ML17291A631

Itl Rept 87-5-77 1 H Fire Endurance Test Conducted on Ladder Cable Tray W/P-1000 Unistrut Attachment Protected W/ Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier Sys.

ML17291A631
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Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	05/07/1987
From:	Siegel A External (Affiliation Not Assigned)
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ML17291A630	List: ML17291A629 ML17291A631
References
87-5-77, NUDOCS 9502070099
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l L>M V iD L D L A Lr TKSTIN G.LABORATORIES.

1 Xl C~C n~tnl~ta Enyln~~ra ivi~tallur y I ate 2%0 Seventh Blvd.~St.Loula, Mlaaouri 53104 31'/771-7111 I.T.L.REPORT NO.87-5-77 ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST CONDUCTED ON A LADDER CABLE TRAY WITH h P-1000 UNISTRUT ATTACHMENT PROTECTED PITH THE THERMO-LAG 330FIRE BARRIER SYSTEM DATE OF ISSUE: REVISION I: 26 JUNE 1987 29 JUNE 1987+502070099 870y07 PDR ADOCK 05000397 PDR I N DUSTRI A I~TESTINO LABORATORIES I no.I.T.L.REPORT NO.87 5-77 ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST CONDUCTED ON h ihDDER CABlZ TRAY PITH h P-1000 UNISTRUT ATTACHMENT PROTECTED WITH THE THERMO-LAG 330 FIRE BARRIER SYSTEM TEST DATE: 7 MAY 1987 TEST LOCATION: THERMAL SCIENCE, IN'200 CASSENS DRIVE ST.LOUIS, MISSOURI 63026 hPPROVED BY: INC>>INDUSTRIAL TESTING LABORATORIES, 2350 SEVENTH BQ)LEVARD ST+LOUIS~MISSOURI 63104 hLLAN M.SIEGEL, P.E.DIRECTOR DATE OF ISSUE: REVISION I: 26 JUNE 1987 29 JUNE 1987 In no event shall Industrial Testing Laboratories, Inc.be responsible to anyone for vhatever use or nonuse is made of the information contained in this Report and in no event shall Industrial Testing Laboratories, Inc., its employees, or its agents incur any obligation or liability for damages including, but not limited to, consequential damages, arising out of or in connection vith the use, or inability to use, the information contained in this Report.

I T.L.REPORT NO.87-5-77 TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE NO~leO 1.1 1 2 INTRODUCTION AND

SUMMARY

Introduction Summary 2 0 PURPOSE 3 0 TEST LOCATION 4 0 4 1 4 2 4~3 TEST PLAN STANDARDS AND REFERENCES 3 ASTM E119 Fire Endurance Test Mater Hose Stream Test Electrical Circuit Integrity Monitoring 5 0 DESCRIPTION OF TSI'S HIGH TEMPERATURE TEST FURNACE 5 1 Transfer Cart 6.0 6 1 6.2 TEST ASSEMBLY Cable Installation Opening Sealant 13 13 13 I.ToL.REPORT NO.87-5-77 TABLE OF CONTENTS CONTINUED SECTION TET1Z PAGE NO.7.0 8.0 8 1 8.2 8.3 FIRE BARRIER SYSTEM TEST MATERIALS THERMO-LAG Stress Sld.n Type 330-69 THERMO-LAG 330-1 Subliming Material THERMO-LAG 330 Prefabricated Panels 15 17 17 17 17 9.0 TEST INSTRUMENTATION 17 10.0 10 1 10.2 THERMOCOUPLES High Temperature Test Furnace Thermocouples Test Assembly Thermocouples 18 18 18 11 0 11.1 ll.2 11.3 TEST OBSERVATIONS Details of the One Hour Fire Endurance Test Details of the Water Hose Stream Test Details oi The Electrical Circuit Integrity Monitoring 20 20 20 21 12.0 TEST RESULTS 23 I.T.L.REPORT NO.87-5-77 TABlE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES PAGE NO ASTM E119 TEST METHOD TIME/TEMPERATURE RELATIONSHIP FOR ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST CABLE INTEGRITY MONITORING CIRCUITS PHOTOGRAPH OF THE EIGHTWHANNEL EVENT RECORDER AND THE MULTI-LIGHT DISPLAY PANEL TSI'S HIGH TEMPERATURE TEST FURNACE 10 GENERAL AMULNGEMENT OF A TEST ARTICLE IN THE TEST FURNACE 12 GENERAL ARRANGEMEhT OF CABLES Ih CABLE TRAY 14 SCHEMATIC DRY'ING OF THE THERMO-LAG 330 FIRE BARRIER PROTECTED TEST.ASS&1BLY 16 LOCATION OF THERMOCOUPLES 19 I i I.T.L.REPORT NO~87-5-77 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF FIGlJRES SECTION TITLE PAGE NO.THERMAL GRADIENT IN UNISTRUT ATTACHMENT AFTER ONE HOUR ASTM E119 FIRE EXPOSURE 24 10 AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM OF ALL CABLE SURFACE TEMPERATURES RECORDED WITHIN THE CABLE TRAY DURING THE ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST 27 P-1000 UNISTRUT SURFACE TEMPERATURES RECORlKD DURING THE ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST 29 12 COMPARISON OF THE ASTM E119 TEST METHOD TIME/TEMPERATURE CURVE PITH THE ACTUAL RANGE OF TEMPERATURES RECORDED DURING THE ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST 30 I.T.L.REPORT NO+87-5-77 TABIZ OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO~TITLE PAGE NO.THERMOCOUPLE CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT FOR MONITORING ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT INTEGRITY MITHIN THE TEST ASSEMBLY 22 AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM OF ALL CABLE SURFACE TEMPERATURES RECORDED WITHIN THE CABLE TRAY DURING THE ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST 26 P-1000 UNISTRUT SURFACE TEMPERATURES, RECORDED DURING THE ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST 28

INDUSTRIAL TESTI N G LABORATORIES I n c.I.T.L.REPORT NO.87-5-77 ONE, HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST CONDUCTED ON A CABLE TRAY WITH A P1000 UNISTRUT ATTACHMENT PROTECTED WITH THE THERMO-LAG 330 FIRE BARRIER SYSTEM 1.0.INTRODUCTION AND STPBIARY 1.1 Introduction This report presents the results obtained from performing a one hour ASTM E119 type fire endurance test, followed by a~ster hose stream test, on a modified ladder cable tray test assembly, protected with a 0.500 inch minimum thickness of the THERMO-LAG 330 Fire Barrier System.The test assembly consisted of a 12" x 4" ladder cable tray modified to include a 21-3/4" long L-shaped P1000 unistrut section welded to one side of the cable tray.The P1000 unistrut section, commencing at the point of attachment to the cable tray and measuring around the exterior of the attachment, was protected with a 0.500 inch minimum dry film thickness of THERMO-LAG Prefabricated Panels.Four (4)thermocouples were mounted one inch outside the protected section in order to monitor the temperature along a nine (9)inch length of the unistrut.The cable tray was also enclosed with a 0.500 inch minimum dry film thickness THERMO-LAG Prefabricated Panel fire barrier.The panels were fastened to the tray by 0.5" by 0.'020" minimum stainless steel banding material, installed alternately at a maximum of 12 inch intervals.

A total of 42 generic power and instrumentation cables were installed in the cable tray test assembly.

In addition, a flared transition design vas installed on the upper leg of the cable tray at its)unction vith the penetration through the concrete slab, and a caulked-in flared transition design vas installed on the lover leg at its penetration through the concrete slab.The fire test vas conducted in accordance vith the applicable sections of the American Nuclear Insurers Bulletin 15(79),"ANI/MAERP Standard Fire Endurance Test Method to Qualify a Protective Envelope for Class lE Electrical Circuits".

All of the materials comprising the THERMO-LAC 330 Fire Barrier System vere manufactured and applied in accordnace vith all applicable sections of Thermal Science's ("TSI")Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Manual/Quality Control Operating Procedures Manual, vhich has been previously accepted by the American Nuclear Insurers-The design configuration used in this test program is described in Section 7.0 of this test report.1.2 Suanaary Based on the results and observations of this test: (1)The test assembly, as described in Section 1.1, vas exposed to the standard time/temperature environment of ASTM E119 for 60 minutes, folloved by a 2 1/2 minute minimum vater hose stream test.Folloving the test, the pover, control, and instrumentation cables vere tested and foun'd to function vith no loss oi circuit integrity (2)The recorded cable surface temperatures in the cable tray section of the test assembly during exposure to the 60 minute fire endurance test did not exceed: A.Average Cable Surface Temperature 133.5F B'aximum Individual Cable Surface Temperature 165'F (3)The thermal gradient over the nine inch distance vithin the P-1000 unistrut section after 60 minutes exposure to the fire endurance test vas as follovs: TC/l;o.'ocation Temperature(F) 25 26 27 28 29 2 3/4" to right of Cable Tray 1 3/4" from front of Vnistrut 3 3/4" from front of Vnistrut 5 3/4" from front of Vnistrut 7 3/4" from front of Vnistrut 119-9 371.2 498.3 615.5 846-8

~,~il 0 These findings show that a P-1000 unietrut section protected a 0.500 inch minimum thickness Prefabricated Panel fire barrier and extending nine (9)inches, as measured from its interface with the outer periphery of the fire barrier, limited the surface temperature at the ad)oining section of the unistrut to the cable tray to 119.9F.(4)The P1000 unistrut, vhen protected with a 0.500 inch minimum dry film thickness Prefabricated Panel, along a span of nine (9)inches as measured into the fire xone from the point of penetration through the fire barrier did not degrade the.electrical integrity of the protected assembly.(5)The transition sections, installed at the)unction of the upper and lower legs of the cable tray and concrete access slab of the test furnace, functioned successfully as evidenced by the relative uniformity of temperature measurements.at all locations in the test assembly and by the fact that they did not allow the penetration of smoke, flames, and water into the test assembly.These recorded temperatures vere below the 325F maximum established for the cable surface temperatures by)urisdictional authorities.

2.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this test vas to: 1)Demonstrate that the fire barrier design tested herein meets the applicable performance criteria of ANI;s Bulletin 85(79)and the 325F cable surface limitation imposed by Jurisdictional authorities.

2)Demonstrate by test that a P1000 unistrut, when protected with a 0.500 inch nominal thickness of the TkK1RO-LAG Prefabricated Panel, along a span of 9 inches as measured into the fire xone from the point of penetration through the fire barrier, vill not degrade the electrical integrity of the protected assembly.3'TEST LOCATION The test vas conducted on 7 May 1987 at the laboratory facilities of TSI in St.Louis, Mo., by its personnel and under the direct supervision and total control of Industrial Testing Laboratories, Inc.of St.Louis, Mo.4~0 TEST PLAN STANDARDS AND REFERENCES The fire endurance test vas conducted in accordance with applicable sections of the ASTM E119 Standard Time/Temperature Test Method, and vas followed by a water hose stream test, in accordance with the following:

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0 American Nuclear Insurer's (ANI)Bulletin f5(79)"ANI/MAERP Standard Fire Endurance Test Method to Qualify a Protective Envelope for Class lE Electrical Circuits" American Society for Testin and Materials (ASTM)ASTM E119"Standard Method of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials" National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)Standard 251"Standard Method of Fire Tests of Building Construction and Materials" 4.1 ASTM E119 Fire Endurance Test Paragraph 3.4.1 of ANI's Bulletin f5(79)states that"the protective envelope shall be exposed to the standard time/temperature curve found in ASTM E119-76 (revised to E119-81)for a minimum of orle hour" In this test, the test assembly vas exposed to the standard time/temperature environment presented in ASTM E119-76 (A2.1)for a minimum period of one (1)hour The standard time/temperature curve is presented herein as Figure l.The required accuracy of the temperature control requirement under this test program is that the area under the test/temperature curve shall be vithin ten percent (10X)of the corresponding area under the standard time/temperature curve The authorities having Jurisdiction over'he fire safety and safe hot shutdovn of nuclear pover generating plants require that a limiting temperature of 325F, as measured on the surface of the protected pover, control and instrumentation cables not be exceeded in the course of the fire exposure.

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4~2 Mater Hose Stream Test In accordance vith Paragraph 3.4.2(1)of hNI's Bulletin t5(79), the test assembly vas exposed to a 2 1/2 minute minimum vater hose stream teat, applied to the exposed surface of the test article, vithin three (3)minutes after the completion of the fire endurance test.h vater pump vas used to provide the vater hose stream during the test.The hose vas delivered through a 2 1/2 inch national standard playpipe, equipped vith a 1 1/8 inch type, at a nozzle pressure of 30 psi.The tip of the nozzle vas held at a distance of 20 feet from the test assembly.The length of the hose vas 150 feet 4~3 Electrical Circuit Inte rity Monitoring Paragraph 3.5 of hNI's Bulletin f5(79)required that circuits contained in a test article do not de-energize during exposure to the fire endurance and vater hose stream tests.h required test condition is to continuously monitor a sufficient number of electrical circuits in the test assembly to detect failure;circuit to circuit (conductor to conductor short circuits), circuit to system (conductor continuity), and circuit to ground (conductor or ground)h schematic diagram of the three monitoring channels utilized in this test program are shown in Figure 2.In this test program, all cables vere energized using a 24 volt, DC pover source to monitor circuit integrity during the fire endurance and vater hose stream tests Selected cables in each test assembly vere instrumented for each of the three parameters'he test assemblies vere grounded during the tests The, three cable groups in each cable test assembly vere wired in series and continuously monitored during the fire endurance and vater hose stream test, using both a Multi-Light Msplay Panel and an Eight Channel Event Recorder as follovs: 1)Pover, control and/or instrumentation cables in the asembly vere connected.

as a short circuit detection circuit as shovn in Figure 2A.2)Pover, control and/or instrumentation cables in the assembly vere connected as a continuity monitoring circuit as shovn in Figure 2B.3)Power, control and/or instrumentation cables in the assembly vere connected as a ground detection circuit as shovn$n Figure 2C

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!Q g~~~~~~4~~IQ 0 g~I~~HQUUCl-h~~~~~~h The Multi-Light Display Panel and Event Recorder vill be vired in such a manner that the monitoring circuits vill be energised, and in the event of a test cable failure: 1)Circuit to Circuit: 2)Circuit to System: Light vill go on and event recorder vill indicate the condition; Light vill go out and event recorder vill indicate the condition; 3)Circuit to Ground: Light vill go on and event recorder vill indicate the condition.

The circuit to circuit and circuit to ground circuits vere manually checked at the conclusion of the vater hose stream test with a test lead to verify that the monitoring circuits vere functioning during both the fire endurance and vater hose stream tests.Figure 3 shovs a photograph of a typical Multi-Light Display Panel and an Eight Channel Event Recorder used to monitor circuit continuity.

5~0 DESCRIPTION OF TSI'S HIGH TEMPERATURE TEST FURNACE TSI's High Temperature Test Furnace is constructed of a steel plate lined with high temperature insulative material and has exterior dimensions of 49 1/2".in vidth, 77" in depth and 66 3/4" in height The bottom section of the furnace is made of 1/4" steel plate and is lined with a 5" layer of three (3)different types of Fiberfrax Durablanket.

The furnace interior is 36" wide by 71" deep by 50 1/2" high.The bottom section is further insulated with approximately 5" of Monocast 50 in order to protect'he test assembly from lour end temperature effects.The entire furnace is mounted on 4 inch"H" beam supports.A total of eleven (ll)burners are arranged in tvo groups of four on tvo opposite sides and one grouped of three at the adjoining vali.The burners are staggered to provide more uniform flaming in the proximity of the test article~A schematic of TSI's High Temperature Test Furnace is shovn in Figure 4.8

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&TENT RECORDER THE MULTI-LIGHT DISPLAY PANEL ,o~~~~~~~l.EIGHT CHANNEL EVENT RECORDER MULTI-LIGHT DISPLAY PANEL LSCJ 0 (el'a f.'l Pi'A FMMAFWi 1Wi&WMWMWW&

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~e furnace air temperature is monitored by eight (8)shielded chzomel/alumel thermocouples.

These eight (8)monitoring thermocouples, are located as follovs: 3 Thermocouples at the left vali 3 Thermocouples at the right vali 2 Thermocouples at the vali ad)oining the tvo valls In addition, two (2)informational thermocouples are located: 1 Thermocouple at the center of the plenum provided by the"U" cross section of a typical test article 1 Thermocouple at approximately midvay underneath the lower run of a typical test assembly Tvo exhaust blovers are provided to remove the flue gases and provide adequate furnace draft from efficient burner oerations.

In addition, outside air and cooling vater are bled into the flue to facilitate draft and temperature control of the exhaust gases.hs installed in the test furnace, the vali section of the test assembly vill serve as the furnace access door.The general arrangements of the cable tray test article and the vali section of the test assembly with the high temperature test furnace is shovn in Figure 5.5.1 Transfer Cart The transfer cart is used to move the test article into the test furnace and then remove it upon completion of the fire test.It is also used to transport the test article from the test furnace to the vater hose spray area.The transfer cart is approximately 50 inches long by 18 inches vide and has 4 inch diameter vheels The transfer cart is attached to the vali section of the test assembly which comprises one side of the test furnace.11

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A bl 6,0 TEST ASSEMBLY The test assembly vas comprised of a 12 inch by 4 inch ladder cable tray section arranged in a block letter"U" configuration.

The approximate length-and height of the test assembly was 5 feet and 3 feet, for a total combined fire exposed length of 8 foot minimum.The P1000 unistrut section had cross-sectional dimensions of 1 5/8" by 1 5/8'-', a veight per square foot of circa 3.51 lbs., with an overai.l length of 21-3/4".The unistrut was velded to one side of the ladder cable tray.6.1 Cable Installation A total of 42 generic po~er and instrumentation cables were installed in the test assembly.These generic cables were: Cable Descri tion uantitv 300 MCM 6AWG/3CDR 14/2C XLP/PVC Pover Power Instrumentation 26 ll 5 The location of the cables in the tray are shovn in Figure 6.6.2 enin Sealant Fire stops comprised of 50X ceramic vool material and 50X THERMO-LAG 330-1 Subliming Trowel Grade Material were inserted in the upper and lower openings in the concrete slab betveen the cable tray penetrations and the cement slab.Those sections of the cable tray and their protruding cables located on the non-fire.side of the test assembly were.vrapped with 2 inches of ceramic blanket to minimize any ma)or heat transfer with the ambient laboratory environment.

13 C A A A A A A A A A A C A b b 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 B 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 O 4~I I 3C 6 4WG B~26 300 MCM r C 0 5 I4/ZC 2ROO CASSEH5 ORIV 5LLQu5.<<~5"5-87 GENERAL ARRANGEMENT QF CABLES!N CABLE TRAY I~

7.0 FIRE BARRIER SYSTEM A one (1)hour fire rated design of the THERMO-LAG 330 Fire Barrier System vas installed on the ladder cable tray section of the test assembly using a Prefabricated Panel Ready Access Design-to completely enclose that portion of the cable tray located on the fire side of'the furnace access door~Pre fabricated Panel Sections vere also used to enclose the unistrut attaChment for a distance of 9 inches from its intersection vith the cable tray and to construct the flared transition design used to)oin the upper and the lover legs of the protected cable tray to the furnace access door at its upper and lover penetration)unction.The Prefabricated Panels vere fabricated from THERMO-LAG Stress Skin Type 330-69 and THERMO-LAG 330-1 Subliming Material-The installation of the Prefabricated Panel Ready Access Design vas accomplished.

by cutting the number of pieces required to form the fire barrier from 0.500 inch minimum dry film thickness THERMO-LAG Prefabricated Panels and then mounting the sections on the cable tray using 0.5" z 0.020" minimum stainless steel banding material The stainless steel banding material vas placed at the interface of the cable tray and the upper valX opening, and then at 12 inch maximum intervals along the cable tray The installation of the Prefabricated Panel Sections on the unistrut attachment vas accomplished in the same manner except that the stainless steel banding material vas placed at approximately 2 1/2 inch intervals The)oints and edges of the installed Prefabricated Panels vere caulked vith THERMO-LAG 330-1 Subliming Trowel Grade Materials The installation of the flared transition designs vas initiated by cutting pieces from a 0.500 inch minimum dry film thickness THERMO-LAG Prefabricated Panel and then forming each piece into a flanged section by making a 90 degree bend along its centerline.

The flanged sections vere then attached to the furnace access door using tvo machine bolts per flanged section.The installation vas performed in accordance with all applicable sections of TSI's Nuclear Quality Assurance Program Manual/Quality Control Operating Procedures Manual.h schematic draving of the one (1)hour fire rated THERMO LAG 330 Fire Barrier Design, applied to the test assembly, is shovn in Figure 7.15 4

aa~~2200 CASSENS DRIVE a'IT LOUI atiSS UIII 63 26~~NONE~oooo 6r]Qap6P~..6 5-5" 87 OOee666 SCHEMATIC DRAPING OF THE THER"10-I 4G 330 FIRE BARRIER PROTECTED TEST S oooo aJ 400Ia~FIGURE 7 8 0 TEST MATERIALS REV I 6/29/87 8.1 THERMO-LAG Stress Skin Type 330-69 This material provides a strong mechanical base for the THERMO-LAG 330 1 Subliming Material.It is an open weave, self stiffened steel mesh, having a 0.0f7 inch minimum strand diameter, 56 minimum mesh size and a weight per square yard of 1 75 pounds, minimum.This material was used in the fabrication of the THERMO-LAG 330 Prefabricated Panels.8 2 THERMO-LAG 330-1 Sublimin Material This material provides the required level of fire resistance.

It is a water based, subliming, thermally activated, fire resistive coating which volatilizes at fixed temperatures, exhibits a volume increase through the formation of a multi-cellular matrix, and blocks heat to protect the substrate material to which it is applied.In addition to this material being used to fabricate the THERMO-LAG 330 Prefabricated Panels, it is also used in a trowel grade consistency to trowel and caulk areas where required.8.3 THERMO-LAG 330 Prefabricated Panels The THERMO-LAG 330 Prefabricated Panels vere comprised on an initial layer of the THERMO-LAG Stress Skin Type 330-69, a minimum dry film thickness of 0 500 inches of the THERMO-LAG 330-1 Subliming Material, and an outer layer of the THERMO-LAG Stress Skin Type 330-69.The above materials are rated as non-combustible with a flame spread, fuel contributed and smoke developed of less than 25.9~0 TEST INSTRUMENTATIOÃ The test instrumentation used to conduct this test program consisted of:...One (1)2280B Data Logger, Serial Number 3465002~~~One (1)T'welve (12)Point Chart Type Thermocouple Temperature Recorder One (1)Digital Temperature Readout Instrument.One (1)Multi-Point Display Panel.-~.One (1)Eight (8)Channel Event Recorder 17 This instrumentation vas calibrated in accordance vi th applicable sections o f TS1'Nuclear Quality Assurance and Quality Control Operating Procedures manual, and the calibration records are on file at the offices of TSX~10.0 THERMOCOUPLES The~ocouples used in this test program consisted of shielded and unshielded chromel/alumel thermocouples.

Shielded 1/4" chromel thermocouples vere used to record the air temperature inside the ASTM E119 high temperature test furnace.Unshielded thermocouples vere used to record the cable surface temperature of the test.article during the test.10.1 High Temperature Test Furnace Thermocouples A total of ten (10).shielded chromel/alumel thermocouples vere used to monitor the furnace air temperature in the test program.These thermocouples, as shovn in Figure 4,.vere located in the High Temperature Tst Furnace as follovs: A)Three (3)thermocouples vere located at the East Mall B)Three (3)thermocouples vere located at the West Wall C)Tvo (2)thermocouples vere located at the South Mall adjoining the tvo valls D)One (1)thermocouple vas located at the center of the plenum E)One (1)thermocouple vas located approximately midvay underneath the test article 10.2 Test Assembly Thermocouples Twenty-nine (29)thermocouples vere used to measure the cable surface temperatures in the test assembly.Twenty-four of these thermocouples vere located in eight (8)cross-sectional areas along the cable tray section of the test assembly.The other five (5)vere located along the unistrut attachment as is shovn in Figure 8.18 l2 l2 l2 sss sss s/s 0 f4 pe~o~o 126~2y 2S t2>l2~dy7 pl&Tt'721$18.%f7.%'f22 22PO FN5 DR>YE T\OQUl Pi5SOVR ee~<oeo r~<<<P<<~Vl P~'5 87'NSVQCOQPLSS l OCC'TOS OV'NS~40 OI%%GUS 11-0 TEST OBSERVATIONS Details of the One Hour Fire Endurance Test The total exposure to the ASTH E119 time/temperature environment for the one (1)hour fire endurance test vas 60 minutes.Electrical cable surface temperature measurements vere recorded once every tvo and one-half minutes using the 2280B Data Logger.B.Visual Observations 1.Only light volatiles vere observed coming from within the test articles at any time during the one (1)hour fire exposure period.ll~2 Details of the Mater Hose Stream Test A.As required by Paragraph 3.4.2(1)of AKI's Bulletin 85(79), a vater hose stream test vas conducted immediately following the fire endurance test.1.A water pump vas used to conduct the required vater hose stream test.2-A 2 1/2 inch diameter national standard playpipe equipped with a 1 1/8 inch tip was used..3.The nozzle discharge pressure during the vater ho'se stream test exceeded the 30 psi minimum required in ANI's Bulletin f5(79)~Prior to the test, the nozzle discharge pressure vas tested and calibrated so that a predetermined 30 psi vas applied to the test assembly during the vater hose stream test 4.The nozzle distance from the test article vas maintained at a maximum of 20 feet 5-The length of the vater hose vas 150 feet.B.Visual Observations Hade Durin the Mater Hose Stream Test 1.The duration of the vater hose stream, test vas 3 minutes, as compared to ANI's requirement of 2 1/2 minute, minimum.2.The virgin phase of the THERMO-LAC 330-1 Subliming Haterial remaining after the fire endurance test did not separate from the test article during the vater hose stream test-20 Cl

~q g~~3, Examination of the cables after the completion of the test indicated that none of the electrical insulation oi the cables vere damaged~Further examination of the nylon tie vires used in retaining the cables within'the test article shoved no evidence of damage.llew 3 Details of the Electrical Circuit Inte rity Monitorin A.As required by Paragraph 3.5 of ANI's Bulletin f5(79), a sufficient number of electrical cables vere monitored in the test article throughtout the fire endurance and water hose stream tests.The purpose of this monitoring vas to detect failure on a circuit to circuit, circuit to system and circuit to ground basis'll electrical cables, vhich vere selected for circuit continuity monitoring, vere located in thermally critical areas immediately adjacent to the valls of the test article.B.Visual Observations Made During the Electrical Circuit Monitorin l An eight (8)channel event recorder and a multi-light display panel vere used in parallel to conduct the circuit integrity monitoring.

2.Pover, control and/or instrumentation cables in the test circuit of the test assembly were connected as a short circuit detection circuit.No failures vere observed during either the fire endurance or vater hose stream test 3.Pover, control and/or instrumentation cables in the test circuit of the test assembly vere connected as continuity monitoring circuit.No failures vere observed during either the fire endurance or vater hose stream test.4.Pover, control and/or instrumentation cables in the test circuit of the test assembly vere connected as ground short circuit detection circuit.No failures vere observed during either the fire endurance or vater hose stream test.Specific cables in the test assembly instrumented for monitoring the cable integrity during the fire endurance and vater hose stream test are shown in Table 1 21 I I4 TABLE 1 THERMOCOUPLE CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT FOR MONITORING ELECTRICAL CIRCUIT INTEGRITY WITHIN THE TEST ASSEMBLY FUNCTION LEGEND: P~Pover Cables C~Control Cables I~Instrumentation Cables CHANNEL ASSIGNMENT CABLE NONYTORYNG GRANDEE TYPE CABLE DESCRIPTION Circuit to Ground Circuit to System Circuit to Circuit 300 MCM 14/2 6AQG/3CDR 22 l I p 12,0 TEST RESULTS fire endurance and water hose stream tests conducted on the test assembly as described in this test report, demonstrate the capability of the fire barrier system to meet the test criteria specified in ANI's Bulletin 0'5(79)for one hour fire resistance.

These test results are as follows: The test assembly contained power and instrumentation cables.The test assembly was exposed to the standard ASTM E119 time/temperature environment for a minimum of one (1)hour, followed by a 3 minute water hose stream test.3.Observations during exposure of the test assembly to.the oriented and uniformly distributed

~ater hose stream demonstrated its resistance to the penetration of water during the test.4.Circuit integrity was continuously monitored during both the fire endurance and water hose stream test,'ith no loss of circuit integrity in any of the test circuits.5.Examination of the cables within the test assembly, following the fire endurance and water hose stream tests, indicated that they were all intact, functional and free from heat or fire damage.6.The recorded cable surface temperatures in the ladder cable tray section, during exposure to the ASTM E119 type fire endurance test, as presented in Table 2 and Figure 10, did not exceed: A.Average Thermocouple Surface Temperature B.Maximum Individual Thermocouple Surface Temperature 133.5F 165.6F 7.The thermal gradient over the nine inch distance within the THERMO-LAG protected section of the P1000 unistrut section after 60 minutes exposure to the fire endurance test as shown in Table 3 was as follows: THERMOCOUPLE NO LOCATION 25 26-27 28 29 2 3/4" from the right of Cable Tray 1 3/4" from the front of unistrut 3 3/4" from the front of unistrut 5 3/4" from the front of unistrut 7 3/4" from the front of unistrut 119.9F 371.2F 498.3F 615.5F 846.8F 23

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-CABLE TRAY-TC25)II 9y TC 26 TC 7 TC28 TC 29 gN I-8 P-(OOO UN)STRUT 2200 CASSENS DRIVE~lO~UI M'SSOURi 63 6~NONE OWO~0+~ease ye)QygPi', o.~6 20" 87 00~IOO~THEILKQ.GRADIENT IN UNISTRUT ATTACHMENT AFTER ONE HOUR ASTM El]9 FIRE EXPOSURE CABLE~>40 1l aosNI FIGURE 9 Lg~~~~~These findings, as delineated in Figure ll, shov that a P-1000 unistrut section protected a 0.500 inch minimum thickness Prefabricated Panel fire barrier and extending nine (9)inches, as measured from its interface vith the outer periphery of the fire barrier, limited the surface temperature at the adjoining section of the unistrut'to the cable tray to 119.9F.The F1000 unistrut, when protected with a 0.500 inch minimum dry film thickness Prefabricated Panel, along a span of nine (9)inches as measured into the fire zone from the point of penetration through the fire barrier did not degrade the electrical integrity of the protected assembly.9.The transition sections, installed at the junction of the upper and lower legs of the cable tray and concrete access slab of the test furnace, functioned successfully as evidenced by the relative uniformity of temperature measurements at all locations in the test assembly and by the fact that they did not allov the penetration of smoke, flames, and vater into the test assembly.10.A comparison of the ASTM E119 test method time/temperature curve with'he actual range of temperatures recorded during the fire endurance test is shovn in Figure 12.11.Throughout the fire endurance and vater hose stream test, the multi-light display panel remained in its prescribed lighted and non-lighted positions.

The lights were energized in the circuit to system monitoring system, vhile the lights in the circuit to ground/circuit to circuit monitoring systems vere not.The eight (8)channel Event Recorder also indicated no circuit, failures or faults during the fire endurance and/or vater hose stream tests.These test results indicate that the THERHO-LAG 330 Fire Barrier System, as tested, met the prerequisites specified by the American Nuclear Insurers and the cable surface temperature limitation established by the jurisdictional authorities.

25 AVERAGE AND MAXIMUM OF ALL CABLE SURFACE TEMPERATURES RECORDED WITHIN THE CABLE TRAY DURING THE ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST TIME ,(Minutes)

AVERAGE TEMPERATURE (F)MAXIMUM TEM PERATURE (F)0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 71.6 71~8 72.8 75.2 78.4 82~6 88.4 98 5 104.6 112 2 119.1 126.2 133.5 73.0 73.7 81.8 98.3 106.6 110.4 117'129.2 141 8 148.0 156.5 161.1 165.6 26 I SI'I I I~~I I I I'.~~I t~S TABIZ 3 P-1000 UNISTRUT SURFACE TEMPERATURES RECORDED DURINC THE ONE HOUR FIRE ENDURANCE TEST TEMPERATURE (F)TIME (Minutes)TC825 TCf26 TC827 TC428 TC029 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 72.3 72.7 74.0 76-4 79 7 83.4 87.6 92 2 97.1 102.5 108.0 113 9 119.9 75.2 78 0 100 8 142.3 176 6 219.1 238.5 259.7 277'295 8 318 1 335.0 371.2 76.2 85.9 119.6 176-4 231.4 276-1 318 6 346 1 372 0 399 1 429.4 464.3 498 3 76.8 104.4 161~9 245.6 317.6 374-2 419.3 455 8 486.9 517 3 551 4 586.4 615.5 78 2 139.0 250.9 379'482 5 555 6 612-6 658.2 694.3 738 0 768.4 804-6 846 8 28 13-fA301-5't-I

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WNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION 1.0 EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

INTRODUCTION This report documents a re-evaluation of the Fire Protection Program at the Washington Public Power Supply System's Nuclear Plant No.2 (WNP-2).In part, the re-evaluation effort was undertaken to resolve concerns and issues identified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)staff in their 1985 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)Report (issued July 1986)and in several inspections of the facility by the NRC regional staff during the first half of calendar year 1986.A plan outlining the re-evaluation approach and major milestones was submitted to the NRC Region V staff on September 16, 1986 (1).Maior elements of the reassessment included: 1)Reassessment of fire protection requirements and comnitments.

2)Re-examination of program responsibilities and administration.

3)Evaluation of program implementation (including both operational phase and construction phase implementation).

The re-evaluation efforts were accomplished utilizing Supply System engineers and fire protection professionals in combination with fire protection experts from Ebasco Services, Inc., and Factory Mutual Corporation.

Ebasco was retained to independently assess Supply System compliance with NRC requirements/commitments and with applicable NFPA codes.Ebasco also assisted in the evaluation of operational phase fire protection program implementation by performing a.fire detection system walkdown/inspection.

The re-examination of program responsibilities, organizational structure, and administration was completed by Supply System senior management.

Supply System.guality Assurance and Engi-neering staffs performed and documented an assessment of the adequacy of design and construction activities associated with the WNP-2 fire pro-tection systems/features during the construction phase.Finally, the Supply System corporate guality Assurance Department performed'a detai>ed audit of fire protection implementation activities (2)during September 1986 using Mr.P.H.Dobson of Factory Mutual Corporation and several Supply System gA engineers.

Mr.Dobson is a Registered Fire Protection Engineer with nuclear plant experience Documentation of the re-evaluation effort is contained in four reports listed below.These reports are discussed briefly in this Executive Sumnary and are included as Appendices:

Appendix;Number Report Title%IF-2 Fire Protection Pmgram Re-Evaluation, Weary 1987 Prepared By Ebasco Areas Covered NRC Requirement/

Coamitment Compliance (Section 3.0)gA Program Assessment (Section'4.0)

(Assessment of Fire Protectf on Program Kespansfbflities and MnTnfstration, Ghcember 1986 Detector Walkdown (Section 5.0)Supply Organizational System, Structure Management Responsibilities Administrative Improvements IIX.Assessment of WNP-2 Ffre: Protection fhmaxdtu~and lfmmedurail Conformance, January 13987 Supply System Fire Marshal Procedure Adequacy and Conformance BP Am EvaTuation of the Adequacy cN Desfgn.and Constructfon Azbfv4tfes Rnr the Fire RmtectÃae Program During the.Canst~ction Phase of WNP.'-2'February 198?Supply Past Design and System Construction Adequacy Engr.5 gA In adNtdimthe Sephs&er 198T gualfty Assur ance audit of the fire protection:

grngraan (Z);and'ssociated corrective action responses subset'antfh57g address the issue of operational phase implementation of the MNP-'8?FVre.Protection Program.Tbfs audit is considered an fntegral element,af the'a-evaTuatfon; however, the audit report and associated responses are:not: fnc7uded fn this report except by reference.

The results of the.audit;are discussed briefly in Section 1.4.1 of this Execu'e-;.

Siaanary., 1.2 REgljIREMENTS:

RE-EVAUQTIQN This'ask>>fnvolved!the re;evaluatfon of the WNP-2 Ffre Protection Program requirements; and'ommitment baseline.In early November 1986, Ebasco Servf~, Inc., ms: retained: by the Supply System to conduct an inde-pendent'.revfm af'he: MNP-2 Ffre Protection Program and related documents ta define.~requirements/cemitaant basis and to evaluate compliance A th~1 fcensfng requirements/commitments.

Theaethod~empTcye4by Ehasco for this revfew was to first identify dis-creet;elements ak~ch: TechnfcaT Posf tfon (BTP)CMEB 9.5-1, the appli-'ah7e:pmrti~ufF Ghrrerfa Letter 86-10, and the various NFPA Codes in effect at MNP-2.BTP CNEB 9.5-1 was used for this review even though the Supply System's coneitment for WNP-2 was to evaluate the plant against BTP APCSB 9.5-1.This was done primarily because the NRC staff used BTP CMEB 9.5-1 for its licensing review.As noted in the MNP-2 SER (NUREA 0892), the staff acknowledged the MNP-2 for use of BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and agrees to account for any differences in their review.Ebasco then identified applicable WNP-2 coaeitments and compared these to the requirements matrix.The MNP-2 FSAR, Amendment 37 and re>ated corre-spondence was the basis for a description of the MNP-2 Fire Protection Program.The scope of Ebasco's contract was limited to specific areas as discussed in Section 1.2 and 1.3 of its report.These scope limitations generally were based upon: 1)the existence of a Supply System effort which already covered the area (e.g., the safe shutdown analysis method, fire brigade, administrative controls, etc.);2)areas of the plant which do not contain safety related systems or'associated circuits;and 3).verification of building design, installation, construction, and as-built documentation.

Me believe these limitations in Ebasco's scope of work are reasonab>e because fire brigade and administrative controls are already the subiect of an ongoing review as discussed in Reference 1 and elsewhere in this document.In addition, the Supply System is in the process of finalizing a three-year 100%reanalysis of the Appendix R safe shutdown analysis.To date, this effort has expended approximately 22,000 engineering manhours.During the period of this review, audits conducted by the NRC (NRR and Region V)resulted in requests for additional information, Supply System responses, and follow-up discussions regarding compliance with Appendix R safe shutdown criteria.The Supply System has responded to and resolved all issues raised by the NRC staff to date.NRC review of the high impedance fault analysis and the high-to-low pressure inter-face (both discussed in Appendix IV of this report)remain to be completed.

Once the requirements/commitment baseline had been estahlished and evaluated, Ebasco evaluated program implementation against applicable requirements.

This evaluation was based on documentation (such as design drawings, plant procedures, etc.)and interviews with cognizant Supply System personnel.

The results of Ebasco's effort reveal that, with the exception of several deficiencies that had already been identified and corrected, WNP-2 4s in substantial compliance with its fire protection coaeitments as presented in the FSAR, Amendnent 37, and related correspondence on the WNP-2 docket.Further, this evaluation indicate that WNP-2 meets the intent of appli-cable regulatory guidance documents and NFPA codes.In some areas Ebasco has recomnended potential improvements for consideration hy the Supply System.In no case has a situation been identified which calls into ques-tion the safe shutdown capability of the plant or the overall adequacy of the installed fire protection systems.

RE~N}llAHIOl4 OF PROGRAM RESPONSHILITIES AND ADMINISTRATION TINrm trask fnvolved re-evaTuatfani of the Supply System organization and defTniWan:

af.-responsibilities for the program.The evaluation results were;suhmT'tted to Region I an January 2, 1987 (3).As a result of the m-evaTuxtFon a new position, ae the plant staf7 (WNP-2 Fire Marshal)was createdi txK improve program fmpTementation and the role of the.-Supply

~temt's.rrepstered Fire Protection Engineer at WNP-2 was strdngthened.

Rsgansfir'iill%tfes were clarrffed:

among the var ious Supply System organ-fizzs5~wIhx are involv&$ni F$rrt Protection.

Also, several adminis-Cm5ia.fmprmrement initfatrves were identified, including increased fire pna5zctNar.

reefee of'lant madi'.f'Tcations, pr ocedural clarifications, and entrancarUapen; Stem tracking.EVALUATiION:

OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION r Thie'task>>

fnvaTved.two major eT'ements.

The first consisted of an inde-pendent" assessment.

of the adequacy of operational phase Fire Protection Pragrartn imp7ementation.

The.second element involved assessment of the adequacy.'P design and constructron:

practices associated with fire prateatforr.

reTated systems during, the construction of MNP-2.Each of these eFertaats fs discussedl hefty below.l 4'anaiTI Pfrase Tlememt@tfan Assessment TIE faTTmfncp sub-tasks were fncTuded in this assessment and are discussed'-

Ardi v f duaTTy beT ow" a g4Ahdi't" Str=37&September.

T88$(2)afF PraceduraT C'ompTi'ance (Appendix II)m Rei~'P~WNP'-Z Ffre PratertrPan:

QA Program (AI~endfx; II Ehasm Repair Rection 4.0)m Rie.IRtimtfam Kystnear, EvafmtÃani (Appendix I, Ebasco Report, Re5inri R.E)),.i~A.AtuHW I)A'Auditr:86-376~

was;a, reguT'arly, scheduled audit of the MNP-2 Fire Protection Program as required.by.'he MNP-2 Technical Specifications, Seotion 6.%MS'Jr The: audiit scape included an evaluation of existing prograrntatfc:

documents, ta veri'fy continued adherence toNRC requirements, inspectT'ons'f; pT'ant areas fo~whfch fire protection is provided, and exaarlmQonr af fire.barriers fire: detection systems, and fire extin-gaishimpspstems Thfs audft: was canducted utilizing the services of an aLLtsidK independent.

ffre pmtectfon consul tant.The outline for the plannimpand:execuae aF thfs auNt was derived from NRC Generic Letter SKM"TechnicaTI SpecfRcaiirfom far Fire Protection Audits."

The results of the audit are detailed in the audit report dated Octoher 6, 1986, and in responses which define corrective actions completed or planned.In general the audit related primarily to implementation of existing commitments and compliance with procedures.

None of the audit findings were of safety significance in the context of safe'nuclear operation and safe shutdown of WNP-2.Procedural Com liance This task (documented in Appendix II)involved an assessment of the adequacy of, and compliance with the following plant procedures.

o 1.3.10, Rev.4-C-Fire Protection Program o 1.3.19, Rev.8-C-Housekeeping o 1.3.35, Rev.1-C-Fire Protection Program Controls o 1.3.36, Rev.1-C-Fire Protection Program Training t The review concluded that these procedures are adequate but need minor revisions to clarify responsibilities, update information, correct wording, and incorporate changes to implement corrective action from the guality Assurance audit.The review identified a need to improve com-pliance with procedures in some areas.Actions are in progress to improve training, controls, and enforcement of procedural compliance.

Fire Protection gA Pro ram Ebasco was requested to perform a limited assessment of the WNP-2 Fire=Protection gA Program.The results of the assessment are set forth in Appendix I, Section 3 (Items 2.86 to 2.96)and Section'.Ehasco con-cludes that the MNP-2 Fire Protection gA Program maintained subsequent to August 1980 comnitted to a@et the requirement of BTP ASCSB 9.5-i.Ebasco stated that a detailed audit would be necessary to determine compliance status.The Supply System did not request Ebasco to perform such an audit for the following reasons: Prior to August 1980, the majority of the Fire Protection Systems were covered under the guality Class II.construction gA program.'hile ()A audits of construction contractors performing Ouality Class II work were not required, t}A surveillances were performed of these contractors by the Supply System and Burns and Roe.All issues from these surveillances were satisfactorily resolved.'I The reve~ification of Completed Safety Related Mork (RCSW)task force conducted a review of the fire protection contractor and subcontractor in April of 1981.This review indicated satisfactory performance by the contractor for his scope of work.Subsequent gA audits by Bechtel Power Corporation in 1981 and 1982 of the fire protection contractor and subcontractor were performed and satisfactorily closed.

During the operational phase (subsequent to Licensing in December of 198K)', Supp'ystem Corporate gA has performed annual audits of fire protection activfties.

at WNP-2 in accor dance with the Technical Specifica&ons.

These au45trs routinely confirm FPgA program impTementation, adequacy.o Results.ef the errgineerinp auelIuation in Appendix IY of this report indicate that with.the: except%on of identified deficiencies, the design and construction:

aFi-Are protection physical plant features dummy the constntetfoN phrase were adequate.Fire Qetertian.

System Ewnl!uatfam This task was,performed<

hy Ebasce arrd is documented in Appendix I, Section Z, Items, 1.159 through T.'.T&6r and Section 5.0 of the Ebasco Report.It resul'ted'n a finding that;the detection system is not-in full com-pliance with NFPA 72D Certain~detectors would have to be added or relocated and: several!other system changes would be required to achieve ahull.compliance

.The changes'derrtified by Ebasco necessary for verbatim code canp1 fance have been eval'uatedi by the Supply System with the conclu-sion that no mchfication to~the dhtection system is required to provide recept,.adequate detectfon.

ot~firt The current detection system instal-ation was reviewed: ardl apgnne5 By ttte NRC staff prior to licensing.

Curn'etector cmRgturstfont genemlITy meets the intent of NFPA 72D.Deviation&em the urdh$s nett.cams5d'ered to be of safety.significance because detection time woultCh nat 5e significantly improved by imple-menting detector relocatfona necessary:

for strict code..compliance and detectors are not required'or.

mfa shutdown (i.e., they provide early warning, far the purpose ale manua~ll fHtre fighting).

As noted!in Sections T',.S ef thir suttltary, the WNP-2 FSAR will be clarified with respect ta the approve committments, and system configurations.

)~'$8-1.4.2 of Fire Pretactfam Spate~.Desi n and Construction at WNP-2 This.task invoTved'n.

eveTuaQam Bogy Rtpply System engineering and gA staffs af the adequacy ef deafen en5 construction activities associated with the WNP-2 Fire Pretactrfon~&agpam The report contains a review of the resuTts of previous destgp>>amB canstruction verification efforts, fire protection LERs: andi NCRs', NRt" FFndings and open items, guality Assur ance audits,.and:, the.int'er.-organizational task force evaluations of the.Fire.Protection:, Programiiniti@tedl in mid-1986.This information was usedh to:;o assess the adequacy aff'the;imnstruction phase implementation of the Fire Protection Pragpami'ncTudfng, design requirements; o assess.generic implfcations-efF fdentified problems;and o determine whether, addMonaD pNysical quality reverification shoul d be undertaken 1.5 The results of this task are documented in detail in the report included here as Appendix IY.The following conclusions were reached: o Deficiencies have been properly identified and have been or are being properly evaluated and resolved.o With the exception of identified deficiencies, the design and construction of fire protection physical plant features during the construction phase were adequate.I o No further physical reverification is warranted.

o The evaluation raised no generic concerns with the exception of the issue relating to cable derating.

SUMMARY

OF THE STATUS OF MAJOR FIRE PROTECTION ISSUES The status of several issues which have received or are still receiving an increased level of attention by Supply System management are summa-rized in this section.These issues are each discussed in more detail in the appendices.

Or anizational Im rovements to Enhance Fire Protection Pro ram Im lementation Supply System organizational responsibilities have been gore clearly defined (see Appendix II-and Reference 4)and a new position, WNP-2 Fire Marshal, has been created to improve Fire Protection Program coordination.

The organizational arrangement associated with WNP-2 Fire Protection is fully consistent with NRC regulations and guidance.These strengthened management controls are serving to ensure more effective program implementation.

Control of Combustibles NRC inspections during 1986 raised certain concerns associated with.housekeeping and admi nistrative control of combustibles within the plant.Plant Procedures PPM 1.3.10, Fire Protection Program;PPM 1.3.19, Housekeeping; and PPM 1.3.35, Fire Protection Program Controls, have all been evaluated for adequacy and effectiveness.

Where appropriate, changes have been made including:

a)establishment of Area Coordinators, b)inde-pendent management reviews, and c)use of, the newly created position of WNP-2 Fire Marshal to enforce compliance, when necessary.

a Modification of Fire Protection License Condition er"Generic Letter 86-10 The Supply System has submitted FSAR'nendment No.37 for NRC staff review and has requested a license amendment to modify the Fire Protection License Condition No.14 as suggested by Generic Letter 86-10 (5).

FSAR: date-Requireaant Basel'inc Friar, ta fsitiatiorr of the Ebasca re-evaluation of the WNP-2 Fire Pmtactiarr:

requirements/caamitmerrts baseline, it was fel t by the Supp>y System arrd the NRC staff that tlie FSAR was not as clear as it could he regarding appTicable Plant Fire Protection requirements and comn4tments.

%le Ehasce revi'ew reinforced tMs impression.

A primary carrcTusion drawn by, Ekasca's review is that a need hxists to@Tariff and: consolidate varFaus ccemitments contained in the FSAR,~ice$.$1I arrd Apperidix FIF%rrr Hazards Analysis.The problems o<cl'arity arrdl canscTMation are net safety significant; however, the Supply+stem heTieves that the prude'aurse is ta accept the Ehasco recom-mendatiarr to update the FSAR te cansolidate and clarify the commitments previausliy, approved.by the NRC ThermaTa.Fire Barrier Adequacy: The adequacy of thermolag fire barrier.was raised during the March 1986 NRC;A'udit This issue was reviewed;by the Supply System and three areas af-concern were noted:.T)less.tftarr the approved amount of thermolag material'nstal'Ted an the.heat.FPaw paths into the cable trays, 2}use of frrstaTTetlae rrl.thads that were mat tested and/or approved, and 3}not prav$dirrg the nan-combustihTe emeHng for the full 20 feet in the cable sprearl raam', 484 foot levH Radksstta Buil ding.The first.issue deaTs with the amaunt of thermolag required on seismic suppart steeT.ta assure.thaC,temperatures inside the fire harrier en-vel'ape remairr under 325.F durfrrg, ae ASTN E-119 test.During construc-fNao o$rre inches of thermal'ag; wax fnstalled on the cable tray seismic suppeW steeT: that could conduct.heat; into the fire protected envelope.Testing perforated by the verrdar," subsequent to the initial WNP-P instar-Tatiorr.has shown T8" to be adequa.te for a three (3}hour fire.For areas where a three haur barrier has bete committed to, additionar thermolag h'as been added,'o the heat,fTca<<

paths to provide 18" of protection.

ArraT'yticaT results indicate ttrati adequate protection is provided for all other areas by the arigfnaT: rrfrrr frmh covering.This is discussed in more detail in Appendix.1V The second issue pertains ta: the.use of a configuration for the conduit protective:

barrier that'ad not'beee tested and approved., Fire tests for the configuration will be compT'etre by April 1987.The need for addi-tional'orrective actions willr Ue determined based on test results.In the.interim.potentially affectedi areas.are maintained on a fire watch in accordance with the requireaerrts.

ef the MNP-2 Technical Specifications.

The.third issue involves the;adequacy of the thermolag, covering provided for the the ZQ-foot exclusion nntr fn the cable spreading room and the anaunt.of area actualTy" coveredr hy thermolag.

In several areas, the 26-foot-thermalagged zone.was im faat between 17 and 19 feet wide.AdditianaT,thermAag has sincr Bete installed.

to meet the commitment for." i I-20 feet and work is in progress based on fire testing to ensure that a one hour barrier is provided.When on-going work is complete, the installation will provide adequate fire protection in the cable spreading room arid will conform to the configuration approved by the, NRC at the time of licensing.

Fire Detection S stem The fire detection system was designed in the early 1970's.~Installation began in the late 1970's and was completed in the early 1980's.The system was field reviewed by Supply System fire protection personnel, NRC fire protection personnel, and the authorized nuclear inspector (ANI)in mid-1983.During reviews by the NRC staff, changes were required by the staff before the system would be accepted.After these reviews, all parties agreed that the fire detection system was satisfactory and met applicable requirements.

Mhile the detection system does not meet strict NFPA code compliance interpretation (see the Ebasco Report, Appendix I), we believe the installed detection system meets the intent of the NFPA code and will provide adequate early'arning of a fire.No change to the originally approved system is planned.Fire Mains An evaluation of all fire protection piping beneath plant structures has been completed.

Specific to the underground main beneath the Diesel Generator Buildi'ng, it 5s concluded that the design does not violate the intent of NFPA 24.Calculations show that the main will not be damaged by building settlement.

The main was hydrotested twice in 1986.The main may not survive a safe shutdown earthquake, but its failure would not degrade plant structures or debil'itate safety related equipment.

Other'safety related buildings were included along with the Diesel Generator Building in our evaluations.

As a result of these evaluations, design changes are being planned to: a)sleeve one of the fire mains under the Diesel Generator Building and E b)add five (5)fire isolation valves to the fire main system.Emer enc Li htin The Supply System conducted a complete review of the adequacy of existing MNP-2 emergency lighting.The purpose was to assure that all access, egress, and operator control areas were provided'ith sufficient lighting to allow for safe post-fire shutdown.Design direction has been issued to enhance lighting in the.following areas: a)Main Control Room b)Remote Shutdown Room c)Alternate Remove Shutdown Room d)SM-8 Switchgear Room e)Diesel Generator.

2 Control Room Am acit/Cable Deratin The Supply'ystem has conducted a review of Class lE and non-Class lE cabTing routed with Class TE power cable sizing criteria.The purpose was to assure that proper derating criteria have been applied for all insta1led conditions.

The resuTts of this review indicate that no additional deratfng (i.e., resizing of cable)was necessary for any of the power cables'reviewed.

Safe Shutdown Anal sis (Several NRC staff concerns arose as a result of audits conducted re-garding the WP-2 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis.This resulted in additional staff requests for information which have been satisfactorily responded to.The status of the remaining NRC concerns is as follows: a)Finalizing of the High Impedence Fault Analysis-The analysf s is scheduled for completion by April 30, 1987.No plant modifications are expected based on work done to date.b)High-to-Low.Pressure System Interface Valve Power Removal-The SuppTy System has removed power from RHR V-123 A and B but believes removal of power from RHR V-8 or V-9 to be contrary to plant safety.NRR is reviewing the Supply System position.T: 6 FUTURE ACTIONS Several follow-on actions are planned as a result of the Supply System's Fire Protection Re-Evaluation.

An overall, detailed milestone schedule is being maintained by the Supply System to track all related future activities.

Our current planning assumes approval of the proposed fire protection Tfcense amendment without major changes.A preliminary arilestone schedule for significant tasks is shown below: 'ask 1)Complete thermelag configuration testing 2)'ssue revised Nuclear Operating Standard (NOS)No.39 on Fire Protectfon 3)Implement emergency lighting fmprovements 4)Complete all Plant procedure revisions identified by the fire protectfon re-evaluations 5)t Complete planned fire.maire design modifications (assumes planned desfgn;modffication can be implemented on as-built, fire main configuration)

Schedule Completion Date 4/87 6/87'/87 9/87 10/87 6)7)8)Document in a report justifications for deviations from NFPA codes Correct thermolag configurations if required based on the test program Complete update of the FSAR to clarify.requirements basis (part of the routine 1988 FSAR update)9/87 6/88 9/88 1.7-CONCLUSIONS The results of these evaluations have been improved documentation of the WNP-2 Fire Protection Program requirements and commitments and several management initiatives to improve program implementation.

Major con-clusions are sumnarized as follows: 2)3)4)5)The Ebasco evaluation of the WNP-2 Fire Protection Program require-ment basis has produced a detailed documentation of compliance by WNP-2 with NRC and NPFA code guidelines.

Any deviation from guide-lines or codes are judged to be technically acceptable or improve-ment initiatives are being implemented.

A new organizational position, WNP-2 Fire Marshal, has been added as a result of the reviews.This new position will provide an addi-tional resource to perform fire protection tasks and is expected to improve the Supply System's ability to execute effective Fire Pro-tection Program implementation.

This organizational change was implemented by the Supply System in January 1987.Program policies and procedures were found to be adequate.However, several minor areas needing improvement and updating have been identified.

Procedure revisions to effect these changes have been initiated.

Improved management monitoring and control of imple-mentation activities is warranted and being undertaken.

Previous fire protection program review activities and related non-conformances were reviewed with the conclusion that the previous WNP-2 design and construction of fire protection systems was adequate and no further re-assessment of construction phase activities is necessary.

Based on the independent Ebasco review and our internal Supply System evaluations; the installed Fire Protection System and existing Fire Protection Programs are adequate to ensure safe shutdown capability and continued safe operation of WNP-2.

1.8 REFERENCES

Letter, G.C.Sorensen to J.B.Martin (NRC),"Fire Protection Re-Evaluation Program," Letter No.G02-86-0883, dated September 16, 1986.

Washington Public Power Supply System, Corporate Licensing and Assurance Audit 86-376,"WNP-2 Fire Protection Program," Audit dated September 8-12, 1986.3)Letter, G..C.Sorensen to J.B.Martin (NRC),"WNP-2 Fire Protection Program Re-Evaluation," Letter No.G02-87-0001, dated January 2, 1987.4)Letter, G.C.Sorensen to Document Control Desk,"Licenke No.NPF 211, Request for Amendment to License Condition 2.c.(14)and Removal of Fire Protection Requirements from Technical Specifications," letter No.G02-87-0046, dated February 10, 1987.5}Generic Letter 86-10,"Implenentation of Fire Protection Requirememts," dated April 24, 1986.6)letter, G.C.Sorensen to Document Control Desk,"Fire Protection Program," Letter No.G02-87-0034, dated January 29, 1987.7)Letter, E.G.Adensam (NRC)to G;C.Sorensen,"Fire Protection Program for WPPSS Nuclear Project No.2-License No.NFP 21," dated February 5, 1987.i WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM WNP-2 FZRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 0 1.2 1.3 1.4 GENERAL DESCRIPTION Purpose Scope of the Report Description of the Report Scope Names and Biographica1 Sketcnes of Reviewers 2.0 LICENSING AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS (NRC BTP QKB 9.5-1;NRC Generic Letter 86-10;Reference Sources: NFPA Codes and Standards, NRC BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix R to 10CFRSO, ASTM, etc.)3.0 LICENSING AND DESIGN COMMITMENTS AND COMPLIANCE STATUS, RECOMMENDATION(S)

FOR CLARIFICATIONS OR IMPROVEMENTS 4 0 QUALITY ASSURANCE (Qh,)AND FIRE PROTECTION ENGINEERING INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENTS OP RiP-2 Qh.PROGRAM 5 0 PIRE DETECTION SYSTEM VALXDOMN REPORT 6 0 LIST OF IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENTS 7.0 WNP-2 NFPA CODE COMPLZhHCE i I l-I!..1 I WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM WNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION 1.0 GENERAL DESCRIPTION 1.1~Poz oee Review the WNP-2 Fire Protection Program (FPP)documentation to identify areas where the Program deviates from Standard Review Plan NUREG-0800 Rev.3 Branch.Technical Position (BTP)'MEB 9.5-1 Rev.2;examine deviations to determine compliance with commitments made by the Supply System;and make recommenda-tions regarding identified deviations.

1.2~Sco e 1 2.1 Review under the direction of the Supply System's Fire Protection

~~~~~~ngineer, the WNP-2 FPP base commitment document;FSAR Section 9.5.1, Amendment 37 against BTP CMEB 9-5-1 F.P.guidelines.

1.2.2 Identify compliance or deviation(s) from NRC F.P.guidelines' 2.3 Where deviations are identified, evaluate to determine if the deviation constitutes a potential failure to comply with WNP-2 commitments.

If so, determine the extent of NRC Staff acceptance of the deviation.

1.2e4 Verify formal deviations taken from NRC criteria described in.Appendix.A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1, technical requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50, or applicability of BTP CMEB 9.5-1 criteria to WNP-2 FPP commitments.

1 2.5 Review implementation of the WNP-2 FPP based on design documents, procedures, input from Supply System cognizant personnel, or walkdown(s) as~i~required, and assess the implementation compliance status 2.6 Provide overall recommendations for clarification of WNP-2 FPP~~commitments or potential improvements.

0809u 1.2.7 Excluded from this effort are: a Safe Shutdown Analysis in'c'ase of fire (Appendix R to 10CFR50)methodology, Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown, Safe Shutdown Capability.

5 Hire protection systems within NRC's Jurisdiction covering areas wMch do not contain safety related systems, equipment or associated circuits required for Plant Safe Shutdown in case of a fire-c Verification of instaHation, constructioa and installation doc(uneatation of the fire protection equipment, systems or components Review of Pire Brigade andi~ding Design.13 Ih~~on of the Re ort K 1.3 X.'tive bssLa of QNP-2 PPP re-eva1huatfon (at this time)is not a~exificatian.

of the PPP, but: insteadi 1a a r~valuation based on Washington Power Supply Syatem (Supply System):: Kaput~aad limited to areas containing safety recta%systems required for EEaae saf'e shutdown ia case of fire.f Are pumps andi water supplies were eei(Xumtiak because they are instrumental to insure that the fire suppression.

agent-Xa delivered when needed to protect the Plant: safety~reXated systems requi.redt four, safe shutdown, in case of a fixe.The evaluation.

by Ebasco Services Incorporated (Ebasco)is further restricted to those.WHP-Z.

cemxltmeats made: to the HKC up to aad including the PSAR Amendment; ST,, set, forth ia correspondence between Supply System and NRC through October EBS The NKC.guideUnes(for fixe pxotection, NFPA Codes and Standards:aad(ether applicaMe criteria(were reviewed only as they applied directIy, or.Xn(Px cd to protect.WNF-Z axaLs(contaiaiag safety related systems, eqafpmeat aad components(req+~K for plant safe shutdown ia case of a&re Areas(within NRC gerisdicti'oa'hi((4o not.have safety related e~pnent;mr~erne required four..prana-se6a shutdown (such as areas where a fire could potentially cause release of radioactivity to the atmosphere) were excluded from the scope of this review.These include the Turbine Building>Radwaste and Decontamination Areas.1.3.2 The detailed scope of work for Ebasco was defined in Supply System Interoffice Memorandum No.58400-CDE&050-86 dated November 7, 1986;formally.revised by mutual agreement between Supply System and Ebasco, via letter EBW2-FP-86-0001.

They.are in the supply system contracts file.1.3.3 The Administrative controls were assessed only through the review of WNP-2 pro)ect procedures highlighted by WNP-'2 engineers.

1 3.4 The WNP-2 Quality Assurance (QA)program was reviewed only for adequacy based on documentation provided by the Supply System Ebasco scope of work did not include review of the QA program implementation.

1.3.5 The Safe Shutdown Analysis in case of fire (Appendix K to 10CFK50)and~~ll related aspects were specifically excluded from the Ebasco scope of work.1.3.6 The fire protection for remote safety related panels was limited to the assessment of the panels separation from other safety related areas.1.3.7 Also excluded from the scope of Ebasco review were Special Protection Guidelines and Record Storage Areas, Cooling Towers and Miscellaneous Areas-1.4 Names and Bio ra hical Sketches of Reviewers Names and Biographical sketches of the Ebasco Fire Protection and Quality Assurance Engineers who performed the WNP-2 Fire Protection Ke-Evaluation are: Fire Protection En ineers: Margereta A.Serbanescu

-Team Leader Joseph Grande-Lead Engineer Max A deVries-Support Engineer Orner Semen-Support Enginer Qualit Assurance En ineer: Robert J.Nespeco-Lead Engineer 0809u 1-3 The resumes of above listed engineers are on file with the Supply System.S h SERElHESCT

-PERE PROTECTION SUPERVISOR AND TEAM LEADER Ebasco utilized the services of M.h Serbanescu as Fire Protection Supervisor and Team Leader for the Vashington Nuclear Prospect Unit No.2.Era Serbaaescm brings 13 years of eag1neering experieace in fire protection for nuclear power plaats, including preparation of des1gn criteria, system design descriptions, fire protection program development, safety analysis reports, fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis in case of fire (Appendix R to 10CFR50).She was responsible for development of f1re protection systems from basic criteria through procurement, installation, aad startup, aad was directly QxvolvecE hx.pneparation or evaluation of fire protection programs for a Xerge manher ef KacXear power plaats.Im her 13 yeara of experience in fire protection, out of which 8 are at Ehasco, Mrs Sexbaaescu has been involved in fixe protection engineering, and',&censI,ag, activities on total 13 nuclear prospects, out of which 9 mme at.Ehasco She was.involved in Ebasco Nuclear Standardization program fire.pratection systems design description and criteria for all t'ai fats of reactors~Sea Sedhmesca possesses a Masters degree in Mechanical Engineeriag from the PoXXtechnfc institute of Bucharest, Romania She qualifies as a"Member.of.the Soc1ety of Fire Protection Eng1neers, she is a member of National Pire: Protection Association and prepared and presented technical paper.about: fire protection considerations ia power plaat design and construction-Ebssco ot~fxedi the services of J Grande aa Tire Protection Principal Rqgbxeer far the Sxclear Prospect Uhit Ke.2 Washington.

Mr.Grande brings 26 years of experience in design, engineering and onstruction of fire protection for Fossil and Nuclear power plants>institutional, industrial and commercial pro)ects including preparation of System Design Descriptions, design criteria, all technical writiag (specification reports, studies, etc.), client liaison, vendor and contractor supervisioa and was heavily involved in fire hazard and risk evaluation analysis and FSAR efforts.In his 26 years of experience in fire protection out of which 9 axe at Ebasco, Mr.Grande has beea involved in fire protection engiaeering activities on 7 Nuclear power plants.Mr Grande attended New York Community College.M.h.deVRIES-PIRE PROTECTION ENGINEER AND SUPPORT ENGINES Ebasco utilized the services of M.A,.deVRIES as Fire Protection Engineer for the Washington Nuclear Prospect Unit No.2.Mr deVRIES has 10 years of engineering experieace in fixe protection of power plants including system design descriptions, safety analysis reports, fire hazards analysis, and safe shutdown analysis in case of fire (Appendix R to 10CFR50).During his 7 years with Ebasco, Mr.deVRIES has been involved in fire protection engineering activities on 5 Ebasco nuclear prospects.

Mr.de%DES possesses a Bachelor of Science degree in Mechanical Engineering and Master of Science degree in Management Science, both from Fairleigh Dickinson University, Teaneck, New Jersey.He is a"Member" of the Society of Fire Protection Engineers and Associate Member of the American Society of Mechaaical Engineers.

0 SEMEN-PIRE PROTECTION ENGQGKR AND SUPPORT ENGINIKR basco utilized the services of O.Semen as Fire Protection Eagineer for the Washington Nuclear Prospect Unit No.2.0809u 1-5 Hn Semen brings 8-Il2 years of engineer1ng exper1ence in fire protection for.fosaU.nuclear fueled electric generating stations and commercial prospects~

including preparation of design criteria, system design,.descxfpMan, safety.analysis reports, fire hazards analysis and safe shutdown: analysis in case of fire (Appendix R 10CFR50)~Hs=~mmgensihle for~opment.of fire protection systems from basis egin>fe Mmughout procurement>>

installation and startup for a large number ef Kuclear power plants Xn'hi's, 8-Ii/2.years of experience:

in engineering, out of which 7 are at Ebasco;Er-Semen has been involved in fire protection engineer1ng on'total of 7'ucIear iud 3 fossil prospects.

Hxz Semam possesses a Echelon of Eagineering 1n Mechanical Engineering OLEJK36 fram the CRT ChXXeae of Kew York.ASSURANCE ENGIKKR AND IZAD ENGINEER E5aew utdiXhx8 the services of E Z Kespeco as Pro]ect Quality Assurance:

Engineez'for the'.Qashfngtoa Nuclear Prospect Unit No.2.Hz.Hhsyeea brings I9'ears, aZ experience in Quality Assurance, chose..@earns-hsva Seam~35asco working in various phases of nuclear power: FXaxdr.d.'esfgm acus retrafrXtr:

a~Wties These activities 1nclude resp~biXity Son the., d'evelopment; and management of ma)or pro)ect quality<.assurance programs;;

development.

and implementation of quality assurance:

plans;for equipment'pecif9;cation and procurement; rev1ew of suppl'ien.

qual'f ty assuage.programs-technical management of pro)ects;Ee..Hhspeco,has:

a BME:, Erma City C'omega of New York, is a member of ASME, anB a Kcgfatered:

Professional~

Engbxeex: fha the States.of New York and PXmfdia WASHINGTON PUBLIC POKER SUPPLY SYSTEM WNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROCRAM RE-EVALUATION 2~0 LZCENSINC AND DESICN REQUIREMENTS (NRC BTB CMEB 9.5-1;NRC.Generic Letter 86-10;Reference Sources: NFPA Codes aad Standards,'RC BTP APCSB 9.5-1 A endix R to 10CHL50 ASTM etc.)ITEM NO./CRITERIA.2il BTP CMEB 9.5-1,"C.POSITION, 1.P1re Protection Pro ram Re uiremeats a Pire Protection Pro ram A f1re protection program should be established at each nuclear power plant.The pxogram should establish the fire protection policy for the protection of structures, systems, and compoaeats important to safety at each plant aad the procedures, cquipmenty and personnel required to implement the program at the plant siteo{1)The fire protection program should be under the direction oi an iadividual who has been delegated authority commeasurate with the responsibilities of the pos1tion and who has available staff personnel kaowledgeable in both fire protection and nuclear safety." NRC GEN)KIC LETTER 86-10: No additioaal guidance,~2 2.BTP CYEB 9.5-1, Item C l.a, Pire Protectioa Program (Coat'd): "(2)The fire protectioa program should extend thc concept of defense-ia<epth to fire protectioa in fire areas important to safety, with the following objectives:

o to prevent fires from starting;o to detect xapidly, control, aad extinguish promptly those fires that do occur", o to provide protection for structures, systems, aad components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extiaguished by the f1re suppressioa activities will aot pxevcat the safe shutdowa of thc plant." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional gu1dance.2 3 BTP CMEB 9 5-1, Item C.lpga, Fire Protectioa Program (Cont'd): "(3)Responsibility for the overaL1 fire protectioa program should be assigned to a person who has management control over all organisatioas involved in fire protectioa activities Formulation and assurance of program implementation may be delegated to a staff composed of pcrsonael pxeyarcd by training aad experience in fixe protectioa aad persoaael prepared by training aad experieace in nuclear plant safety to provide a balanced appzoach ia directing the fire protection program for the nuclear power plant." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10'o additioaal guidaace 1105u 2 1 2.4 EXP QKE 9 S-2&ear C'-Z a.S>>Fire Protection Program (Cont'd)z"(3)The Staff should be responsible for" (a)Pire protecz<ozu pro~requirements, including consideration of pcztezztfaL hammKa assaakated with postulated fires, with knowledge of building Xayout, andi systems design.(bi P~re s~a~~~(c)Design, audntenance, auxvef&aace and quality assurance of all a%re protectiom featnrea Qeg, detection systems, suppression systemsiazrriena, damnee~doors, penetration seals, and fire tEKQRlcc ccg+PMRRe (dI)Pisa~evezzzzfozn

~Mt&el (administrative controls and training).

C)he (f)Prie yXazzzzizzR HRC GEHERhL, LEZTEL 86-16" Qr additional guidance.4~0'r 2.5 STP CKE 9.5-2Item C'a, Pire Protection Program (Cont'd)z"(4)The organizational responsfbil'itiezsazzrK.

Kin'es of communication pertaining to fire protection should'a definaB betweezz the various positions through the use of, organixationa3'harts and: Gszzctiona?

descriptions of each position's responsibilities.

The: foI?owing po~onslorganixations should be designated: (e$The ulnar XeveX.ofKaQm aszzagement position which has management HRC.GENERIC,?QUEER'.

8&%A.H'm abortional guidance.2 5 STP CHES%~Xaam C;~4', Eire Protection Program (Cont'd): "(b)The.Offsite managemenz." position(s)i Cfrectly responsible for formulating, protection program foz: the XXcensea",s nuclear power plant including fire drills awk training.cozabmtaH hei tha EEre, brigade and plant personnel.

The results of these assessmezzts sEauXcB he reported to the upper level management or corrective.

~Lans~aa deemed zzecssarrg

%Lt GEHERXE IBEXES 86 XK:: Hbc aME&onal guidance.2.7 STP CHES: 9.5-1~Item:C'I a.4;H.re: Protection Program (Cont'd)z"(c)The onsite aanagemenzz-position responsible.

for the overall administration of the plant.operations'and!

emergencyplamL".

which.include the fire protection and prevention program amh which>>prov&'ma;ahzgle point of control and contact, for all.contingencies

."*j,~HRC GEHZRXC.'?E'ER'6-'lazz Ho: aKMtional guidance.

2.8 BTP e onsite iv.vi, CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.l.a.4, Fire Protection Program (Cont'd): "(d)position(s) which: Implements periodic inspections to: minimize the amount of combustibles in safety-related areas;determine the effectiveness of housekeeping practices; assure the availability and acceptable condition of all fire protection systems/equipment, emergency breath1ng apparatus, emergency lighting, communication equipment, fire stops, penetration seals and fire-retardant coatings;..

and assures the prompt and effective corrective actions are taken to correct conditions adverse to fire piotection and preclude their recurrence.

Is responsible for the fire fighting training for operating plant personnel and the plant's fire brigade;design and selection of equipment; periodic inspection and testing of fire protection systems and equipment in accordance with established procedures, and evaluate test results and determine the acceptability of the systems under test.hssists in the critique of all fire drills to determine how well the training objectives have been met.Reviews and evaluates proposed work activities to identify potential transient fire loads.Implements a program for indoctrination of all plant contractor personnel in appropriate administrative procedures which implement the fire protection program, and the emergency procedures relative to fire protection.

Implements a px'ogram for instruction of personnel on the proper handling of accidental events'such as leaks or spills of flammable materials that are related to fire protection." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.%~2.9 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.l.a.4, Fix'e Protection Program (Cont'd): "(e)The onsite position responsible for f1re protection quality assurance.

This position should be responsible for assuring the effective implementation of the fire protection program by planned inspections, scheduled audits, and verification that the results of these inspections or audits are promptly reported to cognizant management personnel." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.l0 BTP 6KB 9.5-1, Item C.l.a.4, Pire Protection Program (Cont'd): "(f)The positions which are part of the plant fire brigade'he plant fire brigade positions should be responsible for fighting fires.The authority and responsibility of each fire brigade position relative to fire protection should be cleaxly defined.11.The responsibilities of each fire brigade position should correspond with the actions xequired by the fire fighting procedures.

111.The responsibilit1es of the fire brigade members under normal plant condit1ons should not conflict with their responsibilities during a fire emergency.

1105u 2-3 Ttb cdhdmum number of trained fire brigade members available once".for each operating shift should be consistent with the<~5CSm nnp&xa%to combat the most significant fire.The size aF tha EKre brigade shouXd be based upon the functions required to fig~H.*res;Mth adequate allowance f or in5uries."Pelvat>>Fire B'zigades";'s specified in NPPA No.27-1975, ixuJhd~g th>>appXicable NPPA.publications listed in the Appendix tel SEER, No X7'az>>conafkezed appropriate criteria f or SEE CZRKXC;EERIER 86-XCt Ke ad8itional guidance REF',%NECK HPFk.2T'UL Persoun SEC CRHZRM;TZXXEKt 8&KG'-Sn: adiBMonaI.

guidance IEP SOURCES: HEPT~.HEEL', SPED 6~HPPA 27, BTP.'CHER'R&R.',, Xtam: t X a~Fire Protection Program (Cont'd): "(5)el Qsalifi'caMons (a))The;-position responsible fm formulation and implementation of the fi.re.protecti'on program shouXd.have within his organization or as a consultant;a fire protectioa engineer@ho is a graduate of an axnnpReemR nnt: maes than;&peery of engineering attainment fm&a~~aE geest ie, eaghneering competency and achievement, 3 years<aK vMBh aRuaXL have.beea ia responsible charge of fire eligf:1dIi~

reqMrementa as e.Member in the Society of Fire Pzotectioe Engineers..

ttlg)The'Ura.bc4ycka members" Wud~Lfica tions should include strenuous~acti~~

san aE, tha fire brigade training described in Foakticnu.

O'tF.(~The persanneIL zespom6bXe Sn the maintenance and testing of the bl I<<<<shnuSR b>>.ymXXKL'a5 hy<<tzafafng ant experience for such work.The.-5eIXavfng,HPPR.yuMfcathnaa QhmXrK be used f or guidance to develop th>>.fkre.-protection.

pzngraa-" Ho..4;-Organization for Fir>>8>>races" Ho.4'-Organixat1on of;ai Piro'epartment" No..6.-Industzia1'ire Loss Prevention" Ho-7-"management.-

of.'ica..Emergencies" operations; Ho 27.'"Private.Fire.Brigade¹, an~aLtes:where.

there ia an'operaChxg reactor and construction or modification~

of.othez." units ia und'estray, the superintendent of the operatingr, p~shnuM hLve1 the.Xead'esponsibility for site f ire procecticAh 1

.12 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.l.a, Pire Protectioa Program (Cont'd): "b.re Hazards hnaL sis he fire hazards analysis should demonstrate that the plant will maintain the ability to perform safe shutdown functions and minimize radioactive releases to the environment in thc event of a fire.The fire hazards analysis should be performed by qualified fire protection and reactor systems engineers to (1)consider potential in situ and transient fire hazards;(2)determine thc siquences of fire in any location ia the plant on the ability to safely shut down the reactor or on the ability to minimize and coatrol the release of radioactivity to the environment; and (3)specify measures for fire prcveation, fire detection, fire suppression, aad fire containment and alternative shutdown capabiLity as required would be for each fire ares containing structures, systems, and components important to safety that are in coaformance with NRC guideliaes and regulations."NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: "To ideatify plant specific situations in which seismic events could initiate a fire in a specific plant area, the fire protection engineer and systems engineer performing the fire hazards analysis should be concerned with in-situ combustible materials which can be rclcased in a maaner such that they could contact ia-situ igaition sources by a seismic event.hn example of this would be the rupture of the RCP lube oil line directly above the reactor coolant piping.The fire protection engineer should also be concerned with seismic induced ignition sources, electrical or mechanical, vhich could contact acarby in-situ combustible materials.

Where plant systems are designed to prevent the release of combustible materials caused by a seismic cvcnt, such as a dike around a fuel oil tank transformer, or seismic supports for hydrogen lines, then no fire need bc arbitrarily assumed to take pLace ia the fire hazards analysis.The post-seismic procedures should include a damage survey, and a determiaatioa of whether any fires vere initiated as a result of the seismic event." 2.13 BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.l.b, Fire Hazards haalysis (Cont'd): "Worst case" fires need aot be postulated to bc simultaneous

<<ith non-firemclated failures in safety systems, pLaat accidents, or the most severe aatural pheaomena." NRC GENERIC LET'.HR 86-10: "For those plants rcvieved under hppendix k, our position is (k.4): Postulated fires or fire protection system failures need not bc considered coacurrcat with other plant accidcats or the most severe natural phenomena."1105u 2-5 2 X4, STP CKB 9-$-X.~Xtem C'l.b, Fire Hazards Ana1ysis (Cont'd): "On mu1tipXe-reactor sites, unrelated fires in two or more units need not be pmuM~~ed te occur shueltaneously Fires involving facilities shared betveen unj;ti ancE fires du>>to man~e sit~elated events that have a reasonable probability of occurring aai affecting more than one reactor unit (such as an aircrafr.crash)shouM be considered.

SRL GENERIC LITTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2 XS EEP CHEB 9 5-X., Item C 1 b, Fixe Hazards Analysis (Cont'd): "Because flora map affect safe shutdown systems and because the loss of function of systeaa used to afti@ate the consequences of design basis accidents under pos~ire conditions does not per se impact public safety, the need to limit fire.damage to systems required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions is greater than the need to limit fire damage to those systems require to mitigate the consequences ef design basis accidents.

Three levels of.fire damage limits are established according to the safety function of the structure.'g system or component e'ne train of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown fan either the control room or emergency control station(s) must be maintained free of fire damage by a single fire, including an exposure fire.CeM.Shntdaaa Both trains of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdown may he damaged by a single fire, including an exposure fire, but.%mage must be limited so that at least one train can be repaired or made operable nothin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using onsite capaldiity Both trains of equipment necessary for mitigation of conse-quences follcwing design basis accidents may be damaged by a afngle exposure fire" HRC GENERIC LZETER 86-10: No additional guidance.

.16 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.l.b, Fire Hazards Analysis (Cont'd): "The most ringent fire damage limit should apply for those systems that fall into more n oae category.Redundant systems used to mitigate the consequences of other design bas1e accideats but not accessary for safe shutdown may be lost to e single ezposure fire.However, protection shall be provided so that a fire within only oae such system will aot damage the redundant system." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.17 BTP CNEB 9.5-1, Item C.l.b, Fire Hazards Analysis (Cont'd): "The fire hazards analysis should separately identify hazards aad provide appropriate protection in locations where safet~elated losses can occur as a result of: (1)Conceatretions of combustible coatents, including transient fire loads due to combustibles ezpected to bc used in normal'operations such as refueling, maintenance, aad modifications; (2)Continuity of combustible contents, furnishings, building materials, or combinetione thereof in coafiguretions conducive to fire spread;(3)Exposure fire, heat,,smoke, or water exposure, including those that may necessitate evacuation from areas that are required to be attended for safe shutdown;(4)Fire in control rooms or other locations having critical eafety-related functions; (5)Lack of adequate access or smoke removal facilities that impede fire extinguishment in safety-related areas;(6)Lack of cxploeio~reventioa measures;7)Loss of'electric power or control circuits;)Inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: "Neither the industry nor the staff hes been able to develop criteria for establishing design basis fire conditioas for a single"desiga basis fire" bccausc the ia-situ aad potent1al transient combustibles vary widely in different areas of the plant.However, the establishment of a specific"design basis fire" for individual fire areas or zones is a prerequisite to performance of a valid fire hazards analysis.The protection for redundant/alternate shutdown systems within a yard area would be determined on the bases of the largest"design bes1s fire" (sce response to question 3 8.2)that is likely to occur and the resulting damage.The boundaries of such damage would have to be)ustified with a f1re hazards analysis.The analysis should consider the degree of spatial separation between divisions; the prescncc of ia-situ and trans1ent combustibles, including vehicular traffic>gradingj evailablc fire protection; sources of ignition;and thc vulnerabi11ty aad criticality of thc shutdown related systems.See Sections f3, f4 and f6 of thc"Interpretations of Appendix R." 1105u 2~7

?IE.EEEGHEP P 5-1, Item C 2 bFire Hazards hnslysis (Cont'd): "The ire hmanhs ansi~should verify that.the NRC fire protection program guidelines have baca-mca Xhe analysis shaeM list applicable elements of the program,<<itli;expiatory.statements aa needed to identify location, type of system, aad>>design cd:tcMa The anslyafa should ideatify and)ustify any deviations from.thc.reguDNnry>>

guidcILncs Jitstification for deviations f rom the reguistory>>

y~fXmm shouldI sho<<that.an equivalent level of protection vill be achieved: DeZeeion of a protective feature<<ithout compensating aiEeenzatdva gx~Eon meaezzea~not be acceptable, unless it is clearly MC: CKKRXC'ZX12R.

86-XC Fo additioaal guidance.X'%BXP SE%.5-1, Item C I,.Pire Protection Program (Coat'd)-"c.Pire.si'om S: tern Desi n Easii I.Tota1.rc1'i'ance should aot e placed on a single fire suppressioa system.hpyropriate.backuF Eire supprcsafaa capability should be provided." HRC" CKHEKD DEXTER 86-16 Eo additional guidance.ESP CHBR%~X., Xtem C~>>Pire Suppression System Design Basis CChat.dX;, (%Pi 4 shingle active.faUhne or a crack in s Ioderste-energy line gpipe)~in>>thc.IX'uppression system'hould not.impair both the primary and backup fire aqrpressfon cspab1ILty, For ezamplc, neither the failure of s fire.pump;its.po<<cr: supply.or controls, nor a crack ia s aoderat~nergy line ia: the fire:aqqrrcssioa, system,, shouM result in loss of function of both sprfakYexcamB hase.standpipe systemi La an area protected by such primary snd bac3aq~ayateL HRC.'ESKKZC LEH5X 86'-10'-Ko additional guidaace.IX&CHER 9&-I Idea~c Padre Suppression System Desiga Basis CCmad'd9Q>As'.

mafaimumthc.froze suppression system should be capable of~veriag.'<<atcr:

Ce aaaual hose statLaae located<<ithia hose reach of areas caataiaiag~m~+me~

required for saf'e plant ahutdo<<n followiag thc safe shutdown earthquaRa (SSE)~Xa: areas of;high seismic activity, the staff<<ill consider on ac case-~ass:

basis the need.to design thc fire detection snd suppression~systems; to bc functional.

following the SSE." MRC" CEHKRIC-LEXXER'6-IG Ia additional guidance.

