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Category:CORRESPONDENCE-LETTERS
MONTHYEARML20217H6231999-10-18018 October 1999 Discusses Completion of Licensing Action for GL 98-01 & Suppl 1, Yr 2000 Readiness of Computer Sys at Npps, to All Holders of Operating Licenses for NPPs ML20217J4331999-10-15015 October 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-461/99-19 on 990913-17.One Violation Re Individual Failure to Follow Radiation Protection Procedures When Accessing High Radiation Area Noted & Being Treated as Noncited Violation U-603280, Forwards Rev 27 to Clinton Power Station Physical Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure, Per 10CFR50.54(p)1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Rev 27 to Clinton Power Station Physical Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure, Per 10CFR50.54(p) ML20217C0871999-10-11011 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Attachment Inadvertently Omitted from Encl 2 to Submitting Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Proprietary Encl Withheld U-603276, Forwards Rev 8 to CPS USAR, Which Includes Changes from 970701 Through 990630 & Available Changes Approved After 990630 That Reduce Overall Burden of Submittal Changes for Forthcoming Reporting period.10CFR50.59 Rept Included1999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Rev 8 to CPS USAR, Which Includes Changes from 970701 Through 990630 & Available Changes Approved After 990630 That Reduce Overall Burden of Submittal Changes for Forthcoming Reporting period.10CFR50.59 Rept Included U-603279, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Attached Responses Also Respond to Comments of Environ Law & Policy Center Dtd 990920.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Attached Responses Also Respond to Comments of Environ Law & Policy Center Dtd 990920.Proprietary Encl Withheld U-603275, Provides Updated Illinois Power Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Clinton Power Station1999-10-0707 October 1999 Provides Updated Illinois Power Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Clinton Power Station ML20217A9881999-10-0101 October 1999 Advises of NRC Plans for Future Insp Activities at Facility for Licensee to Have Opportunity to Prepare for Insps & to Provide NRC with Feedback on Any Planned Insps Which May Conflict with Plant Activities ML20217A7361999-10-0101 October 1999 Forwards Insp Repts 50-461/99-14 & 50-461/98-12 on 990729-0908.Two Violations Identified,One Re Failure to Place Control Switch in Proper Position to Identify Piece of out-of-svc Equipment & Being Treated as NCVs ML20217J1251999-09-30030 September 1999 Refers to Investigation 3-1997-040 Conducted from 971028- 980921 & Forwards Nov.Investigations Determined That During Jan 1997,supervisor Qv Dept Discriminated Against Qv Inspector in Retaliation for Inspector Contacts with NRC ML20217J1421999-09-30030 September 1999 Refers to Investigation 3-97-040 Conducted from 971028- 980921 & Forwards Nov.Investigation Concluded That Recipient Engaged in Deliberate Misconduct in That Recipient Discriminated Againt Qv Inspector for Having Contacted NRC ML20212G6751999-09-22022 September 1999 Forwards Comment Submitted to NRC by Environ Law & Policy Ctr Re Proposed License Transfer for Clinton Power Station U-603272, Provides Update to Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. 3-D Monicore & Station Security Sys remediated.Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Cps,Encl1999-09-22022 September 1999 Provides Update to Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. 3-D Monicore & Station Security Sys remediated.Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Cps,Encl U-603225, Provides Closure of Util Commitments Re Ci Cv Noted in Previous Ltr to Nrc.Basis for Expecting Valves to Remain in leak-tight Condition Throughout Operating Cycle & Basis That Justifies Not Performing mid-cycle Leak Testing,Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Provides Closure of Util Commitments Re Ci Cv Noted in Previous Ltr to Nrc.Basis for Expecting Valves to Remain in leak-tight Condition Throughout Operating Cycle & Basis That Justifies Not Performing mid-cycle Leak Testing,Encl ML20212G6981999-09-20020 September 1999 Requests That NRC Reject Proposed License Transfer for Clinton Power Station & That NRC State That Public Interest in Safe Nuclear Power Industry Will Not Be Subordinated to Interest in Maximizing Profit by Limiting Liability ML20217H3421999-09-17017 September 1999 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Licensee 990723 Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend.Response Requested within 20 Days of Receipt of Ltr 05000461/LER-1996-010, Forwards LER 96-010-01, Plant Shutdown Due to Unidentified RCS Leakage from Degraded Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Greater than TS Limit. Revised Rept Includes Cause of Event,Corrective Actions & Discussion of Similar Events1999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards LER 96-010-01, Plant Shutdown Due to Unidentified RCS Leakage from Degraded Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Greater than TS Limit. Revised Rept Includes Cause of Event,Corrective Actions & Discussion of Similar Events 05000461/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Improper Restoration of a APRM Which Caused Monitor to Not Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements.Rept Contains Listed Commitments1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Improper Restoration of a APRM Which Caused Monitor to Not Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements.Rept Contains Listed Commitments U-603269, Certifies That DB Livingston,License OP-31136,successfully Completed Facility Licensees Requirements to Be Licensed as Ro,Per 10CFR55 & Has Need for RO License to Perform Assigned Duties.Five Significant Control Manipulations,Listed1999-09-10010 September 1999 Certifies That DB Livingston,License OP-31136,successfully Completed Facility Licensees Requirements to Be Licensed as Ro,Per 10CFR55 & Has Need for RO License to Perform Assigned Duties.Five Significant Control Manipulations,Listed ML20211Q2671999-09-0808 September 1999 Informs That NRC Tentatively re-scheduled Initial Licensing Exams for License Operator License Applicants During Weeks of June 5 & 12,2000.Validation of Exams Will Occur at Station During Weeks of May 15,2000 U-603229, Provides Response to NRC RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Dtd 990528.Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0556 & Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0570,encl1999-08-25025 August 1999 Provides Response to NRC RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Dtd 990528.Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0556 & Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0570,encl U-603243, Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal. Util Performing Testing of ESF Ventilation Sys Charcoal Samples Using ASTM D3803- 1989 Methodology as Required by TS 5.5.71999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal. Util Performing Testing of ESF Ventilation Sys Charcoal Samples Using ASTM D3803- 1989 Methodology as Required by TS 5.5.7 ML20211D2201999-08-23023 August 1999 Confirms 990817 Telcon with J Neuschwanger & D Mcneil Re Arrangements Made for NRC to Inspect Licensed Operator Requalification Program at Plant U-603258, Forwards ISI Summary Rept, IAW ASME Section Xi,Article IWA-6000.Summary Rept Addresses ISI Activities Performed at Plant from 950429-990527,including Extended Sixth Refueling Outage1999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards ISI Summary Rept, IAW ASME Section Xi,Article IWA-6000.Summary Rept Addresses ISI Activities Performed at Plant from 950429-990527,including Extended Sixth Refueling Outage ML20211B0871999-08-20020 August 1999 Responds to J Hopkins Inquiry Re Application for Order Consenting to License Transfer & Approving Conforming Administrative License Amend Filed by Ilpr & Amergen Energy Co on 990723 U-603259, Provides Notification That Cl Kreidler Has Resigned Position with Util,Effective 990818.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired1999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides Notification That Cl Kreidler Has Resigned Position with Util,Effective 990818.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired ML20211A8931999-08-19019 August 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-461/99-13 on 990611-0728.Two Violations Noted & Being Treated as Ncvs.Violation Re Three Examples Where Licensee Procedural Requirements for Minor Maint Work Were Not Followed U-603253, Notifies NRC That Je Smith,License SOP-30819-1,has Resigned from Position with Ilpr Effective 990813.Status of License Should Be Changed to Expired,Effective 9908131999-08-16016 August 1999 Notifies NRC That Je Smith,License SOP-30819-1,has Resigned from Position with Ilpr Effective 990813.Status of License Should Be Changed to Expired,Effective 990813 ML20210U3771999-08-12012 August 1999 Forwards Notice of Consideration of Approval of Transfer of FOL & Issuance of Conforming Amend & Opportunity for Hearing Re Amend Request for Approval of Clinton Power Station License NPF-62 Transfer to Amergen U-603250, Notifies NRC That Ma Freihofer (License SOP-31296-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illinois Power Effective 990729 & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 9907291999-08-10010 August 1999 Notifies NRC That Ma Freihofer (License SOP-31296-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illinois Power Effective 990729 & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 990729 U-603249, Notifies NRC That He Bouska (License SOP-3055-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illnois Power Effective 990809. & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 9908091999-08-10010 August 1999 Notifies NRC That He Bouska (License SOP-3055-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illnois Power Effective 990809. & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 990809 ML20210N2961999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Form of Nuclear Decommissioning Master Trust Agreement,Per CPS Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend U-603248, Requests Unrestricted License for Kc Scott,License SOP-31532.Scott Has Successfully Completed Facility Licensee Requirements to Be Licensed as Operator/Senior Operator Per 10CFR551999-08-0606 August 1999 Requests Unrestricted License for Kc Scott,License SOP-31532.Scott Has Successfully Completed Facility Licensee Requirements to Be Licensed as Operator/Senior Operator Per 10CFR55 U-603236, Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheets for Clinton Power Station Computer Points That Input to ERDS1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheets for Clinton Power Station Computer Points That Input to ERDS ML20210J0541999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Three Original Signature Pages of Gr Rainey for Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend, for NRC Files U-603178, Forwards Four ASME Section XI Relief Requests Re Performance of non-destructive Exams for First 120-month Inservice Insp for CPS1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Four ASME Section XI Relief Requests Re Performance of non-destructive Exams for First 120-month Inservice Insp for CPS U-603237, Informs That Util Will Provide Response to fire-related Questions One & Two of NRC RAI Re CPS Ipeee,By 0001311999-07-28028 July 1999 Informs That Util Will Provide Response to fire-related Questions One & Two of NRC RAI Re CPS Ipeee,By 000131 U-603240, Forwards Clinton Power Station semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept for Period Ending 990630,IAW 10CFR26.711999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Clinton Power Station semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept for Period Ending 990630,IAW 10CFR26.71 U-603235, Forwards Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend for OL NPF-62.Proprietary & Nonproprietary Asset Purchase Agreement Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend for OL NPF-62.Proprietary & Nonproprietary Asset Purchase Agreement Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 ML20210A4401999-07-16016 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-461/99-10 on 990422-0610.Four Violations Being Treated as Noncited Violations ML20209G7671999-07-12012 July 1999 Ack Receipt of Encl FEMA Correspondence ,which Transmitted FEMA Evaluation Rept for 981118 Biennial EP Exercise at Clinton Power Station.No Deficiencies Were Observed ML20209D5691999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Insp Rept 50-461/99-12 on 990607-11.No Violations Noted.Insp Consisted of Selective Exam of Procedures & Representative Records,Observations of Work in Progress & Interviews with Personnel U-603231, Forwards Summary of Status of Plan for Excellence (Pee) Initiatives & Clinton Power Station (CPS) 1999 Business Plan.Encl Documents Provide Status & Disposition for Actions Not Completed to Date1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Summary of Status of Plan for Excellence (Pee) Initiatives & Clinton Power Station (CPS) 1999 Business Plan.Encl Documents Provide Status & Disposition for Actions Not Completed to Date U-603214, Forwards Results of Analysis Performed on Recently Completed Vendor Contracts,Per GL 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events1999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Results of Analysis Performed on Recently Completed Vendor Contracts,Per GL 