ML17139B891
| ML17139B891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Susquehanna  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/1982 |
| From: | EDS NUCLEAR, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17139B884 | List: |
| References | |
| 02-0160-1102-AP, 02-0160-1102-R1-APPF, 2-160-1102-AP, 2-160-1102-R1-APPF, NUDOCS 8310180504 | |
| Download: ML17139B891 (50) | |
Text
Report No. 02-0160-1102 (t APPENDIX F Revision 0 MALFUNCTION ANALYSIS TABLES 8310i80504 83iOi4 PDR ADOCK 05000387 39 PDR
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p Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1D615 125 VDC Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis'eactor Feedwater Control No affect on plant conditions, auto trip of Plant conditions not affected, no Chapter reactor feed pump turbine A is disabled. 15 analysis required.
Pressure Re ulator T/G Control No affect on plant conditions, A and D Plant conditions'ot affected, no Chapter T/G system alarm and trip disabled. 15 analysis required.
Recirculation Flow Control Loss of flow in loop A due to recirculation Diffuser flow in loop A decreases sharply.
MG trip.
Flow through loop 8 will be reduced due,to Runback in loop B due to recirculation runback the runback signal.
circuit activation.
Flow through the core will stabilize at new equilibrium condition.
Reactor power level stabilizes at new equilibrium conditions.
Reactor level increase is not sufficient to initiate a turbine trip and scram.
System pressures reduced from conditions existing prior to the recirculation pump trip.
'0 Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1D615 125 VDC Sheet, 2 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction 0 erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control No affect on plant conditions, Operator response not required, Saf ety system response not auto trip of reactor feed pump no affect on plant conditions. required, no affect on plant turbine A is disabled. conditions.
Pressure Regulator T/G Control No affect on plant conditions, Operator response not required, Safety system response not A and D T/G system alarm and trip no affect on plant conditions- required, no aftect on plant disabled. conditions.
Recirculation Flow Control Loss of flow in loop A due to The conditions generated are No safety system operation recirculation HG trip. within operator capabilities. is involved.
Runback in loop 8 due to re- No scram will occur for trip circulation runback circuit of one recirculation pump.
activation.
Immediate operation action is not required.
Operator must verify that no operating limits are exceeded.
Operator must ensure that flow must conform to criteria for single pump flow.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 lD615 125 VDC Sheet 3 of 3 Plant Condition Not Covered b Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of 1D615 does not generate plant conditions None required.
not already covered by Chapter 15.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O 1D625 125 VDC Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control No affect on plant conditions, auto trip of Plant conditions not affected, no Chapter reactor feed pump turbine A is disabled- 15 analysis required.
Pressure Regulator T/G Control No affect on plant conditions, B and E T/G Plant conditions not affected, no Chapter'5 system alarm and trip disabled. analysis required.
Recirculation Flow Control Loss of loop B flow due to trip of recircu- Diffuser flow in loop B decreases sharply.
lation MG.
Flow through the core will stabilize at Loop A flow remains the same. - new equilibrium conditions.
Reactor power level stabilizes at new equilibrium conditions.
Reactor level increase is not sufficient to initiate a turbine trip and scram.
System pressures reduced from conditions existing prior to the recirculation pump trip.
Traversing In"Core Probe (TIP)
No affect on plant conditions, ability to Plant conditions not. affected, no Chapter operate TIP is lost; but automatic withdrawal 15 analysis required.
of TIP is initiated upon loss of this power supply.
'0 Report No. 02" 0160-1102 Revision 0 1D625 125 VDC Sheet 2 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control No affect on plant conditions, Operator response not required, Safety system response not auto trip of reactor feed pump no affect on plant conditions. required, no affect on plant turbine A is disabled. conditions.
Pressure Re ulator - T/G Control No affect on plant conditions B Operator response not required, Safety system response not and E T/G system alarm and trip no affect on plant conditions. required, no affect on plant disabled. conditions.
Recirculation Flow Control Loss of loop B flow due to trip The conditions generated are No safety system operation of recirculation MG. within operator capabilities. is involved for this plant condition.
Loop A flow remains the same. No scram will occur for trip of one recirculation pump.
Immediate operator action is not required.
Operator must verify that no operating limits are exceeded'perator must ensure that flow must conform to criteria for
.single pump flow.
The cause of the failure must be determined before the system is returned to normal operation.
The restart procedure for the pump must be followed.
