ML17266A519

Loca.

ML17266A519
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	10/29/1981
From:	FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17212A963	List: ML17212A962 ML17266A519 ML17266A520
References
2-0120042, 2-120042, NUDOCS 8111050502
Download: ML17266A519 (29)

Text

Emergency Procedure 2-0120042 Rev 0 LOCA (~)Page 1 of 21 FLORIDA POWER&LIGHT'OMPANY ST.LUCIE UNIT 2 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 October 29, 1981 MSS OF COOLANT ACCIDENT Q.OCA)REV APPROVAL FRG.PLT MGR DATE DATE TOTAL NO.OF PAGES 21 FLORIDA POWER&LIGHT COMPANY ST.LUCIE PLANT UNIT 2 EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 (LOCA)REVISION 0 Page 2 of 21 LOCA 1.0 SCOPE This procedure provides instructions to the operator in the event of a small or large break loss of coolant condition.

2 0 SYMPTOMS: 2.1 Decreasing przr press F 1 Indications PI-1102 A, PI-1102 B, PI-1102 C, PI-1102 D PR-1100 OTE: 2.1 Alarms H-9, H-10, H-l, H-2, H-3, H-14 Pressurization level may not always be a true indication of RCS fluid inventory.

Pressurizer steam space ruptures, void formation elsewhere in the RCS, reference leg flashing and/or failure may cause indications which are contrary to the true RCS fluid inventory condition.

2~2 Decreasing przr level 2'Indications Leakage greater than'harging pump capacity.LI-1110X, LI-1110Y, LIC-1110X, LIC-1110Y, LR-1110X, LR-1110 2.2 Alarms H-17, H-18, H-25, H-26, H-29, H-30 2'REACTOR RIP/TURBINE TRIP 2'Indications CEA's inserted (ADS)Core Mimic RPS-Ch 1, RPS-Ch.4, RPS-Ch.7, RPS-Ch~91 RPS-Reactor Trip Breakers OPEN 2 3 Alarms L-3, L-9,, L-ll, L-17, L-36s L-44s L-5, L-13s D-8 L>>1.0$L-18 0

Page 3 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042'EVISION 0 2.0 SYMPTOMS: (Cont.)2.4 SIAS/CIS Actuation 2.4 Indications Przr press<1600 PSIA Equipment starts/isolates per Tables 1 and%&be II 2~5 CSAS Signal 2.4 2'Alarms R-6, R-16, R-26, R-3, P-3, P-13, P-23'ndications (Later)2'Increasing Containment Pressure, Temperature and Humidity 2'2.6 Alarms (Later)Indications PIS-07-2A, PIS-07-2B, PIS-07-2C, PIS>>07-2D PR-07-4B, PR-07-5B, TR-07-3B, TR-07-5B, TI-07-3A, TI-07-5A, PI-07-4A, PI-07-5A 2.7 Increasing Reactor Cavity Sump Level 2 6 2 7 M 2~7 Alarms P-13,P-23 Indications LIS-07-6,FR-07.-3 Alarms N-2I,H-29 2.8 Hi containment radiation 2.8 Indications Later r 2'Quench tank high level, temperature, press 2'2'Alarms Later Indications LIA-1 116, TIA-1 116, PIA-1116 2 9 Alarms H-16, H-24, H-32

Page 4 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2>>0120042 REVISION 0 2'SYMPTOMS: (Cont.)2.10 Decreasing VCT level 2.11 Unbalanced charging and letdown flow F 10 Indications LIC-2226 2'0 Alarms M-3, M-11 2.11 Indications FIA-2202, HIC-1110 PIA-2212 2.12 Pressurizer safety valves open F 11 Alarms M-5, M-13, M-15 2'2 Indications (Later)2.13 RCS subcooling margin decrease 2'.12 Alarms (Later)2.13 Indications (Later)2.14 Reactor Coolant Pumps p.m ps motor purfle decreasing and/or erratic RCP pressure differential 2.13 Alarms (Later)2'4 Indications (Later)2.14 Alarms (Later)