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events ML20196J9651999-07-0202 July 1999 Confirms Discussion Between Members of Staffs to Conduct Meeting on 990714 at Clinton Power Station to Discuss Results of Restart Insp & Licensee Progress in Addressing Remaining Long Term C/A Actions to Sustain Improvements ML20196J7131999-06-30030 June 1999 Informs of Closure of Response to Requests for Addl Info to GL 92-01,Rev 1,Supplement 1, Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity, for Clinton Power Station Unit 1 U-603218, Provides Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Attachment Provides Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant1999-06-28028 June 1999 Provides Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Attachment Provides Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant U-603212, Forwards Response to NRC 990315 Telcon Re Proposed Amend of License NPF-62,implementing Feedwater Leakage Control Sys Mode of RHR Sys1999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990315 Telcon Re Proposed Amend of License NPF-62,implementing Feedwater Leakage Control Sys Mode of RHR Sys U-603227, Provides Updated Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Updated Rept Provides Min Decommissioning Fund Estimate,Per 10CFR50.75(b) & (C) Utilizing NUREG-1307,Rev 8 Methodology1999-06-24024 June 1999 Provides Updated Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Updated Rept Provides Min Decommissioning Fund Estimate,Per 10CFR50.75(b) & (C) Utilizing NUREG-1307,Rev 8 Methodology ML20196A3471999-06-16016 June 1999 Ack Receipt of Informing NRC of Steps Taken to Correct Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/99-11 Issued on 990430.Corrective Actions Will Be Examined During Future Inspections 1999-09-08
[Table view] Category:INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE
MONTHYEARU-603280, Forwards Rev 27 to Clinton Power Station Physical Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure, Per 10CFR50.54(p)1999-10-12012 October 1999 Forwards Rev 27 to Clinton Power Station Physical Security Plan,Iaw 10CFR50.54(p).Encl Withheld from Public Disclosure, Per 10CFR50.54(p) ML20217C0871999-10-11011 October 1999 Forwards Proprietary Attachment Inadvertently Omitted from Encl 2 to Submitting Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Proprietary Encl Withheld U-603276, Forwards Rev 8 to CPS USAR, Which Includes Changes from 970701 Through 990630 & Available Changes Approved After 990630 That Reduce Overall Burden of Submittal Changes for Forthcoming Reporting period.10CFR50.59 Rept Included1999-10-0808 October 1999 Forwards Rev 8 to CPS USAR, Which Includes Changes from 970701 Through 990630 & Available Changes Approved After 990630 That Reduce Overall Burden of Submittal Changes for Forthcoming Reporting period.10CFR50.59 Rept Included U-603279, Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Attached Responses Also Respond to Comments of Environ Law & Policy Center Dtd 990920.Proprietary Encl Withheld1999-10-0707 October 1999 Forwards non-proprietary & Proprietary Responses to NRC RAI Re License Transfer Application for Plant.Attached Responses Also Respond to Comments of Environ Law & Policy Center Dtd 990920.Proprietary Encl Withheld U-603275, Provides Updated Illinois Power Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Clinton Power Station1999-10-0707 October 1999 Provides Updated Illinois Power Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Clinton Power Station U-603272, Provides Update to Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. 3-D Monicore & Station Security Sys remediated.Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Cps,Encl1999-09-22022 September 1999 Provides Update to Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. 3-D Monicore & Station Security Sys remediated.Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Cps,Encl U-603225, Provides Closure of Util Commitments Re Ci Cv Noted in Previous Ltr to Nrc.Basis for Expecting Valves to Remain in leak-tight Condition Throughout Operating Cycle & Basis That Justifies Not Performing mid-cycle Leak Testing,Encl1999-09-20020 September 1999 Provides Closure of Util Commitments Re Ci Cv Noted in Previous Ltr to Nrc.Basis for Expecting Valves to Remain in leak-tight Condition Throughout Operating Cycle & Basis That Justifies Not Performing mid-cycle Leak Testing,Encl ML20212G6981999-09-20020 September 1999 Requests That NRC Reject Proposed License Transfer for Clinton Power Station & That NRC State That Public Interest in Safe Nuclear Power Industry Will Not Be Subordinated to Interest in Maximizing Profit by Limiting Liability 05000461/LER-1996-010, Forwards LER 96-010-01, Plant Shutdown Due to Unidentified RCS Leakage from Degraded Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Greater than TS Limit. Revised Rept Includes Cause of Event,Corrective Actions & Discussion of Similar Events1999-09-13013 September 1999 Forwards LER 96-010-01, Plant Shutdown Due to Unidentified RCS Leakage from Degraded Reactor Recirculation Pump Seal Greater than TS Limit. Revised Rept Includes Cause of Event,Corrective Actions & Discussion of Similar Events U-603269, Certifies That DB Livingston,License OP-31136,successfully Completed Facility Licensees Requirements to Be Licensed as Ro,Per 10CFR55 & Has Need for RO License to Perform Assigned Duties.Five Significant Control Manipulations,Listed1999-09-10010 September 1999 Certifies That DB Livingston,License OP-31136,successfully Completed Facility Licensees Requirements to Be Licensed as Ro,Per 10CFR55 & Has Need for RO License to Perform Assigned Duties.Five Significant Control Manipulations,Listed 05000461/LER-1999-011, Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Improper Restoration of a APRM Which Caused Monitor to Not Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements.Rept Contains Listed Commitments1999-09-10010 September 1999 Forwards LER 99-011-00 Re Improper Restoration of a APRM Which Caused Monitor to Not Meet Seismic Qualification Requirements.Rept Contains Listed Commitments U-603229, Provides Response to NRC RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Dtd 990528.Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0556 & Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0570,encl1999-08-25025 August 1999 Provides Response to NRC RAI Re GL 95-07, Pressure Locking & Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves, Dtd 990528.Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0556 & Rev 0 to Calculation IP-M-0570,encl U-603243, Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal. Util Performing Testing of ESF Ventilation Sys Charcoal Samples Using ASTM D3803- 1989 Methodology as Required by TS 5.5.71999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards Response to NRC GL 99-02, Lab Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal. Util Performing Testing of ESF Ventilation Sys Charcoal Samples Using ASTM D3803- 1989 Methodology as Required by TS 5.5.7 U-603258, Forwards ISI Summary Rept, IAW ASME Section Xi,Article IWA-6000.Summary Rept Addresses ISI Activities Performed at Plant from 950429-990527,including Extended Sixth Refueling Outage1999-08-23023 August 1999 Forwards ISI Summary Rept, IAW ASME Section Xi,Article IWA-6000.Summary Rept Addresses ISI Activities Performed at Plant from 950429-990527,including Extended Sixth Refueling Outage ML20211B0871999-08-20020 August 1999 Responds to J Hopkins Inquiry Re Application for Order Consenting to License Transfer & Approving Conforming Administrative License Amend Filed by Ilpr & Amergen Energy Co on 990723 U-603259, Provides Notification That Cl Kreidler Has Resigned Position with Util,Effective 990818.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired1999-08-19019 August 1999 Provides Notification That Cl Kreidler Has Resigned Position with Util,Effective 990818.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired U-603253, Notifies NRC That Je Smith,License SOP-30819-1,has Resigned from Position with Ilpr Effective 990813.Status of License Should Be Changed to Expired,Effective 9908131999-08-16016 August 1999 Notifies NRC That Je Smith,License SOP-30819-1,has Resigned from Position with Ilpr Effective 990813.Status of License Should Be Changed to Expired,Effective 990813 U-603250, Notifies NRC That Ma Freihofer (License SOP-31296-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illinois Power Effective 990729 & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 9907291999-08-10010 August 1999 Notifies NRC That Ma Freihofer (License SOP-31296-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illinois Power Effective 990729 & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 990729 U-603249, Notifies NRC That He Bouska (License SOP-3055-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illnois Power Effective 990809. & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 9908091999-08-10010 August 1999 Notifies NRC That He Bouska (License SOP-3055-1) Has Resigned from Position with Illnois Power Effective 990809. & License Status Should Be Changed to Expired Effective 990809 ML20210N2961999-08-0909 August 1999 Forwards Form of Nuclear Decommissioning Master Trust Agreement,Per CPS Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend U-603248, Requests Unrestricted License for Kc Scott,License SOP-31532.Scott Has Successfully Completed Facility Licensee Requirements to Be Licensed as Operator/Senior Operator Per 10CFR551999-08-0606 August 1999 Requests Unrestricted License for Kc Scott,License SOP-31532.Scott Has Successfully Completed Facility Licensee Requirements to Be Licensed as Operator/Senior Operator Per 10CFR55 U-603236, Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheets for Clinton Power Station Computer Points That Input to ERDS1999-08-0202 August 1999 Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheets for Clinton Power Station Computer Points That Input to ERDS ML20210J0541999-07-30030 July 1999 Forwards Three Original Signature Pages of Gr Rainey for Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend, for NRC Files U-603178, Forwards Four ASME Section XI Relief Requests Re Performance of non-destructive Exams for First 120-month Inservice Insp for CPS1999-07-29029 July 1999 Forwards Four ASME Section XI Relief Requests Re Performance of non-destructive Exams for First 120-month Inservice Insp for CPS U-603237, Informs That Util Will Provide Response to fire-related Questions One & Two of NRC RAI Re CPS Ipeee,By 0001311999-07-28028 July 1999 Informs That Util Will Provide Response to fire-related Questions One & Two of NRC RAI Re CPS Ipeee,By 000131 U-603240, Forwards Clinton Power Station semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept for Period Ending 990630,IAW 10CFR26.711999-07-27027 July 1999 Forwards Clinton Power Station semi-annual Fitness for Duty Rept for Period Ending 990630,IAW 10CFR26.71 U-603235, Forwards Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend for OL NPF-62.Proprietary & Nonproprietary Asset Purchase Agreement Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.7901999-07-23023 July 1999 Forwards Application for License Transfer & Conforming Administrative License Amend for OL NPF-62.Proprietary & Nonproprietary Asset Purchase Agreement Encl.Proprietary Info Withheld,Per 10CFR2.790 U-603231, Forwards Summary of Status of Plan for Excellence (Pee) Initiatives & Clinton Power Station (CPS) 1999 Business Plan.Encl Documents Provide Status & Disposition for Actions Not Completed to Date1999-07-0707 July 1999 Forwards Summary of Status of Plan for Excellence (Pee) Initiatives & Clinton Power Station (CPS) 1999 Business Plan.Encl Documents Provide Status & Disposition for Actions Not Completed to Date U-603214, Forwards Results of Analysis Performed on Recently Completed Vendor Contracts,Per GL 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events1999-07-0606 July 1999 Forwards Results of Analysis Performed on Recently Completed Vendor Contracts,Per GL 83-28, Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events U-603218, Provides Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Attachment Provides Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant1999-06-28028 June 1999 Provides Final Response to GL 98-01, Y2K Readiness of Computer Sys at Nuclear Power Plants. Attachment Provides Y2K Readiness Disclosure for Plant U-603212, Forwards Response to NRC 990315 Telcon Re Proposed Amend of License NPF-62,implementing Feedwater Leakage Control Sys Mode of RHR Sys1999-06-24024 June 1999 Forwards Response to NRC 990315 Telcon Re Proposed Amend of License NPF-62,implementing Feedwater Leakage Control Sys Mode of RHR Sys U-603227, Provides Updated Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Updated Rept Provides Min Decommissioning Fund Estimate,Per 10CFR50.75(b) & (C) Utilizing NUREG-1307,Rev 8 Methodology1999-06-24024 June 1999 Provides Updated Rept on Status of Decommissioning Funding for Plant.Updated Rept Provides Min Decommissioning Fund Estimate,Per 10CFR50.75(b) & (C) Utilizing NUREG-1307,Rev 8 Methodology 05000461/LER-1999-007, Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Design Error Causing Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control Sys to Be Outside Design Basis.Commitment Made by Util,Listed1999-06-12012 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-007-00,re Design Error Causing Main Steam Isolation Valve Leakage Control Sys to Be Outside Design Basis.Commitment Made by Util,Listed 05000461/LER-1999-008, Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure of Motor Driven Reactor FW Pump Regulating Valve.Commitment Made by Util,Listed1999-06-12012 June 1999 Forwards