ML17139B891
| ML17139B891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1982 |
| From: | EDS NUCLEAR, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17139B884 | List: |
| References | |
| 02-0160-1102-AP, 02-0160-1102-R1-APPF, 2-160-1102-AP, 2-160-1102-R1-APPF, NUDOCS 8310180504 | |
| Download: ML17139B891 (50) | |
Text
(t APPENDIX F Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
MALFUNCTION ANALYSIS TABLES 8310i80504 83iOi4 PDR ADOCK 05000387 PDR 39
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! p 1D615 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis'eactor Feedwater Control No affect on plant conditions, auto trip of reactor feed pump turbine A is disabled.
Plant conditions not affected, no Chapter 15 analysis required.
Pressure Re ulator T/G Control No affect on plant conditions, A and D
T/G system alarm and trip disabled.
Plant conditions'ot affected, no Chapter 15 analysis required.
Recirculation Flow Control Loss of flow in loop A due to recirculation MG trip.
Runback in loop B due to recirculation runback circuit activation.
Diffuser flow in loop A decreases sharply.
Flow through loop 8 will be reduced due,to the runback signal.
Flow through the core will stabilize at new equilibrium condition.
Reactor power level stabilizes at new equilibrium conditions.
Reactor level increase is not sufficient to initiate a turbine trip and scram.
System pressures reduced from conditions existing prior to the recirculation pump trip.
'0 1D615 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
- Sheet, 2
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction 0 erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control No affect on plant conditions, auto trip of reactor feed pump turbine A is disabled.
Operator response not required, no affect on plant conditions.
Saf ety system response not
- required, no affect on plant conditions.
Pressure Regulator T/G Control No affect on plant conditions, A and D T/G system alarm and trip disabled.
Operator response not required, no affect on plant conditions-Safety system response not
- required, no aftect on plant conditions.
Recirculation Flow Control Loss of flow in loop A due to recirculation HG trip.
The conditions generated are within operator capabilities.
No safety system operation is involved.
Runback in loop 8 due to re-circulation runback circuit activation.
No scram will occur for trip of one recirculation pump.
Immediate operation action is not required.
Operator must verify that no operating limits are exceeded.
Operator must ensure that flow must conform to criteria for single pump flow.
"e lD615 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Sheet 3
of 3
Plant Condition Not Covered b
Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of 1D615 does not generate plant conditions not already covered by Chapter 15.
None required.
."5~
1D625 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O
Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control No affect on plant conditions, auto trip of reactor feed pump turbine A is disabled-Plant conditions not affected, no Chapter 15 analysis required.
Pressure Regulator T/G Control No affect on plant conditions, B and E T/G system alarm and trip disabled.
Plant conditions not affected, no Chapter'5 analysis required.
Recirculation Flow Control Loss of loop B flow due to trip of recircu-lation MG.
Loop A flow remains the same.
Diffuser flow in loop B decreases sharply.
Flow through the core will stabilize at
- new equilibrium conditions.
Reactor power level stabilizes at new equilibrium conditions.
Reactor level increase is not sufficient to initiate a turbine trip and scram.
System pressures reduced from conditions existing prior to the recirculation pump trip.
Traversing In"Core Probe (TIP)
No affect on plant conditions, ability to operate TIP is lost; but automatic withdrawal of TIP is initiated upon loss of this power supply.
Plant conditions not. affected, no Chapter 15 analysis required.
'0 1D625 125 VDC Report No. 02"0160-1102 Revision 0 Sheet 2
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control No affect on plant conditions, auto trip of reactor feed pump turbine A is disabled.
Operator response not required, no affect on plant conditions.
Safety system response not
- required, no affect on plant conditions.
Pressure Re ulator - T/G Control No affect on plant conditions B
and E T/G system alarm and trip disabled.
Operator response not required, no affect on plant conditions.
Safety system response not
- required, no affect on plant conditions.
Recirculation Flow Control Loss of loop B flow due to trip of recirculation MG.
Loop A flow remains the same.
The conditions generated are within operator capabilities.
No scram will occur for trip of one recirculation pump.
No safety system operation is involved for this plant condition.
Immediate operator action is not required.
Operator must verify that no operating limits are exceeded'perator must ensure that flow must conform to criteria for
.single pump flow.
The cause of the failure must be determined before the system is returned to normal operation.
The restart procedure for the pump must be followed.
