ith ef i line ere )>>lnS evslseted 4 Aea. Stem line Sl-0 1-1/2 OSS-20i 1 10 IM Line lnteraetlon Selmla mvments of both Lines are belns evalsated Sl-0 Sp-DSS-205-H4040 a 0" ESD-200 Lb>> Seleale pxylss sation of 0" Stem Line m sepport lnteraetlon ls bolas evalsated 01-10 L-L/2" O55.205 a 10 Ill line lnteraetlon 5elesle sovmente of both lines are balsa evalaeted

TABLE e Quttter IdeatlftCathn and RSSO}uthn Statue UNT 2 (POITIITIAL PAINRE IRRIR) 4 P P Steccc Drip Le0 Level SR-l 1 MI-205 4 $ 0" Lobe Oil line lntereetlon Selssio noveoents of both lines an beln0 evalsated Intcscentatian SR-R 1 D55-2054 10" Extraction Stean Une lnteraotlon Selsnlo ~ts of both lines are bein0 evalsate4 SR 5 V DRS-202 4 10" Estraetlon Stean Selsalo eormmte of both lines are beln0 evalsated line interaction SR-0 SP-DSS-20$ -E&00T 4 10" PW Et! RA Selsslo what of Iti line ls belnS evsloated drain interaction Stean Avera0ln0 Ncnlfo14 to SR-I 1 ICD-212 Stanchion Sopports Selsnle unmet of 1 line ls beln0 evslsated Pressers trmsdoeer panel ~ lido off SSR 1" DCD-RIR ender EVhC Duet lÃhC seisaio sopport oapaelty ls bein0 evalsated 5$ -$ 1 DCD-212 in proxialty to bloch <<all Rlocb eall selsalo eapaolty ls belns evalsate4 Tubis0 nader EVAC lÃhC selsnlo sspport oapaelty ls bein0 evalsated 50-2 Tobis0 in prorlaity of block <<all Slosh <<all selsolo oapaolty ls beln0 evalsate4 Eey to oetlles typeac A - hncbora0e or Rapport Capacity P Pal lore an4 tallis0 (II/I)

P - Precialty and Ispaot D differential Dlspiaomeat 5 - Tslve Operator Soroein0

ATTACHMENTTO PLA-422S ENCLOSURE3 SUSQUEHANNA LOCA DOSE

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Attachment 2 SUSQUEHANNA LOCA DOSES FOR A COMBINED MSIV LEAKAGERATE OF 300 SCFH USING THE ISOLATED CONDENSER TREATMENT METHOD SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION - EACH UNIT Whole Body Thyroid Beta rem rem rem Exclusion Area A. 10 CFR 100 Limit 25 300 Boundary (2-Hour) B. Doses using 2.47 127.8 MSIV-LCS Treatment>>>>

C. Previous Calculated 2.21 125.5 Doses w/o MSIV Leakage>>>>

D. Contribution from 0.007 0.11 MSIVs 300 SCFH Total <<>>>>

E. New Calculated Doses 2.217 125.61'00 Using IC Treatment Low Population Zone. A. 10CFR100 Limit 25 (30-Day) B. Doses Using MSIV-LCS . 0.37 30.4 Treatment<<>>

C. Previous Calculated 0.33 29.6 Doses w/o MSIV Leakage>>>>

D. Contribution &om 0.04 12.14 MSIVs 300 SCFH Total>>>>>>

E. New Calculated Doses 0.37 41.74 Using IC Treatment Control Room A. GDC-19 5 30 75 (30-Day) B. Doses using 0.38 14.19 12.0 MSIV-LCS Treatment' C. Previous Calculated 0.35 13.6 11.0 Doses w/o MSIV Leakage>>>>

D. Contribution &om MSIVs 0.41 4.95 1.17 at 300 SCFH Total"'.

New Calculated Doses 0.76 18.55 12.17 using IC Treatment No limit specified Doses calculated for Power Uprated conditions in PP&L Calculation EC-RADN-1009 Per GE correspon4ences OG94-574-09 and OG93-1021-09 FORM NDAP-QA-0726-1, Rev. 0 Page 16 of 16

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