NUREG/CR-3215, Summary of ACRS Subcommittee on Human Factors 850404 Meeting in Washington,Dc to Discuss Repts,Including NUREG/CR-3215 & NUREG/CR-3737 & J Macevoy Work on Nuclear Power Plant Safety Measurement & Evaluation Program.List of Attendees En
| ML20134F909 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 05/03/1985 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| RTR-NUREG-CR-3215, RTR-NUREG-CR-3737 ACRS-2300, NUDOCS 8508220015 | |
| Download: ML20134F909 (21) | |
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1 h CERTIFIED COPY DATE ISSUED: May 3,1985 MINUTES OF THE APRIL 4, 1985 MEETING 0F THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS WASHINGTON, D.C.
Purpose:
The ACRS subcommittee on Human Factors met on April 4, 1985 at 1717 H Street, N.W. , Washington D.C. 20E55 in Room 1046. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the following reports: NUREG/CR-3215, "Orga-ni:ational Analysis and Safety for Utilitiu With Nuclear Power Plants";
NUREG/CR-3737, "An Initial Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Organization and Its Effect of Safety Performance"; and work on a Nuclear Power Plant Safety Measurement and Evaluation Program by John MacEvoy, ar A ACRS Senior Fellow. Operator requalification and the check-operator concept were also discussed.
Notice of the meeting, published in the Federal Register on Tuesday, March 19, 1985, is reproduced and shown as Attachment A. The schedule for the meeting is Attachment B. Sign-in sheets of meeting attendees are contained in Attachment C. Attachment D conta, ins a list of meeting handouts kept with the office copy of these minutes. The entire meeting was open to the public. There were no oral or written comments from members of the public. Mr. Richard Major and Mr. John Schiffgens were the assigned ACRS staff members for the meeting.
Attendees:
ACRS D. A. Ward, Chairman C. M. Overbey, RES j G. A. Reed, Member T. G. Ryan, RES )
l F. Remick, Member P. W. McLaughlin, DHFS l ,
C. J. Wylie, Member D. B. Jones, DHFS ,
C. Michelson, Member L. P. Crocker, DHFS R. Osborn, Invited E,. pert J. A. Thurber, PNL 1
l < J. Peterson, Invited Expert A. F. Gibson, REG II
.!Ih fr G508220015 . ,, i.D ORIGINAL 850503 (1 E PDR ACRS
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, Summary / Minutes / Human Factors 2 April 4, 1985 Meeting 9,
- R. K. Major Staff H. B. Kister, REG I J. O. Schiffgens, Staff D. H. Beckham, DHFS J. MacEvoy, Fellow R. M. Keller, REG. I Others E. Oesterle, Bechtel T. Houghton, KMC L. Neal, GE M. Rager, NUS N. Suttora, AIF A. Bivens, AIF S. Seth, MITRE P. F. Collins, RFA Meeting Hichlights, Agreements, and Requests:
Mr. %'ard discussed briefly the meeting schedule and objectives. Mr.
Reed expressed the opinion that the Subcommittee might better have addressed the potential need for more rigorous aptitude evaluation in personnel selection before looking into plant organization. The.
Subcommittee agreed that this matter should be taken up at a future meeting, ,
2a. Mr. Ryan presented a brief overview of NUREG/CR-3215. He pointed out that in July 1982 the NRC initiated a multiphased research program to focus on an organization and management performance assessment and develop some optimization guidelines.
NUREG/CR-3215, Volumes I and 2, reports on the first phase of this research program, which is intended to develop and field validate new innovative standards and protocols for assessing, on both
, quantitative and qualitative bases, nuclear facility organization and management effectiveness in matters crucial to safety during ,
power plant operations. He said that initial work on the program was halted for a time due to J) a shortage of funds, and b) some NRC questioning of the " propriety" of looking into this area. Mr.
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.' April 4, 1985 Meeting -
l Ward expressed amazement over the latter reason, but the staff l t
offered little insight. At that time, July 1983, the NUREG was published (before many conclusions could be developed).
