PNP 2017-017, Notification in Response to Confirmatory Order, EA-15-039

Notification in Response to Confirmatory Order, EA-15-039

ML17124A409
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	05/04/2017
From:	Hardy J Entergy Nuclear Operations
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, NRC/RGN-III
References
EA-15-039, PNP 2017-017
Download: ML17124A409 (12)

Text

Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

Palisades Nuclear Plant 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway Covert, MI 49043 Tel 269 7642000 Jeffery A. Hardy Regulatory Assurance Manager PNP 2017-017 May 4, 2017 Mr. Patrick Louden U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Reactor Projects, Region III 2443 Warrenville Road Lisle, IL 60532

Subject:

Notification in Response to Confirmatory Order, EA-15-039 Palisades Nuclear Plant Docket 50-255 License No. DPR-20

Reference:

Confirmatory Order Related to NRC Report No. 0500025512015013; and Investigation Report 3-2012-021; Palisades Nuclear Plant, dated May 16, 2016 (ML16137A012)

Dear Mr. Louden:

On May 16, 2016, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) issued the referenced Confirmatory Order, EA-15-039, to Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO). In accordance with the Confirmatory Order, ENO developed a case study addressing lessons learned from the events that gave rise to the Confirmatory Order.

Pursuant to Section V, Item 2.c, of the Confirmatory Order, this letter provides notification prior to ENO sharing the lessons learned during presentations at: (1) Regional Utility Group meetings in each of the NRC Regions that Entergy operates and; (2) an industry-wide forum. The presentation materials are enclosed for NRC review.

This letter contains no new commitments and no revisions to existing commitments.

Sincerely,

~~~

JAH/tad

Attachment:

Confirmatory Order, EA-14-013, Lessons Learned Presentation Materials cc: Document Control Desk, USNRC Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, Palisades, USNRC Resident Inspector, Palisades, USNC

ATTACHMENT Confirmatory Order, EA-14-013, Lessons Learned Presentation Materials xx Pages Follow PNP 2017-017

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• Introduction

• Timeline of Events

• Organizational Warning Flags

• Lessons Lea rned

• Summary

• Q&A (Z) II _ M' 0 WE POW E R L IF ESM 1

• What is a SI RWT?

- 300,000 gallon aluminum tank

- Dual use

• Suction path for ECCS pumps

• Refueling water inventory

- Sits on a concrete support structure, above the Main Control Room

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• SIRWT Operational History

- Tank is original plant equipment {19G8}

- Historical leakage events

• 1986

• 1988

• 1990

- Construction drawings specified that the SIRWT sit atop a sand bed

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• May 18, 2011

- After a period of heavy rain, leaking water is noted in the Control Room

• May 27, 2011

- Inspection of concrete support structure

• June 2, 2011

- Direct visual inspection identified two active leaks sized at < 1 drop per minute

• June 8, 2011

- Troubleshooting team was formed

- Results were inconclusive (Z) II _ IW 0 W E POW E R L I F ESM 4

• July 27, 2011

- Troubleshooting team made recommendations to inspect the tank in the next refueling outage.

• August 2, 2011

- Industry consultant contacted.

• September 16, 2011

- Industry consultant concludes that the SIRWT was the likely leakage source.

• February 16, 2012

- Operability determination performed.

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• Numerous long-standing and high-level vacancies

• Lack of an issue owner

• Troubleshooting shortfalls

• Distracted organization

• Disjointed communications

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• Conservative decision-making

- Leaders take a conservative approach to decision-making, particularly when info is incomplete or conditions are unusual.

• Questioning attitude

- Individuals communicate unexpected plant responses and conditions to the Control Room.

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• Stop in the face of uncertainty

- Operators must be sensitive to the importance of identifying degraded equipment so that the problems can be prioritized and resolved.

• Use of Corrective Action Process

- Issues are entered in sufficient detail to assure they can be prioritized and resolved.

- New conditions, identified during investigation, are promptly entered into CAP.

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