5
C' 1D625 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Sheet 2a of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Traversin In-Core Probe (TIP)
No affect on plant conditions, ability to operate TIP is lost; but automatic withdrawal of TIP is initiated upon loss of this power supply.
Loss of TIP control is not beyond operator capability.
TIP probes are designed to be automatically withdrawn and the system returned to normal upon loss of this power supply.
Safety system response not required since there is no affect on plant conditions.
1D625 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Sheet 3
of 3
Plant Condition Not Covered b
Cha'ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of 1D625 does not generate plant conditions not already covered by Chapter 15.
None required.
Q) 1D635 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 1
Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions - Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant
Response
Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control Feed flow increases to a rate greater than required due to erroneous zero flow input from B train flow instrumentation on loss of power.
Reactor feed pump turbine (RFPT)
C trip circuit is disabled, preventing trip if Level 8 trip occurs.
If the Level 8 trip set point is reached due to increased RFPT flow, RFPT A and B
will trip; but RFPT C will remain in operation-Chapter 15 response for a maximum flow demand assumes all three RFPTs trip upon reaching Level 8.
In this case, one RFPT will continue to operate beyond the Level 8 trip position.
This is not explicitly.
addressed by Chapter 15.
The following actions will occur in accord-ance with Chapter 15 as follows:
Level 8 trips RFPTs A and B, and the T/G Reactor scram is activated upon closure of T/G stop valves.
Recirculation pumps are tripped on closure of T/G stop valves.
Recirculation pump trip causes decrease in core flow to natural circulation.
Pressure relief is activated due to high pressure-Turbine bypass valve closes causing vessel pressure to recover.
At this point, further plant response is not explicitly documented in Chapter 15 due to the continued operation of RFPT C.
See "Recommendations" sheet 3.
C': ~
1D635 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O
Sheet la of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Pressure Re ulator and T/G Control No affect on plant conditions due to loss of power supply to system-C system alarm and trip is disabled.
The plant response with regard to the T/G for the Level, 8 trip is covered in the reactor feedwater flow control analysis-T/G will trip due to a Level 8 trip initiated from feedwater system.
1D635 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Sheet 2
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control Feed flow increases to a rate greater than required due to erroneous zero flow input from B flow sensor on loss of power.
Reactor feed pump turbine (RFPT)
C trip circuit is disabled, pre-venting trip if Level 8 trip occurs.
The conditions generated by this power supply failure are not beyond the capabilities of the operator.
The operator retains the ability to runback RFPT C through manual control of the feedwater flow control system.
The RFPT can be tripped by closing its steam admission valve.
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The operation of the Level 8-trip feature for the RFPTs does not adequately cover the conditions resulting from the loss of this power supply.
See "Recommenda-tions" sheet 3.
If the Level 8 trip set-point is reached due to increased RFPT flow, RFPT A and B will trip; but RFPT C will remain in operation-Pressure Regulator and T/G Control No affect on plant conditions due to loss of power supply to system.
C system alarm and trip is disabled.
T/G will trip due to a Level 8
trip initiated from feedwater system.
The T/G trip resulting from the Level 8 trip is not beyond operator capability-T/G trip is a normal response to the conditions generated.
The conditions generated by the loss of the power supply are adequately covered for the T/G as per Chapter 15.
The T/G is tripped when Level 8 logic is actuated by Reactor Feedwater Control System.
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1D635 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 1
Sheet 3
of 3
Plant Condition Not Covered b
Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Reactor Feedwater Control The continued operation of RFPT C beyond the Level 8 trip set point is not covered by Chapter 15 analysis.
Verify through thermal hydraulic and instrument analysis that the Level 8 set point will not be reached.
If the set point is not reached, the conditions are explicitly addressed by Chapter 15.
If the Level 8 set point is reached, there are. two options available:
1-Modification feedwater flow train B instrumentation, currently powered by lD635 125 VDC, should be changed to an alternate power supply, preferably lY218 120 VAC, the loss of lD635 would not generate the transient since the feedwater flow signal from the B sensor would continue to operate normally.
The Level 8 condition would not occur.
2-Reanalysis an alternative to design change would be to analyze this new transient, to de%ermine the net affect of continued operation of RFPT C beyond the Level 8 trip.
Qy 1D645 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision
.)
Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control If reactor vessel level train A is selected as input to the feedwater flow control, there will be no affect on plant 'conditions.