Page 5 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2>>0120042 REVISION 0 3 0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS: 3.1 Reactor Trip 3 2 Turbine Trip 3 3 CIAS 3 4 SIAS 3 5 CSAS 3.6 RAS 3.1'IH/LP or Low Przr Pressure 3.2 Reactor trips turbine 3.3 SIAS initiates 3'RCS press<1600 PSIA 3i5 High containment pressure 3.6 RWT level 3 feet measured Page 6 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 4~0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTION 4.1 Ensure Immediate Operator Actions for a reactor trip have 4.1~1 Any auto functions required have operated properly 4 2 If SIAS was caused by low RCS pressure 4.2 a)Verify CEA's inserted>5 sec.4.2 b)Stop the operating RCP s IMPORTANT:

After RCP's are stopped, immediately refer to EP 2-0120043 Inadequate Core Cooling OTE Observe all avaQ.able indications to determine conditions within RCS: SMM display, RCS-T>, RCS-T, incore thermocouple, RCS press Determine if RCS is subcoolecf or saturated.

Figure 2 will assist in this determination.

4.3 Check the ESFAS Bypass Status board 4'Reason: To ensure availabili ty of equipment for auto functions.

4.4 Ensure SIAS,CIS are functioning properly 4.4 Refer to Table I Table II~pccn~V Overfeeding the S/G s may cause excessive cooldown Do not exceed 75/HR cooldown rate 4'Establish and maintain S/G levels 8 65X 4.5 Use main or AFW 4.6 If containment pressure approaches 10 PSIG, initiate CSAS.4.6 Ensure CSAS components function.-

Refer to Table III 4.7 Classify the event as conditions dictate,'ccording to the emergency plan 4.7 Implement the emergency plan as necessary

~1 r!r,, Figure 2."'SATURATIOH/SUBCQQLB'(G

@lid~.g c g 2 g'd Pg'~'aoo28QO~;.':-=.,"..2600

.',::,':.'".': ':.2400 2200'.'-'-'""-.-"'-"="'-'-"'2QQO 1800 1600 1400 ,~':*'.".'..::

-'."::-'"P 1200-.1QQQ r 400'UBCOOLEO REGION't 5Q r SUBCCOL1NG 20 F"SUBCOOLEttG Af L lE.SURATi0 SUPERHEAT REGEOi'l~: 2nO'0 300 350 ,400 450 500 55Q 600" 650 700 RCS TEt'~PERATURE TH F Page 8 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 TABLE I'AFETY.".INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL SIAS RTGB 206 Left to Ri ht Two (2)CCW PPS 2A, 2B, or 2C.Condition ON Check Two (2)CCW to Fuel Pool HX Isolation Valves MV-14-17, MV-14-18 Closed Four (4)CCW HDR Non-essential Isolation Valves HCV-14-8A, HCV-14-8B, HCV-14-9, HVC-14-10 Closed Two (2)CCW Outlet from shutdown HX 2A, 2B,.Valves, HCV-14-3A, HCV-14-3B~en Two (2)LPSI PPS Two (2)HPSI PPS k Four (4)LPSI Disch to Loops HCV-3615, HCV-3625, HCV-3635, HCV-3645 Eight (8)HPSI Disch to Loops HCV-3617, HCV-3627, HCV-3637, HCV>>3647-Header A HCV-3 616, HCV-3 626, HCV-3 636, HCV-3646-Header B Two (2)HPSI PP Fill to SIT's V3572, V3571 Two (2)SI"Test to RWT I-SE-03-2A, I-S E-03-2B Four (4)SI Tank Isolation Valves V3614, V3624, V3634, V3644 Four (4)SI Tank Fill/Drain Valves I-S E-03-1A, I-SE-03-1B, I-SE<<03-1C,'-SE-03-1D Four (4)SI Check Leakage Test HCV<<3 618, HCV-3 628, HCV-3 638, HCV-3 648~en Closed Closed~en Closed Closed Four (4)FWP Discharge Isolation Valves HCV<<09-1A, HCV-09-2A, HCV-09-1B, HCV-09-2B Closed Four (4)CCW To/From RCP's HCV-14-1, HCV-14-2, HCV-14-7, HCV-14-6 Closed Page 9 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2>>0120042 REVISION 0 TABLE I (Cont.)SAFETY IN JECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL TWO (2)Containment Sump Isolation LCV<<07-1 1A, LCV-07-1 1B RTGB 205 Left to Ri ht One (1)BA Makeup Valve V2512 Two (2)BA Gravity Feed V2509, V2508 One (1)VCT Discharge V2501 Two (2)Letdown Isolation V2516, V2515 T&i~>0>Two (2 Intake Cool Wtr PP's 2A, 2B Three (3)Intake Cool Wtr Isolation Valves MV-21-3, MV-21-4, MV-21-2 RTGB 201 Two (2)Diesel Gen 2A, 2B HVAV Panel Left to Ri ht Four (4)RAB Main Supply and ECCS Exhaust Fans 2-HVS-4A, 2-HVE-9A, 2-HVS-4B, 2-HVE-9B CONDITION CHECK Closed Closed~Oee Closed Closed Closed Four (4)Containment Fan Cooler 2-HVS-lA, 2-HVS-lB, 2-HVS-1C, 2-HVS-1D Eight (8)ECCS Isolation Dampers DSA, D6A, D9A, D12A, D5B, D6B, D9B, D12B Closed Two (2)Rx Support&Cavity-Cool.Fans 2-HVS-2A, 2-HVS-2B, 2-HVE-3A, 2-HVE-3B Off NOTE: Any spare equipment that is running, and not needed for controlling this incident should be STOPPED.