LER 99-008-00,re Failure of Motor Driven Reactor FW Pump Regulating Valve.Commitment Made by Util,Listed U-603213, Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/99-01.Corrective Actions:Calculation 19-AK-05, Calculation for DG Load Monitoring, Was Revised Using Correct Horsepower for Hydrogen Mixing Compressors1999-05-28028 May 1999 Responds to NRC Ltr Re Violations Noted in Insp Rept 50-461/99-01.Corrective Actions:Calculation 19-AK-05, Calculation for DG Load Monitoring, Was Revised Using Correct Horsepower for Hydrogen Mixing Compressors ML20209G7731999-05-27027 May 1999 Forwards Copy of Final Rept for 981118,Biennial Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise for Clinton Nuclear Power Station.No Deficiencies Were Noted U-603207, Provides Util Rept Confirming Completion of Actions Required by NRC Bulletin 96-003, Potential Plugging of ECCS Strainers by Debris in Bwrs1999-05-13013 May 1999 Provides Util Rept Confirming Completion of Actions Required by NRC Bulletin 96-003, Potential Plugging of ECCS Strainers by Debris in Bwrs U-603201, Forwards 4-yr Updated Certification Rept for Plant Training Simulator.Nrc Form 474, Simulation Facility Certification Also Encl Which Was Developed in Accordance with Reg Guide 1.149 & Ansi/Ans Std Ansi/Ans 3.51999-05-0505 May 1999 Forwards 4-yr Updated Certification Rept for Plant Training Simulator.Nrc Form 474, Simulation Facility Certification Also Encl Which Was Developed in Accordance with Reg Guide 1.149 & Ansi/Ans Std Ansi/Ans 3.5 U-603196, Provides Notification That Util Has Completed Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Corrective Actions as Described in 970619 & s in Addition to Repair of Butt Joint Described in1999-04-27027 April 1999 Provides Notification That Util Has Completed Thermo-Lag 330-1 Fire Barrier Corrective Actions as Described in 970619 & s in Addition to Repair of Butt Joint Described in U-603205, Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Clinton Power Station for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Rev 17 to ODCM for Clinton Power Station, Also Encl1999-04-27027 April 1999 Forwards Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Rept for Clinton Power Station for Period Jan-Dec 1998. Rev 17 to ODCM for Clinton Power Station, Also Encl U-603197, Provides Details of Other Activities Being Taken as Part of CPS Plan for Excellence Re Ensureing That CPS Physical Plant & Functional Characteristics Are Consistent with & Are Being Maintained IAW CPS Design Bases1999-04-24024 April 1999 Provides Details of Other Activities Being Taken as Part of CPS Plan for Excellence Re Ensureing That CPS Physical Plant & Functional Characteristics Are Consistent with & Are Being Maintained IAW CPS Design Bases U-603194, Provides Notification That Ta Staber,License SOP-31298,has Resigned Position,Effective 990401.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired1999-04-15015 April 1999 Provides Notification That Ta Staber,License SOP-31298,has Resigned Position,Effective 990401.License Status Should Be Changed to Expired U-603189, Requests That Status of License SOP-31187-1,for Le Anderson, Be Changed to Expired,Per 10CFR50.74.Util Determined That Individual No Longer Has Need for SRO License1999-04-0505 April 1999 Requests That Status of License SOP-31187-1,for Le Anderson, Be Changed to Expired,Per 10CFR50.74.Util Determined That Individual No Longer Has Need for SRO License U-603190, Provides Update for Certain 10CFR50.74(f) Info Addressed in Licensee 980619 Submittal,But Not Included in Final Response1999-04-0202 April 1999 Provides Update for Certain 10CFR50.74(f) Info Addressed in Licensee 980619 Submittal,But Not Included in Final Response U-603185, Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re CPS GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Movs, Program1999-03-30030 March 1999 Forwards Response to NRC RAI Re CPS GL 96-05, Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of SR Movs, Program U-603186, Forwards Rept on Status of Clinton Power Station Decommissioning Funding,Iaw 10CFR50.75(f)1999-03-29029 March 1999 Forwards Rept on Status of Clinton Power Station Decommissioning Funding,Iaw 10CFR50.75(f) U-603184, Submits Info Re Current Levels of Property Insurance & Sources of Insurance for CPS as Listed,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3)1999-03-26026 March 1999 Submits Info Re Current Levels of Property Insurance & Sources of Insurance for CPS as Listed,Per 10CFR50.54(w)(3) 05000461/LER-1999-005, Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Inoperability of Standby Gas Treatment Sys Train a Caused by Inadequate Design of Control Circuit.Commitments Listed1999-03-15015 March 1999 Forwards LER 99-005-00,re Inoperability of Standby Gas Treatment Sys Train a Caused by Inadequate Design of Control Circuit.Commitments Listed U-603165, Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheet for Clinton Power Station Computer Point That Inputs to Erds.Change Necessary to Support Plant Mods to Drywell Floor Drain Instrumentation1999-03-12012 March 1999 Forwards Revised Data Point Ref File Sheet for Clinton Power Station Computer Point That Inputs to Erds.Change Necessary to Support Plant Mods to Drywell Floor Drain Instrumentation U-603179, Provides Notification That RG Giuliani & R Zacholski,No Longer Have Need for Operating License.License Status Is Therefore Requested to Be Changed to Expired1999-03-10010 March 1999 Provides Notification That RG Giuliani & R Zacholski,No Longer Have Need for Operating License.License Status Is Therefore Requested to Be Changed to Expired 1999-09-22
[Table view] |
Text
,
lihnois Power Company Chnton Power Station
- P O Box G78 Chnton. IL 61727 T el 217 935-5623 Fax 217 935-4632 Walter G. MacFarland IV Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Othcer ILLIN91S u4o3o72 P@MR 80.120 An Illinova Cornpany September 29, 1998 Docket No. 50-461 Document Control Clerk i Nuclear Regulatory Commission l Washington, D.C. 20555 l
Subject:
Response to Additional Information Request Regarding the Seismic Questions for the Clinton Power Station Individual Plant Examination For External Events (IPEEE) l
Dear Madam or Sir:
By letter dated February 25,1998, from Jon B. Hopkins, the NRC requested additional information regarding the Clinton Power Station (CPS) Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal in the seismic and fire areas. In letter U-602986 dated April 27,1998, Illinois Power (IP) committed to respond to the two seismic related questions in the February 25,1998, request for information by the end of the third quarter 1998.
The purpose of this letter is to provide responses to the two seismic questions contained in the February 25,1998, request for additional information. The responses to the subject seismic questions are contained in Attachment 1 to this letter.