The Level 8 trip circuit logic will however, be reduced from 2 of 3 to 1 of 2.
For utilization of level train A, plant conditions are not affected.
Chapter 15 analysis is not required.
If reactor vessel level train B is selected f an increase in feed flow will occur due to the low level signal being processed.
The Level 8 trip circuit will also be reduced from 2 of 3 to 1 of 2g however when Level 8 is reached the RFPTs and T/G will trip.
For the loss of level train B, Chapter 15 addresses the failure of the Feedwater Flow Control System in the maximum flow condi-tion.
The plant response as per Chapter 15 is as follows:
Level 8 vessel level set point trips main turbine and feedwater pumps.
Turbine bypass operation initiated.
Reactor scram trip actuated from main turbine stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump trip (RPT) actuated by stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump motor circuit breakers open causing decrease in core flow to natural circulation.
Relief Group 1 actuated due to high pressure.
Relief Group 1 closed.
Turbine bypass valVes close (not simulated) causing vessel pressure to recover and depress water level; Trip attained causing Level 2 isolation with closure of the tlSIVs and initiation of HPCI and RCIC systems.
12
I lD645 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O.
Sheet la of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse
'- Cha ter 15 Anal sis Pressure Re ulator T/G Control For the case when there is no affect on the feedwater system:
When-T/G is operating at a speed greater than 1300 rpm, there will be no affect on plant performance.
The T/G.EHC system will not generate a trip due to the field installed jumpers.
Plant conditions are not affected since the T/G trip is not generated.
Chapter 15 analysis is not required.
When T/G is operating. at speeds lower than 1300 rpm during startup, the T/G EHC system will trip the T/G upon loss of this power supply.
The subsequent closure. of the T/G stop and control valves will not cause a
scram due to scram inhibit logic at reactor power less than 30% NB.
The T/G will have to go through restart.
Plant condition resulting from this loss of power supply will be a T/G trip as per Chapter 15.
For the case when there is a Level 8 trip due to the feedwater
- system, there will be an associated T/G trip.
The Level 8 trip will result in a T/G trip as per Chapter 15.
The plant response is as noted in the feedwater analysis.
13
- 0 1D645 125 VDC Report l<o. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Sheet 2
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction 0 erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control If reactor vessel level train A is selected as input to the Feedwater Flow Control, there will be no affect on plant conditions.
The Level 8 trip circuit logic will however be reduced from 2 of 3 to 1 of 2.
There will be no change in plant conditions.
The power supply failure does not generate conditions beyond the operator capability.
Plant conditions are not affected.
The power supply failure does not require safety system response.
If reactor vessel level train 8 is selectedg an increase in feed 'flow will occur due to the low level signal being processed.
The Level 8 trip circuit logic will also be reduced from 2 of 3 to 1 of 2g however, when Level 8 is reached the RFPTs and T/G will trip.
Operator retains manual con-trol of the Feedwater Flow Control System.
The RFPTs can be run back using manual control.
The RFPTs can also be tripped if necessary using the RFPT trip system.
The conditions are therefore within the capabilities of the operator.
The Level 8 trip for the RFPTs and the T/G will be invoked as per Chapter 15.
In addition, reactor scram
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and recirculation pumps trip will occur in loss of the T/G. If the Level 2 set-point is reached, MSIV closure will occurs HPCI and RCIC will be initiated.
The conditions are therefore within the capabilities of the safety system.
14
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lD645 125 VDC Report No. 02"0160-1102 Revision 9 Sheet 2a of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Pressure Re ulator T/G Control For the case when there is no
~ affect on the feedwater system:
When T/G is operating at a speed greater than 1300 rpm, there will be no affect on plant performance.
The T/G EHC system will not generate a trip due to the field in-stalled jumpers.
Since no T/G trip is incurred, there will be no change in plant conditions.
The power supply failure does not generate condi-tions beyond the operator capa-
~
bilities.
This plant condition does not require safety system response.
When T/G is operating at speeds lower than 1300 rpm during startup,the T/G EHC system will trip the T/G upon loss of this power supply.
The subsequent closure of the T/G stop and control valve will not cause a scram due to scram inhibit logic at power less than 30% NB.
The T/G will have to go through restart.
The conditions generated by the loss of this power supply is a T/G trip.
The T/G trip is not beyond operator capa-bilities.
This plant condition does not require safety system response.