~~~~2.22 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.l.c, Fire Suppression System Design Basis ont'd): "(4)The fire protection systems should retain capability for (a)turaX phenomena of less severity and greater frequency than the most severe natural phe,nomena (approximately once in 10 years)such as tornadoes,'urricanes, floods, ice storms, or small-intensity earthquakes that are characteristic of the geographic region, and (b)potential man made site-related events such as oil barge collisions or aircraft crashes that have a reasonable probability of occurring at a specific plant site.The effects of lightning strikes should be included in the overall plant fire protection program." h NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: "Qe have considered California as being a high seismic activity area.Our guidelines on the seismic design of fire protection systems installed in safety related areas are delineated in Regulatory Guide 1.29 Seismic Design Classification,"'paragraph C.2.The failure of any system should not affect a system from performing its safety function." 2.23 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.l.c, Fire Suppression System Design Basis (Cont'd)"(5)The consequences of inadvertent operation of, or a crack in a moderate energv line in, the fire suppression system should meet the guidelines specified for aoderat~nergy systems outside containment in SRP Section 3.6.1." NO GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.24 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.l, Fire Protection'rogram (Cont'd): "d.Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Alternative or dedicated shutdown capability should be provided@here the protection of systems whose functions are required for safe shutdcwn is not provided by established fire suppression methods or by Position C.5.6." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: Refer to Criteria Item No: 118, 119, 120.1105u 2-9 e~ildings the t th 2 2S STP CMEB-E, Item-C 1, Fire Protection Program (Cont'd): lementation of Fire Protection Pro (E)The fire protectfon program (plans, personnel and equipment) for bu storing new reactor fuel and for a%/scent fire areas that could affect fuel storage area shouhi.be fully operational before fuel is received a e site.Such adjacent: areas include those whose flames, hot gases, and f&~eneraced.

toxic and corrosive products may jeopardize safety and surveiIZance of the stored fuel HRC CBKEREt XEXTKR 86-19 Hto aMitional guidance.2 26 STP CMEB;O'.S-L, Item C'e,, Zmphmentation of Pire Protection Programs (Cont'd): "(2)The fire protection program for an entire reactor unit should be fully operational.

prior to iattM fue1 loading in that reactor unit." HRC%2KRIC LETTER 86-IGt Ho: aBf tional guidance.2 27 STP CMES".9'5-l, Item G 1"e, Implementation of Pire Protection Programs (Cont'd): "(3)On.reactor si.tes<<here there is an operating reactor and constructiom or mcaBficatioa of 8!mr umhts is under way, the fire protection program shoaldI prowhke for coat~n8;eea3laation of fire hazards.hdditional fire barriers, fire protection ctqpdCM~, and administrative controls should bc.provided as necessary to protartr the.operating unit from construction fire hazards HRC (29lZRIC LEXXEK.86<<10.", H'o a5Ktional guidance.2.'2$STP CMEB 9.S-X, Item C~Paettioa, CCont'd): 2o Administrative ControIS Mministrative control's should!he usedi te maintain the performance of the fire protection system am'ersemeh These emtrols should establish procedures

~.safe~elated build&qys or ayaaema dhxina operation or maintenance periods.Regulatory Guide 1 39'zavh%ee yx5Renca am housekeeping, including the 41sposaX of coahxstfhRa aatm~~HRt GENERIC LETTER 86-Et Ha~aMftionsE guidance.2,29 STP.CMES'5-1, Item: C Q bdiainistrative Controls (Cont'd)!"b.Govern the handling.and Limitation of the: use of ordinary combustible materials,, combustible, and fl'anmIable.

gases'nd liquids, high efficiency particulate air and charcoal, filters;, dry." fon exchange resins, or other combustible supplies in saf e~latedL areas." HRt GEHERIC LETTER.8&AC" Ho~a88i5tLonal guidance.

2.30 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.2, hdministrative Controls (Coat'd)-"c.Govern he handling of aad limit traasient fire loads such as combustible and lammable liquids, wood and plastic products, or other combustible materials ia buildings containing safet~elated systems or equipment during all phases of operating, and especially during maintenance, modification, or refueling operatioas." NRC GEHERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.31 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.2, hdministrative Controls (Cont'd): "d.Designate the oasite staff member responsible for the iaplant fire protection x'eview of proposed work activities to identify potential txansient fire haxards and specify required additional fire protection in the work activity procedure." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.32 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.2, hdministrative Controls (Cont'd): "e.Govern the use of ignition sources by use of a flame permit system to control welding, flame cutting, braxing, ox'oldering operatioas.

h separate permit should be issued for each ax'ea where work is to bc lone.If work contiaues over more than oae shift, the permit should bc valid for not more thaa 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> when the plant is operating or for the duration of a particular job duxing plant shutdown." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2i33 BTP CMEB 9,5-1, Item C.2, Control the removal from the area other combustibles resulting from completion of the activity, or at fiist." hdmiaistrative Coatx'ols (Cont'd): " f.of all waste, debris, scrap, oil spills, or the work activity immediately following the ead of each work shift, whichever comes NRC GENERIC LETTlR 86-10!No additional guidance 2.34 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.2, hdministrative Controls (Cont'd): "g.Govern leak testing;similar procedures such as air flow determination should use one of the commercially available techniques.

Open flames or combustion-generated smoke should not be permitted." NRC GENERIC L1?TTER 86-10:-No additioaal guidance.1105u 2-11 2.35 EHP QKR 9 5-1.~Iten C.X, kdmfimistrative Controls (Cont'd): "h.Haintafn the~abc housekeeping.

inspections to ensure continued compliance with thesa adaxkaitxtrxLtive controls NRC: CEfERXC lZXTER.86-10 Ka aMitional guidance.2.3&SIP CHER 9'l,, Item C 2, hdadmhstrative Controls (Cont'd): ControI the usa ef specific combust'~fax safet~elated areas.hll wood opermtfotr Csadh aja Incan@Mocha txz scaffolding) should be treated with f?am~tsrdhxxt Equipment:

or supplfea bauch as new fuel)shipped in untreated comhusMbIe packtng containera may be unpacked in safety-zelated azeas if required:.

for valid.operating, reasons.Howevez, all combustible materials should'e removed from the area immediately foU.owing unpacking.

Such transient-combustible material,.

unless stored in approved containers, shouM not.be left unattended during tunch.breaks, shift changes, or other similar periods Eoose combustible pacdc1ng material such as wood or paper ezcelsioz,, oz.po1yethylene sheeting, should'e placed in metal containers with tight-fitting sel&cl'osing metal covers KLC GENEUiC-XZXXER." 8&-10 Ko axh&tional guidance.2"37 SEP QKS 9~I Itets C 2 Mndhdfsezative Controls (Cont'd): "j.Disarming, oF fire detection oz fire suppression systems should be controlled by a.pe~t systettx Pire<<atches: should!be established in areas where systems are so disazmed'RC CKXIC'XZZXIR.

BS-M Ktx eBKtfonal guidance.5~V 2.38 EXP'HES 9 5-L~Xtets C 2',&~~~tive Controls (Cont'd)-"k.Successful fire protection requires.testintg and maintenance of the fire protection eqtxipment and the emergency XfgIxtfng and communication.

k test plan.that Xfsts the indLMdxxaln andI t9kefz responsibilities in connection with znuthxe testa cadi of the KEme.detection and protection systems shoto%be deveXoped Tha test." pXam ahaxx."I coxxtain the types, frequency, and detailed, pzoceduzee foz teething Procedxxzee should also contain instructions on.maintafning.

fire protection, during these periods when the fire protection system, is impaired', or during.periods'f.

pXant: maintenance, eg;fire watches oz temporary hose connections to, water, systems.'LC GENERIC XZH59L 86-19".No'dditional.

guidance~t a~h$P t~q~t; 2.39 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item: C.2, Administrative Controls (Cont'd): "l.ntrol actions to be taken by an individual discovering a fire, for example, otification of control room, attempt to extinguish fire, and,actuation of local fire suppression systems." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.W 2.40 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item: C.2, Administrative Controls (Cont'd): "m.Control actions to be taken by the control room operator to determine the need for brigade assistance upon report of a fire or receipt of alarm on control room annunciator panel, for example, announcing location of fire over PA system,.sounding fire alarms, and notifying the shift supervisor and the fize brigade leader of the type, si.xe and location of the fire." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10:.No additional guidance.2 41 BTP CMEB 9.5-1,, Item: C.2, Administrative Control (Cont'd): "n.Control actions to be taken by the fire brigade after notification by the control room operator of a fire, for example, assembling in,a designated location, receiving directions from the fire brigade leader, and discharging snecific fire fighting responsibilities, including selection and transportation of fire fighting equipment to fire location, selection of protective equipment, operating instructions for use of fire suppression systems, and use of preplanned strategies for fighting fires in specific ress." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2,42 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item: C.2, Administrative Controls (Cont'd): "o.Define the strategies for fighting fires in all safety-related areas and areas presenting a hazard to safet~elated equipment.

These strategies should designate:

(1)Pire haxards in each area covered by the specific pzefire planss NRC GENERIC L3'.TTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.43 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.2.o, Administrative Controls (Cont'd): "(2)Pire extinguishants best suited for controlling the fires associated vith the fire haxards in that are'a and the nearest location of these extinguishants." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.1105u 2-13 Z.44 E5P NBB%.~, Item C.2.o, hdministrative Controls (Cont'd): "(3)Hnat: 5avorabXe d~~from which to attack a fire in each area ia view of XLkeIy eo.be free.cf fire>>and the best station or elevatioa for fighting the fire ALE access'm'gress routes that involve locked doors should be spcegficsIZy, S~fRfaE ia the procedure with the appropriate precautions aad mct9hxds." fm" access?speal fied HKE CEBBKK ILMKL 86-10: Ho additional guidance.X 4%EEP CHBE9'~Il>>

Xylem" C 2 o, kdmiaistrativc Coatrols (Cont'd): "(4)1?lant.systems that.shcmhk be managed to reduce the damage potential during a locaL fire aad th Xocatioa of local and remote coatrols for such management (eg,;aay, hydraulic.

ar: electrical systems in thc cone covered by the specific fKre: fighting procedure that could increase the harards in the area because of averprcssueBmtimn mr;elcctrica1 luasard s)" HRC GENERIC." EZTXER.86-10: No additional guidance.K4$EEP CHBR KK~Xtee C 2 o, Administrative Controls (Cont'd): "(5)"N@grfna a Xamdk Qfee Rsrtfealarly haxardous coabustibles that aced cooling SEC'-CEHKRIt LETZHL.86-10x No additional guidance.-2'47 KDECHBEP~X>>

XCea C 2 o, Administrative Controls (Coat'd): "(6)Crgamfxatfon aF~fighting brigades and thc assigmaeat of special duties accar~g an.jeh CftZe so that all fire fighting functions are covcrcd by any comFXete: s~pcrsomteL.

complement.

These duties include command coatrol of ahe.5cfgadia.

czanspanafng fire suppression and support equipment to the fire sunup~, agpByhqg thc.cxtfngaf shant to the fixe, communication with thc control HRE CBGMX" Itl?XXKR.8&-XQ So additioaal guidance 2.4&STP.'MEB: K&1,.Item C.2.o, kdmiaistrative Coatrols (Coat'd): "(7)Potential.

radi'oXogical, aad: toMc harards ia fire cones." HKC t KHEKIC XZTXEE.86-10-Ho additional guidaacc 2.49 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.2.o, hdministrative Controls (Cont'd): "(8)ntilation system operation that ensures desired plant air distribution when e ventilation floe is modified for fire containment or smoke clearing peration." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.50 BTP CMEB 9 5-1~Item C.2.o, hdministrative Controls (Cont'd): '(9)Operations requiring control xoom and shift engineer coordination or authorization." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No'additional guidance.A 2.51 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.2.o, hdministrative Controls (Cont'd): "(10)Instructions for plant operatozs and general plant personnel during fire." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.('): a.The need for good organization, training, and equipping of fire brigades at nuclear power plant sites z'equires that effective measures be implemented to ensuxe proper discharge of these functions.

The guidance in Regulatory Guide 1.101,"Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants," should be followed as applicable

" NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.53 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3, Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "b.A site fire brigahe trained and equipped for fire fighting should be established to ensuz'e adequate manual fire fighting capability for all areas of the pLant containing structures, systems, or components important to safety.The fire brigade should be at least five members on each shift.The brigade leader and at least two brigade members should have sufficient tx'sining in or knowledge of plant safet~elated systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability.

The qualification of fire brigade members should include an annual physical examination to determine their ability to perform strenuous fire fighting activities.

The shift supervisor should not be a member of the fire brigade.The brigade leader shall be competent to assist the potential safety consequences of a fire and advise control room personnel.

Such competence by the brigade leader may be evidenced by possession of an operator's license or equivalent knowledge of plant safet~elated systems." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.1105u 2 54 MECH'5-'L, Item C.3, Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "c.The minimum~uipaec~pravMecE for the brigade should consist of personal protective apsfpaaenn audhaa turnout coats, boots, gloves, hard hats, emergency csQIipment j portable lights, portable ventilation equipment~and positive~sura.masks'pproved by NIOSH (National Institute for Occupational Safety and'Health

-approval formerly given by the U.S.Bureau ot Hines)shoal bc provMedi for fire brigade, damage control, and control room-.'eracmme2

~Zeal I9 masks shaXL be available tor tire brigade personnel.

Omgaxdl roexmgemamaeX.

mey be Smahshcd breathing air by a manif old system pJpeB Krom'm ahxaqgm reservoir if practicaL Service or rated operating lite shsIIl.Sc.aa mknfmumi aK an~elf hour for the scl&eontained units." HKC'EHEKC UMIAK 86-10=No additional guidance.1'55 BTECHER%~XItem C 3.c, FLre Brigade (Cont'd): "kt least tvo cztra air-botel'cs shouLK be located onsite for each self-contained breathing unit.Zn'dditiomam onsite~ur supply of reserve air should be provided andi arrangedt to permit.quick;and.complete replenishment of czhausted supply air bottleaiaa~

they>are rcVxrned.If compressors are used as a source of haeaeh&@~onKgp uaBaa approved for breathing air shalL be used;amer 5a oaken.em Xocs~the compressor ia areas free of dust and contaminants." HRC:GENERIC:

EEHZE.86-10: No additional guidance.2 M SXF.CHER%'RXtaa C'>>Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "d.The fire brigade grrogram d~X.ensure that the capability to fight potential fires is estatXfshmB amB maintains<<Thc program shall consist of an initial classroom praetfceandi

~Chf XXs.SK GENERIC IZZREE, 8&-XS".Ho aibB.tionaL guidance.EPCHEB%WEXtee C 3'!>>Ere Brigade (Cont'd): "(1)Thc initial ('I fighting;plan~Mthi sp~Mc.identification.

of each individual' resp onsibilf.ties HRC;GENERIC.Z,Zrnm.

86-10:: No additional guidance.2;58~BTP'CMEB 9'5-+, Item;C'.3.d',.

Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "(b)Identifications of.the cype and, Location of fire harards and associated types of: i%res that;ccadih occur;in.the plant HRC: GEHERZC.XEXXER?.%-10=Fe.Mditional guidance..

B TP CMEB 9-5-1, Item C.3.d.l, Fire Brigade (Cont'd): "(c)The toxic nd corrosive characteristics of expected products of combustion." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.I 2.60 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d.l, Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "(d)Identification of the location of Eire fighting equipment for each fire area and familiarization with the layout of the plant, including access and egxess routes to each ax'ea.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.61 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d.l, Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "(e)The proper use of available fire fighting equipment and the corrective method of fighting each type of fire.The types of fix'es covered should include fires in energized electrical equipment, fires in cables and cable trays, hydrogen fires, fi'res involving flammable and combustible liquids or hazardous process chemicals, fires resulting fx'om construction ox modification (velding), and x'ecord file fires." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.62 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d.l, Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "(f)The proper use o.communication, lighting,.ventilation, and emergency bxeathing uipment." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.63 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d.l, Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "(g)The propex method for fighting fires inside buildings and confined spaces." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.64 BTP@KB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d.l, Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "(h)The direction and coordination of the fire fighting activith.es (fix'e brigade leaders only)." I NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.1105u 2-17 2?6$$2P CHER Pi.f-I', Item C.3.d E, Fire Brigade (Cont'.d):

"(i)Detailed r~'esa oF.Mre fighting strategies aad procedures.

Hate" Item Cf3>may be deleted from the trainiag of no more thsa tvo'of the nonoperati'oam personnel who may be assigned to the fire brigade." HRC: CBKKEC CEXTEt 86-LG Ko addLtioaal guidance.Xdi@EGF CBEB%~X>>Iteaa C 3.d 1>>Pfre Brigade (Coat'd): "())Reviev of aha llaeesn pZane mcaKifB~~tions amK correspcnding changes in fire fightiag gXana Fate." Item ('$)l may: 5e deleted from the tra~ag of ao more than tvo of the nonoperations.

personne1'.who may be assi'gned; to the fire brigade." HRG'C1BKKD L1MZR.86-10 Ko adcULtdLonal guidance.I 2'.S7;BTF GHEE>9'.5-1~.Item C.3 d.X, Flora Brigade (Cont'd): "(k)Traiaiag of the pl'ant, fire brigade.should be coordi'natei vith the local fire department so that: resgomdQi~ni'ea and duties are deLhzeated in advance.This coordination aBauM Se panta cd'he trmhrXag course am%should be included in the traiaiag cK,e5e Ious fRre dhyaeesent.

aaaEf.HRC CEHERZC E1ZXER SS-IG'a achRtdfanal guidance.XAS]62'CHEBl 9~1Item C 3 d g, Hire Srfgade (Coat'd): "(l)Local fire dhpartmenta; ahouId!be provided tt~ng;Qa operational precautions vhen fK'ghting.

Sirea omnuclear paver pIant, litem and should be made avare of the assocLaemB wctu a..nuclear pcnrer phmt sLte 1RC CEHEKXC MHXK.8&RE=Fo;ada%~1 guidance.2.6%ST%GHEE%.X-I,>>Itecs C X.dlPica SMNLde (Cont'd): "(2)The Xnsttmeeion-shout, be.pt~ecR hy qua~aR individuals.vho are knovledgeable, experienced~am'uitably traineR.in;figM~the types of fires that could occur'in.the: plant and.fn.,using.

the types'f equipment available ia the nucl'ear'oven plant'o.NRC;CEHERIC: L1?3!TER.86-10-Soi uBhfftLanal guidance.

2.70 BTP@KB 9 5-1, Item C;3.d, Fire Brigade (Cont'd): "(3)Instruction hould be provided to all fire brigade members and fire brigade leaders." HRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.71 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d, Fire Brigade (Cont'd): "(4)Regular planned meetings should be held at least every 3 months for all brigade members to review changes in the fire protection program and other sub)ects as necessary." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.72 STP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d, Fire Brigade (Cont'd): "(5)Periodic refresher training sessions shall be held to repeat the classroom instruction program for all brigade members over a 2~ear period.These sessions may be concurrent with the regular planned meetings." r NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.73 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d, Fire Brigade (Cont'd): "(6)Practice.(a)Practice sessions should be held for each shift fire brigade on the proper method of fighting the various types of fire that could occur in a nuclear power plant.These sessions shall provide brigade members with mperience in actual fire extinguishment and the use of emergency breathing apparatus under, renuous conditions encountered in fire fighting." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.74 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d.6, Fire Brigade Practice (Cont'd): "(b)These practice sessions should be provided at least once per year for each fire brigade member." NRC GENERIC L1'.TTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.75 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.3.d, Fire Brigade (Cont'cl):

"(7)Drills (a)Fire brigade drills should be performed in the plant so that the fire brigade can practice as a team." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86>>10: No additional guidance.1105u 2-19 2'7$BTP QfES 9 5-1, Item C 3.d.7~Fire Brigade Drills (Cont'd): "(b)GrfMe should be performed at regular intervals not to ezceed 3 months for exch shrift fire brigade Each fire brigade member should participate in each~, but must participate in at least two drills per year.4 edFKlckenz; number of these drills, but not less than one for each shift fire hei'gad+per, year, should be unannounmk to determine the fire fighting.zeeBuess of the plant fire brigade~brigade Leader, and fire protection apeems oncE equipment Penna planniag and authorizing an unannounced drill aNeuiMt ensure that the zespondhtg shift fire brigade members are not aware e5ae a drQX fs betng planned until ft ha begun.Unannounced drills should nnt: be schehQ&closer than 4<<eeks kt.breast one driXL per year should be performed on a"back, shift" for each shift.fire.brigade HRC GESEtIC IZTXZR 8&-10=Ão-additionaL guidance.X'W BTP QKS 9 5-L, Item C'.d.,TFXre Brigade Drills (Cont'd)!"(c)The driIQtm should be preplanned to establish.

the training obgectives of the drill am'lhmld..

be critiqued to determine~wellt.the training objectives have heemmmt Unannamxced dzXXEs slhxeXrK 5a planed and critiqued by members of etc aiaazgement staff responsible Sar pXsar.safety and fire protection.

Sofar:Nance deficiencies of a fire bctgp8e or of individuaL fire brigade members should.be remedied by schechxXing additional training for the brigade m: members ht.3E@spa<<HRC CEHERIC IZXTER, 8&-M-Fa adiRftfonaL guidance.X 7$EXP CALEB 9.5-1, Xtena C R4 TPXra Erkgade Drills (Cont'd): "(d)These CcLIha shmaXd'zavtdc for XocaE 55xa@apartment participation (HRC'EHERIC.XZTTER 8S-Xa., Ha'aamtfonal guidanl;e.

I'9" BTP,'MEB 9.5-1',.Item C'.d,.Pire.Brigade Drills (Cont'd): (e)ht~cue." intervals,, a.zandomly selected unannounced drill should be critiqued by qualified'ndividuals independent of: the-Licensee'staff.'copy of the<<rftten report: from such individual's shout be.available for NRC review." HRC: GEHERIC UTTER'6-LQ'.

Fo~adkktionsl guidance 2.80 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.d.7, Fire Brigade Drills (Cont'd): "(f)iH.s should as a minimum iaclude the following:

i.hssessment of fire alarm fectiveness, time required to notify aad assemble fire brigade, aad lection, placement, and use of equipmeat aad fire fighting strategies." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additlonal guidance.2.81 BTP.CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.d.7.f, Pire Brigade Drills (Coat'd): "ii.hssessment of each brigade member's knowledge ox his or her role in the fire fighting strategy for the area assumed to contain the fire.hssess-meat of the brigade members'onformance with established plant fire fighting px'ocedures aad use of fire fighting equipment, including selfmontained emergency breathing apparatus, communication equipment, and ventilation equipment, to the extent practicable." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: Ho additional guidance.2 82 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.d.7.f, Fire Brigade Drills (Cont'd): "iii.The simulated use of Sire fighting equipment required to cope with the situation aad type of fire selected for the drill.Thc area and type of fire chosen for the drill should differ from those used in the previous drills so that brigade members are trained in fighting fires ia various plaat areas.The situation selected should simulate the size and arrangement of a fire that could reasonably occur in the area selected, allowing for fixe development due to the time x'equired to respond, to obtain equipmeat, aad organise for the re, assuming loss of automatic suppression capability." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: Ho additioaal guidaace.2.83 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.d~7.f, Pire Brigade Drills (Cont'd).: "iv.hssessment of brigade leader's direction of thc fire fighting effort as to thoroughacss, accuracy aad cffcctivcaess." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2o84, BTP 0KB 9o5 1 y I'tern Co Sod y Pire Brigade (Coat')x"(8)Records Individual x'ecords of training provided to each fire brigade membex', including drill critiques, should be maintained for at least 3 years to casurc that each member receives tx'sining in all parts of the training program.These records of traiaing should be ava&ablc for NRC x'eview.Retraiaing ox broadened trainiag for fire fightiag within buildings should be scheduled for all those brigade members whose performance x'ecoxds show deficiencies." NRC GENERIC Q'.TTER 86-10: No additional guidance.1105u 2?SX EZF CKR P S-I~Item C.5.8, Pire Brigade (Cont'd): "(9)Guidance D'acnaents'EPAL; Z7>>'zivate Fire Brigade," should be 5'aIZeseC in: azgyxdLmMcna, txaining and fire drills.This standard also is apylfcahle:

foz: the: inspection and maintenance of fire fighting equ'fpment.

kman8.aha standard'a zeferenced in this document, NFL.197,"Training Standard am Taft Pfxe.attacks', shouM be utiXixed as applicable.

NFPA, booklets and yamphIets~

?fated" in.NET XT may be used as applicable for training zefazenaas>>

Zn;action courses in fire prevention and fire suppression that aaa nmqgmUzed!

~spanscaaK by the fire protection industry should be IRCf QExs4>>%K.GERMS XZEZER.8&-10: Ko additional guidance REF.SOURCES:-'FL RT, NFPh.197 P.'..I'):*.~quaU~assurance (Qh)pzograms of applicants and contractors should ensure.that'he: guidelines for design, procurement, installation, and testing auK.the.admini'stzative controls for the fire protection systems for safety-zeXaeedL azeaa azesatisKted The Qk program should be under the management ,cnmann!IL afr aha 4L mqyad~tfen This control consists of (1)formulating a fBfce gnn~Rom QA pzngraa that incozpozates suitable requirements and is amqreaM>>e te the management responsible for, fire protection or verifying that tt>>pzograa incnzporates suitable requirements and is acceptable to the aanagement zeqronsible.

for fire protection, and (2)verifying the effe~venesa of:.the.Qh,.program for fire protection through review,~nnvaLlZanca,.

axe aacKta Perforauance of other Qh program functions for~ebzg," the fira prate~~a program requirements may be performed by personnel a~'d'e, of'.tha.Qh organization.

The Qk program for fire protection should be.gave af." the: ovezaIT'lant gh, progzana.It shouhk satisfy the specific criteria Xfacaf below..NRC CEHR6EC: IJK55R 8&-10: No additional guidance ZJRF ECP CHEZ 9'X, Etea C 4 QuaLity kasuzance Program (Cont'ds): "a.Ãtmmzes,should'e.

estahLLahed to ensure that the guidciines of the regulatozy position.of this'uide:

are: included in design and procurement documents and, thae.deviation.

theref roa are controlled." NRC GENERICRZTER.

86-,10 Ne additional; guidance 2.88 STP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.4, Quality Assurance Program (Cont'd):,'.

Inst~thous, Procedures and Drawin s Inspections, tests, administrative contzols, fire drills, and training that, govezn the fire protection program should be prescx'ibed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings and should be accomplished in accordance with these documents." NRC GENERIC LETHE 86-10: No additional guidance.2.89 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.4, Quality Assux'ance Program (Cont'd): "c Control of Purchased Material E ui ment and Services Measures s uld e esta lished to ensure that purchased material, equipment, and services conform to the procurement documents." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10'o additional guidance.2 90 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.4, Quality Assurance Progzam (Cont'd): "d.A program for independent inspection of activities affecting fire protection should be established and executed by or for the organisation performing the activity to verify conformance with documented installation dzawings and test" procedures for accomplishing the activities." NRC GENERIC'ETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REFT SOURCES NFPA 13, NFPA 14, NFPA 15, NFPA, 20, NFPA 24, NFPA.72D, NFPA.72E 2-91 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.4, Quality Assurance Pzogram (Cont'd): "e.Test and Test Control A test program should be established and implemented to ensuze that testing is pexformed and verified by inspection and audit to demonstrate conformance with design and system readiness requirements.

The tests should be performed in accordance with written test procedures; test results should be propex'ly evaluated and acted on" NRC GIMRZC IZTTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF.SOURCES: Same as for Item 2.90 above.2.92 BTP@KB 9.5-1, Item C.4, Quality Assux'ance Program (Cont'd): "f.In ection Test and 0 ex'atin Status Measux'es should be established to provide for the identification of items that have satisfactorily passed required.testa and inspections." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF.SOURCES: Same as for Item 2.90 above.1105u 2-23 2 93'ZF'CHEEi F 5-2p, Item C.hp Quality hssurance Program (Coat'd): Heasures: ahaeXS he, elatal~shcd to control items that do aot conform to specified:.

requirements to prevent inadvertent use or installation." RU CKSEEXC LEIZEBL 86-LG-Mo additional guidance.2 94%X'HER%~Xteaa C 4, quality hssurance Program-(Cont'd): protects suer.asl fsRBmas~aal&mctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective coaqpnents uncont~XXect combustible material and aoacoaformances, are prolRptIyj id!Sic!Sicdp, reported'ad corrected>>

HKC CSERDh RESEED 8&-XQ: No additional guidance.,>>~~\t~2.95 STP'HES>>

XtesL.C 4, Quality hssurance Program (Cont'd): i Records~Records should'e prepsrel aud eaintained to furnish evidence that the criteria cnnmemeak abave are being met for activities affecting the fire SKC GRHRKEC'.IIEZXR.8&TO: Eo additional guidance.2 9f.STP CHES-'9'.5-'XXtlnm C 4',.~ty hssuraace Program (Cont'd): dttdhtsI'bodice shou1Ih hs cntnhtctaf and docussnted to verify coepliance vith the fire'protection programineledfng design and procurement documentap iastructioas, p~ures~andi drawfngs, and;inspection sad test activities

"%EC CHEKA'MRS 86-ISt No addf.tioaal guidaace.2 ST 32P CHER~beau C~Poaftfoa (Cont'd)!"5 General Plant QxidcIines'ira begari'ers with~a mininua fi~csistaace rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> should be: provided;to:.Ioasafc~eIated; areas'that could'affect their ability to perform their..safety;function;;(b);Separate: reboant;divisions or trains of saf ety"related systems frm each: ocher so that: both are aot sub)ect.to damage from a single.Bxe-(R~Separate.i'nK+LdneL unfts on at.aaltiple uait site unlesa the t fRxae>>

NRC GENIC LETTER 86-10: "The documentation required to verify the rating of a fire barrier should include the design description of the barrier and the test reports that verify its fire rating.Reference can be made to UL listed designs.""Usually exterior walls are designated as a fire azea boundary;therefore, they are evaluated by the guidelines of Appendix A.A PHA should be performed to determine the rating of exterior walli, if xequired by the above criteria." Pire barriers xelied upon to protect shutdown related systems to meet the requirements of III.G.2 need to have a fire rating of either one or thx'ee hours.10CFR 50.48 references BTP APCSB 9.5-1, where the fire protection definitions are found.Pire rating is defined-"Pire Rating-the endurance period of a fire barrier or structure; it defines the period of resistance to a standard fire exposure before the first cxitical point in behavior is observed (see NFPA 251)." The acceptance criteria contained in Chaptex 7 of NPPA 251,"Standard methods of Pire Tests of Building Construction and Materials," pertain to non-bearing fire barriers.These criteria stipulate that transmission of heat through the bairier"shall not have been such as to x'aise the temperature on its unexposed surface more than 250'P above its initial temperature." The ambient air temperature at the beginning of a fire test usually is between 50'P and 90'P.It'a generally x'ecognixed that 75'F represents an acceptable norm.The resulting 325'P cold side temperature critex'ion is used for cable tray wraps because they perform the fire barrier function to preserve the cables free of fire damage.It is clear that cable begins to degxade at 450'P is fx'ee of fize damage at 325'P.During the Appendix A review, licensees began to propose fire barriexs to.enclose cable tray, conduit, fuel lines, coolant lines, etc.Industxy did not have standard rating tests for such components oz fox electrical, piping or bus duct penetrations.

The NRC issued a staff position giving acceptance criteria for electrical penetx'ation tests.These criteria require an analysis of any, temperature on the unexposed side of the barrier in excess of 325'P.In the past, manufacturers designed theix own qualification tests.Nuclear Insurers, and the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers have issued tests for some of these components These tests usually eryosed the component to the ASTM E-119 time temperature curve, but all had different acceptance criteria.Conduit and cable tray enclosuze materials accepted by the NRC as 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> barrier prior to Appendix R (e.g some Kaowool and 3M materials) and already installed by the licensee need not be replaced even though they may not have"met the 325'P criteria.However, for newly identified conduit and cable trays xequiring such wrapping, new material which meets the 325 P cx'iterion should be used, ox)ustification should be provided fox uae of material which does not meet the 325'P criterion.

This may be based on an analysis demonstrating that the maximum recorded temperature is sufficiently below the cable insulation ignition temperature.

1105u 2-25 Where<<racy zey3Ecatfom of a tested configux'ation cannot be achieved, the field instsllatioe shoul'd;meet all of the following critexia: (L)Tha.cnn~Nty M the fire bazriex material is maintained.

(2)Tha tMdmxess of: the barrier is maintained.

(3)The nature aE the support assembly is unchanged from the tested gggff guzaMotD (4)The;applicaeLcar.

oe.acuk use of the fire barrier ie unchanged from the h peaemct;a cd'.e.tray<<hich differs in configuration from those that<<<<ms.testedf marZdi ba acceptable.

Hovever, the use of structural steel fBfra~mao&~to protect a cable tray assembly may not be acceptable.(sl engineer andi 5nuuK to pznvtde aa equivalent level of pxotection.

If a, fire azea boundary~was.described as a rate barxiex in the 1977 fire hazards'.analysis'md%

<<as-evaluated and.accepted in a published SER, the fire area.boundary: neck ad be.reviewed as part of the reanalysis for compliance

<<ith Section III.C'tE Appendix R Openings in the fire barriers, if any, should have been speeffXcal?y identiMed:

and)ustified in the fix'e hazards analysis<performed'u the Appendix.h.process.If openings in the fire area boundaries

<<ere.not, yzevious1y, evaluated, such an evaluat1on should be pezfoanak aa a basM Gn: smaessMg compXhance with hppendiz R.See Items P4 W Za SZP kFCSS K&%ESxe, 1haz&~~Ke dhfEhzek as: "H,re Ear&en-those cemponentsi oK conshnxction (walls, floors, and roofs)that are rated'y ayprovt'nS, L'ahozatories:

in hours for resistance to fire to prevent.the: spzeadh oK Mze~area.as asecb fm kypemREa K means an ax'ea sufficiently bounded to<<ithaca'he haxszd's:-assoc

~the fire area and, as necessary, to protect important equfgaent.&thou.

the Kze ax'ea from a fire outside the completely, sealed'!Kaox=te~ng and jor vaLL-t~all boundaries.

Where fire area bcnmdaabas:

were.-~aygznvedi muBm the hppend1x 4 process, or whexe such boundaziaa axe.nox waZX~Nal'IL tm H~oz-t~eiling boundaries with all must pezfoaaani evM~n~assess the, efequacy of fire ares boundarj.es in thaLr pianes~ta deteaaLna:

M the: hnuukazMs:

wiLL<<ithstand the hazards associated

<<1th.the area~and'protect important equipment within the azea from a.fire outside the area.-This'analyst's must be performed by at least a fix'e px'otection engineer ancL;if.'required., a;systems earner.hlthough not raquired,.

Iicamrees.

may submit.theiz avaInations for Staff revie<<and concurrence, In any event~, these.anaIyaea must be retained by the licensees f or.subsequent KLC audits;Exterior<<aL'Ls~aach theta-penetxations sheeM be~xalified as zated barries<<han (1), they, are xequfzeki tv separate a.shntdmnx-related divisio (s)inside the plant'zNctitsi zsxhlcdantaltaxnace))

counterpart outside the plant in the hmedLata vicinity, a5 the;astarte-wake~

CX)'hey sepax'ata safety related areas fromf, no~afety7 zeTaCek azine~Present a sign1ficant fire threat to the'afety; zelaxscB azeas'p~(3')l they;are'-

designated as a fire barrier in the FShk oz: PBL REF SOURCES.ASBBK~,XGCE~48, hyyemlix R to LOCPR50, STPkPCBR9'~

kypmhz k to STP hPCSB 9 5-1, NEPAL 251 2 98 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.a, Building Design (Coat'd): "(2)hppropriate fire barriers should be provided vithia a cingle safety division to separate components that present a fire hazard to other safety-related components or high concentrations of safety-related cables within that divisioa." NRC GEN1RIC LETTER 86-10: Same as for Item 2.97 above.REP.SOURCES: Same as for Item 2.97 above.2.99 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.a, Building Design (Cont'd): "(3)Openings through fire barriers for pipe, conduit, and cable trays which separate fire areas should be sealed or closed to provide a fire-resistive rating at least equal to that'equired of the barrier itself.Openings inside conduit larger than 4 inches in diameter should be sealed at the fire barrier penetration.

Openings inside conduit 4 inches or less in diameter should be sealed't the'ire barrier unless the conduit extends at least 5 ft on'each side of the fire barrier and is sealed either at both ends or at thc fire barrier vith noncombustible material to prevent the passage of smoke aad hot gases.Fire differentials should be qualified by test to maintain the barrier integrity under such.conditions." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: Same guidance as for Item 2.97 above.REP~SOURCES: Same as for Item 2.97.2 100.BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5 a.3, Building Design (Coat'd): "Penetration designs should utilize only noncombustible materials and should be qualified by tests.The penetration qualification tests should use the time-temperature exposure curve specified by ATM E-119,"Pire Test of Building Construction and Materials." The acceptaace criteria for the test should require that: (a)Thc fire barrier penetration has withstood the fire eadurance test without passage of fLame or ignitioa of cables oa the unexposed side for a period of time equivalent to the fire-resistance rating required of thc barrier.(b)The temperature lcvcls recorded for the unexposed side are analyzed and demon strate that the maximum temperature does not exceed'325'P.(c)The fire barrier penetration remains intact and does not allo+pro5ection of water beyond the unexposed surface during thc hose stream test.The stream shall be delivered through a 1-1/2 inch nozzle set at a discharge angle of 30X with a nozzle pressure of 75 pei and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm vfth thc tip of the nozzle a maximum of 5 ft from the exposed face;or the stream shall be delivered through a 7.-1/2 inch nozzle set at a discharge angle of 15Z with a nozzle pressure of 75 psi and a minimum discharge of 75 gpm vith the tip of the nozzle a maximum of 10 ft from the exposed face;or the stream shall be delivered through a 2-1/2 inch national standard playpipe equipped with 1-1/8 inch tip, nozzle pressure of 30 psi, located 20 ft from thc exposed face." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: Same guidaace as 2.97.REP.SOURCES: hSTM E-119, ANI File No.N-219.1105u 2 XlZL EHE CHER%5-X., Xtem C 5.a,.EuMKLng Design (Cont'd)"(4)Penetzati'on apmdnga for ventiXatioa systems should be protected by fire hangem 1hmEng, a md:fng equivalent ta that required of the barrier (see HEPT~.her: QnuHtioning and Ven~ting Systems")~Flexible air duct&W HFC'QMRZt LFZKR.86-15:.No alki,t 1 ona1.guidance.REF S')URGES" HEPT.80:, NFPA'CAABZ Fl.le Hv.N-219.,;i qC 2.?52 MP CHER%~X~Xylem C 5.e3hdSdEng Design (Cont'd)(5)Door opemfnga~~<.Rmxfema should'e protected Mth equivalently rated doors,~~,, andi hstahraxa tha have beem tested'.and approved by a nationally record;zedh laboratory'., Such doors shouM be self-closing or provided with closing mechanisms>

and should be inspected semiannually to verify that automatic" holdmpen:release~

andi claaLna mechanisms and latches are op~i~(Se~NEPAL 80"Pie Do~~V~~.")One oE the.foIIXavhxg measuzes should.'e.

provided to ensure they vill protect the opening.as required in.case of'ire" (@Hm doors should be.kept: eI'osed and electrically supervised at a CQ Rfxe dhans sheeldl be Xeakedi eXased and inspected reekly to verify~aha dhcare aze Rn tea eIlaeed position;tf~Fi!ze.d'ecru shauXrf be pxovdSM.vfth automatic hold-open and release mechanism and: inspectedi CaLZ~te verify that doorways are free of ebsrzuctionsf, OI'd9)~~doors should!be.k~eXosed and inspected daily to verify 05adr~az>>in: the.cIham5 position.,>l gV HKCGZHKRIC'REER, 86-XQ%hera a door is part of a fire area':..~.M auanplefnstaIhaeiom of'sew~"contacts"), no further analysis naggy he.pmf5maisd:

JS the;oacEMKcathms could reduce the fire rating QBn."emapXaXaaeaXXation:

m vLefcn".panel), the fire rating of the dxnar akiouXcB ba reassess'n ensure.that it continues to provide cBfa reassessment:

peztainai Cn'ha establishment of a valid fire area Soumhazy, em exemption i's not zeqalzed See Section f4 of the~Zatezpzetations.

of.gyp~'R>>REF.SOURCES:: HPPA.80'~HEPT;%KAHX Pile No.N-219.~~)<i.j.241 3RC5m 2.103 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.a.5, Building Design (Coat'd): "The fire brigade leader should have ready access to keys for any locked fire doors." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.104 BTP CHES 9.5-1, Item C.S.a.5, Building Design (Coat'd): "Areas protected by automatic total floodiag gas suppression systems should have electrically supervised selfmlosing fire doors or should satisfy optioa (a)above." (C.S.a)NRC GENERIC L1HTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.105 BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.a, Building Design (Cont'd): "(6)Personnel access routes aad escape routes should be provided for each fire area.StairwelXs outside primary contaiamcnt serviag as escape routes, access routes for fircfighting, or access routes to areas containiag cquipmcnt necessary for safe shutdowa should be enclosed in masonry or concrete towers with a minimum fire rating of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> aad self-closing CLass B fire doors." NRC GEKRIC HETER 86-10-No additional guidaace.2.106 BT0@KB 9.5-1, Item C.S.a, Building Design (Cont'd): "(7)Pire exit routes should be clearly marked." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2 107 BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.a, Buildiag Design (Cont'd): "(8)Each cable spreading room should coatain oaly oae redundant safety division.Cable spreadiag rooms should aot be shared between reactors.Cable spreadiag rooms should bc separated from each other aad from other areas of the plaat by barriers haviag a minimum fire resistance of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.1105u 2-29 2 IGR RIP CSE 9 S-IL~Xtem C.S a, Building Desiga (Coat'd): "(9)Interior ca%, axe stractxxraL'omponents, thermal insulatioa materials, radiation shfcX~metal>3Lsazxd souadproofiag should be noncombustible.

Interior fhxfshxs: should.Txe.noncaabustible

."%EX GENERIC EEZZKR.86-19-No additional guidance.52P CREE%~II, Xtea C S a, Building Design (Coat'd)'-

Materials that ere aaaxqpmBZa Sar eee as fxxterior finish without evidence of test and listing hp a mddhnaBI~rcccqyrfsah laboratory are the f oLlowiagx a RRaetcr~acoustic pIaster, gypsum plaster board (gypsum<<NLLboar8)',.

either plain,<<xxILpapercd, or painted with oil-or<<at~ase paint;Ceramic timey ceramic paaclsy e GIassgLass, blocks;e Erick,, stone, concrete blocks, plain or painted;a Steel'.and'Luminum panels, plain, painted, or enameled;a'hzy1.tilevinyl~bcstoa tile, Linoleum,'r asphalt tile on concrete fIAxorse NKC: GENERA EZXTHL 8&-LG-Xo addi,tioaaL guidance.ZJIQl]ME'HEB!%~Il, Etemx C S a~Budding Design (Cont'd): "(10)Metal deck-.roof'onstructioxx should be noncombustible and listed as"acceptable for fire" fxx: the-.UE HadiXCins, Matcria1a i%rectory, or Listed as Class I in the Factory MhtuaI System Approval Guide NKC GRHEiLIC EEXXKK 8&-XQ: Ko additional guidance.Z,LIL>.'X'KE, 9'-X., Item C S a~Building Design (Cont'd)-"(11)Suspeaded ceBLng;amB the&a supports should: bc of noncombustible construction.

Concca1cd:

spxxcxxs: shaxXdi be devoid.of combustibles except as noted in Position K.R.lx.<<HKC GKGRXC.TiEIVKt.86-LC So cuhKitioaaL guidance.1'1If(BTP.'CHES:

9'-'L',, Item C 5 a,.HuiXdiag.Design (Cont'd): "(L2)Transformers~

ixxstallcd inside fire:areas containing safety-related systems shouldl.be.

of: the dry-type;on insulated and cooled with aoncombustiblc Liquid.Trsnsformersi filled,~combustible.

fluid that are located indoors should be enclnseb in.a.transfoaner.

vane (sca Section 450(c)of NFPh 70,"Natioaal IKcctricall.

Code.)i'9 GiSEitIC IJ552it 86-10-No additional guidance.

2-113 BTP CRT 9.5-1, Item C.5.a, Building Design (Cont'd): "(13)Outdoor oil&illed transformers, should have oil spill confincmcat featuzcs or draiasgeaway from the buildings.

Such transformers should be located at least 50 ft distaat from the building, or by ensuring that such buildiag walls within 50 ft of oil-filled transformers are without openiags and have a fire-zesistaace rating of at.least 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />." NRC CMUSIC LETTER 86-10: Ho additional guidance.2.114 BTP CMEB 9 5-1, Item C.5.a, Building Desiga (Coat'd): "(14)Ploox drains sized to xemove expected fire-fightiag water flow without flooding safet~eiated equipment should be provided in those areas where fixed water fire suppression systems aze installed.

Ploor draias should also be provided in other areas whexe hand hose lines may be used if such fize-fighting watex could cause unacceptable damage to safety-related equipmeat ia the area (see NPPh-92,"Waterproofing and Draining of Ploors").%uvre gas suppression systems ax'e iastalled, the drains should bc provided with adequate seals or the gas suppression system should bc sized to compensate for the loss of the suppression agent, through the drains.Drains in areas coatainiag combustible liquids-should have provisions for preventing the backflow of combustible liquids to safe~elated areas through the iaterconnectcd drain systems.-Mater drainage fxom areas that may contain radioactivity should be collected, sampled, and analyzed before discharge to the environment." NRC GMRIC IZTHK 86-10: No additional guidance.2.115 Lightaiag Protection should be provided foz thc reactor building, cooling towers and stacks.~REP.SOURCES: NRC BTP hPCSB 9 5-1.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.116 BTP CMEB 9~5-1, Item C~5, Posit'ion (Cont'd)"b.Safe Shutdown Ca abilit 1 Pire protection features should be provided for structures, systems, snd components important to safe shutdowa.These features should be capable of limiting fix'c damage so thats (a)Onc train of systems accessary to achieve aad maiataia hot shutdo<<n coaditions from either the control room or emergency contxol statioa(s) is free fxom fire damage;and (b)Systems necessary to achieve and maintain'old shutdown from either the contxol room or cmcrgcacy control station(s) caa be repaired<<ithin 72 houxs.1105u 2-31 HRt GKSERIC XZZTER 86-10"Section III.G was<<ritten after NRC's muLTM&kscfpline revie<<tesme had visited all operating power plants Mom these mukftts,.the HRC recognised that it is not prsedhmX auK may be impossiMe to subdivide some portions of an operate~plant inta fire: areas In addition, the NRC recognised that in some casern<<here fire areas: are designated, it may not be possible tn prnvfde.alternate shutdo<<n;capability independent of the fire area~~t9raeefore~

<<auld have: te ha evaluated on the basis of fire cones&ddhkm the fixe area.%ha%8 a%so recognised that because some ha%not yet yec&nnnaR a safe shutdown analysis, these aneXysee, may Xh.nCLKy neer mdbgze configurations.

)To cave~the Iarge vazfaeiae aK possible configurations, the o Section XILC l requ1res cme train of hot shutdown systems to be free of Ere damase a;eh damage to cold shutdo<<n systems be limited.e Section XIX.G'.2 provides~certain separation, suppression snd detectiom requirements;

<<ithfin fire area;<<here such requirements arm'mee~an~M fia: ad-necessary.

Se~tae XX3LG'A m~rea eRtmnative dedicated shutdown capability for conffgtrrations thaC did not.satisfy the requirements of III.G.2 ca:<<hera fkxe suppressanta released as a result of fire fighting, rupture aK the system~or: ittdvertent operation of the system may damage.redundant equi~t<<If'lternate shutdown is provided on the bash<: oE rneaa ar: raneethe provision of fire detection and;Scent~XXX~X ef', kypend1%R srates that<<hen in the alternative or CaKfcarecE shutd'o<<m modeecp~paent.

and systems comprising the means uu u8dmte.andi mafnrain~cd~do<<n conditions shall not be damaged by f5'"or the.fRze d'amage te such equipment and systems shall be IfsdMeh ao that: the: ayatema.can ba made operable and cold shutdown can ba achfeenR,ahehfaz 72'.lumnr Thfs is not to be confused with the~~Section III;G;1'.contains;the: requirements for normal shutdo<<n modes utilising the, ccmtrol'oom~

or emergency control station(s) capabiIities., T5e:firaiareas;falling under the requirements of XXT'I b are: those: for.<<hei an.alternative or dedicated shutdown capabtlXtyq ia: not being provided'Por these fire.areas,Section IXI';L.b'.

raquires'onlyr the.capability to repair the systems necessary toi achieve;and: maintain cd shutdo<<n from either the control room or emergency, ccmtr@L<station(s)'Sehbw 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, not the capability to and:, achMre cold~shutdcnrm.<<ithin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> as required for the ateenuadve.or:hcx&catabahe~nnmodes by Sect1on III.L (noted above).~regardi tn areaa fute2rhqg:nnrmaL shutdo<<n, ho<<ever,Section I of kypemBa E.stat~that-"~nd~must.be made using only onsite cd a reasonahha achehtla'ushqg aery available po<<er source..

Section III.G.1 requires that the one train of systems needed to ,achieve and maintain hot shutdown be fzee of fire damage.Thus, the systems needed are to be completely protected from the fire regardless of time.If the intent of the question concerns how long these systems must operate, these systems must be capable of operating until the systems needed to achieve and maintain cold shutdown are available.

One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions must be free of fire damage.PWR licensees have demonstrated the capability to achieve and maintain stable hot shutdown conditions without the use of pressurixer heaters by utilixing the charging pump and a water solid pressurizer foz reactor coolant pressure controL.ks stated in Section III.G.1, one train of systems needed to achieve and maintain hot shutdowen conditions must be free of fize damage.Systems necessary to achieve andmaintain cold shutdown can be repaired withing 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Thus, if this certain equipment necessary only in the cooldown phase, is used to achieve cold'hutdown, it can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.If the certain equipment is maintaining hot shutdown while repairs aze being made, one train must be free of fire damage.See also Section f2 of the"Interpretations of Appendix R." It continues to be our position that torus (suppression pool)level indication is the preferred postMire monitoring instrumentation in order to confirm the availability of the torus (suppression pool)as a heat sink.Qe recognize that ex&sting analyses indicate that suppression pool level is not significantly changed during emergency shutdown conditions.

However, we believe the operator should be able to confirm that spurious operations or other unanticipated occurrences have not affected the torus function.An analysis of torus level change by itself is not considered an acceptable basis.Safe shutdown capabilities including alternative shutdown capabilities are all designed for some maximum level of fire-damage (system unavailabilities, spurious actuations).

Since the extent of the fire cannot be predicted, it seems prudent to have the post-fire shutdown procedures guide the operator from full system availability to the minimum shutdown capability.'s for repair procedure, similar conditions exists.A repair procedure can be written based on the maximum level of damage that is expected.This proceduze would then provide shutdown capability without accurately predicting likely fire damage.The NRC does.not have requirements, noz do re propose any requirements regarding whether post-fire operating procedures should be based upon fize areas, systems or be aympto~sed Ve suggest that the pose-fire shutdown capabilities designs be reviewed with the plant operation staff end procedures written with their input.I105u 2-33 The.only, reydxem~far.yos~ire operating procedures is for those areas>>Weza aItezn~ve.

sluzedaea is required.Por other areas of the-p~shLtdeemvouX4ha acM~K utilizing one of the two,wormal tzaina of'hutdawa.

system, Shutdown in degraded modes (one train unavaiXable))

shout be: covere8 hy present'perator training and abnormal'mB.

eaergenegr oyerati>>>>;

procedures.

If the degraded modes of operation>>

aza not.presently covered, ve would suggest that the epezatiam aran eE the.pXaa determine whether additional training or pCCClhdl1X8%

1288dl5Ra Cd~tom CBm cx5~m af Kcel~r IIZ.L, no specific post-fire ahxerKcin yzocednza glance 5ms>>been developed.

The inspection process:~be fXerHiXe.im.

tRrhs regard as long as the licensee can ahcne compliance.

~the.criteria of Section ZZZ.L." REF.SOURCE-Append'ix:

R to>>ZI CPR50~I I 2 11?'TP'63 K&KItem'~b>.

KaKa Shutdomx Capability (Cont'd): "(2)To meet the.guidelines>>

af.Posi'zion>>

C5.b X,one of the following means of ensuring that:ona aK the~re>>hmdsnt;.traina is free of fire damage should be provhhd!r CN KegacaefcmaKcebXhsrauH erga5pment and associated circuits of zedhmhadk made hg a.fRea Gauzier having a 3-hour rating.Senmtuxa2, stee81 Soaxbrg, a yezc, of or supporting such f ire ,barriers>>.

shouMibe proteetmK to provide fire resistance equivalent to thac, requireiH eP the barzi>>er-,, (bg~um~n<<of:cabl'es;AS.

eqvLpuent and associated circuits of zecbmkant:

tzaimn byr a<<ho&mnntal distance of more than 20 f t with detectaze,andi emauzoaatic:

ELm suppression system should be instate@ia<<the flora-area" ox.".I t~'>>>>w 4~EncXnsuze eG'cabiKaamBeq~paent:

and associated circuits of one rekmshme tzmhu~a>>.three bazzMr having a 1Wour rating.Zn ah@~, fire.Seecznzs~amB aa: automatic fire suppression system shout&.la.inatIQXedk in>><<tom fXre area." e%C'GEHEEIC'.LETXK.8&&".

hgraadix R to 10 CPR Part 50 utilizes the term>>"free, of;fire~damage..

Zn<<promulgating hppendix R, the Commissi'on<<hss provided~methods<<acceptable for assuring that, necessary structures, systema~ancL'.

components:

are free of fire damage (see Section.IZX G'ay., b: and: c),.their.in~the structure, system or compouant;um&z<<conahkezation',is capable of performing ita intended fiction>>during~.and>>

aftaz'.tha yoatu?ated fire, as needed.Licensees seeking, axemptLma fzoa Section ZE G 2, must, shoe that the alternative pzoposeib pzovHas:"zaasonablaasauzanca that this criterion is met.Nota also;that.Section ZIL'G'XaypXias only to equipment needed for hot.shutdown~Thara6ne-,uvezempMon from IIZ G.2 for cold shutdown eqiigipa~is not<<needed

.Thee teaa damage by fire" also includes Cease;te equipmen~5+a;.the=nnzmaL'r inadvertent oyeration of f ire The NRC does not define the structural steel supporting fire barriers.This steel ia ridentified by the licensee.Our position regarding the need to protect the structural steel, which forms a part of or supports fire'arriers, is consistent with sound fire protection engineering principles as delineated in both NFPA codes and standards, and the Fize Pxotection Handbook..It ia not necessary to protect structural steel in existing fire barriers where those.barriers were approved in an Appendiz A SER.If the failure of any structural steel member due to a fire could result in significant degradation of the fire barrier, it must be protected.

0 To meet the separation criteria of Section III.G.2 and III.G.3 of Appendix R, high impedance faults should be considered fox all associated circuits located in the fire azea of concern.Thus, simultaneous high impedance faults (below the trip point for the b'reeker on each individual circuit)for all associated cix'cuits located in the fire area should be considered in the eval'uation of the safe shutdown capability.

Clearing such faults on associated circuits which may affect safe shutdown may be accomplished by manual breaker trips governed by written procedures.

Circuit coordination studies need not be performed if it is assumed that shutdown capability will be disabled by such high impedance faults and appzopriate written procedures for clearing them aze provided.Sections III.G.2 and III.L.7 of Appendix R define the circuit failure modes as hot shorts, open circuits, and shorts to gxound.For consideration of spurious actuations, all possible functional failure states must be evaluated; that is, the component could be energized or de-energized by one or more of the above failure modes.Therefore, valves could fail open or closed;pumps could fail running or not running, electrical distribution breakers could fail open or closed.Fox'hre~hase hC circuits, the probability of getting a hot short on all three phases in the proper sequence to cause spurious operation of~motor is considered sufficiently low as to not require evaluation except foz any cases involving Hi/Lo pressure interfaces.

For ungrounded DC circuits, if it can be shown that only two hot shorts of the pzoper polarity without grounding could cause spurious operation, no further evaluation is necessary except fox any cases involving Hi/Lo pressure interfaces.

Qe would postulate that a"hot short" condition exists until action has been taken to isolate the given circuit fx'om the fixe area, or other actions as appropriate have been taken to negate the effects of the spurious actuation Me do not postulate that the fire would eventually cleax the"hot short." The term fire area" as used in Appendix R means an.area sufficiently bounded to withstand the hazards associated with the area and, as necessary, to protect important equipment within the area fx'om a fire outside the area.In order to meet the registration, fire area ll05u 2-35 bcnmdariee needl neo.be completely sealed floor to-ceiling, fdentLfXed and: constrered when evaluating the effectiveness of the avcral1 barrier Mxere.f~area boundaries are not wall~~all,'ngbaundazIes Mth.all penetrations sealed to the fire rating rcquiredi oK the boundaries, licensees must pezform an eveIuaMou.

te assess: the: adequacy of fire boundaries in their plants te d'etenahze iX the.bound'aries

<<ill withstand the hazards associated

<<dich the azes4 TMiN amaXpa5e must be performed by at least a fize I not.reqefzeKXfeeaseea may.-submit their evaluations for staff review and Hhsevez,, iZ certain cable penetrations were identiSfed as.open SEE.items a the time Appendix R became effective,.Section XII M~of the: rule app1ies (see 10 CPR 50.48(b)), and any variation from the requirements; of Section III.M requires an exempehon..

In any event.these analyses aust be retained by the licensees for.subsequent NRC'udits Sections: IIX.G'.2'.b-and.XXX.C;of Appendix R state that"In additi'on, fire.detectors:

ance automatic fire suppression system shaU.be installedi.

in.the.flora ares;Other provisions of Appendix R aXso'se c5a phrase.Rima 4eeecLors and an automatic fire suppression specs Le.Se Bm area (ace e g.,Section III.G.2.e).

Ie order to comply,'ith~

these.pznWsions, suppression and detection sufficient:

tn: protect: against: the hazards of.the ares must be install'ed..

Iiu this~regard~,, detection and suppression providing less chan SrXX.agree coverage may, be s~uate'to comply with the fnstNIXedi~

II~~nseea must: perf~an evaluation to assess the adequacy the area., The: evatuatimu must: ba performed by a fire protection engineer anxSif: rcqrxtreka.

aysrems engineer.Although not required, Iicenseea mayj sub'heir;evaihations to the staff for review and I'n: any ev~g, the.evaluations must be retained for mhseq~RKC auct5ts%Kara a~mace is providing no suppression oz dea~a an;eraqrai'om.

auat ba requested.

The.staff is always.avaiIahl'e:

ta ccnxsult with utility representatives and'rovide guidance as.to-tha.acceptability of a particular fire protection configuration iniindivtdual plant areas.See also Section 45 of the: "Interpretations~

of: Appendix R." Qith the ezectioa.ef a', partha2, qualified onc-hour rated barrier for portions;of: the: cirndts~with>

Xec.s than 20 ft.separation, if 20 feet of horisoneaIf.

aqmza~n.existed.

between the redundant unprotected portions of'he: cizedts: withaW intervening combustibles oz fire haxardsy.andi iF~fKTS',%L$protected by automatic f ize acti~~

If more than negligible quantitics of combustible materials (such as isolated cable runs)exist between redundant shutdown divisions, an exemption request should be filed.[" Negligible quantity" is aa admittedly Judgmental criterion, sad this)udgment should be made by a qualified fire protection engineer and documented for later NRC audit l Justifications for such excmptioas have been based on the following factors: 1 A relatively large horizontal spacial separatioa between rcduadant divisions; all cables qualified to IEEE-383;2 The presence of an automatic fire suppression system over the intervening combustible (such as a cable tray fire suppression system);.3'he presence of fire stops to inhibit fire propagation in intervening cable trays;4.The likely fire propagation direction of burning intervening cocabustibles in relation to the location of the vulnerable shutdown division;5.The availabQ.ity of compensating active and.passive fire protection.

Aay future changes ia the cable configuration due to modifications could.be haadled under 50.59.See the provisions of the license condition.

There is ao specific definition of"no intervening combustible.".The rcgulatioa is focused on the absence of in-situ exposed combustibles.

Noncombustible materials would not bc considered as intervening combustibles.

In BTP CMEB 9 5-1, noncombustible material is dcfiaed as: "Noncombustible Mater1al" a.A material which ia the form in which it is used aad under the coaditions anticipated, will not igaite, bura, support combustion, or release flammable vapors when sub]ected to fire or heat.b.Material having a structural base of noacombustible material, as defined in a., above, with a surfacing not over 1/8Mnch thick that has a flame spread ratiag not higher thaa 50 when measured using ASTM E-84 Test"Surface Burning.Charactcrist1cs of Buildiag Materials." In Generic Letter 83-33, it is iastated"Staff Position: Section III.G.2.b required the"separation

.~.with no intervening combustibles

~.." To meet this requirement, plastic)ackcts aad insulation of grouped electrical cables, including those which are coated, should be coasidered as intervening combustibles." For fire protection,"no iaterveniag combust1bles" means that there is ao significant quantities of in-situ materials which vill ignite;pad burn located between redundant shutdown systems.The amount of such combustibles that has significaace is a 5udgmental decision.As with 1105u 2-37 ether fssuee, fX the licensees fire protection engineer is concerned that.the rpxaxxtity of combustibles between shutdown divisions may not ha cnn&rRexmE insignificant by an independent reviewer, an exemption coxxXdl be requested,, or the-staff consulted.

Thaxxsfenx" mseerlahs are not considered as an intervening combustible; hn<<ever, they;must be considered as part of the overall fire"hazard%ddMJb aln SECS'dHhe chat an+ha cable trays which are either open or fuDy enclosed ghaeM aXae be ccaahkered as intervening combustibles Cables coated eQQhe.Are reeanfant material are also considered as intervening However;, cabl'es coated<<ith a fire-retardant material, or cables in cable trauma having solid sheet metal bottom, sides and top, if protected'.hy.

auxnxmatic fire detection and suppression systems and if the.design is supported by a fire hazards analysis, have been found ScceptabIe.

uxxder the exemption process.QxxLy'oiL'.

I'n closed containers which are in accordance

<<ith NFL 30 or'shXes(ixx metal conduits are not considered as intervening SPP8h.KtxxxuKsrd;-ZO containers is not considered to be an intervening ELrtia2.g~akler coverage must be properly]ustified and documented.

Sxxn Zeee 4$cd'he Interpretations of hppendix R." cxxaply;Wth~regulation

%here full area suppression and detection fsx non imsxmIXed~

licexxseea must perform an eva1uation.

to assess the adequacy axxdx necessity of partial suppression and detection in an arxxnt ThceavaIxxation aust be performed by.a fire protection engineer auP&,regdMa systems engineer hlthough not required, Xfcnxnseeasep sehaft their evaluations to the staff for review and subsequent.

NRC: audits.~Compliance

<<ith Section III.C.2 cannot be basedh on(rooms(ox=zones.~~See also;Sections:

$5: and f6 of.the"Interpretations of hppendix R." SEE:.SCllECES-" IQCPRN, hppea8tx R to 19CPR50, Ceaeric Letter 83-33, ESTD E-84~HPPA 30 2.X?$ETP'OK%S~,Xtea C 5 b,, Safe Shutdo<<n Capabilites (Cont'd)x"(3)IK the:guidelines>

eRPealtions CS.b 2 and, CS b 2 cannot be met, then.altarnativa m:da~aeak'.

shx~Rmra capability and its associated circuits, K'I NRC CENERIC LETTER 86-10: "Section III.G.3 of Appendix R provides for"alternative or dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits, independent of cables, systems or components in the area, room, or xone under consideration.

While independence is cleax'ly achieved chere alternative shutdown equipment is outside the fire area under consideration, this is not intended to imply that alternative shutdown equipment in the same fire area but independent of the zoom or the xone cannot result in compliance with the regulation.-

The"room" concept must be)ustified by a detailed fire haxaxds analysis that demonstrates a single fire vill not disable both normal shutdown equipment and the alternative shutdown capability.

The control room fire area contains the contxols and instrumental redundant shutdown systems in close proximity (i.e., usually separation is a fee inches).Be cause it is possible to provide shutdown capability that is physically and electrically independent of the fire area, it is our opinion that alternative oz dedicated shutdown capability and its associated circuits for the control room b'e independent of the cables system and components in the control zoom fire area.The damage to the system in the control room for a fire that causes evacuation of the control room cannot be predicted.

A bounding analysis should be made to assure that safe conditions can be maintained.from.outside the contzol room..This analysis is dependent on the specific design.The usual assumptions are: 1.The reactor is tripped in the contzol x'oom.2.Offsite power is lost as sell as automatic starting of the onsite ac generators and the automatic function of valves nd pumps whose control cizcuits could be affected by a contzol room fize.The analysis should demonstrate that capability exists to manually achieve safe shutdown conditions fx'om outside the contx'ol room by restoring ac power to designated pumps, assuring that valve lineups axe corzect, and assuming that any malfunctions of valves that permit the loss of reactoz coolant can be corrected before unrestorable conditions occur.Note that the only manual action in the control room prior to evacuation usually given credit fox is the reactor trip.For any additional control room actions deemed necessary prior to evacuation, a demonstration of the capability of performing such actions would have to be provided.Addi.tionally, assurance would have to be provided that such actions could not be negated by subsequent spurious actuation signals x'esulting from the postulated fire.Aftex the fire, the operatoxs could return to the control room@hen the following conditions have been met h 1.The fire has been extinguished and so verified by appxopriate fire protection pexsonnel.

2-39 The controI zoom has been deemed habitable by appropriate fire yzotectiae.

pezsonneI ancE the shift supervisor.

S Damage haa been assessed and, if necessary, corrective action hme b<<en take tn muuzre necessary safety, control and LnEozmaeion.

systems era functional (some operators may assist~theaa tasks)', ance the ahif t supervisor has authorized zmtnax aZ pLane cmamxlk to the control room.4 1hrnova pzneeRaxeeW5ch assure an orderly transfer of caaercdL fina tdia aXtreemhw shutdown panel to the control room~be<<a coapT~k-After.remanding, to the: conzzoL zoom, the operators can take any actiona compatible:

with;the condition of the control room.Controls in,any," area (cabhxet)Maze the fire occuzred would not be available.

4 be assessed and corrective action taken before controls in such cs5ineta are.deemed'unctionaX Controls in undamaged area (cabinets)

~Ah, be operated as required'inor modifications inside the contzol zoom: map be..perEoeacd, ta reach'cold shutdown.Sezuf~KQE.S zeeagxEzeaeBae

~need for alternate or dedicated eh3z@mem cmgehhXf~esp lane txo 5e.considered on the basis of a fire srera zoom.oz..a H~cene She alternative or dedicated capability shcgQBi ba.independent:

aK the.fRre area where it is possible to do so ('see SqqrLementary'nformation f'r.the final rule Section XZL.Q).areas~are nne.designated; or where it is not possible to have the eXzezaazive on de8Xca~cagehQity independent of the fire area, cazeBaL cnnsidezatimr musd lia gkvea to the selection and locst1on of the ahern:edve:

cm deMcatedl shutdown capability to assure that the alternate az dmBcated.s~hnau is provided for a room or zone, the capahili~must b<<.~gdeaIXyy amB electrically independent of that zaqu~ae the Xocael~~>aE the.'It<<znative or dedicat<<d shutdown I~the'5'I" KKxe'ust be<<valuated These<<nvizoamsnzsimay-lie: due to tha.hot: layer', smoke, drifting suppressants, common ventilatiom systems, common drain systems or flooding.Zn;additionother; int<<ractions between the locations msy be possQila in unique conf1guzations.

M'alternate shutdown'ia~pzovM'eN on the basis of rooms or zones, the provision of fiza datecthuriand<

f xe4 suppression ia only required in the..zoom or zone under considezatfon 7 needech to-, meet CDClIK These remote shutdown systems need to be~hnnMar and!phd icaIXyiindapendene, of the control room in order to gee@.CD@I9'oe CDC.ES>>, dam~~to the control roc'a not zedmuBane but euatr.ba.both g.'ly and<<lectzically independent of aha: came-nX'-~

These statemcats are meant to indicate that the alternative shutdown capability should be powered from aa onsite power system indeyendeat (both electrically and physically) fxom the axes under consideratioa.

Purther, if the aoraal emergency onsite power supplies (dicscl generatoxs) are not available because of fire damage, then a separate and indepeadeat onsite power system shall be provided.As an example,'ome plaats are utilixing a dedicated onsite diesel generator or gas turbine to power iastrumcntatioa and control yanels which arc a part of the alteraative shutdown capability.

Existing remote shutdown capabilities previously reviewed and approved under Apyendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 do not categorically comply with Section IZZ.G.3 of Appendix R.Licensees were requested to rc~aalyxe the1r plaats to determine compliance with Section III.G.If the licensee chooses to use the optioa of III.C.3 for provision of safe shutdown capability for certaia areas, the cx1teria of Section III.L arc applicable to that capability for that axes.The definitioaal process mentioned considers aa alteraative shutdowa capability provided under the Appendix A review as a redundant shutdown capabil1ty uader the Appendix R review.This defiaitional process is incorrect.

For thc purpose of analysis to Section III.G.2 criteria, the safe shutdown capability 1s defined as, one of the two normal safe shutdown txains.If the cxiteria of Sectioa III.G.2 are aot met, an alternative shutdown capability is required.The alternative shutdown capability may utilise existiag remote shutdown capabilities aad must meet the criteria of Sections IZZ.G.3 end ZZI.L of Appendix R.Although, 10 CFR 50.48(b)does aot specifically include Section IZZ.L with Sections III.G, J aad 0 of Appeadix R as a requirement applicable

~to all power reactors licensed prior to January 1, 1979, the Appendix, read as a whole, aad the Court of Appeals decisioa on the Appendix, Connecticut Li ht and Power et al.v.le, 673 F2d.525 (D.C.Dir., 1982), demonstrate that Sectioa IZI.L applies to the alternative safe shutdown option undex Section IZI.G if and where that opotioa is chosen by the licensee.This does aot preclude liceasees fx'om proposing and justifying other methods, e.g., see Section fl, Process Monitoring Zastrumentatioa, of the"Interpretations of Appendix R." REP-SOURCES: 10CPR50.48, Appendix R to 10CFR50, Chaprer 7 of the Standard Review Plan, General Design Criteria 19, Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1.2.119 BTP CNEB 9.5-1, Item.C.S, Position (Cont'd):."c.Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown Ca chili 1 Alteraative or dedicated shutdown capability provided for a syecific fire ar'ea should be able to achieve aad ma1ataia subcritical reactivity conditions in the reactor, maLa tain reactor coolant inventory, achieve aad maiatain hot standby>>'onditions for a PWR (hot shutdown>>for a BWR)and achieve cold shutdown>>conditions

%thin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and maiatain cold shutdown conditions thereafter.

During the post<ire shutdown, the reactor coolaat system process 1106u 2+1 varisMes shQX be maintaEaeK within.those predicted for a loss of normal ac power, ank the fXaaKon;pexkcct:

bmlndary integrity shall aot be affected;ic, there-Qua12.be ne fueL@X'hmage, rupture, or aay primary coolant boundary, t efined!ia.tlute Stsndsrdi XediaficsX.

Specifications."%LE CZSERXt EEHGBR.8$-2Et Per the criteria of Sectioa III.L of g~endd~R a Xoae oK a!ESNKtIc.

pewer shall be assumed for a fire in any~sree camuIrrsnlt ash cKaa foX1owing assumptions.'

The safe shlltdawm cayehfiLtty should not be adversely affected by any one.spurious:actllation er signal resultiag from a fire in any pl'aat.ares".and'The: safe shutd'awm cspahSLtty should not bc adversely affected by a fire: in, any pl'sne area.which results in the loss of all automatic function.{signals,.

Xogkc)'erns the circuits located in the area in conjun~~with>>one, worst: case spur1ous actuation.

or signal rcsu1tixqj fraud thc fire;;and.'ha aaEa dhMhscnmqpdNX~

should aot be adversely affected by a fErm fa any p1hmlt eawu<<hfdf results ia spurious actuation of the rahu~vaLvea%mammer ane~low pressure interface liae.the system>>.itl'eing, usaB.to provide its design function, it geners1Xy is: considered>>

rmHmdhat If the system is being used in Xmas ef tha peeferredi agaeeuz because the redundant components of the preferred,'ystem 4a net" acetr.tea separatioa criteria of Sectioa XXX C.2~the system is considered!

an alterastive shutdowa capability.

Thus~foz: the<<xlmpXc.above~ft'.appears that the condensate system is yrovi'iong, aXternaMve.

shlltdowm.

capability in lieu of separating redundsIIt:

cmnponeaes.

eK tea, ERE System., Pire detectioa aad a fixed~rclhlndsat:

coeponenea afi the.KHR System is not provided.However, ia ths even of.s, turMns.bId.'TiBh~

Mre, the RHR System would be used for saf~shlleblwn am'a nay cnnsdhfered aa alternative capability.

However,.Ona train: tdP the RHK.Rgstear.must be separated from the turbine buM~g REP.", SOURCE", hypemBx;R to: 1$CEL 50 2.120 STD CKB>>0 5-1ZtNC."5';,hXeamxative or Dedicated Shutdown Capability,.

{Cont'd)-.

('2).'The,;performance goals for thc shutdown functions.

shoul'd>>be<<'4)The reacti~cnntxmU SIcnCfom should bc capable of achicviIlg and (hJ The reactor caela>>ne'.aahaag fn~'nn should, be capable of.Km: EMRa and's eh~the: XsIINK indicatioa ia the pressurizer f or PQRa (c)The reactor hest removal function should be capable of achieving aad maintaining decay heat removal.(d)The process monitoring fuaction should be capable of providing direct readings of the process variables necessary to perform and control the above functions.(e)The supportiag functions should be capable of providing the process cooling, lubrication, etc, accessary to permit the operation of the equipment used for safe shutdown functions." NRC GENERIC L1'.TTER 86-10-"Diagnostic instrumentation is iastzumeatatioa, beyoad that previously identified in Attachment 1 to ISE Information Notice 84-09, needed to assure proper actuation aad fuactioniag of a safe shutdown equipment and support equipment (e.g., flow rate, pump discharge pressure).

The diagnostic instrumentation needed depends on the design of the alternative shutdown capability.

Diagnostic instrumentation, if needed, will bc evaluated during the staff'review.of the licensee'proposal for the alternative shutdown capability.

Section III.L.2.d of hppendiz R to 10 CPR Part 50 states that"thc process monitoring function shall be capable of providing direct readings of the pzocess variables aecessazy to perform and contzol" the reactivity control function.In I&E Information Notice 84%9, the staff provides a listing of instrumentatioa acceptable to aad preferred by the staff to dcmoastratc compliance with this provision.

While this guidance provides an acceptable method for compliance with the regulation, it does aot czclude other alternative methods of compliance.

Accordingly, a licensee may propose to the staff alternative iastrumeatatioa to comply with the'zegulation (c.g., boron~coaceatration iadication).

Qh&e such a subad.ttal is not aa exemption request, it must be justified based on a techaical evaluation." REF SOURCE: hppead1x R to 10CPR50 2 121 STP CMEB 9 5-1, Item C.5 c, Alternative or Dedicated Shutdown (Cont'd): (3)The shutdown capabiLLty for specific fige areas may be unique for each such area, or it may be oae unique combinatioa of systems for all such areas.In either case, the alternative shutdown capability shall be independent of the specific fire area(s)aad shall accommodate post-fire conditions where offsite power is, available and where offsite power is not available for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Procedures shall be ia effect to implement this capability

"'RC CLERIC IGNITER 86-10', Ho additional guidance.REP SOURCE hpyeadix R to 10CPR50.1106u 2-43 2?X2R SXF CHES 9.$-I, Item C.S.c kXCeznstive or Dedicated Shutdown/Conn.'4$t<<43 Xf the cspabi11Cy Ca achieve and maintain cold shutdown will nnc: 1ie.anatl~&kXe because of fire damagethe equipment and systems.comprising the means te acMeve and maintain the bet standby or hot shutdown condition~hfavmK Zf aaet equipment snd.systema will not be capable of being powered by hoch amChce AS off'site electric: paver systems because of fire damage, an h gled<~personneLeaec3hxaf~

ef.Ehza Bafgp8e members, required to operate'such eqpdtgamre amR ayamoa aiba'.ha cmaSea em aX1 times.ERC QBIERXC EERIER 8&XS-Re adSLcionsl guidance.X.I29: BTP CHES 9.5-1,, Itea: C'S.ckXaernative or Dedicated Shutdown (Conc!'d)" (5)'.Equipment.

an@system comprising the means to achieve and maintain, cold;shutdown conditionsi should not be damaged by fire;or the fire e to such equipmenc and.'ystems; should.be limited so that the systems can be: made: opersb1e and.colds shutdowm,ackdeved:

<<1thin 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Materials f or suc3z,repairs shel?be readily availabZa onsite and procedures shall be in eSfecC, Co.implement such.repairs..IS such.equipment and systems used prior to 7'aunch eften fixe eHIi.near, he.ca@drZa M being powered by both onsite and cdHhd!cs eXeccrfc: paver ayscaes 5acsuse'-ef ftre damage, an 1ndependent ons1te-"pm~apaeem sthaBB 5e prnm55eR Sp&gamzc, and systems used after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />"'ap be peemR hy cfrance.paler ouE7;.-HKC GEHEHC EEDZEK ES-XO.,%n adtKtional guidance.BBP SDUR/HK"+@rend~K un 2EEEM.ETP CHES: 9'~,, Xewa C Rc;, kl~mative oz Dedicated Shutdown (Conc.'d)=(6)Shucd'owe a@sterna instate&to ensure post-fire shutdown'qpdiLIfity; aeecE not: be.desfgae4 ta~meec: s~c Category I criteria, chyle~me~teriaan oChen;des~

Saeva accident criteria, except where cmquMedl fax ocher reasons'5ecsuae.'E interface with or impact on~ising safety mittens.on:

baca~off adhere valve actions due to fire damage+, HRC (223KRZC'ZVXEF.