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C' Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1D625 125 VDC Sheet 2a of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Traversin In-Core Probe (TIP)
No affect on plant conditions, Loss of TIP control is not Safety system response not ability to operate TIP is lost; beyond operator capability. required since there is no but automatic withdrawal of TIP TIP probes are designed to affect on plant conditions.
is initiated upon loss of this be automatically withdrawn power supply. and the system returned to normal upon loss of this power supply.
Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1D625 125 VDC Sheet 3 of 3 Plant Condition Not Covered b Cha'ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of 1D625 does not generate plant conditions None required.
not already covered by Chapter 15.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 1 1D635 125 VDC Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions - Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Response Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control Feed flow increases to a rate greater than Chapter 15 response for a maximum flow required due to erroneous zero flow input from demand assumes all three RFPTs trip upon B train flow instrumentation on loss of power. reaching Level 8. In this case, one RFPT will continue to operate beyond the Level Reactor feed pump turbine (RFPT) C trip 8 trip position. This is not explicitly.
circuit is disabled, preventing trip if addressed by Chapter 15.
Level 8 trip occurs.
The following actions will occur in accord-If the Level 8 trip set point is reached ance with Chapter 15 as follows:
due to increased RFPT flow, RFPT A and B Level 8 trips RFPTs A and B, and the will trip; but RFPT C will remain in T/G operation-Reactor scram is activated upon closure of T/G stop valves.
Recirculation pumps are tripped on closure of T/G stop valves.
Recirculation pump trip causes decrease in core flow to natural circulation.
Pressure relief is activated due to high pressure-Turbine bypass valve closes causing vessel pressure to recover.
At this point, further plant response is not explicitly documented in Chapter 15 due to the continued operation of RFPT C.
See "Recommendations" sheet 3.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O 1D635 125 VDC Sheet la of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Pressure Re ulator and T/G Control No affect on plant conditions due to loss The plant response with regard to the T/G of power supply to system- C system alarm for the Level, 8 trip is covered in the and trip is disabled. reactor feedwater flow control analysis-T/G will trip due to a Level 8 trip initiated from feedwater system.
Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1D635 125 VDC Sheet 2 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control Feed flow increases to a rate The conditions generated by ~ The operation of the Level 8-greater than required due to this power supply failure are trip feature for the RFPTs erroneous zero flow input from not beyond the capabilities does not adequately cover B flow sensor on loss of power. of the operator. The operator the conditions resulting retains the ability to runback from the loss of this power Reactor feed pump turbine (RFPT) RFPT C through manual control supply. See "Recommenda-C trip circuit is disabled, pre- of the feedwater flow control tions" sheet 3.
venting trip if Level 8 trip system. The RFPT can be occurs. tripped by closing its steam admission valve.
If the Level 8 trip set-point is reached due to increased RFPT flow, RFPT A and B will trip; but RFPT C will remain in operation-Pressure Regulator and T/G Control No affect on plant conditions The T/G trip resulting from The conditions generated by due to loss of power supply to the Level 8 trip is not beyond the loss of the power supply system. C system alarm and trip operator capability- T/G trip are adequately covered for is disabled. is a normal response to the the T/G as per Chapter 15.
conditions generated. The T/G is tripped when T/G will trip due to a Level 8 Level 8 logic is actuated by trip initiated from feedwater Reactor Feedwater Control system. System.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 1 1D635 125 VDC Sheet 3 of 3 Plant Condition Not Covered b Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Reactor Feedwater Control The continued operation of RFPT C beyond the Verify through thermal hydraulic and Level 8 trip set point is not covered by instrument analysis that the Level 8 Chapter 15 analysis. set point will not be reached. If the set point is not reached, the conditions are explicitly addressed by Chapter 15.
If the Level 8 set point is reached, there are. two options available:
1- Modification feedwater flow train B instrumentation, currently powered by lD635 125 VDC, should be changed to an alternate power supply, preferably lY218 120 VAC, the loss of lD635 would not generate the transient since the feedwater flow signal from the B sensor would continue to operate normally. The Level 8 condition would not occur.
2- Reanalysis an alternative to design change would be to analyze this new transient, to de%ermine the net affect of continued operation of RFPT C beyond the Level 8 trip.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision .)
1D645 125 VDC Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Half unction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control If reactor vessel level train A is selected For utilization of level train A, plant as input to the feedwater flow control, conditions are not affected. Chapter 15 there will be no affect on plant 'conditions. analysis is not required.
The Level 8 trip circuit logic will however, be reduced from 2 of 3 to 1 of 2.