Page 10 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 TABLE II CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAL CIAS)RTGB 206 Left to Ri ht TWO (2)SI Tank, to RWT I-SE-03-2A, I-S E-03-2B CONDITION CHECK Closed Pive (5)SI Tank Sample Isolation Valves PCV-03-1A, FCV-03-1B, FCV-03-1C, FCV>>03-1D&FCV-03-1E Closed Four (4)S/G Blowdown Isolation Valves FCV-23-3, FCV-23-5, FCV-23-4,&PCV-23-6 Sample FCV-23-7, FCV-23-9 Two (2)Contain Sump Isolation Valves LCV>>07-1 1A, LCV-07-1 1B Six (6)RCS&PRZR Sample Isolation Valves V5200, V5201,=V5202, V5203, V5204, V5205 One (1)Primary Water Isolation HCV-15-1 One (1)Instrument Air Isolation HCV-18-1 One (1)N Supply Isolation V6741 Two (2)Waste Gas Isolation V6750, V6718 Two (2)RCP Bleed-off Isolation V2505,'2524 Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Closed Two (2)RDT Isolation V6341, V6342 RTGB 205 Three (3)Letdown Isolation Valves V2516, V2522, V2515 RTGB 201 Two (2)Diesel Gen.2A, 2B HVAC Panel Left to Ri ht Two (2)Shield Bldg.Vent.&Control Room Pilter Fans 2-HVS-13A, 2-HVE-6A Pour (4)Control Room.Isolation Valves PCV-25-24, FCV-25-17, FCV-25-18, FCV-25-16 Two (2)Shield Bldg.Vent&Control Room Pilter Fans 2-HVS-13B, 2HVE 6B Pour (4)Control Room.Isolation Valves FCV<<25-25, FCV-25-14, PCV-25-15, PCV-25-19 Closed Closed Closed Closed

