05000335/LER-1980-014-03, /03L-0: on 800324,w/reactor Shutdown for refueling,6B2 Heater for Sbvs Discovered to Be Inoperable. Caused by Defective Thermocouple Amplifier (Fenwal Model 543) in 6B2 Heater Control Circuitry.Amplifier Replaced

/03L-0: on 800324,w/reactor Shutdown for refueling,6B2 Heater for Sbvs Discovered to Be Inoperable. Caused by Defective Thermocouple Amplifier (Fenwal Model 543) in 6B2 Heater Control Circuitry.Amplifier Replaced

ML17266A199
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	04/23/1980
From:	Shoppman M FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
Shared Package
ML17208A556	List: 05000335/LER-1980-014, Forwards LER 80-014/03L-0 05000335/LER-1980-014-03, /03L-0: on 800324,w/reactor Shutdown for refueling,6B2 Heater for Sbvs Discovered to Be Inoperable. Caused by Defective Thermocouple Amplifier (Fenwal Model 543) in 6B2 Heater Control Circuitry.Amplifier Replaced
References
LER-80-014-03L, LER-80-14-3L, NUDOCS 8005080467
Download: ML17266A199 (2)

LER-1980-014, /03L-0: on 800324,w/reactor Shutdown for refueling,6B2 Heater for Sbvs Discovered to Be Inoperable. Caused by Defective Thermocouple Amplifier (Fenwal Model 543) in 6B2 Heater Control Circuitry.Amplifier Replaced

Event date:
Report date:
3351980014R03 - NRC Website

text

0 8 OG508 NAC FORM SSO l7 TTI LICENSEE EVENT REPORT U. S NUCI EAR AECULATOAYCOMMISSION [oOij 7

CON'T [oa~j 00Q341 1

1 1Q4~Q3 25 26 LICENSE TYPE 30 5 ~

OA3 53 discovered to be ino erable.

For the lant condi.tions existin at the CONTROL 9LOCKI I

I I

IQI (PLEASE PAINT OR TYPE ALLREOUIAED INFORMATIONI I

133 9

LlCEVSEE CODE 14

.5 LICSI3$ E 3'IUMSEil LOI 'rl I

I 33 60 M

ODClCET NUMSER SS 69 EVKNTDATE 14 15 REPORT DATE SO EVENT DESCRIPTION 'NO PROGAELE CONSEOUENCES QIO With the reactor shutdown for refuelin the 6B2 heater for the SBVS was time of discovery the SBVS was not required.

However, i.t is not possible 5

to determine the exact time that this failure occurred, and the reactor

~08 ma have been o eratin with the 6B2 heater ino erable.

It is im ortant

~DT to note that the other SBVS train was full o erational at all times.

~o 8

See LER 878-23 for revious SBVS roblems.

30

~09 3

5 9

SYSTEM

CAUSE

CAVSE COMP.

VALVK COOK CODE

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SUPPUER MANUFACTURER rJRL'JR LJR LJR

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44 41 CAUSE DESCRIPTION ANDCORAECTIVE ACTIONS Q23 o

A defective thermocou le am lif er FENWAL MODE NO.

543 in the 6B2 heater control circuitr caused the heater to remain deener ized.

The amplifier was re laced and the heater was retested satisfactoril All SBVS Shield Buildin Venti.lation S stem 3

9 FACILITY STATUS

'I PD3YKA OTNEA STATUS Q N.A.

METIIODOF DISCOVERY OISCOVKAVOESCAlPTION QS2

~BQDI ROUTINE SURVEILLANCE 4$

LOCATIONOF RELEASE Q28 N.A.

~30 LUIS~R~

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10 IS 44 ACTIVITY CONTE."IT RELKASEO OF AKLKASE AMOUNTOFACTIVITYQSS Q" ~08 N.A.

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11 12 PERSONNEL IIMUA36$

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30 N.A.

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(3'05), 552-.3802 N.A.

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~0 NMEOPREPREA "MIKE SCHOPPMAN

~12 other 'A'nd 'B'rain SBVS heaters were verified o erational.

REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 335-80-14 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT PAGE TWO.

ADDITIONALEVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSE UENCES The SBVS 6B2 heater is the 1.5 Kw heater provided for humidity control of'he 300 cfm cooling air flow through the 'A'BVS train when the train is idle.

The 30 Kw (6A1) heater which provides humidity control for the 6000 cfm system operating flow was fully operational at all times.

Thus, the engineered safety feature function of the 'A'BVS train was not significantly degraded.

Additionally, the 'B'BVS train was

'ully operational at all times.

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