~0;.Ho" ahÃef'onal guidance.2 I2S: SXP CHES.: O'.5-lItem C.S'c;.,kXeernative or Dedicated Shutdown (Cont,'4)=(T)~The: safe shutdowa eq~aaant-and systems for each fire area shan~~be brawl co..be-.isoIaced.:

froa associated circuits in the fire area so Chat hot: shocCKg, openi circnitsy.

~short%Co ground-in Che associaCed circuiCs noc-prevent operaMm af: tha.safe.shutdown equipment The separation and~ers: between'.craysl Axe comklits<concafchng associaced circuiCs of one saf e shutdown.divtsiont andtxays:amhcondu~containing associated circuits or safe, shutdowns cNCee from: the." redundant.".

di~on, or the isolation of these associated.

circu&s froe Che.-safe;aherdnwn'quipment, should bc such that a~gaemXated.

fire lnvehvingt;associated..ieLemd~

will not prevent safe shutdown." HRt CQKRZC GKTKK85HS-, Sa adiKCfonal guidance.

2.126 BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.S, Position (Cont'd): "d.Control of Combustibles (1)Safet~elated systems should be isolated or separated from combustible materials.

Rhea this is not possible because of the nature of the safety system of thc combustible material, special protection should be provided to prevent a fire.from defeating the safety system function.Such protection may iavolvc a combiaatioa of automatic fire suppression, aad construction capable of withstanding and containing a fire that consumes all combustibles present.Examples of such combustible materials that may not be separable from the remainder of its system are!(a)Emergency diesel geaexatox fuel oil day tanks.P (b)Turbine-generator-oil aad hydraulic control fluid systems.(c)Reactor coolant pump lube oil system." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additioaal guidance.2.127 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.d, Control of Combustibles (Coat'd): "(2)Bulk gas storage (either compressed or cryogenic), should aot be permitted inside structure housiag safet~elatcd equipmcat.

Stox'age of flammable gas such as hydr'ogen should be located outdoors or ia separate detached buildings so that'a fire ox'xplosion vill aot advex'sely affect any safety-x'elated systems or equipmeat.(Refer to NFPA SOA,"Gaseous Hydrogen Systems.")" NRC GENERIC UTTER 86-10: Ho additional guidaace.REF.SOURCE NFPA SOA.2.128 BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.S.d.2, Control of Combustibles (Cont'd): "Care should bc taken to locate high prcssuxe gas storage containers vfth thc long axis parallel to building ills.This wiLL minimize the possibility of sall penetzatioa ia thc event of a coataiacr failure.Use of compressed gases (especially flammablc aad fuel gases)inside buildings should bc coatzolled.(Refer to NFPA, 6,"Iadustzial Fizc Loss Pxeveatioa.")" NRC GENERIC UTTER 86-10 No additional guidance.REF.SOURCE: PPM 1.3.10 and 1.3.35.1106u 2-45 2-129 KP CHKE 9'.5-l, Item C.5.d, Mntzol of Combustibles (Cont'd): "(3)The use of PIas~materials shouLd be min&Lixed.

In particular', hslogenated plastics sueR as polyvtny1 chloride (PVC)and neoprene should be used only when substitute noncombustible materials sre not available.

hll plastic materials,.

including flame and fire retardant materials, will burn vith an iniety amB SEW product%on in a range similar to that of ordinary hydrocarbons Qhea burning, they produce heavy smoke that obscures visibility and can plug akr filters, especially charcoal and HEPT..The halogepated plastics elise xeLaase free chIortne and hydrogen chloride when buxning wtd.ch are toxic cm hmnnzs and cozzosive to eyafpment.

HRC GKSKREIC LERNER B&-LC: Ho additional guidance 2.130 BTP'QfEE 9 5-1;Item C.5.d, Control of Combustibles (Cont'd): "(4)Storage of flammable Liquids should, as a minimum, comply with the HRC GEHERIC: LETZER 86-10 No additional guidance.REF SOURCE:.PPM 1.3 10 and 1 3 35 2.X3L EGP CSKR 9 5-X,, Ites C.5.d, Control of Combustibles (Cont'd): "(5)Hydrogem Hhuee Lm safe~lated areas should be either designed to seismic Class I.re~zements, or sleeved such that the water pipe is dizectly vented to the outs~~oz should.be equipped with excess flow valves so that in case of a Line braakthe-hydrogen concentration in the affected areas wiLL not exceed~HRC GEHERIC L1KTEK 8&-.LO: "kXX BR's have a hydrogen Line going to the Vetume Control Tank (Ma~p Taak)that needs to be pzotected." 2 L32 EP CHKE 9'-I, Itea C 5,.Position (Cont'd)-"e.Electrical Cable , C'ahXa Tra a ance CaMe Penetrations Gee meteL should;bc used for.cable tzays.Only metaLLic tubing shout@be uaeR fnz.-camber Thi~II, aataLLic tubing should not be used.PLexfb1e meadQlfe, tubing should only be used in short Lengths to connect components te equipment Other raceways should be made of noncombustible materiaL'."'RC.

GENERIC'EIXER 86 10: No additional guidance.2.133'TP'HEE 9.5-1', Xtem C.S e, EIectzical Cable Contstxuction, Cable Trays and'abLe Penetzations (Cont'd)"(2)Abundant safe~elated cable systems outshfe the.-cable spreading room should be separated from each othez and from potenlc5aI'irm.

exposure hazards in nonsafe~elated areas by fire~S barriers with a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.These cable trays should be provided with continuous line-type heat detectors and should be accessible for manual fire fighting.Cables should be designed to allow wetting down witn fire suppression water without electrical faulting.Manual hose stations and portable hand extinguishers should be provided." HRC GENERIC LEXTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.134 BTP CMEB 9.$-1, Item C.5.e.2, Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable.Penetration (Cont'd): " Safety-related cable trays of a single division that aze separated from redundant divisions by a fire barrier with a minimum rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and are normally accessible for manual firefighting should be protected fzom the effects of a potential exposure fire by providing automatic.

water suppression in the area where such a fire could occur Automatic area protection, where provided, should consider cable tray arrangements and possible transient combustibles to ensure adequate water coverage for areas that could present an exposure hazard to the cable system." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10-"In general cable tray supports should be protected, regardless,of whether there is a sprinkler system.However, they need not be protected if (1)the qualification tests were performed on wrapped cable trays with unprotected supports, and the supports aze shown to be adequate, or (2)an analysis is performed, which takes into account the fire loading and automatic suppression available in the area, and which demonstrates that the unprotected support(s) will not fail and cause a loss of the cable tray fire barrier requized for the postulated fire.hn exemption is not required;however, the qualification tests and applicability or the structural evaluation should be documented and available for audit." 2.135 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.e.2, Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (Cont'd): " Manual hose standpipe system may be relied upon to provide the primary fire suppression (in lieu of automatic water suppression'systems) for safety-related cable trays of a single division that are separated from, redundant safety divisions by a fire barrier with a iaiaianua rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and are normally accessible for manual fire fighting if aU.of the following conditions are aet-(a)The number of equivalent*

standard 24-inch wide cable trays (both safety-related and nonsafety-related) in a given fire area is six or less;(b)The cabling does not provide instrumentation, control or power to systems required to achieve and maintain hot shutdown;and Trays exceeding 24 in.should be counted as two trays;trays exceeding 48 in.should be counted as three trays, regardless of tray fill.1106u 2-47 (c))Baal detectors.

are prcvdMd fn the azea of these cable routings, am'ontinuous Efn~~e heat detectors ax'e provided in the cable czapke HRK CZKKIC'XZTIZK 8&-10x Fo additional guidance.2 XZS STP CSHB F.S-X~Item.C S~e X~EXectrfcal Cable Construction, Cable Thape andt Qua Eenetzatfone

(~"4l"-Safety-x'elated cable trays that are no@<<xcssaSBBe Sa=ammaZ.XKm Elg~ag should be protected by a coned uxtaam~isaear a@sum aft'pere<<R BaXege or open directional spray aoxzles arranged'.

see than:<<Leqaate<<ater covemqgc fa provided f ox'ach cable tray.Such cable tran shou&also be.protectecK from the effects of a potential exposuxe.ffmv.by;providing autoaatf'c.

water suppression in the area where such a fire.csun occur..NET CZHEKIC'ZTTER 86-10'o addftf onal guidance 2 13T BTP."CHBE f.-5-X,.Item C.5 e.2',, ELectrfcal Cable Construction, Cable Tzaya aacb'CabXe.

Fenetzatfona.(Cont!4)" Xn other areas whexe it may not be yosNRhXa because aK oCher eeen~tng design features necessary for.zeasons of-aac3~safeeyj

~'pa zecEandlant=

aafe~elated cable systems by 3-hour;zaemR furs.5axa~a~csIxXe tray+shnuRR be pzotected by an automatfc water eyseea<<f'dn~m~eadi deluge.cn.open di@~tional spray nozzles arranged so that adaquaeawazer.

cover~a fs pznvhKecK for each cable tray.Such cable tzaye shen&I eXaa be protects from;the.effects of a potential exposure fire by yznvfdfna;automatic.

water.suppress&a in the area where such a fire could occur The: caqm5flfty to achfeve am'.mNLLntafn safe shutdown considering the effects oE ax fXn fnvoEvtng ffxed'uK petentfal transient combustibles should be evahmtecBsXeh.

and!without actuation of the automatic suppression system aaxK shout be.+~Red'.on.a.suftabEg defined basis." NLC CBRBKC!METER 86-10't Fa a8cEitional guidance.2 X38%TED CEBS KS~XCcam-C 5 s 2 iKeetrfcal Cable Construction, Cable~amU dtXs.Fenetzatf.one (Cont.'4)J-(3)Electric cable construction shamble>>aa4 a.akakanus>>

pasa-the fIsme test fn the current IEEE Std 383.(This does not.'mpEy.-

that".cables passing.thftt.test will not require fire protection

)i NKt CEMEKXC'.LEXTEK 8&-10-Ne aditi onal guidance REF SOURCES;IEEK'.Stepan%.3H 2.139 BTP APCSB 9.5-1, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.75: "Electrical cables should be in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.75." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF.SOURCE: BTP kPCSB 9.5-1, NRC Regulatory Guide 1 75 2.140 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.e.2, Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (Cont'd): "(4)Cable raceways should be used only for cables." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2;141 BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.e.2, Electrical Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Cable Penetrations (Cont'd): "(5)Niscellaneous storage and piping for flammable or combustible liquids or gases should not create a potential exposure haxard to safe~elated systems." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.142 BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C 5, Position (Cont'd)!"f.Ventilation (1)The products of combustion and the means by which they will be removed from each fire area should be established during the initial stages of plant design.Consideration shou3,d be given to the installation of automatic suppression systems as a means of limiting smoke and end'heat generation.

Smoke and corrosive gases should generally be discharged directly outside to an area that vill not affect safety-related plant areas.The normal plant ventilation system may be used for this purpose if capable and available.

To facilitate manual fire fighting, separate smoke and heat vents should be provided in specific areas such as cable spreading rooms, diesel fuel oil storage areas, switchgear rooms, and other areas where the potential exists for heavy smoke conditions (see NFL 204 for additional guidance on smoke control)." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCE: NFL 204 2.143 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.f, Ventilation (Cont'd): "(2)Release of smoke and gases containing radioactive materials to the environment should be monitored in accordance with emergency plans as described in the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.101,"Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants." hay ventilation system designed to exhaust potentially radioactive smoke or gases should be evaluated to ensure that, inadvertent operation or single failures will not violate the radiologicaU.y controlled areas of the plant design.1106u 2&9 This reqefzeaamt XnMades containment functions for protecting the public and HKC CBKKZC LEfXEL 86-10=Ke additional guidance.REF., SOURCE:.Regulatory Qxhke Z.101.2 244 MP CRT 9 5-X>>Iteaa.C 5 E>>Ventilation (Cont'd)'(3)

Special yoeer suypfiyr anS controls for aechaa~X ventilation systems should be rua outside the fKee.area served by, the elates+here practical." NRt CENERIt: XE!TER 86-10-Ãe additional guidance.2 145 hTP.CHEB 9'S-I., Item.C 5 fE,.-Veatiiatioa (Cont'd): "(4)Engineered safety feature-filters should: he protected ia accordaace vith the guidelines of Regulitory.

SoMe: X.52 hay fiIter that includes combustible materials and is a potential'xposure fire harard'.that.may affect safety-related components ahoeM be protected.

aa detenainedL by,.@he, fire hasards analysis." SEC CBHHRXt" IUKEKR 8&RE" Sx Ndiditional guidaace.E?F SNHIÃK-ReguXatory Qh5Re I 52.-2 X4&3T2'HER-3.',, Item, C.5 fF%tatilation (Coat'd)'-

" (5)The fresh air l-be Xocatech remote: from.the aacha~aux." outlets sad smoke vents of other fire areas to aiaimixe the poasibili~

aK contaminating the intake air vith the 5RC CBHERIC" EJ~EK 8&-10 Hco abortional guidance.2.X@2 Sna asm 9~"Item t X.F%aiiM~ion (Coat'd): "(6)Stairwells ahealB be dimkgaeh te mi~akxa.smaka fhdBLtratioa duriag a fire." NKC CBEUiC'.T.ET15K.

86-XO':: Ho'Mi.tioaal guidance.2 148'TP.'HES.S-1',, Itemf;, Vim~tion (Cont'd)"(7)Qhere total floodiag gem;eminguis~aysteaaare.used, area iatake and exhaust veatilatiom dampers: s~ahf be: controlled'n-accordance

+1th NPPA 12,"Carbon IKoxMe.Systems>>" and'EPT, 12A',, Haloa'3QX.

Systems," to maintain the aeceasa~QL1b coILlMatratiom>>

HKC;CZHERIC:amm.

8&-la=N a Miti~~d~e REF SmlRCEK SPY.12>>, HPPk-.'~~

2.149 Filters: All filters shall be UL Class I except as follows: HEPA Pilters shall be in compliance with the requirements of UL 586 as accepterd by ANSI/ASME 509.The UL seal certifying compliance with the requirements of UL-586 should be acceptable evidence.that the filters meet fire and hot air resistance requirements.

NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10-No Additional Guidance REP.SOURCES: UL 586, ANSIii.Ž.>09.t'2.150 Charcoal Filters: All charcoal filters shall be gasketless type.airflow bleed systems to remove decay heat so that charcoal is kept well below ignition temperature of 644'F.NRC GENERIC L1'.1TER 86-10: No additional guidance.REP SOURCE:-Regulatory Guide 1.52 2.151 Charcoal Pilters: High adsorber temperature instrumentation using thermistor cable shall be provided in each charcoal bed arranged to sound aLarms in the control room at two temperature settings below charcoal ignition temperature.

Isolation valves are provided for shield buildings ECCS units to isolate manually in case of fire.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCE: Regulatory Guide 1.52 2.152 Pdlters: Roll~at Pllters aay be UL Class 2, as they are only avadlable ae UL Class 2, bananas of entrayaeat aaterlal on the aedda to enhance filter efficiency.

Fixed manual Mater Spray Systems shall be provided for the nonsafety related charcoal filters located in the Reactor and Reactor Auxiliary Buildings, by installation of a hose coupling on each filter housing, which will bring the water supply manually from an adjacent hose station., NRC GIXERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF.SOURCE: ANI Pile No.N-219, Ebasco, UL (Underwriter's Laboratory) 1106u 2-51 2 153 Smoke and Heat Vent: Protons for smoke and heat vent or power venting should be provided for each baihKng.HRC GENERIC LETTER 8&-LOx He additional guidance 2.154 STP CKBS 9.S-L, Item: C.S,.PmC~(Cont'd): "g.LL h ancE CoaummEcation

-Lfgretna aalu tray voice communication are vitaL to safe eadt erne>qyex~

zmspense in the event of fix'e." HRC GESKRIC LZX1XR 86-10., Fa ecMitionaL guidance.2 155 STP CHES 9 5-1~Item, C 5'f', ELghting and Communication (Cont'd): "Suitable fMed and portabLe emerg~lighting and communication offices should be provided as folio<<s." V (X)Fixed seL&eontained'.

1'i'gh~consisting of fluorescent or sealed-beam units with indf~uaL 8-houx'inimum battery power supplies.should.be provtd'ed:.

in areas that must be manned for safe ahutdo<<a ancL for access.amK egress routes to and from all fire areas Safe shzukaem aannxe include those requi.red to be manned if the control zaea mnsz: Sa eeamxated." HRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10;, The: level of illumination provided by emergency Lighting in access: routes Co and in ax'eas where shutdown functions must be performedhis.-

a level that is sufficient to enable an operator to reach that area amS perform the shutdown functions.

At the xemote shutdown panels the fZhunination levels should be sufficient for controL panel<operators.

The bases-for estimating,these Xevels of Lighting are the guidelines contained in Section 9 5'.3~oK dna Standard Review Plan, which are t'ased on Dr4ustzy standard Ma~ILLuminating Engineering Society HEmre a Licensee haa providedt emergency lighting per Section III.J kyp~Ltx.k<<e<<ould azpec thmz: the Licensee verify by field testing that.this, lighting is adequata to.perform.the intended tasks." REF'.SOQRCEx Appends: R" to'0CPE50'.

2.156 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.g, Lighting and Communication (Cont'd): "(2)Suitable sealed-b'earn batter~owered portable hand lights should be provided for emergency use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance-2.157 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.g, Lighting and Communications (Cont'd): "(3)Pixed emergency communications independent of the normal plant communication system should be installed at preselected stations.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2 158 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.5.g, (Cont'd): "(4)A portable radio communications system should be provided for use by the fire brigade and other operations personnel required to achieve safe plant shutdown.This system should not interfere with the communications capabilities of the plant security force Fixed repeaters installed to permit use of portable radio communication units should be protected from exposure fire damage.Preoperational and periodic testing should demonstrate that the frequencies used for portable radio communication will not affect the actuation of protective relays." NRC GENERIC IJ'.TIER 86-10: No additional guidance.2'59 BTP CMEB 9.5-1,, Item C, Position (Cont'd): ",6.Pire Detection and a.Fire Detection"(1)Detection systems should be provided for all areas that contain or present a fire exposure to safety-related equipment," NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCES-NFPA-13, NPPA-72E, NFPA-70, NPPA-90A.2 160 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C 6.a, Pire Detection (Cont'd)-"(2)Pire detection systems should comply with the requirements of CLass A systems as defined in NPPA 72D,"Standard for the Installation, Maintenance, and Use of Proprietary Protective Sigma1fng Systems," and Class I circuits as defined in NPPA, 70,"National Electrical Code."" NRC GENERIC LLTXZR 86-10: No additional guidance REP.SOURCES: Same as Item 2.159 above.1106u 2-53 2 IiHL STP CHKE 9'-X.~Xtem C.6 a, Pire Detection (Cont'd): "(3)Pire detm~s should ba selected and installed in accordance with NPPh 72E, hacaauaekc Flora Detectors Preoperational and periodic testing of pulsed Xine~e hest detectors should demonstrate that the frequencies used will not NKeetr the ace~km of.protective relays in other plant systems." NRC CEHKRXC LlKXZR.86-10: No additional guidance.REF SQSCESt Same as Xtcaa 2 159 above.(2!~L SIP CSEE%~~Xtea C~6~a, Axe Detection (Cont'd): "(4)Pire 4eeeeefon systems should give audible and visual alarm and annunciation in the control.room.Where coned detection systems are used in a given fire area, XocaI means should)be provided to identify which detector xone has actuated.LocaL audible.alarma shcnald somuk.ia the fire area." HRt, GENERA LETTER.86>>10: No additional guidance.REF: SOURCES:.Same as.Item 2 159 above.'~52P IMR'K$-X~Itea C.6 a~Pire Detection (Cont'd): "(5)Pire alarms ,-'hmalhR he Cfstfnctkve aa8 unique so they will not be confused with any other@Rane system.alarme HKC;CEKRZC: LETTER.86-LQ: Fo acMitional guidance.REF SQIECES" Sanae as Xteau 2 X59 above.Os 2.XS4, STP'ME3.9&-l, Xtem C.6.a, Fire Detection (Cont'd)!"(6)Primary and secondary pcneex suypLfea should be provided for the fire detection system and~ychaary auh secondary power mypXiee should satisfy pzovisions of Sees~222K cf'PPfh.729.This can be accomplished by using normal offsite~et.ea thm~mary: suppXy with c 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> battery supply as secondary supply;andi hp ynnCkXng cspaSKXIty for manneX.connection to the Class lE emergency ycnrem bus.wither 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss: of okfsite power Such connection should fol'Xae: the applicable:

guidelines in Re@alatozy Codes 1.6, 1.32, and 1,75." lHLC CLERIC;LHlTEL 86-10: No additional guidance.REF'GUECESr HFPh-72D..

2.165 Each Local Control Panel (LCP)should display local alarm, trouble, aormal and actuation lights..A fire condition sensed by a detector, energizes a zone light on the LCP, initiates an audible alarm at the fize zone, and any automat1c act1on for fire suppresion system.The condit1oa shall.be indicated on the MFCP.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional gu1daace.REF SOURDES: NFPA-72D.2.166"Manual Fire Alarm Stations should be provided throughout"the pLant and ax'c readily accessible fox employee use ia signaling a fire condition.

In addition to initiating a f1re alert, designated manual fire alarm statioas may be used to actuate eater flow to associated sprinkler or mter spray systems." NRC GENERIC HETER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF~SOURCES: NPPA.-72A., NFPA-72D.2 167 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.b, Pire Px'otection Water Su 1 S stem"(1)Aa underground yard fire main loop should be installed to furnish anticipated water requirements.

NFPA 24,"Standard fox'utside Protectioa," gives necessary guidance for such installation.

It references other design codes and standards developed by such organizations as the Amezicaa National Standards Institute (ANSI)aad the Amer1can Water Wox'ks Association (AWWA).Type of pipe and eater treatment should be design considerations with tuberculation as oae of the parameters.

Means for inspecting and flushiag the systems should be px'ovided." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF~SOURCES: NPPA;24, NPP&26, NFPA 72D.2.168 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.b,.Pire Protection Water Supply (Cont'd)-"(2)Approved visually ind1cating sectional contx'ol valves such as post-indicator valves should bc provided to isolate portions of thc main for aainteaance.or x'cpair without shutting off the supply to pr1mary aad backup fire suppression systems serving areas that coatain or ezpose safety-related equipment." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No add1tioaal guidaace.1106u 2-55 2 169 EEP CHES 9 5-I~Xtem C 6 b, FLre Protection Water Supply (Cont'd): "(3)Valves should be installed to permit isolation of outside hydrants from the fire mata for maintenance or repair without interrupting the water supply ta automatic:

oz manual fize suppression systems in any area containLng or presenting a fixe hazard.to safe~e3Lated or safe shutdown equipment." IKC GZHERIC L1K1EL 8&-IG: Ko additional guidance.REF SOURCE Spy-2'4 2 X70, EXP CHES 9 5-IXteaa C.6 5>>Fkre Protection Water Supply (Cont'd): (4)The fLze main.system piping elzauld be separate from service or sanitary mater system: piping,, except as described in Position C.S.c.(4)." SEC GKHERIC LETTER.86-19:.Eo additional guidance.me SOmCE:.~a-x4.2 I?I.32P CHER 9 5.-I!>>Item.C&.h>>Fire Protection Water Supply System..(Cont her (Q 4 coisam yanK Eire mmLa loop may serve multi~nit nuclear ycwer FIT-<<Kte<<if between units.Sectional control valves ,",uaLt For such instaIXatkon, commoa water supplies may also be utilized.For-NItipI~eactor sitea-eath widely separated plants (approaching 1 mile or=more)~.separate.yard;fire.maLa loops should be used." 5'KKRLC SHIER 86-IQ=Ko sjcMLtional guidance;2 I?2 SXP CHER O'.S-I',, Xtem-C 6 b, Fire Protection Water Supply System.(Cont'd)=C&)'f'ump<<

aze required.'o meet system pressure or flow recpafrementsa stdEh~nr number of pumps should be provided to ensure that ICOS~uM~aRXX.ba avefXaMe assaarfng faLlure of the largest pump or loss of,efface paver (ca@thzaa~pmep<<oz two 100K pumps).This can be accompILsheR for<<xsnyXeby praMXag either: (a)Electric motoMriven fLza pump(<<);andt.dLeseL~ven.

firm pump(s);or (b)Two or more seismic Category X Chase XK cI'ecrxic:

moto~riven fire pumps connected to redundant Class IE, emergency power buses (see Regulatory Guides 1.6, 1.32, and 1.?5)." HKC QBGMC'NTER, 85-16:, No: additional guidance.REF Saaaam-Sara-Z4 NFP~-20 2.173 STP QfEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.b, Fire Protection Mater Supply (Coat'd): "Individual fire pump conaections to the yard fize maia loop should be separated with sectionalising valves between connections.

Each pump and its driver aad controls should be located in a room separated from the remaining fire pumps by a fire wall with a miaimum rating of 3 houzs.The fuel for the diesel fire pump(s)should be'sepaz'ated so that it does not provide a fiz'e source exposing safety-related cquipmeat.

Alarms indicating pump runaing, driver availability, failure to start,,aad low fire-main pressure should be provided in the control room." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REFT SOURCES: NFPA-24, NFPA-20.2.174 BTP QKB 9.5-1, Item C.6.b, Fire Protection Mater Supply (Cont'd)"Thc fire pump installation should conform.to NFPA 20,"Standard foz the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps." r NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCES: NFPA-24, NFPA;20 2.175 Pumps should start automatically on progressive drops in fire maia mter prcssure as foDowsz 1.The motor driven fire pump starts automaticaLLy rhea the pressure in the fire loop drops to approzimately 105 psig, 2.If the pressure continues to drop, at 95 psig the diesel driven fire pump start automatically NRC GENERIC L1HTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF.SOURCE: Supply System Engineering 2 176 Soth pumps should be stopped manually at the pumphousc.

NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCE: NFPA 20 2.177 Pressure relief valves shall be located on the fire pump discharge.

NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidaace.REF SOURCE'FPA

-20 1106u 2-57 2 17&4~pump test discharge header may be provided of adequate capacity to acccmmedate:

initial acceptance f1'nd periodic performance tests.r e GEHRIG LH'fTER&&-10: Eo additional guidance.2.179&omar for the electric sotor driven fire pump should be supplied from 6190 V ycsaer center ay~ed firma a swltchgear.

SR@CBKBRZC XZ!52K 86-19-Ko additional guidance.REF SOURCE=Supply System Engineering C 2 180 Thc disduarge ef,f2'est~r should be sent back to the fire eater storage: tankse, NRC GENERIC QHXEL&6-10-Ro additional guidance.REF 801ZKCE=Cocxk Engineering.

Practice 2.181)Meal dRsdhrrI~fraaa the pressure relief valves on the fire pumps and jockey pumps may be retuxnmK.to the, Zaire~ter storage tanks.Sar CZSaarC XZTZER.&a-10=Xo additi~guidance.2.182 STP'HEE-9'K~

Xtear C 5 h,, Pire Protection Rater Supply (Cont'd): (7)Outs&ha msmudt hosa insaQhLticm should be sufficient to pr'ovide an effective hose.stream te en@onsite Xocation where fixed or transient coabuatihXea could<j'eopardfra eafe~mXated equipment Hydrants should be recommendedl Du NFL ZA: Cutside Protection," should be provided as needed, but at.least: every.Z,MS ft hlten~hvely, mobs.e means of providing hose and associated; equipment;, such as hose carts or trucks, may be used.kohen provided, such<mobs.e equipment:

should.be equivalent to the equipment supplied by three hose.houses., SEC QRHERZC: IZXIZR, 8&-10"-Ko additional guidance.

2.183 Fire hydrants should be non-freeze type.Hose houses should be installed adjacent to each hydrant.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCE NPPA 24 2.184 BTP CMEB 9 5-1, Item C.6.b, Fire Protection Water Supply (Cont'd): "(8)Threads compatible with those used by local fire departments should be provided on all hydrants, hose couplings, and standpipe risers." NRC GENERIC LETTRE%86-10: No additional guidance.2.185 BTP CMEB 9 5-1, Item C 6.b, Pire Protection Water Supply (Cont'd): "(9)Two separate, reliable freshwater supplies should be provided.Saltwater or brackish water should not be used unless all freshwater supplies have been exhausted.

If tanks are used, two 100X (minimum of 300,000 gallons each)system capacity tanks should be installed.

They should be so interconnected that pumps can take suction from either or both.However, a failure in one tank or its piping should not cause both tanks to drain.Water supply capacity should be capable of refilling either tank in 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> or less." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10 No additional guidance.REF SOURCES NPPA.-222.186 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C 6.b, Fire Protection Water Supply (Cont'd):.."(10)Common tanks are permitted for fire and sanitary or service wter storage.When this is done, however, minimum fire water storage requirements should be dedicated by passive means, for example, use of a vertical standpipe for other water services.Administrative controls, including locks for tank'utlet valves are unacceptable as the only means to ensure minimum water volume." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.187 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.b, Pire Protection Water Supply (Cont'd): "(11)The fire water supply should be calculated on the basis of the largest expected flow rate for a period of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, but not less than 300,000 gallons.This flow rate should be based (conservatively) on 500 gpm for manual hose streams plus the largest design demand of any sprinkler or deluge system as determined in accordance with NFPA 13 or NPPA 15.The fire water supply should be capable of delivering this design demand over the longest route of the water supply system." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.1106u 2-59 2 288 BTP CHEB 9 5-1, Item C.6.b, Fire Protection Water Supply (Cont'd): Q2)Freshwater hakes or ponds of.sufficient size may qualify as sole source ef water for fIre protectfon but require separate zedundant auctions in one oz manre fhazake structures.

These exyplfies should be separated so that a failure ef one supply will not result fafailure of the othex supply." SRC GENHRM UTTER 86-10'o additional guidance.2 289 SEP CHES 9 5-3L>>Item C 6 b>>Pffxa Protection Water Supply (Cont'd): Q9%Shen a common water supply Xa@mndtted for ffre protection and the mIMhaate heat sink>>the folio<<fng camRftfoas should also be satisfied:

4'he.addftfonal fire protectfoe water requirements are designed iato the total storage capacity, and.(b)Failure of the fire protection system should'ot.

degrade the functioa of the: ultimate heat sink." HRC GENERIC L1'TTER 86-XG.lfa additfonal guidance.X.X9Q: BTP CHEE 9 5-1, Item C 6 h Ffara Protection Water Supply (Cont'd): CX4%Other water systems that may 5e usa%as oae of the two fire water" sugpXfea should'e yennanently camxmdaeK to the fire main system and should be".e@adQe of automatfe alignment to the.EKre main system.Pumps, controls aad.Power.supplfes fa these systems ehoe3hR satfsfy the requirements for the main'Sine pumps The use of other water systems for fire protection should not be-fncompatfbXe

<<fth.thefr functions zecpCred for safe plant shutdown.Pailure.ef the: other system should aot degrade the fire maia system" SEC GENERIC%EWER 86-10=Fa edBitfonal guidance.2 XSX.SIP CHER 9 5 X.>>Etea C 6 c>>,~ax 8 zinklez and Hose S stems:~SprfnkXer:

systems and manual.hasa station standpipee should have connects.one to the plant undergroumR mater main so that a single actfve Sd&me or: a cracks Sa a aodezat~nerg~

XLae canaot impair both the primary end!5ac8ezp fire suppression systems.AXteznatively, headers fed fzom each end ere permftted fasfda buildings to supply both spxinklez and standpipe systems, provi'ded'.

steel piping, aad fittings meetf'ng the requirements of ANSI B31.1,"Power Piping,, are used for the headers up to aad including the first valve supplying; the sprinkler systems where such.headers aze part of the seismically sna1ysed hose standpipe system.Mbira: pznvfded, such headers are coneidexed an~mxefoa.of.the yard.main system-.Each sprinkler and staadpipe system should he: equipped<<ith OS'outside acre<<and.'yoke)gate valve or other approved shutoff valve and waterflo'w alarm.Safety-related equipment that does not itself require sprinkler water fire protection but is subject to unacceptable damage if wet by sprinkler water discharge should be protected by water shields or baffles." NRC,GENERIC LETTER 86-10: ,No additional guidance.REF.SOURCES+NFPA-13'FPA-14, NFPA-15.2.192 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.c, Water Sprinkler and Hose Systems (Cont'd): "(2)Control and sectionalizing valves in'the fire water systems should be electrically supervised or administratively controlled.

The electrical supervision signal should indicate in the control room.All valves in the fire protection system should be periodically checked to verify position (see NFPA,26,"Supervision of Valves")" NRC GEKRIC LETT1?R 86-10: No additional guidance.-2.193 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.c, Water Sprinker and Hose Systems (Con'd): "(3)Fixed water extinguishing systems should conform to requirements of appropriate standards such as NFPA 13,"Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems," and NFPA 15,"Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: Chapter 4 of NFPA-13 provides guidance as to the location of sprinkler heads in relation to common obstructions.

Zn general, to achieve complete areawide coverage, sprinklers should be located at the ceiling,.with additional sprinklers provided below significant obstructions such as wide HVAC ducts and"shielded" or" solid bottom stacked cable trays.To the extent that an existing or proposed sprinkler system design deviates from this concept, the design would have to be justified by a fire hazards analysis.See also Section 05 of the"Interpretations of Appendix R.Individual plant areas are diverse in nature.The designer should determine the particular water density or occupancy classification.

Those areas which contain a limited quantity of in-situ and anticipated transient combustibles and which feature contents such as tanks and piping, may be considered as"Ordinary Hazard (Group 1)," as defined by NFPA Standard No.13.For those areas containing large amounts of cables.or flammable liquids, an occupancy classification of."Extra Hazard" may be warranted.

The decision as to which classification should be applied should be made by a qualified fire protection.

engineer.Once the occupancy classification is determined, the minimum water density should be based on the Density Curves~'r'.Table 2.2 1(B)of NFPA 13 hny density equal to or in excess of the curves would be in conformance with our guidelines as delineated in Section C.6.c of BTP CMEB 9~5-1 1106u 2-61 Sp~er heads should be located at the ceiling.Sprinkler heads at other locations may be necessary depending upon the hazard and the cumulative effect of the obstrucscharge of water from the sprinkler head The spriakler system design should meet NPPA 13.Suppression systems installed in connection with Appendix h may or may not have to be extended as a result of.III.G.The U.censee must analyze each area where suppression ie required by III.C, and where only partial suppression has been provided, determine if the coverage fa adequate for the fire hazard in the area.The licensee may consult with the staff during this review.In any event, the Appendix R analysis showing that'he suppression provided is adequate must be retained and avaiIable for NRC audit.See also Section$5 of the"Interpretatons of Appendix R."Section III.G.2 requires an automatic suppression system.Our guidelines would recocmLend that the system be in accordance with an HPPA Code.If deviations are made from the Code, they should be i8entified in the PShk or PHA,.(2W2 2.194 Wet T S rinker S stems should be one step automatic fire suppression systems supplied through piping systems charged with eater.Each system should consist of aa alarm check valve, piping and fusible link sprinkler heads Water vill be discharged on the fire upoa meltiag of fusible links.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additioaal guidaace.REP~SOURCE NPPk 13e 2.195 Pzcsction S rinkler S stems should be too step automatic fizc auppressioa systems coataiaiag air under a supervisory pressuze of 10-15 psi-downstream from the preactioa valve.Each system should consist of a pre-actioa valve, a fire detection system, pipiag and fusible link sprinkler heads.Whea a detector senses fire, the pzc-action valve shall be actuated and eater shall floe into the piping system.Water shall bc discharged oa the fire upon melting of fusible liaks.NRC GENERIC LEXTER 86-10: No addiioaal guidaace.REP SOURCE NPPk 13 2.196 cultic cle S rinkler S stems shall be pre-action systems modified so that the eater f ow coatro valve s 1 shut off automatically shen the fire~~is extinguished aad shall reopea by the automatic fire detection system if the fire.redevelops.

Each multicyclc sprinkler system shall bc hydraulically designed.In the event of damage to the detectioa circuit, the spriakler system shall be capable of beiag aritched to lo~zessure air system operation mode, aaintainiag the protection, alarms and supervisioa of this sprinkler system.When controlled by the fire detection system, the multicycle system shall automatically cycle"on" vhenevcr any detector senses heat or"off" after all the detectors in the detectioa system sease that the temperature haa deczeased beler their actuatioa point.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REP~SOURCES: NPPk-13, NPPh-15'oes aot apply to WNP-2.1106u 2&3 2 f97 Q'ater 5 ra S stems shall consist of open water spray heads supplied tgaaugh hydzau3Xcally designed piping systems,<<ith<<ster fle<<controlled by a deZuge valve actuated either automatically or manually.Rater spray sy4stea shall be actuated automatically by the operation of the tQremal fire&taction system installed in the same area of coverage as the spray heaKs%barn the detection system senses fire, the deluge valve shall opem and the neer ahsil flow into the piping system-SR'BHBEC KELTER 86-10: Ho additional guidance~4 2.198 bTP CHEL 9$-I, Ztea C.6.c, Qatar Sprinkler and Hose Systeas (Cont'd): (4)I'nterior aanual hose installation should be able to reach any Zocaclcn that.Containsy or could present a fire exposure harard toy safet~&ted4 equipeent<<ith at least one effective hose stream.To accomplish.

this, staadpipes with hose connections equipped<<ith a aasimum of IM ft of I-I/2'.in<<oven)acket, lined fire hose and suitable notables should be provided, im all.buildings on all floors.Zndividual standpipes should be at: Zeaar 4 im im Qaaeter for aaltiple hose connections and 2-1!2 in.in@Smear Sar ahngKa hose connections.

These systeas should folio<<the 4 4'aud yfye support rapairsaents NL'ENERXC XZTXER 86-10: Ne additional guidance REF>>SCURF NPPX-14 LX$%bTP CKKS 9$-1, Xtes C.6 c, Rater Sprinkler and Hose Stations (Conr.'gr (4l Rosa stations should be located as dictated by the fire harard aaLyNKa to faehIQata access and use for fire fighting operations.

AIeamaelva hoac seasons should be provided for an area if the fire hasard ccNXk bZocBL access to 4$KIzgXc hose station servina that area 5RC CIBIERD XXI'6 IOs Ke additional gufdance 4 4 4'I~~

2.200 BTP MEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.c, Water Sprinkler aad Hose Stations (Cont'd): "(4)Provisions should be made to supply water at least to standpipes and hose conncctioas for manual fire fighting in areas containiag equipment required for safe plant shutdown in the event of a safe shutdown earthquake.

The piping system serving such hose stations should be analyzed for SSE loading and should'e provided with supports to ensure system prcssure integrity.

The pipiag and valves for the portion of hose standpipe system affected by this functioaal requirement should, as a aLaiaum, satisfy ANSI B31 1,"Power Piping." Thc vatcr,supply for this condition may be obtained by maaual operator actuation of valves in a coaacctioa to the hose staadpipe header from a aormal Seismic Category I vater system such as the esseatial service water system.The cross connection should be (a)capable of providing flov to at least tvo hose stations (approximately 75 gpm per hose statioa)and (b)designed to thc same standards as thc Seismic Category I water system;it should not degrade the performance of the Seismic Category I vater system." NRC GENERIC LET'XER 86-10: No additioaal guidance.REF.SOURCES: ANSI b31.1"Power Piping", SSE Loading ASME Section VIII.Docs aot apply to RiP-2...2.201 bTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.c, Mater Spriaklcr aad Hose Stations (Cont'd): "(5)Thc proper type of hose noxxle to be supplied to each area should be based on the fire haxard analysis.The usual combination spray/straight-stream nozzle~should not be used in areas.where the straight stream can cause unacceptable mechanical damage Fixed fog aosxles should be provided at locations where hig~oltage shock haxards exist.All hose aoxxles should have shutoff capability.(Guidance on safe distances for vater application to Live electrical equipmeat may be found in the"NFPA Fire Protection Handbook.")" NRC GEtKRIC LETTER 86-10: No additioaal guidance.2.202 bTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.c, Mater Sprinkler aad Hose Statioas (Coat'd): "(6)Fire hose should be hydrostaticaLLy testad in accordance with the recommendations of NFPA 1962,"Fire Hose-Care, Usc, Maintenance." Hose stored ia outside hose houses should be testid aaaually.Interior standpipe hose should be tasted every 3 years." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidaacc..2 203 bTP CMEB 9 5-1, Item C.6.c, Water Spriakler aad Hose Stations (Cont'd)-(7)Ccrtaia fires, such as those iavoLviag flammable liquids, respond vali to foam supprcssioa.

Consideration should be given to usc of mechanical Lcnmxpansion foam ,systems, high-expansion foam generators, or aqueous film-forming foam (AFFF)systems, includiag the AFFF'deluge system.These systems should comply<<ith the requirements of NFPA 11, NFPA llA, NFPA LLB, and NFPA 16, as appLicablc." NRC GENIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidaace..1106u 2WS

• -ll<<j should be Loca~at: apprxxaiaately L00 ft intenrals.

NRC CKHEKC SEXIER'.86-XO Ho, additional guidance.REF., SOURCE SPPA, X.4 2 205 Hose ataefhxam ehracqghiec the pXant should be designed in accordance eath Noh-X4CXaaa+yceehTeR at approabately 100 foot spacing.IRC CESEKC RHKEK.E&XS Ko additional guidance.REF SOURCE SPPA.L4 2 20tx Indi.vtduaIL ataxxdyipe.

shaIL bc 2-I/2, 3 or 4 in.diaaeter for aultiple hose connections SRC BKRZE IEEXR$&XS=M acmitional guidance.REF 5gg8ÃDR" Sqxgily Sgeaaa Ehgtneering.

2.IW-Xl 3~2-XJ2 in.atandyfges dleXf~adequaaa Shoes and pressures.

NRC CRIERS ERROR 8&-XCt Hh additionaL guidance-REF~SQUEAK SPEC~~SPRY-XS 2 208 STP CHER~g Xtes C'%%ca detection and Suppression (Cont'd)x Felon S Salon Are aysteaa shnxrI4 conply vSth the.requireaents of NFL 12h and liPP+~,,"HaXogenated Fire:, Fxt~pd.shing Agent Systems-Helen 1301 and Halon L'2Il.'nly<I-Listed~

or FK-approved agents should be used.Provisions for LocaLLy-disarming; automatic Hslon systeas should be key locked and under strict, ahaixxistratim contraIi Lotoaatic Halon extinguishing sys~shexld.note ba'disarmed'nL'eaa coxxtrols as described in Position C.2.c.are prarbfed, SR@CKHERXC: LATER.S&Qh:

Hc aMitional guidance.

2-209 BTP CHEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.d, Halon Suppression System (Cont'd): "In addition to the guidelines of NPPA 12A and 12B, preventive maintenance and testing of the systems, including chec~eighing of the Salon cylinders, should be done at least quarterly." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF~SOURCE: NFPA;12A.2.210 STP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.6.d, Salon Suppression Systems (Cont'd): "Particular consideration should also be given to: (1)N.nimum required Halon concentration, distribution, soak time, and ventilation control;(2)Toxicity of Ealon;(3)Toxicity and corrosive characteristics of the thermal decomposition products of Halon;and (4)Location and selection of the activating detectors.

NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.211 BTP 9KB 9.5-1, Item C.6, Pire Detection and Suppression (Cont'd): "e.Carbon Dioxide Su ression S stems Carbon dioxide extinguishing systems should comply vith the requirements of NPPA 12,"Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems." Mhere automatic carbon-dioxide systema are used, they should be equipped vfth a predischarge alarm system and a discharge delay to permit personnel egress.Provisions for locally disarming automatic carbon dioxide systems should be key locked snd under strict administrative control.Automatic carbon dioxide extinguishing'ystems should, not be disarmed unless controls as described in Position C.2.c.are provided" NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.212 bTP CNEB 9.5-3., Item C.6.e, Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems (Cont'd): "Particular consideration should also be given to!(1)Minimum required C02 concentration, distribution, soak time, anR ventilation control;(2)Anoxia and toxicity of C02;(3)Possibility of secondary thermal shock (cooling)damage;(4)Conflicting requirements for venting during CO2 in5ection to prevent overpressurization versus sealing to prevent loss of agent;and (5)Location and selection of the activating detectors." t NRC GENERIC LETTl?R 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCE: NPPA 12.1106u 2%7 2 229 KP CHES 9 S-IL~Xtem C 6~I Portable Extern ishers a firm exposure hazard.to, safet~elated equipment in accordance

&th guideLbue of HPPA 10>>"Portable Firi Extinguishers, Installation, Maintenance amS fee Qey 8mtca3L exNnguishers should be installed mith due<<onstderation given to possibIe.adverse effects on safety-related equipment fnmtmIXed in the area%LC CEMBUX: XZHZR$$-XCr Fo additional guidance.mEF gÃRNK=SPPA-.XQ>>Regulatory Cuide 1 i78, Use of lhcthryatshXag kits in Habitable Areas..2 2X4 STP CHES 9'-1,', Idea+Position (Cont'd): "7 Cuidelines for S ecific Plant Areas a.Prima and Seconds.C'ontainment (1): Normal 0 eratian-Fire;protection requirements for the primary and secondary containment.

areas should.be-.Provided for hazards identified by the firm haaLrds anelyshs.2 2'TF CHES 9'-1, Zeem: C T.a, Primary and Secondary Containment (Cont.'4):

Emir?cs of such hexane,include:lubricating oil or hydraulic fluid mystem for the.primary.coolant pumps, cable tray arrangements and cable hprnvfCeC by automatic fixeK systems.The effects of postulated fires&thin tha pcLmaxy containment sheba evaIhmted to ensure that the integrity of.the primary coolant system and the containment is not)eopardized assuming no ,acth'a@Scca to flight: cue fire SKC CKSERXC REEBOK.8&.XEr Fe aha tional guidance I 2'TP CMEE f.S'-X, Ital C.7'.a,, Primary and Secondary Containment (Cont!d)t (a)Opexation of.the Are protection systems should not compromise the integrity of the: containment or: other safety-related systems.Fire protection, activities iu~the containment areas she>id function in con)unction Kth total containment requfrements:

such aa ventilation and control of contaaLnated Xiyshk an@gaseous.ralaase HRC.CEHERXC'ETER.

8&-10:: H'o additional guidance.

2.217 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.a, Primary and Secondary Contaiamcat (Cont'd): "(b)Inside aoniaerted coataiameat onc of the fixe protection means stated in Positions C.5.b.l and C.5.b.2 or the following fire protection means should be provided: separation of cables aad equipment and associated aoasafety circuits of redundant traias by a noncombustible radiant energy shield having a minimum fire ratiag of oae-half hour."-NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: "Inside some containmcats, there'arc large coaceatrations of cables coavergiag at electrical penetratioa areas.In some cases, where'he penetratioas vere grouped by division, shields werc placed between the divisions so that radiant energy from a fix'e involving the cables of one divisioa would not degrade or ignite cables of the ocher divisions.

These shields also directed the coavective energy from the fire away from the, surviving division.These shields<<erc usually constructed of 1/2-inch msriaitc board ia a metal frame Appendix R, Sectioa III.G.f refers to these shields as"a noncombustible radiaat energy shield." The guidclincs in BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Section C.7.a(1)b.

indicate that these shields should have a fire rating of 1/2 hour.Ia our opiaioa aay material with a 1/2 hour fire rating, should bc capable of performiag the iequired function.The guideliacs of BTP CMEB'.5-1 relating to a fix'e"rated radiant energy shield are beiag considex'cd in current reviews of NTOL plants.Howcvcr, to the extent that an applicaat can]ustify that a proposed radiant energy shield can achieve an equivalent level of safety, NRC has bcca acceptiag shields that have not been tested against the acceptaace criteria of ASTM E-119 In hppcadiz R reviews, NRC has accepted aon-fire-rated radiant energy shields that have beea demonstrated by fire hazards analysis to provide aa acceptable level of protection against the aaticipated

~hazard of a localized fire within the coataiament.

NRC has also accepted firemated metal-sheathed mineral insulated cables, as a x'adiaat eaergy shield in specific configuxations." 2.218 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.a, Primary and Secoadary Coataiament (Coat'd)x"(c)In primary coataiament, fire detectioa systems should be provided for each fire hazard'he type of detcctioa used and the location of the detectors should be the most-suitable fox the particulax type of fire hazard idcatificd by the fire hazard aaalysis." NRC GENERIC LETIm 86-10: No additional guidance.i 2 219 BTP CMEB 9 5-1, Item C.7.a (c)~Primary aad Secondary Coataiamcat (Cont'd): "h general area fire detcctioa capability should be px'ovided ia the primary contsiament, as bactuxp for the above described hazaxd detectioa.

To accomplish obis, suitable smoke ox heat detectors compatible with the radiatioa envixoameat should bc iasta11ed." NRC GEiERIC IZTI.'ER 86-10: No additioaal guidaace.1106u 2&9 2.220.BTP CHES'SW, Item C.y.a, Primary and Secondary Containment (Cont'd)Q)Stand+pe.and hose stations should be inside PWR containments and SQK contahmenta that are not inerted.Standpipe and hose stations inside containment:

<<ay be comxected to a high quality<<ater supply of sufficient quantity.and: pzessure-.

other than the fire main loop if plant-specific features prevent~mBng, the fthm main supply inside containment.

For BWR dzy<<elis, standpipe euK hose stetfons shouht be placed outside the dzy<<ell<<ith adequate lengths of hose, no longer than 100 ft, to reach any location inside the dzy<<eIL~an effective hose stream."%RE QBKERZC LKZEL 86-XOz No kad1tional guidance.2.221.BTP'MEB 9.5 1, Item C.T.a(d), Primary and Secondary Contaimaent (Cont'd)'".

The containment penetzation of the standpipe system should aeet the requirements of Ceneral Design Criterion 56 and should be Seismic Category.X.and'oaXLty Croup B"-HRC: CZRERIt LEXTKL 86-XO: Eo additional guidance..'2 2'EP CHES 9'~X.~Xtea C 7.a, Primary and Secondary Contaimaent

'(Conn"Ht M The reactor coolant pips should be equipped<<ith an oil coXXceefon system if the containment is not tnerted during normal operation.

The oil;collection system should be so designed, engineered, and installed that failure<<Ql, not: Xead to fire during normal or.design basis accident conKtiona auh that.Here ia reasonable assurance that the system<<ill eithatand'he safe shuuRoen eazthprake." NKC t KMKRZC XZXXKL 86-10 Ko additional guidance.REF SCURF" JLypeadix R to IQCPR50 2.223 SIP CHER K&K, Xtem C.y.a(e), Pnmary and Secondary Containment (Cont'4)-<<.

Sscli'elXe~on systsma should be capable o j collecting lube oil froa aIL'otential:

pressurized and unpressurised leakage sites in the reactor coolant pump tube ok'ystems Leakage.should be collected.

and drained to a vented.closed, container.'that can hold the, entire lube oil system inventory.

h, flame: arrester;is required.in the vent.if the Hash point characteristics of the oi1 present: the hazard of fire Hashback.Leakage-points to be protected shoehi inctud'a lift: pump and pip~overflo<<lines, lube oi1 cooler, oil fill and drain.lines and'.pIugs,, flanged connections on oiI lines, and lube oil reservoirs

<<here.such features exist on the reactor coolant pumps.The drain line should,'.be.large enough.to accoaaodate the largest potential oil leak."

NRC CZNERIC LETTER 86-10: "Qhcre the RCP lube oil system is capable of Wthstaadfag the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE), the analysis should assume that oaly random oil leaks from thc points could occur during the lifetime of the plant.The oil collection/system, therefore, should be designed'o safely channel the quaatity of oil from one pump to a vcntcd closed container.

Under this sct of circumstances, the oil collection system would aot have to be scismfcsily designed.hn exemption is required for a non-seismically desigaed oil collectioa system.The basis for this excmptioa would be that random leaks are aot assumed to occur simultaneously with the seismic event.However, the Rule, as written, does not make this aLLowance.

If the reactor cooLant pump, iacludfag the oil system, is seismically designed aad the aearby hot surfaces of piping are px'otectcd by seismically designed splash shields s'uch that aay spilled lube oil maid contact only cold suxfaces, and it could be demonstrated by cagiaeering aaalysis that sump and splash shields muld bc capable of prcvcnting a fire duxing normal and design basfs accident conditioas, the safety objective of Section III.O would be achieved.The justificatfon for the.exemption should provide reasonable assurance that oil from all potential pressux'ixed and uapressurixed leakage pofnts muld bc safety collected aad draiaed to the sump Thc sump should be showa capable of safely containing all of the anticipated oil leakage.The analysis should verify that there are ao electric sources of ignftfon." REF.SOURCE: Appendix R to 10CPR50.2.224 BTP CMEB 9.5-1,'Item C.l.a, Prfmary aad Secondary Containment (Cont'd): "(f)Por secondary contaiamcat axeas, cable fire haxarda that could a feet safety should be protected as described in Positioa C.5.e(2).The type of detection system for other fire haxards identified by the fire haxards analysis should be the most suitable for.the particular type of fire haxard." NRC CENEQC LETXXR 86-LOc No additional guides.2.'225 BTP CKS 9.5-1, Item C.l.a, Primary aad Secondary Coatafament (Cont'd): "(2)Refuclin and Maintenance

-Rcfue1iag aad maintenance operations ia contaiameat may introduce additioaal haxards such as contamination coatrol materislsq decontamfaatfon supplies, mod plankiag, temporary wiring, wcLdfag, and flame cutting (with portable compressed-gas fuel supply).Possible fix'es would not, accessarily be in the vicinity of fixed detection and suppression systems.Management procedures and controls accessary to ensure adequate fire protectioa for traasient fire loads are discussed fn Position C.l."NRC GENERIC IZTTIR 86-10 No additional guidance.1106u 2-71 2 226 EXP CHES 9.S-l, Item C T~atlQPrimary and Secondary Containment (Coat'd): "hdcquate selfmontained breat?aing apparatus should be provided near the containment entrances for fixe: fighting and damage control personneI These units should be.fm5spendent of any breathing appazatus or air supply systems provided for genexaX.plant activities and should be clearly aar3cecL as e<<ergency equipment HRC CZHZRIC LETTER 86-10-He acMitional guidance.2 22T KP CKS 9 S-l, Item C 7@rhSeXines for Specific Plant kreas gone>>C)W Control Room Keg The contreX.rooa complex including gal~lie, office spaces, etc)should be protected against disabling fire damage: and should be separated from other areas of the.plant by floors, vaL1~, aeR roof having minimum fire-resistance ratings of S hours Peripheral.

rooms in.the control room complex should have automatic latex supyression and shoul'd be separated from the control room by noncombustible construction rtth a firmesistance rating of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.Ventilation system openings between'he contx'ol zoom and pex'ipheral rooms should have automatic smoke dampers: that close on operation of the fire detection or.suppression system IS.a halon flooding system is used for fire~aypresshm these dampers should!be aaron~enough to support the pressure".hsthm fnco the control xooe Carbon@<~Re flooding systems are not-, acceptabIe floe these areas.NRC t EHKRIC LETTER 86-10" 5O acMttional guidance.".2 228 STP CHES 9 S-l, Item C 7 hContro1 Room Complex (Cont'd): "Manual-fire Etghth@capability should be.pxevided for both: (1)Fix'e oxiginating lRtcBLE a cahfARot f consols, or connecting cab 1 e s;and (2)Exy o sure f ire s.~nr1vtng.cnahusekbies in the gemrxaL xmas axes."'NRC CESERZC LZXTKR 85-XSx%a<<fdftional guidance.2 229 STP CHEB'S-I>>Item C 7'>>Control Room Complex (Cont'd)"Portable Class k and'lass C fire extinguf.'shers:

should be located in the control room.h hose station;should be installed hsaeNately outside the control room." SEC C?KRZC XZXDK 85-10', lfo ahkitional guidance.REFT SCQRCEz NIPS.-10<<

2.230 BTP CMEB'.5-1, Item C.7.b, Control Room Complex (Cont'd): "Norzles that are compatible with the, hazards and equipment in the control zoom should be provided for the manual hose station.The norzles chosen should satisfy actual fire fighting needs, satisfy electrical safety, and minimize physical damage to electrical equipment from hose stream impingement." NRC GENERIC.LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.,REF SOURCE NFPh-14 2.231 STP CMEB 9 5-1, Item C.7.b, Control Room Complex (Cont'd): "Smoke detectors should be provided in the control room, cabinets, and consoles.If redundant safe shutdown equipment is located in the same control room cabinet or console, additional fire protection measures should be provided.Alarm and local indication should be provided in the contxol room." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCES: NFL-72D, NFPh-72E.'232 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.b, Control Room Complex (Cont'd): "Breathing apparatus for contzol zoom operators should be readily available."NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.233 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.b, Control Room Complex (Cont'd): "The-outside air intake(s)for the control room ventilation system should be provided with smoke detection capability to alarm in the control room to enable manual isolation of the control room ventilation system and thus prevent smoke from entering the control room." NRC GENIC IXX:KR 86-10: No additional guidance.2.234 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.b, Control Room Complex (Cont'd): "Venting of smoke produced by fire in the control zoom by means of the normal ventilation system is acceptable; however, provision should be made to permit isolation of the recirculating portion of the normal ventilation system.Manually operated venting of the control room should be available to the operators.

NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.1106u 2-73 2.235 SXP CHES 9.5-1, Iteac C 7 b, Control Room Complex (Coat'd): "hll cables, that enter the controI.room should termiaatc ia the control room.That is, no caI&ng should be rautech through the control room from oac area to another CabXes in underfloor ad ceiling spaces should acct the separation criteria.necessary for fire.protection." SEC GKNERXC XETTER.8&-10 t Ko additioaal guidaace.'<<i<<2.235 X2'HES 9 5-X>>Xtma C.7 5>>Control Room Complex (Cont'd): 'functions shard!be ducted sepazately from cable runs in such spaces;i.e if caM~arc: routed;fa underfloor or ceiling spaces, these spaces.should!not be used as;afr phmums for veatiiation-of the control room.Polly eacloscd electrical', race<<ays located in such uadcrfloor aad ceiling spaces,.if'ver 1 sq" ft in, cros~ctional arcs, should have automatic fire suyyression, inside Area automatic fire sriyprcssion should'e provided for uaderfloor and.ceiling, spaces&used for cable zuas ualess all cable is run in~a.or smellier stee1 conduit.or the cables are ia fully enclosed race<<ays internally, protected.

by automachc.

fire suppression." SEC'KHERIC XZXTER;.8&-.10-So additional guidance.2.23T 3XP CHEB 9D-X>>XCea C.7 5>>Control, Room Complex (Coat'd): "Thcrc should'.ba no cazpetLag.

tm@ha contro1.room.SEC CKSERIC QKXEE E&.IS=S'e additional guidance.<<<<C ,~2 238 SXP CHES 9 S-l,, Xtcm e>>CaMe 5 rcadia Room sprcadiag room should be aa shoahk have provimionN f'nz-mauuaI'pens~

at a remote station;ho<<ever, there QmuId!be pre~~ta Nraeladc.Luadvcrtent operatioa., Location of syrinkXer heeka or spray: nnxrlea shouM consider cable tray arrangements and possible transfen.combuaeMaa to ensure adequate<<atei-coverage for areas that: could present.exposure: hazards'o the cable system.Cables should be designed-to aDer<<ettiag~do<<n',<<ith.<<atex'supplied by the fire suppression system<<<<ithout.electrical.

faulting."'RC; l~ESIBXCEUXEt.

R&-16z: So ahKtional.

guidance.<<<<<<)2 239 5TP CHES 9.S-3lItal C T c>>, CahIa Spreading Room-(Cont'd)c Open~ad deluge-and.open directicmaLspray systems should be xoncd."%LC CKSERIC'IZXUZE.

8&XS Fo: ak&tkma1 guidance,~<<<<

2.240.BTP CMEB 9.5<<1, Item C.7.c, Cable Spreading Room (Cont'd): "The use of foam fs acceptable." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86"10: No additfonal guidance.d 1<mited discharge suppression systems utilizing a three percent solutioa of hqueou~Pile Forming Foam (hFFF)~The system shal'e equipped with nozzles, foam maker, foam liquid storage tank and linc proportioncr sized for a floe application rate of 0.16 gpm per sq ft.NRC GMRIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REP.SOURCE: NFPh-11B.Docs aot apply to WNP-2.2.242 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.c, Cable Spreadfng Room (Cont'd): "Cable spreadiag rooms should have: (1)kt least two remote and separate entrances for access by fire brigade personnel; (2)hn aisle separation between tray stacks at least 3 ft vfdc aad 8 ft high;(3)Hose stations and portable extinguishers fastalled immediately outside the room;(4)brea smoke.detection; and (5)Continuous liae-type heat detectors for cable trays fasidc the cable spreading room." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additioaal guidance.REP SOURCES: NFL-14, NFPh-10.'.243 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.c, Cable Spreadiag Room (Cont'd): "Drains to remove fire fighting eater should be provided.When gas systems arc installed, drains should have adequate seals or the gas eztfngufshiag systems should be'ized to compensate for losses through thc drafni." I NRC GENIC IZXTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.244 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7 c, Cable Spreading Room (Coat'd): "k separate cable spreadiag room should be provided for each redundant division.Cable sprcsdiag rooms should not be shared between reactors.Each cable spreading room should be separated from the others and from other areas of the plant by barriers with a miaimum fire ratiag of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.If this is-aot possible, a dedicated system should bc provided." NRC GENERIC UTTER 86-10: No additional guidsace..

REP=SOURCE: ANI Pile Noi N-219I106u 2-75 X~245 hTF CHEB 9.S-XXtem C 7 c, Cable Spicsdiag Room (Cont'd)i"The vim&tiatkon system te each caMe sprcadiag room should be designed to isolate the area upon actuate on eK any, gss extinguishing system in the area.Separate manma3Ly actuated smoke venting, that ia operable from outside thc room should Se prevfZcd fer tha caMe aprcadfag room." 5RC CEMERXC TET1HBR 86'-IC." Se additions L guidance.2.246 PEP CHES 9 5-X.~Xylem C VCbLCeiines foz Specific Plsat kzess gCcadt"d)d Pbmt r Rooms Computer rooms for computers perfarud;ag safety-related functions that are not Iart ef the control.room compXea ahoeIC be separated from other areas of thc plant by barriers having, a, mininnim fi~sistance rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and ahoul'd'.be protected by, automatic detection and fixed automatic suppression.

Computers.

that are part ef the: control.room complex but not in the control room should be separated'nd~

protected aa described in Position C.7.b.Computer cabinets located'n-.

the contmX, room should bc protected as other control.room equipment.

and;cab1e runa therein.Nonsafety-related computers outsid'e.the control room complex shouM be separated from safety-related areas by.-fize barriers<<ith a.minimum rating.of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> aad should be protected as ae&dI te prevent fire: am'moke: dama~te safety-related equipmeat."@RAN CHRERXC MXER.I&XS=Hh ahKtional guidance."2;24T STP CHES 9.&XStern~

C~7;, CuidhTLaes for Specific Plant Areas ('0: the remainder of the plant, hy.'arriera satb a minimum fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.Re&indant svitcbgear safety." dfvtsi'ons:

sheiaLd be separated from each other by~barriers<<ith a Miouz" ftca ratings, kiitoimatic fire detectors should alarm and f leye at a minima te afafnChce.

the.com5uaCRble loading.These rooms should not ba used fer aay other purpose, F&e: Baca atatioas and portable fire lkh I I NRC CEHHtIC PRIZE, 86-.IG'madiRftioaal guidance.REF.SOURCE:.hNI: Pile.No N-~2.248~STP CMEE 9 S-X,, Item.C'7'e, S<<LCchgcar Rooms (Coat'd)t"Equipmeat sheuM be located te faeHftata-acceseifer manual firefighting.

Drains should t4 equipmcnt (see NPPk 92M,,"Va~zoofin@and Drainiag of Floors").-Remote maaiimXLy actuated ventDaricm shonhhbe previded f or venting smoke vhcn aaausl firm: siipprassioa effort Xa;needeU C'sea.~tion C.S.f)."

2 249 bTP@KB 9.5-1, Item C.7, Cuidelincs for Specific Plant hreas~~~(Coat'd)!"f.Remote Safet elated Panels Redundant safety-related panels remote from the control room complex should be separated from each other by barriers having a minimum fize rating.of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.Panels providing remote shutdova capability should be separated from the coatrol room complex by barriers having a minimum.fire rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.Panels providing remote shutdova capability should be electrically isolated from thc control room complex so that a fire ia either azca viLL not affect shutdovn capability from the other area.The general azea housing remote safct~clatcd panels should be provided vith automatic fire detectors that alarm locally aad alarm aad aanuaciate in the contzol room.Combustible materials should be controlled aad Limited to those rcvircd for operation.

Portable extinguishers and manual hose statioas should'be readily avaiLable in the general arcs." NRC CENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.I'.250 bTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C 7, Cuidcliaes for Specific PLaat Areas (Cont'd)"g.Safct Rclatcd Batte Rooms Safety-related battery rooms should bc protected agaiast fires and.J explosions.

Battery rooms should be separated from each other and other areas of the plant by barriers haviag a minimum fire ratiag of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> inclusive of aLL penetrations and opeaings.DC switchgcar and iavcrters should not bc located ia these battery rooms.hutomatic fire dctcction should be provided to alarm and anauaciatc in the control room and alarm Locally.Ventilatioa

'ystems in the battery rooms should be capable of maintaining the hydrogen coacentratioa vcll belov 2 voL-X.Loss of ventilation should be alarmed in the control room.Standpipe aad hose aad portable extinguishers should be readily available outside the room." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.251 bTP@KB 9.5-1, Item C.7, Cuideliaes for Specific Plant hzass (Coat'): "h.Turbine Buildin The turbine building should separated from ad)scent structures containing safe~elated equipmcnt by a.fire barrier vith a minimum rate of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.The fire barriers should be designed so as to maintaia structural integrity even in the event of a complete coLLapse of the turbine structure.

Opeaings aad penetratioas in the fire barrier should be minimized and should not be located vhere the turbine oil system or generator hydrogen cooliag system creates a direct Cire exposure haxard to the barrier.Considering the severity of the fire haxazds, defease ia depth may dictate additional protection to ensure barrier integzityo HRC GENERIC 9?TTER 86-10: No additioaal guidaace.LL06u 2-77 2.252 Turbine Generator Buildin s-are separated by a 3-hour fire wall beneath the operating f1oor The followin'g areas should be enclosed in 3-hour r fire resistance rated barriers with openings protected by Class h type fire doors0 1)Labe Oi1 Betcb Tank Roon, 2)Main Turbine.Oil Reservoir Room, 3)kuxfliary Foam, 4)Switchgeer Rooms and 5)Battery Rooms NRC GEHERIC EEVER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.253 Turbine Generator Buildin (Cont'd): Hydraulically calculated wet type sprinkler systems should be provided in the following areas of the turbine building: 1)Beneath the Turbine Generator Operating Floor, 2)Beneath the Mezzanine Floor>extended to include the condenser pit, 3)-Turbine Building Unloading Bay, 4)Lube Oil Batch Tank Room and 5)Kdfa TtxrhEne Oil Reservoir Room.~'/IRC GENERIC XZXTER 86-10: No additional guidance.I 2 254 Turbine@migrator Buildin (Cont'd): Hydraulically calculated Mater.'-Spray Syateme aheeJN be provided in the following areas of the turbine building=e)Eydrogem Seal Oil Unit, b)Steam Generat'or Pumps and c)'urbine.

G'enerator Bearings.SEC CSEEXC'XZXTER$

6-10:.No additional guidance.'REP>>SOURCES NPPk-15+2 255 Turbi'ne Generator Buildin (Cont'd): Design of automatic sprinkler systems and for the fired spray protection in the Turbine Building should be based on largest water demand<<ith largest flow of 1000 gpa for hose streams and largest portion.ef the fire loop out of service NRC'ENTILIC'XZTTER.

86-10: No additional guidance RRP SOURCES SPY-13'FL-15 1106u 2-78 2.256 Turbine Generator Buildin (Cont'd): In the turbine building, hydraulically balanced automatic sprinkler systems should be designed to provide density of.30 gpm/sq ft for any, including the most remote 3,000 sq ft area and density of.20 gpm/sq ft for any 10,000 sq ft area.Coverage for each system does not exceed 25,000 sq ft.NRC GENERIC'LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.257 Turbine Generator Bui1din (Cont'd): Steam generator feed pumps in the Turbiqe Building may be located in a curbed area and protected by automatic water spray system.Pire protection engineering acceptable alternative to enclosing such equipment within Moor fire resistive rating barriers.NRC CENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.REF SOURCE Pire protecion engineering acceptable alternative to enclosing such equipment within 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> fire resistance rating barriers.2.258 BTP QSB 9.5-1, Item C.l.i, Guidelines for Specific Plant hreas (Cont'd): "Diesel Generator Ax'ess Diesel generators should be separated from each other and from other areas of the plant by fire barriers having a minimum fire-resistance rating of 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />s-" NRC CENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.259 BTP CNEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.i, Diesel Generator kxeas (Cont'd): "kuteptic fire suppression shouLd be installed to combat any diesel generator or lubricating oil fires;such systems should be designed for operation when the diesel is running without affecting the diesel.Automatic fire detection should be provided to alarm and annunciate in the control room and aLarm locally.Hose stations and portable extinguishers should be readily available outside the area.Drainage for firefighting water and means for local manual venting of smoke should be provided" NRC GENERIC IZTTZR 86-LOs No additional guidance.1106u 2-79 2.250 EXP QQK~9'-I>>Etem C.7 i, Dfesel Generator hreas (Cont'd): "Day tanks with: totaX.capacity up to 1100 gallons are permitted in the diesel genezatm" adam.under the follcnCng conditions:

Q3i The tbLy tank is located.in a separate enclosure vith a minimum M~esistance.

rate oK 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, including doors or penetrations.

TBese enc1'osuree shout be.capable of containing the entire contents: ef the day tanks and should be protected by an automatic NO)Xha.Cap tank fs LocateCh insfde the diesel generator room in a RRe5 enelhanre that has sufficient capacity to hold 110I o'f the eannenea ef the day tank.or ia drained to a safe location." HKC CZHERXt" EE'XR, 86-10: No additional guidance.2.261 5TP CHES!9'-X.~Xtea C T~Cufdelfnes for Specific Plant Areas (Cont'd).:.

f: Iliesal.'uel Oil Store e.Areas Diesel<.fiick aLL'anks Mth a capacity greater than 1,100 gallons should not be located>, insi'de.~Kngs.containing, saf st~elated equipment.

If aboveground tanks: are used;.they ahouM be located't.

least 50 ft from any building i be houal5S ill 4t$8QRJ~TAKEMii?g~construction having L minimum'fi~afaemearaefhqg eK 3 haerm Potential oil spills should be confined or directeB asap fane IhdZCLngs contatnfng safety-related equipment.

Totally buried: tanks;are.acceptable outside.or under buildings (see NPPA 30, RKE CRBERXC'-XZZtHL 8&-IQ Eo ah$1aional guidance.~, SOURCE SPPA 3C 2.252.KEP CHES'.9'.Item C 7', be~Puel OQ.Storage Areas (Cont'd): I system lRCCEHEKZC ID'6 XCr H'o ah&tfonal guidance 2 253'TP'CHES:

OS'l+, Item C 7, Cuidelines fox'pecific Plant Areas (C'I: Pump houses.and rooms housing, recluudant safety-related pump trains should be separated'~each.other'and'rom other areas of the plant by fire barr'iers ha~a.Xeast;~ur.

ratings.These rooms should be protected by automatic fire detection snd'qqeession unless.a.fire hasards analysis can demonstrate that:a~fixe<<UL<.not: endanger other;safe~elated equipment required for safe plant shahdom., Pire.detection should.aXam and annunciate in the control rooa andi alarm=.lnca3Ly.

Rose stations and portable extinguishers should be resÃ.y: acnasaime~SRC: CIQKRXC:METER 86-Xea Ea aRftfonal guidance.

2.264 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.'7.k, Safety-Related Pumps (Cont'd): "Floor~~~~~~drains should be provided to prevent water accumulati'on'rom damaging safety-related equipment (see Position C.5.a.(14))." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-'10: No addftio'nal gufdaace.2 265 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.k, Safety-Related Pumps (Coat'd)!"Provisions should bc made for manual coatrol of the ventilation system to facilitate smoke removal if required for manual fireffghtiag opcratfon (see Position C.5.f)." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidaace.2.266 bTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7, Gufdelines for Specffic Plant Areas (Coat': "1.Ncv Fuel brea Haad portable cxtiaguishers should be located within this area.hlso, hose stations should be located outside but within hose reach of this ares.hutomatfc ffre detectfon should alarm and aanuaciate in the control room and alarm locally.Combustibles should bc limited to a minimum fn thc aev fuel area.The storage area should bc provided with a drainage system to preclude accumulation of mter." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No addftfoaal guidance.REF~SOURCES: NFPh;10, NFPh-l4, NFL-72D, NFL-72E 2.267 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7.1, New Fuel brea (Cont'd): "The storage coafiguratioa of neo fuel should always be so msintsiacd as to preclude criticality for any eater deasfty that might occur duriag fire eater appiicatfon." NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.268 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item C.7, Guidelines for Specific Plant Areas (Cont'd)-."m S eat Fuel Pool brea Protection for t speat uel pool area should be provided by local hose statfoas aad portable estfagufshers.

Autoaatfc fire detectioa'should bc provided to alarm aad annunciate fa the control room aad to alarm locally." HRC'ENERIC LiHTER 86-10: No additfoaal guidance.2.269 BTP CMEB 9.5-3., Item C.l, Guidelines for Specific Plant kreas (Coat'd): "a Rsdvastc and Decontamination hreas Pfre barriers, automatic fire supprcssioa aad detection, aad ventilation controls should be provided." NRC GENERIC LITTER 86-10: No additional guidaace.1106u 2-81 2.270 SXP CNBS 9 5-L, Xtea C.7, Guidelines for Specific Plant hreas (Cont'd): o Safe elated Water Tanks Storage tanks that supply water fox safe shutdown should be protected from the effects of an exposure fire.Combustible materials should not be stored next to outdoor tanks.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10-No additional guidance.2.271 STP CSEE 9 5-X~ZteN, C 7, Cuidelines for Specific Plant brea (Cont'd): p ReeeeXs Stora e hreas Records storage areas should be so located and protected that a fire in these areas does not expose safety.-xelated systems or equipment (see Regulatory Guide 1.88,"CoIlection, Storage, and Maintenance of Nuclear Power Plant polity Assurance.

Records")~" HKC CENERZC LETTER&6-10: No additional guidance.REF., SOURCE:.Regulatory Cctde 1.88-NFL-232.2.272 STP CREE.5-I~

Xtem C 7, Co&&lines for Specific Plant hreas ('a--RRBBI*Cooling tmsera shaeXrR be of noncombustible construction or so located and protected tham a fXre~not adversely affect any safety-related systems or equipment.

CaoXinS towers should be of noncombustible construction when the basins are used'or the uLtimate heat, sink or for the fire protection water supply NKt GKSEKXC LEIHKK 86-IQx?Jo additional guidance..2.273 STP CNEE 9.5-IL>>Xtem C~TQahielines for Specific Plant Areas (Cont'd)r l&sceIIaneous hreaa~Mtscellaneous areas suctx ae shops,<<arehouses, auxiliary boiler rooms, fuel oil tanks, am'Ranaaal~

am%.co tiMc liquid stoz'age tanks should be so located auk prntecred, thac a firn or effects of a fire, including smoke, will not adverseLy affect: my safe~aXated'.

systems or, equipaent" NKC CENEEZC E1H15R 86-10=ka<<xterior yard axes without fire barriers.shoQM be: considered as one fire area The area may consist of several'ire xones The boundaries of the fix'e xones should be determined'y a: PE4" 2.274 Ahainiatratiaa and.Service'I This building should be separated from the Reactor Rmiliary'uilding and the Tux'bine Building by Moor fire resistive barriers NKt CRHIRXt LEXIS.86-IC So additional guidance.

2 275 Miscellaneous Buildin s: The following areas inside this building hould be separated from othex areas by 3-hour fire resistant barriers: onssfety Chiller Room, Mechanical Equipment Room, Vault, Hot Machine Shop, Decontsnd.nation Ares, Machine Shop, warehouse snd Storage hrcs.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.276 h8ministrstion snd Service Buildin: hutomstlc Met Pipe Sprinklex'ystems should c pxovided ia the Vault aad Mechanical Equipmeat Room of the khaiaistrstioa and Service BuQding.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additioasl guidsacc.l2.277 Outdoor Oil Filled Transformers:

Buildiag walls within 50 ft of the outdoor oil filled transformers should bc of 2-hour fire resistive construction aad should be blank.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance.2.278 Yard Transformers:

Two-hour fire barries msy be provided between sll'Msia aad Stsadby Transformers spaced less than 50 ft apart.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additional guidance..279 Yard Transformers:, Transformer yard dxsiasgc pits should be capable of containing the oil fxom the largest tx's"..sformer, aad the water fx'om two..deluge systems operating simultaaeously for a discharge period of 10 minutes.NRC GENERIC Q?TTER 86-10: No additional guidsace.2 280 Yard Transformers:

'Statioa, Main, kvr~ary, Staadby aad Stamp traasfoxmers should be pxovided with hydraulically calculated water Spray Deluge Systems.NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10: No additioasl guidaace.2.281 BTP CMEB 9.5-1, Item-C, Positioa (Cont'd)x"8.S cial Pxotection Cuidelines a.Stors e of hect len en Puel Gases Cas cylinder storage locations should not be in areas that contaia or expose safet~elated equipmeat or the fire protectioa systems that serve those safety-related axeas.k permit system should be required to'use this quipment in safe~elated areas of the plant (also see Position C.2)." KtC GENERIC LETTER 86-10 No additional guidon-e 1106u 2&3 2.282 BTF CHES 9 5-1, Item-C.8.a, Storage of hcctyleac Oxygca Fuel Cases (Cont'4), b Stora krcaa for Ion Exchan c Resins Unu~fcnr exchange res~shouZrk not be stored in areas that contaia or expose safe~lated equipment.

SEC CEHERIC LEG3K.8&-la=No additional guidance.2 28$NIP QQB 9D-X.>>Xtca C 9 a Storage of kcctylcae Oxygen Fuel Cases CCone;"At e Bazardaam Chemheahs Kamsa:dous;

~caIs shouhf aot.be stum'a areas that contain or expose safe~+Rated equiymcat<<

NRC GENERIC LETTER 86'-10: Nai additional guidance.2.284 3TP CHES 9.5-1, Item.C'8.a,, Storage of hcctylenc Oxygen Fuel Casts (Cont.'d):., d Materials Coats'adioactivit Materials that.co ect and'aintain raUioactivity such as spent ioa exchange resins, charcoal filters, and HEPh,fiI'ters should be stored in closed metal tanks or containers that.arc located im.areas free from ignitioa sources or comhuatiMee These matcxMs shouhB be protected from exposure to fires ia.rsmawa3L ef decay heat fame enemfmek radEccctive materials.

SKC GENERIC XZTTER 86-.10=Na.aha!,tioasl guidance.SEC CESEkZC E152EE 86151Ecenefay Policy: The basic elements reqcChaR Sa the fire protecehm yIaa are-described ia 10 CFR 50.48(a).The fire protection program that.implements'hat:

pisa'hould include the details of: the.fire hazards anal~,The.

@ham and program may be separate or combined.doauaeats and,'uar'e.

leapt: uxcranr.with the fire hazards aaalysis g!!!!therefare woe?4 be uydarml amh adW~)to the NRC ia conformance with the!!I sa'.'M!!=aran SOURCES:.10CPR50;48',,10uMtR.71.