If reactor vessel level train B is selected f For the loss of level train B, Chapter 15 an increase in feed flow will occur due to addresses the failure of the Feedwater Flow the low level signal being processed. The Control System in the maximum flow condi-Level 8 trip circuit will also be reduced tion. The plant response as per Chapter 15 from 2 of 3 to 1 of 2g however when Level 8 is as follows:
is reached the RFPTs and T/G will trip. Level 8 vessel level set point trips main turbine and feedwater pumps.
Turbine bypass operation initiated.
Reactor scram trip actuated from main turbine stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump trip (RPT) actuated by stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump motor circuit breakers open causing decrease in core flow to natural circulation.
Relief Group 1 actuated due to high pressure.
Relief Group 1 closed.
Turbine bypass valVes close (not simulated) causing vessel pressure to recover and depress water level; Trip attained causing Level 2 isolation with closure of the tlSIVs and initiation of HPCI and RCIC systems.
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I Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O.
lD645 125 VDC Sheet la of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse '- Cha ter 15 Anal sis Pressure Re ulator T/G Control For the case when there is no affect on the Plant conditions are not affected since the feedwater system: T/G trip is not generated. Chapter 15 When-T/G is operating at a speed greater analysis is not required.
than 1300 rpm, there will be no affect on plant performance. The T/G .EHC system will not generate a trip due to the field installed jumpers.
When T/G is operating. at speeds lower than Plant condition resulting from this loss of 1300 rpm during startup, the T/G EHC system power supply will be a T/G trip as per will trip the T/G upon loss of this power Chapter 15.
supply. The subsequent closure. of the T/G stop and control valves will not cause a scram due to scram inhibit logic at reactor power less than 30% NB. The T/G will have to go through restart.
For the case when there is a Level 8 trip due The Level 8 trip will result in a T/G trip to the feedwater system, there will be an as per Chapter 15. The plant response is associated T/G trip. as noted in the feedwater analysis.
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' :0 Report l<o. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1D645 125 VDC Sheet 2 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction 0 erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control If reactor vessel level train There will be no change in Plant conditions are not A is selected as input to the plant conditions. The power affected. The power supply Feedwater Flow Control, there supply failure does not failure does not require will be no affect on plant generate conditions beyond safety system response.
conditions. The Level 8 trip the operator capability.
circuit logic will however be reduced from 2 of 3 to 1 of 2.
If reactor vessel level train Operator retains manual con- The Level 8 trip for the 8 is selectedg an increase in trol of the Feedwater Flow RFPTs and the T/G will be feed 'flow will occur due to Control System. The RFPTs invoked as per Chapter 15.
the low level signal being can be run back using manual In addition, reactor scram processed. The Level 8 trip control. The RFPTs can ~
and recirculation pumps trip circuit logic will also be also be tripped if necessary will occur in loss of the reduced from 2 of 3 to 1 of using the RFPT trip system. T/G. If the Level 2 set-2g however, when Level 8 is The conditions are therefore point is reached, MSIV reached the RFPTs and T/G within the capabilities of closure will occurs HPCI will trip. the operator. and RCIC will initiated.
be The conditions are therefore within the capabilities of the safety system.
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Report No. 02" 0160-1102 Revision 9 lD645 125 VDC Sheet 2a of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Pressure Re ulator T/G Control For the case when there is no Since no T/G trip is incurred, This plant condition does
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af f ect on the feedwater system: there will be no change in plant not require safety system When T/G is operating at a conditions. The power supply response.
speed greater than 1300 rpm, failure does not generate condi-there will be no affect on tions beyond the operator capa- ~
plant performance. The T/G bilities.
EHC system will not generate a trip due to the field in-stalled jumpers.
When T/G is operating at The conditions generated by This plant condition does speeds lower than 1300 rpm the loss of this power supply not require safety system during startup,the T/G EHC is a T/G trip. The T/G trip response.
system will trip the T/G is not beyond operator capa-upon loss of this power bilities.
supply. The subsequent closure of the T/G stop and control valve will not cause a scram due to scram inhibit logic at power less than 30% NB. The T/G will have to go through restart.