Sincerely yours, 1
F Gr 't j
[L10aC &&
Walter G. MacFarland, IV l
Senior Vice President and
[g/ l ChiefNuclear Officer
/ l EET/krk ,
- . ., , , ._, ; i l
Attachment l cc: NRC Clinton Licensing Project Manager NRC Resident Office, V-690 Regional Administrator, Region III, USNRC Illinois Department ofNuclear Safety i 9810020347 980929 PDR ADOCK 05000461 P PDR,
SUBJECT:
Response to AdditionalInformation Request Regarding U-603077 the Seismic Questions for the Clinton Power Station 8G.120 Individual Plant Examination For External Events (IPEEE) J l
i i
bec: W. D. Romberg, V-928 K. A. Baker, V-928 P. E. Walberg, V-928 M. A. Reandeau, V-920 NRAG Secretary, V-852 E. E. Tiedemann. V-920 Author (s)
Technical Validators l
- 1. A. J. Hable. V-928 1 1
- 2. N/A l
l l
1
- Associated Corrective Action Document N/A 1
~
Attachment 1
- to U-603077 l Page 1 of 9 Responses to NRC Ouestions Pursuant to Seismic Evaluation for IPEEE at CPS NRC Ouestion 1:
According to the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) submittal, the preferred success path for the Clinton Power Station (CPS) relies on the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) system, and RCIC alone, for reactor coolant system (RCS) l inventory control. The RCIC system, which uses a turbine-driven pump, is a single train system with only moderate reliability. According to EPRI NP-6041, "the use of single- l train systems with recognized poor availability" should be " treated with caution" (for non-seismic-caused component or system unavailability). EPRI NP-6041 further states that l "one should have reasonable assurance that the plant level non-seismic system unavailability is no more than about 0.01 [per demand]" and RCIC is cited as an example of systems with poor non-seismic failure probabilities. For Clinton, the independent failure probability of the RCIC system used in the Individual Plant Examination (IPE), as indicated in some of the Level I core damage sequences (from the IPE analyses), is 0.0546 per demand, higher than that specified in EPRI NP-6041 (i.e., about 0.01). The failure prol bility may increase for IPEEE application because of the longer mission time required f ae IPEEE (72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for IPEEE versus 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> for IPE). The use of generic data from JREG-ll50 for turbine-driven pumps (3E-2 per demand for failure to start, SE-3/ hot Sr failure to run, and IE-2/ demand for unavailability due to test and maintenanw) would yield a higher failure probability for a 72-hour mission time. The reliance on RCIC alone would yield a higher failure probability for a 72-hour mission time.
The reliance on RCIC alone for high pressure injection in the preferred success path is therefore questionable. To address this issue, the high pressure core spray (HPCS) system is also required in the IPEEE for some other BWR6/ Mark III plants as a back-up to the RCIC system. In these IPEEEs, although either the RCIC system or the HPCS system can satisfy the success criteria for high pressure injection, both systems are included in the safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL) for seismic evaluation. Please provide additional basis for the use of RCIC alone in the preferred success path for RCS inventory control and discuss the seismic capacity of the HPCS system.
Response
In order to respond to the question of the seismic capacity of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) System, a seismic walkdown of the HPCS system was performed. This walkdown included not only the HPCS injection system but also the HPCS support systems. The walkdown was conducted according to the guidance given in EPRI NP-6041.
This extensive walkdown for HPCS and support systems negates the need to provide additional basis for the use of RCIC alone in the preferred success path. The seismic l walkdowns of the HPCS and support systems are of the same level of diligence that was l used in the walkdowns performed for the original CPS IPEEE submittal.
- . ~ .- -- - . - - . . - - -_ _ - . - . - . . ._ -. .. -. ..- -
4 Attachment 1
. to U-603077 Page 2 of 9 The HPCS and support systems walkdowns provide the basis for use of HPCS as a backup to the RCIC system as other BWR 6 plants with Mark III Containments have done. The HPCS and the support systems are all classified as Division 3, which is divisionally separate from RCIC.
To this end, a safe shutdown equipment list (SSEL) was prepared, the seismic evaluation walkdown sheets (SEWS) for each component developed, walkdowns conducted, and results evaluated.
Support systems walked-down include the following Division 3 systems:
Shutdown Cooling Water (SX)
SX Pump Room Cooling (VH)
HPCS Room Cooling (VY)
Diesel Generator Room Cooling (VD)
Essential Switchgear Cooling (VX)
Instrument Power System (IP)
Diesel-Generator (DG)
Diesel Oil Storage System (DO)
Auxiliary Power System (AP)
DC Power System (DC)
' After developing the SEWS forms for the SSEL components, the Seismic Walkdown Team from the original walkdowns was re-assembled. The qualifications of the Seismic Review Team (.SRT) remain the same as in the September 1995 submittal with the addition of more years of experience. A pre-job briefmg was conducted to re-familiarize the team with the objectives and methodology of the seismic walkdowns, lessons from the SQUG Walkdown Screening and Seismic Evaluation Training Courses, and the SEWS documentation forms.
The walkdowns were conducted during June of 1998.
Inclusion of HPCS as a Backup to RCIC in the Preferred Safe Shutdown Path For the preferred shutdown path, HPCS is considered a backup to the RCIC system.
This path assumes that a loss-of-offsite power (LOOP) occurs with the Review Level Earthquake (RLE).
If RCIC fails, then HPCS is available as a backup inventory control system. The HPCS system starts automatically on low reactor water level 2. The system stops injecting on high reactor water level 8 and restarts on level 2. Thus, no manual actions are necessary for HPCS to start and inject and maintain reactor water level between level 2 and level 8.
There are no other changes to the preferred path system operating description. Safety Relief Valves (SRV) will be used for pressure control and the Suppression Pool Cooling i.
mode of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system train "A" will be used when the pool temperature increases. This path places the plant in hot shutdown.
._ 7 _- .
Attachment 1
- to U-603077 Page 3 of 9 l
When a RLE occurs, the Reactt r Protection System (RPS) will provide a SCRAM signal if necessary, and the Control Rod Drive (CRD) system will provide motive force for driving in control rods for reactivity control. If a loss of offsite power (LOOP) occurs l coincident with the RLE, the RPS will initiate a reactor SCRAM Control room operators l verify that the reactor is shut down following the SCRAM signal. To verify shutdown l criteria are met, if non-safety power is available, the Rod Control and Information System l (RCIS) display is used. If non-safety power is lost, the RCIS display is also lost and
! operators utilize a back panel in the main control room (MCR) to verify that the "all rods in" LED is lit on either Division 1 or 2 of the Rod Gang Contrcl Cabinets (RGCC).
During the few minutes required for an operator to verify all rods in if the RCIS display is lost, other operators will utilize alternate means to determine whether significant rod movement occurred. Since non-safety power is lost, the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) would close and the number of SRVs lining would be indicative of whether the reactor was on a decay power trend or still at power. The Safety Parameter Display
! System (SPDS) power indication and suppression pool heatup rate would also indicate if l the reac'or was still at power. These alternate indicaticns would give operators immediate indication of not meeting shutdown criteria while an operator is verifying the "all rods in" LED on the RGCC.
l The next step in this scenario would be pressure control by the SRVs in response to closure of the MSIVs because ofloss of solenoid power. Division 1 actuation and control logic of the SRVs is the preferred success path front line system for the reactor pressure l control function. If no operator action occurs, the SRVs will lin on their set pressure.