2.28&'RC CENERIC LETTER'&-10',, Licensiag; Policy (Cont'd): "For plants liceased prior: to Jaauary.1',.1979'nd'.for those modifications which deviate from the previously acceytedi fire.protection configurations, the exclusioa of the applicability of Sections~of'kyyend'i'x.

R other thaa III.C, IXI.J, and III.O is'imited to those features-aceqeedl+the NRC staff as satisfyiag the provtsi.oas W kyyendix k.te.Branch Techafca1 Position BTP kP CSB 9.5-1 reflected'a staff fire yrnrscti'on saf aCp evaluation reports.issued prior to the effective data of the;raIe.No reansLysis is required.except for proposed.'od~tions which.w.W9.aire~previously approved features.This position is assed.directly'on CPK 50 4@9 RE-.SOURCE: lyyesuBx: R to.IGCZRM>>10 CPR50.48, kypeadix h to kPCSS'9'2<<I 2.287 NRC CEHERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): "If a future modfffcatioa involves a'change to a licease coadition or tcchnical specification, a license amendment request must be submitted.

Rhea a modiffcatfon not iavolviag a technical spccificat1on or licease condition is planned, the evaluation made 1a coaformaace w1th 10 CPR 50.59 to determine vhether an unreviewed safety questioa is involved must include an assessment of the.modificatfoa's impact on the existing fire haxards analysis for the arcs This part of the evaluation must bc performed by the pexson gcsponsiblc for thc ffre"safety program for thc plant.The assessment must include the effect on combustible loading and distribution and the consideration of whether circu1ts or compoaents, including associated circuits, for a tx'aia of equfpment needed for safe shutdowa are befag affected or a new clcmeat introduced in the axes.If thfs evaluation concludes that there is no significant fjapact, this coaclusion and its basis must be documented as part of the 50.59 evaluation aad bc available for future inspectioa aad reference.

If the evaluation fiads that there is an impact that could result 1a the area either not being in conformance with hppendfx R, oz'ome other aspect of the approved fire protectioa pxogram, or being outside the basis for an exemption that vas granted for the area involved, thc licensee must either make modifications to achieve conformance or]ustify and request exemption (or, for thc post 1979 plants, approval)from the NRC." BEP~SOURCE 10CPR50 59 2.288 NRC CENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): "In response to the first two questioas above, once he time period allowed by a schedule ia 50.48 has run out, the schedule caanot be reinst1tuted by exemption.

In such a sftuatioa the licensee 1s ia violation of the regulation aad should notify the Region proposing compeasatoxy measures and a schedule for gainiag complfaace either<<1th the provisions of Appendix R ox'ith the provisions of an approved technical exemption.

If a techaical exemptioa is iavolved but is aot yet applied for, the schedule for that actioa should be included aad the liceasee ruas the risk that if thc technical cxemptioa is deaied, a violatioa of the regulation has been incurx'ed." REP SOURCE 10CPR50 2.289 NRC CENERXC LETTER 86-10, Lfcensiag Policy{Cont'd): "Requests for schedular exemptions may be made under 10 CPR 50;12, but such requests will be granted.sparingly based upoa thc following criteria'.

1.The utility has, since the promulgation of hppeadfx R ia 1980, proceeded expeditiously to meet thc Commission'a requirements." REP SOURCE 10CPR50 2.290 NRC CENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): "2.The delay 1s caused by circumstances beyoad the utility's-control, or fmmedfate fmplemeatatfon would cause undue hardship (e.g., plant shutdown to effect a minor modiffcatfoa).

1106u 2-85 2.291 HRC GENERIC H'.TTER 8&-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd)-"3.The proposed schedule for completioa represeats a best effort under the circumstances." 2 292 HRC.GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): "4.Adequate interim compensatory measures witt be admen until compliance is achieved." 2 293 HRC GENERIC LETTER 86-.10, Licensing Policy (Coat'd): "Thc Adtl.j~analysis The conclusion of this analysis is always subject to review by the HRC inspector, 2 294 NKC GENERIC L1ZTEK 86-10, Licensiag Policy (Cont'd): "If licensees propose changes to their HRC approved modificatioas, they must submit their nc<<proposal and revised schedule for implementation for NKC approval." 2.295 HRC GENERIC EZX:KR 86-10, Liceasiag Policy (Coat'd): "Changes must be justified as to (1)the reasoa for the change, (2)the basis for the revised scheduIe, and (3)the interim measures that will be provided to assure post fire shntdo<<n capability uati1 the final modifications are implemented.

Qhether er not enforccamat action<<itt be tahea based upon continued noncompliance

<<ith Appendix.R<<ill be decided by the NRC Regioaal'Admkaistrator in, consultation with NRC Eeadquarters." 2 296 HRC GENERIC EXMR 86-10~Idtccasing Policy (Cont'd): "Deviations f rom the codes aimuhk be.hkentified am'stified in the PSAK or PHA." 2.297'RC GENERIC EXETER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): "An exemptioa is not required for%PA codes HRC gabteXLnes reference certaia NPPA codes as gubteliaee to the systems acceptable to the staff, aad therefore such codes may be accorded the same status am Regulatory Guides.",, 2 298 HRC GENERIC EZTHR 86-10,.Licensing Policy (Cong'd)s"Mhen thc applicant/licensee states that its design"meets the Intent of the NPPA Codes" aad does not ideatify any deviations.

from such codes, NRR aad the Regions expect that: the design conforms to the.code and the design is subject to inspection, against the NPPA codes.," 2'99 HRC GENERIC LZXTEK'6-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): "Some cables are being developed for high temperature (e g.>1700'P)applications Aa exemption<<oat be required if such caMe is used in lieu of the alternatives of.III G?.or III G 3 in a pre-1979 plant A deviaton from the guidelines would.be required fox similar applicathma i>.a post 1979 plant 2.300 NRC GENERIC QHTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): "Post-1979 plants are subject to:""GDC 3." 2.301 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Liceasiag Policy (Cont'd): Post-1979 plaats arc subject to: "10 CFR 50.48(a)and (e)." 2,302 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): Post-1979 plaats aze subject to: "The'uidelines identified in the footnotes to 50.48(a)." 2.303 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Coat'd): Post-1979 plants arc subject to: "Guidelines documents issued aftez Jaauary 1, 1979." I-2.304 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): Post-1979 plaats arc subject to: "Commitments made to acct the requirements of Appendix R;or specific sectioas such as ZZZ.G,.IIZ.J, III.O;aad Appendix h to BTP kPSCB 9.5-1;or-BTP CMEB 9.5>>1, which iacludes thc requirements of Appendix R>>and the previous guidance documents incorporated iato the Bzaach Technical Position.+h deficiency ia the BTP CMEB 9.5-1 has beea noted ia that a requirement in'ppendix R Section ZII.C.3.b to provide altcrnativc or dedicated shutdown capability in an area where both redundant safe shutdovn trains could be.-damaged by suppressioa activities or inadvertent operation or rupture of fire suppression systems is not included.This zequiremcnt vill be added in the next revision of the'BTP." 2.305 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd)'-"The license for each plant licensed aftez Januazy 1, 1979 contains a liceasc coadition which identifies by refereace the approved fire protection program for that plaat." 2.306 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Liceasiag PoLicy (Cont'd)t"h licensee can achieve compliance with IIZ.C.l(C) by demoastratiag that oae train of cold shutdown equipmcat<<ill remain free of fire damigc.Hc is aot limited to the three alternatives in ZII.C.2.See Item f3,"Interpretations of hppcndix R."" 2 307 NRC GMKZC UHTER 86-10, Licensiag Policy (Coat'd)s"Pire Protectioa Guidance Issued Since Jaauary I, 1975 IE Information Notices o.-: Actuatioa of fire suppression systems causing inoperability of safety related equipment.";

I106u 2-87 2.308 NKC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Liceasing Policy, Pire Protection Guidance-IE Notices (Cant'd)"No.83-69 Improperly installed fire dsmpcrs at nuclear peer planta." 2.309 NRC GRKRXC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Pire Protection Guidance>>ZE Notices (Cont.'d)"No 83-83: Use of portable radio transmitters inside auclcar po<<er plants." 2 310 HRC CBKRIC XZXKR 86-10, Licensing Policy, Pire Protection Guidance-IK Noticeo 4Cont'd)x eNo 84&9x Lessons Learned Prom NRC Inspections of Pire Protection Safe Shutdo<<n Systems (10 CPR 50, kppendiz R).eStaff positions regardiag the aced for certain exemptions deliaeated in this guidance document have been revised per the"Interpretations of kppcndix R"." 2'.311 HRC'ENIC LKTi3K 86-10, Liceaaiag Policy>>Pire Protection Guidance (Cont'd)"Standard Rcvic<<Plan 9.5~1>>Rev~I Are Protection System>>dated 5/1/76." 2.312 SEC CKNERXC XENIX 86-10, Lfcenaiag Policy, Pire Protection Guidaace-"SRP (Cont'd)t"9 S I, Rev.2 Pire Protectioa Program, dated 03.78." k 2.313 NRC GENEtZC,.LZXTER.

86-10, LLceaatng Policy, Pix'e Protectioa Guidance-SRP (Cont.'d)"9 S I>>Re+3 Pire Protection Program, July 1981." 2 314 HRC GKHHKC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): "Generic Letters NOTE: The,faIIoehzg documeata<<eze obtained from thc Palisades Pile Docket No 50-255 SSa~deameata ahoehh be ia the file for other operating faciIities The datee may vary aIf+tly.I.Letter dated.9/2S/76-EncIaafng kyy k to BTP hPCSB 9.5-1 and supplementary'td.dance oe information needed for fire px'otection program~valuati~2.315 NRC GENERIC IJHTEE.8&-10,.Licenaiag Policy, Fix'e Px'otection Guidance-Generic Letters.(Cont'd),:

2>>Letter dated 12/I/76-Encloaiag sample 2'.316 HRC CENERZC LETTER 8&-I0>>, Ltcmming Policy, Pire Protectioa Guidance-Generic Letters;(Cont>>d)" 3.Letter dated,8/19/77

-Encloaiag Nuclear Plaat Pire Protection Functional ReaponailCIitiea, Administrative.

Controls an (luallty kasurance."

NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Fize Pzotection Guidance-Generic Letters (Cont'd): "4.Letter dated 6/8/78-Re: Manpower requizements for'operating reactors." 2.318 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance-Generic Letters (Cont'd)!"5.Letter dated 9/7/79-Re: Minimum fire 2.319 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance-Generic Letters (Cont'd): "6.Letter dated 9/14/79-Enclosing staff positions-safe shutdown capability." 2.320 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10;Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance-Generic Letters (Cont'd)-"7.Letter dated 10/31/80-Enclosing new 10 CFR$0.48 regarding fire protection schedules for operating nuclear power plants." 2.321 NRC GENERIC LE~K.86-10, Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance-Generic Letters (Cont'd): "8.Letter dated 11/24/80-Enclosing a copy of revised 10CFR50.48 and new hpp R to 10CFR50,, and a summary of open items from the SER for the BTP hPCS3 9.5-1 Review."..2.322 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance-'Generic Letters (Cont'd): "9.Letter dated 2/20/81-Generic Letter 81-12 identifying information needed for NRC review of modifications for alternative shutdown capability

" 2.323'RC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance-Generic Letters (Cont'd): "10 Letter dated 4/7/82-Provided clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 and guidance on information needed for NRC review of exemption requests.2.324 NRC GM?RIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance-Ganeric Letters (Cont'd)s"11 Letter dated 10/6/82 Generic Letter 82-21;provided criteria for annual, biennial, and triennial audits zequized by.Technical Specifications." 2 325 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance-Generic Letters (Cont'd): "<<12.Letter dated 10/19/83-Generic Letter 83-33;NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of kppendiz R to 10CFR50.<<Staff positions regarding the need for certain exemptions delineated in this guidance document have been revised per the"Interpretations of Appendix R"." 1106u 2-89 2,326 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Licensing Policy, Fire Protection Guidance (Cont'd)-"Staff Generic Positions 1.Letter~Deaton to Bernsca, dated 4/20/82-Control room fires.")2.327 HRC CKHERXC LEXTER 86-10, Liceasing Policy, Fire Pzotectioa Guidancc-Staff Gem~Posftfoas (Cont'd): "2.SECY 83-269, dated July 5, 1983-.kttachmeatm 8 andi C 2 328 NRC GKHIZIC BETTER&6-10, Lfcensiag Polfcy, Fire Protectioa Gufdancc-Staff Generic.Posftions (Cont'd)"3 Memo, Eiseahut to Olshfaskf, dated 12/30/83-Physical fadependcace of electrical systems." 2.329 NRC GEHEGC XZTXER 86-10, Licensing Policy,'Fire Protection Gufdsace-Staff Generic: Positions (Cont'd): "4 Memo, Eisenhut to Jordaa, dated 10/24/83-BuIlct resistant fire doors".2 330 NRC CQBiEHZC'KHXR 86-L0 Deviation from Guidance Documents, Licensing Policy (~~di)s Xf a MME determines that a deviation from a guidance docasent exists am exemptfoa repmt does not need to be filed.2.331 NRC GEHERXC INTER&6-10, Staff Interpretations of Appendix R, PoIifcy.(Cont"d)Staff positions are iaitiated when our experience

~hows that generfc: iaa~s are identified that require clarification.

These positions, are.revf'ewer fcn: accuracy and coasfstcncy by thc cognizant Division Usually,.they a@a aot fssued for comment However, Geaeric Letter 83-33 was commented'm, by the NUFPG (Nuclear Utility Fize Pzoteetioa Group)since ft.was fed.tfatek~

fa parti, at their request.2 332 SRC GKHHKCEEXXIK,M-XC'~

IH~emfaatfoa of New Staff Positions, Xfceasfag P5IIcy (Cited:"Ht The Staff positions on geaeric sub5ects arc coasfdered:

for issuance: fa Geaerfc.Letters from ONRR aad Information Notices or BuIXetfns from QIkE Staff positions issued for specific questions on specific pIants are.not gfven generic promulgatfoa because they aozmslly involve: plaat speefffc desfgn consideratfoas." 4 i LET'TER 86 10'oordination Study Update, Liceasing Policy (Cont'd)::

Ve would: expect that.as circuit modifications are made f the design pac3cage.would'ddress the: e1ectrf eel protection required aad the ef f ects of this protection on, the coonkhmtfon of the protectioa for the power dfstrfbutfoa:

system~Tea type.of'onsideration should be included in the evaluatfee requMR hy X0'PR$0'9 Changes, Tests and Experiments.

Ihe design package.andi modXffcatfon'vahmtfon could aot be complete without coasfdermthm of't5e:cuordfaatfoa'tudy Therefore, we would expect that thc coordination see@ca sreM M carrot with the last circuit modification made."

2.334 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Exemption Request Treshhold, Licensing PoLicy (Cont'd): "The licensee must deveLop its criteria for an exemption request threshold.

Rcqucst is not needed for each aad every possible deviation from kppendix R." 2.335 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Penetratioa Designs Not Laboratory kpproved, Licensing Policy (Cont'd): No exemption requests are needed for penetration designs revi'cued and approved by NRC but aot classified by aa approval laboratory 2.336 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Individual versus Package Exemptions, Licensing Policy (Coat'd): Future exemptioas should be submitted iadividually, if they are indepeadent of each other." 2.337 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Exemption Request Licensing Policy (Cont'd): See Enclosure 2 of NRC's letter to all liceasces dated kpriL-May 1982 for level of detail needed ia an exemptioa request.2.338 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Exemptioa Request Liccnsiag Policy (Coat'd): Exemption requests for future modifications should bc submitted under LOCFR50 12.2 339 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Post January Ly 1979 Plants and Exemption Requests Licensing Policy (Cont'd): Deviatioas from the requiremeats of Section ZZZ C, IZI.J aad IZZ.O should be identified aad justified in the FSAR or FHk and the deviation would probably require a liccnsc ameadmeat to change the licease condition.

2 340 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, NRC kpproval for BTP CNEB 9.5-1 Deviations Liceasiag Policy (Cont'd)t Compliance swath guidelines in the BTP CMEB 9.5-1 is only required to the extant that they vere iacorporated in the approved Fire Protection Program as identified in the License coaditioa.

2.341 NRC GENERIC LETTY 86<<10, Zaspcctioa Policy Safety Implications kppeadic R Violations (Coat'd)!"ZZI.C.2 provides alternatives to casure that oae of the redundant traias ia free of fire damage.Fire spread vithin one area canaot be predicted, but damage is limited to oae fire area.Datcrminatioa of thc kppcadix R violations that have"importaat safety implications arc based on thc equipment, components, aad systems that are located in thc same fire area that arc needed for safe shutdam or can adversely affect safe shutdowa, and are not protected by the features of IZING~2, IZI.C.3 oz aa approved alternatives

.1106u 2-91 L.342 NKC GKSERLC XEXIXR 8&-19, Inspection Policy Uniform Enforcement t}xzoiqgrout.

R'egLonsx"Each Region evaluazes violations in secor&ace with the NRt Enforcement Pokfcy>>XQCFR2>>kpyenHx C.The Policy provides guidance for the: determination of appropriate enforcement sanctions for violations.

The Qffice of.;Inspection andi Enforcement pzxxvHes guidance for and monitors af8Ltion,.

the po1icy;requix~that ale..escalated enforcement actions be appmrved: bp the MrectozaE t}xe.Office oE Inspection and Enforcement; K34$5BE GRfEBXC EEHQHR EK-XQXhegeeefoxx Po1icy, NTOL Inspections x NTOLs to the JtgxenCLx.

R suffice-the TI 2%5/62 is being revised to I~'t IQCFR50'8'equires each: such.pIant to: have a fire protection plan.Their opera~.license wiI1 contain.a.specfXhe license condition to implement their approved'ire pzotectioa program whi'c}x must identify deviations from hppendiz cond'ions.2U[44 HRt GKNERZt ILEZXER B~, Xizegea~Policy Future Temporary I"Ij-j'~Ijjljl NRC;G}DUADIC: LETTER,$$-~,'Policy Documentation Supplied by Ill'-Xfcexxsee:

to pzovhke adiKtfmxaX.

zeievant." dha=umentation.

k new listing of-.Ijjl~$HRC GEHEKQ" TiERXGk.El&XS, Inspeatdha Policy, Subsequent Inspections.

'Ij~~ll I I~I mania noncompliance.

with kppemBx.R.zequfizements is identified, a notice of violation wiI1 be issued ta ensure adequate.corrective action.In those cases in w}xich the licensee believes'that.

the-.staff.has invoked a reinterpretation W'decgxacy in azeasi which had'pzmviousXyr been-reviewed, NRC'procedures for appeaX wouldi be.app3Lckbl'eo L$4T'Rt GENERIC'ETEZRi 8&XC~, InspeM3m Policyx Subsequent to an I'~.I I Ww de Xfst: the;azess~hmpe~h amBwkfeza min~apliances were not found."

2.348 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Znspection Review, Inspection Policy: "To the extent that a licensee's subad.ttal to NRR is comprehensive and sufficiently detailed, the basis for the OZ&E Appendix R inspection will be the assumptions, shutdown paths and equipment selections approved by NRR.If the inspection results in new information that casts doubt upon the approved configuration, the Regional inspectors have the responsibility to resolve such doubts." 2.349 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Inspection Policy, List of Shutdown Equipment: "Regional Inspectors will use the lists of shutdown equipment the licensee has identified in his fire protection plan.Generic Letter 81-12 and its.clarification documents expect licensees to show how they will shutdown if a.fire area is not provided with redundant train separation.

Inherent within this expectation is the assumption that the licensee will identify the equipment to be used.It is because the licensees have not had fire hasard analyses at all for non-alternative shutdown fire areas that the inspectors to date have resorted to using the only lists available (the alternative shutdown equipment Mst used by NRR in their reviews).I tc It is ualQcely there would not be a list of at least those systems to be used I=for alternate shutdown, since 10CFR50.48 requires NRR review and approval of.the means of alternate shutdown." End of available criteria to date.;2 350 NRC GENERIC LETTER 86-10, Inspection Policy (Cont'd): "The NRC plans:to issue a new or revised version'of Temporary Znstruction 2515/62 for future hppexujix R audits." 2.351 NRC GENERIC LEXTIHL 86-10, Inspection Policy (Cont'd)-"The documentation listing provided in TI-2515/62 does not restrict the inspection team from enhancing inspection efficiency by requesting a licensee to provide additional relevant documentation.

A new listing of documentation for TI-2515/62 is not being developed" 2.352 NRC GENIC LETTER 86-10, Inspection Policy (Cont'd): "The Appendix R inspections are conducted on a sample basis.These inspections do not certify that all possible items of noncompMance with Appendix R have been identified.

The inspection results do provide a basis for a determination of the adequacy of a licensee's Appendix R reanalysis, modification and preparation." 2 353 NRC GENERIC LEXTER 86 10, Inspection Policy (Cont'd)'When a noncompMant.e with Appeukix R requirements is identfied, a notice of violation will be issued to ensure adequate corrective action.Zn those cases in which the licensee beMeves that the staff has invoked a reinterpretation of adequacy in areas which hsd previously been reviewed, NRC's procedures for appeal would be appMcable." 1106u 2-93 X.SS4-NRC GENERIC LZXTER 86-XO, Inspection Policy (Cont'd): "Subsequent to an'kyycau~

K inspection

~the NRC<<i'll not provide a List of iteas revieved eaxK Soaaxh to be Xn conformance Wth Appendix R." LBEi NRC GEHERXC Q?X1XR 86-10, Znspection Policy (Cont'd): Ne do List the HRC GENERIC HR3ZR SS-XS, Inspection Policy (Cont'd)c To the extent that a XLeensee'N suhmittaI to HBR hs cceprehensive and sufficiently detailed, the basis for the OI&K kppenrBz R inspection vill be the asemrptions, shutdovn patda and equipaent selections approved.by NRR.If the inspection results in nee infozasti'on that casts-doubt upon the approved configuration, the Regional inspectors have.the rasponsibiL1ty.

to resolve such doubts." 2~T NRC GENRIC IETXER, 86-10, Znspection PoLicy (Cont'd): "Regional Inspector<<i11 use the lists of shutdovn equipment the licensee has identified in his fire protection.

plan 2 358 NRC CBSERIC XKH39k 85-XC'Xnsyection Policy (Cont'd): "Generic Letter St-.XR Nuaerjaam if a Size area fs not prcnCrKed<<ith redundant train separation.

Znhezent<<ithin this expectatfcm fs the asemption that the Licensee vill hheeify-the ecpCpment to be used It is because the licensees have not had~hazard analyses at all for.no~ternative shutdovn fire areas that the., imq~tors to date Ewe resorts'to using the only lists available (the alxixnative ahzekmm equipaene list;.used by NRR in their revievs)." 2 3S9 NRC GENERIC XHiMR 8&-XS Znspection Policy (Cont'd): "It is unlikely there<<eQ4 not be a XLst of ae least, those systems to be used, for alternate-shaefmm, since IG: CPR M 48 reqsdlrea NRR reviev and approval of the aeans of aItmrnate shnrdc<<n Suk of ava~hIe criteria to date.

HASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POHER SUPPLY SYSTEII kHP-2 F lRE PROIECT IOH PROGRAII RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG AHO OESIGN REOUIRE+HTS/CONPLIANCE kHP-2 Coaei toent I To Coapliance kl th Criteria)Fire Protection

.iten No.Criteria formal NHP-2 Fire Oevi ation(s)I Protection Prograa Taken Isplenentatlon HHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoseended Optionls)for lnprovenent Of NHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Rirks 2.4 2.5 through 2.7 Yes, in coopliance as described in FSAR hppendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation; Section f.3, Coapllance

~1th Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsect1on F.3.2, Coapliance Evaluation, Positions Al and A2,hnendnent No.37;and Position B5, Aoenaaent No.19;and Section F.i, Coepllance

<<1th Appendix R, Ttens F.4.2.h and F,4.2.k, haendnent No.37.Yes, in coopliance as described in FSAR Append1x F, fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compli-ance with Branch Tech-nical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Conpliance Evaluation, Positions A.l, A.2, and 0.5, Aeendaent No.37;and Section F.l, Conpli-ance arith Appendix R, Itees F.4.2.h and F.4.2.k, Aaenaent Ho.37.Not needed Not needed HHP-2 FSAR Section 9.5.1 Aaendaent 33 and PPH's: 1.1.3,'1.3.10, 1.3.35, 1.3.36, 1.3.7, 1.3.12, 1.3.29~1.4.2,'I.7.8, I.14.2, I.li.3, Voluee 7 as applicable, OA Prograa, Voluoe 10 as applicable.

HHP-2 FSAR Sect1on 9.5.1 Aaendeent Ho.33 and PPH 1~3 10'I 1 3~'I 3 35~1.3.36.ln coxpliance with Plant Sane as for Itea 2.1 and.Cooeitients, sects the see Reaarks.intent of the criteria.ln coepliance with Plant No aandatory change, hou-Coaaltoents, aeets the ever, see Reaarks for intent ot the criteria.Criteria Ites 2.1.Criteria Itea Hos.2.4.b, 2.i.e, and 2.4.1 are not part of this review.4400A NASHiHGTON PUSLIC POHER SUPPLY SYSTfN NHP:2 FIRE PROlf CT ION PROGRAH Rf-f VALUATION FUNGI)QHAL, LIC(NS/NG AHU QESIGN RfQUlRE+NTS/CONPI,IAHCE frit<rig tow IH: NIP-P CeleileenE Tg BI>)/>O P N lh f)fe FrgIPclIW~Crikgi'l0 Yee, in CneplianCe 9S described In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation Section F.3, Coepll-ance arith Branch Technical Posi t ion APCSS 9.5-1, Subsec tion F.3.2, Coepliance f valuation,.

Posi tion Al;haendeent NO.19;and Sectien F.4, Coepl lance arith Appen-dix R, ltea F,4,3, heendaent No, 37, Ye,s, in coepl i ance as 4escribed in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Firt Protection Systea an4 Appendix F,'ire Protection Evaluation; hacndaent No, 37, Yes, in coeplianqe as 4escribed in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Eval-uation;Section F.3, Coapliance ulth Branch Technical Position APCSS 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Coepliance Evaluation, Position hl.Aeendeent No.37.Aml}0;Yisl)P.O!

s)like.II Not needed Not needed, FSAR Section 9.5.1 and hppend1x F eeet the'ntent of the criteria.Not needed 0=k fire gf'8$CE080 Pfgiif'lI lNPlewg>H(igO e HHP-.2 FSAR Sertion 9,5,1, heendaent No.33.NHP-2 FSAR Section 9.5.1, heendeent Ho.33.HHP-2 FSAR Section 9.5.1 haendeent No.33 and I'PH 1,1.3, l.3.IO, 1.3.35 1.3.36.IIP=P Fire PmteslieII Frggrga Slalgs ln coepliance, aeets the intent of this criteria'.

Nas approved by the NRC 1n tte SER for S.fi,l.ln coepl lance, aeets ihe intent of this criteri~.ln coapliance arith Plant Coaaitaents and aeets the intent of this cri-teria.Recooae need Optionlsj for.lHprovesIenl Qf.)HP-2 Firg frgtect)OII PrOIIraw No change.ho>>ever, ue re-coaaend the Supply Systea to prepare a Project Procedure or an independent docuaent to be HHP-2 fire protection prograe iepleae>>tatlon docwent.Ho change Ho change, see ltee 2.1 also, prepare a chart to reflect the fire protec-tion responsibilities at HHP-2, by personnel title and naees.geaarkS Revise the FSAR to consolidate and ciariiy the pre-viously approved coaaiteents.

This reeark applies for cost part of this evaluation.

Saae as for ltee 2.I.Saee as for ltea 2.l.ISOOA MASHINGTON PUBLIC POKER SUPPLY SYSTEH" MN'-2 FIRE PROTECTIOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING AND DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/COHPL IANCE MQ'-2 Coaaf taent To Coapllance Ml th Crl teria Fire Protection Itea No.'riteria I I Forao I Deviation(s)

Taken MKP-2 Fire Protection Program Iepleaentation MKP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recommended Optfonf's)

For leproveeent Of MKP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Remarks 2.8 2.9 2, IO Yes, in ccepl lance as described 1 n FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coepffance ufth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-I, Subsection F.3.2, Coeplfance Evaluation, Positions AI, A2, 83 and 85, Awendaent No.37, and Section F.4, Coeplfance ufth Appendix R, Iteas F.4.2.h, F.4.2.1, F.4.2.j and F.4.2.k, haendeent No.37.Yes, ln cceplfance as described ln FSAR Appendfx F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coeplfance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coeplfance Evaluatfon, Positions C4 and C9, Amendaent No.37.Not evaluated, see Rewarks Hot needed Not needed I.MIIP-2 FSAR Section 9.5.1 and Appendix F, haenhaent Ho.33.2.MKP-2 PPH'so MNP-2 Fire Protectfon quail ty assurance prograa.In compliance fifth Plant Coeaf taents.In ceapl I-ance~1th the intent of this criteria~.Refer to Criteria Iteas: 2.86 through 2.96.Revise the FSAR and Mftp-2 Fire protection prograe to reflect the Plant Coaaft-aents.Refer to Crfterla Iteost 2.86 through 2.96.Fire Brigade acti-vities~ere not evaluated, because they are not part of the scope of this revieu.Plant Fire Brigade criteria ftea does not constitute part of this revfe~.4400A HASHINGTOH PUBLIC P0%R SUPPlY SYSTEI(HNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRN RE-EVALUATION Fukr TIQNAI., lirNSIHO AHU OESIN REqUIREHEHTSICOHPLIANCE fr)ISrly lÃ-.g CRIIRI)WRY fr)Br)>" FRne)Wv(ilute(I!

q)T<>>ii")(H(I=5 PF>>)F8)pp)I8(I PrgIIIsw)ejHNe(IHtl()II OP=5 AF>>)r8t8808II

$1'Rgl'lN 5lg<HS Rggoefaelk)<0 R Rtlnn(i)FRZ PRl'nYeloenf

()f)(HP=2 Fire PN)PE f)81)f'F8/FIN TN>f H ppPRI(ihcp yy (to.,5 (Ital)eI)Ln(t(led'p BQ ond Appendix F Fire Protection Evofuat(oni Section F.l lntroduc-goa~IwllONlnt llo..Cowpllonce with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F,3.2, Coepli-ance Evaluation Positions Al, B(ond BS, heendwent Ho.37;and Section F.4, Coa-lienee with Appendix , heendocnt ko 37.There ls no specific reference ln thc FSAR to the NFPA publica-tions listed ln 2.11.6.FSAS Qpf RII 5..(j..l RN>>Z1(.ienl Hg~)BIHI HHP=R PP))'lI I.8.I,).35 I)lQ Il 13.10.)g I3.tQ, I), 1.3.1Q, I.3.19, t,3,35,'l3.'2.), 4)2)1~13 I I~13 F I~13,14,5, 1.3.1Q,)3.)4,4,)~ln pgppl(goge NIT)I Plent Cokvllwenls, 2, Cr(terie (tees 2.11,5.b ond 2,11,5,d vere not evaluated, see Resark I, 3.The follovlnp NFPA publications vere used os oppllcabl~for guidance to develop the NHP-2 Fire Protection Progroa: NFPA 4A, and 27.Also, see Remark 3.NFPA 27 vas used, os applicable for guidance for l%-2 Rccooecndatlons for Organisation, Train-ing and Equipoent of Fire Brigades.kkP-2 accts the intent of NFPA 27.Specific differences arc sct forth below: Paragraphs 24(a)and 24(d)Fire Brigade Chiefs Outy Paragraph 71-11th paragraph Haintcnoncc Repair Paragraph 73 Lists of Equipacnt 1, gevlse the (SAR to cgk.SOI(dite and Clarity the Plant C~ltgents os approved by the NRC.2.Clarify thc plant status against thc kFPA gu'I-dance docuaents, 3.For HFPA 27.evaluate to include in the Fire Bri-gade Chief duty respon-sibilities of Paragraphs 24(a)and 24(d), explain vhy coeplying with Para-graphs 71 and 73 ls not practical at kkP-2.3.The following NFPA publica-tions do not apply to kkp-2: kFPA 4, the plant has only a fire brigade not~fire dcpartwent; kFPA 6 and 8 vere not used at kkP-2 they vll'I be em-ployed at the Supply Systea Corporate level.4, NNP-2 I's o single rcoctol si tc.5.Revise the FSAR to consolidate ond ciority the 1, Criteria Items 2,11.5.b ond 2.11,5.d do not constitute part of this review.2.Crltcrl~(tea 2.Il.7 does not apply.NHP-2 is o one re-actor site.4400A 4.Criteria Itea 2.11..7 does not apply.Reiark 4.I Plant coua1t-Nents approved by the URC.

HASH(NGTOH PUBLIC POKER SUPPLT SVSTEII ION'-2 F1RE PROTECT10H PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTlDKAL

~L1CEHSING AKD DESIGN REQUIREMENTS/COHPLlAHCE Cri ter f~item No.Nfd'-2 Coeef tment To Compliance Kith Fire Protection Formal Deviation(s)

Taken Hlt-2 Fire Protection Program implementation NKP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recommended Option(s)For Improvement Of KKP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.'12 2.'13 2.14 Yes, in compliance

~s described In FSAR Section 9.5.l, Fire Protection System, Amendment Ho.37;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluatfon; Section F.l, lntroduc-tfon, Amenchent No.37;Section F.2, Fire Kaaards Analysis, Amendment No.37;and Section F.4, Compli-ance wfth Appendix R, items F.4.3.6 and F.4.4, Amendment No.37.Tes, fn compliance