Mr. Ryan expressed the view that the success or failure of most enterprises rests with the organization and the top-level manage-ment. According to Mr. Ryan, people in numerous industries have tried the " bottom-up" approach to organizational analysis and reorganization in efforts to improve company performance and have concluded that improvements are best made through a " top-down" approach. Mr. Michelson suggested that justification for continued support for this program would probably hinge on the staff's ability to establish a solid link between safety and the nature of the organization and management performance.
1 The main point stressed in Volume 1 is the need for an orga-nizational perspective. Secondly, a three legged interactive
' model is introduced for analyzing nuclear utility management. One leg is organizational characteristics focusing on the structure, another is intermediate outcomes of performance, and a third is indicators of safety. Volume 2 is essentially a handbook for government and industry researchers and practitioners who are 1
interested in developing the area. An interactive model of l organizations, organization management, potential impacts of t
- utility industry environment on organizational design, orga-4 nizational assessment practices of selected federal agencies.
I organizational characteristics data sources in the nuclear utility industry, and a critical analysis of existing safety indicat'or data l ~.ree discuss in Volume 2.
! There.was considerable discussion of the ratings for the nine potential data sources identified in Table 1 of the' report (see
- Attachment E). Mr. Ward said that based on the 1 (for good) to 5 i (for bad) rating scale, it did not look like the sources listed -
l were very good. Mr. Osborn suggested that the Subcommittee interpret the table as saying that the data sources did not suit ;
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Surnary/ Minutes / Human Factors 4 Aprii 4, 1985 Mzeting 2,
- research purposes and were not detailed or specific enough across all plants. He said that this is to be expected for information that is collected for other purposes, as was the case here.
Mr. Reed asked if it was possible and desirable to come up with a standardized organizational chart for nuclear power plant manage-ment and a set of rules for the "best" structure. Mr. Osborn replied that the plant organization needs to be tailored to a number of factors; i.e., because plants differ so substantially in their sizes, their technologies, their environmental settings, and the regulatory systems they operate under, standardization may not be a wise choice. Mr. Reed and Mr. Remick wondered about the extent to which the talent of available personnel should influence organizational structure.
Mr. Ward asked if INP0 was doing any research in this area. Mr.
McLaughlin responded that as far as the staff knows.they are only collecting data on indicators of safety performance. Mr. Ward asked the same question with regard to EPRI. Mr. Ryan said EPRI had a small on-going organizational program. Mr. Overbey added that EPRI had published a report in this area and that he would obtain a copy of it for the Subcommittee, s
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2b. Mr. McLaughlin made some introductory remarks before the presenta- i tion on NUREG/CR-3737. He emphasized that this report is only an ,
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" initial" analysis. He said that NRR considers it an important I activity with two objectives: 1. To describe the relationship, if one exists, between organization and management and safe operation I
of a nuclear power plant; and 2. To develop a set of indicators l l that would characterize how well (safely) a plant was performing.
The first task was to identify and collect existing objective measures of plant safety performance. The second was to identify ,
and collect existing objective measures of plant management organization. The third task was to take these two measures and l
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. Summary / Minutes / Human Factors 5 April 4,1985 M:eting
] attempt to empirically correlate them to establish if, in fact, there is a relationship between them.
Mr. Thurber, the project manager, described the research effort ,
that resulted in NUREG/CR-3737. He began by reminding everyone that the project is not a study of management but, rather, an empirical study that looks at organizational structure with indicators of safety performance as the dependent variable.
Structure is something that can be looked at empirically more easily than can be the art of management and the skill with which a manager communicates things. Mr. Ward wondered whether top level personnel or organizational structure is the most reliable and
- permanent characteristic of the corporate entity. Mr. Thurber ventured that structure is more stable than personnel. Mr.
Michelson suggested that staff review procedures for evaluating technical specification changes involving organizational structure should be considered at a future Subcommittee meeting. l l
Using the approach discussed in NUREG/CR-3215, Mr. Thurber said they identified nine preliminary safety performance variables.