For the case when there is a Level 8 trip due to the feed" water system, there will be an associated T/G trip.
The condition generated by the feedwater system failure results in a T/G trip.
The T/G trip is not beyond operator capabilities.
The safety system response is as noted in the feedwater analysis.
The conditions generated are within safety system capabilities.
.C; O
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1D645 125 VDC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 3
of 3
Plant Condition Not Covered b
Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of lD645 does not generate plant conditions not already covered by Chapter 15.
None required.
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O O f'
1Y218 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O
Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control For Complete loss of feedwater flow control (auto and manual)<
a speed freeze is invoked on Reactor Feed Pump Turbines (RFPTs),
upon loss of control signal to the Electric Auto-matic Positioner for RFPTs A, 9 and C.
Feedwater flow rate is locked in at the flow rate in effect prior to loss of power.
There are three categories of conditions that can occur subsequent to the speed freeze.
a.
Maximum feed demand at time of speed freeze will result in a Level 8 trip of the RFPTs and the T/G.
- b. Minimum feed demand at the time of speed freeze will result in Level 3 and 2 trips.
- c. If the speed freeze occurs between maximum and minimum demand conditions, the feedwater system will be locked in at, the flow rate prior to the loss of power.
For maximum feed demand, the Chapter 15 response is as follows:
Level 8 vessel level set point trips main turbine and feedwater pumps.
Tur-bine bypass operation initiated.
Reactor scram trip actuated from main turbine stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump trip (RPT) actuated by stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump motor circuit breakers open causing decrease in core flow to natural circulation.
Relief Group 1 actuated due to high pressure.
Relief Group 1 closed.
Turbine bypass valves close (not simulated) causing vessel pressure to recover and depress water level-Low water level trip attained causing isolation with closure of the MSIVs and initiation of HPCI and RCIC systems.
For minimum feed demand, the Chapter 15 response is as follows:
initiates Scram.
initiates recirculation pump trip and HPCI and RCIC actuation.
MSIVs close.
Group 1 pressure.relief valves open to relieve pressure,.
then close.
+4 lY218 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Sheet la of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control (cont'd)
For the category between maximum 'and minimum demand, no Chapter 15 analysis is required.
No transient is generated by the conditions of "speed freeze" in'the feedwater system.
Reactor Manual Control S stem (RMCS)
Ability to move control rod(s) is lost for any plant operating mode upon loss of power supply.
The Scram safety function is still fully available since it is completely independent from control rod operation.
The loss of the ability to move control rods does not generate a plant transienti and therefore does not required Chapter 15 analysis.
This system condition has no safety implications.
If either the Level 8 or Level 3 trip is reached due to feedwater flow transient (maximum or minimum demand),
a scram will be initiated.
The Level 8 or Level 3 conditions resulting from the feedwater flow transient directly lead to a Scram.
The Scram is adequately covered in Chapter
- 15. It overrides the effect of loss of power on the RMCS system.
Recirculation Flow Control Flow control for recirculation pumps A and B is disabled.
Upon the loss of control signal, flow rates at the instant of bus failure will be maintained via locking of the MG set scoop tubes.
Since the scoop tube locking mechanisms (recirculation Loops A and B) react to maintain the flow at the instant of the
- failure, no transient is introduced into bus the system.
Chapter 15 states that the loss of the master controllers cannot be more severe than the trip of both recirculation pumps.
18
j'WO lY218 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160 "1102 Revision P Sheet lb of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recirculation Flow Control (cont'd)
If the Level 2 set-point is reached as a
result of the feedwater flow problem, the recirculaton pumps will trip.
The Level 2 conditions resulting from the feedwater flow transient directly lead to a trip of the recirculation pumps.
This response is adequately covered in Chapter
- 15. It overrides the effect of loss of power to Recirculation Flow Control System.
Pressure Re ulation T/G Control The loss of this power supply will not affect plant conditions for this system;
- however, the conditions generated by the feedwater
.fystem on Level 8 or Level 3
and 2 trips will cause the T/G to trip.
Trip of the T/G under these conditions is covered by Chapter 15 analysis.
See Feedwater System (page
- 1) for further explanation.
Reactor Water Cleanu S stem No affect on plant conditions, RWCS pump high differential shut-off lost.
Plant conditions are not affected, no Chapter 15 analysis is required.
Nuclear Pressure Relief No affect on plant conditions, loss of Nuclear Pressure Relief Valve temperature monitoring capability.