.Page 11 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 TABLE II (CONT.)CONTAINMENT ISOLATION'ACTUATION SIGNAL CIAS)CONDITION CHECK Two (2)Containment Purge Exhaust Fan 2-HVE-SA, 2-HVE-SB Six (6)Containment Purge Isolation Valves FCV-25-1, FCV-25-3, FCV-25-5, FCV>>25-6, FCV-25%, FCV-25-2 Off Closed Three (3)Continuous Containment H2 Purge Isolatdon FCV-25-20, VCV-25-26, VCV-25-21 Closed Two (2)Shield Bldg.Vent.Isolation Valves FCV-25-32, FCV-25-33 0 en Two (2)Fuel Bldg.Emerg.Vent.Isolation Valves FCV-25-30, FCV-25-31 Six (6)Containment Sample Isolation Valves FCV-26-2, FCV-26%, FCV-26-6, FCV-26-1, FCV-26-3$FCV-26-5 (RTGB 206)'Closed Closed Page 12 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 TABLE III CONTAINMENT SPRAY ACTUATION SIGNAL'ONDITION CHECK Tvo (2)Containment Spray Pumps 2A, 2B On Two (2)Containment Spray HDR Isolation Valves FCV-07-1A, FCV-07-1B~Oen Two (2)Iodine Removal System Pumps 2A, 2B On Two (2)Iodine Removal System Isolation Valves I-SE-07-3A, I-SE>>07-3B OEen NOTE: Ver if Flav on FI-07-1A, and FI-07-1B Page 13 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 5 0 SUBSE UENT ACTIONS CHECK 5.1 Refer to Reactor Trip/Turbine Trip, 2-0030130 and ensure that all subsequent actions (section 5)have been or are being performed, 5.2 When containment pressure decreases to<10 psig, Stop lA and 1B CS.pps.Close FCV-07-1A, FCV-07-1B Stop Iodine Removal PPs 2A, 2B Close Iodine Removal System Isolation.

valves I-SE-07-3A, 3B 5.3 Within one (1)hour, but without exception no later than one (1)hour,~sto RCS/BAMT boration via the charging pumps.5.4 Conduct area radiation surveys as soon as possible to determine extent of damage.5'Implement the Emergency Plan as necessary in accordance with EP 3100021E.5.6 Commence RCS cooldown as soon as possible and in any case within one (1)hour.CAUTION: Ensure RCS is maintained in a subcooled condition.

After any SIAS, operate the SIS until RCS hot and cold leg temperatures are at least 50 F below saturation temperature for the RCS pressure.5.7 Ensure proper operation of the safety infection system by checking flow rates and SIT levels.5~8.If steam dump to condenser is available close the atmospheric steam dump and begin dumping steam to the condenser.

5.9 If offsite power is lost, steam dump to the atmosphere must be used for cooldown.CAUTION: Do not exceed 75 F/Hour cooldown rate.5'0 Continue auxiliary feedwater flow to the steam generators during cooldown.5.11 Reduce steam generator pressure to less than 985 psig.(Safety setting)Refer to OP 2-0030127, Reactor Plant Cooldown..

Page 14 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2<<0120042 REVISION 0 5.0 SUBSE UENT ACTIONS: (Cont.)CHECK 5~12 Immediately prior to RAS ensure power is available to V3659, V3660, V3495, V3496.5+13 Ensure RAS occurs when the RWT level decreases to 3 ft indicated-(4 ft.from bottom of the tank).Table IV page 16 may be-used as a check 1<st.5.14 If all HPSI pumps and charging pumps are operating and the HPSI pumps are delivering less than 75 GPM per pump, stop the charging pumps one at a time, then HPSI pumps one at a time until only one HPSI pump remains operating.

5.15 Check RAB radiation levels and sump levels after RAS to detect SIS leakage.Even if leaks are detected, at least one HPSI pump must remain in operation to provide flow to the core.5'6 Establish radiation areas and warnings where necessary 5.17 Without exception and within ten (10)hours of the'incident occurance, initiate hot leg infection.

This will be in con)unction with the existing cold leg infection.

5~18 If the pressure and inventory control with the SIS cannot be established after eight hours and RCS press is less than 300 PSIG, continue hot and cold leg injection.

