ML17266A199: Difference between revisions

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| issue date = 04/23/1980
| issue date = 04/23/1980
| title = LER 80-014/03L-0: on 800324,w/reactor Shutdown for refueling,6B2 Heater for Sbvs Discovered to Be Inoperable. Caused by Defective Thermocouple Amplifier (Fenwal Model 543) in 6B2 Heater Control Circuitry.Amplifier Replaced
| title = LER 80-014/03L-0: on 800324,w/reactor Shutdown for refueling,6B2 Heater for Sbvs Discovered to Be Inoperable. Caused by Defective Thermocouple Amplifier (Fenwal Model 543) in 6B2 Heater Control Circuitry.Amplifier Replaced
| author name = SHOPPMAN M
| author name = Shoppman M
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| author affiliation = FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
| addressee name =  
| addressee name =  

Revision as of 02:51, 19 June 2019

LER 80-014/03L-0: on 800324,w/reactor Shutdown for refueling,6B2 Heater for Sbvs Discovered to Be Inoperable. Caused by Defective Thermocouple Amplifier (Fenwal Model 543) in 6B2 Heater Control Circuitry.Amplifier Replaced
ML17266A199
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 04/23/1980
From: Shoppman M
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML17208A556 List:
References
LER-80-014-03L, LER-80-14-3L, NUDOCS 8005080467
Download: ML17266A199 (2)


Text

0 8 OG508 NAC FORM SSO l7 TT I LICENSEE EVENT REPORT U.S NUCI EAR AECULATOAY COMMISSION

[oOij 7 CON'T[oa~j 00Q341 1 1 1Q4~Q3 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 5~OA3 53 discovered to be ino erable.For the lant condi.tions existin at the CONTROL 9LOCKI I I I IQI (PLEASE PAINT OR TYPE ALL REOUIAED INFORMATIONI I 133 9 LlCEVSEE CODE 14.5 LICSI3$E 3'IUMSEil LOI'rl I I 33 60 M ODClCET NUMSER SS 69 EVKNT DATE 14 15 REPORT DATE SO EVENT DESCRIPTION

'NO PROGAELE CONSEOUENCES QIO With the reactor shutdown for refuelin the 6B2 heater for the SBVS was time of discovery the SBVS was not required.However, i.t is not possible 5 to determine the exact time that this failure occurred, and the reactor~08 ma have been o eratin with the 6B2 heater ino erable.It is im ortant~DT to note that the other SBVS train was full o erational at all times.~o 8 See LER 878-23 for revious SBVS roblems.30~09 3 5 9 SYSTEM CAUSE CAVSE COMP.VALVK COOK CODE$USCCDK CCMPONENT CODE SVSCODE SUSCDOK*R LJR L'JR~R LJR L'JR 6 9 10 11 ll ll 15'l9 20 SEDVENTIAI.

OCCVRRE'ICR RKPDRT AKVISION~Lr RIRO EVENT YKAA REPOAT NO, ,.3 CODE TYPE~NO.Qrr rrrorr~80~~01 4'M~03~L~0'2'l 24 26 21 lS 29 30 31 22~ACTION FUTVAE EFF EC SHUTDOWN ATTACNMENT 4PROK P.'IIM'E COMP.COMPONENT TAKEN ACTION'CN PLANT MKTNPD~NOVAS+22 SUSMITTEO FORMSUS.SUPPUER.MANUFACTURER rJRL'JR LJR LJRIS LJS LJS~S 34 ,$5 56 40'41 42 4$44 41 CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORAECTIVE ACTIONS Q23 o A defective thermocou le am lif er FENWAL MODE NO.543 in the 6B2 heater control circuitr caused the heater to remain deener ized.The amplifier was re laced and the heater was retested satisfactoril

.All SBVS Shield Buildin Venti.lation S stem 3 9 FACILITY STATUS'I PD3YKA OTNEA STATUS Q N.A.METIIOD OF DISCOVERY OISCOVKAV OESCAlPTION QS2~BQDI ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE 4$LOCATION OF RELEASE Q28 N.A.~30 LUIS~R~3 S 10 IS 44 ACTIVITY CONTE."IT RELKASEO OF AKLKASE AMOUNTOF ACTIVITY QSS Q"~08 N.A.3 3 9 4 10 11 44 PERSONNEL EXPOSURES llUMSER TYPE DESCRIPTION QC9~i>~00 O IQ~ZQ33 5 11 12 PERSONNEL IIMUA36$aZ~Q'"'""-'Q N.A.30 N.A.SO 9 11 I'2 LC$5 OF CR OAMACE rO FACILITY Q42 TYPE OESCAlPTION

~gQ42 IO PUSLICITV ISSUED DESCRIPT:ON LPJ~O'.A.7~6 30 NRC USE ONLY ASS 69 50;":(3'05), 552-.3802 N.A.0 1~0 NME OPREPREA"MIKE SCHOPPMAN~12 other'A'nd'B'rain SBVS heaters were verified o erational.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-80-14 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO.ADDITIONAL EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSE UENCES The SBVS 6B2 heater is the 1.5 Kw heater provided for humidity control of'he 300 cfm cooling air flow through the'A'BVS train when the train is idle.The 30 Kw (6A1)heater which provides humidity control for the 6000 cfm system operating flow was fully operational at all times.Thus, the engineered safety feature function of the'A'BVS train was not significantly degraded.Additionally, the'B'BVS train was'ully operational at all times.r