Loss of Nuclear Pressure Relief Valve temperature indication does not require Chapter 15 analysis.
Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP)
No affect on plant conditions, loss of ability to operate TIP.
Loss of ability to operate TIP does not require Chapter 15 analysis.
19
lY218 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102, Revision 0
Sheet 2
of 3
Plant Conditions - Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control For complete loss of feedwater flow control (auto and manual)i a speed freeze is invoked on Reactor Feed Pump Turbines (RFPTs),
upon loss.of control signal to the Electric Auto-matic Positioner for RFPTs A, B, and C.
Feedwater flow rate is locked in at that flow rate in effect prior to loss of power.
There are three categories of conditions that can occur sub-sequent to the speed freeze.
a.
Maximum feed demand at time of speed freeze will result in a Level 8 trip of the RFPTs and the T/G.
- b. Minimum feed demand at the time of speed freeze will result in Level 3 and 2
trips.
- c. If the speed freeze occurs in between maximum and minimum demand conditions, the feedwater system will be locked in at the flow rate prior to the loss of power.
The maximum feed demand con-dition is not beyond operator capability.
The RFPTs will be automatically tripped on reaching the Level 8 set-point.
The plant response is also within operator capabilities as per Chapter 15.
The minimum feed demand con-dition is within operator capabilities.
The conditions generated as part of the plant response are also within operator capabilities as per Chapter 15.
The conditions generated by an RFPT speed freeze between minimum demand are not beyond operator capability.
The feed-water flow cannot be adjusted until power is restored to the feedwater system. and the speed freeze circuit is reset.
If Level 8 trip occurs due to speed freeze at maximum
- demand, the following safety systems as per Chapter 15 will be actuated:
The conditions generated are not beyond the capability of these safety systems:
If Level 3 and 2 trips occur due to speed freeze at minimum demand, the following safety systems will be actuated:
The conditions generated are within the capabilities of these safety systems.
If speed freeze occurs be-tween maximum and minimum demand no safety systems are required to function.
The conditions generated by the power supply failure are therefore within the capa-bilities of the safety systems as per Chapter 15.
20
C' t.
lY218 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision Q
Sheet 2a of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Manual Control S stem (RMCS)
Abilityto move control rod(s) is lost for any plant generating mode upon loss of power supply.
The Scram safety function is still fully available since it is completely independent from control rod operation.
For the situation when the feedwater system does not cause a Level 8 or Level 3
and 2 trip the loss of the ability to move control rods is not beyond operator capa-bility.
Even without elec-tric power to these major components of the RMCS sys-tem, the operator still retains the capability to Scram since it is completely independent from the RMCS system.
The operator would be required to regain elec-tric power in order to be able to move rods once morc'or the situation when the feedwater system does not cause a Level 8 or Level 3
and 2 trip, the condition generated by the loss of power to the RHCS system does not require safety system response.
There is no transient generated by this condition that would involve a safety function.
If either the Level 8 or Level 3 trip is reached due to Feed-water flow transients (maximum or minimum demand),
a Scram will be initiated.
In the case in which either the Level 8 or Level 3 and 2
trips are reached, a Scram will occur.
The Scram does not present conditions which are beyond the operator capa-bilities. It should be noted that due to loss of Rod Posi-tion Indication (RPI) from the RMCS, th'e operator will not be able to verify all rods in using RPI.
Alternate methods of Scram verification are available through monitor-ing nuclear instrumentation, plant pressure, temperature, etc.
21 In the case in which either the Level 8 or Level 3 and 2
trips are reached, a Scram will occur in accordance with Chapter 15.
Therefore, the conditions generated by each of these trips are within the capability of this safety system.
"0 1Y218 120 VAC Report No. 02"0160"ll02 Revision Q
Sheet 2b of' Plant, Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Recirculation Flow Control Flow control for recirdula-tion pumps A and B is dis" abled.
Upon the loss of control signal, flow rates at the instant of bus fail-ure will be maintained via locking of the MG set scoop tubes.
The conditions generated by the loss of power to this system are not beyond operator capability.
Recirculation flow remains as it was prior to the loss of power-Speed control of the recirculation pumps is possible by manually positioning the scoop tubes.
~
Since no transient is intro-duced by these plant condi-
- tion, no safety system re-sponse is required.
If the Level 2 set-point is reached as a result of the feedwater flow transient, the recirculation pump will trip.