Page 15 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 TABLE IV RECIRCULATION ACTUATION SIGNAL CONDITION CHECK Two (2), LPSI PPS 2A, 2B Off Two (2)SI PP Recirc.to RVZ Isolation Valves V3659, V3660 Closed Two (2)Minimum Flow Isolation Valves V-,3495, V3496 Closed Two (2)Containment Sump Outlet Valves MV-07-2A, MV-07-2B~en.Two (2)RMT Outlet Valves MV-0 7-1'A, MV-07-1 B Closed EHERGENCY PROCEDURE NUHBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 Page 16 of 21 LOCA I 1 5'SUBSE VENT ACTIONS: (Cont.)1)Verify subcooling by checking the saturation pressure for the existing temperature.

2'Realign the SIS for cold leg infection.

3.)Continue to maintain subcooling and reduce RCS pressure to<268 PSIA for shutdown cooling by reducing the flow delivered by the high pressure injection and charging pumps.4'While reducing pressure and after shutdown cooling is initiated, maintain RCS pressure with the charging pumps and f}-O/or the HPSI pumps to maintain at least 50 subcooling

~5.19 If pressure and inventory control with the SIS are established after eight (8)hours and RCS pressure is greater than 300 PSIG, conduct one of the following activities, (in order of decreasing preference.)

This condition indicates the system is refilled and subcooling has occurred.5 19.1 OR 5.19.2 Continue to remove decay heat using auxiliary feedwater and steam dumps if adequate condensate is available and,(5.19.1) cannot be implemented.

OR 5~19.3 If 5.19.1 or 5.19~2 above, cannot be implemented, Open przr power operated relief valves and align the safety infection system for cold leg infection.

To open the PORV s, pull two RPS przr high pressure trip unit bistables.

5 20 Place both hydrogen recombiners in service.(See Appendix"A")5'1 If containment hydrogen concentration cannot be maintained below 3.5X as indicated on the containment hydrogen sample system, then place the containment hydrogen purge system in operation.(See Appendix"B")

Page 17 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 6+0 PURPOSE AND DISCUSSION:

This procedure provides instructions to be followed in the event that leakage from the Reactor Coolant System exceeds the capacity of the operable charging pumps.Mhen conditions in the Reactor Coolant System degrade'to the point that a Limiting Safety System Setting is approached the Reactor Protective System.will initiate a reactor trip, making the reactor subcritical.

This vill stop the production of power in the core.Cooling of the core, however, must continue to remove the considerable decay heat that remains.The Safety Infection System automatically provides a flow of subcooled water to the core for decay heat removal.Failure to keep the core covered will result in overheating of the fuel, failure of the cladding, and a release of gross amounts of fission products to the containment atmosphere.

The spectrum of breaks which would cause a LOCA is from approximately at.2 inch diameter break up to a double-ended hot leg rupture.For an example: Analysis show that the flow from an unrestricted

.3 inch diameter break is approximately 180 GPM at 2250 PSIA.A ma)or concern for these small breaks is that the flow through the break may not be sufficient for decay heat removal.In those circumstances it is imperative that a secondary heat sink be available.

This in turn dictates the use of the Auxiliary'Feedwater System as the main feed-water system is disabled due to an SIAS.Operator actions should be directed toward ensuring proper operation of the Safety Infection and Containment Isolation Systems, ensuring all automatic functions have initiated properly, and taking action to protect plant personnel.

Long term action is directed toward placing the plant in a cold shutdown condition.

For small breaks where the ECCS will maintain RCS volume and pressure, operator action must be directed toward establishing and maintaining subcooled c'onditions in the RCS during the cooldown to prevent void formation Fig.4.4 is a quick reference for operators actions.

Page 18 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2>>0120042 REVISION 0 6~0 PURPOSE AND DISCUSSION: (Cont.)Some instruments (valve position, temperature, pressure, level indications, etc.)specified for use in this procedure have not been designed for long term post LOCA conditions inside containment.

Therefore, the operator should be especially alert that the potential exists for erroneous indication after>15 minutes have elapsed following a LOCA event.If there's a high radioactivity level in the reactor coolant system, circulation of this fluid in SDC may result in high area reaioactivity readings in the RAB.The activity level of the RCS should be determined prior to initiating SDC flow.It may be necessary to fill the przr solid to regain pressure control and to achieve 50 F subcooling.