~s described fn FSAR Appendix F.Fire Protection Eval-uation, Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technfcal Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsec-tfon F.3.2, Complfance Evaluation, Position A4, Amendment Ho.19;and Section'.4, Compliance i))th Appen-dix R, items F.4.3 and F.4.4, Amenhxnt Ko.37.Does Hot Apply (DKA).See Remarks.Not needed Ibt needed FSAR Section 9.5.l and Appendix F.FSAR Appendix F, Sectfons F.3 and F.4, Amenanent Ko.37.ln compliance ufth Plant Co<<<<ai tments.See Remarks.ln comp)fance wf th Plant Co<<ef tments.Ho change, however, we reco<<<<<<end to rewrite the Fire Hazards Analysis (FKA)to consolidate all the information and coeaftj<<ents In one report, not all over the Appendix F as presently done.Evaluate the response to KRC Position A4 from FSAR Appendix F, Section F.3 to determine the use of HFPA 78 In the design of KKP-2 lfghtning protection system.l.MKP-2 Primary containment is fnerted during normal opera-tion.2.Same as Item 2.1.KFPA 78 was not part of the scope of this review.KKP-2 Is a single unit reactor.4400A NSHIHATOM I'INLIC POHER SUPPLY SYSTEM HHP-.F FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-PALUATIaH FUNCTIONS, LINHSIHQ AHPÃ%irH FKOUIRNFHTS/CW LfAHCf f:Cft>sf'ifl Itgr Iflf8;g Cppqf fpent TI Eefllfvt lith Er/(pe p Fsref jonf'.AeI8I felt-I Ff FP PF8$ppff8II PF8IIrfi fe8>neIIflff8II Recoavaepgyg HTIRAfsl F8F pprnvmnf gf Nk.-t[IF<fr9fectf!8 PF8)F>>I Ye>>>111 Cnepf fence as descrfbed fn FSAR Appendix F, Pire Protection Evaluation; Section F.l, Introduc-tion, Aaendeent Ho, Ni and Section F.1, Coepliance with hppen-4ix R, 1 teei,F.'1.1.1 end F.4;4..3, m(Wagner HQ<Her Ye>>fII cmlfgoce g>>4>>crfhe4 fh FQR appendix F, Fire pro I I ectfon Kvaluationi ction F,l, intro-duction, Aaeehcnt No.3l;Section F.3, Coepliance vith Branch Technical Position APCSB g;5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Coepli-ance Evaluation, Posi>>tion Dl(a), Aaendaent-No.37;and Section F.e, Coapliance arith Appendix R, 1teas F.4.3 and F.4.4, Ajeendeent No.37, Hot Deeded FSAR Appen4fti F, Section F.i, Aaendnent Ho.3l, Hgt Reedgl FEAR iopendfs F, Sectioh F,3, hwendextnt No.47, ln coapl i ance No change ln ctxapliance uith Plant Mo change, however, see Cacai taents, Iten 2.12.alooA

~~~I 1 MASHIHGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSIHG ANO OESIGH REQUIREMENTS/COIlPL IAHCE MHP-2 Coaaal trent To Ccopl lance Mi th Foraal M i i'Fire I'rotection Oevi4tfon(~)l tea No.C t Taken rl erie MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Impleax.'ntetion MHP-2 Fire Protection Progrea Status Recoaaended Optlonls)For Icproveevnt Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa I I Reoerks I 2.17 2.18 Ycs, ln coapiiance

~s described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation; Section F.l, Intro-duction, Aoendaent Ho.37;SectIon F.2, Flrt Hazards Analysis, Amendment No.37;and Section F.4, Ccepli-ence with Appendix R, Aaendwent No.37.Ycs, ln caapiiencc es described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Eval-uation;Section F.l, Introduction, Amcnd-aent No.37;Section F.2, Fire Heaards Analysi s haendcent Ho.37;)ection F.3, Coepllancc with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Coaplionce Evaluation, haendoent Mo.37;and Section F.4, Caeplience uith Appendix R haend-~N.'nt No.3f.Hot needed FSAR Appendix F,-.Section F.2, AaenCkent No.37.For specific FSAR Appendix F, deviations Sections F.l, F.2, F.3 ond refer to crl-F.4, heenaant No.37.teria iteas uhere they are listed.In compliance uI th plant Coarai tax.nts.1.In coopllance uith PI ent Coaaai tments.2.The FHA verified that MNP-2 fire protection prograa coarniteents Net the intent of the HRC applicable guide-lines.3.Deviations erc Identified.

Some justI ficotions are provided.1.Locate or rc-create the FHA Coabustible load cal-culations for actual (os built)plant conditions.

2.Update the FHA to con-solidate and clarify the Plant Caaraitax.nts as described in criteria Itew 2.17.3.Evaluate the backup docu-av.'ntetian far the FHA to be kept current end read-ily available.

1.See Itea 2.12 2.Update the FHA ond the FSAR to identify any deviations from the NRC guidelines, provide tech-nical)ustltication to shou that an equivalent level of protection Is achieved, or on accept-table fire protection measure!s In place.The Plant FIN Is a live document which is kept cur-rent throughout the life span of the Plant.4400A WASHINGTON PQRLIC PQWR SWLT STSTClf IINP 0 FIRC PRQTCCTIQN PRQGRAN RC-CVAlVATIQII FUNCT IQHAL, LICCNSING AN DESIGN Rf QUIRMNT5/COHPLIhlfCE NNP-2 C~f trent To Cosylfence Nith Focal Crl terfe Fire Protection Devfetionfs)

Item No.Crlterfe'oken ioP-2 Fire Protection Progrea Ieplenentetfon NNP-2 Fire Protection Progrea Stetus Recoaeended Optionfs)For leprovement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Progrsa 2.19 Tes.fn coeplfence es described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection 51st'ubsection 9.5,1.3, Aeondnent No, 35l end Appendix F, Fire Pro-tectlan Eveluetlan; Section F.2 Fire lleserds Ane4sf s, Aeendoent Ho.'3l t en4 Section F,3, Cfvsplf=inde Nffh Irench~~~~echnlcel Pqsf tfon PC$8 9,5 I, Suhsec tlon F.3.2, Conpll~nce Eveluetfo'n, Posf-tion A3, loendient No, 19.Not needed 1.For detell description of prfesry end beckup sup-pression for ecch fire, cree refer to FSAR Appen-dfs F Section F,2.2.For detell list of fiple-aentfng docueents refer to Criterle Iteasi 2,213, (Leter)ln coeplfence.

No change e100A ,0 MASHlHGTOH PUBL(C PONER SUPPLY SYSTEff MNP-2 F(RE PROTECT lN PROGRAff RE-EVALUAT (ON FUHCTIONAL

~LlCEHSlNG AND OESlGH REQUIREffEHTS/COHPL(ANCE MNP-2 Coaaf teent To Coopl fence Mlth Fire Protection Criteria tea Ho.Crl terl~Foraal Deviation(s)

Taken Mlp-2 Ffrc Protection Prograa faplenentatlon MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Receeended Option(s)For liproveoent Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.20 Yes, fn coaplfance as described fn FSAR Section 3.6;Section 9.5,1, Fire Protection Systole, Subsection 9.5.1.3, Aoendieent No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Eval-uation;Section F.3, Coepliance el th Branch Technical Pc'sftfon APCSB 9.5-1', Subsec-tion F.3.2,'oapl fence Kvaluatlon, Posl tlon Ai, Aaendaent No.19;uith the exception that both Primary and Backup Fire Suppres-sion Systeas are con-nected to the sane riser ln the folloufng safety-related areas: a)Control Roaa Emergency Fl1 ter Units (fifth standpipe cross-connectfon).

b)Standby Gas Trcateent Fflter Unit.c)Reactor Building Suep Vent Filter Unl ts.Ycs.Sce Supply Sys-tea res-nse to MRC osftfon ln Aaend-ecnt No.19 dated Octo-ber 1981 filed uf th MRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.1.MNP-2 Flooding Analysis.2.Pressure drop calcula-tions for fire suppres-sionn sys twas.1.(n coeplfance arith Plant Coasaiteents.

2.Flooding analysts or ressure drop calcu-atlons could not bc located at the tfee of this reviews.l.No change due to devi~-tlon taken prior to 12/23/83.2.Update the FNA to reflect these devi a tf ons.3.Locate or re-crcate the flooding analysis and pressure drop calcula-tions.4IOOA QQtlNTOtl PM(ILTC POttER StjPPLY$TSTE)t (t)IP-.g FlRE PROTECT(OII PROGRAII RE EVALVAT(O)t Ftt)(CTIIIALt LTCF)($)t(O AN OE$(Ott REAM(REIIEIIT$

/CQHPL(AIICE CP(ttFII liei))gg it)tp-lt Camte.(iwent Ta Coettliencp tti Ctt Fift Protection Critgrle Farool Oevtettqn(s)

Tegmen NP-g Fire Protection Progrei lipleaentetion ttttp-2 Fire Protection Prograi Status Recvee nded Option(s)For Tnprovement Of IIHP-2 Fire-Protection Program Reearks ON-See Iteiarks I.For plants for>>hlch construc-tton peratts>>ere tssued rior to July , t976, the.Gutdeltnes of Appendtx A to Blp APCSB 9.5-1 do not require standpipe sys-teas to be cap-able of dell-verlng>>ater to hose stations after~safe shutdam earth-quake.For NRC approval see Safety Eval-uatton Report Suppleeent tlo.3 (SSER 3)page 9-5 second paragraph.

2.Eastern Mashtngton is not constdered to have high setSatc ac'tl-vlty In accor-dance>>lth UK.4400A I~I I ,0 NASHTNGTOH PUBl.lC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEli NN'-2 F lRE PROTECT lOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT lOH FUHCTIONAL, LlCEHSlNG AND OESIGH REQUIREff NTS/COHPLTANCE Cri terf~(tea lfo.NNP-2 Coaaf taent To Cenplfance Nfth Fire Protection Criteria Focal Oeviation(s)

I Taken NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa lapleaentatfon NNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recocaended Option(s)For (nprovea>>nt Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.22 Yes, fn coeplfance as descrfbed~fn FSAR~Section 3.7;Sectfon 9.5.1, Ffe" Protection Systea Subsections 9.5.1.).4, and 9.5.1.3, haendoent No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tectionn Eval wti on;Section F.3.Conplfance vf th Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coeplfanca Evaluation, Position A4, haendaent No.19;and Section F.4, Coeplfance ufth Appendix R, ltea F.4.4, fuwenda>>nt No.37.Yes, natural heqoeena of ess severity and greater frequency than the aost severe natu-ral phenoeena (approx f aa tely once in 10 years)uas not described.

Supply Systea to provide.1.ln coapliance ufth Plant Coaefta>>nts.

2.Lightning protection is provided.3.Sefsafc Category l criteria used for f fre protection systeas in safety related areas.Ho changes appear to be needed at this tfee.2.23 Yes, in coepl lance as described fn FSAR Section 3,6;Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systee, Subsection 9.5.1.3, AaendeentrNo.

36;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evalwtfon; Sectfon F.3, Coeplf-ance ufth Branch Tech-nical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coeplfance Evaluation, Position E 3(al, mount Ho.24.and Posi-tfon AS, Aa>>ndeent No.37.Not needed NNP-2 Flooding Analysis.1.ln cooplfance

~fth Plant Coawaf tx>>nts.2.Flooding analysis could not be located at the tfx>>of.this revfe~.1.Ho change.2.Locate, or re-create the flooding analysis calcu-atfons.4400A MASIIllNNN PQSLIC POMKR SS'Pl.Y SVS'lKII%2 FlRK PkD1KCIIN PRDGRAH RK EVANAJIOM FNCT IOHALy tICKNSIIIG hlO DESIGM RKQUIRKICNISIC~IhkCK CPItgFIg}IN Ngg 1&.t Casel Iaent to Caeyllsnce Ill th f IFP Protectfon Crltpilo Foraal Ogvfotlon fy}token lflt~f PIro Prot pctfon Propre Iepleeentot fan NP 2 Ffro Plotfctlon Prop fw Stltos ksc~nde1 Optfonfs}for Improvement Df N'-2 Fire Protection Proyree leIN fConV4}standards or evaluate the FSAR coeeltjaent In Appen-dix F, Secton F.3, Posltlon 51, 1 Q Describe the Industrial Safety and Fire Protection Involveeent In the Design Control and Proc<<recent Doc<<cent Control for nev/addltlonal fire protection equlpeent, systens and coeponents, as applicable.

h.Clarify the Shift Support Supervisor or Shift Hana-ger Interface<<I th Fire Protection Engineer.I.Clarify the Fire Match re-sponslbl 1l tfes 1 tea 1.3.1O.S,J.1 by explalnlng the exact sequence of actions he or she needs to do, IKxanples'first to contact the Shift Ilanager/Control Roon to activate the fire brigade and then tate action possible to control the fire".PPII's 1.%.l and 1.%.12.kev Isa these proced<<res and lndustrl~1 Safety and Fire Protection lian<<el to describe In nore detail the fire protection por-tion Interface In Plant~actlvl ties related<<I th fire safety, fire hazards, plant operation, plant nodlflcatlons, correla-tion<<Ith fire codes and avthorltles having Jurls-dlctlon over various por-tions of the Plant fire protection.

NASHTNGTON PUBLTC PLY SYSTOI NN'-2 FlRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTlDNAl., LICENSING AND DESIGN RE4UIREHENTS/CDKPLlANCE tea No.Qt-2 Coeval taent To Coop)lance ill tb foraal Criteria Fire Protection Deviation(s) l Cr lterla Taken NP-2 Fire Protection Prograw taplceentatton NP-2 Flee Protection Prograa Status Reculade d Optlonls)For laproveoent Of tNP-2 Fire Protection Prograe Reaarks 2.2&Yes, In compliance as described In FSAR Appendix F, Fire I'rotec tlon Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSI 9.6-1, Subsection F.3.2, Conpl lance Evaluation, Positions Bl, B2 and Gl, Awenduent No.37;and Section F.4, Ccepllance with Appen-dix R, Itea F.1.2.k, haendeent Ho.37.PPI1113121

~137~1.3.10, 1.3.19, 1.3.35, 1.3.36, 1.4.2'l.g.l, 1.9.12, I.Tl.f and l.l4.3.ln coepllance with Plant coaa1 taents.~o The'Purpose'hould ln-elude Life Safety and Plant Safe Shutdown In case of~fire.The'Dl scusslon'hould be expanded and reworded for clarity and consis-tency.1.PPH 1.3.10 should be re-viewed by the Supply Sys-tee Fire Protection Engineer.expanded and clarified as followsr Refer to Ttew 2.11 for inforaetion about the NFPA CoCks and Stand-ards applicab)k to MIN-2.C.d.eo Revise and clarify the".Definitions ol Fire Protection Systea'nd"Fire llazards Analysis'.

Delete the reference to KFPA 803 froa ltea 1.3.10.6.A.2.

NNP-2 is not following this NFPA.Evaluate if Appendix R to 10CFR50 technical criteria should be added.Clarify the interface of the Plant with the Fire Protection Engineering In industrial Safety Group.Provide an Interface chart.Qescrlbe the industrial Safety and Fire Protec-tion Involvkaknt In assur-ing that Adainistrative procedures required to aaintain the MNP-2 fire protection sysrea and personnel pcrforaanck are in accordance with the appllcablu NFPA codes and NSIIIISlON tlNI IC tON'1 SLI'tlat SISIIII NI4'FIRE tNOIICIION tkONHI 1f-tIAIUAYIOH fUSI IOMI, I II I NSIIKi@IN 8 SIOH IifpQINIIKHIS/ILIA'I IAHrC fl lltl iy)le'feI~ewe or tRt=t teel local I>>Kneylieie e IIIIIi f irN t>illec l loll'f r I Ill I g feildeI Pefltll~n)1)

II!tn gl'-l fire troIRI Iieet tro/sI lglteientella>>

I I41-.f fire trots<Sion trvgrsn iteIM}OeceeeonA4 opl laiiis I for Isen oscaeit Of'kilt I fire prelo(I Ion tregne f05<IN iWI le%t if Ife'f Iieegi ggC5'rl"r'P]<<, P@lll Ilsrih.AtCSI f.i-), SoOsec-tlan F,),t, Conpll-ence fee!ection, tosl t ion II, Aeen4-eent No, 41I en4 Section F.i, C~)I-<<nce vi tli looenola I,!tee F.1;5.C heendaent No.)f.Itfl't l~).)i Ig)il0f I f),)i ln coepllenee vIIli blent, gofer to Iteas t.g end t.21.coif I>)a)fi coealtnents, Refer to Iten t,3, (9001~=~

VASIIINGTON PURL IC POlKy'opt T SYSlfil MN'-2 F IRE PRDTECl ION PR-EVALUATION FUHC7IOINL, LICENSING Ala OESIG REKN1S/CIWPLIANCE IRt-2 Coai tnent lo Co@pl lance Vl ih fire Protection Crl teria I ten No.Criterl~Formal Oevl a ti onf s)laken Nt-2 Fire Protection Program Inpiewentat lan IRIP-2 fire Protection Prograa Status Nec~nded Optionls)For Inprovenent Of llllp-2 Fire Protection Prograe Reaerks 2.2g Yes, in conpliance es described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluatlonl Section f.3, Coopl lance vl th branch lechnlcaI Position APCSS'.b;i-l, Subsection F.3:&, Coapli ance Evaluation, Posl tines Al b3 12~and Gi, Aoendnenf No.371 and Section f 1~Coepl lance vi th Appendix R, Itea F.i.2.K, Anendnent No.37.Not needed PPII's 1.3.7 1.3,10 1.3.35, ln conpIIance vith Plant 1.3.34, I.I).2, I.Il.l, coael toents.I.li.2 and 1.11.3.I.Change PPII 1.3.10 as de-scribed in I tea 2.28.2.Clarify Appendix f, Sec-tion f.3, Subsection f.3.2, Position Gi re-sponse, Oelete'i@i'A and charcoal filters are handled In accordance vl th 19CFR, Section 171-178'.Add"llfPA filters ale.col-lected In plastic bags, coopacted In Radvaste Quilding, then placed In natal containers vlth cover, vhlch neets the re-qulreaents ot 19CFR Para-graphs 173.111 or I)3.112.A sprinkler is planned to be~dded In area vhere ItEPA filters are coupactea.

2.30 Yes, In coupliance as described in f SAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Conpliance vl th branch lecbntca)Position APCSb 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Conpl lance Evaluation, Position b3, Anendnent No.37;and Section F.i Coapliance vlth Appendix R, Iteas F.1.2.k and f.i.3.c,.Aeendnent No.37.Not needed PPII's soae as For Itew 2.29.ln conpllance v)th Plant coeai tnents.Sane as for Iten 2.29.

HhSHIHOTmf PURLIC POIKR SS'PLT STSTN NF-2 FIRE PRQNCTIOH PROGRNI RE-SVhlMhTIOff FOHCTIOHhL, llQNSIHQ hN OISIN REQUIRKKHTS/COHPLlhNCC Lrfterf~item Nor I&-0 Coast taent To comyl fence Nl tll f fre Prefect lob Criteria Forest oeviatfonfsI Titan lAt.t Fire Protection Probraw Inplewentatfon Nt-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recommended Optfonfs)For lnprovanent Of NHP-2 Fire Protection Prograw Rewards 433 Tes, fnccopllance as described ln FShb hppendix F, Fire Pro~taction Evaluation'ectfon F.3, Coapl)-ance vfth branch Technfcal Posltfon hPCSb 9,$l, Sub-section F.3.2, Com-lienee%valuation, ysltlon b3, Wend sent Ho.3);and Sibtfen F..i, Coeplf.axe uf th hpWnllh I, ltee F.i.c,c Aendeent No, 3f, Tes, fn ccepffance as described ln FSlR hppendfx F, Fire Protection Kvaluatfonf Section F.3, Conpllance ufth branch Technical Posftico APCSb 9.5-l~Subsection F.3.2, Coeplfance Evaluation Position b3, heendaent No.3l;and Section F.i, Coeptlance ufth hppendlx R, fteas F.~.2.fL and F.i.3.c, Aaendwx.nt ffo.37.Hot needed Same as Item 2,29.Hot neade4 Sase as Itco 2.29.ln conpl fence ufth Plant Revise PPH 1.3.10, see ftea comf tacnts.2.28.fn.coeplfance vfth Plant Revfse PN 1.3.10, see Itea comf taents.2.28.

NASNIMGTON PUBLlC N SS'PLY SYSTEH IOP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAII RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING ANO OESIGH REgUIREKNTS/COHPLlANCE IN'-2 Coaef teent To Coopl fence kith Criteria Fire Protictfon Ttea No.Criteria Foraal Oevfatfonis)

Taken MI'-2 fire Protection Prograa lnpienentatfon kkP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Rec~nded Option(s)for lnproveaent Of kkP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Remarks 2.32 Yes, fn conplfance as described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluatfon; Section F.3, Conpllance vfth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.6-I~Subsection f.3.2, Coepllance Evaluatfon, l'osltfon B3, Peen<bent No.37;and Section F.~, Cosmpllance vfth Appendix R, fteas F.1.2.k and f.1.3.c, Aeendeent No.37.Not needed Saae es ltea 2.29.ln conplfance vlth Plant Revise PP}f 1.3.10 as recce-Sa~as for coeaf tnents.aended ln I tea 2.]8.Itew 2.ll.1I03A

'~r'xilANION PN IC 5%4 IMPLY iT ffll NNP=i FIRC PRQTKPINI PRWBAH RE-.EYA MATIN FQ%7fNAL I:IfkllSIIIr.

W alblrN RE99185%1%/N@KIRlfN r/f<P)R LFII N;PIIINPf8llfll fs.)NN Flrt tFIlEfkl8ll tFff'N PgaiVales 8 FIN Rccweetuieli Qptiiofil E8)sjrecpep 4 Pf'gif f L I 80 N'fe)FII Yeg, lit Ctspliglv'9 Ot described III FSRR Rppendlx F, Fire Protection Evoluotfottf Section F,3, Coapli ence vith 4ronch Technical Position hPCS4 9.$-I, Subsection F.3.4, Cotaplfence Kvaluatfolt, Positions 43 and 41, AeendNpt No.3PI ond Rcctiatt F.g,'coNPII-..

Rjj ltilh Q j.d.ix W IN zEtky NRPIRf t t Yn, fR ageil))rRC9 Ra described)lt F5'ppcndix F, Fire rotecilott Rvolus tlonI ctIotl F,k, cotxpl I oltcp Lllllas IPC!4 Till-.li$4IPctiott F.4 0, eoaplionce Kvglpstion, position 45, es oppII-cobltt Rtsendttcht Iloo 371 ond Section F.1, Coepli ance vf th Rppen-dlx R, Itee F.d.f.k, Aacndeentlo.

3l.Not Reeded Pp It),)0 gRd I,3.36, Nq)RtelleII PN leltkt Itk~ft I,3.19, Yolyse 7 ond Yol~IO procedures

~s Indicated by Supply Systea, Apparently, I II cottpll once vlth Plant C~lt-~ents.PPH's 1.1.3 and'1.3.10 I 1 st responsib-ilitiess of various kNP-g personnel, ond PPH 1.3.7 describes main-tenance vora'equest.

Required, hovever, ia'e lest plan that lists thc Individuals and their re sponsibi1 I ties In connection vlth routine testa and Inspections of thc fire detection and protection syatcas.The plan contains the type, frcqu'cncy ond detailed procedures for testing'.A test plan and liat of Individuals In connection vlth routine tests and inspections of fire dctcctcctlon and protection could not bc located.tvoluote other IWP-t plant procedurca inot reviewed by fboaco)ond locate the proccdurcla)

~here the teat plan ond list of Individuals appears, and frequency of testing ls described.

If It cannot be found, create one, or update an existing plant procedure to Include this.Please note that dedicated, trained crcus assigned for testing and ealntcnance of fire protection and detection systcas present on asset and on advantage to the plant operation.

The individual procedures covering specific testing and aalntcnancc appeared to bc~dkquatc.In coeplloltct lfiIII p)opt Revise pPH I.).IO os I'!'fee coal ttasnts.ended in Itew t.20.RFIn Tecfnlco'I Specification 3.1.6.t IRWIN MASHINGTON PIWL l C PLY SVSTEII MIN'-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAII RE-BALUATION FUNCTIONAL

~LICENSING NO OESIGN REOUIREiKNTS/COHPLIAIKE Crl teria Itea No.MNP-2 Cori taent To Coapliance Ml th Fire Protection r teria C I Formal Oeviatlonls)

Token MIN-2 Fire Protection Prograa Inpleaentatlon INP-2 Fire Protection Prograw Status Rec~nded Opt loni s)for Inprovenent Of MIIP-2 Fire Protec tion Program 2.35 Yes in conpliance as described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire tro-tectlon Evaluation; Section F.3, Conpll-ance vlth branch Technical Position APCSb 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Coepll-ance Evaluation, Position b2, haend-wnt No.37;and Section F.i, Coopll-ance vl th Appendix R, Itee F.i.2.R hneehent No.3f.Not'eeded PPM 1.3.19.ln coopliance vith Plant cocaI tnants.No change 2.35 Tes.In caapllance as described in FSAR Appendix F, fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coepl lance vith branch Technical tosltion APCSb 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Conpl lance Evaluation, Position b3, haendnent No, 37;and Section F.l, Ceepliance vlth Appendix R, Iteas F.i.2.k and F.4.3.c, haendeent No.37, Not needed Sane as for Itew 2.29.I>>conpliance>>ith Plant Revise tPH 1.3.10 as recoe-coaaI taents.aended ior Itea 2.28.4403A fFllgFlg I/O Ifs<frllrrlt Feral 9evlgt/8pfll lA(II Ialf:P Ore frslgrd8II Erg'<>>f>>P18>>.IIlg08II Ernie Iles PF89I'H il)Ng N<IP Ygg>ill gnepllgncp gg Ilot elevetglI,)FII foll i, detgrlbed In FW Sip llf~irhS, IIgpengls F, Fire Prntectloll gvelietlggI Segllgp F,4, cgppllepcg yIC'h Nl'encl Tichtilcel I8SIllgn hPtSII 8,S-.I,@tggtlgg F 0 0>gp>>lieve fvelgaklglf, F811tinll A II)>deeh4 lolls Ilgwu Be IIot evelveted,)e!Ileeerks Iloi evelueted, see Ihmhs.Only PPII's desig-nated by Supply-Systea Engfneers sere part of the scope of this re-vleu.These PN's vere ln Voluaes 1, 2, 7 arid 10.2.11 Not evelueted.

See througfa Nestle.2.51 Strategies for flghtlng fires or preflre plans did not constitute part of the scope of this review.)&VI~

NASHINGTON PUBLIC R St@PLY STSTEII NNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION FUST IOINL Q L ICENSIMG AIO DESIGN RE(UI REAGENTS/COHPL IANCE NNP-2 Coml taent To Conpiiance Ml th Fire Protection Nf-2 Fire.Protection Program Foleol Deviation(s)

Crl teria npleeentatlon tea No.I~Crl teria Taken I NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Rec~nded Option(s)for laprovenent Of NP-2 fire Protec tlon Pro grew 2.39 Tes, ln conpliance as described In FSAR Appendix F, fire Protectlo>>

Evaluation; Section f.3, Conpllance vlth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.6-1~Subsection F.3.2, Conpllance Evaluation, Posl tlon Bl, Anendnent No.3l.Not needed PPII 1.3.10, 1.3.35~nd 1.3.36 ln conpiiance vlth Plant Update PPH 1.3.10 as recoa-coaai tnents.@ended ln I tea 2.]8.In addition, Include aanual actuation of~local auto-aatlc suppression systea to the action to be taken by a person discovering a fire and explain hov to do it.Plant Pre-fire plans vere not revlewl, as they vere not part of the scope of this report.i(03A

[lt'I C J I('I tq.I.i 1 I a,.J~,'I'I l t 4 I t~r'I;J.1')1 NASHlNGTON PUBLlC POQER SUPPLY SYSTOI'Q'-2 FlRE PROTFCTIOH PROGRAif RE-EVALUATlON FUHCT lOHAL~L 1CENSIHG AHU OE SlGN REOUIREKHTS/COIIPL lAIKE NMP-2 Coaef tnent'o Coeplfonce Nith Criterfe Fire Protection Fotaal Oevfatfon(s) tea Ho.Criteria Taken NIP-2 Fire Protection Program lnpieo>>ntatfon NHP-2 Fire Pro tec t ion Prograr Status Recoanended Option(s)For improvement Of kkP-2 Fire Protec tion Prograa Renorks 2.52 through 2.85 2.86 2.87 See Reaorks Yes, in compliance as descrfbed ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Conplfance ufth Branch Technical Positfon APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Ccapifance Evaluation, Position CI, Auendaent Ho.37.Yes, fn coeplfonce os described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coepl fence ufth Branch Technfcal Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Conpl fence Evaluation, Posftfon Cl, Ao>>ndwent Ho.37.Not needed Hot needed Pro)oct Manual instruction 1-9 Paragraph 5.0.Acceptable between 5/80 end present.See criteria 2.87 through 2.96.-Pro)ect Manual Instruction 1-9 Paragraph 5.0.-CSHHP-2-0I7.

-Mld'-2-017.

-TOP E 2.1.-El 2.1.-PPII 1.1.'I.For the period 5/80-present Could not be assessed without on audit.Could not be assessed without on audit.An audit fs required to assess status.An audit fs required to assess status.Fire Brfgode eval-uation fs ex-cluded from the scope of this re-port.1100A NASHlNGTOH PUBLlC PORR SUPPLY SVSTEII M%-2 FlRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTfONAL j LICENSlHG AND OESlGH REQVIREHEHTS/COHPLIANCE Crf ter)e llei ffg~NNP-t Coelaf taent , Ta Compliance Nl th Ffje Pratyctfan'l fterfl Formal peVfatfotI)s)

Taken W'-t Fire protectian Pragrai TIspleeentatfon NNP-2 Fire Pratectlon Prograw Status Roc~nded Optlonfs)For leproveeent Of IINP-2 Fire Protection Pragraa Rcearks 2.90 Yes.fn cm)fence ay de)crfhed fn FSAN Appendfs F, Fire'gtectfon FValuatfonf.otfon F,3, coepliance

<<fth BranCh TichnfCal Pasftfqn Apc)g 9,'5-l,'isection F.3.2I Caeplfance Evaluatfon, pytgw c2, QHaewnI 9<fn cgnpl fence ee deszrfbed fn FEAR Appendix F, Fire rotectlan Evaluatlonl ctlon F.3, Coipl lance with Branch Tcchnical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coepl I ance Evaluation, Position C3, haendeent No.37.Vcs, ln coepllance as described In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Cowpllance

<<lth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1,'Subsection F.3.2, Coaqllance Evaluation, Position Ca, Aaendccnt No.37.Hot neod-.Pro)ect Hanual lnstructlan 1 9 Paragraph 5,Q, gechtel Canstructlan Nark/Plan Prace4ure Pragrai Hanual, QPPSS Test 4 Startup Pro gras ffanual,~PPH f.t,f-l.te5e For the perfoo 5/BO-present

-.Pro)ect Hanual instruction 1-9 Paragraph 5,0,~pcH GNp/p-a.5e

-PCH GNP/P-lt-a.

-PPH 1.3.13.-NPPSS Test 5 Startup Prograa Hanual.-PPH 1.15.2.-PPH 1.3.39.For the period 5/BO-present Not needed-Project Hanual instruction a-9 Paragraph 5.0.-Bcchtcl COOI Section l I l.-GPSS Test B Startup Pro-graa Hanual.PljC-01.For the period 5/80-present Could not be assessed<<f thaut an audft, Could not be assessed<<fthout an audit.Could not be assessed<<lthout an audit.An audit Is required to assess status.An audit ls required to assess status'n audit ls required to assess status.

MASHIHGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH Mlt-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUHCT IOHAL, LICENSIHG AHD OESIGH REOUIRMNTS/COHPL IAHCE I I Criteria Iteo Ho.I MUP-2 Cosa)taient To Coapl)ance Mith Forwal F)re Protection Dev)ation(s)

Criteria Taken MIP-2 Fire Protection Progroa leplewentatlon MHP-2 Ffre Protection Prograa Status Recommended Optfonls)For laiproveiiient Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reoa res 2.9l 2.92 2.93 Yes, fn coeplfance os described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protect)on Evaluation; Sectfon F.3, Coepllance ufth Branch Technical Posltfon APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Co~I)ance Evaluation, Pos)t)on C5, koendeent ko.37.Yes, ln coaplfonce as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coapl)ance ufth Branch Technical Posit)on APCSS 9.5-l, Subsection F.3.2, Coiiiplfance Evoluat)on, Position C6, Aoenaiient ko.37.Yes, ln coaipl lance os described fn FSAR Appendix F, F)re Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coapllance ufth Branch.Technical Position APCSB 9.5-l, Subsection F.3.2, Coepl)once Evaluation, Position C7, Aiiendiiient Uo.37.Hot needed-Project Hanual Instruct)on 4-9 Paragraph 5.0.-MPPSS Test 8 Star tup Program Hanual.-Index of Surveillance Procedures Related to Fire Protection.

For the period 5/80-present Hot needed-Project Hanual Instruction 4-9 Paragraph 5.0.-MPPSS Test ond Stortup Prograa Hanuol.-PPH 1.3.8.For the period 5/80-present Not needed-Project Hanual Instruction 4-9 Paragraph 5.0.-PHI 4-4.-PHI 4-4.l.-PHI 4-I3.4.-MPPSS Test 8 Stortup program Honuol.-PPH 1.3.'12.For the period 5/80-present Could not be assessed without an audit.Could not be assessed>>fthout an audit.Could not be assessed without an aud)t.An audit ls required to assess status.An audit ls required to assess s'talus~An audit fs requ)red to assess status.4400A NSIIINTN PUBLIC POKR SUPPLY SYSTEH INP-?F lltE PitOTECTIOff PROGRAH RE-EVALUATIOif flNTIPNL)if(!IISII%

A NEIN lt$0ffIBFIAIS/NVAIAIICE r/IPF/I tvN: iftIB-0 CAPNI Ised ffFP rrab~ffqp frffSFIB YeS, fit caeplfence

~s descrfbey 18 FSAR Appendftt F, Fire Protection Evaluatfon; Section F.3;Conpliance ufth Branch Technical Position APC'8 9.5-1, Subsectfon F.'3.2, Compliance Evaluation Position CB,'Aatendecnt lioi 4l.Yes, in compliance es described.fn FSAR Appendfn Fi Fire Protection Evaluatlonf Sectfon F.3, Coopl fence yfth Branch Technics)Position A0CSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, oapl lance Evifuatfon, osftfon C9, Aeendecnt Ho.37.FAmI PpYfgffopf~)

9hS11'gt pcedc4 lfot needed OH.Ffre PFAIefhfAA Plglff1 Iep1eBeAHEIAA Pro)ect Iffngel Instruction 4-9 Paragraph 5.0.Np-2 QAP Sect, C i19.PHI 6.13.3.QPPSS Test 4 Startup Program Hanual.PPH 1.3.12.For the period 6/80-present Pro)ect Hanual Instruction q-9 Paragraph 5.0, Bechtel Constructfon Borh/Plan Procedure Progran Hanual.O'PSS Test 6 Stsrtup Pro-ran Hanual.PH 1.6 scrfes.For the parfod 5/80-present P<ll<NEIISII Frg(FIN ikifgs Could not be assessed without en audit.I Could not be assessed ttfthout an auaft, itpcneltenifeif OpkfanfS)FAZ Inprqvesteof 9f INP-?Fire Protection Irggrse An audit is required to assess status.An audit fs rcqufred to assess status.2.96.Yes, in conpl fence as deacrfbcd in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protectfon Evaluation; Scctfon F.3;Conplfancc itlth Branch Technfcif Position APL'SB 9.5-1>Subaectfon F.3.2.Compliance Evaluation, Posftfon CIO, Ancndacnt fio.31.tbt needed ProJect Hanual Instruction 1-9 Paragraph 5.0.NP-2 0AP Scctfon C l5.CQA 1-18-1.DC0AP 0AR 18.PqAP 0AP-20.For the period 5/80-prcscnt Could not be assessed without an audit.An audit fs required to assess status.2.97 through 2.125 Scc Rcearks Excluded froe the scope of this rcport.~anQA*

HASHIKGTOH PUBLIC POKER SUPPLV SYSTEif HHP-2 F IRE PROTECT IOH PROGRNf RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL

~LICEHSIKG AND DESIGH REQJIREIKHTS/CQIPLIAKCE NNP-2 Coaef tment To Compliance Hfth Fire Protection Crl terf a tem Ko.Criterl~Fo real Deviation(s)

Taken KNP-2 Fire Protection Program Implementation NNP-2 Ffre Protection Program Status Recon>>f dcd Option(s)For Improvement Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.126 Vcs, fn coaplfancc as described ln FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsections'9.5.1.1.1 and 9.5.1.1.2, Amend-ment Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compl lance with Branch Tcchnical Position APCSS 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2.Compliance Evaluation, Position D2(a), Amend-ment Ho.37.Hot needed Archl tectural Drawings Serfes"A".Civil Drawings Series'S".General Arrange-ment Drawings Serfes"N.In cooplfancc with Plant Coaaftments.

Ho change Fire Resistance ratIngs are not sho~n on the draw-ings.Construct-ion details are sho~n, from which fire resistance ratings can be de-rivedd.2.126(b)Turbfne-generator Oil and ffydrauifc Control Fluid Systems are not within the scope of this re-review.2.126(c)Reactor Recirculation Pump Lube Oil Collect-.ion System is not provided as the Primary Contain-s>>nt iS lnerted.4400A 1-')IN)I%TO)I PNI.)C PQlf I WPlT SWPI W=f F)BF PRO)ECT)ON PROORAN RE='gYAINTIO)1 Flf)B'T)PIIA):I

):)glfsll%AN ling!glf REOI))g)f I!TI(COHPI-.IAIICg P/)Ptt BdN;08-g Conf)neqt 79 cern)>snoop")f))h

.FRY)F)FP prR)ef)ref!

OeY)5)fpgIy)

Fr))trit If)I=II ff FP Pre)ms)en Preqrsd ld~lmROHRti OP-.g Ffrp Pre)9<Mes FreItrsd%HAS Bec08eendp4 Optfonfs)Fer!PProVPPgns QF IHIP-.F Fire Prekectfen Pregrsd l~fkl TPS.fn Cedp)>gnce

%.Spe recon-.Sffp!fap Op f FN.3B, gs 49>>crfb94 fii fsAt)nendatlon snd eewrsl Arrsnefient Apprndfs F, Fire'ensrh>>, Drs>fngs Sgrfes"tf", resection Evelestfonf PP)I 1,4,10 end PP)f),3,35.ctfon F,3, coepflance vfth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-), Subsection F.3.2, Coepllance Eva!uatfon, Position 02fb)ANendnent lie,)T, L)ll ln colylfenCB 1I)III F)apt Reeue>>t Fo~l DPV)etfen Cael trent>>, for the location of ciepressed gas cylinders'I located ln the Reactor Building used for H202 System There are ten Clgss A gas cylin-ders in the React-or Bulldln9 a'El.522.The 2$and 6$hydrogen ln Argon, 2$and 6$oxygen ln Argon Is non-flaaaable and vill not adversely affect any safety'elated systeas or equfieent.

Hot part of the scope of this re-vfev.2,129 Yes.In coaplfance es described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protectfon Evaluation; Sectfon F.3, Coepl lance vl th Branch Technical Posltfon APCSB 9.5-1, Subsectfon F.3.2, Coapl fence Evaluation, Position 02fc), Aeend-aent ifo.37.Not needed Archl tectural Oravl ngs Serfes.Contract Oocu-oents 210, 210A and 218.PPII I.TS.2.Contract Docu-ment FFC 005.Tn'compliance vlth Plant Coaeftsents.

Revise FSAR F:3-52 to delete.d.Rater tight boot seals on pipes In Reactor Building exterfor valls and on interior valls belov Elev.471'-0".el00A MASHIHGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEII MMP-2 FIRE PROTECT IOH PROGRNI RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSIHG AMO DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/COMPLIANCE MMP-2 Coaaf trent To Coeplfance Kith Formal trttert~I Fere Frotettton oertetton(et ltea Ko.Criteria Taken MKP-2 Fire Protection Prograa)apl eaentatf on MMP-2 Ffre Protection Prograa Status Rec~nded Optfonls)For Improves>>nt Of MHP-2 Fire protection Prograa Rcaarks 2.130 Yes, ln coopliance as dcscrlbed in FSAR Sec-tion 9.5.I, Fire Pro-tection Systea Subsec-tions 9.5.l.l.k, 9.5.1.1.3 and 9.5.1.1.5 Aaendernt No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coepifance wfth Branch Technical Sdbscctfon tF.3.2, Position APCSB 9.5-1, Compliance

/valuation, Position 02(b), Ajacnd-Nent Ho.37;F9 and FIO, heendoent No.19 with the exception of the Diesel Generator Ofl Oay Tanks.Yes.See Supply Sys-tea Response to NRC Posi-tion 02(d), F9 and F10 ln haendaent No.19 dated October 198I flied wf th HRC prior to fuel load date of 12-23-83.Letter of duly I, 1983 Supply Systea see SSER 4 page 9-5.Contract Oocua>>nts, 24, 53 and 2I5.Orawfngs I1-512 Sheet 1, il-512 Sheet 4, 5-857 00-448-1 00-44)-l.e, Oo-i46-1.8, 00-442-1.1I, 5-858, H-512 Sheet 3.PPII 1.3.IO, 1.3.35~1.3.19.In coepl fence with Plant Coaaf tments.Fiaaeable or coebustfble liquids arc not stored-fn safety areas, except 2.for the diesel of I fn the diesel generator oil day tank rooas.3.KFPA-30 was extensively used as gufdance for control of coobustfbles.

Specific differences are set forth below: a.Paragraph 2254-Slope 4.of vent pipe b.Paragraph 2263-Slope of fill 6 dis-charge lines 5.c.Paragraph 2265-Fill and eaptyfng connec-tions d.Paragraph 2342-Valves on connecting lines to the tank e.Paragraph 2348-Over-flow prevention de-vices f.Paragraph 2630-Hydrostatic test for for tanks and conrtectfons g.Paragraph 5241-Eaer-gency Drainage Systeo Provide overflow pre-vention devices per Paragraph 2348.Recom>>nd the evaluation of the fnllowfng HFPA-30 Paragraphs for feaslblIfty and apnlfcabilfty to MHP-2: 2254, 2263'265, 2342, 5241.Paragiaph 2630 ls not fn accordance with the code and Justify its equiva-lency.Evaluate MIN'-2 ceaftocnt to have cao-bustlble liquids pro-tected in coxtpifance with HFPA-31 3 1974)as classf tied under HFPA-32 (1973)In FSAR Subsection 9.5.1.1.I.Sec reearks.2.Revise the FSAR to clarify l.and consolidate the pre-viously approved coaoit-~>>nts.Only safety related areas were evaluated as part of this report.HFPA-31 and 32 were not part of the scope of this report.4400A t&PI~"'L g$I'p'1 jL/0\Pg f I/I~)W-8 t a~HASIIINGTOH PURLIC POHER SUPPlY SI MIH'-2 F IRE PROTECI ION PROGRAM RE-EVAL~'IOH FUNCTIONAL)

I (CEHSIHG AHA PESIGH REI)UIROf HIS/LWPlIAlfE

(,'r(leri 9 (tel Hoe NP-R Casual fiaent Ta Caeg)lance Hith f(rf Prate<<t(gn Crilerl~Far~el Oeyfatfon(s)

Tinea NHPil Fire Protection Program Inpienentatfan HHP~R Fire Protection Pragran Status Rtcoeeende4 Optian(s)For Inprovenont Of RNP-2 Fire Protection Program Renarks 2.13I OHA, see RenarkS Te4 ln clop)fence eg deSCrfbed ip FSAR Sect(an 9,5 I, Fire Pratectlon 4stee, Subsectlan 9.5.1.2.8, Aaendsu,nt No.)i;end Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluatfonf Section F.3,,Compliance with 8ranch Technical Posftfon APCSS 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coeplfance Evaluation, Position 03(~), Aaend-eent Ho.19;<<lth the exctptfon tha't lt dots not address oattrfal for'cable trays, conduit and the use and non-use of fltxl-Ible netallic tubing~nd thin-walled attal-Iic tubing respec-tivelyy.Yes.See Contract Dacueent 218, Supply Electrical Design Orawlng No, Systea re-O2-217-OO8i Sheets 1-72.sponse to HRC Position O3(e)In Anendetnt Ho.19 date4 October 1981 file4 with HRC prior to futl load date of 12/23/83.In coeplfance ofth Plant Cteaf talents.Ho design change.Update FSAR F.3 Position 03(a)to Indicate arterial for cable trays, conduit and tht use and non-use of fltxIblt oetallic tubing and thin walled metal lic tubing.1.Ptr tele-con with Jfo Parker, QNP-2 Htch-anicai Engineer on 12/12/86, there Is no hydrogen pip-ing routed through the safety-related areas or equiparant.

2.QWP-2 Is a SQR.4400A MASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POHER SUPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 FIRE PROTECT IOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATIOH FUHCTIONL, LICEHSIHG AHD DESIGH REQUIREHEHIS/COHPLIAXCE MXP-2 Coasaitment To Compliance Mith Formal Criteria Fire Protection Deviation(s) lt~Criteria Taken eo Ho.MXP-2 Fire Protection program l apl ementa ti on XHP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoaeaended Option(s)For-Improvement Of XXP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.'l33 through 2.I37 2.138 Does Hot Apply (DXA).See Remarks.Yes, in ccepliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3;Coapl force>>ith Branch~Technical Position APCSB 9.5-l, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation.

Position A3(f), Amend-ment Ho.37.Hot needed Contract Docent 218.ln ccepliance>>ith Plant Coaai tments.Xo change Redundant cables and associated circuits requireo for Safe Plant Shutdo>>n in case of fire are protected to meet the separation criteri~of Appen-dix R to IOCFR 50 Section III.G.Smoke Detectors are provided in areas>>here cable is present.Han-ual hose stations and portable ex-tinguishers are located through-out the plant.ilOOA NASH)NGTDN I%0llC POHER RIPPLY SYSTE))gf~2 F)RE PRDTECTlOH PROGRAM)RE-EYll.)fAT 1ON QIKTTOHALI l)CEH$1HQ AHD DES)QH REBEL))REAGENTS/CQHPL!ANCE Crf teria lier ito.riterfa Mlf-2 Cosa)trent To Carpi)ance I)th Fire Protect)on C Fonaal Devi ation(S)Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograr lrplerentatlon lNP-2 Fire Protection Prograr Status Recorrended Opt)on(s)For lrproveaent Of Qnf'-2 Fire Protection Prograr Remarks 2,139 Yes>in corp'I)ance as descr)bed in FSAR Append!x F, Fire Protection Eyaluatfonl Section F.3, Corpli-ance v)th'er'ance'ech.

R)cg Poq)tlon Apc~p ,f=,'uhlect)pn bin Ttl(If fglglF II 1)F91951)RR gYgl)fan)RR) 59);119R f,4.Ce.p 1tee i)th Brapch'Techn cal Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Conplfance Evaluation>

Posltfon D3(h), Arendeent Ho.37.Hot needed Contract Docent 218, t nh Bltell$8IIIFIE)09fl%Lt ulled W=lf)=XII(Lsis 1=B ln corpl lance.tll ENP1)IXBs No change.No change.2.111 Yes, ln coeplfance as described fn FSAR Appendix F, fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coopl)ance vfth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Conpllance Evaluation, Position 02)b), Arend-rent No.37.Not needed PPN 1.3.35.In corpl lance sfth Plant Cosa)teents.Revise FSAR to state'Miscel-laneous storage and piping for flacaable or coabust)ble liquids or gases does not create~potential exposure hward to safety-related systems'.Revise F.3 Position D2lb).iIOTA'2 NASHINGTON PUBLlC POKR SUPPLY SVSTEII NN'-2 F lRE PROTECT lON PROGRAH RE-EVALUATlON FUNCTlONALi LlCENSING AND DESlGN REI)UIREKNTS/COMPLIANCE Mllp-2 Cosa)toent To Coopliance Nith Criteria Fire Protection ltea No.Criteria Fomal Deviation(s)

Taken ProtectIon Prograa lapleientation NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoaaended Option(s)For laproveaent Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa 2.169 Yes, In cospliance as described In FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1 and 9.5.1.2.1.1, Anendoent No.36;and Appendix F.Fire Pro-tection Evaluation:

Section F.4, Coopli-ance with Section F.4, Appendix R, iten 1.C, Anendoent No.24.Not needed Flsns Diagraa Fire Protection Systee Drawings No.II-515, II-573, N-741 series and Isoaetric Orauings.Contract Oocueents 2O6, 215, 217 and 224.PPH Vol.7 (Surveillance).

ln coopliance arith plant No design change.cosaI taents.See Item 2.167 2.170 Yes, In conpliance as described In FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systew, Subsections 9.5.1.2.1 and 9.5.1.2.1.1, Aaendoent No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coepliance uith Branch Technical PositIon APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coop)lance Evaluation, Position E2(~)A~nt No.h.Not needed f lou OIagrai fire Protection Systea Drawings No.H-515, H-573, M-741 series and lsooetric Drawings.Contract Doc~nts 206, 215, 217 and 224.ln coapli ance.No design change.See Iten 2.167 4401A MASNIHGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLV SYSTOI NHP 2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAff RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, L ILENSIHG AND OESIGH REQUIREHENTS/COHPLIAHCE Criteria Item No.HNP-.2 Cnssf trent To Wfvspliance Nfth Fire Protection Criterfe Forwaf Oevfatfonfs}

Taken WP 2 Fire Protection PrograN Ispleaentation HNP.2 Fire Protection Prograi Status Recoswen4e4 Optfonfs}For Iaproveeent Of NP-2 Fire Protectfon Program Reearks 2.IT I QIA, see Reaarks, IAIP-2 is a single reactor unit site.I 778v NASNINGTON PUBLIC POKER SUPPLY SYSTEH NP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSIKG AND DESIGN REOUIREHENTS/COHPLIANCE Crf teria l tea No.NP-2 Coaaf taent To Coap'Iiance Nfth Fire Protectfon Criteria Foi)Oevlationfs)

Taken NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa lapleaentatfon NP-2 Fire Protectfon Prograa Status Recaaaended Optfonf s)For laproveaent Of NP-2 Fire Protection Progrm'eaarks 2.172 Yes, fn coaplfance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.

Aaendaent No.30;and Section F.3, Coapliance

<<fth 8ranch Technical Position APCS8 9.5-I, Subsection F.3.2, Coa-llance Evaluation, osition E2fc), Aaendaent Ko.19.Yes.See Sup-ply Systea response to NRC position E2(c)fn Aaendaent No.19 dated October 1981 ffled with NRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.Flow Dfagraa Fire Protection ln coapllance with P)ant Systea Drawings Ko.H-515, Cuff taents.H-573, H-509.Plant Draw-ings No.EN0-62E-027,-028,-029,-031,-032 and-053.Contract Documents 29, 206, 2I5 and 250.Calculation Ko.E/1-02-85-07.

Oocuxent 5I573-Transafttal Ko.2 8dR File No.5-1573.Systea 62 Acceptance Test Report.Puap Perforaance Curve FP-P-I)0.No change, revise the FSAR to provide these clari-ffcations.

2.Section 9.5.1.2.1.1 Aaendaent No.36 states that the capacity of the fire water puaps fs based on the aaxfa~probable water deaand of 2385 gpa (1885 gpa for a fixed sprinkler systea and 500 gpa for hoses).However the original SER states that the largest single fire suppression systea water deaand is 2561 gpa which in-cludes 750 gpa for hose streaas.Clarify which fs the appro-priate Plant aaxfam~ater deaand for autoaat lc systeas and hose streaas.Verify what the fire pro-tection calcu-lationss indi-cate 1778v WASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEII HHP-2 F IRE PROTECTIOH PROGRNI RE-EVALUATIOH FUHCTIQHAL, LICEHSIHG AHO OESIGH RE+lREltEHTS/COHPLIAHCE rfiprl9 iEI Ne: WP-a Cofnlftsv n>$a Cqyifincp iff fh f)rp Protrctigil

'rifriis'attsal Qevf jtfpnfs)NP-5 Ffrt Prelpptfnn Pra9rai feflf W.@~finn HHP=2 Fire Protoctfon Progrsi 5tStUS Recwsended Optfanfs)For Ittpraveeent Qf HHP-7 Fire Protection Pro)rm BIRfnc.tf RII Sphere.t Hh>>Hie 5:3 1.2:ft..n4t ntffp 8" Ilii4 hpen4ia F, FIre Prnteptfaq EY4e Oni$ectfan F,4, fop fannie wf<h Branch Tenhn cal Position hPCSH 9 5-1>Sohsectian F.),2, Ceepliance Evaiuatfont Posftfan E2fcl AIendsent Ho, I91<<ith the exception.that three fire pwps and thefr drivers and controls are'each separated by sore than 20 feet ln lieu of separation by three hour fire rated<<all s.Tes.fee sup-p)y System'" I'esppnse tR IIII'gII ujq Aien4stent ifo.19 4ato4 Octohpr ISA)ffle4<<fth HRC prfar to fuel load date af l2/23/03, Flint PiasrAIB Fire PrntvWRII System Ql'gt Ilail ffp.ff-%IOt ings 1IR f'IfII'=SF-Q27t=QPOt-Rz9,:Ni, SII0-.N3,'ontract PaqHnentl 29, 2', 210 an4 25Q, Calculation Ho.E/f-.Q2=N0-07.

Recent 5I573-.l'ransifttal Ha.2 SlR File Ho, 5-I573, System 52 hcceptance Test Report.Ptasp Perfortsance Curve FP-P-Il0.n fplfon60 wftft Ho change, ha<<ever update lint cmfttsonts the FSAR to clarify this~~pasftfan, See Item 2.I67 I7)8v 0 MASHIkGTOK PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYS'TEH NP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATIOH FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG AND DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/COHPL)ANCE Criteria)tea No.NP-2 Coaxf taent To Coap)lance Kith Fire Protection Criteria Foraa)Deviation(s)

Taken NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa lapleaentatfon NP-2 Fire Protection Prograe Status Rccaeaended Option(s)For Iaproveaent Of NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.171 Yes, in coapliance as described In FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea, Subsection 9.5.).2.1.)

Aaendecnt No.36 and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Eva)uation; Section F.3, Coapf)ance with Branch Technfca)Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Caa-plfance Evaluation, Position E2(c), Aaend-aent Ko.37.Not needed Flow Ofagraa Fire Protection Systca Drawings ko.H515, H573, H892 and H509.P)ant Drawings Ko.EMD-62E-027,-028-029,-031,-032, and-053.Drawings Ko.E502, E503 and E515.Contract Documents 29, 206, 215 and 250.Cal-culation Hos.E/1-02-85-07, 2.06.08 and 2.03.09.Contract Document 51573-Transaittal Ho.2.BdR File Ho.5-1573.Systea 62 Acceptance 1'est Report.Puap Perforaance Curve FP-P-110.Vendor aanua)s FP-P-1 and FP-P-)10.(CVI 02-29-00, 3T and CVI 02-324-00,2)

.AHI Annual Psap Test Reports.ANI Acceptance Letter dated 2/5/82.Technical Specifications 3.7.6.1 and 1.7.6.1.2.

PPH's Vol.)(Adainfstrative)

Vol.7 (Surveillance)

Vol.10 (Haintenance), as app)icab)c.

PN's 02-84-)07)-OF) 02-84-1623.

DCP 0284-1623,0A.

HFPA-20 was extensive)y used as guidance for thc installation of the Plant Fire Puaps.Re-view of the coap)lance.

status was comp)fcatcd by Paragraphs 1-7 of the)974 edition (the code evaluated against)which al)owed use of the pre-vious edition for exist-ing installations.

In that puaps had been pur-chased and Installed prior to the Iap)eaen-tation date of the 1971 code, Paragraphs 1-7 aay have aade the previous code the applicable code for NP-2.Thc previous code edition (1959)fs not as restrfctlve as the 1974 edition.The MNP-2 aay have been in coap)l-ance with applicable provisions of this earlier edition.In any event, the instal-led systea configuration aeets the intent of HFPA-20.Specific dif-ferences are set forth below: a.Paragraph 1-6.1 Coa-plete Plans d Date b.Paragraph 2-1.4-Over pressure pro-tectionon.

c.Paragraph 2-1.5-Jockey Puap 2.3.Change wiring per 6-2.2 and 6-3.1.Correct cable aarkfng (7-3.7.2)I.5.Secure the batteries (8-2.6.5)Lock the cabinets, If feasible (9-1.3.4)Mire the cfrcufts as needed (9.1.4.2)and evaluate the reaote a I arms 6.l.Evaluate NP-2 status of coap)fance

<<ith HFPA Ho.20 1959-1972 edition for the three vertica)2000 gpa fire pcs and NFPA No.20 1980 addition for the horizontal 2500 gpa fire pmp.2.Coapare the above-sug-gested results with NP-2 status of coap)l-ance against HFPA Ko.20 1974 edition.3.Update the FSAR to clar-Ify.the Plant status of coapl lance wf th HFPA-20.I.Based on the NP-2 status of coapliance with NFPA No.20 1974 edition, the following are rec~nded: 1.)nstall a Jockey puap.Refer to PHR 02-81-1623.

2.The 3 Verticai turbine 2000 gpa fire puaps In the Cfrcu)a-ting Mater Puap House werc de-signed In the 1972 tiae fraae.NFPA-20 1959-1972 appear to have been used in the design effort.How-ever, the hori-zontal 2500 gpa was designed in 1982 and used HFPA-20-1980.

The NP-2 FSAR lists the HFPA-20-1971 as code of re-ference.This variation of standards used In design and for reference has caused pro-bleas In eval-uating.the coa-pliance as stated in FSAR.No doceen-tation concern-ing acceptance test is avaf I-able per NFPA-20 Para-graph 4-5.I.I.1778v MANIHGTOH PUBLIC POMMER SUPPLV SVSNII NP-2 FIRE PROTECT!OH PROGRhH RE-CVALNTIOH FUHCTIOHlL, LICfHSIHQ AHO NSIGH RNUIRfHEHTS/COIU'LlaHCf ritgria tN Ngc!Cont'd)NP-.2 CoeWQL nt Ta (IaapliaXe Hi@f)rP Prntegtlnq (rltgr!a Fwsa)deviation!S)

Token NP-l Fire Protection Program IIR)ealntation NP-.P fire Protection Progral Status d.Paragraph 2-6.1-Pressure gages e.Paragraph 2-6.2-Pressure gages f.Paragraph 2-8.6-F loor Pitch g.Paragraph 2-9,7.1-Penetration Clearance h.Paragraph 2-I0.3.1-llose Valves for Testing I.Paragraph 3-l.l!h)Splash Shield Paragraph 3-5.1 mountings k.Paragraph 6-2.2 Pouer Source 1.Paragraph 6-3.1 Pouer Source r.Paragraph 6-5.l.2 Hale Plage n.Paragraph 7-1.1.3 labels o.Paragraph 7-3.7.2~Cable Harkings p.Paragraph 8-2.6.5 Battery Location q.Paragraph 8-3.1 Pinup Roon Drainage Recoevsended Optlan!s)For Inpraveeent Of QHP-2 Fire Protection Prograi 7, Recommend the evaluation of the follouing Para-graphs, for feasibility and applicability:

1-6.1, 2-l.l, 2-6.1,'-6.2, 2-8.6, 2-9.7.1, 2-10.3.1, 3-l.l!h),~8.3.1, 8.6.1, 9.I.l.2 8.List the following Iteas as not In accordance with the code, and)ustify their equivalency based on engineering analysis and backup doc~ntatlon for Paragraphs:

3-5.1, 6-5.l.2, 7-1.1.3.Reiarks 1718v XASHINGTON PUBLIC POKER SUPPLY SYSTEII NP-2 FIRE PROTECTIOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL

~LICENSIHG AHD DESIGH REI)UIREHEHTS/COIIPLIANCE Criteria Itew No.NP-2 Cceef taent To Camp)lance Mith Fire Protectfon Criteria Focaal Deviation(s)

Taken MHP-2 Fire Protect fon Program Inplenentatf on NHP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoaaend ed Optfonfs)For Iaprovenent Of NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Rewarks 2.171 (Cont'd)2.'175 Yes, In conpllance as described fn FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.1, Aaendaent Ko.30.r.Paragraph 8-6.l Fuel Supply ffafn-tenance s.Paragraph 9-).3.I Locked Cabinets t.Paragraph 9-1.1.2 Reoote Alara 4 Signal Devices Not needed Contract Documents 29, 286, In coeplfance

<<fth 215 and 250.Plant Coca)taents Xo change2.176 Yes, fn coeplfance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.I, Fire Protectfon Systea, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.1, Anendaent No.30.Not needed Contract Docent 29.In caapl I ance No change 1778v NSIIIIQTDH Plfffl.IC PANER slfPPLY STSTEII NP=g FIIIE PRRTECTIDH PIIQAII IIE-EVN.NTIOH FDHCTIPH4'4f LlQH5IHG NID QESIQI REQQIilfff(HTS/CNPI,lh(cf, Lrl@rfa l tee Hp.NP-7 Cnsf4itfsent Tn tpmpliancy Mf Ill fire Prptgctlgn Critter/4 Yes, In caaplfance aS 4eSCribed ln FSAR Section 9 5.1, Fire Protectfon Svstee, Subsection 9.5 1.2.I.I, AAIgfIAiOAF Hgg 30~PyVfatfqnfs)

Tate Not needed NP-l Fire Prgtectlgn Prograw Iwplyentation Flow Dfagraa Ffre Protection Syst<<a Drawings ifo.H-515 and H-573.Contract Document 29.INP-g Ffrg Prgtegtlgn Program Status Pressure relief valves are provided for diesel driven fire pcs.In conpl I ance with Plant Coeval teents and NFPA-20 Paragraph 2-9.6.1.Recoswvfn4e4 Dptfnnfj)Fgr Isqroveeent Qf NP-2 Fire Protectlgn Program No change RenaAs Prcssure relief valves are not required for the electric driven fire pumps.Tpfp iD ff4sp)fafIcn~s 4esprfbed In f$4R Sgp'Finn 9 5 I"Efje'l 0t 8-'f84, In Pep)fence 44 deScrfbed In FSAR Appen4fx F, Fire Protectfon Evaluaton; Section F.3, Coepliance with granch Technical Position APCS8 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2,'oaplfance Evaluation, Position E2fc), Amendeent No.19.ligt Dgge]Flow Diagram Fire Prntectfon Suites rulings kg.H-.S)5'I f1;an4 ii=f1).i..8flFFEFF Doc~nf Contrgst DOCHIOnt 217, Electrical Hiring Olagr aa END-62E Sheits 000, 001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 027, 028, 029, 030, 031, 032, 036A, 039, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Drawings E502, E503 Sheet 6, E504, E508.Design Orawfng 02-217-0084, Sheets.1-72.ln conpl lance.wf th Plant Cqeeltaeq!4 an4 NFPA-RO, P4r4gr!pfI4 8=10;I an0 1=11:)In coeIPIIance with Plant Cows f tments.No change Revl se,FSAR F.3 Position E2fc)to indicate that peer for the e1ectrfc aotor driven fire puep is supplied froa a 6.9 kV suftchgcar, 480 V Power Center.1778v KASHIKGTOH PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEII NP-2 FIRE PROTECTIOH PROGRAH RE-EYkUATIOK FUHCTIOHAL, L ICEHSIHG AHO DESIGH RElglREHEHTS/COHPLIAHCE Criteria)tea Ko.NP-2 Coaaf taent To Coop)lance Kith Fire Protection Criteria Fossa)Devfatfon{s)

Ta'ken NP-2 Fire Protection Program lap)enentation NP-2 Fire Protection Prograw Status Recaeaended Option(s)For laproveaent Ol NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.)80 Yes, fn coup)lance as described fn FSAR-Sectlon 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.1, Aeendaent Ko.30.Kot needed Contract Ooc~nts 2)5 and 206.F)ou Dfagraa Fire Protectfon Systew Drawings Ko.N-5)5 and H-573.In coap)lance ufth Plant Cmaf teents and KFPA-20, Paragraphs 2-10.1, 2-10.2 and 2-10.3.Ko change Discharge eater trae hose headers terefnate to areas outside buildings.

2.181 Yes, fn coop)lance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.1, Aaendnent Ko.30.Kot needed Contract Ooc~nts 215 and 206..F)ou Olagraa Fire Protection Systea Drawings Ko.H-5)5 and 11-573.In coup)fance with Plant Caeftaents for circu-)atfng uater puep house (CMPII)thfs is done.for the storage tank the fire punp re)fef valve the eater is discharged outdoors.The corres-ponding)ockey puep does not have any recfrcu)a-tion.(this punp is used very infrequent)y).

Ko change P 1778v

)~C Qi4+A-~I~L~HASHIHGTNf PUBLIC POHER SUPPLY SYSTEff OP-P FIRE PROTECTIOH PROORAH RE-EYALUATIOH FUItCTIQNhl CICKNSIN9 ANP NSIOH REQUINNNTS/CQIIPI:(ANCE Crilorf a 1$ew ffo;NP-2 Caassfbaent To Aeplfance Hftll Fire Protection Crfterfa Focal Oevlatfon(sl Tjten f(NP-$Ffro Protection Pragr~lelentatfan IWP-0 Fire Protection Pragrai Statg>>Recoeende4 Option(s)For Iayroveeent Of uNP-2 Fire Pratectfon Prolirae Rewards Yes, fn coiplfance as 48>>srlh<4 fn ('SAR Sectfon 9.0.I, Fire Protection Systee Subsection 9,6.I.k.l.l, heen4aent Ha, 33;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Cospiiance

<<fth Branch Technical Posit(an APCSB 9.5-1, Suhsectfan F.3.2, Cawplfanqe Evaluatfan, Pa>>It(an E2(gl~hwend-Nent Ho, 2I;<>~See Supply Systei response to'RC Position E2(gl Aiend-Ient Ho.21 dated Hay l982 filed<<1th HRC rior to fuel oad date of 12/23/8).Flw Pfagrai Fire Protect(an Systee Ora<<fngs Ho>if-616, ff-573, and if=lil series, contract Oocuwents 206, 21i 2I5, 217, 223, N4 and 23l.ln caalilfanse Hfth Ho change.i(eats the intent ifahfle mans are Plant f'oraftionts, of criteria and provides an not provided, nor equivalent level of pro-required.tectfan.2.I83 Yes, fn coepIfance as described fn FSAR Section 9.5.l, Fire Protection Systee, Subsection 9.5.l.2.l.l, Aaendeent Ho.33;and Appendix F, Fire Protectfon Evaluation; Sectfon F.3, Cowpliance <<ith Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-l, Subsection F.3.2, Ccepllance Evaluatfon, Position E2(gl.A<<endaent Ho.2a.Hot needed Contract Ooc~nts-206 and 2I5.ln coapliance <<I th Plant Caai tix.'nts.Revf se FSAR F.3, Posf tfon E2(9)and Section 9.5.l.2.i.l to indicate that fire hydrants are non-freeze type.l778v MASHINGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEII MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING ANO DESIGN REQUIREHENTS/COHPL IANCE Criteria I tea No.MNP-2 Cmal 4aent To Coap)iance Mith Fire Protection Criteria Foraa)Deviation(s) Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Iopleoentation MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recommended Option(s)For Iaprovesent Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograe Resarks 2.184 2.185 Yes, in coop)(ance as described In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Coop)lance <PBSftfgn f2tff, and wftfi Sect an lfance w th Appendfs , ftea I.a Aaen4ent Ho, 19;with the esceptfan that the prflary water protec-tfan systee fs drawn froa the Circulating Mater Pmphouse basin..This water source is reliable but is not dedicated solely to fire protection. The circulating water taps draw froa the asfn at a lower eleva-tion than the fire puaps.However, for the fire pmp water source to be depleted, there aust be a Eall-ure of the circulating ~water systea pfpfng.In addition, the circu-lating water systea fs a closed systea.This arrangeoent has been reviewed and accepted by Aeerfcan Nuclear Insurers (ANI I.Yes.see Flaw Qfagral Fire Protection Supply system systei tirawfngs HB;!1-510, resfIanIP to If-83 bing ff-.T{I series, IiRC PqsftInif Cantf4Ct fiaCNP.nti )@I gfgf?I>and R8l Anendov.nt ffa.19 datetf Octoher 198)1 flied with IIRC prior fa fuel lead date af l2/23/83, 1.,!n compliance with Plant Coasftlonts. 2..Ifased an fts revfew the HRC faund the'ater supply systea ta eeet the guide-llres of QTP CHEa Section C,6.b, which includes the water supply.3.The Supply Systea is fn process of instal-ling a 400,000 gal-lon fabrfc tank.Ho change The existing de-sign provides an equivalent level of protection with the criteria.I778v NASHINGTON PUBLIC PONER SUPPLY SYSTEll NNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING AND DESIGN REQUIREMENTS/CONPLIANCE Criteria Itew No.NNP-2 Coaaibeent To Conpliance arith Fire Protection Criteria Fonaal Deviation(s) Taken QMP-2 Fire Protection Prograw Iapleaentation NP-2 Fire Protection Progrea Status Recoaaend ed Option(s)For luproveoent Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograw 2.187 Yes, in coop)lance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systeo, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.1, Aeendment No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-'I, Subsection F.3.2, C~pllance Evaluation, Position E2(d), Asend-aent No.19;and Posi-tion E2(e), Amendment No.24.Not needed Flow Oiagrae Fire Protection Systea Orawings No.II-SI5, I4-573 and II-71)series.Contracts Uocuaents 206, 2I5, 2I7 and 224.In caepliance with Plant Caaai txu.'nts.No change For calculations refer to trans-aittal No.1651 of Contract 217.2.188 ONA-see Remarks Yes, in coapli ance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection .Evaluation; Sec-tion F.3, Compli-ance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coapliance Eval-uation, Position E2(f), Aaendeent No.I9.I778v WASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POKER SUPPLT STSTEff MHP-2 FIRE PkOTECTIOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATIOH f UHCTIOHAL, L ICEH5 IHG AN OES IGH REf)UIREHEHTS/COHPL IAHCE fr)teria)$tfs)fa~Np-ff Canpfi Mat Ta Cwplignci Hit)f Fire Pratectiao (riteria Fata)Oey)ation(s) Teton'IHP=R fire Pratec t lan Pragral ilp leeeota tian HHP-8 Fire Pratectian Pragral Status Recossaended Option(s)Far Isyroveaent Of HHP-2 Fire Protection Prograi Remarks g,)N OHA-see Rolarts 2.190 OHA-see Reearks Kot app)fcab)e as described In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Pro tee tlon Eva)-uatfon;Section F.3, Coop)lance with Branch Tech-nical Positfon APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coop)fence Eval-uation, Position E2(f), Aeendment Ho.19.Hot applicable as descrfbed In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Eval-uation;Sectfon F.3, Caaplfance efth Branch Tech-nfcal Posftion APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F 3 2 Coapllance Eval-uatfon Posltfon E2lt), Aaendoent Ko.19.I 778v MASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL ~LICEHSIHG AHD OESIGH REf)UIREHEHTS/COHPLIANCE Criteria Iteo Ko.2.191 MNP-2 Comaf tax.'nt To Caeplfance Mfth Fire Protection Criteria Yes, fn coeplfance as described fn FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systee, Sub-sections 9.5.1.1.5, 9.5.1.2.1, 9.5.1.2.1.1, 9.5.'I.2.1.2, 9.5.I.2.).3, 9.5.1.3 and Table 9.5-5 Alend-aent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluitfon; Section F.3, Coaplfance with Branch Technfcal Position APCSB'9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coapliance Evaluation, Position E3(a).Aaendaent Ko.24.Fonaa)Deviation(s) Taken Yes, as noted in FSAR Sec-tion F.3,Posi-tion E3(a), ANendaent Ho.24 filed with the HRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.HRC found this accep-table fn SER, SSER 3 and SSER 4.'NP-2 Fire Protection Prograe Iep)elentatfon Flow Ofagroe Fire Protect fon System Orawfngs Ho.H-515, H-573 and H-741 series.Contract Ooc~nts 206, 215, 217, and 224.MNP-2 Fire Protectfon Prograe Status In caaplfance with Plant Coaaaf tax.nts.l.Sprfnkler and stand-pipe systeas have con-nectfons to the Plant underground water aafn which pre lude~single active failure to flair both the prfoary and backup fire suppression systems except for ihe aanua1 deluge sys-tems protecting the HVAC Suap Vent Filter Units and Standby Gas Treateent Filter Units located in the Reactor Building.2.Each sprinkler, pre-actfon and~ater spray fs provided<<1th an approved isolation valve and<<aterflow; Standpipe systeas have equivalent scans for shutoff such as the nearest Post Indicator Valve fn the yard.There are no alanas on the standpfpes. Mater shfelds or baffles are provfded as required.Recoaaended Option(s)For laproveeent Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Revise and update the FSAR to reflect and clarify the Plant previously approved coaaftients. Reaarks 1778v NASHIHGTRH PUBLIC PRNER SUPPLY SYSTEH NHP~2 FIRE PROTECT IOH PRQNNI RE-EYALUATIOH)UNCTIONAL, llQEHSIHQ ANR RESIGN REQUIREIIEHTS/COHPLIANCE CF(teria I ttss No~NNP-2 Cossal trent Ta ctep)(ance 'Kftff Fire Protection f.:riterfa Furca)Roy(at(an(%) Taken NNP=2 Fire Protection Program Ifsp)ewenta tian NHP-2 F lro Protect(on Prograi Status Reconaen4e4 Option(s)For Improvement Of NHP-2 Fire Protection Prograe Remarks f,)N Yes, in caipllance as 4escribe4 in FEAR hppen4ia F, Fire Protection Evaluationl Section F.3, Comp)(ance with Qranch Technical Positfan APCS8 8.5-), Subsection F.3.2, Comp)(ance Evaluatlan, Position E3(b), Aamnd.sent Ho.19..Yes~as noted Contract Oocnnnts 2I7 and fn technical 218.PPH 1,3,2g, Ppff 1.3.8, Specification Electrical Hiring Oiagraa 3/i.7.6 and EHR-62E Sheets 000, 001 FSAR Amend-002, 00), 00i, OOS, 006, 007 arnot)g.008, ON, 010, 027, 028, 02g 030 03)J 032 036A 039 OiO~Oil, Oi2 and hS3, IIrawfng Kos.ES02 ES03 Sheet 6,'SOI ESOIS, Resign Orawlng a2-2i7-008i, Sheets 1-72, PPH's Yol, 7 (Surveillance) an4 Yol, 1 (Adsfn(Strative). PN Systce EI2,1, ln compliance with Plant Cosol teents.Electrical supervision of valves with alarm in the Control Rom ls provfded for the water flow control valves in-stalled upstream of automatic suppression systems release valves and for FP-V-16A and FP-V-168 sectlonallalng valves located In the yard.Only for these valves monitoring are ln conformance with KFPA-26 Class II, Proprietary Supervl sory Service System, except for par-tial compliance with paragraph 801, where no record Is provided.The valves electrical super-vlsfon ls done via Class 8 supervised circuits as defined ln HFPA 720.Lack of recorder was approved by the Author)-ties having)urfsdfcatfon and ls therefore con-sidered an acceptable deviation. All other valves are either locked open and a program of management supervision was instituted approved.Revise the FSAR to clarify the previously approved Plant Coarxftments and clarify the degree of coorxftment to conformance to MFPA-26 and 720 as applicable to valve supervision. For the degree of coaaftment to compll ance and conformance wl th NFPA-720 refer to Item Ho.2.160, 1778v MASHIKGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 F IRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATIOH FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG AND OESIGH REf)UIREHEHTS/CUHPLIAHCE Criteria Item No.MNP-2 Coaaf tment To Compliance Mi th Fire Protection Criteria Foraal Oevfatfon(s) Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa lapleaentation MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoaeended Option(s)For improvement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Reaarks 2.193 Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea, Subsections 9.5.').2.1.2, 9.5.1.2.).3, and 9.5.1.2.1.4, Amend-xent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation; Sect1on F.3, Comp)t-ance with Branch Tech-nical Position APCSB 9.5-), Subsectfon F.3.2, Ccapliance Evaluation, Positfon E3{c), Amendoent Ko.19.Yes.Refer to: Letter of October 4, 1982, MNP-2 proposed to deviate auto-matic fire suppression systems froa seven areas.(Refer to KRC SSER 3 page 9-3).The NRC SSER 3 finds this acceptable. Supply Sys-tea letter G02-83-0981 'f October 28, 1983, G.C.Sorensen to A.Schwen-cer,

Subject:

Response to Fire Protec-tion Site Audit Con-cerns, MNP-2 coaaftted to install additional sprinkler heads and adjust the baffle plates to provide complete pro-tection cover-Contract Ooc~nts 217 and 02.Flow Oiagraa Fire Protection Systea Drawings No.H-515, H-508 and HS)0.Pipe Isometric Drawings CVI 02-215-00, 14362,)4363 and 2750.C'Vl 02-250-03, Sheet 206.Oestgn Orawing 02-2)7-0084 Sheets 1-72.Orawfng EMO-62E-036A.

Orawings A520, A521, and A508.FSAR F.A of Appendix'F'.Plant Procedure Hanuals: Voleae 7 (Surveillance)

Volte IO (Hafntenance) and as applicable.

PEO E-249 EP 2.1.NFPA-13 and NFPA-15 were used as guidance at MNP-2 for Sprinkler Systeas and Mater Spray Fixed Systems respectively.

The systeas configuration aeets the intent of NPFA-)3 and NFPA-)5.Specific dt ffer-ces are set forthbelow:

NFPA-13 Paragraphs:

)-5.2(a)-Haintenance 4 Instruction Charts by Contractor

)-5.2(b)-Care and Hafn-tenance of Sprfnkler Sys-tems by Contractor 1-9.I-Suppression System Marking Plans Sub-aitted to The Authority Having Jurisdiction 1-12-Contractor's Hater-1al and test Certificate 2-9.2.2-Mater supply pressure gage 3-8.1-Test pipe for wet systems 3-1).2.2-Joining of we)ding piping 3-13.).2-Orain valves and test valves of approved type 3-)3.2.3(d)

-Inspection NFPA 13: 1.Justify devfation froa Paragraph 3.14.1.5, Pipe hanger's are seisaic Category I which are a more conservative design than MFPA and are required for nuclear safety.2.Justify deviation froa Paragraph 3-1).2.2, as welded pipe was provided for nuclear safety rea-sons and seen by NRC Inspector during the MNP-2 Site Audit.3.Evaluate the following.paragraphs for feasbtltty and app)icabi)ity to MNP-2: 2-9.2.2, 3-8.1, 3-15.7.1, 3-15.7.2, 3-15.7.3, 4-4.I9, 4-4.20.4.List the fol)owing para-graphs as not in confor-mance with the code and of valves controlling 2.3.4.Revise and update the FSAR to 1.c)arffy the Plant previously approved coexftaents and the status of compliance with NFPA-13 and 15.The clarf-ficatfons should Include Engineering Analysis and back-up documentation.

Based on the MNP-2 status of compliance following are recaaended:

The wet pipe sprinkler sys-teas evaluated are located in the Hatn Control Room living quarters and circulating water pumphouse.

They fall under HFPA-13 guide-lines.The Pre-Action Sprinkler Sys-tems are covered by NFPA-15, as they are direc-tion water sprays using closed heads.'ihey are systeas 65, 66, 79, 80, BI, 82, 83, 84.The aanual de-luge systems pro tec ting the charcoal filters mre approved by the Authority Having Jurls-dlction-American Nuclear lnsurers The existing design provides an equfvz)ent 1778v l N))(INTA)I Wgl.)C P()CR WPP)Y 8$TF11 W(P"-g FIRE POINT(()H PR()GR(ui RE-EVhlNTIAN EV(CTIBKAL 1 f)K)S))G bND QES(Q]1(E(IVI()ENEQ5/)+PI.IAKCE g.lg3 (Cont'dl age for the area housing the diesel enerators;

--Refer to NRC SSER 4 page 9-8), The NRC SSER 4 finds this iccept-able, Pp~IEalN (()PI Spr(nk)er System 3-14,1.5-Pipe hangers 3-I5.7.1-Spare Spr(nk)ers 3-15.7.2-Sprinkler Nrench 3-15,7,3-(tuant(ty of spare sprinklers 4-4.19" Baffles for sprinklers 4-4.20-Sprinkler loca-tions in slall roms NFPA-15 Paragraphs:

2031-Spray Nozzles Obstructed by debris 2042-Galvanized Pipe 2052-Rubber Gaskets 2101-Pressure Gages 4020-Design guides for the Nater Spray Systcias 4032(b)-Nozzle 1ocation and density rcquircecnt 4033(c)(3)

-Protection of Structural Supports Prptec)(DA)N()p~)ustl fy theIr equivalency based on engineering analysis and backup docmentat ion: 5.1-5.2(a), 1-5.2(b), 1-9,1 (partial cocp)lance), 1-)2 (partial cocp)I ance)3-13.1.2, 3-13.2.3(dl-approved by Plant Technical Spec I f ication 3/4.7.6j 3-14.).5.NFPA 15 1.1.1st paragraph 4111 as an approved dcv1ation by AKI and provide Its des-cription.2.List paragraph 60)8, in-spcction of spray nozzles, as approved deviation by tcchn1cal specification 4.7.6.2.3.Investigate response tiac of detectors per paragraph 8051.4.Evaluate the foll<a(ng para-graphs for feasibility and appl icabil I ty to KKP-2: 2042 2052, 2101 4021, 4032)b)4033(c)f3) 4052(a)fl), 4062(b), 4063, 4101, 6001, 6002, 6003, 6013, 6017, 6019.1evel of pro-tection.The NRC recog-nized that the fixed autoaatic suppression sys-tees~re de-signed to the provisions of NFPA 13 and 15 and found the desig~to be In coapl I ance<<I th STP CNES 9.5-1 Section C.5.c.)778v fMASHIMGTON PUBLIC POKER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING AND DESIGN REQUIRENENTS/CONPL)ANCE Criteria Itea No.NKP-2 Cmei tao nt To Compliant'ith Fire Protection Criteria Formal Deviation(s)

Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Iap)eaentatlon MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoaiaended Option(s)For Iaproveaent Of MKP-2 Fire Protection Program Reearks 2.193 (Cont'd)Supply Systea letter, G02-83-059l, of July I, 1983, G 0 Bunhey to A Sctwencer,

Subject:

Re-sponse to Fire Protec-tion Site Audit Con-cerns, QNP-2 ceaaitted to install addi-tional sprink-ler heads and'to adjust sprinklers to correct all sprinkler pattern de-f ic ienc ies.(Refer to NRC SSER 4 page 9-6)the NRC SSER 4 finds this accept-able.KRC letter dated 4/13/83, 0 Xubick to R Ferguson,

Subject:

Fire Protection Site Audit MKP-2.MNP-2 SSER 4 Paragraph 9.5.1.6(l).

Technical Specification 4.7.6.2.4052(a)(l)

-Oisposal of liquids 4062(b)-Reoote tripping devices 4063-Accessibility drains for Iou points 4101-Hanger support for piping 4lll-Strainers 6001-Training for Hain-tenance and care for Spray System 6002-Instructions for Haintenance and care for Spray Systee 6003-Inspections of Spray Systeas 6013-Inspections of piping 6017-Valve Supervision 6018-Inspection of spray nozzles 6019-Flushing of under-ground aalns 8051-Response time for detectors 5.List the following para-graph as not in confor-aance~ith the code and justify its equivalency based on engineering analysis and backup documentation:

2031.

NQIIHATAH PARI-fC PAAR NPPI-V SYSNif MHP-.tI FIRE PRRNCTIAH PRRQRN RN=EVhf klTIAH fkHCT)AHA!

y 1 fCfH%lHA RHR AESIQH lINkfNNEHT%/60ffPf;TAHC(cFfterle}le lfo.efpq Civnsf<>>ent Tn fee)fan e lfftfi f)rq Prntechfen frfhrle Focal Aeyfatinnfs!

Taten OP=I fire Pratectfan Progra>>feplmntatfon NP-P Fire Protection Pragraa Status Recoawended Optfonfsl For flsprovesent Qf inIP-2 Fire Protection Program I Tpy, fn CO>>plfepCe VeS, See ltaa~~s tfeScr'fhe)'fn FQH 2 193 far e f8<W)~fire Irlilfl>: 8 get nn fva Hat/nni ccflnn f.), 0~lhnpP Iud>>ection F.3, , Cm plfame evaluation, 1'ositlon f3fc), 4Nend.lent Ha.I9.contrapt Reprint PIT.F/Ow Rfagrals Fire ProteAfon gyrate>>Araki s H: f1=hIS~~4 II-<N,f]p fIw~trh cvl@=ISA:A blent FM.Arawfn fHA-5=1354, Ara¹fngs 4, 4$N an4 4QI, FP 2.li PPif 1A.P:ll~P(A (=Philic fleet>>the intent, of this gnfdeline; The Net pipe sprfntler syste>>installed n the ffain control Rao>>living nuarters ls a w lde4 pips systeI, has a N-Tfsted check valve and a kl listed water flow alai>>.The systea wa>>de-signed ta the provlsians of HFPA 13 and the design was found by the HRC ln coapllance with BTP CHES 9.5-1 Section C.5.c.Re-fer to ltei 2.193 for dlscussfoo of NFPA-)3 status.Revise and update the FSIR to clarify the Plant prevlausly appraved coawftlents and the status of compliance with NFPI 13.Refer ta ltee 2,193 for details 1778v MASHINGTOK PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL

~LICENSING ANO DESIGN REQUIREHEKTS/COHPL IANCE Criteria Itee No.MNP-2 Caaaitaent To Coapl lance Mith Fire Protection Criteria Fora)Deviation(s)

Taken MKP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Iapieaentation MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoaaended Option(s)For laproveeent Qf NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.195'Yes, in coapllance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Pfo'tection Systim, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.2 Aaendav.nt Ko.30;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compli-ance ulth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Sub-section F.3.2, Caa-pli ance Evaluation, Position E3(c), Aaend-oent No.19.Not needed Contract Documents 217 B 02.Flou Diagram Fire Protection Systea Drawings Ko.H515, H-508 A H-510.Pipe lso-aetric Orau(ngs CVI 02-215-00 14362, 14363 and 2750.Design Drying 02-21 7-0084, Sheets 1-72.FSAR F.4 of Appendix F,l: Tech.Spec.4.7.6.2.PPH Vol.I (Adsin-istrative).

PPH Vol.2 (Fire Protection Operation), PPH Vol.13 (Eeergency), PPH Vol.7 (Surveillance), PPH Vol.10 (Haintenance), PPH Yol.4 (Alara Response).

Electrical Miring Dlagraa EMO-62E Sheets 000, OOI, 002, 003, 004~005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 027, 028, 029, 030;031~032, 036A, 039, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Drawing Nos.f501, f503 Sheet 6, E504, E508.DCP 02-85-0088, OA.PEO 217-E-0249.

Instruction Hanuals 02-999-00 and 02-217-03.

~Heat the intent of this guide)ine.The MNP-2 pre-action sprinkler systeas are closed no@ties/heads directional eater spray pattern sys-teas and follow the de-sign criteria of KFPA)5.Refer to itea 2.193 for discussion of NFPA l5 status.Revise and update the FSAR to clarify the Plant previous-ly approved coamitav.nts and the status of coepliance uith KFPA 15.Refer to Itea 2.193 for discussion of NFPA 15 recoaaendations.

1778v

~4-Mll'4~A F~HASHINGTOH PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTN HHP-2 FIRE PROTECTIOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL

~LICEHSIHG AHO OESIGN REGUIRENEHTS/CON LIAHCE Criterle ltcs Ho.NP-2 CIsnsi tsent To Ceelience Hlth Fire I'rotectlan Crlterie Farwa)Oevletianlsf Teton HHP-8 Fire Protectian Pragrew Inplcaontetlon NP 2 Fire Protectlan Progrew Status Recoevsended Optianis)For iapraveeent Of NHP-2 Fire Protection Progrm Reaarks 2,I90 ONA-see ReasAs Hul t l cycle sprinkler systeas are not utilized.l778v MASHIKGTON PUBLIC POllER SUPPLY SYSTOI MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG AXO DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/COHPLIANCE Criteria Item No.MXP-2 Coeai teent To Caapliance Mith Fire Protection Criteria Foraal Oeviationls)

Taken MXP-2 Fire Protection Prograa lwplementa ti on MXP-2 Fire Protection Prograw Status Recom.nded Option(s)For Improveeent Oi MXP-2 Fire Protection Program Reaarks 2.197 Ves, in caapliance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea, Subsections 9.5.1.1.5, 9.5.1.2.1.4, and Table 9.5-5 haondxent No.36.Does not address hydraulically designed piping systeas.Mot needed, sects the intent of the caeit-aent to coa-pliance.Contract Doc~nts 18 and 216.Flow Olagraw Fire Protection Systew Drawings No.11-515, I1-508, C IISIO.Pipe lso-wetric Drawings CYI 02-215-00, 14362, 14363 and 2750.Technical OCP 02-85-0088, OA.Specification PEO 217-E-0249.

4.7.6.2.Instruction Hanuals 02-999-00 and 02-217-03.

In caaplIahce with this uideline.The only deluge)water spray systeas which constitute part of this evaluation are the annually actuated systeas protecting the charcoal filter units: HVAC Say Vent and Stand-by Gas Treatav.nt located in the Reactor Building, and HYAC Emergency Exhaust located in the Control Rooe.These systaas do not caaply with HFPA 15.However.they were approved by Aaerican Huclear lnsurers (ANIl, and therefore are con-sidered to be an accep-table-alternative to the Code requireaents.

No design change.Revise and update the FSAR to clarify the Plant status and previous-ly approved coaaibaents.

1.The KRC recog-nized that NFPA 15 was used in all SER's that fire protection systews were"designed to the provisions of NFPA 15" and"found the de-sign to be in coepiiance with BTP CHEB 9.5-1 Section C.5.c." 2.See Technical Specification 4.7.6.2.)778v HASHINGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPlY SYSTEII NP-2 FIRE PROTECTIN PROGRAH PE-EVALUATION FUHCTIOHAILICEHSIHG AND OESIGH REQUIREIIEHTS/COHPLIANCE Criteria ate Ife NP-0 Cmf tjsent Ta Cmlfince Hfth Fire Pratpctjan 5r!hprfi Formal Pevlatlanfs) 14I ell NP-2 Fire Prafectfan Pragr4I fIAPleeenlotian WP-R.Ffre Protection Pragram StatUS Recoxmwended Option(s)For Ieqroveaent Of HNP-2 Fire Pratectipn Pragrm Reaarks Yes, fn p~plfance is 4PSprfhed'III FSAII hppkfRO 0:).I, Fire Pf'atectfaII 5ys)pl)sNhsectfans q.s.i.?.1, 9.5 1.2 1 1 and Tg)e If.5-5 hex'affixing Ho.3II;anff 69peqIflx F.Fire I,'fptec)fan fvaluatfqII;)aptfaII F.), f@R five Nffh Ilrihrff Techli p4)I'Rsfkfqfi hPCsR 9 S-l, Sgbipcl<90 F.'0.g,".Cgs.pffange EV>lgitfpn, Pgsftfan E3(4l, AaLand--eept Ho, 37, Yes.Ify let-tei af Ifirch lfNP-0 prg-pase4 tp utf}fee 150 feet qf hose to prqtecg 411 areas of the Reactor'Iuf I4fII.'e<<silrg feit gf hose will he pre-connected ta the hose out-lets.The reeaining 50 feet of hose<<Ill be con-nected only If required to suppress a Fire In a reaote area.This<<as ac-cepted by HRC SSER 3 page 9-5.Technical Speci f I-catlons 3/4.7.6, 1.7.6.2a.contract Agcmnts RI5 end 217.'law Rfigrejw Eire Prgtechfgn Sist'owing lfa, If:blk, Plant Praqe4ure ffsnuelsf 7.4.7.6.1.).i) 7.1.?.).i, 7.4.7.6.ih,),4,35)?.$.?.If:i Ig ln compliance with Plant Kmsf toonts, lN ft, of hose was 4pyraved by NRC, in-dividual standpfpeS are fn'excess'af at 1east 4 In.In dfaaeter for Iultiple hose Gannec-09ns~HFPh ka, 11 was oxten-sively Used 4s 9ufdance for the requfreIents of the interior standpipe and hose systeas.lhe systea configuration eeets the Intent of KFPA Ho.14.Specific dif-ferences are set forth be lo<<: a.Paragraph 412-Locatfon of hose outlets b.Paragraph 113-Valves provided at the oaln riser c.Paragraph 142-Pressure reducer at standpipe outlets d.Paragraph 721-Inspection of standpfpe systees 1, Revise the FSAR to clarify the status of coepl fence<<1th HFPA Ho.11 and pre-viously approved devf-atians.The existing design provides an equivalent level of protection.

g.Based on HNP-2 status of coeplfance

<<ith NFPA Ho.14 folio<<lng are recoe-aended: a.Recoaeend the evaluation of the folio<<fng para-graphs For feasibility and applicability:

113, 442.b.Evaluate paragraph 721 against procedure PPN 7.4.7.6.4.1 and paragraph 724 against PPH's listed In KFPA coeparlson and Technical Specification 4.7.6.4.B.

c.Paragraph II2 Is not In accordance

<<1th the Code and justify Its equi-valency based on engine-ering analysis and documentation.

e.Paragraph 724-ln-spectIon of hoses I778v 4 a t MASIlIHGTOH PUBLIC PO'4ER SUPPLY SVSTEH NP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG ANO DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/COHPLIANCE Criteria I tete Ho.NP-2 Coaaf ttttent To Cotttpiiance Hfth Fire Protection Criteria Fortaal Oeyfatfonf s)Taken NP-2 Fire Protection Program Istpletaentatlon I NP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recotaaended Optfon(s)For Istproveaent Of NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.I99 Tes, fn coatpifance as described fn FSAR Section 9.5.1, Ffre Protection Systea, Subsections 9.5.l.l and 9.5.1.2.1.

Atttend-aent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation; Sect1on F.2, Fire Hazards Analysts, Sub-section F.2.4.e and the fire hazards ana-lysis for each fire area, Aeendaent Ho.37;it does not address alternative hose stat1ons provision for instances when the fire hazard could block access to a single hose station serving that area.Hot needed Contract Documents 2I5 and 217.Flow Dfagraa Fire Pro-tect1on Systea Drawing Ho.H-5I5.Plant Procedure Hanuals: 7.4.7.6.1.1.4, 7.4.7.6.4, 7.4.7.6.4b, 1.3.35, 7.4.7.6.4.1.

ln cotttpifance with Plant coieai ttttents, Technfcal Speci f fcations 3/4.7.6, 4.7.6.2.a.

as approved by NRC SSER 3.Update the FSAR to reflect plant cotuafttttents.

177av MASIIIHGTOH PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PRUTECTIOH PROGRAII RE-EVALUATION FUNC'TIONAL, L ICEHSIHG AHO DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/COHPLIANCE iffiP-0 Cmi&of TR (ITPRli4IL e ififh Fire PrghCAIBII friigrig FRrw4)OeyigtlnfI) s)TAk off NP=P Fire Prnlectigo Prggr4N iIapl fsacntatign NIP-2 Fire Prntectloff Program Status Recowen4e4 Optlonfs)For laproveeent Of MNP-2 Fire Protectfon Progrm Remarks 2.20I OHA-see Resets Yes, ln caapliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Ccapllance wf th Branch Technical Positfon APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Ccaplfance Evaluation, Position E3(e), Anend-aent Ho.24.Not needed Contract Ooc~nts 215 and 217.Flow Diag'ire Protection System Orawing Ho.I4-515.Tcchnical Specifications 3/4.7.6, 4.1.6.2a.In coeplfance with Plant Cooaf tjaents.ko change Not applicable for plants for whfch.construction per-aits were Issued prior to July 1, 19J6.The guide lines of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 do not specify standpfpe and hose systems fn areas contain-ing equipment re-quired for plant shutdown In the event of a safe shutdown earth-quake to be analyzed for SSE loading to ensure systea pressure integrity.

MNP-2 construction per-mit was Issued in 1913.I 778v NASHIKGTOH PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SZSTEH NP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EZALUATION FUNCTIONAL

~LICEHSIHG AKD OESIGH REgUIREHEHTS/COHPLIANCE Criteria)Item Ho.I I 2.202 2.203 2.204 re Protection Criteria Zes, in cowpiiance as described in PPII 10.29.'I9 NA-see Rewarks DHA-see Reaarks NP-2 Canal toent To Caapliance Nith Fi Foraal Oevlation(s)

Taken Yes, see Plant Tech-nical Speci-f ication 3/4.7.6.NP-2 Fire Protection Prograw lapleaentation PPII 10.29.19 NP-2 Fire Protection Prograw Status ln caspiiance with plant coeml taents.Recanaended Optionts)For Improveaent Of NP-2 Fire Protection P rogue No change, aention in the FSAR.Remarks NP-2 Code in effect is NFPA 196(1972).

There are no fiaa-aable liquids in-cluded in the plant.See Supply Systew response to HRC Position E3tf)in Anendaent No.19 dated October 198l HRC prior to fuel load date of l2/23/83.Foaa or AFFF are not used at NHP-2.50 ft.of l-l/2 inch hose is not utilized at NP-2.1778v MASHIHGTOH PUBLlC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATIOH FUHCT IONAL, L ICEHS ING AIO DESIGN REQJ IREHENTS/CNPL lAHCE~Crigrip'faa Iia.'HP-.2 Cage)blent To Cmpliance QlQ chirp Prptectipp Cri)Pr)a Fareull Pevijtionfy) if@HIIP-?Fire Pralectign Praqras}flspl 9lseII la t!%MHP-2 Fire Prg tertian Prggr9al Sta)qs Recoaaended Dptlonls I Far hspravenent Af IIMP-.g Fire Pratectioq Progr@y llenarks IIgfeF p f)qy 2,1)8.Refer to IIg for ta)tee 2,198, Far discussion of HFPA Ma.11 status and hase statians spacing refer to Item 2.198.Standpipe and hose systems at HNP-2 are intended to be used far Class ill service, Sale as for Itea 2.198, See Item 2.198.2,20II Yes, in ctwplianrp as described in FSAR Section 9.6.1, Fire, Protection System, Subsection 9.5.I.2.1.1, Anendaent Ho.36.Ifat needed Cantract Documents 215 and 217.FIae Diagram Fire Protection Systea Drying Ho.H-515.HMP-2 uses standplpes Ho design change, refer to ln excess of this guide-Iten 2.I98.I lne.For.details refer to Item 2.198.1399A l L' MASNIHGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 F IRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG AND DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/COHPL lANCE MNP-2 Coacaiteent To Compliance Mlth Criteria Fire Protection Item No.Criteria Formal Devlatlonfs)

Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Implementation MNP-2 Fire Protection Pro'gram Status Recaaaended Optionls)For Ieproveeent Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.165 Yes,.in compliance as described ln FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systee, Subsection 9.5.1.2.3, Amendment No.30.Fire condition, sensed by a detector, ener-gizes as zone light on the main panel ln the Control Room.Only detection systees actuating suppression systems have local control panel with these features and local alarm is sounded.Yes.See FSAR Sub-section 9.5.1.2.3, Amendment Ho.30 filed with HRC prior to fuel load, Contract Documents 217, 218 and 02.Electrical Miring Diagram EMD-62E Sheets 000, 001, 002, 003, 004'05, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 027, 028, 029, 030, 031, 032, 036A, 039, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Drawing Nos.f502, E503 Sheet 6, E504, E508.Design Drawing 02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.In compliance

<<1th plant Ho changes, ho~ever, coamltments and meets revise the FSAR to clarify the intent of this plant conaiteents.

criteria.1.HFPA 72A, 720 or 72E do not have this re-quirement.

2.A ne<<ly added local control panel in RB EI.60b has these features for detection.

2.166 Yes, ln compliance as described ln FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsections 9.5.1.2.1.3 and 9.5.1.2.1.4, Amend-ment Ho.30 and 34;<<1th the exception that lt does not address that manual fire alarm stations are used to actuate water flow to the spray nozzles.Hot needed Contract Documents 217 and 218.Electrical Miring Diagram EMD-62E Sheets MO, 001, 002, 003, 004'05, 006, 007, MB, 009, 010, 027, 028, 029 030, 031, 032, 036A, 03$, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Dra>>lng Hos.E502, E503 Sheet 6, E504, E508.Design Drawing 02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.In compliance with plant coaxal taunts.Revise FSAR Section 9.5.1.2.1.4 to indicate that manual fire alarm stations are utilized to actuate water flow to the spray nozzles.4401A MASHIHG'ION PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT ION FUNCTIONAL, L ICEHSIHG AND DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/CUHPL!ANCE Criteria!tern (Io.MNP-2 Comftment To Compliance Mith fire Protection CFI!eric Formal Deviatfon(s}

Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Program lmp!ementatiop MHP-2 Fire ('rotectfon Program Status Reconamnded Optionfs)for Improvement Of MHP-2 Ffre protectiOn program Remarks 2.!67 Yes, In compliance as descrIbed in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsections 9.5.!.I.S jnd 9.5.1.2.1, Amend-ment Ho.36 an)Appen-dix F, FIre protection gvaluatfon', Sectfap F.3, Compliance wfth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsectfan F.3.2y, Complfence EvaluatIon, Posit(on E2(a), Amendment Ho.37.)lot needed F!o>>Diagram Fire Protection System Drawings N-515, II-573 and 11-861.Drawings II-741 ser}es and associated Isometric Prawfngi, prawfng 11-932 (DCP 83-0047;OG}.

Drawing 5749'DCP 83-0047-0H).

Diawfng EMD-62E Sheets 27-32 and 53.Dra>>fng ION-SS2-PE-86-!42!.

Contract Documents 20 0 214, 2150 217, 2231 224 and 231.'PPH's Vol.7 (Survefllance) and Vol.10 (Admini stra t fan).PHR's 02-86-0395 and 02-84-1071.

Hydrostatic Test Report Documents.

AHI letter to D.Evans (MPPS)dated 4/26/82, HFPA 24 was extensively used as guidance for the underground yard main loap design and Instal-latIon.The underground yard main system includ-ing hydrants and acces-sories meet the Intent of HFPA 24.Specific differences are set fourth in the Para-grapIIs be}ow: NFPA-24 a.15-Framed plans of complete system b.3601-Labels for control valves c.5201-Location of hose houses for hydrants d.5501-Identifi-cation of hose houses e.5601-Hose house accessories f.5801-Approved nozzles g.5901-Hydrant use other than fire pro-tection purposes h.6101-Hoses for hydrants Update the FSAR to Clarify the Plant status of compliance

>>Ith HFPA 24 by detailing the'extent of uidance used from HFPA 24 ar the underground yard maIn loop, These clari-ffcations should include engineering evaluation and backup documentation, 1.Hark hose houses per paragraph 550I 2.Revise procedures for hydrants to be used solely for Fire Protection pur-poses per Paragraph 5901 3.Provide depth of cover to be in accordance per Paragraph 9101 4.Recoaeend the evaluation of the folio>>ing para-graphs for feasibility and applicability:

3601, 5201, 5601, 5801, 9301, 9302, 9303, 9601, 9605, 9606, 9901 and 9902 5.List of the following items as not In accord-ance>>Ith the code and)ustify their equivalency, for Paragraphs 15, 6101, 8101, 8301, 98UI, 9802, 9803.I~The existing design pro-vides an equfvalent

!evel of pro tee t Ion.2.Based on Its'eview the HRC found the water supply system to meet the guidelineS of BTP CHES Section C.6.b.This includes the underground yard)oop.440!A.D~

MASHINGTOII PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 FIRE PR01ECT10N PROGRAH RE-EVALUATIOM FUIICTIOHAL, LICENSING AHD DESIGN REQUIREMENTS/COHPL IAHCE Criteria Item No.2.163 MNP-2 Connf tment To Compliance Mlth Fire Protection Criteria Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsection 9.5.1.2,3, Amendment Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire I'rotectfon Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F,3.2, Compliance Evaluatfon, Positfon Kl(c), Amend-ment No.19.Fonaal Devfation(s)

Taken Hot needed Mljp-2 Fire Protection Program Implementation Contract Documents 217, 218 and 02.Electrical Miring Diagram EMO-62E Sheets 000, 001, 002 003, 004, 005'06, 007,$08, 009, 010, 027, 028, 029 030, 031, 032, 0361, 03$, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Drawing Hos.E502, E503 Sheet 6, E504, E508 Design Drawing 02-2)7-0084 Sheets 1-72.MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Status ln compliance with'plant conxf tments.Recoaeended Option(s)For Improvement Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Ho change.Remarks 4401A HhSHIHGTAM PIIBLIr POIJER 50PPLY SYSTEH HHP=2 FIR[PRATVTIW PRKRhH RE-EYAI ahTIAH FIIIHiTIWJII-.s E INH$IHS NII NSIQ RfgIIIR<ICH1$

/NIIPPIhH<E PrHpriy ltiIP.(8: NP:7 Q>>I>>IE>>vII seII Istsl iIIIII (r)E<rfe In~g iiYIl)IIIIi II INIIr'IIII Prl'PI.~I heenlkeent HA, 30;rifts)tIIR'escejt<ari that,'n eIIIIIEIAA tp the Pr/<Fy BA>>er sogply frA>>1 the plentI>>gAApra IAg Q>>terer Hh/Eh]fr h>E)iII HII iHPIIlgr e!PEA llery>>BIKe li eve)elle fran the urgency~rile>>el generator'Ith backup capa-bilities from aC storage batteries>>ith a capacity of t>>o hours;and capability for Nanual connection to the Class lf.EeIergeacy Po>>er Bus>>ithin 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of loss of off-site po>>er end folio>>the applicable guide-lines in Regulatory Guides 1.6,1.32 arId 1.75.Fn reel SSYIelioII 7>hSII I(II WI(I8s Arlhar to fqpl 1gelI, 1IIIB-2 Fire PFAtrg f IAA Prggreel leijlEIAEIIEeEIBII IIPIP geIIIIIInII iiI is gleEtr Ee)WFIg Nellrelll III-%~'"IIINI qadi, aaT, 000, 009, 0'I 0'22~020 029 030 031, 032, 03IIh~035, a<5, Qelrr Peer eAII 550)'rming HA!FI'ra2 kN>~heel<r Hiller<<'~IIP>>)gn IIreIIIAQ III=517=NIIl 5heet>>1=19, HHP-II Fire ProteEtion Prnjra>>I 5EeEgi JsiiIIPIiii'IIEs, IFIAPII'Ni II>>BII 4>>e 9QIIleace for the ProteEtlve IIIgnalling Iry>>tee at QHP-2, The HHP-2 pa>>er supply saurces neet the intent af HFPh-.720, The difference>>

are es-p)eined in the cade eveloetinn with Pere=graph 2Ãa Po>>er Sup*Iie>>fiain Control ow).The system configuration a'Iso eIeets the intent of BTP CHEB 9.5-1.Recense Aggro Option(>>l For Imprave>>Ient af HHP-2 Fire Prgtegtlgn Prngre>>l IIAVI>>e the FSAII ta Elerify the previoo>>iy approved Plant fo>>Iaitssrnt>>.

The noted para-raph>>are included in the owal deviation>>

taken, This clarification should include appropriate Engineer-ing hnelyses and backup dacureentatian, Remark>>440IA j MASHINGTON PUBLIC POkER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 F IRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING AND DESIGN REQUIREHENTS/COMPLIANCE Criteria Item No.MNP-2 Coaoi tment To Compliance Mith Fire Protection Formal Deviation(sl Criteria Taken MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Implementa ti on MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recomaended Option(s)For Improvement Of MIIP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.167 (Cont'd)810I and 8301-Coat-ing and Lining of pipe 9101-Depth of cover k.930I, 9302 and 9303-Protection against damage l.9601-Anchors m.96DS and 9606-Thrust Blocks n.801, 9802 and 9803-Flushing of under-ground mains o.9901 and 9902-'lesting of under-ground mains 4401A NIIII)IIATON POAI-IC PA4R SDPPlY SYSTFII f(HP=g F(N PRATFCTIII PAQQRN III-5VhlNT(OII f(!NTl(IN()L(Q)(5)(l9 h)0 PF$(N NgI))NNH1$

/(NPl:)NXF (lrf terfa ltesl Hg~f()IP-.F CnsgIf Tw n>To CreplfanEe iffth Fire PreteEtfen Crftorfa Oovfatfonis)

Taken f(NP.2 F lre Protection PrograsI (eplelentat(on IIP-2 Fire Protectlan Program Status Rqcfxnaonded Option(s)For leprovement Of NIIP-2 fire Protectlan Prograi Remarks 2.15e Yes, ln compliance as described In FS4R Sec-tion 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsections 9,5,1.2,1 and 9.5.1.2.1.

f, Aaend-Nent No, 35I and appendix F, Fire Protection EValuatfonf section F,3, cownlfance vfih Rranch Techhlcal Pesftfen hPCSO g~5=1<Sp(I<ection F.3.2, Clasp)fgnEe EVlluktfelI, Pe>ftien FF(gl, Ivsen0: lent He gI<fed sag=4)w F.5, CnsIplfgncg uf)h hppendfs.'lI,!tesI T.II, mnmnt flo, F4;wfth the e4ceptfan that ft does IIet address the purpose of post fndfcator valves to isa1ate portfans of the Main for maintenance or repair without shut-ting off the supply to prfaary and back-up fire suppression systeis serving areas that contain or expose safety-rel a ted equi peent.Yes, as noted in noted FSiR subsec-tfon F,3.2 Position P(h), Aaend-oont IIo.24, and Section F,i, ltel 1.5, hmend-ient ffo, 2l, Floe Diagram Ffre Protectfon Meets the intent of Systel Drawings II-SI5, this criteria.11-573, H-741 series and Jsoeetrfc Drawings, Cantract Documents 206, 215, 211 and 224, Revise the FSAR to clarify the Plant approach and coaef teents.~Install a 12 Inch post indf<<cator valve In the 12 inch cast Iron fire aafn line No.12'P (4)-I located on the east end opposite valve No.fp-v-l)P, south of intersect-

.Ing line No.12 FP (8)-I.4401A 0 MASHINGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECT ION PROGRAI4 RE-EVALUATION FUNCT IOIIAL, LICENSING ANO DESIGN REI)UIRENEHTS/CUNPLIAHCE Criteria Item No.MNP-2 Coaei tment To Compliance Mith Fire Protection Criteria Formal Deviation(s)

Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Implementation MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoaeended Option(s)For improvement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.162 Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System Subsection 9.5,1.).3, Amendment No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compli-ance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position El(b), Amendment Ho.37.All signals.to the Control Room are dis-tinctively divided in-to zones which desig-nate the building, floor and cause of alarm.Supervising signals and alanas from sprinkler system actuation and pull boxes from all build-ings except the ware-houses shall sound in the Control Room and-are automatically sent to offsite fire depart-ments.Provision or lack of local audible alarms transmitted by the fire detection system, sounding in the fire area~here a fire is detected is not dis-cussed.Yes.See Supply System FSAR Section 9.5.1, Sub-section 9.5.1.2.3 Amendment No.30 and re-sponse to Subsection F.3.2 Posi-tion El(b)in Amendment No.19 dated October 1981 filed with HRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.Contract Documents 217,218 and 02.Electrical Miring Diagram EMD-62E Sheets 000, 001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 006 007, 008, 009, 010, 027,.028, 029, 030, 031, 032'36A, 039, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Drawing Nos.E502, f503 Sheet 6, E504, E508..Design Drawing 02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.Heets the intent-of the guidelines.

Fire alarms are received in the Con-trol Room.The Control Room operator gives oral instructions over the public address loud-speakers.Ho change in Plant Design, due to the deviation token prior to 12/23/83.Upd4te FSAR to reflect Plant Com-m(talents.

Evaluate the need or feasibility of providing local audible alarms which sound in the area~here a fire may be sensed.4401A~~g HA(lllHATAH PARLIA PANII IIAPPI-Y IIYHPII Nlp-.g PIPE PIIAHPTIAH PIIAAIIN 5-5YIII.AATIAH BHI.:(if&i:.I k)8t6IIII'I (II(A NIIIAH 1!fW IIf%5fS/F.AIAIAHS criler!e)fels N;NHP-2 ca<<Wtsv'.nE Tp caen)i<<nce I()Eh'Fire ProtepEIeII

'FIEefil Ye><io geoere)fMB)<<llpe H IIe>eF heii io ESIII sec ion Il II I Fire Pro efEIRo+sip<<le Suhseetion 9:k.k), bfaeo~>>Ho.i', iog bopeogix F, P1re'f'BEectipn Pv<<18<<tionl section F.P, Pire II<<e<<res Ao<<lysis, bacon<<wnt No le)Section F.4, Caspli=ance with Qranch Technical Pasition Apcss 9.5-I Subsection

(.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Positions El(a.b), Amendment No.19, and El(c,d), Amendment Iio.19;and Section F.4, Compliance with Appendix R, Item F.4.2.f, Amendment Ro.24.Fanp<<I Aevi jEIao(s)$<<Eeo Ye<: IIefer.Ee: HI%letier 1I<<Eeii I'~PAII<<R Ferguson, Subject-.Pire Prate<-tign SIIe buI)it NP=P;@BB)y System let ter-AA>-83=0<>>

dated 7/I/Oj, G 0 8ouchey to h Schwancer, Subject-Re-sponse to Fire Protec-tion Site Audit Con-cerns;Supply System letter G02-83-0981, dated 10/28/83, G C Sorensun to A Schwencer, Subject-Re-sponse to Fire Protec-tion Site Audit Con-cernsl and MNP-2 SSER 4 paragraph 9.5.1.6(1).

IIHP-2 Fire Preleeti!p Prpgr<<<<I II<<pleIReoE<<EIeo c n)F<<ct AoegjpeoEs IIV<<oa P II f lee trip<<l MIFIIIQ<<jr<<sI AiA:QÃsheets III, AAl, IAI, Afl), III, AlA, A2f, NA.Akg.A3A, Q3li 032, 03(vI g9 04(),$41, A12<<nil Ah, Rr<<wing Has.f502 f503 5heet O, 5504, LID, Qes1gn Qrawing 02-217-0004 Sheets I 72, WP-P Pire Protection Progr<<sI 5E<<Eus Io eoI<<B)i<<oee Ivith g)eoE eosRIIE<<Ieols, HPPA:TZf u>s used as guidance io e)ection anII inst<<I=ation of Pire Aetec-tors it ItHP~2i The sys~tei configuration meets the intent ot IIFPA-Bf Qifferences are as noted belowI a)Paragraph 2 5 I 2~Drawing Review by Authority having Jurisdict1on b)Paragraph 2-5.1.3-Drawing Rev1ew by Authority having Jurisdiction c)Paragraph 2-6.5-Detecior Location (4-4.6)d)Paragraph 4-1.2-Detector Location (4-4.6)e)Paragraph 4-3.1-Detector Location f)Paragraph 4-4.5.2-Detector Location j)Paragraph 4-4.6-Detector Location (Deep Pockets)Smoke detectors locat1on was approved by the Auth ity having Juris-di Recommended option(s)For Improvement Af HHP-7 Fire Protection Prollr<<a IIevise The PW to clarify Ehe BreviouS)y

<<Bgroveo covNIIIments to IIFPA=TÃ.The noted cade paragraphs are included in the approved deviatian.

This clarifica-'ion shauld include appro-priate Engineering Analyses and backup cfacumentatlon.

Evaluate Paragraphs 4-3.I and 4-4.6 for feasibility and applicability to NRP-2.Refer to Section 5.0"Fire Detection System IIalkdown Report" of this report for specific recoameoded improvements.

gC<<I<<rlIS Pulseil line heat detectors ere not uti)Ised.4401A MASHlNGTON PUBLlC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 F IRE PROTECT lOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATlOH FUNCTlONAL, LTCEHSING AND DESlGN REI)UlREHEHTS/COHPL lANCE Criteria item No.MNP-2 Cori tment To Compliance Mith Fire Protection Criteria Formal Oeviation(s)

Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Program lmpiementation MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recomuended Option(s)For improvement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.160 (Cont'd)t.3445-Mater Temper-ature supervision u.3446-Fire pump supervisory instru-ments v.3511-Distinctive smoke alana signals w.3541-Smoke alana signals x.3542-Smoke alarm signals y.3544-Supervision of detection circuits 4401A 1)IA5IIIHATQH PAAl IG PQIIEII 5APPlY 5Y5TE)i)IHP-2 F)RE PRQTECT)QH NQAPAH AE-EYAIIIATIAH EIIHCT)AHAB ET@HSIIIQ AIIA APSIGH NAAIIIPKHTSICQHPFIAIIM criEerie tleI0 NA: IIHP-7 Cns)gitieAF Tn Aeglienee)IIEII Eire PrBFef Eign FPI Ferie E8ml IIevieE}8AI0)

IIHP-0 Eire Prntectign Prggrai IIP)else AE0E I 8A)IIIP-P Eire Prgteetign Prggrai$)stus IIef 80)aeniIei)

Ptignfsl Egr.lsgroveient Af IIHP=-P Eire ProFOction Prograi lleiark>>2)59 Vi sing 5tatlen I<qiIEisl Ikpntrq)hoon)Are PaF 0HFetleEical)y re;68rlIeII)Ilt=ll8=Blpys a Bre-.4)ere ie=Fectign%yatels~hIEII nnw)4A 0I>re signe)n FIIe cnntrgl renls Only The (entre)II881 Operator 1>wally 488M>>0 bgi)ein9=Niae 0)ill ovef'110 ubliC aaareSS SyS-eo, An a)ana also can be sent to off-site fire departsents.

g,)24)-Aaily reports Ii,)20)(cl-Aisposition Of the Cause Of a)a@a signal i, RAP)-Aocuent sub nit'tea prior to approval], 2))A Mationa)Electric Code HFPA Ho.70 k, 22I2-Equlpoent approve)I.2221-Power Supply e.2222-Prleary Power Supply n.2223 (a-f)-Second-dary Po~er Supply o.2224-Separate power supply for trouble signals.p.2231-Addi tlona)power supply q.2243-Overcurrent protective devices.r.225)-Rectifier Power Supply s.3444(b)-Hater level 4401A 0 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POkER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAII RE-EVALUATION FUHCTIOHAL, LICEHSIHG AND DESIGN REI}UIRENEJITS/COHPL IANCE Crf teri a Item Ho.MNP-2 Coagritment To Compliance With Fire Protection Criteria Forrnal Oevf atf on(s)Taken MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Implementation

'NP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoanrended Optfon(s)For Improvement Of MNP-2 F1re Protection Program Remarks 2.160 Yes, meets the gufde-lfries as described fn FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsections 9.5.1.2.3 and 9.6.1.3, Amendment No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2 Fire Hazards Analysis, Amendment No.37;Section F.3, Compli-ance<<fth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Sub-section F.3.2, Com-liance Evaluation, ositfons Elta,b), Amendment Ho.37, and El(c,dl, Amendment No.19;and Section F.4, Compliance with with Appendix R, Item F.4.2f, Amend-ment Ho.37;-and the Technical Hemorandum Ho.1227, Rev 3, Amendment Ho.33.The fire detection system complies with Class 8 systems, as defined in NFPA 720, with the following exceptions:

detec-tion circuits that actuate fire sup-pression systems in safety-related areas are Class A.All signals coming 1nto the Central Super-Yes.See Supply System response to HRC Posi-tion El (a)fn Amendment.Ho.19 dated October 1981 filed with HRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.Contract Documents 217, 218 and 02.Electrical Miring Diagram EMD-62E Sheets 000, 001, 002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 027, 028,.029, 030, 031, 032, 036A, 039, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Drawing Hos.E502, E503 Sheet 6, f504, E508.Design Drawing Ho.02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.In compliance with plant commitments.

Ff ru de-tection systems used to actuate autoaatic fire suppression systems in safety related areas are Class A as defined by NFPA-72D, Paragraphs llll, 3541 and and 3542.All other fire degection systems are Class B.NFPA-720 was used as guidance at MHP-2 for Proprietary.Protective Signalfng Systems.The systems configura-tion meets the intent of HFPA-72D.Specific differences are set forth in the Paragraphs below: a.12ll-Recorder does not automatically record signals b.1212-Recording de-vices not provided c.1221-Access to Con-trol Room by author-1zed people d.1222-Control Room staffing e.1223-Control Room operator's function f.1234-Drain list Ko change to Plant Design due to deviation taken prior to 12/23/83, and approved by the HRC.Revise the FSAR to clarify the prevfoulsy approvea com-mftmerits to NFPA-22D, The listed code paragraphs are included in the approved deviations noted in FSAR Appendix F, Technical Ifemo-randum No.1227, Revision Ho.3, Amendment No.33 and and SER 4, Section 9.5.1.6 pages 9-5 and 9-6.This Harlffcatfon should include engineering analysis and backup documentation.

This crf teria Item changed from the original criteria of Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.6-1,~here the require-ments for Class A system were not spelled out.Therefore, MHP-2 fnHuded tirls feature, at the NRC request, only for actuation of automat1c fire suppression sys-tems fn areas~here safety related systems are present.4401A HASNIHGTON PUBLIC POHER SUPPLY SYSTEH NHP-2 F lRE PROTECT lOH PROGRAN RE-EVALUATlOH FUNCTIONAL, 4ICEHSIHG ANO OESlGH REQVIRENKNTS/COHPL!ANCE Kri tprlg lui lie;HNP-.R Cossslt+nt Te ceH8)itin.p arith fire Preteptien PFlhr>I~~~~)urn Preteptlen g>>tei.%8sPStlen>

9.6.1.1.6 en)9.$~1.2.))Ampn+ent Ho.36'ng'hppen4la F)Flrp 8rntectlan

'il!IIIIIIII:

WF$)8R)~mal ioi)~IN llw~)1<<Pn c4)Position APCSa 9.S-I)Suhsec-tion F,3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Positions Ella,b), Amendment Ho.37, and EI(c,d)Amen4-ment Ho.19;an4 Sec-t1on F.4, Compliance

))1th Appendix R, item F.4.2f, Amendment No.37;and the Technical Nemorandum Ho.1227 Rev 3, Amendment Ho.33.Fee>)Aevl4tienls)

)<vere)crees Nre net previded arith>>svlte 4e'teeters)

Av litter 4<te4 Pnlv 1, i9))(ll)P-.2 veri fice tlen that thp ventilgtlen systeH)ls 4qsleneg tg f>cilitate movement of smoke toward the detec-tors thus eliminating the HRC Staff con-cern about smoke strati-fication and and detector response.HRC found this accept-able and granted a deviat1on.

Refer to HRC SSER 4, pages 9-5 and 9-6.HHP-.2 Fire Preteetien ProqreIR 1118)ia)entiitlen c otrect Aepwnent>>)117 end 7 I).5)eetrlce Hiring A ejrei fltA:Qf Sheets AAA, AAI, AA2)QA3)AA4)AAs, AAf), AAT, Aoa, AA9, AIA, N7, 02a, 029, O30 031)032, 03)A 039 A41,'42 4n4 O4'ireuing W>>ESA2~IN'hect 0, 1Ieslan Arewi n~N=4ll=AAN sheets 1-)8, ocp 02-a6-ooaa oA, PPI4's Vol, 7 lhurveilla)ce) an4 Vol.IO{IIalntenance).

HHP-2 fire Protection Proqrsi 5HtEli ceiplies with Plant Qse)i tsv)nts, fleets the intent of the criteria, Existing deviations

>>)ere evaluated and faund acceptable by the HRC, Reco)unended Option(s)for ls)proveient Af RHP-.R fire Protection Program Revise the FsAR to reflect the HHP-2 previously approved conaitments.

The existing de-$19n provides an equivalent level of protection.

44OIA MASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUHCTIOHAL, LICEHSIHG AHO OESIGN REQUIREHENTS/COIIPLIANCE Criteria Item No~I MHP-2 Coaei tment To Compliance Hith Fire Protection Criteria Forma I Oeviation(s)

Taken MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Iwplementation MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoaeended Option(s)For Improvement Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Program 2.156 Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position 05(b), Amend-me'nt Ho, 37, Not needed PPI$1.3.36 In compliance with Plant Coaxai tments.Ho design change.Update FSAR.2.157 2.158 Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position OS(c), Amend-ment Ho.19.Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Posit$on APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position 05(d), Amend-ment Ho.19.Hot needed Contract Oocument 228, Hot needed Contract Document 228.In compliance with Plant Coaeltments.

ln compliance with Plant coaeitments.

Ho design change.Update FSAR.Ho design change.Update FSAR.4401A~~r 1 HASH)HOTAH PAIH-)C PA'I$R SN'PLY STSTEN KHP-2 F)RC PRAlgCT$0H PROMO RC-EVALllATlAH F'gHCT)QHA4e VISHNU)HQ NO NS)QH RNQ)RCTICHTS/CAfIPL.)AH@(rlterio)TON Hg.KHP-2 Postal talent Ta 6aip)lance K10 Fire Prate<lien Critgrla Formol OeviotianfS)

Token KHP=2 Fire Protection PragrotI lpplesentotion HHP-.2 Fire Pratection Program Status Recostaended Option(<)For liproveient Of NHP-2 Fire Pratectlon Prograi P,)00 YeS, in coa plianCe OS described ln FsAR Appendix F.Fire i'rotectian Evaluation; Sectian F.3, Compliance with Rronch Technical Positian APCSS B,S-), Subsection F.3.g, Comp)lance Evaluation, Position AS(a)Send=ment Hg, lg;wITh the exception that east fixed emergency lighting consist of self-cantoined light-ing units with 2-2SH, SV, sealed beam lights ond a 20 A-H battery supply, provided in critical areas.The batteries will last 2-3 hours.ln addi-tion, emergency light-ing connected to the A.C.emergency buses<<hich are supplied by the diesel generators is installed.

This lighting will last in-definitely, therefore, the plant is essen-tially in compliance.

Fixed emergency light-ing in the Hain Control ROOm, Remate Shutdawn Room, and interconnect-1ng access corridor con-sists of B-hour battery units in accordance with the requirements of lOCFRSO Appendix R.See Yes,$ee Supply Sys-teia respanse to HRC pasl-tion OSTo)Amendment Ha, 19 doted October lgll filed with HRC prior to fuel load dote of 12/23/03.Cantract Qocuments 2ll ond 220, ln campllance with Plant coetsi tments.Ho change due to deviation taken prior to 12/23/83.Revise the FSAR to clarify the Plant coaxaitments and acceptable deviations.

A DCP is being worked to provide Emergency Lighting in the Alternate Shutdown Room as part of the re-vised Shutdown Procedure.

440 lb MA'SlilHGTOH PUBL lC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEN MHP-2 F lRE PROTECT lOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATlOH FUHCTlOilAL, LlCENSlNG AND OESlGH REI)UlRENEHTS/COKPLlAHCE Criteria item No.NNP-2 Commitment To Compliance Mi th Fire Protection Criteria Formal Deviation(s)

Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Program implementation MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoaeonded Optionls)For improvement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.154.Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Amendment No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation:

Section F.3, Compli-ance~1th Branch Tech-nical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Positions 0.5.a, D.5.c and 0.5.d Amendment No.19 and D.5.b, Amendment No.36;and Section F.4, Compliance arith Appendix R, item F.4.2, Amendment Ho.19.Hot needed Contract Documents 218 and 228.ln compliance

~1 th P I ant Ceaai tments.No design change.Revise the FSAR to clarify Plant Ceauit-mentse a40)A L NASIIINATQW PHRLIC PAgR S'@PLY SYSTKH NNP-g Flg PNQTgC'T)DH PRPGRAH RC-gYA!NATIAN f<K>l@W I=Ininllm he ir>i'@III>OINT><ree<len frilcri4 tlcm Ne, 0-1SR NIB-0 CeFei EIPPIII'tn$8@litIRFP N fh fire I relnlisII Cri)qr)l Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2 Fire'aaards hna4sis, Fire Areas: RC-IY, RC Vl RC-VII RC-VIlI and RC-xl Amendment ko.34, fRWl OCVI4li OR(S)Talion Not needed OP=I fire Prgle@isiI Prggrw lIspleIHIAIROon Air Handling Specification Contract No.57.rREccl QA Prngraai SLOI4i In compliance vi th Plant Cori tments II,'l:5N'I~

NHP=2 Fire Protection Prosraa No design change.Clarify the FSAR to reflect Plant Coseitments.

Rewards locate or re-create the Combustible load Calculations for these fire areas.2,IS3 Yes, in compliance as.described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluationi Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Areas: RC-IV, RC-VI, RC-Vll RC-Vill and RC-XI, Amendment Ho.34.Hot needed Air Flow Diagram Orauing Hos H 548)H 54S~H S49)H-SS1.In compliance ui th Plant easel tments.Ho design cliange.Clarify Refer to Item the FSAR to reflect Plant 2.152.coaaai tments.440IA HASHlHGTOH PUBL lC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 F lRE PROTECT l0il PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT10H FUNCTlONAL, LICEHSIHG AHU OESlGH RE0UlREHENTS/COHPLIANCE Criteria item Wo.MHP-2 Commitment To Compliance Nith Fire Protection Criteria Forma I NNP-2 Fire Devi atlantes))Protection Program Taken implementation KNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoaeended Optionls)For improvement Of HHP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.150 2.151 Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Section 6.5.1, Engine-ered Safety Features Filtration Systems;and Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Sub-section 9.5.1.1.2, Amendment Ho.36.Redundant fans are provided for each standby gas treatment system to remove decay heat which is an acceptable substitute for a1r bleed system.Yes, in coapliance.as described in FSAR Section 9.5.I, Fire Protection System, Subsection 9.5.1.1.2, Amendment Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazard Analysis, Fire area: RC-Xl, RC-Xll and R-l, Eleva-tion 5?2'-0", Amendment Ho.34.Not needed.Hot needed Air Flou Diagram Drawing Ho.8-544.Ai r Cleaning Speci f ication Contract No.18.Air Flou Diagram Drawing No.H-544.ln compliance with Plant Coeai tments.ln compliance ui th Plant Coaei tments.No design change, however, update the FSAR.Ho design change.Update locate or re-create and revise the FSAR to the Combustible reflect Plant Costi tments.Load Calculations for these areas.440'IA HANIHQOH PHIII-IC PACR SNPPlT 5T5TN I/HP=2 fIRC PROTECTION PRQNN RP-fVAlNATIOH f Qg IOI'IN f lICfH5IIS AHO OPSIS IIIOIllglCHT5/COIIPWAHN Krf Ierf e It>i HQ: si.NIIP-2 Cnsgf tsv'nt Tn FBipli4@p HI)h ffrp iigtpHIBA Orfterfg fgrml PeVfgtfgnfS)

Token HHP=P ffrp Prgteftlgn Prngrsi IIspleseptetfgn NHP-2 Pire Prgtgctfgn Pregrew 5titui Recommended Optfgnfil fgr INprgveient Of HHP-2 fire Protegtfon Prograi Reiirk s Pevfatian as<etcrfbed in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Pratqctian Eval-ujtfan;Sectfgn F.4.cgs.plfance with granth~~~echnfc41 PQSftfQQ PA'5 0 5-1, 5gh<pB-" tfBQ f..k 7, CQRPlf=erf p 4s luatf Bn, Patf-.tfan 04(f), Amenosent Ho, 18.Ho smoke cantrol systei fs in-stalled, 2,148 ONA-see Remarks Yes, See Sup;Nat implemented, due to ln compliance arith ply System deviation taten and approval'lant Coooitments.

respanse to hy the NNC, HRC Position Alff I in Amen4mgnt NQ, 10, 1st>f R tahpr 9 I filed ufth HIH,'iar to fuel aad date of 12/23/8).No design change however, update and clarity the FSAR to clearly reflect Plant CoeNftments.

Total Flooding Nalon System is not used at MNP-2.2.l49 Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Section 9.4, Neating Ventilating and Ai r Conditioning, Amend-ment No.9;and Sec-tion 9.5.l, Fire Pro-tection System Sub-section 9.5.l.k.l, Amendment No.35.Not needed Air Cleaning Speci fication Contract No.IB.ln compliance with Plant Cocci tments.No design change 4401A HASHINGTOH PUBLIC PONER SUPPLY SYSTEH NNP-2 F IRE PROTECT ION PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT ION FUHCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG ANU DESIGN REOUIREHEHTS/CUHPLIAHCE Criteria Item No.NNP-2 Coaek tment To Compliance Ni th Fir<<Protection Criteria Formal Deviation(s)

Taken NHP-2 Fire Protection Program Implementa tion HNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status R~roaaaended Option(s)For Improvement Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.144 2.145 2.146 Deviation as described In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Eval-uation;Section F.3, Coayliance wIth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Compli-ance Evaluation, Posf-tion 04(c),-Amendment No.19.Yes, in compliance as described In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Posftfon APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position 04(d), Amend-ment Ho.19.Yes, In compliance as described In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position 04(e)~Amend-ment Ho.19.Yes.See S pply System re-sponse to HRC Position D4(c)in Amendment No.19 filed with HRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.Not needed Hot needed Implemented to the extent possible and practical.

Air Cleaning Speck f ication Contract No.18.Fire Protection System Flow Diagram Drawing No.H-515.AIr Flow Diagram Drawing No.H-548.Physical Layout Drawings H-788,-805,-809,-810,-820,-823,-825,-826,-828.In compliance with Plant Coaaaitments.

ln compliance with Plant Coaeitments.

In compliance wfth Plant Crxaaktments.

No change, due to deviation taken prior to 12/23/83, ho~ever describe and clarify In the FSAR.Ho desIgn change, however update the FSAR to clarity the Plant Coaaaitements.

tfo change.

NASllINGTOH PUSLIG POUER SUPPLY SYSTEH NHP-2 F IRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUHCTIOHAL, LICENSING ANO OESIGH REQUIREHENTS/COHPLIANCE cFi teria lia.HHP-?Cosiaitment To cosiolience Nith Fire Protection ErileF!g F'oroiai Pevietionfs)

T4kgn llNP-?Fire PrntectiOn Prggraei)iisbeonlehign HHP-2 Fire Protection Prograi.Be@s Recoariiende4 Optionisl For Isiprovement Of NHP-?Fire Protection Progrei Re1IAS~S Vu iri.lf Fnrnliiirr Ri IFIIF Fllnll iIRIFRI R.G...2>'9'.$.).).), 9'<:~>.)9'9j 9.5..1.$qnII.s.).F.g, e snow<e Ph'n4 Apped>>5 Irp I rn)pgtibn Ivlln(innj kAFWRR Analysis each Fire Iatards lnalysis{FIIA)area, Amendmunt No.37;and Section F.3, Compliance uitb Srarrch Technical Position APCSS 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Compli-ance Evaluation, Posi-tion 04(al, Amend-ment No.I9.Separate rate smoke and heat vents are not provided in the areas uhere potential exists for heavy smoke conditions as called for in HFPA Standard 204 refer-enced in the criteria.s>keg Hgp)y Syl-KP!S rn 8nSP in nrtnniIIF Firn in<i: Rrr IRI filed vri th 8K prior lg foe)in<4 4ite of 12/23/g3, I r[1 III III narin (rnnini ll RII,'l-:IPI',>-:I'onlracts:?fA, g,)O;Af flh=li)5N enF res Bengal:)IFPA h Hog ashen=Ynli IIRRII RR fnllln=HNP-2 venal lotion Sir Steer IR Plant Technical gpeci ficetignS COVer the Ionitoring of r441o.active ssioko an4 gasseSR l..lIO (eSign Change 4ge to 4evletion Bken prior lo lk/g)NP, 8evise en4 Hp.4ete the FSN to ref)eel tho Plant costiiitsuints 4n4 previously approved 4e-viatlons g, Oeleto tho coseiitsiont to cooipliance arith HFPh 204.Soe Remark 1, 3.Evaluate HNP-2 compliance uith HFPA 91 arid 101 See Remark 2.li NPA=FO4 gui4.ince for Ssioke control address Fires not fol'his plant.lhe Stinko COntrol ob]ectives ot HFPh-204 aro fulfilled through tho adoption of the relevant guide-lines of NFPA 90A and BTP CHES 9.5 I, Item C.b.f.2.NFPA 91 and NFPA 101 were nut part of the scope of this.report.440 I A MASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POKER SUPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 F IRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATlOH FUNCTIOWALo LlCEHSIHG ANO OESIGN REQJIREHENTSICNIPLIANCE Criteria item Ho.eviatfon s Cri ter fa Taken MNP-2 Coeaf tment To Compl lance Mf th Formal Fire Protection I O l)MNP-2 Fire Protection Program lmplementatfon MHP-2 Fire Protectfon Program Status Recoaxaended Option(s)For improvement Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Program C Remarks 2.207 OHA-See Remarks.Standpfpes greater than 3 inches In size are utilized at MNP-2.2.208 Yes, fn compliance

<FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.7, Amendnent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Pro-tectfon Evaluation; Section F.3, Compliance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position El, Amend-ment Ho.37.Does not address disarmament of automatic Halon extin-guishing systems nor adafnfstrative controls as described 3n BTP CHEB Posf tion=C.2.c.

Not needed Contract Oocument 02.Orawings EMO 62E Sheets 1-10.Plant Procedures:

Administrative

-Volua>>1, Surveillance

-Volume 7, and Alarm Response-Vofua>>4, as required.Hafntenance Voluae 10.29.15.Speci ficatfon HIL+-1221BB.

PPH 1.3.35.ln compliance wfth Plant cosmic taents.The Halon systems for the Hain Control Room PGCC Control Cabinets meet the requfrea>>nts of NFPA 12A.For inspection and maintenance of these systems the guidance of HFPA 12A was used extensively.

Specific differences are set forth below.a.Paragraph 17'15-Check weight of refillable containers.

b.Paragraph 1717-weight and pressure recorded on tag.PPH 1.3.35 describes the admfnistrative controls to be present when impairment of Halon System fs required.Update the FSAR to clarf fy the compl lance, previously approved coexi tments and explain that MHP-2 means of addressing Paragraphs 17I5 and 1717 criteria represents a practical approach to-speciffc plant conditions.

The Halon systems for the Hain Guardhouse and Building 85 did not cons tf tute part of this review.4399A MASHIHGTOH PUBLIC PO'MER SUPPLY SYSTEN MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAN RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG ANO DESIGN REOUIREMENTS/CSIPL IAHCE Criteria Item Ha.MHP-2 Cmnef tment To Cmsplianco Mlth Fire Pratectlan Crlteifa Formal Qoviatfanfs)

Taken MHP-.2 Ffre Protection Pragram lmpl omen to t I an MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recaasaen dad Optionfs)For Improvement Of MHP-2 Firo Protection Program Remarks Yos, ln compliance as doscrfbed in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Pro~taction Evaluation.

Qctian F.), Cfsspl 4nce wfpi Rragch Tochnfpa)8gsfffgn AK@g$-.l, h>Man..5<Cfssgl gnse EYAINIItfgR Pp>lt gn f4~4wd=entifg Pli Nf@th<g<<estfgn that harlan cyl Ii@r.f1l).'Verff1=

got pn fs parforsed every sfx months fn lieu of 3 sniiths or guar terly e Yes, See Supply Sys tem respanso ta HRC Pasf-tlan E4'n Amen4pent Hg.19 Quod October 1glflt filed w)h HRC r gr tg fgol aed Ate gf 7/8/N, Plant Procedures Surveil-lance Volume Ho.7.PPN Voluam 4 1Alarm Response 1, In compliance with Plant Same as for Item 2.208.Cammf tments, NFPA-I2A, Paragraph 17IO which re-quires inspection and testing at least annual-ly, and meets the intent of ifsfntenance and Testing of tho guldelfnes and HFPA 12A require-ments, Specific differences are sot farth below: a.Paragraph 17I5-check weight of refillable containers.

b.Paragraph 1717-weight and pressure recorded on tag.Melghfng of 60 agent cantafners is impracti-cal.Lfquid level is measured.This is an equivalent method af measurement.

4399A HASHINGTOH PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH HNP-2 F IRE PROTECTION PROGRAN RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSIKG ANO DESIGH REQJIRDIEHTS/CNPLIAHCE Criteria Item Ho.HNP-2 Canal tment To Compliance

'Ni th Fire Protection Crfteria Formal Deviation(s

)Taken HNP-2 Fire Protection Program Impl ementa tf on HHP-2 Fire Pro tee t f on Program Status Recoimaended Option(s)For Improvement Of HHP-2 Fire Protectfon Program Remarks 2.2IO 2.211 and 2.212 Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsection 9.5.1.2.1.7, Amendaent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Ffre Pro-tection Evaluation; Section F.3, Caapli-ance arith Branch Technfcal Position APCSB 9.5-1, Siib-section F.3.2, Complfance Evaluation, Position E4, (koend-ment Ko.37.See Remarks Hot needed Contract Oocus>>nt 02.Drawings EHO 62E Sheets 1-10.Plant Procedure Nanuais: Volua>>1 (Admfnfstratfve)

Volume 4 (Alarm Response)Volua>>7 (Surveillance)..

PPH 10-29-I5 and Haintenance Vol.10, Paragraph 10.29.15.Speci f I ca t ion IIIL+-122188.

In compl fance srfth Plant Cooef tments.This was done by GE.Saa>>as Item 2.208.C02 suppression systems are not installed fn areas containing safety-related equipment.

Therefore, an evaluation Mas not per formed.Hot par t o f the scope of this Report.4399A MASHIHGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION FUNCl'IONAL, LICEHS ING ANO DES IGH REJIG!REHEHTS/CNPL IANCE Criter(a Item Has MNP-2 Cotmf tment To Compliance Mfth F(re Protection Cri teria Formal Oeyia t(on(s)awaken MHP-2 Fire Protection Program lip)caen ta t(on MHP-2 Fire Pro tee t I on Program'tatus Recox>>Iended Option(il For Improvement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.213 Yes, in co>>pl lance as described fn FSAR Sec)fan 9.5.1.Fire Pfqtectfoq System, Subsect(aIis 9.5.1;I.)9.5.1.1.5, 9.5.).2.).k, 9.5.1.3 an4'feb)i 9.5-5, Ameqdment Hq, 36;anff Appendix F, F(re Protect(pn Eya)-uat(aq;Seclfaq F;2 Fire ifazards hqa)yj)s-.each fire area, AyeqIkxeqt Ho.37;aqd Sectioq F.3, Compli-ance with Branch Tech nical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation Position E6, AmenIkxent;Jo, 19.I Ho)needed Contract Ha.211 PEff, 2.8.9.ln compliance with Plant Ceaaftments.'pproved by the HRC Staff fn the or)-g(nal SER.A walkdown (IIdicates that the intent af NFPA 10 for proVfsion (IBd installation of pprtabie extiqguisherS appears to have been met, A so selection af dry chemfcal extfnguishers appears to be in accor-dance with HFPA IO.(See Remarks)Specific differences are set forth belo~;'IFPA 10 Paragraph 1-4.8-Instal-lation of extfngufshers above 5'0'rom fl oor Paragraph 1-4.9-Opera-tion of extinguisher Revise and consalfdate the FSAR to clarify the degree of coxuI(tment and compliance with NFP(t IO.Based on dif-ferences fouqd in camparisoq of MHP.-2 against NFPA IO Code Gufdelfnes the fII))aw(qg 4re FecaImIIended;

')Veri fy installation height of portable extin-gufshers against Para-graph 1-4.8.2)Obtafn instruction manuals of fire extingufshers used at MNP-2 as required by Paragraph 1-4.12.3)Explain haw selection of extfngufshers for specific hazards a>>ets the intent of Paragraphs 2-1, 2-2.1, 2-2.1.1 and 2-2.1.3, and ANI approval of their selection.

MHP-.2 dfd not corn: mft (o do iqspec'-" t(all, mafntgqanc(I anI(testing af pqFQb)e ext(qgu(=stIer%in acqardaqqg w((II IIFPA I(), anIj tfleryfare Chapters 4qd 5 da fla't apply and were nat eva)uated, Paragraph 1-4.12-in-struction manual Paragraph 2-1-Selection of extfngufshers Paragraphs 2-2.1, 2-2.1.1 and 2-2.1.3-Selectfon of extinguishers per hazards Paragraphs 3-1.1, 3-1.2, 3-1.2.1, 3-1.2.2, 3-1.2.3, 3-1.2.4 and 3-1.3-Distribution of Extingufshers 4)Evaluate for feasibility and applicability the following paragraphs:

1-4.9, 3-1.1, 3-1.2, 3-1.2.1, 3-1.2.2, 3-1.2.3, 3-1.2.4, 3-1.3, 3-2.1, 3-2.2, 3-2.3, 3-2.4, 3-2.5, and 3-6.4399A J MASHIKGTOH PUBLIC POKER SUPPLY SZSTfli MNP-2 F IRE PROTECT IOH PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION FINCTIONAL, L ICEHS IHG ANO OES IGH REQJIREHEHTS/CNPL IANCE Criteria)Itea Ho.l I MNP-2 Cocaf taent To Cmp)lance Kith Fire Protection Crfterfa Foraa)Oevfatfon(s)

Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Imp)eaenta tfon MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoaaended Option(s)For Improveaent Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reearks 2.211 through 2.216 2.217 through 2.223 Zes, fn coap)fance as described fn FSAR Section 9.5.1, fire Protection Systea, Subsections 9.5.1.1.1.3.1 and 9.5.1.2.5 heendaent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evalua-tion;Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Areas: R-I through R-XV, R-XVIII through R-XIX and R-XXI, Aaendaent No.37;Sec-tion F.3, Coap)lance with Branch 1'echnfcal Position APCSB 9.S-l, Subsectfon F.3.2, Coe-lfance Evaluation, osftfon F l(a), Amendaent Ho.24.OHA-See Reaarks Clarification:

For Crfterfa Itea 2.221, GOC 56 applies only to Prfaary Contafn-aent, therefore', the entire Criteria per-tains only to Prfaary Contafnxent.

See Reaarks.Hot needed Fire Protection Prograa;FSAR Section 9.5.1 and Appendix F.including the Fire Iiazards Analysis (FKA), as applicable.

ln cowp)lance with Plant Coeaf baen ts.No change, however, revise Ourfng norwa)and consol fdate the FSAR and operation MHP-2 FHA to dearly reflect plant Prfaary Contafn-coaai bien ts.sent is fnerted.Locate or re-create the coebustfb)e load calculations for these fire areas.Prfaary contafn-aent fs fnerted during noraal operation as descrfbed fn FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Eval-uation;Section F.3, Coapl lance wf th Branch Tech-nical Pos I tI on APCSB 9.5-1, Sub-section F.3.2, Compliance Eval-uatfon, Position Fl (a), Axendsent Ho.24.4399A MAsIIIHGTQN PUQLIc FQMER sUPPLY sTsTEII NNP-2 FIRE PR01ECTION PROQRAN RE-EVALUATION FUNCT(QIiRI-, 1((:(HSING AIR)(IKSIQI RENIRPI[HTS(CNPLIAHCE C<<imp<>}EN Na: F,SrmI>>)@v(>>ilBA fl).Ikey NP=F F(rg PFBtnc((I)A 0<<B9FR feplemHtl8n NNP-P F(rp ('rBIPBtlBII Prnqr>>e)Htw Re<<oeeended Qgtlnn(s I Fnr.ingrnvenent (0 NHp.g fire PFBtg6tlBA Fro9FM Ylis'ln fnNA)I>>AH i5 doser(bed ln F(N-Sest(on 9,5.l, F(F9 Protection Systoa, SubSectlons 9,5,1,1,1,3,1 an4 9.5.1.2.5, heen4ent No, 351 and Appen4ia F, Fire Protection Eve)Bat(on; hect(on F;0 F(re Hazards Rna)fs(%;Fire iro>>SI R-f fhWgh R-n R=Y5(ll through)=5)N and R-.Ql, henI)aont No, 3);and Section F,3, Ctepl(ance ulth Rranch Technical Position APCSS 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2,'oepl lance Evaluation, Positions Fl(a)and F I (b), haendeent No.2i.Fire protest(on prograNI FSN Sertion 9,5,1 an4 Appendix F, including the Fire Iiaaards Analysis (FNA)as applicable, ln Soap)lance w(th Plant No change~ho>ever, revise Ipprovedby the Coesslgaents, Refer to an4 consolidate the FSAR and NRC In the SER.2il33-2,li), FIIA to clearly reflect Plant Refer to Itee Coca ibsen ts.2.21 i.43994 MASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEll MHP-2 F IRE PROTECT IOH PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG ANO DES IGH RE/)IRMHTS/CCHPL IAHCE Criteria I tea No.MNP-2'Coaai taent To Cuapl i ance Mi th Fire Protection Criteria Foraal Deviation(s)~Taken MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograw Topi caen ta t ion MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoeaen ded Optionls)For Iwprovement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.225 Yes, in coapliance as Not needed described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsections 9.5.1.1.1.3.1 and 9.5.1.2.5, Awendeent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Areas: R-I through R-XV, R-VXIII through R-XIX and R-XXI, haendaent No.37;and Section F.3, Cmpliance with Branch Technical Position APCSS 9,5-1, Subsection F.3.i;.Coepliance Evalu'ation; Position Fl(b), haend-~ent No.3T.Saw as for Item 2.21i and ln coapl lance with Plant Procedure iianuai (PPH)Plant Coral taents.-1.3.35 Sasm as for Itew 2.2Ii Saae as for I tea 2.22'.1399A HASIIlHGTON PMQI.lC PMR SQPPLY SVSTfli HHP-2 FlRF PRQTECTlQH PRQQRHI Rf RVAIOATIQN FQHCTIOHAI,~

LICHENS IHQ AHQ QHlQH RFQJIRPINTS/CCIIPllhHN CFitorie ltd Noi NP-.Z Caei teent To Ciep)lance HI@f)fe Protectlqq CF/ter)a Forrnal Qeviatlonts)

TQen HHP-.Z Fire Protection Prograa lgpleaHvlla tlon HNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Roc~dad Option(s)For lnproveaent Of HHP-2 Fire Protection Progroa RelaAS Z,ZZ6 Yes, ln coapllance as described In FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systee<Subsections 9.5.1.1.1.3.1 and 9.5.1.2.5, 4een4aent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection

" Evaluation; Section F.Z, Flri Itaiards Analysis, Fire Areqsl R-1 through R-XV, p-)Xiii thr'ough R-XTX and R-XXl, AeendeeQt Ho.37;and Siction F.3, Coepllance*utth Branch Technical Position AFCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coapllance Evaluation; Position Fl(b);Anent-antt No.37.Not needed Saw as for ltea 2.225.Ho w ltten docuaentation available.

Verbal confiraation by MHP-2 engineers Sam as for ltea 2.211.Also a plant procedure should be Initiated to designate location and assure aalntenance of sell-contained breathing apparatus.

Sam as for 1 tea 2.22a.4399A MASHlHGTON PUBLlC POMER SUPPLY SVSTEff NP-2 FlRE PRU1ECTlOH PROGRAM RE-EVALUATlOH FUMCT IOHAL~L lCEHS IHG AXO OES lGM REQJ lROIEHTS/CfifPL)ANCE Crf ter fa ltea No.I MNP-2 Coaxf taent I To C~pl lance Mith I Foraal Fire Protection

)Oevfationfs)

Crf ter fa I Taken I NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa lap)caen ta t f on MXP-2 Fire Pro tee ti on Prograa Status Recoaaended Optionfs)For laproveaent Of MXP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.227 Yes, fn coaplfance as.described fn FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea, Subsections 9.5.1.1.2, 9.5.1.1.3, 9.5.1.2.1.7, and Table 9.5-5, Aaendaent No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Eval uation;Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Area RC4, Aaend-aent Ho.37;Section, F.3, Coapliance with Branch Technical Posi-tion APCSB 9.5-1, Sub-section F.3.2, Coapli-ance Evaluation, Posit-ionss 04 and F2, Aaendaent No.19, and 03(j)and E4, Aaend-aent No.37;with the exception that peri-pheral areas of the Control Rom proper are separated by partitions that are not fire rated.Yes.By letter of 7/l/83, WP" 2 coaaiited to install an autoaatic sprinkler systea in these peri-pheral areas.NRC SSER-4 pages 9-7 and 9-8 finds this acceptable.

Orf gfnal SER page 9-35.FSAR Section 9.5.1 and Appendix F.FHA: RC-X for further details refer to criteria lteas: 2.142, 2.160, 2.166, 2.193, 2.208, 2.213.1.Tn coapl lance with Plant Coaaf taents.2.Barriers that define the rooa were not evaluated for faple-aentation as they are not part of the scope of this report.See Reaarks.Peripheral rooas are of non-coxbustfble constuc-tion, but without fire resistance rating.'This was approved by NRC in the SER and SSER's.No sake daa-pers are provided.Carbon dioxide flood-ing is not used for the Control Rooa.llalon fs used only for PGCC systea protection.

For status of coaplf-ance with specific fire protection provisions for the control rooa refer to lteas: 2.142, 2.160, 2.I93, 2.208, 2.213.1.Ho desfgn change due to deviations taken prior to 12/23/83.2.However, revise, update and clarify the FSAR to clearly describe the Plant coaaf taents and approved deviations, including fire door daapers and fraaes, etc.Building desfgn features are not part of the scope of this report.Locate or re-create the Coa-bustible Load Calculations for this fire area.4399A MASNIHGTOH PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 F IRE PR01ECTIOH PROGRAM RE-EYALUATIOH FUNCTIONAL, LlCEHSIHG ANQ QESIGH REqUIRflfEHTS/CNPL!AHCE Criter fa ltee Ho, MHP-2 Cceei tlent To Caipliance Mith Fire Protection Criteria Foraal Qevfationfs)

Taken MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Iapiencnta tfon MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoeaendod Optianis 1 For Inpraveacnt Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2,228 through 2.230 Yes, in coaplfance as described in FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systel,=-Subsection 9.5.1.2,1.8 and Table 9,5-5, haend-aent No.3O;and Appendix F, Fire Pratertion Kvaluatfonf Sectfon F~2, Fire Nacardl AnalySIS Are Area R¹N, beni liuent No, 37I and Sec-tion F,), Cmplfance with Qranch Technical Posftfan APCS8 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coup)lance Evaluation, Position F2, Aaend-mnt No.37.Yes, Technical Speci ff-catfons 3/4.7.6 and 4.7.6.4b.AHI Approvals Praperty File Ho.N.219 f lg79), Original SER pale$-35, SSER 4e Sam as ltel 2.227.ln coaplfance with Plant Coaaf taunts.For details refer to criterfa Itens 2 160~2 166~2 193~2.198, 2.208, 2.213.No design change.Clarf fy the FSAR and FHA.Refer to Itea 2.227.2.231 Yes, in coaplfance as described fn FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Area RC-X, haend-acnt No.37I and Sec-tion F.3, Cmplfance wfth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1,.Subiectfon F.3.2.Coepl fance Evaluation, Posf tfon F2, Ajmend-ecnt ko.37.Not needed FSAR Appendix F Section F.2 and F.3.For further details~refer to criterfa Itees: 2.159, 2.160 and 2.I61.ln coaplfancc with Plant.Coaaftaents.

For further details refer to Iteas 2.159, 2.I60 and 2.161.ko desfgn change, however, clarify the FSAR and FHA.Refer to Itea 2.227.4399A MASHlNGTON PUBLlC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 FIRE PROTECT lOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATlOH FUNCTlOHAL, LlCENSlHG AND OESlGH REI)UIREHEHTS/COHPLlANCE I I Criteria l tea No.'kNP-2 Coaal teent To Coapl lance Ml th f Foraal Fire l'rotectlon i Oeviatlon{s)

Crl ter I~Taken MN'-2 Fire Protection Prograa lapleaentation kHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recaaaended Option(s)For laproveaent Of kHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa 2.24l ONA-see Reaarks Foaa or AFFF are not used at kHP ln safety re-lated areas.4402A NASIIINGTON PUBLIC POllER SUPPLV SVSTEH NNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGIUUI RE<<EVALUATION FUNCTIOtlhL, LICENSIIIG AND DESIGN REQUIREif NTS/COHPLIANCE Cyl ter(a)tea Ng;1INP-2 Coaaftaent To Caapliance Nith'ffyg lrokpctfgn Crftprfi YRl, in cpaB)fancfj gy tian F.3,2, Caoplianco fvaluatfan, Positfon F3(a), Aaendaent No.19;vlth the excep-t tions that there are saee tray crossover~ad support obstruc-tlons vhlch haaper but do not preclude~ccess~one hose station ls installed fxeedtately outside the rooa and line detectors are not provided.Foraal OeviatlonIS)

TyLin IIee RIP(lV vital (V@n4enl fig-.)I), dated October lgBI filed vith NRC prlar to fuel load date af 12/23/83, Not required by BTP APCSB.SER.MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa fapleaentatlan Srchifecfual gratings serfgl"Av'Cfvf)grqyfnqS Serfs'O'I P(effnj PfgNf>g 8=k)5, BP)f g.g.%.fgnfyect'nCNPRT$

2)I'I, 2)7~nd g)I), f)ectyfca) lllyin9 Rfaqraa ENR:62 (Ng, 001, 002, 006, 007, 008, 02BI 029, Q3Q, 039I 04OI Qsl I Rravlngs ES02, E604, f608.Design Oravtng Sheets 1-72.Sheets OQ3, 004, 005)009'010'Or>'3)o 03t, 03th, Q42 and 063.f603 Sheet 6, 02-217-0084 PEO's 217-f-0249 217-8-0247 and 0250.Instruction Itanuals 02-999-00 hand 02-2I7-03.

ANl approval, Property File Ho.N-219 (1979).Supply Systea Letter G02-83-184 (3/4/83).Lesson Plan 80-FPT-0600-L.

PPN's Vol.I (Adalnlstratlve), Vol.2 (F.P.Sys.Operations), Vol.4 (Alara Response), Vol.7 (Surveillance), Vol.10 (maintenance), Vol.13 (Eoergency).

NP-2 Fire Protection Pragraa Status ln caap)fence vffh P gnt cgsaffau.nts., gyi-.I ng)if<)e dgsfgn Nal n gggayd<nce vflh lhls Kyfteyfa, pypkenlly heels thq intent.Structural supparts of cable trays are interfering.

This vas approved by the NRC, Continuous line detectors are not used.Coxaf tteo before 1983.For further details refer to Criteria)tees: 2.I60 2.I61, 2.198 and 2.)13.Recommended Option(s)For laproveaent Of UNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa ffg dgsfgn change, update, cansa)t ati and clarify the FSAR S Fffh based on previausly appraved coesaft-aents and deviations.

for further details refer ta Criteria lteas 2.160, 2.161, 2,198 and 2.213.Reaarks I(NP 2 did not coa.aft to have line detectors, and therefore lt ls consfdered to be an acceptable de-viation.4402A II~0 MASfflHGTOH PUBLIC POMER SPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 FIRE PROTECTTOH PROGRAN RE-EVALUATION FUHCTlOKAL, LICENSING ANU DESIGN REQUIREMENTS/COMPLIANCE I I Crl teria)tea No.MNP-2 Coaiaiteent To Coaplfancc Nlth Fire Protection Crlterl~Fonaa I Deviation(s)

MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa lapleacntatlon NP-2 Fire Protection Pro grai Status Recoaiacnded Option(s)For laprovement Of MKP-2 Fire Protection Program 2.243 Yes, ln coeplfance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Flre-Kazards Analysis Fire Areas RC-ll A,S,C and RC-TT, heendaent No.37;and Section F.3, Caaplfance>>fth Branch Technical Position APCSS 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coeplfance Evaluation, Position 01(f)c, Amendment Mo.24.Yes.See Supply Systea res-ponse to NRC position Dl(f)in Amendment Ho.19 dated October 1981 f f led wi th HRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.NP-2 FKA.General Arrangement Drawings Series"H'.Drawings Series'S".Pluibfng Drawings.ln coopl lance with Plant cowni taents.Civil Drains werc not provfded in thc cab I e spreading roon.Flooding I s accounted for until doors arc opened.Gaseous sup-pression systteas are not installed ln the cable spreading rooa.Revise the FSAR and FKA to update and clarify the Plant coaeftaents and pre-viously approved deviations.

KFPA-92 H does not apply to MNP-2, as it was not used in the plant design.Flooding was a consideration ln the Flfh.Gas extinguishing systeos are not installed ln the cable spreading IOOO, 4402A

>><<~<<<<4 4>>~~~'I i<<<<'>><<t>>~~'*a'~<<-'.<<~<<>+-<<,'I>>~<<~>>~-<<-~<<+~HASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POKER SUPPLY SYSTEM HNP-2 F IRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION FUHCT)NAL t L ICE HSING AMD OE SIGH REQUIRE)'f HT 5/COMPLIANCE Crfterig}).PH Hg.HIIR-a Casssffemnt fa CcvaplianCe llftft ffrg 4)ectfaII f:F!<elf)Fern)QftYfatfaII f>>l'f>>II>f1 HIIP-.?Fir p Prati'ctfgII praqr1H fIafI)pl>>PIilgff gfl MHP=2 Fire Pratgqifqfi Frggra>>1 Sl>>tg>>Recoaaende4 Optfonfs)Far fmpravemant f)f RHP-?Fire prgleptfgfi PrafIF>>w g>>NFII>>YP>>t 111<<pep)fence gl de>>Crfge4 fn FSN Appen4fa F, Fire Pratectfan Evaluatfag; Section F.?, Fire)beards Anal/it~Amendment Ho.37;and Section F.3t compliance wftfi'ranch Technical Posi-tion APCSB 9.5-I, Sub-section F,3.2, Ccmp)f-ence Evaluation, Posit1ons 03(b)and 03(c), Amendment Ko.37;with the excep-tion that separate spreading rooms are not provided for each redundant division.However, the cable spreading room is designed to provide divisional separation.

Yp>>.17y letter af oclaber 12<ISBI from HHP-.2 to ffRC, KKP-2 com-mitted to comply with Sect ion I I IG of Appendix If.SSER 3.Technical Specifica-tions.CalItrapt OacusvtIIT 2)OA.Arch1tectural Orawfngs Ser fa>>"A"tCfvfl fIjatlfngs Serfe>>ttSO t PPM's I.3.lg,).3.35,?.1t?.7t2.

l,?.1.7.7.2.1.

PEO 210A-CS-0370.

FHA, as applfcabfe.

)0 camp)f ance Hflfl Plant Cori tmunt>>, HHP-2 is one-reactor unit and has one cable spreading room.Build-ing design features and safe shutdown analysis were not evaluated See Remarks.Hp Change.Clarify the an4 FHA, to reflect the Plant coaiitments.

FSAR The.building de-sign features and Safe Sheet-down Analysis in case of f1re were excluded from the scope of this report.1102A ('

MASHlNGTOH PUBLTC PONER SUPPLY SYSTE)1 MHP-2 F)RE PR01ECTlOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATlOH FUHCT)ONAL, LICENSING ANU DESlGH REqulREKHTS/CQtLlANCE

!MNP-2 Coalaiteent To Coepliance Mith Cr1teria Fire Protection)tea Ho.Critcri~Fennel Deviation(s)

Taken MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Tnpleaentation MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoaaaended Optionls)For Ioproveeent Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.245 Yes, in coopliance as descr1bed in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Sect1on F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, F1re~Areas RC-ill A B,C Amendgent No.$7;and Section F.3, Coa-liance with Branch echnical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Coapliance i Evaluation, Position O4(a), hnendeent Ho.19.Gas extinguish-ing systens are not used in cable spreading roon+Separate aanually actuated saoke venting that is operable froa outside the roon is not provided for the'able spreading roon.Yes.See Air Flow Diagraa Orawing Supply Systea No.N-549.response to HRC position N{a)and F1rc Hazards Analysis RC-lll, A,B,C in Aneneaent Ho.19, dated October 1981, filed with HRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.ln coopliance with Plant Centi baents.Portable aanualiy actuated saoke reaoval is provided.Revise the FSAR to include saoke renoval capabili ty stated in FHA RC-lll, A,B,C.4402A HASIIIHGTOH PU8LIC POHER SUPPLY SYSTEH HHP-2 FIRE PR01ECT IOH PROGRAIi RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSIHG AND DESIGH REQUIREMENTS/CQHPL IANCE MNP-2 Costsi taent To Compliance Hith Criteria fire Protection itee Ho.Criteria Foraol Oeviationls)

Taken Hg-2 Fire Protection Prograa Implementation HHP-2 Fire Protection Progran Status Recoaaended Option(s I For laproveoent Of HHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Resorts 2,246 DNA-see Remarks There are no cce-putors perforaing safety-related functions at QNP-2.Non safety-related cooputers are lo-cated in buildings separate from the Control Rooa Coa-plex.TOAS coeputer and PPIC cooputer are located at the Oata Center in Richland, MA.4402A C' MASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POMEM SIPPLV SYSTEH MQ'-2 F IRE PR01ECTIOH PROGRAII RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LI CENSIHG AHD DESIGN REQUIRENHTS/COHPL lANCE Criteria ltea Ho.2.247 MHP-2 Cocaltaent To Coapllance Nith Fire Protection Criteria Ves, ln coapliance as described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire llezards Analysis, Fire Areas RC-Vill and RC-XIV, Awendment Ho.37 and Section F.3, Comtpllance uith Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1,'ubsec-tion F.3.2, Coepllance Evaluation Position F5, Aaendeent Ko.19.Autoaatic fire detec-tors do not alara locally.Formal De via tl on(s)Token Ves.See Supply Sys tea response to NRC position F5 in hsend-aent No.19 dated October 198I, filed with HRC rior to fuel oad date of 12/23/83.SSER 3 9.5.1.6 ge 9-3 ists devia-tion froa C.G.C of BTP CHES 9.5-1 for Witch-ear Rooa II.echnical Specifica-tions.MIP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Iapleaentatlon PPII's Vol.Vol.Vol.Vol.Vol.Vol.I (Adainlstratlve) 2 (Fire Protection Systea Operation) 4 (Alara Response)7 (Surveillance) 10 (Halntenanco) 13 (Eaergency)

PEO's 217-E-0249, 217-8-0247 and-0250, 210A-CS-0370.

Instruction Iianuals 02-999-000 and 02-217-03.

ANI approval, Property File No.N-219 (1979).Supply Systea Letter G02-83-184 (3/4/83).Lesson Plan BO-FPT-0600-L.

Fire IIaeards Analysis.Architectural Orevlngs Series"A".Civil Drawings Series"5".Contract Oocaaents 210A, 215 and 217.Electric-al1 Miring Diagraa EMD-62E Sheets 000, 001, 002 003 004, 005, 006, 007, hOB, hag, 010, 027, 028, 029, 030, 031, 032, 036A 039, 040, 041 042 and 013.Dressings E$02, E503 Sheet 6, E504, f508, Design Ororlng 02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.MHP-2 Flrc Protection Progrea Status ln coapliance

~1th Plant Comaltaents.

Fire bar-riers of 3-hour rating or equivalent are provided.Less than 3-hour ratings arc acceptable based on the coabustlble loading and defense-ln-depth concept.The redundant&vltchgear

.Rooa is separated by rated fire barriers.(see Reaarks).Autoaatic detection is provided, althout local clara, as previously approved.(See Criteria ltea 2.160).For further details refer to lteas: 2.160, 2.161, 2.198 and 2.213.Recoeaended Option(s)For Iaproveaent Of MIIP-2 Fire Protection Prograa No design change, however, revise and update the FSAR and thc FHA to reflect the Plant Coaoitaents, previous-ly approved deviations and describe the equivalent level of protection provided.For further details refer to lteas: 2.160, 2.161, 2.198 and 2.213, as applicable.

Rcaarks l.locate or re-create coabustl-ble load cal-culations for thc Suitchgear Rooas.2.Building design features are excluded froa the scope oi this review.4402A

<<'$>>;<<~f>>>>>>g>>,~0<<,~>>>>>>>>,~"<<0)>>>>L SJ b>>j>>~>>>>>>0>>>>>>>>>>>>>>, gw;<'g<<>>>>>>.

>><<4s:"'v i>>>>'>>i"*.r>>>>>>'i>>.

': '.-~.."~~>>~": 'Iw"-r}is~'ffAIlf~

Lvr'sspTIVAIVuWws f0Ãf}@II}:I f,}fgk}N5 IlWÃ5}N g}R<~N5/Ntf

}RKF Crfterfe ltei NQ}IIIP-.P Pssfsf WAE fs (sep}fable Nf}1 fire IrsfgstIQA Sr))erie Fs riel Perfetfgn}s}

ThkeA NNP=P Pire Prsteclisn Prograi lwjlesentetfsn NNP-9 Fire PlstKSIQA Pr serai Status Rcsaeeomfed fiptianfs}

FQF}aprsreient Qf NNP-0 Fire Protection Prsgraa ReiaFRs 2,2h8 Yes, fn coepliance as describe4 In FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protcctfon fvaluatfonf Section F.2, Fire Hatards Analysis.f'ire Areas RC-.Yll l~nd RC-V IX;lienonent Ho'9,'ooke would be removed through the operation of the seoke eahauSt SyStco vfth psrtable gushing, yes, per Fire Hatards Ana.'lysis Fire Area RC-Yfll Swltchgear Roon No.2 and Fire Area RC-XlV, Svftchgcar Raoa No.1, Anendoent No~3h.See Supply System I'e sponse to NRC posItfon Ohfa)fn haendeent Ho, 10, dated October 1981, filed with HRC rior to fuel oad dote of 12/23/83.AIr Flow Dfagran Orawfng No.II Shg.ln coepl fence with Plant Coaef teents, Flooding vas descrfbe4 fn the FHA.NFPA 92H 4id not consti-tute part MHP-2 design.Hanual portable seoke vcntfno vas accepted by the HRC.No design change due to devfa-NFPA-92H vas not tions taken prior to 12/23/83, part of NNP-2 de-hovcvcr, clarify and change sign.thc FHA ond FSAR to reflect the Plant Coeeftocnts, and previously approved devia-tions.hhOZA I Je NASHIKGTOH PUBLIC POQER SUPPLV SVSTEH NNP-2.F IRE PROIECTIOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING AHD DESIGN REQUIREMENTS/COHPLIANCE Crl teria ltea No.NUP-2 Coeal taent To Coapliance Nith Fire Protection Foraal Devi a t I on(s)I I Crl terl~" Taken N%-2 Fire Protection Progrea Iapleaentatlon NKP-2 Fire Protection Pro9raa Status Recoaaended Option(s)For laproveaent Of NKP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Rcaerks 2.249 Ves, in coapllance as described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Scctlon F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, as applicable, Aaend-acnt Ho.36;and Section F.3, Coapll-ance arith Branch Tech-nical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coapliance Evaluation, Position F6, Aacndeent No.19;~1th the exception that autoaetic fire detectors do not~1 are locally.Yes.Sec Sup-ply Systea response to NRC position F6 in Aaend-oent Ho.19, dated October 1981'iledlri th NRC rior to fuel oad date of 12/23/83.Plant Tech-nicalI Speci-ficationss.

PPH's Vol.Vol.Vol.Vol.Vol.Vol.I (Adalni strati ve)2 (F.P.Sys.Operation) 4 (Alara Response)7 (Surveillance) 10 (Helntenence) 13 (Eaergency).

PEO's 217-E<249, 210A-CS-0370, 2I7-8<249 and-0250.Architectural Orelrings Series"A".Civil Drawings Series"5".Hcchanica 1 Drawl ng H-515.PPH 2.8.9.Contract Oocuaents 21OA, 215, 2I7 and 218.Elec trl eel Nl ring Diagraa END-62E Sheets 000, 001, 002, 003~004, 005, 006>007~008'09~010 027'28, 029, 030, 031 032'36A~039'40'4'I 042 and 053.Orelrings E502, f503 Sheet 6, f504, f508.Design Drafting 02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.In coapl i ance rri th Plant Coaai toents.The 3-hour fire resis-tance rating was not a crl teria requirement for NKP-2,.Refer to FSAR Appendix F, Section F.3, Position F.6.Detection and portable aeans for fire protection are pro-vided: Local alaras are sounded through paging systea froa the Control Rooa.This aas pre-viously approved by the KRC.(see Itea 2.160).For further details refer to lteas: 2.159, 2.160, 2.161, 2.198 and 2.213.No design change, hovever, revise, update, clarify the FSAR and FHA to clearly des-cribe the previously approved Plant Cocaitaents.

For further details refer to Iteas: 2.159, 2.160, 2.161, 2.198 and 2.213.At NNP-2 direction only separation of these areas froa other safety re-lated areas and fire hazards uere evaluated at this tiae.4402A NQ)lNQIt PAN lP PANER 5NPM 5T5TN NNP=tI f)W PRNEQTlN PRANA'=EYA)

NATION f'ltNCffNhE)

WNN51NA IILNP NS)AN REQI)RES'NT5/CNPE)NÃ Crtcerle lE>>I Ns~P'-5 Cnetoiileot To Coop)tenCe j)Eh Ore PFBEecciso cr1E>>F)e Forays)geviettso(g)

TAco M.-.P Fire protect tsn Progrel)sIP)esIenteEinn NP-2 Fire Protection Prograr Status Recowaended Optionis)For)nprovesvent Of kkP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Rosaries):N vvb II vvvvlvmv vv Nvvjvv'A'r'.,"rie v r-vtv vtv kgv r v v pv'vv$vvv vv)IvstvvV'(tI ttv vI PIP tvivAlv 4)v=iranch Technice)Position APCSS 9,6-), Subsection F.3.2, Cospllance Evaluation Position Ft, iaendvoent tto 37'ith the following excepttonsI ventt)ation penetra-ttons are protected by-1-1/2 hour fire rated daapers, Battery Rooa ll east and west wall have a two hour rating.)8 vvl)v vvmtrv.BFisF)e fvv Vvvd iNvlL vvv BFigioe)RR gv5.).6)1) page 9-29 and FIN iten l.aFire Areas RC-V and RC-Vl, haend-aent No.19.v)b IP RIP=Mv tlvv vll IE Or>>tI Egrt)>kAH>15.)V))Flv)Ag5 SF>>s etI'.RFF F<viAP 4vvrv,, vvvvlvv jl)rl:II 1 ht BEIAE>fib PEOvs 217-g-02i7 and<<0260, 21OA-CS.0370.

SER Suppleaent 3 (tiay 1983).Nil approval, Property File No.H-219 (1979).4rphtEepEsre)

Arav)AI)E A=rIMI k=W.A=IISt It:IBI$=.)II)gal Hfik,-PNIg VO)v I ldttinigtrettve)

To)v 2 F.P, Systei peration)Vol.7 (Survetl lance).v A esNA)ieoF>>viih 1lAE FRFRIIEseoEE.

The hgfE>>ry F88%1 heYtI)eked Eh>A 11A)IVI):hr-f/Fe FPEIHgAFP FgE>>l)[IF=Ftsf 5 s%tgfiog EANI leap 9HA>>F5 FRE)Ag Bf ltd hl IH%e PFi&v I)i)pg)Eev revise IAO csoin)t~lv HeEP Elis Fttl cog the NNP"->>sonll)Eev.:oc<

in Eh>>DN, Es FEf)>>GE he lgAE (sgol)EtleAB vvv vrvvlvvvtv vvvrevvv vvvv*eElsog, Verify n Ehe NRr he g=hpv fire rest)Eence F4Evr o vi>BAN PrsY se EPEho sel ifistlisA 18 Ef eccep=n vvi N F standtns in the original SER, of the battery rooi venti-lation systeas coepltance with IIFPA 69.Change the Re-sponse to RRC Posttton F7 to be conststeot with the tire reststance rattng of the bat-tery rooI boundries as listed tn the FHA for tire areas RC-V and RC-Vl.h Wr, rvvbv vr vv vvvrv: ttivisisoe)

Kali vas not lent)oned, This confi-guration 4 technically acceptable based on the fire loading for the rooes and defense-tn-depth provided tn fire protection.

Autovaattc ftre detection alarms tn the Control Rooa not locally, lhts was approved tor the enttre Plant Refer to ltea 2.162.vllv vll)vll viv vr't-vl!vvvI Ilvvvv Rv vvvlvvvr gl IIER hs Y r Eh>>'eoe)yS)lv EVe)NEf Ehe pl fseollcleAE eod Rr;s snIte Ctlnart son of NFPA=bg Kith)IP=P lfH)go Keg ASE PerE sr Ehe>gsse sf this Fe Vievv ITP OCR 9.5='1)ses nsE sIeoE~4 NFPh ill in its side)fnec toF iEEeg Rsols, Auilding design features were not evaluated as they were ex-cluded froa the scope of thts review.ii02A NASHINGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEN NHP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUHCT IONAL, L ICENS ING AN DESIGN REQJ IRIMNTS/COIPL IAHCE Criteria I item No.)I 2.2)3 (Cont'd)NNP-2 Cauai tment To Ccmpl lance Nith Formal Fire Protection l Oevla tionis)Crl teria)Taken I MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Imp l caen ta ti on NHP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Paragraphs 5-5.3.1, 5-5.3.2 Testing equipment for non-compressed gas types Paragraph 5-6.2-Testing procedures for non-compressed gas-.types Paragraph 5-6.3-Testing procedures for hose asses@)I es Paragraph 5-6.4.2-Record-ing of tests for non-compressed types Paragraph 5-6.1.3-Hose assembly hydrostatic test recording Recomaended Option(s)for Improvement Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 4399A NAQIINGTON PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH NHf'-2 FIRE PRO1ECT ION PROGRAN RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING AUD DESIGN REQUIREMENTS/COHPLIANCE cri terie Itei No, NAP-0 Cossi tient To folplience NI III Fire Protectiw Crlterie Foliel IIevletlonii)

Teton Nlf-8 Fire Protection Progrea'Ipleeentetion NNP-0 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoslended Option(s)For IIproveaent Of RNP-8 Fire Protection Prograa Iteo Nos.See Regret, g,HI through g.lig Not evaluated, excluded froa tbe scope of this report.clop MASIIINGTOII PUBLIC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEH MNP-2 FIRE PROTECT IOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, L I CENS IHG ANO DESIGN REQJ IREHEHTS/COlPL IAHCE MHP-2 Caaai tment To Compliance Mith Criteria l Fire Protection Item No.I Criteria I 2.213 (Cont'd)Formal MNP-2 Fire Oeviation(s)

I Protection Program Taken)Impl caen tati on I MNP-2 Fire Pro tee ti on Program Status Paragraphs 3-2.1, 3-2.2, 3-2.3, 3-2.4, 3-2.5-Extinguisher size and lacement for Class A'zards.Paragraph 3-6-Extin-guisher size and place-ment for Class A Hazards Follouing paragraphs do not apply to MNP-2 (See Remarks): Paragraphs 4-1.2-Inspection Paragraph 4-1.4-Hain-tenance and recharging of extinguishers

~Paragraph a-3.2.3-Operating instructions on extinguisher 1 abel Paragraph 4-3.3-Corrective actions for extinguishers Paragraph 4-4.1-itsin-tance Paragraph 4-4.1.1-Ilydrostatic test Paragraph 4-4.1.2-Spare extinguishers Paragraph 4-4.2-Hain-tenance I'rocedures Recoazxended Optlonis)For improvement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 4399A MASHINGTOH PUBLIC SUPPLY SYSTEH MHP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRN RE-EVALUATIOH FUHCTIOKAL

~LICEHS IHG AKO DESIGN REOUIRIIIENTS/CNPL IAHCE Criteria I tea Ho.MHP-2 Caaaf tjaent To Comapl lance Qf th Fire Protection Criteria Foraal Oevfatfon(s)

Taken MHP-2 Ffre Protection Program la pl caen ta t I on MKP-2 Fire Protection Program Sta tus Recomen ded Optfon(s I For Improvement Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Remarks 2.234 ONA-See Remarks Not needed Air Flow Ofagrm Orawfng Ho.II-549.ln conpl lance with Plant Coaaf talents.Ho desi~change, however either clarify the FSAR section 9.5.1 or cross-reference to Ventilation Section for further details.x For table soeke extraction fs util ized.2.235 Yes, fn compliance as described In FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection System, Subsection 9.5.1.2.2 haendaent No.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Area RC-X, Jlnend-<<ent No.37;and Section F.3, Coaplf-ance with branch Tech-nical Position APCS8 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coapl lance Evaluation, Position F2, Amendeent No.37.Hot needed Contract document 217.Electrical Miring Ofagrae EMO-62E Sheets.000>001m 002'03m ONe 005'06, 007, 008, 009, O'IO~027, 028, 029, 030, 031'32, 036A, 039, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Orawfngs E502, E503 Sheet.6, E504, E508.Oesfgn Orawlng 02-217-0084 Sheets.1-72.In cowpl fance>>ith Plant Coeai bnents.Ho design change, upate the FSAR to reflect this.Refer to Item 2.227.4399A MASHIHGTON PUBLIC PO UPPLY SYSTEff MHP-2 F IRE PROTECT IOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUHCTIOHAL, LICEHSIHG AHO DESIGN REqUIRDfEHTS/CSIPLIAHCE Crf terfa l tee Ho.MHP-2 Coezxf teent To Ccepl lance Mi th Fire Protection Crf teria Forwal Oevfatfon(s)

Taken MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Iipleeenta tfon MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Status I Recoaaended Option(s)For Improvement Of MHP-2 Fire I Protection Prograa I Rewarks 2.232 Yes, fn Compliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Area RC-X, hnendnent Ho.37;and Section F.3, Col iance wf th Branch Technical Posi-tion APCSB 9.5-1, Subsectfon F.3.2, CAT fance Evaluation Posf tion F2, Awend-mnt No.37.Not needed HUREG No.0737 ln coaplfance with Plant Coaaf twents.Ho design change, clarify the FSAR and FHA for fire area RC-X.Refer to Itea 2.227.2.233 Yes, fn coap"lance as described fn'FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Compli-ance with Branch Tech-nfcal Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coepliance Evaluation, Position F2, haendment No.37;with the exception that the Control Rooa ventilation intake fs provided with wke detection capability to autoaa ti cally alarm locally and isolate the Control Rooa Ventilation Systea in lieu of aanuafly 1so-latfng the ventilation sys tea.Not needed HVAC Flow Ofagraa Orawing ln coapl lance with Mo.ff-648.Contract Oocu-=Plant Connftments.

aunts 216 and 218.No desfgn change, however Cross-reference revise the FSAR.IIVAC Section 9.4.4399A NASNNQTON POILTC PONER NPPLY SYSTE)f NP-.2 FTRE PRQTECTlON PRQGRAH RE-EVALUAT(QN fWCTfONAL p LfgNS WG AMO OESfGlf REqtl fROfENTS/C@PL TAMCE Criteria)ties Kgi WP-2 Calf tnent To Carp)lance Nifh pire Protection Crfterfi Fares)Oev la tf on(s)T4f en NP-2 Fire Protection Pragraw iipl even to tlon IMP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Receded Qptfanfs)Far fwpraveiont Of MMP-2 Fire Protection Program Renarks Yes, ln coipllance as described fn FSAR Section 9,5.I, Fire Protectlan System, Table 9,1-.5, Aextnd-~ant Na.35I and Appendix F,.Fire Pro-tectfon Evaluatlonl Sectlan F,2 Fire Naaards Analysis, Fire Areas Rf;-ff A,i),C, and RC-)ll, Anendeeot Nae 371 ant)Section F,3e Coipl fence wf th Oranch Technfcaf Position APCSI 9.5.)Suhsectfon F,3,2, Coiotlance Eval-uation Positian F 3(a), Aaendeent Na.37.Cable spreading rooe ls protected by a closed head directional uater-spray preaction sys tea.Yes, See Supply System response to RRC position F3(a)fn Aaendeent No, 19, dated October, 1981 fi)fed 4th NRc.prior to fue)load date of)2/23/O3, Cantract Oacuwnts 02, 215, 2l7 and 218, Klectrfcal Nfrfng Ofagraa ENO-62E Sheets 000, 001, 002, 003, 00l.005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 027, 028 0290 030.031, 032 036)i 039, NO, oal, 04k and 353.Oratfnos f502 E503 Sheet 6s ESOf>E Oraufngs ff-510 and H-515, Ppff's Vol.1 (Adnfnfstratfve)

Vol.2 lF.P.Systea Operatlan)

Vol, 4 (A)are Response)Vol.7 fSurvelllance)

Vol.10 Haintenance)

Vol.13 fEsergency).

PEO 217-E-OH9.

OCP 02-.85-0088<A.

Oesign Orwfngs Sheets 1 R 2 Dr+fag 02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.instruction Hanuals 02-999-000 and 02-217-03.

ln compliance ufth Plant coeei talents, Closed head directional eater sprays are used.Open head spray systeis are not used at NMP-2.For further details refer to fteas: 2.160, 2.161, 2.193-MFPA 15 only.No design change.Update, consolidate and clarify the FSAR and the FNA.For further details refer to Iteas: 2.160, 2.161, and 2.193-MFPA 15.Locate or recreate the Cowbus tibia Load Calculations for these fire areas'399A MASHINGTOH PUBLIC PO UPPLY SYSlEH KNP-2 FIRE PROTECT)OH PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION FINCTIOHAI., LICENS IHG AHO OES IGH REJIG IREHEHTS/CIHPL IANCE Criteria Item Ho.KNP-2 Ccmmf bent To Ccepllance Mlth Fire Protection Criteria Formal Deviation(s) laken KNP-2 Fire Protectfon Program Impl amen ta tl on MHP-2 Ffre Protection Program Status Recoeaen ded Op t I on(s)For Improvement Of KNP-2 Fire Pro tec tlon Program Remarks 2.236 2.237 Yes, ln compliance as described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluatton; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Area RC-X, Amend-ment Ko.37;,md Section F.3,".ompll-ance with Brach Tech-nical Post tfon APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position F2, Ameneaent Ho.37.Yes, fn compliance as described tn FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, F.A.RC-X, Amendnent Ho.37.Does not speci-fically address.Hot needed HVAC Flow Diagram Orawtng Ho.It-548.Contract Docuxents 02, 216 and 218.Electrical Orawtng EKD-62E, Sheets 1-10.PPH's Vol.1 (Admfnistrattve)

Vol.I (Alarm Response)Vol.7.(Survetllance).

PPH 10-29-15, Specification I)IL+-)22188.

Hot needed Fire Protection Program FSAR Section 9.5.1 and Appendix F, including the FHA.In compliance wt th Pl ant Coaat tments.For further details refer to Criteria Item Ho.2.208.Appears to be tn accor-dance with Plant Coextt-ments, as there Is no mention of a carpet being present tn the Hain Control Room.Ho desfgn change.Revise and update the.FSAR to reflect Plant conditions.

For further detafls refer to Items 2.208.Ko change Refer to Item 2.227.Refer to Item 2.227.l399A

~l~)g 0 C J C 4'0 (NIIIIINON PNIN.IC POCR SNPI.Y STSTN NNP-.R f IRg PRAT(CT ION PRPQRNI Rg-.gylLQAT ION ryder WWL,'miISII<6 ae IIuIW RfqSieIIWPNetthXm

.PFITPFI]itsy Pg~INP='11 f Reef Bent 7~missal)s%e NIII fife iretpptinn PrftprIi Israel AoyisIInn fsl Ts)en NP=P FIFe prntectien Pra11rsg Iapieeentetian NP=I1 fIFe PratestIgn Program Status RecoeeendeO tianls)for epraveeent Of MHP-2 FIre Protection Prograa RCMI+s fif<O OHl-see Rearms Foaa is not used in Cab1e Spread-ing Rooas at OP-2.

~~HASHINGTON PUBLIC POQER SUPPLY SYSTEII HNP-2 FIRE PROTECT IOH PROGRAli RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSING AND DESIGN RE(UIREHENTS/CONPLIAHCE Criteria Itea Ho.I NNP-2 Coaei taent To Compliance Hi th Fora@1 Fire Protection Deviation(s)

Criteria Taken QtP-2 Fire Protection Program Inpleaentation HNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoeaended Optionls)For laprovesent Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaerks~+2.239 DNA-see Reaarks Open head deluge and open direc-tional spray sys-teas are not used a t.NHP-2.4402A