In the case of Level 2 tripJ the recirculation pumps will be tripped-This does not generate conditions beyond operator capability.
The saf ety system response upon Level 2 trip is covered in the feedwater system.
The conditions generated are within the capabilities of these safety systems.
Pressure Re ulator T/G Control The loss of this power supply will not affect plant conditions for this systems however, the conditions generated by the feedwater system for Level 8
or Level 3 and 2 trips will cause the T/G to trip..
Trip of the T/G under these conditions are not beyond operator capabilities.
The safety system response upon Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 trips is covered in the feedwater system safety sys-tem response description-The conditions generated are within the capability of these supply systems.
22;
17218 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O
Sheet 2c of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Water Cleanup No affect on plant conditions, RWCS pump high differential shut-off lost.
Loss of the automatic RWCS pump This plant condition does high differential shut-off is not not require safety system a condition beyond operator capa-response.
bility.
The operator can manually stop the pump if the condition exists.
Nuclear Pressure Relief No affect on plant conditions, loss of Nuclear Pressure Relief Valve temperature monitoring capability.
Loss of Nuclear Pressure Re-lief Valve temperature moni-toring is not a condition beyond operator capabilities-Relief valve downstream con-ditions can be monitored by relief valve flow monitoring until power is restored-The plant condition does not require safety system response.
Traversin In-Core Probe (TIP)
No affect on plant conditions, loss of ability to operate TIP.
Loss of the ability to oper-ate TIP does not generate conditions beyond operator capability.
If TIP isola-tion is desired it can be accomplished by operating the DC shear valvei other-
- wise, no operator action is required until the system power is returned-The plant condition does not require safety system response.
23
i, lY218 120 VAC Report No. 02"0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 3
of 3
Plant Condition Not Covered by Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of 1Y218 does not generate plant conditions not.already covered by Chapter 15 analysis.
None required.
24
lY219 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse - Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Manual Control S stem Control rod drive temperature monitoring is lost.
Plant conditions are not affected>
no Chapter 15 analysis is required.
Reactor Water Cleanu S stem Loss of letdown capability to condenser or liquid radwaste system> purification is still available.
Loss of letdown capability is not a con-dition that impacts on safety.
Chapter 15 analysis is not required-Loss of RWCS pump cooling protection and RWCS temperature monitoring.
C"'
1Y219 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O
Sheet 2
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction 0 erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Hanual Control S stem Control rod drive temperature monitoring is lost.
Loss of control rod drive temperature monitoring capa-bility is not a condition beyond operator capabilityg loss of temperature monitor-ing creates an alarm con-dition that will alert the operator that a system fail-ure has occurred.
The power must be restored to the sys-tem to return temperature monitoring capability'his plant condition does'ot require safety system response.
Reactor Hater Cleanu S stem Loss of letdown capability to condenser or liquid radwaste system, purification is still available.
Loss of RHCU pump cooling pro-tection and RHCU temperature monitoring.
If letdown is required for the plant operating modef operator must regain power to operate the RHCS.
Con-trol of this failure is within the capability of the operator.
This plant condition does not require safety system response.
lY219 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O
Sheet 3
of 3
Plant Condition Not Covered b
Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of lY219 does not generate plant conditions not already covered in Chapter 15 analysis.
None required.
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27
lY226 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O
Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Nuclear Pressure Relief Loss of Division II relief valve flow mon-itoring capability.
Plant conditions are not affected, loss of Division II relief valve flow monitoring does not require Chapter 15 analysis-Reactor Water Cleanup System Loss of filter demineralization inlet temperature monitoring capability.
Plant conditions are not affected, loss of filter demineralizer inlet temperature monitoring does not require Chapter 15 analysis.
28
('O lY226 120 VAC Report No- 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 2
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction 0 erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Nuclear Pressure Relief Loss of Division II relief valve flow monitoring capability-Loss of flow monitoring is not a condition beyond operator capa-bilty.
Flow monitoring is still available on Division I relief valves.
Temperature monitoring is also available until the power supply can be reenergized.
This plant condition does not require safety system response.
Reactor Water Cleanu S stem Loss of filter demineralizer inlet temperature monitoring capability'oss of filter demineralizer inlet temperature monitoring is not a condition beyond operator capability.
RWCS system tempera-tures can be monitored until the
. power supply can be reenergized
~
This plant condition does not require safety system response.