If this is the case, HPSI discharge valves will have.to be carefully throttled during the cooldown to reduce system pressure.Ensure HPSI flow to the core continues after RAS.Do not allow the HPSI pumps to operate"dead-headed".

HPSI shutoff head (no flow)1250 PSIG.Do not exceed 75 F/hour cooldown rate.If conditions permit, attempt to locate and isolate the source of the leak.Possible leak locations include but are not limited to the PORV s, the letdown line and the sample lines.Przr level may not always be a true indicator of RCS fluid inventory.

Przr.steam space ruptures, reference leg failures, and reference leg flashing may cause indications which are contrary to true conditions.

All available indications should be used to aid in diagnosing the eve'nt since the accident may cause irregularities in a particular instrument readings Critical p'arameters must be verified when one or more confirmatory indications are available.

With the Subcooling Margin Monitor (SMM)operating normally, use the nomograph on RTGB 104 in conjunction with the SMM to eliminate dependence on z single instrument.

With the SMM inoperable, refer to the nomograph utilizing control room indicators such as THOT, przr pressure, and incore thermocouples to determine the Th margin to saturation Subcooling margin can also be determined by subtracting hot leg temperature from przr temperature (TE-1101)~Take appropriate action to keep core covered or ref lood if it becomes partially uncovered.

Maintain or re-establish a heat removal path.Regain RCS pressure and level control.Follow long term shut down procedures in order to assure that boron precip'itation does not occur.I e

Page 19 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 7'

REFERENCES:

C'),l St.Lucie Unit Pl Emergency Procedures Unit/f2 FSAR SECT.1.0, 6.0, 9.0~7>C~E.generic LOCA guidelines

<5 Songs OI S023-3-.5-..6 8.9Lund Consulting report to C~E.(Feb.6, 1981)g,qDraft of NUREG-.0799~l Normal Log Entries't~WER g.Nransient indicators and recorder charts.9e0 APPROVAL: Reviewed by Plant Nuclear Safety Committee Approved by/Plant Manager Revision Reviewed by Facility Review Group Approved by/Plant Manager 19 19 19 7

Page 20 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 APPENDIX"A" PLACING H2 RECOMBINERS IN SERVICE I.Place recombiners in service as follows: 1A 1B 1.Ensure breakers 841262 in 480V MCC 2A5 (2A)and 8'42103 and in 480V MCC 2B6 (2B)are closed.2~Set the power adjust potentiometer at zero (ooo)~3.Check that power is available to the power supply panel by observing the"power available" white light on the control panel is illuminated.

4.Set the Power Out Switch on the control panel to the"ON" position.The red light on the switch will illuminate.

5~Gradually turn the Power Adjust potentiometer to 70 KW as indicated on the Power Out Wattmeter.

CAUTION: There is a lag in the meter reading, so turn the potentiometer knob slowly.Do not exceed 75 KW.6.Periodically check the temperature of the three thermocouples using the temperature channel selector switch.And, when the temperature reaches 1250 F, adjust the power adjust potentiometer to maintain temperature between 1250 F and 1400 F.CAUTION: Do not let the temperature exceed 1400 F as indicated by the thermocouple readout.

Page 21 of 21 LOCA EMERGENCY PROCEDURE NUMBER 2-0120042 REVISION 0 APPENDIX"B" PLACING CONTAINMENT H2 PURGE IN SERVICE 2.3.II.Place containment H2 purge in service as follcws: Verify closed V>>2538 filter bypass valves.Unlock and open V-25-20 and 21 suction isolation valves.Open V-25-35 hydrogen purge discharge to vent stack., 4~5~Start 2HVE 7A or 7B.Unlock and open V-25-25 and V-25-26 makeup air for purge 6.Modulate FCV-25-9 open as needed to maintain charcoal absorber temperature below alarm point.CAUTION: Ensure that either 2HVE 10A or 2HVE 10B is running~7.Periodically check the stack radiation monitoring system for increasing gaseous and particulate levels."L A S T P A G E" Emergency Procedure 2-0120042 Rev 0