~~~-5 (4,',~".di;)"'C" r'rw,"~tan~",~,,Sr,.'vA~~~,,~~~w.*NSH)HOTOH Pug<TC POHSR SN Pl.V STSnll W-S r>aa PROTCCTlOH PaarW RS-SVauRTlaH PIIHPIWIIhi 5)RHSI[9 IHII 5$IAH llEOIJlg flCHTS(gNPlTRWg PrTTgrte)<ee Ho, l0fP=P SoselTlgnt To 4oIIR)lgnse Ht th f lp Erg)NLIOn Crltyrly Fgflgl OgvietlonfSI Tekell HHP=P Ore Frotgctin ProgreIs TIepleleentetloq HHP=P Fire.Protection Progres Stitus Reomended ptlonfs)for IspraveIeent Of QIIP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Resarks t.252 Hot revleued, See through Re1e As~2,2S7 These guidelines are not part of the scope of this (review)report.

NASHINGTON PUBLIC PONER SN'PLV SVSTot NNP-2 F IRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT ION FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG AHD DESIGH RE(UIREHEHTS/COHPLIAHCE I I Crl teria Ites Ho.NHP-2 Covet tnent To Caipllance Ml th Fire Protection Foraal Devtettonts) iten MHP-2 Fire Protection Program leplenentetlon NHP-2 Fire Pro tee tl on Program Status Recoeaend ed Option(s)for Improvement Of HHP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.251 Ves, ln coapitance as described tn FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea.Subsection 9.5.1.1.3.3, haendeent No.36;end.Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, as applicable, and Section F.3, Coapltance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position FB, Auendoent No.37.Not needed The NHP-2 Fire Protection Program, which ts the FSAR and FHA.Civil Drawings Series"5".In coepltence with Plant Ho change.coamttnents.

SER Suppleiaent 3.Bulldtng Design features ln presentation were not evaluated at this ttae, per Supply Systea dlrec t I on.Only the provision of barriers separ-ating the Turbine Building froe adjacent struc-tures containing safety-related equtpeent was reviewed at this time.Oetatl Design of the barrier, nor ta-pleientatlon were not part of the scope of this review.4i02A MA P%'h L~.+~')~C~~~I'~NASHIHGTON PUSLlC POHER SUPPLY SYSTEII MN'-2 FIRE PR01ECTlON PROGRAII RE-EVALUATION FUHCTTOHALi LlCEHSIHG AHD DESIGM RE(dIRBf HTS/CNIPLTANCE HHP-2 Coxvaf t>>ent To Co>>pl(ance Kith Cri terl~Fire Protection I to>>No.Criteria 2,269 Yei, in co>>pliance ao described fq FSAR Septfen 5 5 1<Ffe Preteetfoe'EY4 g40eR)Vptfen F,$, F rP Areas OR=1@rougfI%-.f'sp~pt'<<.