29
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lY226 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160"1102 Revision 0
Sheet 3
of 3
Plant Condition Not Covered by Cha ter 15 Analysis Recommendation Loss of lY226 does not generate plant conditions not already covered by Chapter 15.
None required 30
j."y lY629 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Manual Control S stem Loss of rod control< rod(s) remain in same position prior to loss of powers further rod motion cannot be accomplished.
The loss of the ability to move control rods does not generate a plant transient and therefore does not require Chapter 15 analysis.
Pressure Re ulator T/G Control 1
The loss of this power supply at T/G rated speed does not generate a transient due to redundant power provided by the Permanent Magnet Generator (PMG)-
The T/G will continue to operate normally.
Plant conditions are not affected, no Chapter 15 analysis is required.
The loss of this power supply at less than rated
- speed, when the PMG is not providing redundant power, will result in a T/G trip If this loss of power supply occurs at greater than 30'4 reactor power, a scram will occur.
Both the T/G trip and scram conditions are addressed by Chapter 15 analysis.
Recirculation Flow Control Recirculation runback circuit is partially armed due to loss of power supply.
With no T/G trip, plant conditions remain unchanged with respect to the recircula-tion system.
Chapter 15 analysis is not required.
The recirculation pumps will trip if the T/G is tripped.
With the T/G trip, the recirculation pumps will trip.
31
1Y629 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 2
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Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Manual Control System Loss of rod controls rod(s) remain in same position prior to loss of powers further rod motion cannot be accomplished'oss of the ability to move control rods is not beyond operator capabilities.
Even without electric power to rod drive control, the oper-ator still retains the capa-bility to scram since it is completely independent from the RMCS system.
The operator would be required to regain power in order to be able to move rods once more.
The conditions generated by the'oss of power to the RMCS system do not require safety system response.
There is no transient gen-erated by this condition.
Pressure Re ulation T/G Control The loss of this power supply
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at T/G rated speed does not generate a transient due to redundant power provided by the Permanent Magnet Generator (PMG).
The T/G will continue to operate normally.
Operator response not required, no affect on plant conditions.
Safety system response not
- required, no affect on plant conditions-The loss of this power supply at less than rated
- speed, when the PMG is not providing re" dundant power, will result in a T/G trip. If this loss of power supply occurs at greater than 30% reactor power, a scram will occur.
The T/G trip and scram do not generate conditions beyond operator capabilities as per Chapter 15.
The safety system response to the T/G trip is Scram/
HPCI and RCIC as per Chapter 15.
The conditions are therefore with safety system capabilities.
32
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lY629 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 2a of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Response Per FSAR Recirculation Flow Control Recirculation runback circuit is partially armed due to loss of power supply.
Without the T/G trip, the Feedwater low flow signal only partially arms the runback logic in auxiliary circuits A and B.
No special compensating operator action will be required until the bus voltage is recovered.
The condition is within the capabilities of the operator-No transient is introduced into the system.
Chapter 15 indicates that the trip of one or both recirculation pumps under normal operating conditions involves no unique safety action system response.
With a T/G trip, both Recir-culation pumps will trip.
This trip is a normal occur-rence based on the T/G trip condition.
It is within operator capabilities.
The safety system responses as noted in the analysis for T/G trip at greater than 30%
NB power, is through Scram, HPCI and RCIC as noted in Chapter 15-33
<<':o 4
lY629 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 3
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Plant. Condition Not Covered by Chapter 15 Analysis Recommendation
~
Loss of lY629 does not generate plant conditions not alreay covered by Chapter 15 analysis.
None required.
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Feedwater Flow Element FE-1N001 A, B, C
Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 1
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Plant Conditions - Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control If a single feed flow element fails such that an erroneous high flow signal exists, the feedwater system will decrease feed flow.
This reduction in flow may lead to Level 3 and 2 trips.
For this low feed flow condition, the Chapter 15 response is as follows:
initiates scram.
Reactor Vessel Mater Level 2 initiates recirculation pump trip and HPCI and RCIC actuation.
HSIVs close.
Group 1 pressure relief valves open to relieve pressure, then close.
If a single feed flow element fails such that an erroneous low flow signal exists, the feedwater system will increase feed flow.
This increase in flow may lead to a Level 8 trip.
For 15 this high flow condition, the Chapter response is as follows:
Level 8, vessel level set-point trips main turbine and feedwater pumps.