For the case when there is a The condition generated by The safety system response Level 8 trip due to the feed" the feedwater system failure is as noted in the feedwater water system, there will be an results in a T/G trip. The analysis. The conditions associated T/G trip. T/G trip is not beyond generated are within safety operator capabilities. system capabilities.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1D645 125 VDC Sheet 3 of 3 Plant Condition Not Covered b Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of lD645 does not generate plant conditions None required.
not already covered by Chapter 15.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O 1Y218 120 VAC Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control For Complete loss of feedwater flow control For maximum feed demand, the Chapter 15 (auto and manual)< a speed freeze is invoked response is as follows:
on Reactor Feed Pump Turbines (RFPTs), upon Level 8 vessel level set point trips loss of control signal to the Electric Auto- main turbine and feedwater pumps. Tur-matic Positioner for RFPTs A, 9 and C. bine bypass operation initiated.
Feedwater flow rate is locked in at the flow Reactor scram trip actuated from main rate in effect prior to loss of power. There turbine stop valve position switches.
are three categories of conditions that can Recirculation pump trip (RPT) actuated occur subsequent to the speed freeze. by stop valve position switches.
- a. Maximum feed demand at time of speed Recirculation pump motor circuit freeze will result in a Level 8 trip breakers open causing decrease in core of the RFPTs and the T/G. flow to natural circulation.
- b. Minimum feed demand at the time of Relief Group 1 actuated due to high speed freeze will result in Level 3 pressure.
and 2 trips. Relief Group 1 closed.
- c. If the speed freeze occurs between Turbine bypass valves close (not maximum and minimum demand conditions, simulated) causing vessel pressure the feedwater system will be locked in to recover and depress water level-at, the flow rate prior to the loss of power. Low water level trip attained causing isolation with closure of the MSIVs and initiation of HPCI and RCIC systems.
For minimum feed demand, the Chapter 15 response is as follows:
Reactor vessel water Level 3 initiates Scram.
Reactor vessel water Level 2 initiates recirculation pump trip and HPCI and RCIC actuation.
MSIVs close.
Group 1 pressure .relief valves open to relieve pressure,. then close.
+4 Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 lY218 120 VAC Sheet la of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control (cont'd)
For the category between maximum 'and minimum demand, no Chapter 15 analysis is required. No transient is generated by the conditions of "speed freeze" in'the feedwater system.
Reactor Manual Control S stem (RMCS)
Ability to move control rod(s) is lost for The loss of the ability to move control any plant operating mode upon loss of power rods does not generate a plant transienti supply. The Scram safety function is still and therefore does not required Chapter 15 fully available since it is completely analysis. This system condition has no safety implications.
independent from control rod operation.
If either the Level 8 or Level 3 trip is The Level 8 or Level 3 conditions resulting reached due to feedwater flow transient from the feedwater flow transient directly (maximum or minimum demand), a scram will lead to a Scram. The Scram is adequately be initiated. covered in Chapter 15. It overrides the effect of loss of power on the RMCS system.
Recirculation Flow Control Flow control for recirculation pumps A and Since the scoop tube locking mechanisms B is disabled. Upon the loss of control (recirculation Loops A and B) react to signal, flow rates at the instant of bus maintain the flow at the instant of the failure will be maintained via locking of failure, no transient is introduced into the MG set scoop tubes. bus the system. Chapter 15 states that the loss of the master controllers cannot be more severe than the trip of both recirculation pumps.
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j'WO Report No. 02-0160 "1102 Revision P lY218 120 VAC Sheet lb of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Half unction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recirculation Flow Control (cont'd)
If the Level 2 set-point is reached as a The Level 2 conditions resulting from the result of the feedwater flow problem, the feedwater flow transient directly lead to recirculaton pumps will trip. a trip of the recirculation pumps. This response is adequately covered in Chapter
- 15. It overrides the effect of loss of power to Recirculation Flow Control System.
Pressure Re ulation T/G Control The loss of this power supply will not Trip of the T/G under these conditions is affect plant conditions for this system; covered by Chapter 15 analysis. See however, the conditions generated by the Feedwater System (page 1) for further feedwater .fystem on Level 8 or Level 3 explanation.
and 2 trips will cause the T/G to trip.
Reactor Water Cleanu S stem No affect on plant conditions, RWCS pump Plant conditions are not affected, no high differential shut-off lost. Chapter 15 analysis is required.
Nuclear Pressure Relief No affect on plant conditions, loss of Loss of Nuclear Pressure Relief Valve Nuclear Pressure Relief Valve temperature temperature indication does not require monitoring capability. Chapter 15 analysis.
Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP)
No affect on plant conditions, loss of Loss of ability to operate TIP does not ability to operate TIP. require Chapter 15 analysis.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102, Revision 0 lY218 120 VAC Sheet 2 of 3 Plant Conditions - Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control For complete loss of feedwater The maximum feed demand con- If Level 8 trip occurs due flow control (auto and manual)i dition is not beyond operator to speed freeze at maximum a speed freeze is invoked on capability. The RFPTs will demand, the following safety Reactor Feed Pump Turbines be automatically tripped on systems as per Chapter 15 (RFPTs), upon loss .of control reaching the Level 8 set-point. will be actuated: Scram, signal to the Electric Auto- The plant response is also HPCI, RCIC and RHR. The matic Positioner for RFPTs A, within operator capabilities conditions generated are not B, and C. Feedwater flow rate as per Chapter 15. beyond the capability of is locked in at that flow rate these safety systems:
in effect prior to loss of power.
There are three categories of The minimum feed demand con- If Level 3 and 2 trips conditions that can occur sub- dition is within operator occur due to speed freeze sequent to the speed freeze. capabilities. The conditions at minimum demand, the
- a. Maximum feed demand at time generated as part of the plant following safety systems of speed freeze will result response are also within will be actuated: Scram, in a Level 8 trip of the operator capabilities as HPCI, RCIC and RHR. The RFPTs and the T/G. per Chapter 15. conditions generated are
- b. Minimum feed demand at the within the capabilities time of speed freeze will of these safety systems.
result in Level 3 and 2 trips.
- c. If the speed freeze occurs The conditions generated by If speed freeze occurs be-in between maximum and an RFPT speed freeze between tween maximum and minimum minimum demand conditions, minimum demand are not beyond demand no safety systems are the feedwater system will operator capability. The feed- required to function. The be locked in at the flow water flow cannot be adjusted conditions generated by the rate prior to the loss of until power is restored to the power supply failure are power. feedwater system. and the speed therefore within the capa-freeze circuit is reset. bilities of the safety systems as per Chapter 15.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision Q lY218 120 VAC Sheet 2a of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Manual Control S stem (RMCS)
Ability to move control rod(s) For the situation when the the situation when the is lost for any plant generating feedwater system does not feedwater system does not mode upon loss of power supply. cause a Level 8 or Level 3 cause a Level 8 or Level 3 The Scram safety function is and 2 trip the loss of the and 2 trip, the condition still fully available since it ability to move control rods generated by the loss of power to the RHCS system is completely independent from is not beyond operator capa-control rod operation. bility. Even without elec- does not require safety tric power to these major system response. There is components of the RMCS sys- no transient generated by tem, the operator still this condition that would retains the capability to involve a safety function.
Scram since it morc'or is completely independent from the RMCS system. The operator would be required to regain elec-tric power in order to be able to move rods once If either the Level 8 or Level In the case in which either In the case in which either 3 trip is reached due to Feed- the Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 the Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 water flow transients (maximum trips are reached, a Scram trips are reached, a Scram or minimum demand), a Scram will will occur. The Scram does will occur in accordance be initiated. not present conditions which with Chapter 15. Therefore, are beyond the operator capa- the conditions generated by bilities. It should be noted each of these trips are that due to loss of Rod Posi- within the capability of tion Indication (RPI) from this safety system.
the RMCS, th'e operator will not be able to verify all rods in using RPI. Alternate methods of Scram verification are available through monitor-ing nuclear instrumentation, plant pressure, temperature, etc.
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"0 Report No. 02"0160"ll02 Revision Q 1Y218 120 VAC Sheet 2b of' Plant, Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Recirculation Flow Control Flow control for recirdula- The conditions generated by ~ Since no transient is intro-tion pumps A and B is dis" the loss of power to this duced by these plant condi-abled. Upon the loss of system are not beyond operator tion, no safety system re- .
control signal, flow rates capability. Recirculation sponse is required.
at the instant of bus fail- flow remains as it was prior ure will be maintained via to the loss of power- Speed locking of the MG set scoop control of the recirculation tubes. pumps is possible by manually positioning the scoop tubes.
If the Level 2 set-point is In the case of Level 2 tripJ The saf ety system response reached as a result of the the recirculation pumps will upon Level 2 trip is covered feedwater flow transient, the be tripped- This does not f in the eedwater system. The recirculation pump will trip. generate conditions beyond conditions generated are operator capability. within the capabilities of these safety systems.