Pe(Flf (, cssf1 lxo F9.A>>end>>ent No, 191~nd Position Dl(l)c A>>end>>ant Ho.24;<>atic fire de-tection circuits do not alar>>locally, through the alara and signaling syste>>.For>>al Deviation(s) Taken Yes.See Sup-ply Systei respense te NRS eesf<fea F9 (II (Vsend=WRT Ne<19<doled aclehgF lg)filed ufth NRc...e~rfnr tn feel Rod datp e't)Fjvh/I)3j H%-2 Fire Protection Progra>>l>>pie>>entatfon lfechanfcai Ora<<ing Noi 11-515.PPII 2.8.9.Afr Floe Rfogray Rri<<fng Net)(=549, Centract Recounts 02, 5)RA, l)S gnd Ill, Electricil Nfr/III jlfigrai QR4$E Sheets aaa, 001, 002, Ras, 004<095, aob;aa7, aaa, aag, ala, 027~t a2a~a29~a30'31'32I and AO): Qrawfngs E6gg, EOQ)$hCef Oj f504)E$0ai 0esfgn Arsufnff 05.2))0084 Shoots 1 72, PPH's Vol.1 (Ad>>inistrative) Vol.2 (F.P.Syste>>Opera ti on)Yol.4 (Alara Response)Vol.7 (Surveillance) Vol.IO (Hofntenance) Vol.13 (E>>ergency). PED's 217-E-0249 217-$-0247 and-0250, 2IOA-(5-0370. Technical Specification 4.7.6.2.instruction ifanuals 02-999-00, 02-217-03. AHl approval, Property File Ho.H-219 (1979).NHP-2 Fire Protection Progra>>Status ln co>>plience <<ith Plant creef t>>ants.Local alamfng ef auto>>otic detection systews<<as gddreSSSd in)ten 2,160.Floodfng is expected, ind acceptable, as described in every fire hazards analysis, Local>>cons of dro'fnage the fire suppressfen systeI is provfded, For further dotafls refer to items 2.160, 2.162, 2.193-'HFPA 15 only, 2.198, 2.213.Recoon>>nded Option(s)For l>>prove>>ant Of HHP-2 Fire Protection Progra>>Revise the FSAR to reflect Plant conxft>>ants and pre-viously approved deviations, verify coo>>f t>>ants are described sa>>e woy throughout. For further details refer to lte>>s 2.160, 2.162, 2-.193-HFPA 16, 2.198 and 2.213, Re>>arks Fire Area DG-X does not have ony safety related equip>>ent. 4402A , MASHIHGTOH PUSLlC POMER SUPPLT SYSTEH Mi6'-2 F lRE PROTECT lOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, LICENSlHG AHD DESlGN REQUIREHEHTS/COHPL IANCE I I MHP-2 C~i taent To Caepllance Ml th Criteria Fire Protection l tea Ho.Criteria~Formol Deviation(s) I Taken NP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Iepl eaentatlon MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoaeended Optlonls)For improvement Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Pragraa Remarks 2.258 Yes, ln ccepl lance as described ln FSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire Protection Systea Subsection 9.5.1.'l.3, lVaendeent Ho.30, 9.5.1.1.3.5, Amendaent Ho.36, Tables 9.5-4, Anendeent Ho.30, 9.5-5, Aaendeent No.36 and 9.5-6, Aaendeent Ho.36;and Appendix F, Fire Protection Eval-uation;Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysts, Fire Areas DG-l through DG-X, Aaendaent Ho.37;and Section F.3, Coa-pl lance>>l th Branch Technical Posl tlon APCSS 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Coopll-ance Evaluation, Position F9, Anend-eent Ho.37.Yes, fire dampers ins-talledd non-listed francs.Supply Systea letter dated Septeaber 29, 1983 and approved by the NRC in SSER 1 pages pages 9-4 and 9-5.Architectural Ora>>lngs Series ln conpl lance>>l th"A".Civil Dra>>ings Series Plant Local taents."5".Contract Docuient 2IOA.PPH 1.3.19 1.3.35, 7.4.7.7.2. f and 7.4.7.7.2.1. Revise the FSAR to reflect Locate ar re-create the Plant previously approved the coabustible coaal tsents.loadlngs for these fire areas.4402A NASH1NGTON PUSLTC PONER SUPPLT STSTEII NNP-2 F lRE PROTECT lON PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCT10NAL, LlCENSlNG AND OESlGN REQUIRMNTS/COHPLlANCE NNP-2 Cocci taent To Coop'I lance Ni th Cri ter i a Fir<<Pro tee ti an iten Ho Criteria Formol Oeviation)s) Taken NNP-2 Fire Protection Pragrin lnplenentation NNP-2 Fire Protection Progran Status Recoxwended Option(s)For leproveoent Of NNP-2 Fire Protection Program Reiarks Z.211 j",262 Yes, in coop))ance as described in FSAR Appendix F, F)re Protection Evaluation; Sectian F.3, Cospli ance vith Branch Technical Position APCSS 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3,2, Conpli ance Evaluation, Posi-tion F10, Aaondient No, 191 vith the esceptlon that diesel fuel tanks vith~capacity greater than 1,100 gallons<<re located inside build-ings containing safety-related eauip-eent.(See iten 2.260)Yes, Seo Supply Systei response to NRC'position F10 ln Aaend-eent No.19, dated October lggl filed vith NRC prior to fuel load date of lZ/23/03 Original SER 9.6.1.7(6) page 9-37, General Arrangewent Oravings ln conpliance vith Plant series'H".balsa refer to conxi taents.Nain diesel iten 2,260, fuel oil storage tanks are buried in the yard.The day tanks are 3,000 gal, for details refer to iten 2.260.NFPA 30 vas extensively used as guidance.For specific differences refer to item 2.130.No design change, hovever, revise, consolidate and update the FSAR and FIIA to reflect the Plant cooelt-aents and previously approved deviations. For further details refer to Itea 2.130.4402A C HASHIHGTOH PUBLIC PSKR SUPPLY STSTEII Qlg'-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT ION FUHCTIONAL, L ICEHSIHG AHU DES IGH REQUIREHEHTS/COHPL IANCE Criteria Itea Ho.)RJP-2 Coeai tnent To Coup)lance Nlth Fire Protection Criteria Formal Oevi at i on(s)Taken Nit-2 Fire Protection Prograa Inpleoentation NNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recocacnded OptionIs)For Improveeent Of NHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Renarks 2.2N Yes, in coepllance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, Fire Areas DG-VII, DG-Vill~nd OG-IX;Anendeent No.37;and Section F.3, Coop)lance with Branch Tech-nical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coepllance Evaluation, Position F9, Anendeent Ho.19, The day tank capacities are 3,000 gallons.Yes.See Supply Systew response to NRC position 9 in haend-nent Ho.19, dated October 1981 filed arith NRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.Original SER 9.5.1.8, page 9-38.Technical Speci f ica-tions.Contract Docent 210A.Architectural Orauings Series"A".General Arrangeaent Drawings Series"H".Civil Drawings Series"S".PPH's 1.3.19, 1.3.35, 7.i.7.7.2.1 and 7.i.7.7.2.1. PEO 210A-CS-0370. In coepl lance ui th Plant coaai taunts.Revise the FSAR and FHA MMP-2 Iopleaented to reflect Plant coaaitaents option 2.260(l)and previously approved devia-tions.II02A i~s'k l, r v'=~.Ave':-vr ol~'v'd vv" ex v'ex'sr ve l t evr~~v HASIIINGTDH PUBLIC POOR SUPPLY SYSTEH NNP 0 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIDII4Le LICENSINQ AHP NSIGII RNUIROCHTS(COHPLIAHCE (Fltefle Itei llo..IINP-g Coeisi twent To Cospl lance III th fifo Protection Critefie Foml Perietionie) Taken Ng~l Pire Protertion Prograi Inpleoentation NM Pire Protection Prograi Status Recommended Option(s)For liprovement Of MXP-2 Fire Protection Progroa Reserves NASHIHGTON PUBLIC POMER SS'PLY SYSTEH N'-2 F IRE PROTECT IOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT lON FUHCTlOHAL, LlCEHSIHG AHD DESIGN REQUIREHEHTS/COHPLIAXCE , 2.263'Cont'd)L1STIHG'C" Safety Related Pu~nescrt lion Residual Heat Reaoval Puskps locstlon Reactor Building Detection Yes~nrtnklers Ho Yes Yes Floor Drains 3 Hr Barriers Hose Station and~xt n o s ers Hose Station and Portable Extinguisher RHR eTBR-to be reeoved.Residual Heat Reeoval Punps Standby Service Hater Yes Puephouse No Yes Yard Hydrant 1402A j MASHIHGTOH PUBLIC POXR SUPPLY SYSTE11 MHP-2 FIRE PROTECT(OH PROGRAII RE-EVALUAT IOll FUHCTIOHAL ~L ICEHSIHG AHO OESIGH REQUIREIlEHTS/COHPL IAHCE Cr'I terl~Itchy Ho.NP-2 Coarirf tment To Compliance Mlth Fire Protection Criteria Formol Deviation(s) Talen MN'-2 Fire Protection Program Implementation NP-2 Ffre Protection Program Status Recoeaendcd Optfon(s)For Improvement Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.263 Yes, ln ccepifance as described ln FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, ffrc areas, as applicable, Ariiendnent Ho.37;and Section F.3, Com-llance vfth Branch echnical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsec-tion F.3.2, Compliance Evaluation, Position Fll, Aaendrtrent Ho.19;rrfth the exception that fire detection has~Iocalf visual alrlta and not a local audfb(e clam.Yes.See Supply System response to HRC post tlon Fl1 ln Amend-aent Ho.19 dated October 1981 filed rrfth HRC rior to fuel oad date of 12/23/83.Technfcal Specifica-tion 1.7.6.2.Contract Ooc~nts 02, 2IOA, 215 and 217.Architectural Drairfngs Series"A".Civil Dralrfngs Sel'Ies S~Hechantcal Drairfngs If-510 and H-515.PPH 2.8.9.Electrical Mfrlng Olagraw EMD-62E Sheets 000, OOI, 002, 003, 004, 005, 006, 007, 008, 009, 010, 027, 028, 029 030 031 032 036A, 035, 045, 04), 04k, and 053.OraMfngs E502, f503 Sheet 6, E501, E508.Design Orairfng 02-217-0081 Sheets 1-72.Ppll's Vo.1 (Administrative) Vol.2 (F.P.System Operation) Yol.4 (Alarm Response)Yol.7 (Surveillance) Yol.IO (Halntenarice) Yol.13 (Emergency). PEO's 217-E-0219 217-8-0217 and-0250, and 2COA-CS-0370. Instruction Hanuai 02-999-00 and 02-217-03. In coapllancc rrfth Plant coaraf trrients.AHI approval, Property Fire Ho.M-219 (1979).The RHR pumps located ln the RB are enclosed rrfthfn 3-hr rated fire barriers.The prmips located ln the Standby.Service Mater Pump-house have approxfmate 100 ft by 100 ft separation rrfthout inter combus-tibles.5Tectfon ls provided, automatic suppression ls not provided.For non-provlslon of local alarm approval refer to Item 2.IM.Loss of any of the above listed pumps rrfII riot adversely impact the Plant safe shutdoirn, as demon-strated by the fire hazards analysis ln case of fire.The HRC found this acceptable and approved the arrangement in the original SER page 9-37.For further details refer to Items: 2.160, 2.162, 2.198, 2.213.Ho design change.Update, revise, corisol ldated the FSAR and FHA to.reflect the Plant coawltments and aproved deviations, based on description of equivalent protection. For further details refer to Items 2.160, 2.162, 2.'I98, 2.213.l.See attached'listing"C" of safety related pumps and re-lated fire pro-tectlori systems.1402A QlSHlHOTON PUlllC~R SNPLV SVSNN Nf-8 F1RE.PROTECTlON PRXielPI RE-EVRNlT(QN AJHP1Wl e KlWENSINrj ANP DESIQI REQVlRPf HTS/CQftPLllNCE fr!HF)8 lfNp=p CAm)&nt Tf ceftlyq each krlkPrb FAmH WvletlARIs) 'P=5 Fire FFAlpctlAn prA9Fee liplestp>letlon NNP->Fl<<Protef tl Bn PFA9FIR 50@0 Receacnded Optionis)For fopravesu:nt gf'HHP-3 Fire protNtlon pro/Fel lieis Fits 1<klii VP<, in PA+lienee 8s Ye%,$ee liF Flov Meyers 1Feulg sAFlh0 lp F94 hopple Systei IQ, H-H0, ppeng>>F, FIFe response to F I l 9 t rotectian Eveluetion! NRc paeitlon ctlon F,), caepli.Pate)in ence vlth Irench Tech-Mendeent nicel Position RPCSI Na.19, dated 9,5-1, Subtectlan October 1981 F.3.t~Cauplience filed vfth HRC E 1 stion, Position rior to fuel QtteI~lwendoent Ho.baaed dete of 3 f1 vfth the except-lt/D/83.ion thet Ienuel con~trol of the Ventilet-ion systea ls not pro-vided.tn coaplience vith Plent cecal tients, IHnuel porteble aeons for seo'ke resevel is provided end accepted by the HRC.llpdete the FQI end FHl by cross.referencing the HVAC section end aentfan the portable seeds of saoke rexovel es en eccepteble elterntive. Ventlletlon systee not speci f leal ly addressed in Supply Systea response to HAC position F11, holdover described in Sect)on 9.5.4. MASHINGTOH PllSL IC POMER SUPPLY SYSTOI W'-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUATION FUHCTIOHAL ~LICENSING AHD OESIGH REQUIREMENTS/COHPLIAHCE Criteria Itea No.MHP-2 Coaaaf tient To Coaplfance Mf th Foraal Fire Protection Oevfatfon(s) Criteria Taken M)l'-2 Fire Protection Prograe Iepleaentatfon MHP-2 Ffrc Protection Progran Status Recoauended Option(s)For Ieproveaent Of NHP-2 Fire Protection Prograi Remarks 2.261 Ycs, fn coaplfance as described fn FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Iljzards Analysf s, Fire Area: Cfrcula<<ting Mater Pucp House, lteo 5.d, Aaendeent Ko.37;and Section F.3, Coaplfance <<fth Branch Technical Posftfon APCSS 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coaplfance Evaluation, Posf tlon Dl (l}c haendnent Ho.2k.Yes..Scc Sce Itea 2.263.Supply System response to HRC position Of(f)ln Awendaaent No.19 dated October 1981 filed<<lth HRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.fuel load date of 12/23/83.Approved by the original'ER.ln coapl lance<<I th Plant coaaaitaents. Equfpaent ls located on pedestal and flood-ing could potentially occur, ho<<ever, portable punpfng units<<ould be available to reoove<<a ter.Revise the FSAR and FHA to reflect the Plant coaaaf uaent and previously approved deviations. Refer to Itea 2.263"C of safety related pueps and related fire pro-tection systeas Ii02A MASIIIHOTON POSL1C PONER SIJPPLY SYSTEli NHP 2 FIRE PROTECTION PROORe RE-EYALOATION FMHCT lONAl glCEHSINQ lND OESIOH IIEQIIIREHEHTS/COIIPLTAHCE gr I teFl I ftes No, NNP=S CosNII tIaent To goipllence Ni<h Flit.ProtectlOII Cf)terle Focal Qevl et Ionts)Teton NHP-2 Fire detection Prograw lsIploaentetion NNP-E Fire Protection Prograll Status Recoeeended Option(s)For 1Iaproveaent Of NHP-2 Fire Protection Progran Reaarks 4,267 Yes, in coepliarce es described in FSAR*Appendix F, Fire Protection Eyaluatlonl Section F,3, Coipll-ence ulth Sranch Tech-nical Position APCSS 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coipliarce valuation, Position 12, Anenltent Ho, 2e, Not needed Architectural Orawlngs Series'A'.Civil Orawlngs Series'S", Yes, in compliance in~ccordance wl th Nr.R Talbert-Supply Systen Nuclear Engineer-ing.No change, update the FSAR to reflect this status. MASIIINGTON PUBL IC'OMER SUPPLY SYSTElt Mlf-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAlf RE-EVALUATION FUNCTIONAL, L IL'ENSIHG AHD DESIGH REQUIREWITS/COHPL IAHCE Criteria ltea Ho.NP-2 Cosaftaent To Coop)fence Nt th Fire Protection Criteria Foraal Deviation(s) Taken MI6'-2 Fire Protection Progrea Iapleaentatton NP-2 Fire Protection Progrea Status Recoeaended Option(s)For Improveaent Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reaarks 2.266 Ycs, in coaplfance as described fn FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis.es applicable, Aaendment 37;and Section F.3, Coaplfence ufth Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsec-tfon F.3.2, Coeplf-ance Evaluation. Position F.12, Anend-aent Ho.24;ufth the exceptfon that auto-aattc fire detection does not clara locally.Yes.See Supply Systea response to MRC position F12 fn Aaend-aent No.24, dated Hay 1982 filed ufth MRC prior to fuel load date of 12/23/83.Found accep-table by the HRC tn the original SER.)Iechanfcal Dreufng No.H-515.PPH 2.8.9.Contract Docuaents 215, 217 end 218, Electrical Miring Dfagrea ENO-62E Sheets 000, OOI, 002, 003, 001, 005, 006, 007~008 009 010 027~028'29'30 031~032 036A~039'40'41~D42 and 053.Drawings E502, E503 Sheet 6, E504, E508.Desfgn Oreutng 02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.Supply Systea Letter G02-83-184 (3/I/83).PPH's Vol.I (Adafnfstrattve) Vol.2 (F.P.System Operation) Vol.4 (Alara Response)Vol.7 (Surveillance) Vol.10 (Hafntenance) Vol.13 (Eaergency). PEO's 217-E-0249. 217-8-0247 and-0250.Instruction ffanuals 02<<999-00 end 02-217-03. ln coaplfence ufth Plant coaaitaent. Suppression fs prov)ded as required by the FMA.Ventilation controls are provided, For further details refer to Itcos: 2.160, 2.I62, 2.193-as applicable, 2.198, 2.213.Revise, update end consol f-date the FSAR end FMA to reflect the Plant coeeft-aents and previously approved deviations. For details refer to lteas 2.160, 2.162 2.193-as applicable, k.198 and 2.213.Bufldtng design features uere nut evaluated, as they ucre excluded froa the scope of this revfe~.4402A NASHINGTOH PUBLIC PONER SUPPLY SYSTEII Mlt-2 FlRE PRO1ECTION PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT)ON FMHCT)ONAL, L lCKHSINQ AHO OES)QH REI}U)REISE HTS/CONPL)ANCE Criteria)tea Ho, NNP.t Cosfaf tment To Comp)fence Nith Fire Protection Criteria Focal Oevfatfon(s) Taken Nf-2 Fire Protection Program implementation NNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoasaended Optionls)For improvement Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Remarks 2.269 Yes, ln complfance es described ln FSAR Section 9.5, I, Fire Protection System, Subsection 9,S.l.I.3.2, Amendment Ho.30;end Appendla F, Fire Pro-ection Evaluatlonl ction F,2 Fire Hasards Analysis, es applicable, lmenbeent No.37;and Section ,3, Cup)lance ufth ranch Technical Posi-tion APCSQ 9.5-I, Sub-section F.3.2 Coipll-ance Evaluation, Post-tfons Fie end FIS, Amendment Ho.37.Noi needed FHA, es applicable, Architectural Oraulngs Series"A'.Civil Oraufngs Series'S'.Ifechanicel Oraufng Ho.H-SIS, PPH 2.8.9.PED's 2I7-E-02eg 217-B-02i7 and-02SO, 21OA-25-0370. ANI approval Property File How H-219 tI379), ln compliance fifth Plant Caeaf tments.Looked at coaeftments to have fire barriers only.See Remarks.No desfgn change.Further evaluation of these areas.Building design was not part of the scope of this revfe~.ee02A MASHINGTON PUSLlC POMER SUPPLY SYSTEII N'-2 FIRE PROTECT IOM PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT IOH FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG AHD DESIGN REQUIREMENTS/COHPLIANCE MNP-2 Coeai teent To Ccepliance Mith Cri teria Fire Protection Fonael Deviation(s) tea Ho.Criteria Taken MIt-2 Fire Protection Program Tepieaentation MHP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Status Recoeaended Option(s)for Ieprovement Of MHP-2 Fire Protection Program Reaarks 2.268 Yes, in compliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Pro-tection Evaluation; Section F.2, Fire Hazards Analysis, as applicable, Amendment 37.Section F.3, Coa-pl)ance with Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1~Subsec-tion F.3.2, Coepli-ance Evaluation, Position F13, Aeend-eent No.19;with the exception that~utoestic fire de-tectors do not alara locally.Yes.See Supply Systea-response to HRC position FI3 In haend-ax.nt Ho.19, dated October 198I filed uith NRC rior to fuel oad date of 12/23/83.Found accep-table by the NRC in the original SER.Hechanical Drauing No.H-515.PPH 2.8.9.Contract Documents 215, 2I7 and 218.Electrical Miring Oiagraa EMD-62E Sheets 000, 001, 002~003, 004, 005, 006~007~008, 009, 010, 027, 028, 029, 030, 031, 032'36A, 039, 040, 041, 042 and 053.Orauings E502, E503 Sheet 6, E504, E508.Design Orauing 02-217-0084 Sheets 1-72.Supply Systea Letter G02-83-184 (3/4/83).Lesson Plan 80-FPT-0600-L PED s 217 E 0249~217 8 0247 and-0250.instruction Manuals 02-999-00 and 02-217-03. ln coapliance with Plant coaai tments.Local alarm froa auto-aatic detection is not provided as explained in Ttea 2.160 and found acceptable by the NRC.For turther details refer to Iteas: 2, 160, 2.162, 2.198 and 2.213.Revise, update and consoli-date the FSAR and IHA to reflect the Plant coeait-wents and previously approved deviations. For further details refer to Items: 2.160, 2.162, 2.198 and 2.213.4402A I I J~~.I~':l I NASHIHGTON PUBLIC PONER SUPPLY SYSTEH NNP-2 FIRE PROTECT IOH PROGRAH RE-EVALUAT ION FUNCTIONAL, LICEHSIHG AND DESIGN REQUIREIfHTS/COHPLIAHCE i NNP-2 Coae5 teent To Coepliance Ml th Criteria Fire Protection Itea No.Criteria Formal Oevi at i on(s)Taken NIP-2 Fire Pro'tact'Ion Program I epleoentation NNP-2 Fire Protection Program Status Recoaeended Option(s)For Ieproveeent Of MNP-2 Fire Protection Prograa Reearks 2.270 Yes, in coepliance as described in FSAR Appendix F, Fire Protection Evaluation; Section F.3, Conpli-ance uith Branch Tech-nical Position APCSB 9.5-1, Subsection F.3.2, Coapliance Evaluation, Position F16, haendaent No.37.Not needed Plot Plan, Civil Drawings In coepliance arith Plant No design change, heaver up-Series'S".Fire Protection canal tments.date and revise the FSAR.Program.4402A audit performed in an expeditious manner.)The Ebasco Fire Protection Engineering revieved the QA findings and concurs~th them.There is a coaxnent ve suggest to be added to the FSAR and O'Qk program The Design.and Construction QA Progzam is described in.......and@as approved hy the NRC Staff............However, for components of the Fire Proteron Program designed, specified, procured, manufactured, fabricated, or installed prior to the institution of the Pire Protection Quality Assurance program (Date), sufficient control vas exercised and followed to the extent practical, and the activities perfozmed evaluated during suhsecpxent audit, surveillance and design review.The FP Engineers revieved the PPQA Audit Report performed on September 8-12, 1986, and the Response to Qh Audit 86-376 dated November 19, 1986. WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM WNP-2 FIRE.PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION 4.0 UALITY ASSURANCE INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT In accordance with the descrip.ioa of Task 3.3 as outlined in the Supply System Letter No.G02-86-0883 from G.C.Sorensen to J.B.Martin-NRC dated September 16, 1986, the Supply System requested Ebasco to assign a QA Engineer to review the WNP-2 Fire Protection QA program against licensing commitments. Ebasco Fire Protection Eagiaeers were requested to review the Ebasco QA Engineer report and the WNP-2 FPPAQ Audit performed on September 8-12, 1986'ad provide additional independent assessment of the existing fire protection program and its adequacy.The QA Engineer reviewed the WNP-2 QA commitments as described ia the FSAR Section 9.5.1 and Appendix F Amendment 37 against the NRC Criteria listed ia Section 2.0 Items 2.86 through 2.96 of this Report.Section 3.0 Items 2.86 through 2.96 of this Report reflects the status of compliance with NRC Criteria, FPQA implementation and compliance. We offer the following commeats: l.Ebasco received no documentation about, the FPQA program prior to May 1980, except of verbal discussions that Burns and Roe was responsible for it prior to the above-listed date.2.Ebasco received ao written documentation as to the date when the FPQA was.established at WNP-2.The first time a commitment to the NRC was made in WNP-2 FSAR Appendix F, Amendment 19, issued ia October 1981.3.The WNP-2 FPQA program tempi.emeatation cannot be assessed without aa audit to establish compliance. This audit may be performed by either Supply System, or Ebasco.Please advise us if the Supply System wishis fbasco to perform the audit, because there is a list of prerequisites Ebasco needs in order to have the Burin/Elevation f R&CBI501'-507'&CB/525'. RB/422'-3" and 441'-0" i RBI@He&50le RBI606'-10.5"&522'RB/5*8'572'2-217-00-84 Sh.38 B 02-217-00-84 Sh.39 02-217&0-84 Sh.45 H 02-217-00-84 Sh.47 02-217-00-84 Sh.48 E D 02-217&0-84 Sh.46 C 8/24/84 12/14/82 10/10/85 7/07/82 8/24/84 8/24/84 3 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS a Draving Compliance The drawings show as-built conditi'ons with a high degree of accuracy.The following deviations vere found: Drawing No.02-217&0-84 Sh.31: detector 39-10 is shown incorrectly as a flame detector instead of a photoelectric detector.2.Drawing Ho.02-217-00-84 Sh.38:., the vali shown on the drawing hetveea detectors 26-9 and 26-8 has been removed.-3 Draving Ko 02-217&0>>84 Sh.48: an existing beam in not shown near detector 18-4.It is recommended that the drawings be changed accordingly to reflect actual pIant condiKons-b.NFPA Code Compliance Relocation. of the devices listed is recommended to comply vith NPPA codes.Refer, to Attachment A for details on the areas of noncompliance Listed beIov'338C 01/19/87 WASilINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM WNP-2 PIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION 5.0 PIRE DETECTION SYSTEM WALKDOWN REPORT A walkdown was performed in November 1986 by Ebasco Services accompanied by Supply System personnel. The walkdown covered only safety-related areas of WNP-2.They included areas in the Reactor Building (RB), Diesel~nezator (DG)Building, RadWaste and Control Building (R6CB), and the Service Water Pumphouses were included.The walkdown was done to check only for strict compliance with NFPA codes.1 PURPOSE OP WALKDOWN The purpose of the walkdown was to perform a visual check for:a.Drawing compliance b.NFPA-72A,-72D and-72E code compliance c.Potential delay of the response time of detectors based on their location or obstructions d.Additional detectors required for minimum coverage per NPPA Code e.Any other potential problems 2 AREAS COVERED The following areas were reviewed and inspected: Buildin/Elevation a.Service Water Pumphouse/Grade b.DG/441'445'.RSCB/437'. RKCB/467'RSCB/487'2-217-00-84 Sh.6 P 02-217-00-84 Sh.31 F 02-217-00-84 Sh.35 02-217-00-84 Sh.36 F 02-217-00-84 Sh.37 I 8/24/84 7/01/82 7/01/82 9/05/86 7/01/82 9338C 01/19/87 e detectors with Potentially Delayed Response Times Ihetectors listed to be in noncompliance with Paragraph 4"4.1 of 5FPA-72E quoted above have potentially delayed response times due Ce the presence of obstzuctions such as HVAC ducts, cable trays, etre Detectors installed above HVAC ducts should be relocated to eXear the duct where there is adequate clearance for smoke travel.IEetectors installed above cable tray stacks have potentially CeXayed response times for fires in trays below the top one.These detectors should be moved to the outside edge of the stacks.khKf Mona1 Detectors k88Ltional smoke detectors are recommended to be installed to provide minimum coverage for compliance with NFPA 72K in several of the areas investigated, as follows:~Buildiu R&CB R&CB Elevation 437'6?B 487'o.of Detectors RB RS 471'22'roposed, Xccations for additional smoke detectors are shown on the accompanying prints.411 additions? smoke detectors should be~e12ed in compliance with SPPA-.72K e Qeher.Potential Areas of Concerm TRa arms'-'af concern discussedl hello+should be investigated, Beever they currently meet SEE@.code Three areas have been fSeatlfM as sources for poteddD.concern:+ILL 01/19/87 Device No.Recommendation DG/455 DG/455'G/455 Detector Detector Detector 38-1 38-2 38-3 Relocate Relocate Relocate R&CB/437'&CB/437' &CB/437'&CB/437'&CB/467'&CB/467'&CB/467'& CB/487'&CB/487'&CB/501'&CB/525'etector Detector Detector Detector Detector Detector Detector l Detector Detector Detector Detector 66-7 66-7A 66-7B 66-7C 23-12 23-13 23-14 65-29 65-30 27-4 66-15 Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate RB/471'S/471 ~RB/471'B/471'B/503'B/522'S/522'B/572'S/572'etector Detector Detector Detector Detector Detector Detector Detector Detector 14-10 14-22 14-24 14-28 15-15 16-6 16-9 18-18.18-.21 Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate RB/572'S/572'B/572'S/572'etector Detector Detector Detector 18-22 18-25 18-27 18-30 Relocate Relocate Relocate Relocate Details for rc:commendations to correct the above-listed areas of noncompliance are provided in Attachment A.9338C 5-4 01/19/87 ATTACHMENT A DETAEEE9 FZHDXNQS BY AREA a Orawiaa, Ko 02-217-00-84 Sh-6, Service Water Pumphouse/Grade: Smoke detectors and Manual Alarm Stations are installed as shown on the drawing.Recommendation-No changes to existing system.b.Ihmsfag So 02-217&0-84 Sh-31, Diesel~nerator/441' 455': Eanua?.Discharge Stations throughout the areas are not labeled te%advocate precisely what system is being discharged/actuated. tion: Labels should be modified or added to indicate~ch system will be actuated by each manual station and the corresponding area affected.2?fanny PuI1 Station 40M is not located in the path of egress am'oabi easily be missed.Et is located around the corner frem the door and two vertical conduits are between it and the tion: Relocate the PuLL Station near the door 3 k whee aha duct, passes immediately below detectors 38-1, 38-2, am%3K-3 with very little=clearance. This could present an obstruction to the air carrying particles of incomplete 01/19/87 1.The signs near manual discharge stations do not identify the fire suppression system'intended to be discharged or the areas affected by the discharge. It is recommended that the signs be modified to indicate precisely which system will be actuated and which area will be affected, through their use.2.Another source of potential concerns may be the occurrence of stratification" of smoke in highmeilinged areas.Detectors are spaced closely throughout the safety-related areas, due to the deep beams, which, can compensate for the ceiling height.3.Fires in lower trays of cable tray stacks may be difficult to detect in their early stages due to lack of air flow.It is recommended that detectors be relocated above the outside edge of the stack.h detector should be considered at an intermediate level to provide better protection. 9338C 01/19/87 5.Manual Pull Station 20-3 is located behind a normally open door and is not readily available or visible.The door leads to the stair<<ell and elevator and is the normal exit route.Recommendation: Relocate the station to the room side of the door+7 Areas investigated for compliance <<ith NFPA-72K (refer to the drawing)brea 1 Pocket near coluam X2 5 and N.l.Cable trays, large pipe, and air dhxet go through the area and there is electrical equipment below.Recamaiend!a&am"- Xnsta11 a smoke detector between pipes au%the.dict<<brea 2-kccess hatch at ca7iumn.13.6 and N.9 Other detectors are present hu tfie area Recommendatfon =Ha detector is required., Area 3.Pocke at eeIumin~and Q.l.Piping,.duct, and caMe tran crnss'Qhmqgh this area.There is a pactiaTi maIQL through the center of this area.Recomaiendht5m" ZhseeXX.a smoke detector above the shcirtr<<aIiE amB Betimes.the.duct and, cable trays.Drawing Eo 02-2h7&~4 Sh~KMS/4&7': Detector~S Ia fns~sB Nhxee a cable tray Air flow may be obstructs hp cam'a-~.VZeualL inspection indicated the detector map ba a@dnst" tha.hasau 01/19/87 c.Draving No.02-217-00-84 Sh.35, R6CB/437': 1.Smoke detectors 66-7, 66-7A, 66-7B, and 66-7C are located above a vide HVAC duct vith very little clearance. The duct creates an obstruction in the air flow to provide intelligence for these detectors. Recommendation: Relocate the smoke detectors to alternating edges of the duct.2.Smoke detectors 66-21 through 66-27 are located above a duct.Visual observation indicated adequate clearance for air flov.Recommendation: No changes to existing system.3.Smoke detectors 20"15 through 20-19 are located above tvo 2-foot"diameter pipes vith little clearance. Visual observation indicates inadequate space for early warning operation. ~Recommendation: Relocate the detectors betveen the pipes and the duct.4.Detectors 20-11 through 20-14 vere inaccessible due to a highmadiation area.Design drawings shov smoke detectors to be betveen two rows of cable tray that are thiee or four trays deep.There is approximately three feet of clearance-above the trays.Recommendation: Inspect the area when conditions allow it.3.Inaccessible scaffolding located at ceiling level obscured the view of detector 20-22.Recommendation: Reinspect the area vhen conditions allow it.9338C 5-8 01/19/87 brea l.Electrical room between columns 15.1 and 13.9'and columns 8.3 and K.l.Electrical equipment is present in the room.Recommendation: Install a smoke detector in this room.hrea 2 Pocket at column 12.2 and K.l.There is an air duct in the area and no combustibles below.Recommendation: h detector is not recommended. hrea 3.Pocket in Ba~aste Control Room near column 13.9 and N.1., There im electrical control equipment in this area+Recommendhtioa: Xasta11 a smoke detector in this area.e.Drawing Ho 02-ZL7'WQW4 Sh 37, R&CB/487'. Cable SprearBina Roam%he fuRXowing detectors are installed near obstructfonst 65-7>>~, 65-12, 65-14, 65-15, 65-18, 65-19>>65-20'>>6K-7i465-26&S-29, 65-30, 65-33, 65-34, 65-36, and 65-37%Lsue2.~pmtiom~cates that there is adequate clearance araamh eX2.4etrectara ezcept 65-29 and 65-30.H Recommendatfcm" RBncate d~m~m 65-29 and 65"30 to clear the obstat~2 Detector+~tQn:augh 6&XX arm Xastalled on beams under the grat~floor Kfgpa imRcate.~y that detectors are under the floor Sasedi am'SiimZ.Laspectlon by Supply System Personnel, ehs.deteeaac Xocaefnn"s vere verified and adequate clearances: ~Recoammxdathma" TBa sggai'.ahauM be changed to show the detector'n~ anxS Qcls~e" M&Rtfone 9338C 01/19/87 Recommendation: Relocate the detector between the cable tray and the duct.2.Detector 22-2 is installed above HVAC duct (approx.3 feet wide)with little clearance to the ceiling.Recommendation: Relocate the detector to clear the edge of the duets 3.Detector 22-1 is installed ad)scent to a beam.Recommendation: Move the detector into the pocket on the other side of the beam.See Area 1 below.4 A wide HVAC duct (approx.4 feet wide)is obstructing detectors 23-12, 23-13, and 23-14.t Recommendation: Relocate the detectors to clear the duct, placing them on alternate sides of the duct.5.-HVAC Duct and cable tray obstruct detector 22-9.Visual inspection indicated moving the detector is not feasible.Recommendation: No change to existing system.6.Cable trays are installed below detector 23-8.with about three feet of clearance. Visual inspection indicated there is adequate clearance. Recommendation: No changes to existing system.7.Areas without detection investigated for compliance with NFPA 72K (refer to the drawing):9338C 5-10 01/19/87 Recommendation Move the Station near the door.2 Detectors 28-1, 28-3, 28-6, 28-8, 28-24, 28-25, 28-26 and 28-28 are installed above a wide HVAC duct (approx.3 feet vide)with approximately one to two feet of clearance. Visual inspection indicates clearance is adequate.Recommendation: No change to the existing system.3 There is very little clearance for detector 66-15.Visual inspection indicated the clearance to be adequate.Recommendation: No change to the existing system.4.Areas investigated for compliance vith NFPA 72E (refer to the drawing)r brea I.Pocket at column 10 and betveen K.l and L.9..No combustibles are in the area, only an air duct.Recommendation: No detector recommended. brea 2 Pocket at column 10 and between K.l and H.3.Two cable trays pass through this area on an exit path.Recommendation. Insta11 a smoke detector.II h Onavtng No.02-21M)0-S4 Sh.45, Reactor Building/422'-3" and 441'R=I.Most of the building on this elevation vas inaccessible due to high radiation and could not be inspected. Recommendatioe. investigate this area when the conditions 01/19/87 3.Detectors 24-4 and 24-5 are installed above cable trays.Neither detector is visible from the floor.Visual inspection of the area indicated there is adequate clearances. Recommendation: No changes to the existing system.4.Detector 24-33 is installed above an HVAC duct.Visual inspection indicates adequate clearance between the top of duct and the detector.Recommendation: No changes to the existing system.5.Areas investigated for compliance with NFPA-72A (refer to drawing): Area 1.Radiation equipment storage area near column 15.1 and K.l.'Recommendation: Install a smoke detector.brea 2.Office area near column 12.5 and N.l.Recommendation: Install a smoke detector.f Drawing No.02-217-00-84 Sh.38, RSCB/501'-507': 1 A girder is obstructing detector 27-4.Recommendation: Relocate the detector on either side of the beam for accessibility. g.Drawing No.02-217-00-84 Sh.39, RSCB/525': 1 Manual Pull Station 28-31 is installed across the room from the~-path of egress and is located behind two rows of.conduits.9338C 5-12 01/19/87 kaaa 3L Pocket at column 8.3 and between H.3 and K.This is a very small area with an air duct, girders, aad no combustibles. Recommendation: k detector is aot recommended. Area 2 Pocket between columns.8.3 and 9.4 aad columns K'and H.Duct and a large crane are in the area.Recommendation: Install a smoke detector.km'I Pocket between columns 3.4 and 4 and between column H aad H 8.Duct aad a Large crane Ia the area.Recommendatioa: Install a smoke detector.knea 4 Pocket at column 4 and N.Cable tray, piping, aad girders are in this area.Recommendation: iastall a smoke detector.km@5 Pocket at column 4 and between column K and M.Duct and a large crane are in the area.IRewfng Ke.02-217&0-84 Sh 47, Reactor Building/606'-10.5" aad QP!~R~tenr 1~aad 16-9 are above an air duct.Ssrmnamhtion.- Hove each detector to the edge of the duct.2~actor X.6-33 is installed ia the corner of two beams.Sesame'ove detector a1z Inches or.more from both 01/19/87 2.Area investigated for compliance with NFPA-72E (refer to the drawing): Area 1.Pocket between columns 5 and 6 and at N.8.Combustibles are present in the area.Recommendation: Install a.smoke detector.i Drawing No.02-217-00-84 Sh.46, Reactor Building/471'nd 503': 1.Detector 14-24 is blocked by a HVAC duct.Recommendation: Move the detector to either side of the duct.2.Detector 14-28 is blocked by a cable tray.The detector cannot be seen.Visual inspection indicated that moving the detector is not feasible.Recommendation: No change to the existing system.3.Detectors 14-10, and 15-15 are each installed above a stack of six cable trays with six inches of clearance from the top tray.There is a possible problem with detecting fires on lower trays.Recommendation: Move each detector to the outside edge of the cable trays.4-Detector 14-22 is blocked by air duct.Recommendation: Move the detector to either edge of the duct.5.Area investigated for compliance with NFPA-72E (refer to the drawing): 9338C 5-14 01/19/87 Recommendation: Xnvestigate these areas when conditions allow.2 Detectors 18-18, 18-21, 18-22, 18-25, 18-27, aad 18-30 are installed above air ducts.Recommendation: Move detectors to the edge of the duct.3.Areas investigated for compliance with NFPA 72K (refer to drawing)-brea 1.Equipment room at column 5 aad M.HVAC duct and conduits pass through this area.Recommeadatioa: Zastall a smoke detector-brea 2 Pocket at column 7.1 and N.Conduit and possible transient combustibles are preseat-in this area.Recommendation: Ias'tall a smoke detector.brea 3.Pocket at column 8.3 and R.Transient combustibles, could be present Xn this area.Recommendation. Xnsta11 a smoke detector.9338C 5-X.7 01/19/87 3.De'tectors at El.606'-10.5" have been removed and the system on this elevation is being redesigned. Refer to Design Change Packet DCP 02-85-00-88&A. Recommendation: Design and install in ac'cordance with NFPA-72E.4.Areas investigated for compliance with'FPA 72E (refer to drawing): Area 1 Pocket at column 4 and K.This is a very small area.Recommendation: A detector is not required.Area 2.Pocket at column 4 and M.This is a very small area.Recommendation: A detector is not required.Area 3.Pocket between column 6 and 8.3 and column N and N.B.Cable trays are below the area.Recommendation: Install a smoke detector at the outside edge of cable trays.Area 4.Pocket between column 6 and 8.3 and on column N.Electrical controls are in this location.A detector was previously located here so that conduit and a)unction box are already in this area.Recommendation: Replace the removed smoke detector.k.Drawing No 02-217-00-84 Sh.48, Reactor Building/548'nd 572': 1 Two areas for review were in high-radiation zones and could not be inspected. 9338C 5-16 01/19/87 6 2 Plant Procedures Manuals (PPMs)(Cont'd)PPH No.1 3.19 1.3.29 1 3.35 1 3.36 1 3.36 3E I 9..1 1 10.1.Rev Ho.Title 8 Housekeeping 7 Iec3ced Valve Checklist 1 Fire Protection Program Controls r 1.Pire Protection Program Training 1 Pire Protection Program Training 4 Fbaat Safety Program 7 Reportable Events and Occurrences Required by RegaXatory Agencies 2.8.7 2.8.9 4.12 4 1 7 4.3.7.9.3 3 4 Pire Protection System 4 Methoxy Pire Eztinguisher Inspection 2 Xanfzatioa Detector Channel Function Test Xoua X4 7 4.3.7 9.3.4 2.Xom%na&on Detector Channel Function Test Zona X4 74.37913 Xamhmtfon Detector Channel Function Test Zcme 65 7 4.3.7 9 14 2~xetKon Detector Channel Punction Test Zcma 6$7 4.3.7 9 23 , 2 ThermadL D'etector Channel Punction Test Zone 79 7 4 3.7 9,24 2 ThemmlL Ihtector Channel Punction Test Zone 80 7 4 3 7 9.25 7 4 3?9.26 7.4.3.7.9.27 7 4 3 7 9+28 7 4.3 7 9.29 7 4 3 7 9.30 2 IXexmdL Detector Channel Function Test Zone 81 ThenaaQL Detector Channel Punction Test Zone 82 2 ThecmmtILSetector Channel Punction Test Zone 83 2 ThecaaaILQatector Channel Punction Test Zone 84~Ihdmetoz Rater Spray%%-PU-54k-CFT Eaatr.DheeetorlIater Spray%lb.-P0-54B-CFT WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM WNP-2 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RE-EVALUATION 6.0 LIST OF WNP-2 IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENTS 6.1 Contract Documents's Contract Document No.02 18 24 29 53 67 206 210A 214'15 216 217 217A 218 223 224 Contract Descri tion Nuclear Steam Supply Standby Gas Filters Shop Fabricated Tanks Fire Pumps aad Drivers Diesel Generators hir Handling Units General Construction Architectural Construction Turbine Generator Installation, Mechanical Equipmeat HVAC and Plumbing Installation Fire Protection System Fire Protection System Electrical Iastallatioa Contract Cooling Towers and Accessories Temporary Facilities Specification No.None None None Noae None Noae None Noae Noae None.Noae None None Noae Noae 158,3A,15B,15H Date (Looked at)11/14/86 11/19/86 11/18/86 11/12/86 11/18/86 11/19/86 11/12/86 11/14/86 11/14/86 11/14/86 11/19/86 11/14/86 11/14/86 11/14/86 11/14/86 11/14/86 6.2 Plant Procedures Manuals (PPMs)PB!No.1.3 8 1.3.10 1.3.10.5A 1.3.10.5A1 1.3.10.5Fl Rev No.Title X'equipment Clearance and Tagging Fire Protection Program iire Protectioa Program Fire Protection Program Fire Protection Program 0809u 6-1 Plant Procedures Manuals (PPHs)(Cont'd)PPM No.Rev No Title 10.29 29 1321 13 10.11 13 10 12 13.10 13 2 Fire Protection Spr1nk1er System.Plush 3 Fires/Explosions 3 Plant Emergency Team Duties 3.Reentry Team Duties 3 Recovery Team Duties hrchitectural Drain s Ih Mo Rev No h-506 36 h-506-h 5 Title h-507-1 h-507-2 h-508 h-508-h h-520 26 19 M550 h-553 h-554 h&55 8 19 66~No~E-502 Sh 1 E-52 Sh 3 E-502 Sh 6 E-503 Sh 10 Title Saba, one line diagram~one line diagram kamQf~ery one line diasram 4EQV Rotor Control Center onc linc 6'Plant Procedures Manuals (PPMs)(Cont'd)PPN No.Rev No.Title7.4.3.7.9.31 '7,4.3.7.9.32 5 7.4.3.7.9 33 2 7.4.3?.9.34 2.7.4 7.6.1.1.2 3 7.4.7 6.1+i.2.3 3 7.4.7.6.1.1.3 3 7.4.7 6.1.1.4 5 7.4.7.6'.1.6 2 7.4 7.6.1.2.1 2 7.4.7.6.1.2 2 3 7.4.7.6.lr3.1 4 7.4.7.6.2 2 7 4.7-6.2.3 7.4 7.6.4 1 7 4.7 7 2.1.7 4.7 7.2.4 1025 10 29 10 10.29 15 10.29 17 Heat Detector Water Spray for REA-FU-2A-CFT Heat Detector Water Spray for RZA-FU-2B-CFT Heat Detector Water Spray for SGT"FU-1A-CFT Heat Detector Water Spray for SGT"FU-iB-CFT Monthly Fire Pump PP-P-2A Operability Test.Monthly Pire Pump FP-P-2A Operability Test Monthly Fire Pump FP-P-2B Operability Test Monthly Fire System Valve Alignment Fire System Flow Path Valve Exercise Monthly Operability Test of Diesel Pire Pump FP-P-1 Diesel Fire Pump Fuel Test Weekly Pire Pump Battery Testing Annual Pire Protection Testable Valve Operability Sprink1er System Puactional Test and Inspection Plant Pire Hose Station Operability Demonstration Pire Door Operability Unlocked Fire Door Operability Rotating Equipment Coupling Alignment Function Check Deluge System aad Pre-Action Systems Removal/Installation of 26/44 lb Spherical and 30 lb Cylindrical PGCC Halon Bottles and Agent Quantity/Pill Verif ication Wet Pipe-Plow aad Tamper Switches-CFT 0809u '1 I+r'I I 0 I I~l 4//,~~J wt~St 6.4 Electrical Drawin s (Cont'd)~Rw No.E-504 Sh 6 E-504 Rev No.30 30 Title Vital one line diagram Uital one line diagram E-508 Sh 1 E-515 Sh 2 02-217-0084 Sh 1 02-217-0084 Sh 2 02-217-0084 Sh 3 02-217-0084 Sh 4 02-217-0084 Sh 5 02-217-0084 Sh 6 02-217-0084 Sh 7 02-217-0084 Sh 8 52 2 D Electrical Design Drawing G Electrical Design Drawing G'lectrical Design Drawing H M Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing hC Power Panel Schedules 480V Switchgear Breaker Settings List Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing02-217-0084 Sh 9 02-217-0084 Sh 10 02-217-0084 Sh 11 02-217-0084 Sh 12 02-217&084 Sh 13 J 02-217-0084 Sh 14 02-21?-0084 Sh 15 02-217-0084 Sh 16 02-217&084 Sh 17 E 02-217&084 Sh 18 G 02-217&084 Sh 19 D 02-217-0084 Sh 20 02-217-0084 Sh 21 02-217&084 Sh 22 Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Elect'rical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Dragng Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing 08090 f 4 EEeetnfca1. Drawin s (Cont'd)Bee No.GZ-ZDTM084 Sh 23 C GE ZDT~84 Sh 24 C~ZD7M084 Sh 25 E ER-~084 Sh 26 D 62E-ZD7MG84 Sh 27 C GZ-ZDT~84 Sh 28 9 GZ-ZDTMG84 Sh 29 C GZ-.ZD7H$084 Sh 30 I GZ-ZETM084 Sb 31 P GZ-ZXTM084 Sh 32 5 GZ-2~084 Sh 33 C GZ~M084 Sh 34 GZ-ZDT~84 Sh 35 C EB-ZDT~84 Sh 36 P OZ-ZUTr 6084 Sh 37 8 KB-2XTM084 Sh 38 8 0K~~84 Sh 39 E GZ-2ZT~84 Sh 40 I~RXTWG84 Sh 4X.P C&K97~84 Sh 42 E 62~7~84 Sh 43 E OZ-ZRT~N4 Sh 44 8 lace eeeMeolee 4%OZ~~~Q Sh 4$r-..OL2X7~84I Sh 47 E OK~~M'4 Sh 48 Title Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing ELectrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing ELectrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing ELectrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing ELectrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Blectrical Design Drawing ELectrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Blectrica1 Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrica1 Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing ELectrica1 Design Drawing 6.4 Electrical Dxawin s (Cont'd)~ov No.02-217&084 Sh 49 02-217-0084 Sh 50 Rev No.C 02-217-OQ84 Sh 51 P Q2-217-0084 Sh 52.E 02-217-Q084 Sh 53 02-217-OQ84 Sh 54 02-217-0084 Sh 55 02-217-0084 Sh 56 02-217-0084 Sh 57 02-217-0084 Sh 58 02-217-0084 Sh 59 02-217-0084 Sh 60 02-217&084 Sh 61 M 02-217-0084 Sh 62 02-217-0084 Sh 63 02-217-0084 Sh 64 B E'2-217&084 Sh 65 D 02-217-0084 Sh 66 02-217&084 Sh 67 02-217&084 Sh 68 OR-217&084 Sh 69 02-217-0084 Sh 70 02-217&084 Sh 71 k 02-217-0084 Sh 72.EQD&2E Sh 000 Title Electrical Design Draving Electrical Design Draving Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing E1ectxical Design Draving Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing'lectrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Draving v Electrical Design Draving Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Dxawing E1ectrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Draving Electrical Design Draving Electrical Design Draving Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Drawing Electrical Design Draving P.P.-System 62-Electrical Miring Diagram 08090 6.4 Electrical Dravin s (Cont'8P Ih~Ho.KQD-62E Sh 001 ER~2E Sh 002%MD-62E Sh 003 EQ9-62E Sh 004 ZSD-62E Sh 005 EH~2K Sh 006 ES~2E Sh 007 EQ~2E Sh 008 EQ~2E Sh 009 ES~2E Sh 010 ZQD-62E Sh 027 EQ~2E Sh 028 EWIm2E Sh 029 Hin'-62E Sh 030 EQ~E Sh 031.ZM5-62E Sh 032~i2E Sh 03'ev Ne.Title F P.-System 62>>Electrical Wiring ECagram F P-System 62-Electrical Miring agram P P.-System 62-Electrical Miring Magram F P-System 62-Electrical Wiring Seagram F P'System 62-Electrical Wiring IMagram F P-System 62-Electrical Wiring IRK@gram F F-System 62-Electrical Miring Magram F P-System 62-Electrical Wiring Ingram F P-System 62-Electrical Wiring IRtfagram F<<P-System 62-Electrical Miring HEegrsm FM<<-System 62-Electrical Wiring IRLas ram FM.-System 62-Electrical Miring IR5qymm i'System 62-ELectrical Wiring IKagram F.P-System 62-Electrica1 Wiring BRqymm P.P-System 62-KLectrical Wiring 1R5qp:am KF-System 62-Electrical Wiring II5sg~~-'P' System 62-Electrical Wiring IHhgeam 6.4 Electrical Drawin s (Cont'd)~Dv No~EHD-62E Sh 039 END-62E Sh 040 EWD-62E Sh 041 Rev No.Title F.P.-System 62-Electrical Miring Diagram F.P.-System 62-Electrical Miring Diagram P.P.-System 62-Electrical Wiring Diagram EWD-62E Sh 042 EHD-62E Sh 053 0.F.P.-System 62-Electrical Miring Diagram P.P.-System 62-Electrical Miring Diagram 6.5 Mechanical Drawings~Dv No.M-510 M-512 Sh 1 M-512 Sh 3 M-512 Sh 4 M-515 M-515 Sh 1 M-545 M-549 M-551 M-573 M-587 M-741 M-788 M-805 M-809 M-810 Rev No.61 51 33 32 30 22 26.24 21 18 32 Title Pire Protection Plow Diagram Pire Protection Flow Diagram Flow Diagram Plow Diagram Plow Diagram Pire Protection Flow Diagram General hrrangement '080 9u 6 5 Mechanical Drawin s (Cont'd)Dwg No.S-820 8-823 Rev No.21 5-825 28~28 29 8-892 10 Mesel Fuel Oil Drawin s 9~No.Do-442-1 11 DQ-446-1.8 Rev No.~47-1 8 Civil Drawings Bem No.~08 C-896 Rev No.$.$Structura1 Ihg~Ho.:$-858 27 6.9 Plumbin Drawin s~De No.P-541 P-542 Rev No.27 Flow Diagram Plow Diagram Title'.10 6.10Pi e Isometric Drawin s: CVI 02-215-00-14362 CVI 02-215-00-14363 CVI 02-215"00-2750 CVI 02-29-00, 37 Pi e Isometric Drawin s: (Cont'd)CVI 02-216-001658, Rl CVI,02-216-06, 9, RO CVI 02-216-06, 10, RO CVI 02-216-06, 10, R8 CVI 02-224-00, 2 Maintenance Procedures: Volume 4 Volume 7 Volume 10 6.12'SAR Technical S eciHcations: 3/4.7, b'3 7 6ol.4.7.6.2.a 4 7 6 2.c.2 4 7 6 2 c 3 4.7 6.2.d 3 6.13 Pro ect E ineerin Directives (PEDs): 0249-7/83 210h~-0370 E-249 08090 6-11 6 14 Pro ect Modification Re uests (PMRs): 02-84-1071-0 02-84-1071-1 02-84-1623 02-84-1623 6 15 Desi n e Pacha es (DCPs): 02-84-1623.0A E 01-85-0088. OA 84-1071&6-006 6.16 Instruction 1fanaals: CP-30 CP-31 6 17 Calcu1atioas= 2 03 09 206 08 212 00 932 00 Zlr-02-85-07 6 18 Misce11aneoua Ihrcusrents Property, MXe E-219 1979 FP-P-JIG IBm&xrmance Curve for Aurora Pump No.82-65340 hutoaaOLc. ~~tion Equipment 02-217&0-84 Sheets 1-72 Ho 2 BhR File No.5-1973 System SZ&mepCance Test Report F P Peagaam 1.3 10 1101 Steilat.Stemma Drawing 21307 Sheets 1 and 2 Rev 1 Rracedure Vo1 7 STCHEB: 9.RJL Saeva.C.5.X Euer8eaegr Ehm.Zmplementkng Procedure (EPZP)-13.2.1 Emerges~RKam Xmplementlng Procedure (ZPZP)-13.14.4 ASSESSMENT OF FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES AND ADMINISTRATION December, 1986 ouc ey 1r to, Support Servic s overs, ant Manager l L'.4 1 I i-0 ,4'~t'f f J I ASSESSMENT OF FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES AND ADMINISTRATION I.INTRODUCTION In the 1985 Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP)Report (issued in July 1986), U.S.Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)noted that"In general the fire protection program appears to lack effective cornitment and coordination among various aspects of the proaram..." They recommended that management consider..." assigning to a member of plant management staff the responsibility for providing overall coordination of the program..." In sub-sequent discussions with the HRC-Region V Staff, they indicated their major concerns relate to strengthening the role of the registered Fire Protection Engineer and the concept of establishing a MNP-2 Fire Marshall was suggested. These positions would assure that fire protection issues are adequately con-sidered in the course of plant engineering, operations, maintenance, and modification implementation (including resolution of issues at the proper level of management, if necessary). Based on NRC comments in their SALP evaluation and commitments made during recent NRC inspections the Supply System has undertaken a major reevaluation of the WNP-2 Fire Protection Programs (Reference 1).One task in this reeval-uation involves reassessment of our Fire Protection Program, definition of I responsibilities, role of the Industrial Safety and Fire Protection (IS8FP)and Plant staff, and administrative/work control processes to assure their I adequacy.Examples of areas that will be reexamined and improved by this task.l include the role of the registered fire protection engineer, fire protection staff review of welding/burning permits, fire protection review of design modifications, maintenance work requests, LERs, etc.This report summarizes the results of the reevaluation task in two (2)sections.The first deals with organization and roles;the second with admin-istrative processes to ensure adequate implementation. A final section identifies an action plan for implementation of future millstones. ZE.MCP-2 FIRE PRGTECTMN PROGRAM%6REANIZATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND ROLES A.Organizatf orr.Structure The PTantt Manager is the Tine manager responsible for the adequacy of fire protection: af MNP-2.En tJns role, he is responsible for the proper implementatfoe af.the QlP-2 Fire Protection Program, including conform-ance with the appl'icabTe Fe~alI and State regulations and corporate requiremerrts. The Program is'ontroTTed primarily through two positions, (T)'regi'stered'ire.Pretectfon Engineer (reporting to the ISBFP Manager)and'Zl a QNP-2 Fire RarshalIl ('mparting to the WNP-2 Operations Manager).The Supp'ystem."s organization associated with the Fire Protection Progl am's shown in Figure T.7la$s organizational arrangement is fully consistent: withe NRC regulations and guidance (References 2 and 3).The raTe of key positions witttin tth$s organization in the WNP-2 Fire Protec-tion Program: are summarized. bel'caw Assistant ffarragfng, Director, for Operations [J.W.(Jack)Shannon (acting)3: Senior management cfficiaT,'esponsibTe for safe and efficient operation of Supp'ystem nucTear power f'aei4$ties.MNP-Z PTant.lIItanager gC.Ã.fQorrr),'Powers3: Overall line manager respon-sibTe for the fmpTementation arrdI etfrectiveness of the WNP-2 Fire Protec-tion Program Reports to, the Assftstant Managing Director for Operations. Mana.r, Support Services I.'t.D'Sack Bouchey]: Assigned the overall corporate: responsibilitJJ for R~pretection program formulation and for assessment-af, adequacy eF f%re pmM%fon at Supply System facilities includfng. 1QP.-Z.Reports to: the Assistant Managing Director for Operation: Managing ir'ector D.W.h1azur WWP-2 Plant Manager C.H.Powers.Assistant Hanager Director for Operations J.W.Shannon (Acting)Manager Support Srv.G.D.Bouchey Director Engineering J.P.Burn Manager, WHP-2 Gen.Engineering L.T.Harrold Director Lic.&Assur.R.B.Glasscock anager Operational Assur.Prog.C.H.McGilton h1anager WHP-2 Plant gA D.S.Feldman Manager WHP-2 Maint.J.A.Landon Ha'nager WllP-2 Technical K.D.Cowan Manager WNP-2 Operations R.L.Corcoran Manager IS&FP J.C.Dell Manager I&C Systems H.S.Porter Man.Mech.Systems C.R.Noyes Han.Huc.Sys.&Anal: G.L.Gelhaus Fire Protection Systems Engr.R.O.Catlow W1JP-2 Fire Marshall J.V.Hanson (Acting)Prin.Fire Prot.Engr.C.O.Eg en Supply System Organizational Element Associated >>ith Fire Protection Figure l 0)C~I l e-i',.i I Industrial Safety and Fire Protection Manager[J.C.(Joe)Bell-3: Respon-sible for development of corporate fire protection policies/programs for all Supply System operating plants and construction projects.Responsible for formulation and assessment of the effectiveness of the RNP-2 Fire Protection Program,,;in support of the MNP-2 Plant Manager.Reports to the Manager, Supports Services, which provides an independent management chain for policy matters or resolution of issues.Principal Fire Protection Engineer LC.D.(Dale)Eggen]: Overall respon-sibility for ensuring the technical adequacy of all elements of the Fire Protection Program.Encumbent is required to be a Registered Fire Protection Engineer and Member Grade in S.F.P.E.Reports to the ISBFP Manager.Areas of responsibility and functions are summarized below: o Safe Shutdown 0, Reviews of the safe shutdown method against the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)commitments; Reviews the fire barrier required for the safe shutdown system used;and Performs the Plant's fire hazards analysis and reviews the safe shutdown methods and analysis for compliance with regulatory requirement and technical adequacy.o Physical Protection 0 Reviews the fire protection systems, related to design, FSAR commitments, NRC or ANI letters, etc.to ensure system/program adequacy;Reviews net.fire protection related work, including PMRs, DCPs, SCNs, and the FSAR (Volume 16, Section 9.5.1 and Appendix"F");Reviews NCR and LER corrective actions related to fire protection; and Reviews e;nergency lighting for safe egress, vision at shutdown panels, and adequate maintenance.. o Administrative Control Reviews fire protection procedures to assure commitments are met;Investigates all fires/explosions to determine the root cause, to recommend changes, to prevent recurrence, and to ensure an investigation.history file is maintained; Reviews fire brigade training to assure compliance with proce-dures and regulations; Periodically tracks fire protection system surveillances and preventive maintenance to assure program adequacy and proper implementation; Reviews QA audits and audit responses related to fire protec-tion;and Perfortrs periodic plant tours and reports results to the WHP-2 P)ant Ranager and Manager ISZFP.~t a Others e Stake recommendations to management to correct any weaknesses $dentifiecf and help to implement the changes;and o Provid'es technical support to Plant and Engineering organiza-tions, as required, to assist with identification of cost effectTvt soTutions to problems and with preparation of system desi~s l 17am'ire Yarsha77 P.V.(Johnl Hanson (Acting)3: Responsible for adequate implementatfon of the Fire Protection Program requirements by the.P'Tant Staff/support groups.Serves as the principal point of contact-Snr tht Program,'s concerns and's responsib1e for ensuring proper reviews Ly the ISBFF Fire Protection Engineering Staff as described above.fop~te the WNP-2 Operations Hanager.The WNP-2 Fire Marshall is de'egated. the authortty necessary te accomplish his responsibilities incTueing. authority ta stop PTant work if necessary until conformance wi'th fhre protectrFan prop ams is achieved.Areas of responsibilities and functn";ons. are.sumaarSzed'eTow: o Safe Shutdown o Ensures adequate implementation of commitments within, the Plant.o Physical Protection Coordinates Plant activities, which may impact barriers, detec-tion, and suppression, systems, to ensure proper implementation of program requireme'nts; Reviews and ensures adequate implementation of new work;Reviews NCRs/LERs and assures adequate correcti,ve actions are implemented; and Reviews special fire protection requirements for tlWRs.o Administrative Control o Coordinates implementation of fire protection administrative requirements by Plant organizations;, o Reviews and assures implementation of fire protection related Plant procedures; o Serves as a point of contact for all fire protection inspections; o Coordinates system surveillances/preventative maintenance programs to ensure proper and timely'mplementation; and o Implements fire barrier and penetration programs.. e Other o Participates in the investigation of all fires/explosions to determine the root cause and to prevent recurrence. Generation EngIineerin Manager[L.T., Harrol 43: Provides for design and discipline support of fire protection systems.Performs safe shutdown analysis and'ngineering assaciated with electrical separation. Responsible far adequacy of design, design documentation, and design control pracess implementatian, including obtaining appropriate fire protection reviews.Reports ta Director of Engineering. 4 MNP-2 Operatians Rang er[R.L.(Roger)Corcoranj: Responsible for imple-mentatian af numerous Program eTements including system operation, performance af certain fire system surveillances, fire brigade staffing and member qu&ification, recarding of proper response to fire alarms, notification ef PTant Fire NzrshaITT of all fir es and system impairments, approval of firn system impairments, and approval of Program's permits.Responsible te provide managemerr< support for the MNP-2 Fire marshall.Reports ta the WNP-Z P'Tant Yerager.~tq l MNP-2 Nainterrance Ãanager L.Z.A (Jim)Landon3: Responsible for timely, preventative and,'corrective m$rrtenance of fire protection systems and surveillances af fire detectiae systems.Reports to the MNP-2 Plant Manager.MNP-2 Technical'fana r fK.P (X$rk)Cowan3: Provides a Fire Protection System Engineer, impTements fi're protection system performance trending and modifications, arr4 admirriates the fire barrier penetration surveiTTance pragpam Rl parts 1!a the MNP-2 Plant Manager.Director Licensfa and QtmT$Assurance[R.B.(Bob)Gl asscock3: Provides independent, quaTity surveiT'Tance and audit programs in conformance with regulatarjj requfrements'rrdl carrlpxrate pol icies.Reports directly to the Nanaging Directar MNP-2 PTant QA, Ptana er..(iQLR, (USE Feldman3r Responsible for on-site gA functions at WNP.-2: fncTuding gA/QC.programs associated with the fire protectiarr: pro~gt' B.Interface Analysis As part of the review of the MNP-2 fire protection program functional roles within the Supply System a review of the major organizational interfaces was performed. The results of the review were utilized to formulate the organization improvements described in this report.Figure 2 is a sketch of the major programmatic interfaces involved in the MNP-2 fire protection program implementation. It is included here because we believe it helps to understand how effective program coordina-tion will be accomplished. It should be emphasized that Figure 2 is not an organizational, chart nor should it be interpreted to prohibit or discourage communication or interfaces not specifically shown in the diagram.As shown in Figure 2 the Principal Fire Protection Engineer interfaces'ith all program elements (including the WNP-2 Fire Marshall, Engineering and Training)in a coordinating, technical advisory and assessment role.The MNP-2 Fire marshall has the key role in on-site implementation of the program and provides the principal interface with all WNP-2 Plant organi-zations on fire protection matters. I I 1 III.FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM AOMINISTRATION An overall review'of the Fire, Protection Program administration was conducted to assess its adequacy.Areas that were evaluated include design process, system modifications, licensing/FSAR maintenance, incident reporting/investi-gation, records, qual,,ity assurance, procedures/procedure review, staffing levels/qualifications, performance assessment, surveillance/maintenance, training/training records, welding/cutting, control of combustibles, and fire system impairment procedures. As a result of the review, the following improvement initiatives, have been identified and are being implemented. 1.Broader review is needed by a Registered Fire Protection Engineer of significant fire protection.program documentation. Specifically, the following improvement to the current administrative review process is being or has been implemented: o All facilities and Plant modification packages (DCPs)are now being reviewed and signed off by the Principal Fire Protection Engineer for fire protection impacts.The Engineering design control proce-dures has been changed to reflect this process modification. o The fire protection review of procedures needs to be improved.A list of plant procedures will be identified that require mandatory fire protection reviews.The procedure coordinator for these ,procedures will ensure a fire protection review is performed of all modifications to these procedures. ISBFP will review plant procedure changes for impact on fire protection. Comments will be tracked by ISBFP to assure appropriate resolution. o Open fire protection issues should be tracked to completion by the Fire Protection Engineer who ensures timely action.Results should be periodically reported to Senior Management. 10 Z.N7 NMRs should receive an improved fire protection review by the fmplIemerrting organizations. PPH 1.3.7, Maintenance Mork Requests and associate fire protection plant procedures (PPMs 1.3.10 and 1.3.35)will be revised to require appropriate fire protection review.The review will he documented at least in checklist form.t 3.The fire protection system surveillances and preventative maintenance activitfes mTT be overviewed by the MNP-2 Fire Marshall to assure full compTiance with regulatory commitment and applicable codes.EV FllTURE ACTIONS The faTTawinp miTestones and responsible individuals are established to implement the actions described in Section II and III above: Graf<revision to t<OS 39 Policy Issue revised MOS Z.ZmpTemerrt Organization Changes{i.e create Fire Marshall position)1/15/87 G.D.Bouchey 1/31/87 1/1/87 C.M.Powers~-3ÃeeC with involved staff to cTarify roles 1/15/87 G.D.Bouchey/C.M.Powers 4L.Revfse pl'ant procedure as described in=Section ZIZ.3/3/87 J.V.Manson/J.C.Bell 5 Conduct.management review to assess adequacy of actions/status. ImpTement mM-murse corrections if necessary 6/87 G.D.Bouchey/C.M.Powers References 1.Letter, G.C.Sorensen, Supply System to J.B.Martin, NRC Region V,"Fire Protection Program Reevaluation", dated September 16, 1986 2.10CFR50, Appendix R, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities. 3.NRC Supplementary Guidance,"Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls and equality Assurance", June 14, 1977.12 0)r I/~~~I~J p\.I-e I j I'l J l I r FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ASSESSMENT JANUARY 1987 BY: J.V.HANSON I'~I yf, e~~+J l l FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM'ASSESSl1ENT JANUARY 1987 Back round This report is an assessment of the WNP-2 Plant conformance to the Plant Fire Protection Program.The Plant Fire Protection Program is defined in the follnwinq proceFiures: J PPN'EV 1.3.10 4-C Fire Protection Program 1.3.19 1.3.35 8-C Housekeeping 1-C Fire Protection Program Controls Fire Protection Program Training These procedures identify the individuals responsible for c rtain actions to make the fire protection and other related programs a success.1.3.36 Hetho!iolony The following legend explains the symbols used to assess the performance tn the procedure requiLrement and their meanings.Each nrocedure was reviewed in detail to determine how well organizations and personnel are imolementing the requirements. Each action was judged on the basis nf interviews with personnel involved, evaluation of previous gA concerns and corrective actions being implemented, and evaluation of recent procedure revisions. The assessment is a subjective view of the ANP-2 Fire Protection Procedures and their implementation. LEGEtlD PE%FOR'ONCE ACCEPTABLE. /PERFOR'<AilCE ACCEPTAGI.E IiN MOST AREAS;INPROVING NEEDS IlPROVEMENT IN ISOLATED CASES PERFORMANCE GENERALLY NOT PER EXPECTATIONS. ItiPROVEfiENT 'EEDED IN HOST AREAS.PERFORMANCE DETERIORATING. REDllIRENENTS NOT FOLLONEO.NO ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE. Conclusions The 14P-2 Fire Protection Program Procedures are adequate.The four procedures require minor revisions to clarify responsibilities, update information, correct wording and incorporate changes to inplenent corrective actions fron guality Assurance audits.The procedure conpliance by Plant organizations needs improvement in snye areas.Corrective action in the form of procedure revisions, additional training and inplenentation of nevi prograns will strengthen the Plant's overall Fire Protection Prngram.These corrective actions.will he implemented before April 1, 1987.An assessment of the effectiveness of some of thi changes will not be possible to observe until the Spring Refueling Outage. PROCE 1.3.10 Res onsibilit Re uirement Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Plant~lanager Establish fire brigade and supply training.Trained fire Ibrigade existsl Drills and practice sessionsl for fire brigade.IFire brigade lis trained andi Idrilled Fire hazard/safety surveys and/or inspections are conducted.and documented. Procedures prepared.ID.Eggan pre-Ipar es monthly linspection Ir eport Heed management attention or response to identified concerns.Coordinating fire drills and evaluating. Posting areas to store fire retardant lumber.f IAreas are lidentified in IPPH 1.3.35 Signs are not posted.Revise.procedure or post signs.Assure maintenance and operations maintains the fire equipment and performs PNs and surveil-lance procedures. IHeeds closer Iscrutiny Develop matrix of NFPA*HRC requirements identify responsibility. All control valves larger than 1-1/2" in the fire protection system are locked in the wide open position with non-breakable Shackle locks and chains.IHost valves I lare sealed Management decision to lock all 2" and larger valves controlling water to sprinkler systems and standpipes. Revise procedure. PROCEDURE Responsibility Plant Technical Manager 1.3.10 Re ufrement Prelfmfnary review of design changes for possible impact on Plant fire protection provisions. IAssessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolutf on/Renarks Assurf ng speci al inspections and audits are conducted as r equfr q5 by Tech, Specs, Plant Operatiqns rfiw joi Fire brigade members H.P.!Technicians maintain their qualifications. Health/Physics Chemistry Manager Ffr e brfgaCe members Kquflrqent Operators maintain i thefr qualifications, I Need to improve on timeliness of completing I review.I.I I I Improved-previous problems with member not I maintaining qual f fications. Scheduled for I training.Shift Support Supervisor should!I have r eady access to PgS.I Same as'above.Shift Supervisor should I have ready access to PgS.Generation Engfneerfnq Manager Prepare design packages.Packages pre-pared on priority set by Plant Techncial Manager Incorporates design changes for fire protection into the FSAR.Assures design changes are reviewed hy.IMFP Fire Protection Engineer.All design chanqes are iewed by P PROCE Responsibilit ."lanager of Industrial Safety and Fire Protection 1.3.10 Re uirement Recommend equipment for fire protection use.Drills and training with local fire departments. Assessment of Performance Assessment Conment/Resolution/Remarks Smoke evaluation -equipment. Heed to develop review of P.R.for Safety and Fire Protection. Recommendations for main-taining fire protection equipment. Provide technical assistance in preparing instructions and procedures. Pre fire plans need update.IS&FP needs to incorporate changes to pre-fire olans.Designated by Plant lianager to take lead.Aid Plant Manager in coor-dinating fire drill s and evaluating. Technical assistance in locating fire related signs.Signs properlyl located.Audit and follow-up nn"Tr ansi ent Combustibl es=Permit" and"Cutting, Melding-Grinding Permit" which are overdue.IS&FP have provided followup action.Review responsibility and revise procedure. Assign to responsible Plant Department iManager.Monthly fire prevention inspection of the Plant.Results to Plant Manager. '*KNyl4~0~=Q'<<h C PROCEDURE 1.3.10 Responsfhfl f t Re uf rement IAssessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolutf on/Remarks Hanaqer gf lndustrfe1 5ofetv cori fire Pr g4ectinq Revfew%Re resultfng from survef11anco testing, Nevfe~technical aspects of fire bpfjydq an4 fire witch Ct'oioiog Not revfewfnglRevfew nf f<1IRs generated as a result of sur-nuRs Iveillance testing is Plant staff responsibility-fire Marshall.Revise procedure. 1qyestfgate ffre explosion I or malfunctioning fire pro-I tectfon equfpment. Prepare!I report.!Review%Rs on a random I basis to determine ff I adequate preplanning for impairments, hazards work etc.have been included by the OSG.lnvestfgatfons Lack of cooperation between ISI'P and Plant are not being operations has hampered'erforming through done properly investigations. Repair and reinforce com-Imunication channels.Revise procedure to Ireflect agreements. Preplanning fs done at the work supervisor level.OSG does not know the scope of work to adequately identify fire hazards.Revise procedure. Shift'Aanager Stopping work that does not meet fire protection requirements. I Receives notification of planned system impafrments. Assures redundant fire pro-tection components or systems are not impaired prior to approving an impairment. PROCE Res onsihilit Shift Manager 1.3.10 Re uirement Revie~s fire protection system impairments against Tech.Spec.requirements. Directs Shift Support Supervisor to notify the NRC.Assessment'f Performance Assessment Cogent/Resol uti on/Remarks Delete Shift Support Supervisor notifying HRC.Shift Hanager to notify NRC.Revise procedure. Initiates surveillance action requirements applic-ahle to fire system impair-ments.Notification of IS&FP of all fires, explosions on related incidents and unplanned firel protection impairments. IHave not noti-Plant Operations Manager and IS&FP tlanager have defied or corn-agreed on corrective action.Heed to finalize Imunicated withl details.Hay require procedure revision to I IS&FP on firesl incorporate the final agreement. Notify the Shift Support Supervisor of any impairmentl to the fire protection sys-tem due to surveillance testing or maintenance. Shift Support Supervisor Act as fire brigade leader and assures all others on fire brigade are qualified. Recent change to procedure appears to be a successful change.Heed to clarify role of Shift Support Supervisor when he is in the control room license maintenance. -Initiates a.fire protection I system checklist for an I unplanned impairment and maintaining in a notebook until returned to operable condition. PROCEDURE Shtft Support: Supepvisop 1.3.10 Reports fire protectian system iy~airmer}ti go IIftt', Assessment of performance Change reSpon-sibility 4o Shift 1'taoaqer Comment/Resolution Remarks Hot done, Shift ganager'responsibility, r/eels pt orqgure revision Notifies Nf fear all fire protection system impair-ments or malfunctions and when they are restored, Notifies AHl, but does not notify ISEFP Heed to be timely, I Plant Operations thnager and ISCFP Manager tn I agree on notification requirements. Completing fire protection system impairment checklist when system is restored to onqrab)o, Impairment Ichecklist i I s I~Inot consi s-Itently being sent to Files I Files do not have a complete list of com-I pleted checklists. Plant Operations Ranager I action to correct deficiency. I I Maintain a notebook for active"cuttin~-welding-grinding" and'ransient combustible" permits.Thosel that are close to time limitl and have exceeded time limit are sent to ISSFP for follow up action.IPermits exceeding timel limit Should be maintaining a log.Should be reported to Plant Maintenance Manager for action.ISSFP should audit.Establish log.Revise procedure to have Plant t1aintenance !1anager take action.Performing fire hazard analysis when required.Approving"cutting-welding-"grinding" and"transient combustibles" permits.Inappropriate luse-of words His review should be to determine that the permit is within the frame work of the FSAR fire hazard analysis.Revise procedure. Mork supervisor reviews. I~~PROCE 1.3.10 Responsibilit Re uirement Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Work Supervisor Completing and implementing requirements of cutting-welding-grinding permits.Assuring personnel perform-ing work under their controll follow cutting-welding-grinding permits and/or transient combustible permits.Supervision needs to follow closely to ensure compliance. Assures that the cutting-welding-grinding permit is attached to the HMR and/or procedure. Supervision needs to follow closely to ensure compliance. Stopping any work that does not meet Fire Protection Program requirements. Assuring"Transient Com-bustible Permits" and Fire Protection System impairmentl checklist are closed out andi returned tn radwaste controll room and attached to tSR.Look closely at the process.Train personnel. Review close out process.Coordinating planned impair-I ments with the Shift Hanagerl prior to system impairment. I I PROCEOVRE 1.3.10 Res ansfbflft Re ufrement Assessment of Performance Assessment Covalent/Resolution/Remarks Nark Supervisor Notffyfng the Shift Hanager or designee as soon as system returned to normal.}~Establish a group of trained ff r e watch personnel, Assure that ffre extfn-gufshers checked out of the taol crib-have been ret'urned at end of)ab, 5 days, or!friday jj.m>>ihiaIIever comes 599llCPE tdentfffed as a concern on recent gA audft Corrective action has been implemented by Plant Maintenance Hanager.maintain qqpy of cqttfng-I Wolrifng-grfndfng permit I at wor k location.I Fol lowing requirements/ I precautions on permft.I Lead or foreman sign off permit at the start of period or shift.I Hake sure workers follow through on closing out permf ts.Reinforce through trai ni ng.Coordinating a planned impairment with his super-visor prior to impairment of system.Obtaininq approval of Shift HanaEjer prior to impairing al fire system.I PROCE 1.3.10 Res onsibilit Re uirement Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Workmen I Following specific require-ments of the permits that are required by this procedure. Notifying the Shift Manager when a fire protection system is returned to service.Cleaning up the worksite at job completion or end of shift.r INeeds Icontinued I a ttenti on Returning any fire extinguishers to the tool=crib.New program being implemented needs to be monitored. Any Individuall Reporting to the control room any activity which may affect fire protection control.Fire Watch Person In case of fire related to work task, notify Shift Manager/control room and take action to control fire.Stop work when activities deviate from permit appr ovedl requirements. Report to work su ervisor. PRQCEOURK 1,3.1Q Res onsfbflft Re ufrement Assessment af Performance Assessment Comment/Resol utf on/Remarks Fire Watch Person Remain fn the area to per-form fire watch duties.Revisit area nr make arrangements for others ff required by permit.Returnfng Ffi e extfngufshersl used fn fire watch to the tool crib.Monitor fire extinguisher control program.Tool Crib Operator lssufng fire extfngufshers only that have current monthly inspection. Coor-dinate inspection to have adequate number in reserve.1 PROCEO 1.3.19 Res onsfbil fty-Re ufrement Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Plant Operations Hanager I Cleanliness of operating equipment and control panels.Plant Operations Hanager needs to define expectations. Instrument Haintenance Cleanliness of fnstrument racks and installed instruments. Provide labels at racks and periodic inspection program.Electrical t$aintenance Cleanliness of electrical switch gear.Have a PM program.Each Plant Employee Wipe up ofl spills.Pick up rags, papers, and foreign material.Improvement needed.Expect Area Coordinator to identify areas needing cleanup.At the end of the job, return tools-and equipment. At the end of day, neatly orgarifze tools out of the way.IProblem occursl Program is defined.tteed to evaluate I during nutagesl performance during outages.After fnspecting, close all inspection and access doors.Remove combustfble shipping material to designated storage or waste storage.At the end of the job removel or arrange to remove scaffolding, shielding, special fixtures, etc.00 llluc com-Ibustible ship-Need to minimize radwaste input/need to Iping material identify storage areas.Itaken into thel Ibuildin I Work supervisor package review for closeout.Improvement needed during outages. pRannuRr.Res onsfbflftv Plant Operations 1.3.19 Re ufrement Inspect and clean all control panels, escutcheons and engravings, Prqperly securfng gas bgttles against substantial jpgeps with rqpe or chkfq Me gled St kgp r>d bg54W Assessment of Performance Assessment Cogent/Resolution/Remarks !Designs are being developed for providing racks I as the need is fdentfffed, Oesfgn and insta1-I lation af the racks must compete against higher priority work, ques Potfles pot secqre$tg<5f(4i r~li4e4 e~<immt 8F)H)88l'hh ffqqqekeepf qg pr oblemS yry reported to the Floor Coordfnator s for action, Must patch during Floor Coordinator rounds.!Toke corrective action when identified, t l~eed to improve method to document problems.I Assistant Plant Ranager maintains a list of (Area)Floor Coordfnators.(Area)Floor Coordfnatnrs Inspect their assigned areas periodically to ensure compliance with the house-keepfng procedure. Anyone Identify hnusekeepfng con-cerns to (Area)Floor Coor-dinator For action on house-keeoing report forms.tleed to provide a usable form. .PROCED'.3.19 Res onsibility Department Managers Re uirement Inspect monthly those areas assigned to their personnel. Prepare report to Assistant Plant Manager describing ageI and backlog of housekeeping.l Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Evaluate their performance. All Employees Mork area kept free of tripping hazards and sharp projections on floors.Loose overhead items are secured or stored at ground level.Heed to improve performance in the dry well.I Spills of oil, water, and chemicals are immediately cleaned up.Get surface cleaning-not a detailed cleaning.Provide.temporary protectionl where handrails are removed.Restore as soon as possible.Storage area kept free of an accumulation of materials. C Control vegetation and keep grounds neat and clean.Covers to switchgear, cabi-nets and panels are in lace.Minimum effort 437'levation of Rvl a problem-need to define more storage areas.Grounds are kept clean, debris picked up.Could control vegetation better.Apply herbicide before it seeds or grows to maturity.Heed to enclose dumpsters. A few missing covers. PROCEOURE Responsibilit All Employees 1.3.19 Re uirement Introduction of combustible materials into the Plant shall be minimized. IAssessment of IPerformanceI AssR ssment Convent/Resolution/Remarks I Fix as part of radwaste minimization. I.I I I Flamnable liquid combus-<<)bles, such as lubricants, cleaners, paint, etc.shall be handlid in containers I and'c)osed when got used, I t v I pastes shall not be buttletI os'site,'n exception is burning'waste oil for fft'e t brigade trair}ing. All combustibles shall be I kept out of the new fuel I storage rack areas on 606'Reactor Building when it is I being used to store new I fuel.Burning oghep materia]oq Isite I I I I I I I I I I Burn tumbleweeds blown against the industrial perimeter fence.Stop burning weeds or deviate procedure. Have not stored new fuel in new fuel storage rack.Not anticipated to store fuel there in the future.Mork done on critical equip-I ment shall provide for I measures to prevent contam-I ination with foreign I material.Hew PP!1 1.3.42 should help monitor during the outage.Chemicals used for Plant Maintenance and Plant Oper-ations tasks shall be aporoved for use per PPH 1.13.2, Chemical Permits.Very few chemicals in use without stickers. PROCE 1.3.19Res onsibilit Re uirement Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks All Employees Employees shall assure work spaces are kept free of radiological contamination to the extent practical. Personnel working in an areal are responsible for return-ing it to a clean uncontam-inated state.Mork spaces get a general cleanup but not a good cleanup.All waste materials gener-ated in controlled areas shall be treated as contami-nants.-Such materials shalll be surveyed by H/P and dis-posed as directed by H/P.blaterials shall be unpacked before taking into such zones.IToo much com-Ibustible pack-I ling material lin radiation Izones Plant needs to improve on taking packing material into zones.All grinding, blasting, welding shall be contained to prevent spread of air-borne contamination.- Care taken to limit the areas of surface contami-nation-use plastic covers.H/P personnel provides assistance to determine level of contamination and recomnend decontamination. PROCEOURE Respnnsibilit All Employees 1.3.19 Re uirement Only the quantities of paints, lubricants, solvents degreasers, and chemicals speeded for the gob shall be removed from storage.Drips and leaks of lubri-cants and chemicals shall receive attention as soon as reported.IAssessment of Performancel Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks I I Such as basement of Service Building and I Reactor Building crane.I I t,'nntainers of products, I (oil, paint, solvents)shallI r be kept tightly closed to prevent introduction of I foreign material and reduce I the risk og spills.All water hoses should be shut off when not in use.All pump seal leakage or valve leakage should be minimized or repaired as quickly as possible.I Work is completed that can be accomplished during the time and manpower limits of a forced outage.Floor shall be swept or wet vacuumed.All detected system and equipment leaks should he repaired expe-ditiously. t 4 PRQCE 1.3.19 , Res onsibilit Re uirement Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks All Employees Outside door should remain closed except for entry.Where possible provide isolation area.441 West Turbine Building Door and 437 Rad-waste Rollup Door need to be opened only when needed.All outside doors should have weather stripping to limit dirt input to liquid Radwaste-system. Packing cases, shipping, containers, wood, should not be taken into radiologically controlled areas.Radwaste i4inimization Program implementation. Tools and special equipment used in radiologically controlled areas should be predetermined and precautionl taken to minimize contami-nation.Develop Hot Shop.Hand tools routinely used inl contaminated area are to be stored in special hot tool storage cabinets, boards, or boxes.Develop Hot Shop.Rope barriers shall not be installed or attached to J:..tubing, flexconduit, elec-I, trical wires'or instrument I-r acks. PROCKQURK 1.3.19 Res ibil t e ufrement$))fop)pyeyq)qaffoldfng should not be eriggqd toa q]ose tq'qr)ti ia1 tat.;ki ot'amjonints, Assessment of Per formance Assessment Covalent/Resolution/Remarks Scaffoldfng should not be erected to change traffic flow to expose instruments, racks, KC panels, etc.from bumping damage.Temporary power cords shall!not vfolqte divisional power critorion. Gas bottles should be stored in properly designed bottle packs.Temporary storage per PPM 1.3.19.4A,2.g. There are designs being developed for providing racks.Plastic bag color coding is used to maintain an effective radioactive contamfnatfon control program.Sag sorting will minimize radwaste input.Brown plastfc bags-clean trash.Green plastic bags-contain radiologically clean equfp-I ment and material.Sag sorter will eliminate concern.0 PROCE 1.3.19 Resoonsihilit Re uirement or radioactive equipment or material.All Employees Yellow plastic bags-contain contaminated, potentially contaminated I Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Have some clean material in them. PRaCFOuRr. 1.3.35 8eosonsihlo Hstoriol 0sor tlontrot of flrwcItle ar cgtAgqtiblo mytet'iaido a Fl preabl e t iquids o Cambustible liquids a Flammable gases Asqeqsment of Porfa ance Asse ament Comment/Resolutian/Remarks Individuals do not fallow housekeeping require-ments on cleanup of their work both in process and end of job.Supervision and foreman to enforce procedures with workmen.Weed to watch closely during outage.Shift Support Supervisor a Aerosol cantainers o Combustible materials in vityl areas I n tlamgustib]e materials in!romointjar of Plant Transient combustible permit procedure. Applies to Plant Haintenance H.P.needs to police housekeeping due to their activities. Cease storage of yellow bagged material all over Plant for extended times.Welding shop needs to close out permits consistently. Plant Haintenance Cleanup of flaanable and combustible waste, scrap, etc.resulting from work activity.Workmen do not always consider cleanup part of work package.Reinforce workmen that it is their responsibility to cleanup their work-"Aational Park Policy".All temp wood used in the Plant shall be treated with a U.L.listed pressure impregnated process.Reactor Building-good.Won-pressure treated wood used in Turbine Building-laydown cribbing.Ladders greater than 9'hall be fiberglass. Less than 9'ay be wood.r~4 PROC 1.3.35 Responsibilit Re uirement Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Plant Maintenance Application of the cutting, welding, grinding permit and time restrictions. ITime restric-Itions-are not I Ifollowed and IPlant Opera-Itions allows Itimes in lexcess of Iprocedure Plant Operations and Maintenance are not imple-menting procedure. Train Shift Support Super-visor and Plant Maintenance to follow proced-ures.Work authorized and reviewedl by work supervisor. In-process review not done by Supoly System supervision. Bechtel also needs to improve.Approval of work imple-I mentation of work require-I ments closeout.Supervision is done from the office or desk.Implementation of general-requirements of the cut-weld-grind permits.Fire watch implementation for cut-weld-grind permits.Fire protection system impairment checklist procedure. Plant Application of the fire Maintenance/ protection system impair-Plant I ment checklist procedure Operations and time restrictions. PROCKOURK 1.3.36 Res onsibilit Re uirement Assessment of Per f ormance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Plant Maintenance/ Plant Operations Mork authorization and review by work supervisor. Approval of work implemen-I tation of work requirements,l Special requirements for priach)ng op campramis)ng y f)j'i by~t'ice.I Heed to train and educate Plant personnel in I fire barrier awareness. I gppliqatiotl q f'echnics) 5PPP)fijagiqtl, Ag, ggPA yotll NNAR1Y SYStom reqliemAAts gtl f)re barrier parent'otiios. Inspection testing and I checking of fire control I equipment per PPMs, Tech.I Specs., and ANI requirementsl I I I I I Visual inspection monthly ofl fire extinguishers maint-enance per NFPA 10.4 Meekly Plant inspections for control of flammable and qombustible materials. Report to Plant Manager/Assistant Plant Manager for action.Hot being done Procedure does not identify responsibility for inspection. Heed to revise procedure to require periodic inspection by the Floor Coordinators. PROC%'t.3.35 Res onsibilit Re uirement Assessment-of Perf ormance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Industrial Safety and Fir e Protection Upon receipt of an.overdue permit, logs and follows up to close out.litotes dis-position and corrective action in the log.Logs being kept and.in order.t<eed to redefine responsibilities to Plant Haintenance Manager. Res onsibilit Fire Brigade 1,3,36 Re uirement Five (5)members on site at all times.Leader and two{8)others shall be plan knowledgeable. Shall not include minimum shift crew required to safety shut down the Plant.AISOSmCl14 of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks I Cans)st o f Shi f t Suppor t I SuperviSor (Leader),!Health physics/Cpey, Tech (1)Wd!EqNipipOt D~Otatets ()I-Initial physical examinyt$on and an annual reexamination for continued fitness.Ho physical examination until 1986.Reeval-uate examination requirements. Drills will be conducted (4)times a year per shift.Members must participate in the required number of drills.I Have a few deficiencies at end of the year.Offsite fire department willi participate in one (1)per year.Drill shall be in the Plant to allow team practice. PROCE 1.3.36'Resoonsfbf1 f t Re ufrement Assessment of Per f ormance Assessment Comment/Resolution/Remarks Fire Brfgale Unannounced drills shall be four (4)weeks or greater a art.30 days minimum between drills for each shift.Preplan drills, critique andi remedy deficiencies. Unsatisfactory drill per-I formance followed by repeat drill within 30 days.No-experf ence wi th unsatf s factory dr il 1 s.Every three (3)years, have an unannounced drill crftiqued by independent, qualified individual avail-able for NRC review.In 1985 Disqual f fication, requal-fffcatfon and makeup drills.Practice sessions held once every year.Makeups on practice sessionsl within 90 days.Disqualification, requal-ification and makeup practice sessions. PROCEDURE i4:>PQlib lki I I 49 I Fire Brigade I.3.36 Initial classroom instruc-tion includes: IAssessment I I Pl ari o Train with local fire departments understand responsibilities I I o Local fire department I be provided special I nuclear hazards training I!o Proper use of emergency equipment o hiethohs for fighting fires I I I I I I Portable ventilation equipment use needs I improv ment.I o Oirection and coordina-tion of activities (fire brigade leaders)o Qualified instructors o Instruction to be pro-vided to all fire brigadel members Periodic classroom instruc-tion will be part of each drill and practice session and include: o Review of strategies and procedures l PROCE 1.3.36 Res onsfbilit Re uirement Assessment of Performance Assessment Comment/Resolutf on/Remarks Fire Brigade Periodic Classroom Instruc-tion (Cont.): o Review of Plant Modifica--tions and changes to firel fighting procedures o Periodic refresher training sessions to repeat classroom instruction over two (2)year period o Identification and loca-tion of fire hazards and types of ffres o Toxic and corrosive effects expected o Location of fire fightingl equipment layout, access and egress routes P o, Proper use of available fire fighting equipment and method for each type of fire j Prefire plans lout of date Update prefire plans.ISKFP to 1 ead update.Regular planned meetings at least every three (3)monthsl for all fire brigade membersl with an agenda of required reading.If not done, mem-ber is disqualified until completing meeting require-)ments. PROCEOORE Res onsibilit Ffre 8rigade 1.3.36 Re uirement At)training documented on a training attendance record or igjnal forwarded tn Training Development and Eyalqatfon Department, IAssessment of Pe rf ormance Assessment Covalent/Resolution/Remarks Pjsqgy)jfiig member fs excludeg fram brigade dggfys Mjtf]t'e~uo)jffed, Fjrt.f jghtipq procedupeg yp t jpstrjctjotls shall be developed to cayet'he follwioII areas;o Dfscovery of fire I I o Action of control room operator o Selection and respon-sibilities of fire brigade members o Coordination of offsite fire department activ-ities o Actions of security guards for fires o Responsibilities of other Plant personnel n Preplanned strategies forl!fighting fires IPrefire plans!ar ut of d Assigning disqualified and nonqualified personnel to fire brigade.Need to execute!program.I I I I I I I Update prefire plans.ISBFP to lead update. PROCED 1.3.36 Res onsibility Fire Brigade Re uirement Instructions and preplanned strategies shall be eval-uated during drills and practice sessions.Assessment of Perf ormance Assessment Comment/Resoluti on/Remar ks Fire Match Personnel Selected from Plant maint-enance'nd Contractors staff.Completed fire watch training course.Personnel must understand responsibilities as noted in PPHs 1.3.35 and 1.3.10 Retrain every two years. 1 I L J tl WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM AN EVALUATION OF THE ADEQUACY OF THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITIES FOR THE fIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM DURING THE CONSTRUCTION PHASE OF WNP-2 FEBRUARY 1987 REPORT NO.WPPSS-ENT-108 >/~~/ev ar ro , nager, nera ion ngsneenng j~l'i I I t qt y Lp A'L~ EXECUTI VE SlNh1ARY~~This report, provides an evaluation by Supply System Engineering of the adequacy during the construction phase of design and construction activities associated with the Fire Protection Program at WNP-2.The report contains a review of the results of previous design and construction verification efforts, fire protection LERs and NCRs, NRC findings and open items, equality Assurance Audits, and the inter-organizational task force evaluations of the Fire Protection Program initiated in mid-1986.This data base was used to: o Assess the adequacy of the construction phase implementation of the Fire Protection Program including design requirements, o Identify and assess generic implications, and o Determine whether additional physical quality r everification is recoamended. Mhile the WP-2 Fire Protection Program addresses a11 activities contributing to fire protection at the plant, this report is concerned on1y with the physical plant features that are part of the Fire Protection Program, Physical plant features include the fire suppression system (pumps, piping.hydrants, valves, tanks, sprinklers, hangers, controls, etc.), the fire detection system, fire barriers (fire walls, doors, dampers, seals, etc.), safe shutdown cable protection (THERMO-LAG and 3M materials, and electrical separation), and emergency lighting.L Free the evaluation described in this report the following conclusions are made:-o Individual and program deficiencies have been properly identified and have been or are being properly evaluated and resolved.Nth the exception of identified deficiencies, the design and construc-tion of fire protection physical plant features during the construction phase were adequate.No further investigation of the design and construction activities of the physical features of the Fire Protection Program is required, except for the resolution of the open deficiencies identified in this report.Identified deficiencies are unique to the fir e Protection Program and are not applicable to other systems, with the exception of the generic issue relating to cable derating.There are no identified deficiencies (including those still in process of investigation or correction) that constitute a reduction in safety with continued operations of the plant.Engineering believes that a thorough and complete evaluation of the WNP-2 Fire Protection Program has been performed. ~~ TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary Table of Contents~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~1.ii I.Introduction and Scope........-.....II.Summary and Conclusions ...............~III.Detailed Discussion of Reviews................~~~1~~~~~~5 IV.Listing of Reviewed NRC Findings... -~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~28 ,V.Listing of Reviewed NCRs....................... 32 ,YI.Listing of Reviewed LERs....................... 33',VII.References............... ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~36 4)I p~~I 5 INTROOUCTION Atl0 SCOPE'ntroduction The fire protection issue has been a continuing effort fr om the conception of the MNP-2 project.WNP-2 recefved fts construction permit in Parch of 1973.The Brown's Ferry fire occured fn March of 1975.From that point forward there have been a'umber of criteria changes that have been identified with respect to fire protection design in nuclear power plants.At the start of construction (1972)at WNP-2, the Fire Protection Program was considered to be fire pumps, fire main suppression system', detection systems and structural fire barriers.Also in-cluded was the administrative control for these systems and fire prevention activities. Following the 1975 Brown's Ferry fire, addi-tional items were put into the Fire Protection Program.They include such things as'safe shutdown"'systems, electrical separation, and fire separation of electrical divisions. Recognizing that MNP-2 was not licensed for operation until 1983, there was a fair amount'f design and construction that had been.accomplished prior to the time that additional guidance relatfve to fire protection was issued to the industry.As a resu1t of that, the plant was not designed with full cable separation and all other fire protectfon criteria satisfied. Much of the work that has been done has been by nature of a backfit.Throughout. this period WNP-2 has concentrated on meeting the intent of the industry with respect to fire protection design.In areas where there was not-sufficient spacing to meet separation criteria, materials such as THERMO-LAG were fnsta11ed to provide fire barriers.At the time those contracts were started, there was&nfmum guidance available on what should be done and how mater fals should be applied.'MNP-2 was on the leading edge of the technology. There were only two other plants that were involved fn the appl ca-tion of THERMO-LAG at that time.They also were presented with the same concerns that have been identified at MNP-2.MNP-2 was identifying new.design and construction methodo1ogy as constructfon progressed. This review identifies deficiencies that were missed fn those construction days.Additional fire protection gufdance has continued to be'ssued by the NRC up to and fnc1udfng the issuance fn 1986 of Generic Letter 86-10.An hfstorical revfew fndfcates that the'ire protection regulations and guidance were not a model of c1arfty.It fs apparent that the entire industry, including the regu1ators, were learning as the Fire Protection Program was developed. MNP-2 has attempted to stay cur-rent with thyrse developments fn design and construction activities. Because MNP-2 was one of the early plants fnvo1ved fn implementation of additional guidance on fire protection, there was no precedent that could be exactly followed. Inftia7Ty the qua7fty controTi af'he ffre protection system was in carrforman>>D with the NFPA codes effective at that time.While'some of the F$ne.fRretection Program was'uality Class I, the vast majority was gua7!fit@CTasr.II, although some of the guality Class II work was SHsmf'c.Cstegany'because ef: its proximity to other guality Class I Systems.QaTfty.Pass I;syrtmrs;were routinely audited in.accor-dance wf>>th, TGGFRSQAppendix: H., gtta7fty Class II work, however, was not.noutFnePyl audited untf1l the issuance of Appendix A of Br anch TechnfcalI Pasftf'an>> APCSB 9.5-'1l f n A'ugust 1976.Consequently, desi gn 4~M RI f:tt Ff.P t tf P 4 t earÃte5 a!s camp1eMy as safe naia>>tedI systems.B.Sco~.Xn Jhgust T%%, tfte Rtpply, Sjrtee established a program plan to reevaluate: the: NP-2 Ffre Protectf'arr Program and on September 16, T98&,, submftted! the.-'program plan>>te the NRC.This report provides the oval'uatfom ef the adequacy, ef>>'esign and construction activities durfng;the.construction>> phase demef5ed fn Task 3.3 of that program pl'an (