Othenvise, operators could control reactor pressure manually by controlling the SRVs.
This action occurs in the MCR horseshoe and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) valves are used during this event though non-ADS valves may be available.
Depressurization of the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is not required for this preferred l success path because both RCIC and HPCS are high pressure injection systems.
l l The RCIC System will automatically start on a low reactor water level signal (Level 2). In accordance with operating procedure, operators will verify that the RCIC system is operating and providing inventory makeup. RCIC stops injecting on high water level (Level 8) to prevent water carry over to the RCIC turbine. No manual actions are required for restarting injection since the system will automatically restart injection on low water level (Level 2). However, the operators will manually control RCIC in accordance with Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) to prevent the cycling of RCIC injection.
This operator action is performed from the "at the controls" area in the MCR and would not have to occur for RCIC to respond successfully in this scenario.
Attachment 1
. to U-603077 Page 4 of 9 In the event that the RCIC system is lost, the HPCS system is used for inventory control.
HPCS is capable ofinjecting water to the reactor vessel at a much higher flow rate than RCIC. The HPCS system will also start automatically on a low reactor water level signal (Level 2) and isolate on a high water level signal (Level 8). While RCIC is the preferred system because it is more easily controlled, HPCS is an alternate source of high pressure injection to the vessel. There are no operator actions required to operate this system.
The next action in this path is to start Residual Heat Removal (RHR) train "A" in the Suppression Pool Cooling mode to remove decay heat from the suppression poci and thus protect the containment. This is performed manually in accordance with EOPs when the suppression pool temperature increases. Suppression pool temperature will increase as a result of discharge from the RCIC turbine and/or the SRVs. ,
Operators placing RHR into Suppression Pool Cooling mode are required to use the MCR's controlled operating proceddre, and would have sufficient time to properly place the system into operation before cooling is required. There is a self-checking system in place at CPS to minimize operator errors. There are also other members of the operating crew in the "at the controls" area of the MCR to assist in peer-checking. The shiA manager has oversight responsibilities.
Walkdowns Per the guidance in EPRI NP-6041, "A Methodology for Assessment ofNuclear Power Plant Seismic Margin", Appendix D, " Sampling Guidelines" page D-3, commodities installed in bulk such as piping, cable trays, HVAC ducting, electrical conduit, and instrument lines can usually be screened generically subject to walkdown verification of inclusion rules. Since this was performed during the walkdowns of the original CPS l IPEEE submittal, and design and installation practice of these items at CPS have been consistent and are included in the plant's quality assurance program, generic screening was not pe-formed for these walkdowns.
HPCS AND SUPPORT SYSTEM AREAS WALKED-DOWN BY THE SRT HPCS Pump Room and associated piping areas (Fuel Bldg 712,737, & 755 foot elevations)
HPCS Diesel Generator (DG) Room (Diesel Generator Bldg 737 foot elevation)
HPCS DG Day and Storage Tank Rooms (Diesel Generator Bldg 712 & 737 foot elevations)
HPCS DG Ventilation Area (Diese! Generator Bldg 762 foot elevation)
HPCS Electrical Equipment Room (Control Bldg 781 foot elevation)
Div 3 Battery Room (Control Bldg 781 foot elevation)
Div 3 SX Pump Room (Screenhouse 699 foot elevation)
Main Control Room (Control Bldg 800 foot elevation) i
- Attachment 1
, to U-603077 Page 5 of 9 l
The above areas contain the necessary active equipment to operate the HPCS pump, given a loss-of-offsite power event. Ventilation systems for the HPCS pump room, associated DG room ventilation, the Shutdown Service Water (SX) system pump room ventilation and the ventilation for the HPCS electrical equipment room were also included in these walkdowns.
Piping was walked down in accordance with the EPRI Seismic Margin Assessment (SMA) methodology which included a review of the following considerations:
Non-ductilejoints '
Cast iron pipe Branch lines flexibility Piping connections for excessive nozzle loadings !
Adequate clearance for valves to avoid seismic interactions i Multiple support failure issues
)
Vibration isolation on equipment <
l l
Piping across seismic gaps Seismic in"m+n The piping systems in inese safety-related systems have been qualified for the Clinton SSE level earthquake of 0.25g. No weaknesses were identified during the walkdowns, therefore the seismic capacity should well exceed the RLE of 0.3g Ductwork and dampers associated with the UPCS and support systems were also walked down and found to be acceptable for an PJ2 of 0.3g.
1 The HPCS pump room is located at the lowest elevation of the power block (excludes the j service water pump house). The effects of seismic amplification are minimized at this level in the power block. The pump, piping, and valves were found to be adequately restrained by seismically qualified hangers, restraints, and snubbers. Branch lines and valves were i found adequate for items mentioned above from the EPRI SMA methodology.
i Certain HPCS motor operated valves (MOVs) were walked down and screened from I
further investigation during the walkdowns performed for the initial submittal of the CPS IPEEE. These MOVs received a walkby to confirm that each valve's configuration and l potential interaction sources had not changed since the previous walkdowns. No problems were noted and all MOVs in this category were screened from further evaluation.
The HPCS pump room also included the room cooling coils, fans, and cabinets. This equipment wasjudged adequate to survive an RLE based on the EPRI SMA guidance.
_ _ _ . _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _mm- i --- - - w
1
- Attachment 1
. to U-603077 Page 6 of 9 The DG system was also walked down. The associated air start compressors and air receiver tanks were included with the DG as well as the fuel oil storage and day tanks, fuel oil pump and the ventilation for these areas. The guidelines of the EPRI SMA methodology for these types of components were followed and no outliers were found; therefore, these systems were screened from further review.
l The electrical equipment area of the HPCS system walkdown included the switchgear I panel, motor control centers (MCCs), battery and charger, distribution panel, and room ventilation equipment. All the equipment was found to be adequate for an RLE.