Pressure Re ulator T/G Control The loss of this power supply Trip of the T/G under these The safety system response will not affect plant conditions conditions are not beyond upon Level 8 or Level 3 and for this systems however, the operator capabilities. 2 trips is covered in the conditions generated by the feedwater system safety sys-feedwater system for Level 8 tem response description-or Level 3 and 2 trips will The conditions generated cause the T/G to trip.. are within the capability of these supply systems.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O 17218 120 VAC Sheet 2c of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Water Cleanup No affect on plant conditions, Loss of the automatic RWCS pump . This plant condition does RWCS pump high differential high differential shut-off is not not require safety system shut-off lost. a condition beyond operator capa- response.
bility. The operator can manually stop the pump if the condition exists.
Nuclear Pressure Relief No affect on plant conditions, Loss of Nuclear Pressure Re- The plant condition does not loss of Nuclear Pressure Relief lief Valve temperature moni- require safety system Valve temperature monitoring toring is not a condition response.
capability. beyond operator capabilities-Relief valve downstream con-ditions can be monitored by relief valve flow monitoring until power is restored-Traversin In-Core Probe (TIP)
No affect on plant conditions, Loss of the ability to oper- The plant condition does not loss of ability to operate TIP. ate TIP does not generate require safety system conditions beyond operator response.
capability. If TIP isola-tion is desired it can be accomplished by operating the DC shear valvei other-wise, no operator action is required until the system power is returned-23
i, Report No. 02" 0160-1102 Revision 0 lY218 120 VAC Sheet 3 of 3 Plant Condition Not Covered by Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of 1Y218 does not generate plant conditions None required.
not.already covered by Chapter 15 analysis.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 lY219 120 VAC Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse - Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Manual Control S stem Control rod drive temperature monitoring Plant conditions are not affected> no is lost. Chapter 15 analysis is required.
Reactor Water Cleanu S stem Loss of letdown capability to condenser or Loss of letdown capability is not a con-liquid radwaste system> purification is dition that impacts on safety. Chapter still available. 15 analysis is not required-Loss of RWCS pump cooling protection and RWCS temperature monitoring.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O 1Y219 120 VAC Sheet 2 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction 0 erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Hanual Control S stem Control rod drive temperature Loss of control rod drive plant condition does'ot monitoring is lost. temperature monitoring capa- require safety system bility is not a condition response.
beyond operator capabilityg loss of temperature monitor-ing creates an alarm con-dition that will alert the operator that a system fail-capability'his ure has occurred. The power must be restored to the sys-tem to return temperature monitoring Reactor Hater Cleanu S stem Loss of letdown capability to If letdown is required for This plant condition does condenser or liquid radwaste the plant operating modef not require safety system system, purification is still operator must regain power response.
available. to operate the RHCS. Con-trol of this failure is Loss of RHCU pump cooling pro- within the capability of tection and RHCU temperature the operator.
monitoring.
Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O lY219 120 VAC Sheet 3 of 3 Plant Condition Not Covered b Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Loss of lY219 does not generate plant conditions None required.
not already covered in Chapter 15 analysis.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision O lY226 120 VAC Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Nuclear Pressure Relief Loss of Division II relief valve flow mon- Plant conditions are not affected, loss of itoring capability. Division II relief valve flow monitoring does not require Chapter 15 analysis-Reactor Water Cleanup System Loss of filter demineralization inlet Plant conditions are not affected, loss of temperature monitoring capability. filter demineralizer inlet temperature monitoring does not require Chapter 15 analysis.
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('O Report No- 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 lY226 120 VAC Sheet 2 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction 0 erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Nuclear Pressure Relief Loss of Division II relief valve Loss of flow monitoring is not a This plant condition does flow monitoring capability- condition beyond operator capa- not require safety system bilty. Flow monitoring is still response.
available on Division I relief valves. Temperature monitoring is also available until the power supply can be reenergized.
Reactor Water Cleanu S stem Loss of filter demineralizer inlet of filter demineralizer This plant condition does temperature monitoring capability'oss inlet temperature monitoring not require safety system is not a condition beyond operator response.
capability. RWCS system tempera-tures can be monitored until the
. power supply can be reenergized ~
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Report No. 02-0160"1102 Revision 0 lY226 120 VAC Sheet 3 of 3 Plant Condition Not Covered by Cha ter 15 Analysis Recommendation Loss of lY226 does not generate plant conditions None required not already covered by Chapter 15.