Reference:

1)., The evaluatfon:

was.accampl'fshed' reviewfng documentation associated eath the fuT:iaaf.'mp:

o}hm&eehfmn pthse dhsfgn amB camtructfon ver f fication effor ts.e Qeffcfenafes fd~f fed>>by~QmlIAy Assur ance or ganfzatf ons, the RRRIPI" tftt~Rl t (PIER), 4 Lf 4 t Repants L>>>>ms).'>>TeagI wf tti'mrctated corr ectf ve actions.o XnCennaTi~~ocernf'mp subsequent to construction compl etion.%lease.reef~uumfstaS aF the feT>>7Iowfng:

o The CataIm!(ENGR@MFa ab" 5 was collected. e TNe daCa}}Ise wes~feedi Snr any fire protection related fthm The.fdentf'ffed-'ixamints: ~etfve'to fire protection were re-viewed ta.estahl fsh>>scope.and>>rrature of the deficiency. This fncluded!speci ffc.assessaanta. ef safety significance, cause as related>>ta.constructfon>> or.desf gn",.and generic fmplf cations.The.correctfve. actfons-.. see revfewed to fnsure that they correct1'g, resoTved.: the-: deffcfencf'es. For those deficiencies that;~-design related;, the.*design requfrements were reviewed te fnsure the appro~ateness: of the corrective action.(Seehtorr R1)af.R@Rrence;1'rovfdes. a comprehensive comparison of the;-NP~K're.Mt!ectfort ~rerun with the desfgn re".~~fre-menta$~NH%andI, FSN:..)>Ru-deffcfencfes wfth corrective actfons;mN: yet.compTete,, the.gT>>armed and scheduled correctfve actfons..were.evil uated~andithe. adequacy of interim correct)ve/ remedfaT/etta gatfarn, rwrasurem wane evaluated. Recognizing the NNP-2 Fire Protection Program addresses all activi-ties contributing to fire protection at the plant, this report is concerned only.with the physical plant feature es that are part of the Fire Protection Program.Physical features include the fire suppres-sion system (pumps, piping, hydr ants, val ves, tank s, sprink 1 er s, hangers, controls, etc.), safe shutdown cable protection (THERMO-LAG and 3N materials, and electrical separation), and emergency lighting.None of the Fire Protection Program's physical features were inten-tionally placed outside the scope of these reviews, but only those portions having specific identified deficiencies are addressed. The following limitations have been applied to the scope of this evaluation: o The focus of this evaluation is on the construction phase implementation of the Fire Protection Program.Mhere necessary, specific reviews have been extended into the operational phase of MNP-2 to identify deficiencies associated with construction phase activities. Operational phase activities have been eval-uated elsewhere in the Fire Protection Program Reevaluation Plan described in Reference 1.o This evaluation activity did not involve a major physical quality reverification effort since the need for such an effort was not identified by this review.o This review does not include a specific evaluation of design compl iance wi th code requirements, BTP 9.5-1 or other FSAR cexdtments as that evaluation is being performed by the inde-pendent fire protection consultant under Task 3.1 of the Fire Protection Pr ogram Reevaluation (Reference 1). !In li980~QQF'~safety-related construction work was suspended because of a breakdown i'e armagement. control and'ork quality.Substantial changes in Sujp7y@stem Ravagement and construction contractors followed.?n the fnterim'erfad! until restart of safety-related construction in July 1981'conqeehensive revfews of documentation under which construction was periIormeS wan aampltetM Included were construction contract specifi-cati'onedefi'cf~documents, construction and gualfty Assurance proce-dures;, Nxrnfecp amf qualfffcatfon procedures and procedures covering verfaus phases ef weefc planning and caeCro7.The principal purpose of the mwh~e.eF specff5catiions ind@meed'xnes was to assure compliance wftlh emBe~sCandhnfs and FSAR requfrements to provide fnternal consis-tencyt amb adi~acy of" Qualfty throughout the construction contractors. Under ttifa pmgmn;constructf on was restarted in July, 1981 on a controlTed: contract"-by-contract hasf s.In 198Pthm RrppTy System coarnftted'e refnspect safety-related work compl'etch prfe-te the)980 shutdown TMs comprehensive and manpower fntensf ve-.pragI.am was completed over.a three year time frame.The program!was'aT!Ted'he gualfty Verf ffcatfoa Program and was established to venffj,.the.adequacy of safety-eel;ated'ork completed prior to the shu.txfown.~,Ira MHlBhdtCe% tRsemr F~peratfoa, am~psrfenced constructf on management oryurfhetfiuv. was sHeeted to manage the campletfon of WP-2 construction. In additfmrEedttt l assegai'fed a specfIN engfneerfng management team whfchi conqxfredl. a: lfst of 3N potentfaT: engfneerfng problems drawn from Bechtel andI'fadustry.- experfence. Each.pro&1'em was assessed to determine.$f Rmra en'he 5aC meoyHzed an6 adeqmtHy resolved the problem..In.7982.".the Ihsfgn.Reverfffcatfoe Freyr'as established to evaluatethe ah~regpet-" MNP>>Z design and to ensue that FSAR and NRC r equfrements hadi Seem Sq8emnted fete desf gn doamants.This reverf ff cation consisted ot'ee sde~stems and one non-st~system and was extended into generfc".amb firhn;act5ve issues te assure terat the program provfded an!!!~Fdh&!W!!$85,, I!Sh!!PYg!!!~&Ch!h!!!!!!!!!tTAA),'o:; fnd@andentl'y revfew andevarmata these.programs and to audit thefr effectf veness..TAA, concluded'hat " o The'vem17i program was a, comprehensive and fntegrated set of actf-vftfes capahTe af;provfdfng. conffdenm that MNP-2 had been desfgned and;canstructed te meet regulatoryg am5 FSAR commi tments.o QuaTf tJJ.'nhancements whfch were davHaped durfng work suspensfon and Stpravecb work".control practfces; tiqd'emented fn the restart pr ogram were=effhchtva and'dequate., o FQR coaeftmeets and regeTatary~ reqmfmstents have been effectfvely carrfh5 fusser@fete desf ge daeuianCs i o The Design Reverification Program including interactive studies and the depth of the reviews provides adequate confirmation that MNP-2 design is adequate.o Weakness in the design process used to confirm original design assumptions had been adequately addressed with adequate corrective actions implemented to correct those weaknesses throughout design.o The overall design process was conservative and.produced a safe plant conforming to FSAR and Regulatory requirements. As discussed in Section III.A of this report, the reinspection of work completed prior to 1980 provided only a limited review of the physical features associated with the Fire Protection Program and the Design Reverification Program only reviewed, as a separate study, the fire pro-tection interaction with RHR-loop B equipment required to bring the plant to shutdown.However, since the Burns and, Roe process for both safety and non-safety related design was essentially the same, the results of the Design Reverification Program provide high confidence that the design of the fire protection physical features was adequate, including design provisions for emerging regulatory criteria.Similarly, the quality and.work control improvements that were put in place prior to restart in 1981, and the heightened management awareness to quality following restart, provide confidence that the fire protection physical features were pro-perly constructed. In Section III.B of this report, deficiency documents associated with fire protection are evaluated as an element of the overall assessment of the construction phase Fir e Pr otection Pr ogram.Of the seventy documented NRC findings associated with fire protection, twenty were considered design or construction related.These address concerns in the areas of safe shutdown, cable protection, fire barriers, and emergency lighting.Seven remaining open items have been thoroughly discussed with NRR and NRC Region.V and are currently in the resolution process.These NRC con-cerns have arisen primarily due to the complexities of backfitting addi-tional fire protection requirements into a plant which was substantially completed and the lack of clarity of the governing criteria.Hence, to a large extent, the Fire Protection Program at, MNP-2 evolved as a unique program not under standards or requirements common to either safety or non-safety related systems.The open items are addressed further fn Section III.C of this report.-The corrective actions associated with identified deficiency documents have been reviewed and found to be acceptable. Corrective action plans for open items are considered satisfactory and the interim remedial actions currently in place pending final r esolution are considered adequate.This review has also determined that the construction and operational phase NCR programs have been effective in resolving identified deficiencies. One generic deficiency has been identified that is applicable.to fire protection. MNP-2 cab'le sizing calculations did not reflect THERHO-LAG ampacity derating.All calculational discrepancies have been resolved and field modifications were not required. Since tfie.NRC'eam fnspectfon of, the.NRP-2 Fire Protection Program in Nardt.798f, the Supply SystemI has beem conductfng an fn-depth review of pnagrann adequacy.; Znf tfal efface ware concentrated on the THERMO-LAG flue@eventuaTTy evo1ving fnto an~free;-organfzatfonal review of the tel pmrram The, cb5ectrva$s tm prcwSde a forum for identifying all fn@ivtduaT'nt organfzatfoaaT concerns.;; fdentf fy and collect all known pedi7ems"detfne: and fmplemeet car~.tfve actions and track reso1ution to cT'as'Thfs.pmrgram has Seem eSFee5fve fn probfng all aspects of the Ff~Pratec~~gram and tht fdentff%catfon of areas to be evaluated. TIE.tidmnmT'.tref~art df scussadi tm Ssrtkfan.II I.C.TNe nacht&ga5Nlcant. oF~ftmihmaaiA nerrffee open ftems fn terms of poten-~fitq@M ae tNe pTaet eel'ate te tfh THERMO-LAG tests which are scked-ul'eS Rm.T987t 7lhme tests an fntendis5 te val f date fnstallatf on methods, mf~NIaterf'aTt substftutfans whfch~not fncluded in the original tested: conff guratf on, and<untested>fateefaces between tested barrier matertaTs The tmt prop'ams.are desfgped: to test potential solutions shuuM Yam tharr'ptfttwam teat resuTtm;he ob,tafned. The Sugrly System~fnftfated; a prograrm fn June 1984 to re-perform the MNP-2'..safe-shutdown. anaTysfs to verffjy that the coamftment to meet the fntent.eÃthe tachnfcaT requfrements ef Appendfx R was fncluded fn the Barns>amb Nse desfgr TMs anaTgsfm was camp)eted fn March 1986 but fs~~W fKneH cHcutlIatFeeaiH tRwn.An edNtional high-impedance fault anaPysPs neqy5redf 5y NK EereÃc Hstttmr 8$-M was fnf tfated fn April 1986 andi f3.mw came~Tits evaTuetf'one pPus the ampacf ty der atf ng calcu-ta&ana%cÃscrepancy-correctfons have fnveTved over 22,000 man-hours of engt'neenfny affart.Errors foundi fn~15'ourse of the re-analysis have beer.eepontmU amb ffeT4!chcuqgs ann su5sbanttf:ally complete.7'emfnden" et-".the firfarna1 nerrf4~thqpScs dfscussed fn Section III.C~eeTR on.thefr..w~y'o eTosurt NusL ef these have been reviewed by the*NRE KM sufBcfent: dfateg te ynvr4de.a sufficfent technfcal basis fan.c3'asur4't fa Na.avmraXi7i camQ'usfer'fF ttttr nt~k.that the constructf on phase at sF th Ith>>I IbeN.Sy.'dW t.Hth th axcegtf~aF tfte wrac Oddly occurs dfurfng the YHERMO-LAG f nstall atf on enB the.erors=whf'dr were.fdentfS'ed. fh.the arfgfnal safe shutdown analy-afa performed.'y. Burne and'oe..The-WKRNQ-LAG problems have been sub-atantfaTTy corrected: pendfng;addf tfonaT~.testing for speci ffc conff gura-tfons, and<<the.-.safe-shutdown~ reanalysfs: has been completed with dfscrep-ancfes-.substantfally, corrected: fm the-ff'e1'd'he errors whfch were dis-covered.Nttr the.-THERNMAG'nard'Tatfhm and.the safe-shutdown analysis are.cons%dered~ to.resul,t frol~the:.1'act af.'ndustry knowledge of the THERNO-'LAG: producf".and the, Tack of'3'arf;ty wfthfn the fndustry of the STER&T;.crtterfa.-, CTe@ffcatfcn; of~the.requfrements have been provf ded as.Tete as.TSK&th, the fssuance: aF Rnenfc: Lethe 86-10.The.desfgn requfreaents.-. dunfirg.ttie amstnuctfon phase fmplementatfon of the R~hatectfoe; Reyram~~-consfdhre5 adequate wfth the exceptfon aF tha desfgpr, em'mr assacfatmU&th~ the calculatfon for the amount of THERMO-LAG required for seismic steel and the omission of structur al support steel in the original fire test specification for the THERMO-LAG barrier.These errors have subsequently been corrected in the field for the three hour barriers.The calculational error in omitting derating of power cables in THERMO-LAG raceways has been corrected with no hardware impact as the original calculation was conservative. As an additional verification of the adequacy of the design requirements, an independent consultant is evaluating the design for compliance with the NFPA code and the FSAR.All identified deficiencies have not yet been closed.In these cases the interim corrective/remedial/mitigation measures have been evaluated and the intended safety function is satisfied by the interim measures.These interim measures provide adequate assurance of public safety and compli-ance with MNP-2 Technical Specifications. The final or total corrective actions planned for incomplete items have been reviewed and have been determined to be adequate.Completion of these corrective actions is being pursued as a high priority.Each of the physical plant features of the NNP-2 Fire Protection Program is being adequately addressed to pro-vide assur ance of design and construction in accor dance with required codes, standards, and commitments.

I I.DETAIL'EOZSCUSSIOH GF REVIEWS'.Previous Oesf'nt Constructfne Ver$Fication Efforts The ohcti've cF thfe task was to identi fy and assess the adequacy cf." amstrucV'om pHaae diesi'gn and construction veri fi-catfan efforts;di'recte4 aC the Fir e Protection Program.There two: verhfficatfam efiRnta employed during the construction plass, as illews." a.Qual.%stf fi'.cat5nn Rregpam (9 YP)that evaluated the.compTetedI construettam erNvities and was conducted from August 7980i through~@mater 1983.h Gesi.gn~R'everf ffcatdon.8'eg.am (DRP)that evaluated the desfgn~aces@andi was'.nmdhcted from October 1982 through Septemhe", T98$s.The QVP'n4 tNP concentratedi an safety related systems and those portions: aF the fira prutaction components that directly fraterfaceh wfittn the sa~naPakmf systems.Therefore, the g VP ae5 GRP pnawHdhB ISa5tekf avaPeatfon of the total Fire Protec-tfcnI Ptagitem.+on.Cf R~f~andi Rj digits;.Vertffcat5am Ef~fa~-OhaM Verification Pro ams fh'une 1IT.986,', the.'RRE Issued a 10CFR50.54(f)

Notice of HCTatfae te the.SUgd'gy Sjstem (Reference 2)..Several specf tfc defIcferrcfes.'ere. cited fn il lustration of a ccaaen:, prahTem Ehe&MNve control by Supply System and Burns am5 theInc;.(EK)f ef the activi ties of contr actors efthertr.ERE eeHereUgu8i~ Assurance programs.'En response Cm ttia NRK'stance of Violation, the Supply System'eveTepek.

• and>iipF~nted a plan for the detailed reveri ff cation of" caaqRetm5 safety si gni ficant work intend-ed'o.provide.adequate assurance that construction activi-tfes.both~complete and" fitcampTete would conform to required standards.regul ations-.-.

and'ommitments (Refer ence 3).This'e reAs.red'o;: as-the Quality Verification Program CQVP)..The: gVP was;accomplfstie5 Ltf sizing a random sampl-ing of the complete work'etr was'ategorized equality Class I e.guaT'ityi CTass IIISh4smta Category I.Since much of the Rre Pratectfaa Program"a pfiysfcal features were equality CFass;H.nmhFelsmia:Qdagpiqr EE ft was outside the scope ef the QN'., Completed wnk was reviewed on a system basis and alter-natively on a contract basis.The physical features of the Fire Protection Program that were addressed by the OVP included por tions of the fire suppression system, fire detection system and fire barriers that dir ectly inter-faced with safety related systems.No significant defi-ciency relative to the construction of the Fire Protection Program's physical features was identified. All identified QVP deficiencies were properly reso1ved.Verification Efforts-Desi n Reverification Pro am The DRP was establ i shed to r everi fy that MNP-2 was designed to meet the regulatory requirements comnitted to in the WP-2 FSAR.To accomplish this the MNP-2 design requirements for safety systems were reviewed to ensure that they were complete and corr ectly reflected in the detailed design documents used during construction. The conclusions of the DRP were based on the in-depth review of two Quality Class I systems (HPCS and RHR)and one Quality Class II system (RFM).In addition, five studies were conducted to evaluate the interactions between the..reactor system and other systems.Of those five studies one addressed fire protection interaction with the RHR (Residual Heat Removal)system.The only relevant portion of the DRP was a limited study covering the interface of the fire protection system with RHR Loop B.This study concentrated on establishing that RHR Loop B was adequately protected from fire and provided assurance that the dedicated path was available for shut-down.This study addressed design considerations relevant to the Fire Protection Program's physical features as they fnteracted with the RHR system.The single DRP finding affecting the fire protection sys-tem was that cable sizing calculations did not include thermal derating.Since Burns and Roe advised that thermal derating was in process, it was not identified by the DRP as a deficiency. It has subsequently been determined that Burns and Roe failed to implement this commitment.(See Section III.C.3 for a detailed discussion of this ampacity der ating issue).Conc)usions The QQ'oncluded that completed work was satisfactory; however, it did not provide a comprehensive review of the construction of the fire protection system because this system was generally out of QVP scope.The DRP concluded that the design of Quality Class I and II systems, components and structures was satisfactory. The.same process was used for design of the fire protection system.However, the QRP dfd not provide a comprehensive revfew af, the fire pratection system design because this was generaT,Tip au.t of the QRP scopo.Bath of these efforts (gVP and DRP)were independently veri-fied hy the Technf'c@T Audtft Associates, Inc.(Reference 4)B.Fire Protection: P, i Mentf8'ed'eficfencfes 2.Back Ffre Proteetfae tbreprarm dhNicfencfes have been identified and documented 4 glaHif~Issuance Ff ndf ngs, NRC Inspection Ffndfngs., RCRs,, and!L'ERs The abjectfve of the review of these documents was ta: determfne f~f actfons were correct and to deter-arlne the possfhTe garterfc.desf'ga and construction fmplications ~of the deffcfencfea Descrf Van.ef, Rev.few and:: FesuYts a.uaTf;, Assurance: Ff ndfngs tl tt~Ih pl ply t t f t~~~S H~E~II.The gualfty Assurance P 5.~5 thtyhph, dfydlf,htty aurÃted'esf~ anN emst~ctfon activi tfes related to guaTf ty;Class'appNeatfans.. However, Are Protectf on Programs'thm ghaTtt EPess II applications wer e not raff net mu5teB utrt%Appendf x A of Branch Technf cal Posftfon APCSR K&4 waa fmplemented as defined fn Peenda~ES af=N'e.FMP Sfnce August 1983, the entfr e Pl~p 5.h 5 dd d I th 5pply System's emu'>>ftra yyetee5ae audits.Qua7ftgy Eaaeetce eudBm cP constructfon contractors per-formfny ghar'ttp Q'ass-EE emk were not required.However, when 8 anal TeohntcaT> ReNC'.an: APCSB 9.5-1 was fmp1emented, QA.audtts of~'aTf~CIass H Ffre Protection actfvftfes were f'nstftutedi and~p~onm5 for the Supply System by the systems;compl etfon>>contractor,; Bechtel Power Cor poratf on (BPC)., Two-such>>audfta, ef'he fire protection contractor (Sentry, Automatfc. Sprfnk>>Ter')': and a subcontractor (Lord Bectrfc.)~ were., and!subsequently cl osed f n the thfrd>>quarterl'198l'm'- erst;quarter of 1982, respec-tfvely,;, Addfttonally:;,8m'. performed gualfty Class I work on, flee barnf~-pence;a4fom seals-and THERMO-LAG appl fca-tfons am'as-;aTsoiaudfte5ljy EPt These'An~ntNeek."tudf'ta'ddressed the full range of hl ttt fl'Phh tt~p tpl Ih fhdpt 5'd fh'~d pl I\In the"~P~~~A~A.the-'upply System performs an annual audit (References 5 through 8)of the Fire Protec-tion Program as required by MNP-2 Technical Specification 6.5.2.8.h using the gui dance provi ded in NRC Generi c letter 82-21.Two deficiencies are further discussed in Section III.C.6.f of the this report.Post construction reviews have indicated an oversight in this area discussed in the conclusion'f this section, III.B.3.NRC Findin s NRC Inspection Reports provided another means for identi-fying problems, weaknesses, or potential problems related to the Fire Protection Program.In this portion of the task, NRC findings related to Fire Protection were reviewed to identi fy design or construction rel ated deficiencies and to evaluate the adequacy of the corrective actions.All NRC inspection reports for MNP-2 were reviewed through Oecember 1986.Seventy NRC findings per taining to fire protection were identified and are listed in Section IV.Twenty of these findings are considered to have a root cause related to design and/or construction. These find-ings address concerns in the areas of, safe shutdown cable protection, fire barrier s, and emergency lighting.Df the 14 open NRC findings as of Oecember, 1986, 7 are associated with housekeeping, training, blocked fire doors, etc.The remaining 7 are associated with design and construction. Speci ficall'y they ar e safe-shutdown methodology, THERMO-LAG installation, RHR Hi-Low inter face, control room fire procedure, and emergency lighting.A detailed discussion of these i tems is.pr esented in Section III-C of this report.The NCR program identifies nonconformances to specified standards and then provides the administrative vehicle for tracking them through the resolution process.This process includes an evaluation of the scope and safety-significance of the nonconformance and a course of corrective action that addresses the specific nonconforming condition, appli-cability to other items or areas, and actions to prevent recurrence. ?n order to identify applicable NCRs, the computerized NCR index was examined.Those NCRs having a description that could possibly be associated with fire protection were then identified. The NCRs reviewed are listed in Section V of'his report.These NCRs were reviewed to determine that the NCR process appropriately resolved identified defi-ciencies.Fir e protection related NCRs issued during MNP-2 operation resulting in LERs are addressed in the next subsection of this report.11 A tata'7.of 736 constructfon phase NCRs were fdentified and reviewed.The time period covered by these NCRs was from Jhlty 36~.>975 to October)8, 1983.The deficiencies docu-mented: on these NCRs were caused by personne1 error, pro-cedturali neacompl iance, or de fecti ve equi pment/ma ter i a 1.Ties generfc deffcfencfes applfcable to fire protection were f denti;ffect by trendf ng.One addressed improper fnstal 1 a-tfam of concrete fnserts and the other addressed improper fnstaTTstfan of anchor bolts.Correct review, df sposition m4 fmpIementatfon was canfirmed for all reviewed NCRs.4 thaM OF 52 Fire Pretectfon Program operational phase~!tave a desfgn ar construction related cause.They a45~deficiencies fm the areas of safe shutdown cable pmtectfonI ffre barrfers,. fire detection, ffr e suppres-sfon,, and: eaergency lfghtfng.These issues are discussed fn: Sectfon III.C of thfs report.Those condftfons or events that violated the terms of the MNP-2: Ope'atfng License.are documented and repor ted to the NRC vs L'ERs.LERs were not required to be written during gh tl Itl~ihf IF flit t flp t@tarn neltattedl LERs~$tten after 1983 were reviewed.A 5rfeP dascr$ptfcn of these Hong with the associated cause ant corrective actions,.are lated in Sectfon VI of this report diem llERa having a root cause related to design or con-sCvuetNcaa &ffcfencfes fn: the Ffre Protection Program are fm the~e suppression. system, fire barriers, and in the safe shame cable protectfon. A discussion of the design reTatmh fsstma fdeetfffed by these LERs is discussed fn Shetfinn REF C of thfs pep~.ihny of=the satm ar sfmBar.design related Ffr e Protection Pro-gram~daffcfencfes have been: fdentf ffed by CA organizations, NRC fnspectfonsNCRs,. and, LERs..All valid'deficiencies are also associated'fth an NCR.Thfs, fncludes an evaluation of the causesafety sfgnf ffcance and appl fcabf1 fty to other items tf.e generf c, Cmpl fcatf ons)'..It.fa the: concl'upon of'his revfew that the construction and operatfonal~ phase NCR program has been effective fn resolvfng fdentf fhsk&ffcfencfes. However, internal reviews conducted hy;the.Supp'>>+stem~frr, T986 have f dentf ffed problems wf th THEIttC~t fimps~e;fnstal'Tatfon which were not identified by NRG: fnspectfan. reports m ttA audits and inspections during con:~elf'on'ecftfuaTTy these are the unauthorized use of the annulus pumping method of THERMO-LAG application for con-duit protection; incomplete installation of seals~in conduits entering the protected raceways;and general adherence to pro-tection of 9 inches of all thermal conducting materials entering the barrier.Even though these over si ghts coul d r ef1 ect a weakness in the program based upon today's knowledge of the product and its application, the overall cause is complex in nature.The THERNO-LAG install ation was state-of-the-ar t in 1982 when work began and MNP-2 was one of the fir st plants to install the material.Installation was complex because of the inter ferences and the mul ti tude of heat conducting member s penetrating the envelope.In addition, the THERMO-LAG material was installed under the technical direction of two THERMO-LAG vendor employees who.provided help during the construction phase.Engineering concludes that these THERMO-LAG problems, when viewed from the total design and construction perspective of physical plant fire protection features, are unique and as such do not reflect negatively on'the integrity of the overall installation. It is also concluded that only one generic issue has been ident-ified and that is the cable ampacity, derating issue.This is further discussed in Section III.C.3.Furthermore, it is concluded that the current open issues and associated remedial actions ar e in compliance with the MNP-,'2 Technical Specifications and are not of a generic design nature.Post Construction Internal Reviews Foll owing construction, the Supply System identi fied several fire pr otection improvements that were considered necessary and were subsequently implemented. Three notable examples are: A lar ger storage tank was constructed to provide adequate and reliable water volume for the fire suppression system.The site potable water system and fire protection system have been completely separated to increase the reliability of the fire suppression system.Additional plant storage areas have been created with the in-stallation of automatic sprinklers on the 487', and 467'leva-tions of the radwaste building.This will allow materials to be stored away from safety related areas aqd increase the over-all safety of the plant.In early 1984, the Supply System had difficulty in updating the FSAR using Burns and Roe's safe-shutdown analysis and has subsequently peri'ormed a complete reanalysis. The results of this reanalysis is discussed fn Section III.C.4 of this report.13 Zm l~aF Tg&6the NRC performed an'on-site inspection of the Ffre Protection Program.During this inspection an NRC concern surrfmedi aver the amourrt of 7HERM8-LAG appl ied to seismic steel penetr'atfng. the.three-hour fire barrfer associated with safe shut-dowrn cahTes-Ttrfis resulted fe anr engineering review of the design m7cuTatf'ons; frrstaTTatfon specf ficatf ons, THERMO-LAG vendor's reqaf'remend and the fire barrf er test program to determfne the comm~amaurrC uf YHERNO'-I(AS. reqg$red on seismic br acing for the thrr~tham harrf'er Separately, the NRC Offf ce of Investigation fntif'at'ad. am fnvestfgatf'mr. fnta, the subject of seismic steel protec-tNarn ett W~As a mmB.t of a ccmarftment made to the NRC.in the Itttt 133$~0 I:, tt I litt 3 I I t'ien perrfimm@arm eviltuaktfon of the design control process as it eppWfeC ta$fre prMtect%aa durfrrg the construction phase.This evaiTuatfen'nafsted: ef'detafTed review of 20 fire protection system'i object.Engfneer-Gfrectfves (PEDs).It was concluded that the'.desi gn control pracess for fir e protection was satisfactory (wfitdt the:-exceptf'oni af;the THERMO-LAG issues)(Reference 9).As a resuTt: of" ShppTy, Systemrevfews of the 3 hour THERMO-LAG bar-rier".andi frr.vfew.af the number of NRC questions and concerns rega~d-fng other aspects.af'he program,.an fnter-organfzatfonal task force~establiMie5 frn August: 1986 te Merrtf fy all known fire protection aamrerrns-en'eCert'f'aBl problems fncludf ng the NRC's, and track pregpem W camizlaCfam. Represented fn the task group are Lf censing, TeeftnfcN SC@PF.glmT4tp Jhsurance, Engfneering, Fire Protection and KedrtrP Ttrfs, grautr.meets bf~Ty to add new issues as they are rifsedl and ta provf'de-rreeded dfrectfon to satisfy the issues as they ane foTToweCh te em','ation. No new fssues have been added since Nweaterr X.TSK NrHe a totalI of 47 issues have been raised, 29 ef themt werr campT'ebsh 5y teenier lS, 1986, and work continues on the remafrrderr arr a prfarfty basis.These issues have been grouped fram the, 6rTTawfmp sfx, gener a7-categories and are df scussed 58giRlrKCelg I PhaNsftm cF e ane mr three hour fire protection barr fer for ambT"es (ITS fmues)': hylt~:~3 yl Il It I a, Cable.deratfng/tray,. averfiT1 (3 f ssues).e Safe: shutrfawm arrd<other NRC concerns (6 issues).a~Pragnutmetfc: concerns (7 f ssues).a.NfsceTT'arreaus. hardware;f tems (ffre doors, saake detectors, penatmtfan~ sea.Ts..etc.)t10 issues). 1.Provision of a one or three hour fire rotection barr ier for ca es issues a~Back ound Safe shutdown dedicated cabl es are protected either by separation (20 feet with no intervening combustibles), a fire rated wall, or by application of fire barrier mater ial with or without a sprinkl er system.The fire barrier material THERMO-LAG was used exclusively during the con-struction period while 3M mater.ial use was added post con-struction. A one-hour barrier fs used where a sprinkler system'is available and conversely a 3 hour barrier is used without sprinklers. Mhen fire barr ier material is used, the suppor ting structural elements and heat flowpaths, as well as the cables themsel ves, are required to be protected. Nen the THERMO-LAG was being applied during the construc-tion period it was a new product and there was some con-fusion as to the details of application and amount r equired to provide a safe envelope for the cables.This was a problem parti cul arly with the protection of structural steel and the multitude of interferences with the fire barrier envelope in the field.In 1986 several concerns were raised as to the adequacy of these fire protection measures, as follows: (1)Use of an untested application procedure for applying THERMO-LAG to conduits.(5 issues)(2)Failure to provide a full 18" of heat flowpath pro-tection for three hour fire barriers on dedicated cable envelopes. (3 issues)(3)Use of untested materials within the protected envel-ope.(2 issues)(4)(5)(6)(7)Seals for conduits entering the envelope may not be complete.(2 issues)I Untested interface between, tested bar rier materials. (1 issue)Requirements for component supporting structur al steel protection. (2 issues)One hour fire barrier in cable spreading room.(3 issues) b.Descri tion of Review (1)Use of untested a Tfcation rocedure of THERMO-LAG 0 cofi ulnas issues The construction, Pal'es and procedures were researched for Justification, ta use the untested annulus pumping method fifth negative r;esults.The vendor was queried about tMs methane with negative results.Nb eagf~ing;dfnertfon or Justification can be found for use eF t$$s untested method of THERMO-LAG fnsta7)ation,. A series af'iche ta~is being conducted in 1987 to verify the adequacy of.the installation method.If not adequateappropri'ate corrective actions will be taken.Any correctfve .actions are scheduled for completion June: SP,, Vig88.In the meantime aH areas with THERMO-LAG applied in this manner are, on: firewatch in accordance with MNP-2'echnf cal Q~fi cation 3.7.7.Since these N;em are mn%Kneed'.ch, Engineering does not feel there 4s any saA4y cancern.Addi tionally, a trained fire~ddt" ts avaAable, all areas are provided fifth fi'm datec.tarsand hose stations and fire extfnguishers; ~im the.'area if fires are detected.Theref~e;, this-umxHiti'on does not present a safety cancan wtth contf'numB operation of the pl ant.f2)FaiTure tn., tde.m ful'T 18" of heat flaw ath ro-ani, our~re arr ers or e sca d~my ee fn lhrch 1986, the NRC ques-tkae5 ttte.fnstHMim.of 9" o'f THEPPO-LAG on seis-a th h ff b t when~they'ad.obs.ervect= l8" at'another plant.In response to'his-issue.a report was submitted to the NRC: in Nay 1986:-(Refer ence 9).In preparation for this report', vendor'ata; and architect/engineer cal-cul'ations were reviewed": to determine the basis for the: use.o5'9;-'of~ THERMO'-LAG on secondary steel mem-bers., By calcul'aNurr. ft can be shown that 9" of THERM-LAG. fs.-adequate-for-structural steel protec-tion.Howeva';, thnly test data that could be found fndfcates. th'MTS".is adequate to protect the cables within the enveTape tto maintain cable temp-eratures-. less:.thar-.3RS;F).Tests have not been conducted ta cerfire"-the adequacy of 9" of THERMO-LAG .an: mmdary~steeF..TNa evaluation of the basis for 5 THERMG-LAG:fs.-:disused'n reference 9. The conclusion reache'd in the reporvt to the NRC was that a judgemental error was made, influenced by the level of industry experience and status of nuclear plant Fire Protection Programs in place at the time of impleaantation. Furthermore, this judgement has been evaluated to be a unique design error.All dedicated cables within the three hour barrier have since been provided with 18" of heat flow path protection. Prior to and during this work, a fire watch of the affected areas was provided.This work is now compl ete..Therefor e, there is no safety concern with continued operation of the plant.Use of untested material s within the rotected~enve o e issues Construction files were reviewed and meetings were held with the THERMO-LAG vendor concerning the use of untested materials such as Kao-Mool and hardware cloth in the THERMO-LAG envelope.Project design changes issued during construction have been reviewed.to determine whether there was any authorization for use of non-tested materials. Recognizing materials may have been tested separately, there is no evidence that materials in combination have been tested.No adequate justification for the use of these materials has been identified. A fire test will be conducted to affirm that the untested materials are acceptable. If they are not appropriate corrective actions will be taken.The fire test is scheduled to be completed in 1987 and any corrective action, if needed, will be completed by June 30, 1988.Pending results of this fire test, these areas are all on firewatch in accordance with MNP-2 Technical Specf fication 3.7.7.Addi tionally, a trained fire brigade is available, all areas are provided with fire detectors, and hose stations and fire extin-guishers are avail able i f fires are detected.Engineering concludes there is no safety concern with continued operation'of the plant.Seals for conduits enterin the envelopes may not be~corn e ssues As part of the review and field inspections, the seals in conduits entering cable tr ays were checked.As a related issue, continuous, non-dedicated con-duits supported from structural members within the protected envelope have not been sealed when these conduits are continuous thr ough the envelope.17 En, the f>eT4 frrspection, some sea1s were found to be missing: or'ncompTete and these nonconformances were documented. These missing or incomplete seals were then praperly: se+Ted'nd remained on the fire watch untfT the work:.was completed. For those nondedicated conduits.that are continuous and pass through the enve1'ape, f'nformatfon was received on January 16, 7987fran the THERNQ-LAG vendor that the design used fn: the.pl'ant provided adequate protection for the dedfcatedI cabe eiveel'ope. No additional sealfng was access~.TNeretbre, this, issue fs considered clI~Untested fntsWcree between tested barrier materials issue (In 198&',, 3N'fra harrfer material was used as an al.ternate ta THEBMG-LAG, but no approved fire test of an fnterface between these two materials has been conducted.'. An firteMace test fs scheduled and those effectedI areas're an fire watch pending successful completf'an af.thfs test by Mar ch 31, 1987.Since Clice images me on ffrewatch and the actual ffre 11aedfnI fm flan hufldfngs fs much.less than the desfyn SAN carrd$tram, Engineering concludes there fa na sa%canc'f th continued plant operation. Re frementa foe structur al steel rotecti on Ourfng Ssppl'g System field fnspectfons a question arose cancamfmp the amount of THERMO-LAG protection requfre5 far, eahedifed steel strip plates whfch sup-port, hangem foe.diMFcated cable trays.A calcula-tf'cm wax per@rnedl wlNch showed that 9" of THERMO-LAG pratectfam was axthqpete. In all cases, 18 inches of heaC fl'aw pari tfav~heen protected and 9"-of protec-tfan'Ls;e~lteee provfded on all embedded steel pl ates;in., the three hour fire barrf er areas.EngfneerfngJ concTudes'hf s problem is resolved.One hour*fire.harrier in cable s readfn room ssQBR l One hour-ffre: ban",fers were originally to be fn-stalledl fn~the.cablIa spreading room fn the 20 foot excTusfan-anea~Am eTl cables.This was subsequently sodffieh durfng~carmtmctfon by a design change which usedi T%RNQ-'L'AG te pmvfde a 20 foot nm-combustfble area:..As, a:resuX~not all supports for dedicated cah7es mcefve5 THHNQ-LAG protection necessary for the: heat': fTet Pa4f'- Available test resul ts show that 18" of heat flow path protection is adequate.An engineering analysis indicates that 9" of protection is adequate in com-bination with sprinklers. This calculation is cur-rently being reviewed by the THERMO-LAG vendor.Additional THERMO-LAG is to be added to provide the additional protection required.These areas are on firewatch and Engineering con-cludes this condition does not present a safety con-cern with continued operation of the plant.2.Desi n and Construction'f Fire Lines (3 issues)~Bk 1 Comitments for OP-2 include NFPA 13-75 (Sprink1 er System), 20-74 (Fire Pumps), and 24-73 (Private Fir e Mains).During the construction period fire mains were installed in accordance with standard design practice in effect before the Brown's Ferry fire.Subsequent review did not result in any changes to the basic fire main lay-.out.In a recent inspection an NRC repr esentative ques-tioned the location of a fire main under the diesel generator building.b.Buried Fire Mains (2 issues)As a result of the NRC concern, a complete evaluation of all fire protection piping buried under plant structure es was completed, including obtaining an opinion from NFPA Code regarding the MNP-2 design.Specific to the buried piping underneath the diesel generator building, this evaluation resulted in the following conclusions: (1)The design does not violate the intent of NFPA 24-73.(2)The design of the building is adequate in case of leakage.Calculations show that the main will not be damaged by building settlement. The main has already survived significant water overpressure variations without damage and has been hydrotested twice in 1986.(5)The main may not survive safe shutdown earthquake motions as presently constructed but its failure would not degrade plant structur es.(6)The other safety related buildings were also evalu-ated.The addition of 5 isolation valves is being considered to enhance the plant's ability to maintain the fire protection system.19 $7')Other segments of We fire mains were also hydro-tested;f,n 1986.If a break were to occur it would happen under the hallway sewates the CteseTi generator building from the reactor.5ufTdfng ance he caused by the differential. build-fng movememts during an" earthquake (an event that does not have te he eursideredL cambium ently with a fire).The pipe f's rfgidTy attached't t5e reactor building and using worst case assumptfans. Cs considered captured by the mud mat umfeL" the tBesH@enactor bufldfng even though the 4raw5ngs site Ore 5ettmm ef the mud mat at the top of the ape.Tltemfere the pfpe can only break between the two 5uiTCings. 0 break frt.ChiIs line would not degrade the diesel generator huA'dfng, Rundation to the extent that the dfeseT, generators. woHd:become inoperative. The postu-Tated.break.would not.prevent safe shutdown of the plant.Consfderfng the haTlway.sTab, which fs free to lift, and the penetratfon fnta the Factor Bufdlfng, a break would cause flooding fn.the.haTTway and some water would reach the Reacts EuiTdfng sumps: but the 1 inc would be fsolated.Basedl upon the abave currclusfons, the current desfgn of tlirt faire mafm erder the dIesel generator buil ding and%fees unclear other sefttg-relIated buf1 dings f s not con-@ltd'a~~5 a sa%~Yern.Transfarmer Yard: GeT:u S'1 issue)Il5e GHuge System fn.the 7emsformer Yard would not auto-aaatfcaÃly 4rafn after teshfng and potentfally could freeze.As a temperer'ornMfon the drain valve was changed to he Tacked'peN. and'di..a!fit heTe was dr filed fn the screwed cap down: stream.at the.drain valve.The permanent fix will le'e aha aae (T:)'pec thmdI to automatically drain the system.TlNs tasL fs!mthaflaled; to be completed by January MB Am accepts'snpererg! amrmctfon has been fmpl emented.Engfneerfnr. conclidhs there fs no safety concern with contfnued operatfon'f; the pTant.3'., Cable Deratin/Tra OvenffTT'. (3." fssues)Aa a resul't aF the RRC'u<St performed fn March 1986, NRC concerns were expressed. ahab cable deratfng analysis for caNes'f.th THERMO-LAG proteetfon and cable tray over fill.Ky~ff'caT!Ty f1'.appe'~t5at.MNP-2 power cables routed, fn;THKRNQ'prateetadf mceways wer e not additionally debate&~the 7HERNK~envelope;that some power cable mcaays shown~frr, aha MNP-P cable schedule ar e indicated as greater than 40>>filled which could result in additional derating.required; and that bottom cables laying on sharp edges of trays could fail due to cable weight.b.Descri tion of Review (2)~M1 0 tt t1 t Power cables routed in THERMO-LAG protected raceways require a 9.4%additional ampacity derating for those in conduits and 17.7'X for those in trays.The exist-ing MNP-2 cable sizing calculations do not reflect THERMO-LAG ampacity derating."A complete review of power cables routed in THERMO-LAG protected r aceways has been completed to assure that these cables are adequately sized to accommodate the addi tional required derating.Approximately 2,000 Class lE and associated power cables have been reviewed to verify the adequacy of the original cable sizing calculations. Of those, 28 cables were shown to be calculationally under-sized.A review of each identified cable was per-formed to physically verify actual running currents.These were compared with calculated values.All calculational discrepancies have been resolved.No field modifications are required.Therefore, Engineering concludes there is no safety concern with continued operation of the plant.Cable Tray Overfill Review (2 issues)The MNP-2 cable tray loading criteria requires that no more than 40%of power tray cross sectional area be filled with cables and no more than 50'X for con-trol and signal trays.Concerns by the NRC in a recent exit briefing that MNP-2 trays appeared to be more than'40 to 50 percent filled were evaluated by'review of the then exist-ing MNP-2 tray loading schedules. Investigations, however, revealed that overfill conditions did not actually exist in the field.Due to methods of node assignment and cross sectional area assignment, the trays only appeared to be overfilled. Therefore, no unsafe conditions exist in the plant.Each of the indicated overfilled nodes (approximately 50 out of 2000 Class 1E)was reviewed against.actual conditions. The majority of apparent overfill con-ditions were eliminated by revising the stated cross sectional tray areas to actual.The r emaining con-ditions were justified on an individual basis.21 Kfnce ne overfill conditions actually exist and tray mT7autz an smooth edged, failure of bottom cables weT"gfrt is not a concern.4.Safe Shutdown, arrdi GtNer.NRC Concerns (6 issues)Safe%Ltdbwm AraT is f2 issues)En.Dime Vga, following completion of the Appendix R safe shutdown analysis by Burns and Roe, the Supply+stem assunred responsfbflity for the prepara'tfon of tahelN~FKH Appendix F update.Zt, was determined that the existing analysis format dtd!not Tend.ftself to the FSAR update format re-quested~hy.the NRC.Additionally, the Burns and Roe analysis was not arranged fn a manner that allowed easy'enfAcatfon of compliance to the various re-qufrementts of, Appendfx R and appeared to contain fnccrrststencf es.W a nesuTt,.the Supply System initiated a program tm v+4+the amaritment to aaet the intent of the thehnfca1 reqmfrements of Appendix R and to provide en ens7~s fIm an acceptable format.As the Supply Quatern anHysfs progressed, some discrepancies were found,', reported to the NRC in LER 84-031 as required, andt aerrected'. Addf tfonally, during this time the NRG.f'uuedi cl,'Kfying Generic Letters 85-01 and 86-10 nasuM'mg ite additional analysis.The last of these anaTyses fIs~edified to be completed fn March 1987.an: of, the Review 4 cmap7e~reanalysis of Appendix R safe shutdown wasE.pe~m5 between June 1984 and March 1986 fn-vcTvfngt egpraxfnately 11,000 manhours of engfneerfng tfhe An mfdftfonal high fmpedence fault analysis nequfrM tiy 6enerfc Letter 86-10 and cable deratfng revf~bepn: fn Aprf1 1986 fnvolvfng an additional Tl',GGK engineering manhours.Resul ts/Status: TNe: anaTyses a%though complete, are not yet in ttieft'fna1I calculatf onal form.The reanalysf s uncoveredi several desi gn df screpancf es which were reported'y revf sions to LER-84-031. Resul ting Ael&madfiRcatfons are fn progress and are substan-t5+TTj~cenpl'etc., Fire watches exf st for all areas wltene fries.are not yet complete.No unsafe condf--tdians;relist fn, the plant. b.Other NRC Concerns (4 issues)(1)Safe Shutdown NRC Concerns'3 issues)On October 20, 1986, the Supply Sy'tem received NRC concerns regarding safe shutdown.The response was submitted on December 1, 1986 (Reference 10).Of the ten questions, three were considered to be of sufficient safety significance to warrant further information via phone.The three questions concerned the control room evacuation procedure 4.12.1.1, power removal from RHR-V-8 and V-9, and location of fir e detectors. 'hese were discussed with the NRC on December 18, 1986.Mith regard to Procedur'e 4.12.1.1, the following commitments were made: (a)Deviate the procedure to (1)correct typos indi-cating which Automatic Depressurization System (ADS)valves are used, and (2)clarify that six ADS valves are relied on in control room evacua-'ion due to fire (step 12 page 2 appeared con-fusing to the staff).This action was completed by December 22, 1986.(b)Deviate the procedure by December 26, 1986 to clearly indicate actions taken for evacuation of the control room due to fire.Confusion seems to exist in that the procedure is for evacuation under any circumstance and the staff could not readily discern what por tions of the procedure are expected to be completed for fire.Attach-ment D to the procedure was modified to meet this comnitment by December 22, 1986.(c)Inform the NRC by January 2, 1987 which of three options will be selected: new procedure, appen-dix to existing procedure, or high 1 ighted (asterisked) portions indicating control room fir e evacuation actions.Subsequently the NRC has been notified that a separate procedure for control room evacuation due to fire will be completed by February 1987.In the interim the procedure deviation assures evacuation and requi-'i teactions can be accompl i shed wi thin the required time.The NRC has since reviewed this,pracedure and parti-cipated in a drill in January 1987, to ensure that 6 ADS valves could be actuated within the 10 minute 23 boundary determined, by analysis.The drill showed the valves cou1d be actuated in 5 1/2 minutes.With this resoluti'on, Engfneerfng concludes there are no safety concerns wi th continued operation of the plant.Consf:derfng, the suggestion to remove power from RHR'-V-'8'nd V-'9, ft appears that the NRC staff man-agement was not fu~TT'y aware of the Supply System's pasf tf on:.RHR-V-BV-9 ar e used as the preferred safe shutdown calf'rg path post-LOCA and, therefore, reirava7 ef that.patch fs more significant to safety tham the proposed fT'~scenario fn which opening both vaTves: due to a.fire.fs a credible occurrence. The staff coamf tted ta r evis it their posi ti on.This concern fs still open.To date the safety concern ef this'tem fs f'n question.At the present time Brgfneerfng concludes. this fs no safety concern with cantf nued operation., N:th respect ta the location of fire detectors, it was recognfzed that the Lfcense condition is based ae Amendment. 33 ta;the, FSAR which in turn provides ae exceptforia ta camplfance with NFPA 72E.There are detectors-maurr~fn the plant that appear to rret'.he fn compl fancy wfth NFPA 72E.An independent ffre protection consultant to the Supply System is performing a detailed evaluation of detector loca-tfon compliance wf thi NFPA Code and the results will he presented'fn another part of the Fire Protection ReevaTuatfon Report'.The Supply System will evaluate the extent, of conformance, and the necessity for carrfemmce ta the code when the consultant's report ts remfved.However-.in the interim, the comftment ta.ducuaent the noncanformance on an NCR for evalua-tfcm am: to reportahfTfty and posting of a fire watch~made The NRK staff dfd acknowledge that this fssue was not a sf'gnfffcant safety issue.(5 Hf-ta.-Low RHR S stem Inter face.RHR-V-8 Power emuva ssue This.fssue was brfefTy discussed fn the previous section., Removal of power from RHR V-8 during normal plant operation results fn Toss of the normal shut-down cool fng.and.vessel water level r eduction past-accident; This fs contrary to the requirements ef the Elergency Procedure Guidelines. The NRC fs mviewfng'he regu1ation conflict and will provide ttrefr.assessaaiit f n" the near future.24 5.Programmatic Issues (7 issues)Programmatic issues are addressed in another section of the Reevaluation Plan (Ref.1).These are all administrative con-trols such as fire reporting, a1arm response and organizational matters.6.Miscellaneous Hardware Items (10 issues)~Bd!"~\During construction there was a lack of sensitivity to minor details that might affect the overall Fire Protection Program.Mith the intensive reevaluation undertaken in the current review these miscellaneous items were identi-fied and steps taken to correct them.They consist of such items as small modifications to fire doors, loss of some details on penetration seals, emergency lighting and architectural design changes in the control room.b.Penetration Sealin (3 issues)In 1986 a field verification of the fire seals addressed by the MNP-2 Technical Specification was conducted (all were inspected except for less than 5'X that were inacces-sible), and the Plant Seal Tracking System (PSTS), a com-puter program containing all penetration data, is being updated to reflect the as-built information. The certified vendor information (CVI)file is also being corrected to reflect this as-built information. Penetrations that were found to be improperly-sealed during the field verification were documented on non-conformance reports.Required cor-rective action is complete on all identified non-conforming seals.The 5X that was not accessible will be inspected during the refueling outage in April 1987 and any correc-tions required will be completed by June 30, 1987.I A firewatch was established in these areas-once it was determined that these seals could not be checked due to obstructions. There is no reason to believe that these seals have been improperly installed, or degraded.Thus the firewatch gives an added confidence level that barriers will not be breached by a fire.Engineering concludes there is no safety concern with continued operation of the pl ant.The fire penetration seal s were'nstall ed as a gual ity Class I system.The installation contractors installation procedure contained a step to assure that if overfill of cable was noted, a change-of detail was made.Mhen over-fill was noted, SF-60 seal material was installed. This SF-60 material has been tested successfully in overfilled 25 penetratfon seaTs.The change of material is noted in PSTS and has been field ver ified.The work on the original seals has been checked and found to be acceptable. Therefare, the adequacy of overfill ed penetration is in agreement wf th orf gfnH requirements and is consi dered closed.with no safety fmpact on the Plant.c.ArchftecturaT. Chan s to the Control Room (1 fssue)Changes ta the Shift Nhnager's office in the control room were made without arI approved design change.As a result of the fire protection. revfew, installation of additional combustfbTe materfaTs was stopped.An NCR was prepared to docutti.nt thfs probTem and appropriate corrective actions were taken.to provide.a correct design for the desired changes'nd to prevent;recurrence of the departure from plant procedures. This'rea is continuously occupied and ffre suppr essfon equfpment is avail able.Engineering concTudes there fs na safety concern with continued opera-tion af the plant.d.Emer en U tfn;(3 f.ssues)(1 l~B&Durfng"the Nhrch:.T986 NRC Audit, the NRC reviewer fdentfffed that the 8-hour battery powered emergency lfghtfng existfng;fn diesel generator room 18 did tet pravfde: sufffcfent illumination to all panel controls.(2)Qescrf tfon af Revue A campTete Hghtf:ng review was conducted to assure that adequate emergency lighting exists throughout the facflfty far." access and control areas necessary fm shutdown aperatfoas which must be made during a tfre event (31 Res ul'ts/Status: The;revf'ew.-fdentf fi'ed the foll owing ar eas which requfre'd addf.tf eraT~emergency 1 i ghting: T..Nafn ContraTi Raom.Remata shatdeer.Raom 3.'..A'ate.nate: Remte Strutdown Room.4.58-8 Saf.tehgear, Raom-ReseT, Genevatatr Racm TB. Diesel backed 8 hour battery pack emergency lighting exists in all areas where operator post-fire actions're required.However, some ar eas are lacking in sufticient illumination. In the interim, until modifications can be completed, other por table 1ijht-ing is available to supplement existing lighting.Therefore, no unsafe conditions exist in the plant.All modifications are scheduled to be completed by.the end of the second refueling outage in June 1987 (Reference 10).e.Fire Detection Instrumentation (2 issues)During the 1986 NRC Appendix"R" audit, deficiencies with the MNP-2 fire detection system installation were noted.'he MNP-2 commitment stated the installation was per-NFPA 72E-74 requirements. A consultant was coamissioned to review the MNP-2 fire detector installation against NFPA requirements..That effort is not covered in this report but will be covered elsewhere in the Fire Protection Re-evaluation report.f.Fire Door Moditications (1 issue)Fire doors in the plant have had signs installed that violate the UL fire rating of the door..The plant staff completed walkdowns that identified all doors with viola-tions.Mork orders were then issued to repair/restore the fire doors to UL listed configuration. A memorandum was issued that identi fies the proper r epair procedure and sign limitations and cautions employees to contact a know-ledgeable person before repairing or modi fying fire doors.All work is complete and the fire doors are in compliance with the UL label requir ements.Therefore, this condition does not present any safety concern with continued opera-tion of the plant.27 I V.LISTING OF REVIEMED NRC FINDINGS Closed by Rt~RI dt IR~RRRR t 20 78-10-05 79-04 Descri tion of Ffndin s Cable separ ation probl em.Cannot be further evaluated until cabl e fnstallatfon and ffr e bar rfers are fn place.21 22 23 24 24'9-04-07 82-28 80-07-'Ol'2-28 80-1 9-.02 82-08 81-1 7-02 81-25 81-175'2-28 Cable separation problem.Crf teria being appl fed to separation of Cl ass-1 cfrcui ts at termination locations. Separation criteria for Class 1E, non-Class 1E, and associated circuits.Separation of electrical cables from fnstrument tubing on redundant. sys-tems fs not being considered. Faf lure to revise RG 4-9 pertaining to Ffre Protection. Lack of clear cable separation crf-terfa for electrfcal contractor. 25'82-12-01 82-15 Responsfb f1 f ty for per forming f n-spectfons of the fire protection 'ystem requires clarification. Resolve confl feting instruction ~between Bechtel gC aanual and Sechte'l Engfneerfng. 26 28 82-21-01 83-18 82-21-04 83-1 8 82-21-05 83-18 83-38-14 85-37 83-39-01 83-50, 85-31 Faf lure of electrfcal contractor to assure qual f ty wf th respect to electrf cal separation. Electrical separation of Class 1E and non-Class lE.Safety Division 1, 2, and 3 are fn physical contact with each other fn the control room.Electrfcai raceway separ atfon.Ffre hfgade embers wearfng fu11 beards.28 Closed by R f~F'ID~NRC R t 28 83-39-02 83-50 Descri tion of Findin s Fire Br i gade Training-Review SCBA Tr aining 28 28 28 83-39-03 , 85-31 83-39-04 83-50, 85-31 83-39-05 85-31 Cutting and Welding Permit System.Fire Watch Program., Install ation of fire barrier pene-tration seals and dampers in pro-cess.Re-examine at'future inspec-tion.28 28 28 83-39-06 83-39-07 83-39-08 85-'05 85-30 83-50 Fire Doors.Small fire door in'he wall of the MCC rooms not UL ap-proved.Fire Doors.Doors not self-closing due to ventilation system imbalance. Emergency Lighting.28 83-39-09 85-31 Fire Protection Systems-Pressure and gauge OK but valve supervision incomplete. 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 83-39-10 83-39-11 83-39-12 83-39-13 83-39-14 83-39-15 83-39-16 83-34-17 85-31 85-05 85-29 85-05 85-05 85-05 85-05 83-50 Fire Protection Systems-Match up identi fi cation systems.Fire Protection Systems-Hal on system incomplete. Fire Protection Systems-Fire pump tests to meet.HFPA standards. Fire Extinguisher Program.Fire Fighting Equipment-Distribu-tion of equipment. Fire Fighting Equipment-Hose sta-tion and hydrant houses.Pre-Fire Plans.Technical Speci fication Surveill ance Procedure. 29 28 83-39-18 Rf~FfCh ID Closed by NRC Re ort 85-05 Descri tion of Findin s Power Genera tf on Control Comp1 ex (PGCC)Floor.28 28 29 29 29 29 31 83-39-20 83-39-21 83-50-01 83<<50-02 83-50-03 84-29-01 86-13 86-13 85-05 86-13 85-05 84-06 85-38 85-31 Safe Shutdown Capabf1fty. Ffre Protection Evaluation will be rer evf ewed foll evf ng comp1 etf on of current changes.Ffre doors had extra holes drflTed fn them.Emergency lfghtfng test results and PN program not inspected. Addf tfonal hose station installation was incomplete. Safe shutdown capabf1 f ty not per Appendfx R, Sectfon III.G.Request'xemptf on for the two condi tf ons cf ted.Fire Suppression System design con-trol of hangers.General fire protection/safety to be included fn plant training for personnel access.Housekeepf ng--cl eanl f ness and Fire Safety (change PPN 1.3.19).33 33 84-29-02 85-31 85-05-01 Open 85-05-02 Open 85-05-03 Open 85-05-04~.85-31&5-05-05 86-01 Ffre protection for welding, grind-ing, and cutting activities (change PPH 1.3.10).No procedure fi annual functional test of afr dampers.hddftfonal stafffng of ffr e protec-tion engineer.Fire Brigade Trafnfng.Control of transient combustfb'les. Housekeepf ng fn DG rooms-absorbant pads~ Ihf~Ff dI ID 33 85-05-06 33 85-05-07 Closed by NRC Re ort 85-31 85-31 Descri tion of Findings Housekeeping -aerosol cans.Housekeeping-nitrogen gas bottles.33 85-05-08 85-31 Fire brigade locker labeling.34 85-22-01.85-31 Evaluate desirability of placing"Controlled Copies" of PPM's at remote S/D panels.34 85-22-02 85-31, 86-01 Evaluate desirability of placing"Controlled Copy" of PPM's in smok-ing area of Reactor Building.L 35 36 37 85-22-03 85-30-04 85-31-01 86-05-01 85-31 85-37 85-36 Open Control of combustibles. Bechtel inspectors did not under-stand working document.Use of plastic sign holders on fire doors.Safe Shutdown methodology in case of fire has not been approved.Documentation discrepancy. 37 86-05-02 Open Cable trays not thermolagged enough to provide safe shutdown train sep-aration.37 86-05-03 86-22 Approprfate gA/gC measures have not been applied to fir e protection. 37 86-05-04 Open Separation of High/Low voltage cir-cuit cables.Being evaluated by NRR for potential safety signifi-cance.37 37 86-05-05 86-05-06 86-13 Open Organization of design documents impl ementing procedures. NRR is currently evaluating MNP-2 analysis for control room fire and cable spreading room fire.-37'6-05-07 Open 86-05-08 86-13 86-05-09 86-13 DG Room emer gency lighting.Emergency 1 ighting drawings.Door rating proof.31 37 86-05-10 86-05-11 37 86-05-12 R I'Fi df ID Closed by NRC Re ort Open 86-13 86-13 Descri tion of Findin s Define continuous alarm response.)Two errors in a first.draft of the DG spurious si gnal analysis were i denti fied.t Spurious signal to RHR valve ini-tiating lOCA.38 39 86-06-01 86-22-01 86-34 Open Ni trogen air cyl inders improperly stor ed.Plant housekeeping control of flam-mable liquids.39 86-22-02 Open 86-31-IIA Open, 86-31-IIC Open 86-16 Open Plant housekeeping control of com-bustibles and fire doors.Fire Protection Housekeeping. Reactor Building fire door open.THERMO-LAG installation. 0 32 LISTING OF REVIEWED NCRs The following NCRs were reviewed to determine the adequacy of the NCR program as it relates to fire protection: Construction Phase Burns and Roe, Inc.NCRs 00700, 00737, 02439, 02732, 02746, 02823, 02838, 02924,.03396, 03544, 03545, 03556, 03740, D3852, 03875 through 03882, 04030, 04270, 04671, 04948, 04964, 05593, D5716, 05748, 05783, 08009, 08800 through 08824, 09025 through 09097, 09931, and 09933 (132 separate NCRs).Bechtel Power Cor r ation NCRs 20072, 20077, 21656, and 22181 (Four separate NCRs).The tiaa period covered by these NCRs was from July 30, 1975 to October 18, 1983.These NCRs were initiated by the following site contractor s: Contractor Bovee Cr ail, Geri/MBG Mal dinger Corporation Sentry Automati c Sprink1 er Fischback Lord Johnson Control, Inc.Bechtel Power Corporation Contract No.2808-215 2808-216 2808-217 2808-218'808-220 2808-250~Sf II General Mechanical HVAC Sprinkler Systems V Electrical Instrumentation System Completion o Meld Records o Vnistrut o Documentation Discrepancies .o Anchor Bolts o Spalled Concrete o Pipe Supports The topics addressed by these NCRs were: o Welder qualification Records o Concrete Inserts o Inspection Checkl ists o Torque Mrench Cal ibration 33 L~Dth'I Ph 1.Ffre Barrfer s Ffre Barrfer Penetratfon Seal Deffcfencfes 250-22296, 283-0183, 284-0011, 284-0154, 284-0328, 284-0770, 285-0068, 285-0288, 285-0289, 285-0301, 285-0231, 286-0026, 286-0052, 286-0200, 286-0276, 286-0280 Ffre Door Deffcfencfes 284-0094, 284-0224, 284-0227, 284-0553,'84-0588, 284-0589, 2844725, 285-0432, 286-0065)286-0415 Ffre Dam r Deffcfencfes 283-0176, 285-0045 2.3.Safe Shutdown Cable Protectfon 284-0311~284-0740, 285-0268, 285-01 33, 285-0347, 285-0474, 285-0477, 285-0486 foal 284-0383, 284-0502, 284-0378, 285-0059, 285-0266, 283-0204, 284-0001~284-0349, 284-0423, 284-0617 4.-Ffre Detectfon 283-0177, 284-0071, 284-0705, 285-0060, 285-0087, 285-0480, 284-0809, 285-0005, 285-0232, 285-0484, 285-0485, 286-0070 5.Bar n Lf tfn 284-0613, 2~759, 285-M59, 285-0533 Vl.L OF REVIEMED LERS LER ND DATE ISSUED DESCRIPTION 1)2)CAUSE CORRKCTI K ACTION(S)83-002 1-20-84 FP-TK-100 llater inventory was less than the required 280,000 gallons 1)2}Equipment. Afr binding of supply pump Corrected through procedural changes to prevent recurrence. 83-003 1-20-84 Ffre dampers dfd not conform to UL requfrements 1)2)Procedure. Hodfffed exfstfng damper s and scheduled replacements. 83-004 1-20-84 Loss of fire detection fnstrumentatfon on Reactor Building 606'l.1)2)Kqufpment. Instrument was shorted out due to condensation. Power supply replaced and source of condensatfon corrected. 83-005 1-20-84 Fire rated seals were removed to perform con-struction work for plant mod.1)2)Personnel error.Mark document dfd not specify ap'proprfate measures.Added to ffre watch and replaced seal.when const.completed. 83-006 1-20-84 Fire rated door had a hole burned into it causing a loss of fire boundary integrity. 83-M7 1-20-84 Fire hydrant froze fn cold weather.1)2)1)2)Personnel error.Added to fire watch and scheduled door replacement. Personnel error.Craftsman fnadvertently blocked'rafnage port of hydrant.Repair hydrant and used alternate hydrant during interim.83-008 1-20-84 83-009 1-20-84 84-026 4-18-84 84-03'I 5-10-84 Fire damper dfd not function correctly causing a loss of fire boundary fntegrfty. Fire damper stuck open causfng a loss of fire boundary integrity. A pressure surge resultfng from the start of fire pumps caused inadvertent and momentary activation of other portfons of the system.Ten cables required for plant safe-shutdown identified as not THERHO-LAGGED. 1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)Equipment. Guillotine style damper was stuck open.Added to ffre watch and scheduled for repair.Equipment. Link holding damper open had fused.Added to ffre watch and scheduled for repair.Oesfgn.Caused by pressure surge.A design change to minimize pressure surge was fnf tfa ted.Desfgn.Cabl es were TIIERllO-LAGGEO. lER NS DATE lSSUEO 64-'047 6-15-84 84-061 7-6-84 DKSCR1 PT10H Penetration fire protectfon seals were not installed fn bfological shield wall.h Floor drain on 522'.of Reactor Building is open to another fire zone on 501'l.1)2)CAUSE CORRECTl VE ACT IOHt S)Desfgn.Assigned ffre watch untf1 penetratfons are sealed.Des f gn.Assigned ffrewatch until fire barrfer established. 84-061-01 7-26-84 Two addftfonal drains penetrating ffre zones were f den tf f fed.84-086 9-6-84 Faf lure to conduct fire tour.1)2)1)2)Oes fgn.Assigned ffrewatch untfl fire barrier establfshed. Personnel error.Ffre tour was promptly rewstablfshed. 84-096 9-27<<84 8I-031-01 11 29-84 84 122 12-20-84 84-031-02 12-20-84 84-031-03 1-17-85 84-047-01 1-25>>85 05-004-01 2-28-85 85-015 4-16-85 A deluge system was activated due to a steae leak.The pressure surge caused by the pump tripped two preactfon systems.Cooling water to t e DG ffrepump was fnadvertently isolated.Another cable required For plant safe shutdown was fdentf fied as not THENfO-I.AGGEO. inadvertent terwfnatfon of fire door supervisory alarm circuit.Four more safety related cables were fdentf ffed as unprotected. The emergency stop swftch for the Dfvfsfon 2 emergency diesel generator was not fso)ated froi the mafn control room.Same as f.ER 84-047 Technical Specfffcatfon surveillance on ffre pjmp batterfes exceeded maximum allowed time period.The ffre detection fnstrument for RHR valve room was inadvertently reeoved.1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)Equfpaent and personnel. Steam leak and fnadver-tent cooling water isolation. Fixed steam leak and locked open valve.Oesf g'n.Added to ffre watch until cfrcuft repaired.Personnel error.Assigned ffre watch untfl circuit repaired.Design.Added to ffre watch until TltERMO-f.AGGEO. Design.Added to ffrewatch untfl cfrcuft isolation established. Ho change.Corrective actfons completed.'ersonnel error.Performed surveillance and changed schedulfng practice.Personnel error.Added to ffre watch and upgrade procedures and personnel. f.ER N DATE ISSUED OE SCRIPT lON 1)21 CAUSE CORRECTlK ACTION(S)85-028 5-16-85 Unsealed floor penetratfon fdentf fied.85-023-1 7-11-85 Same as LER 85-023 84-031-04 7-11-85 85-043 7-22-85 Cfrcufts for Div.2 Eng.Service Mater cooling valves without control fsolatfon. Result of 18%Technical Specification surveill-ancee on fire barrfers fdentf fied four detfcfencfes 85-046 7-29-85 Reactor scramned due to fire.on FN-D-18.85-023 4-16-85 Appendfx R electrical separatfon deffcfency fdenti fled.1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)1)2)Oesfgn.Add to fire watch and upgrade procedures and personnel and correct specffic deficfencies. Procedure. Add to fire watch until seal installed, inspect other floor penetration seals.Ho change.Corrective actions updated.Procedure. Add to fire watch until transfer swftch installed. Procedure. Add to fire watch until sealed, performed 100K inspectfon. Equipment. Fire extfngufshed, pump failure analyzed and repaired.N 85-050 8-19-85 85-054 8-30-85 85-023-02 9-9-85 84-031-05 9-19-85 The so)enofd valve controlling flow to the sprinkler header would not open.Fire tour not completed per Technical Spec)ffcations. Items fdentiffed by LERA 85-023-01 as befng placed on fire watch were not placed on fire watch.Three cables listed fn I.ER 84-031-04 as havfng work completed-dfd not have work completed. 1)2)1)2)1)2)Equipment. Added room to fire watch until valve repaired.Personnel error.Resumed ffre tour and counseled personnel. Personnel error.Added to fire watch and counseled personnel. Personnel error.Added to ffrewatch and upgraded affected fnstructions/procedures. 85-057 11-8-85 A fire damper was found to be not fnstalled. 1)2)Procedure. Added to fire watch until damper fnstalled. lf.R NS OhTE lSSUEO I)-.Q3}s06 3385 86-028 9-18-86'.86-028-01 10-3-86 86-033 10-13-86 86-033-01 10-22-86 DKSCRlPTlN hddf tfonal f te~s fdentf f fed as requfr f ny electrfcyl separI tfon.Flooding analysfs for all areas containing safety related equipment fdantffied as incomplete. Same f.N 86-028 incorrect sfzfng of underground cables (SH-P-lh and IB}Cable deratfng for additional cables was not properly taken fnto account.CAUSK 2 CORRKCT1%ACTlOH S 1)Design.2)hdded to fire watch untfl electrfcal separatfon comp)ete.1)Design.2)isolate flooding sources, add affected rooms to fire watch and analyze for flooding.1)Same 2)IJpdates correctfve actions.1)Des f gn.2)Pre}fefnary analysfs perforated, an fndepth analysis to follow.1)Oesfgn.2)Perform an fndepth analysfs of problem. VII.REFERENCES* 2.3.4, 5.6.7.8.'10.12.G02-86-0883, G.C.Sor ensen (SS)to J.B.Martin (NRC)-Region V, dated Sep~er 16.1986,"Fire Protection Program Reevaluation". i Docket No.50-397, EA-80-20;V.Stel 1 o, Jr.(NRC Director of Inspection and Enforcement) to N.O.Strand (Supply System Managing Director), dated June 17, 1980,"10CFR50.54(f) Notice of Violation". 602-83-153, N.O.Strand'Supply System Managing Director)to V.Stello, Jr.(NRC Office of IhE).TAA Report 1126-FI, dated 0/83,, Approved by HE Sheets (Technical Audit Associates),'An Independent Eval uation of, the Plant Ve itication Program at MNP-2".CA~-83-85, TJ Houchins (Supply System Audit Manager)to JD Martin (MNP-2 Plant Manager), dated August 8, 1983,"Corporate Licensing, and Assurance Audit 83-261." CA-TJH-84-114,, TJ Houchins (Supply System Audi t Manager)to JD Mar tin (MNP-2 Pl ant Manager), dated September 11, 1984,."Corporate Ucensing and Assurance Audit 84-305." CA<N-85-086, TJ Houchins (Supply System Audit Manager)to CM Powers (MNP-2 Plant Manager), dated September 16, 1985,'Corporate Lf censing and Assurance Audit 85-344".CA-DN-86-119, TJ Houchins (Supply System Audi t Manager)to CM Peters (MNP-2 Plant Manager), dated October 6, 1986,"Corporate Ucensing and Assurance Audit 86-376".602-86-418, GC Sorensen (Supply System Manager of Regulatory Programs)to JB Martin (NRC)dated 5/9/86,"NRC Inspection 86-05 Enforcement Conference, April 15, 1986".602-86-1049,. GC Sorensen (Supply, System, manager of Regul atory Program)to EG Adensam (NRC), dated 12/1/86,"MNP-2 Response to Request for Additional Information". MNP-2 Prospect Management Instruction Manual.Letter, F.J.Barta (Brand, Corporate gA Manager)to M.Tretheway (Brand Site'gA Manager), dated December 29, 1981,"Brand Corporate gA Audit of hand Site gA Program".. ii f i*t it i i il ftit'i ti presented. However, only dir ectly r elating documents are speci fically noted in the text of this report.39 13.14.15.16.17.18.21 o 22.23 24.25.26.27.28.29 Letter.F.J.Barta (Brand, Corporate gA Manager)to W.Tretheway (Brand Site gA Manager), dated January 3l, 1983,"Brand Corporate OA Audit of Brand Site gA Program".BECBI-006-81-0016, S.Pohtos (Bechtel Constructfon Manager)to M.S.Stevenson (Brand), dated November 30, 1981,"Report of Bechtel gA Audft 16.1.1 of Brand".BIBEC-006-82-009, M.G.Tretheway (Br and, gA Manager)to S.Pohtos (Bechtel Constructf on Nanager), dated January 26, 1982,'Response and Request for C1osure of Bechtel Audf t 16.l.l".BECBI-00&42~9, S.Pohtos (Bechtel Constructfon Manager)to M.S.Stevenson (Brand), dated February 8, 1982,"Closure of Audit 16.1.1".BECBI-006-83-0090, J.F.Newgen (Bechtel Constructf on Manager)to N.S.Stevenson (Brand), dated June 3, 1983,"Repor t of Bechtel Audit 18.1.1 of Brand.BIBEC-006-83-0110, M.L Tretheway (Brand t}A Manager)to J.F.Newgen (Bechtel Constructfon Manager), dated June 8, 1983,'Response to Bechtel huNt 18.1.1 of Brand".BECBI-006-83-0'l34, J.F.Newgen (Bechtel Constructf on Nanager)to N.S.Stevenson (Brand), dated July 8, 1983,'Closure of Bechtel AuNt 18.1.1 of Brand".NC Inspectfon Report No.7&-10,'October 24-27, 1978 Inspectfon". NRC Inspectfan Report No.79-04,'Feb.27-March 16, 1979 Ins pectf on'.NC Inspectfon Report No.80-07,'Nay 27-30, 1980 Inspectfon". IRC Inspectfon Report No.80-19,'Mov.4-7, 1980 Inspectfon". %C Inspectfoa Repor t No.81-17, Letter dated October 23, 1981,'August 31 to September 4, l981 Inspection". NC Inspectfon Report No.82-12, Letter dated July 1, 1982,'May 1982 Inspectf on'..NC Inspectfon Report'o.82-21,'Aug.9-Sept.3, 1982 Inspection". MRC Inspectfon Report No.83-38, Letter dated 8/30/83,'Aug.1-15, 1983 Inspectf on'.%C Inspectf on Repor t No.83-39, Letter dated August 29, 1983,'August&-12, 1983 Inspectfon'. NC'nspectfon Report No 83-50,, Letter dated December 14, 1983,'October 12-B, 1983 Inspectf on".e,'1 40 NRC Ins pectf on Re port Mo.84-09 Letter date 31.NRC I e une 13, 1984 Inspectfon Re~~I port No.84-24 Ltt dted Se~32.NRC Ins ct on.ptember 21, 1984,~.Inspectfon Report No-9 ns ct-9, Letter dated 84-29'984 I ctfo nspectfon Re ons~t eport No.85-05 34.e, Letter dated Na 9 NRC Inspectf on Re on~rch 19.9, 1985, Letter dated Au August 7, 1985 nspectfon Re S 1985 I tf 36.NRC Ins ptember 20, 1985, nspectfon Report No ns,.85-31, Lette I tf r dated Ins pectf on Re 85, n Report Mo.86-0-5, Lett d te 38.NRC Ins c a d Apr f1 4, 1986, nspectf on Repor t No 86-06, Letter r dated Aprfl 7 C Inspectfon Report 1986,~~po t No.86-22, Lette r,dated 8/4l86,'RC Inspectfon Re June 10-13, Report No.86-31 L tte d ted Se 41.NRC I Re e nspectf on Re~ptember 18, 1986 n port No.d June 18,'l985-1462, L L.T.Harrol d (Generatfon En fn dated November 14 43.10CFR50.55 c fon'Pro Genera on 1986.5 Deffcfen Lo 1'lf>under YOCFRI 4.WP-2 FSN.8 0.55.ffcfencfes Co nsf dered for N Sectfon 9.8.1 Aaendment 36 ystem.and Appendfx F 5.Contract 29 a ns n Pum s Anendment 3?, 9 awarded to Johnston Pum s Contract 206 ns n Pumps for Ffre Pumps an d 9 fves re p ng.Cr af1 for (Sectf on 158}e>>15 arded to MBG for for provf dfng and-41 48.49.51.52.53.54.55.56.Contract 2TS (Sectfon 15S)subcontracted to Brand for provfdfng and fnstalTfng fire barriers.Contract 217 awarded to Sentry for furnishing and installing fire protectfon systems.MNP2MCL-F-SC-OTT3, D.E.Dobson (Supply System Deputy Pro)ect Manager, Constructf on)to All Contractors, dated July 17, l 980,'Stop Mark Order No.009 for'gualf ty Class l Mor k".MNP2NCL&-8M314, D.E.Dobson (Supply Sytem Deputy Progect Manager, Constructfao) te All Contractors, dated July 23, l 980,"Clarfttcatfas ef Stop Mork Order No.009-Includes equality Class II Sefsmfc Category I".Contract 250 awarded to Bechtel Power Cor por ate for compl eting unftnf shed system constructf on.Report, N.N.Leach (Bechtel Reverfffcatfon Group Lead Engfneer)and J.B.Gatewood (Bechtel gA Manager), dated July 29, 1982'Reve fffcatfon Report for'fre Protection and Deluge System (62)".BECMNP2-82-082&, S.Pohtos (Bechtel Construction Nanager)to H.A.Cr fsp (SS), dated Ju1y 26, 1982,"Wscell aneous Fire Pr otection Systees (62.6)Reverf ff catfon.MNP2SAS-217&-ST-0128, G.I.Mell s (Deputy.Pr object Manager, Constructfoe)'e 8.Doupey (Sentry), dated Hay 15, 1981,"Release A os Stay Mark Order NO.QQ9.RCSM-N-644, T.D.8efth (RCSM Senfor Engineer)to M.R.Mingfiel d (RCSM Teai Leader), dated August 6, 1981,'Subcontractor Review of IR's, NCRs,.and Open gAFR's Appl fcable to Brand".RC%Revert ffcatfaa Package for Contract 215.58.RCSM Reverfffcaon Paci:age lm Contract 217.59.61.NRC Inspectfon Report Nn.N-55, Letter dated January 5, 1984,'Novenber T4-TS, T983 Inspectfon'. Contract 206 Reverfffcatfon Report Bovee and Craf1, dated August 29, 1983.Sfgned'.and.stamped by N.N.Leach (Bechtel Reverfffcatfon), J.B.Satewood, (SechtH;QA.Nanager), R.L.Knawa (gVP Nanager), R.T.Johnson.(Prefect.gA@wager)g%Qvervfew Report, Approved by CS Carl f sle (MNP-2 Program Df recta),.dated 9/2T/83'.MNP-2 Gesfge Reverfffcatfoe Program Repor t, Approved by GD Bouchey (Supply System Teemfcal SpeHalfst), dated 9/83.IN, E FeTdaae (MNP'-2 QA Manager)to N Powers (MNP-2 Plant Nanager j, Catch 12/&48%, Electrf cal Separatf on Issues Summary Report.}}