There were no additional MCR panels needed for the instmments and controls of these systems than what was included in the original CPS IPEEE submittal. The MCR panels did receive a walkby to confirm seismic configuration and to verify that no new problems had emerged.
The Division 3 SX pump room contains the SX pump, strainer, valves, MCC, and room ventilation equipment. The shaft of the SX pump could not be inspected below the floor of the pump room. Drawings were used to determine the location and adequacy of the seismic restraints on the pump shaft. The SRT found these to be adequate. The MCC and l HVAC panels were inspected and passed the initial screening as did the air handling equipment. The valves, exposed piping, and SX pump all passed the initial screening for the respective equipment categories.
For the SX buried structures, penetrations were checked for flexibility but the analyses performed as part of the original CPS IPEEE submittal for the buried piping and electrical l mns seismic distortions were not re-performed. The soils analyses from the original IPEEE submittal were reviewed and considered appropriate for demonstrating the adequacy of buried equipment that supports HPCS.
Summary There were no outliers found during the course of the walkdowns. All of the HPCS and I support systems components were screened from further evaluation. The addition of the HPCS and support systems to the preferred shutdown path does not change any of the conclusions of the original CPS IPEEE seismic submittal. These walkdowns serve to add credibility to CPS as a plant that has sufficient seismic margin to successfully withstand an RLE of 0.3g.
Attachment 1
- to U-603077 Page 7 of 9 NRC Ouestion 2:
It is stated in the submittal that " Operators use existing procedures to operate all of the systems in both of the success paths and are trained extensively on the use of these procedures in an on-going operator training program," but no details are provided. Since operator actions following a review level canhquake (RLE) are crucial for the successful shutdown of the plant, please discuss in more detail the types of operator actions needed, the locations where they have to be performed, the time available for these actions, and the estimated failure rates (e.g., obtained from IPE). Please also provide a discussion concerning the anticipated effects of the RLE on rates of operator errors which may I impact the integrity of the preferred and the alternate success paths, as well as a more i detailed discussion of the on-going operator training program and its effect on the IPEEE.
]
i
Response
Following a RLE, operators would follow the directions given in CPS procedure 4301.01,
" Earthquake." There are no "Immediate Operator Actions" in this procedure. I
" Subsequent Operator Actions" include the following:
Within 8 (eight) hours, a walkdown inspection of plant accessible equipment, piping, and the Clinton Lake dam should be made. Safety-related equipment should be checked first.
These activities should have no effect on the availability of the preferred or alternate shutdown paths.
If the non-safety-related and non-seismically qualified systems such as Feedwater (FW) that are used in a normal plant shutdown are lost, operators would use equipment reviewed during the SMA. The discussion of operator actions during the preferred and alternate safe shutdown paths follows.
Preferred Path The inventory and pressure control systems in the preferred path can operate without operator intervention. The safety relief valves (SRV) operate on set pressure and l deadband reset pressure. The SRV's can be controlled manually to lower reactor vessel pressure to values lower than the SRV's would control when operating in automatic based on set pressures. Manual control of the SRV's occurs in the MCR. The SRV's are designed to control reactor vessel pressure automatically.
The RCIC system operates automatically between levels 2 and 8. Operators could take manual control of the system to adjust pump flow, but this action would occur only when time and circumstances allow. This operator action is intended to control reactor water i level within tighter bands and avoid multiple cycles on the RCIC system. However, if the 4
operators do not take this option, RCIC is designed to maintain reactor water level automatically.
, to U-603077 Page 8 of 9 I
The Suppression Pool Cooling mode of RHR train "A" would be used when the l l
Suppression Pool increases in temperature. This operator action is performed from the MCR with a controlled copy of the operating procedure. The Suppression Pool Cooling ,
mode of RHR has been used periodically at CPS during normal operation to maintain the l suppression pool temperature within allowable limits. As a result, operators are l experienced in this manual operation. The RLE should not affect this action since it is not l a time-critical task and self-checking and peer-checking would help in minimizing human 1 errors.
l l
Alternate Path l l To reduce reactor vessel pressure, ADS or operator action is needed to bring the pressure l within the limits of a low pressure injection system. One consideration of the effects of an RLE is that an operator may not be able to perform manual actions immediately. In this
! scenario, the ADS system will automatically actuate upon completion of the initiation ;
logic permissives and timer. A low pressure injection system will automatically inject 1 when reactor pressure decreases to below the system pressure.
After reactor water level is stabilized and pressure is reduced below the shutdown cooling -
(SDC) setpoint, operators procedurally place RHR 'B' in SDC mode.
l l Operators undergo periodic training on manual control of SRVs, RCIC, HPCS, Shutdown
! Cooling, and Suppression Pool Cooling. The on-going operator training program is conducted la accordance with 10CFR55.59, "Requalification." The CPS licensed operator training program is an NRC approved systems approach to training program and is accredited with the Institute ofNuclear Power Operations.
l Since there are no operator actions required to complete the actions associated with reactor vessel pressure and inventory control, there is no discussion on the anticipated i effects of the RLE on rates of operator errors. There are operator failure rates associated j with placing RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling mode and Shutdown Cooling mode. The rates used in development of the IPE are 1.6E-3 for RSPCOOLSWW, " Failure to Initiate l Suppression Pool Cooling," and 3.0E-3 for RSDCOOLSWW, " Failure to Manually Start l Shutdown Cooling." The RLE should not significantly affect these actions since they are not time-critical tasks and self-checking and peer-checking help in minimizing human erTors.
l Licensed operators practice earthquake, off-normal, and emergency scenarios in the CPS plant specific simulator. Because of participation in these scenarios, human errors are r.nticipated to be minimized. Procedure adherence is stressed, not only during simulator earthquake scenarios but at all times. Procedural adherence expectations have resulted in l precise and clear procedures which help to minimize human errors.
~
d Attachment I
' to U-603077 Page 9 of 9 Conclusion There are no immediate operator actions required for reactor vessel pressure and inventory control as a result of the RLE since those systems are designed for automatic operation. Subsequent operator actions are performed from the MCR, are proceduralized and trained upon, and are not time-critical.
The self-checking and peer-checking programs in place at CPS help to ndnimize the number of operator errors. The on-going operator training program re-enforces these error reduction techniques.