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y Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 lY629 120 VAC Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malf unction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Manual Control S stem Loss of rod control< rod(s) remain in The loss of the ability to move control same position prior to loss of powers rods does not generate a plant transient further rod motion cannot be accomplished. and therefore does not require Chapter 15 analysis.
Pressure Re ulator T/G Control Plant conditions are not affected, no 1
The loss of this power supply at T/G rated speed does not generate a transient Chapter 15 analysis is required.
due to redundant power provided by the Permanent Magnet Generator (PMG)- The T/G will continue to operate normally.
The loss of this power supply at less than Both the T/G trip and scram conditions are rated speed, when the PMG is not providing addressed by Chapter 15 analysis.
redundant power, will result in a T/G trip If this loss of power supply occurs at greater than 30'4 reactor power, a scram will occur.
Recirculation Flow Control Recirculation runback circuit is partially With no T/G trip, plant conditions remain armed due to loss of power supply. unchanged with respect to the recircula-tion system. Chapter 15 analysis is not required.
The recirculation pumps will trip if the With the T/G trip, the recirculation pumps T/G is tripped. will trip.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1Y629 120 VAC Sheet 2 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Manual Control System Loss of rod controls rod(s) of the ability to move The conditions generated by remain in same position prior control rods is not beyond the'oss of power to the to loss of further rod operator capabilities. Even RMCS system do not require powers motion cannot be accomplished'osswithout electric power to safety system response.
rod drive control, the oper- There is no transient gen-ator still retains the capa- erated by this condition.
bility to scram since it is completely independent from the RMCS system. The operator would be required to regain power in order to be able to move rods once more.
Pressure Re ulation T/G Control The loss of this power supply ~
Operator response not required, Safety system response not at T/G rated speed does not no affect on plant conditions. required, no affect on plant generate a transient due to conditions-redundant power provided by the Permanent Magnet Generator (PMG). The T/G will continue to operate normally.
The loss of this power supply The T/G trip and scram do not The safety system response at less than rated speed, when generate conditions beyond to the T/G trip is Scram/
the PMG is not providing re" operator capabilities as per HPCI and RCIC as per Chapter dundant power, will result in Chapter 15. 15. The conditions are a T/G trip. If this loss of therefore with safety system power supply occurs at greater capabilities.
than 30% reactor power, a scram will occur.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 lY629 120 VAC Sheet 2a of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Response Per FSAR Recirculation Flow Control Recirculation runback circuit Without the T/G trip, the No transient is introduced is partially armed due to loss Feedwater low flow signal into the system. Chapter 15 of power supply. only partially arms the indicates that the trip of runback logic in auxiliary one or both recirculation circuits A and B. No special pumps under normal operating compensating operator action conditions involves no will be required until the unique safety action system bus voltage is recovered. response.
The condition is within the capabilities of the operator-With a T/G trip, both Recir- The safety system responses culation pumps will trip. as noted in the analysis for This trip is a normal occur- T/G trip at greater than 30%
rence based on the T/G trip NB power, is through Scram, condition. It is within HPCI and RCIC as noted in operator capabilities. Chapter 15-33
<<':o 4 Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 lY629 120 VAC Sheet 3 of 3 Plant. Condition Not Covered by Chapter 15 Analysis Recommendation
~ Loss of lY629 does not generate plant conditions None required.
not alreay covered by Chapter 15 analysis.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Feedwater Flow Element FE-1N001 A, B, C Sheet 1 of 3 Plant Conditions - Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Reactor Feedwater Control If a single feed flow element fails such For this low feed flow condition, the that an erroneous high flow signal exists, Chapter 15 response is as follows:
the feedwater system will decrease feed Reactor Vessel Water Level 3 flow. This reduction in flow may lead to initiates scram.
Level 3 and 2 trips. Reactor Vessel Mater Level 2 initiates recirculation pump trip and HPCI and RCIC actuation.
HSIVs close.
Group 1 pressure relief valves open to relieve pressure, then close.
If a single feed flow element fails such For this high flow condition, the Chapter that an erroneous low flow signal exists, 15 response is as follows:
the feedwater system will increase feed Level 8, vessel level set-point trips flow. This increase in flow may lead to main turbine and feedwater pumps.
a Level 8 trip. Turbine bypass operation initiated.
Reactor scram trip actuated from main turbine stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump trip (RPT) actuated by stop valve position switches.
Recirculation pump motor circuit breakers open causing decrease in core flow <o natural circulation.
Relief Group 1 actuated due to high pressure.