Turbine bypass operation initiated.
Reactor scram trip actuated from main turbine stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump trip (RPT) actuated by stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump motor circuit breakers open causing decrease in core flow <o natural circulation.
Relief Group 1 actuated due to high pressure.
Relief Group 1 closed-Turbine bypass valves close (not simulated) causing vessel pressure to recover and depress water level.
Level 2 trip attained causing isolation with closure of the HSIVs and initiation of HPCI and RCIC systems.
3 Feedwater Flow Elements FE-1NOOl A, B, C
Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
1 Sheet la of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recirculation Flow Control Failure of a single flow element under an apparent high or low flow condition will not introduce a transient via the recircu-lation system.
Since no transient is introduced by this failure, plant conditions are not affected.
Chapter 15 analysis is not required.
If a Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 trip results, the recirculation pumps will trip.
If Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 trip results, the plant response will be as described in the feedwater system.
The recirculation pumps will trip as a result of these conditions.
Feedwater Flow Elements FE-1NOOl A, B, C
Report No.
02-.0160-1102 Revision 0
'Sheet 2
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/l1alfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control If a single feed flow element fails such that an erroneous high flow signal exists, the feedwater system will decrease feed flow.
This reduction in flow'may lead to Level 3 and 2 trips.
The low flow condition is not beyond operator capability-The operator retains the ability to take manual con-trol of 'feedwater flow prior to reaching the Level 3 and 2 trips.
The conditions resulting from the Level 3
and 2 trips are also within operator capabilities as per Chapter 15.
If Level 3 and 2 trips occur due to the low flow condi" tion, the following safety systems as per Chapter 15, will be actuated:
The conditions generated are within the capabilities of these safety systems-If a single feed flow element fails such that an erroneous low flow signal exists, the feedwater system will increase feed flow.
This increase in flow may lead to a Level 8 trip.
The high flow condition is not beyond operator capa-bility.
The RFPTs will be automatically tripped on reaching the Level 8 set-point.
The operator also has the ability to take manual control of feedwater flow prior to the Level 8
tripoccurring'f Level 8 trip occurs due to the high flow the following safety systems, as per Chapter 15, will be actuated:
The conditions generated are within the capabilities of these safety systems.
Recirculation Flow Control Failure of a single flow element under an apparent high or low flow condition will not introduce a trans-ient via the recirculation system-The conditions generated by the flow element failure will not require operator response.
There is no safety system response required for this plant condition.
Feedwater Flow Elements FE-1N001 A, B, C
Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 2a of 3
Plant Conditions Power, Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stein Res onse Per FSAR Recirculation Flow Control (cont'd)
If a Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 trip
- results, the recirculation pumps will trip.
The conditions generated by the Feedwater System impact on recirculation pump opera-tion.
Both recirculation pumps will trip.
Loss of both recirculation pumps is within the capabilities of the operator.
The Level 8 or Level 3 and 2
trips require the same safety system response as noted in the feedwater sys-tem.
The response to these trips is within the capabil-ities of these safety systems.
'0 Feedwater Flow Element FE-lN001 A, B, C
Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 3
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3 Plant Condition Not Covered b
Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Failure of a single feedwater flow element does not generate plant conditions not already covered by Chapter 15 analysis.
None required.
C' CASCADING POWER SUPPLY EFFECT 1Y218/1Y219 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0
Sheet 1
of 3
Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis The plant conditions generated by the simultaneous loss of these two power supplies are covered in the individual analysis for lY218 and lY219, respectively.
The simultaneous failure of these power supplies do not result in conditions that have not already been covered in previous malfunction analyses.
40
CASCADING POWER SUPPLY EFFECT 1Y218/1Y219 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160"1102 Revision 0
Sheet 2
of 3
Plant Conditions - Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR The plant conditions generated by the simultaneous loss of these two power supplies are covered in the individual analysis for lY218 and lY219, respectively.
The simultaneous failure of these power supplies do not result in conditions that have not already been covered in previous malfunction analyses.
- 41
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CASCADING POWER SUPPLY EFFECT 1Y218/1Y219 120 VAC Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision Q
Sheet 3
of 3
Plant Condition Not Covered b
Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation The plant conditions generated by the simultaneous loss of these two power supplies are covered in the individual analysis for lY218 and lY219, respectively.
The simultaneous failure of these power supplies do not result in conditions that have not already been covered in previous malfunction analyses.
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