Relief Group 1 closed-Turbine bypass valves close (not simulated) causing vessel pressure to recover and depress water level.
Level 2 trip attained causing isolation with closure of the HSIVs and initiation of HPCI and RCIC systems.
3 Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 1 Feedwater Flow Elements FE-1NOOl A, B, C Sheet la of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Halfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recirculation Flow Control Failure of a single flow element under an Since no transient is introduced by this apparent high or low flow condition will failure, plant conditions are not affected.
not introduce a transient via the recircu- Chapter 15 analysis is not required.
lation system.
If a Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 trip results, If Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 trip results, the recirculation pumps will trip. the plant response will be as described in the feedwater system. The recirculation pumps will trip as a result of these conditions.
Report No. 02-.0160-1102 Revision 0 Feedwater Flow Elements FE-1NOOl A, B, C 'Sheet 2 of 3 Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/l1alfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR Reactor Feedwater Control If a single feed flow element The low flow condition is not If Level 3 and 2 trips occur fails such that an erroneous beyond operator capability- due to the low flow condi" high flow signal exists, the The operator retains the tion, the following safety feedwater system will decrease ability to take manual con- systems as per Chapter 15, feed flow. This reduction in trol of 'feedwater flow prior will be actuated: Scram, flow'may lead to Level 3 and to reaching the Level 3 and HPCI; RCIC. The conditions 2 trips. 2 trips. The conditions generated are within the resulting from the Level 3 capabilities of these and 2 trips are also within safety systems-operator capabilities as per Chapter 15.
If a single feed flow element The high flow condition is Level 8 trip occurs fails such that an erroneous not beyond operator capa- due to the high flow the low flow signal exists, the bility. The RFPTs will be following safety systems, feedwater system will increase automatically tripped on as per Chapter 15, will be feed flow. This increase in reaching the Level 8 set- actuated: Scram, HPCI, RCIC.
flow may lead to a Level 8 point. The operator also The conditions generated are trip. has the ability to take within the capabilities of occurring'f manual control of feedwater these safety systems.
flow prior to the Level 8 trip Recirculation Flow Control Failure of a single flow The conditions generated by There is no safety system element under an apparent the flow element failure will response required for this high or low flow condition not require operator response. plant condition.
will not introduce a trans-ient via the recirculation system-Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Feedwater Flow Elements FE-1N001 A, B, C Sheet 2a of 3 Plant Conditions Power, Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stein Res onse Per FSAR Recirculation Flow Control (cont'd)
If a Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 trip The conditions generated by The Level 8 or Level 3 and 2 results, the recirculation pumps the Feedwater System impact trips require the same will trip. on recirculation pump opera- safety system response as tion. Both recirculation noted in the feedwater sys-pumps will trip. Loss of tem. The response to these both recirculation pumps is trips is within the capabil-within the capabilities of ities of these safety the operator. systems.
'0 Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 Feedwater Flow Element FE-lN001 A, B, C Sheet 3 of. 3 Plant Condition Not Covered b Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation Failure of a single feedwater flow element does None required.
not generate plant conditions not already covered by Chapter 15 analysis.
C' Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision 0 CASCADING POWER SUPPLY EFFECT Sheet 1 of 3 1Y218/1Y219 120 VAC Plant Conditions Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction Plant Res onse Cha ter 15 Anal sis The plant conditions generated by the simultaneous loss of these two power supplies are covered in the individual analysis for lY218 and lY219, respectively. The simultaneous failure of these power supplies do not result in conditions that have not already been covered in previous malfunction analyses.
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Report No. 02-0160"1102 Revision 0 CASCADING POWER SUPPLY EFFECT Sheet 2 of 3 1Y218/1Y219 120 VAC Plant Conditions - Power Supply or Sensor Failure/Malfunction erator Res onse Safet S stem Res onse Per FSAR The plant conditions generated by the simultaneous loss of these two power supplies are covered in the individual analysis for lY218 and lY219, respectively. The simultaneous failure of these power supplies do not result in conditions that have not already been covered in previous malfunction analyses.
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Report No. 02-0160-1102 Revision Q CASCADING POWER SUPPLY EFFECT Sheet 3 of 3 1Y218/1Y219 120 VAC Plant Condition Not Covered b Cha ter 15 Anal sis Recommendation The plant conditions generated by the simultaneous loss of these two power supplies are covered in the individual analysis for lY218 and lY219, respectively. The simultaneous failure of these power supplies do not result in conditions that have not already been covered in previous malfunction analyses.
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