Indicators were collected for these nine from LERs, forced outage data, SALP scores, and violations data for 1981, they were con-trolled for plant age, she, region, reactor type, and vendor, and combined to form the following more reliable and general safety performance indicators:
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- Human Error Rate
- Hardware Failure Rate
- Regulatory Compliance
- Plant Reliability _
These composite indicators, from data that was available to the
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research team, served as their measure of plant safety. Mr. ,
Thurber said that if they had more money they may have selected INP0's 31 indicators of safety performance.
Summary / Minutes / Human Factors 6 April 4, 1985 Meeting
- With regard to organizational structure, Mr. Thurber stated that formal structure is as important in a plant as are managers because it establishes a basis for determining what work has to be done. -
who will perform given tasks, and what standards are to be applied ,
to the work, as well as how activities are going to be budgeted, cooratnated and controlled. From technical specifications, FSAR's, and other sources, the research team collected measures of vertical organization (organizational patterns, such as supervisory spans of control, number of ranks up in the plant, number of ranks from the first line supervisor to the top manager of the unit in question),
measures of horizontal organizational patterns (such as number of departments at the first line of management), and measures of management coordination (such as communication and systems of communication). Mr. Ward asked how they measured cross communication. Mr. Thurber said they used, for example, the level at which operations and maintenance functions converge in a plant, and the level at which operations and engineering functions converge.
Mr. Thurber said they did regressional and discriminate analyses of the relationship between organizational structure and safety to describe and explain the variance in the dependent variable, safety (actually, the four indicators), in terms of the structural variables. Plants were separated-into above average and below average and organizational factors correlated to each group. With regard to safety indicators, the following patterns were dis-covered:
- Plants using many vertical ranks of authority performed less well;
- Plants with narrow spans of control or a larger ratio of
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supervisors to subordinates performed less well; and ,
- Plants with better developed coordinative mechanisms across
- functions tend to perform better.
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. Summary / Minutes / Human Factors 7 April 4, 1985 Meeting
',' Mr. Ward asked if organizational theory gives an optimum number for the spans of control. Mr. Thurber responded that some experienced managers (and the Navy) say six, but there does not seem to be a consensus. He said that damaging events are too rare .
to be used as the only measures of nuclear power plant (NPP) safety performance, that there is no connonly accepted definition of NPP safety performance at this time, and that there is great danger in making an evaluation based on a single in indicator (i.e., the results from all indicators need to be combined).
Mr. McLaughlin said that this work was done with less than $200,000 of FY-84 funds. He said they had budgeted for programs on maintenance indicators, $70,000 for FY-85 and $150,000 for FY-86.
2c. Mr. MacEvoy presented a description of his work on Power Plant Safety and Performance Evaluation. The objective of his effort was to use readily available data sources on performance indicators (that are objective) to provide an overall index of plant safety and performance that wfll permit reliable comparisons from year te year and from plant to plant. Changes in the index are intended to signal a need for a detailed analysis. He chose the following indicators: ,
- Automatic Scrams at Power per year (premise: challenges to the ReactorProtectionSystemare" bad").
- Yearly Occupational Dose (premise: radiation' doses to personnel must be minimized).
- Airborne Curies Discharged (premise: radiation released to the environment should be minimized).
- ) Plant Yearly Average Availability (premise: high availability ,
is an overall indication that the plant runs well).
. Summary /Minutos/ Human Factors 8 April 4, 1985 Meeting
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- Average Yearly Plant (thermal) Efficiency (premise: plants should strive for the highest efficiency possible).
There was considerable discussion of these indicators and the .
extent to which they are measures of safety. The following views were expressed by various Subcommittee Members: Some routine challenges to the RPS can provide evidence that systems are working properly and, hence, are good. A low yearly occupational dose may be an indication that timely maintenance is not being done (the effects of which may not show up or. a short time scale). Airborne curies discharged has to be corrected for reactor type, i.e. PWR or BWR. Again, on a short time scale, a high plant yearly average availability may be reflecting neglect of maintenance rather than safety. A high average yearly plant thermal efficiency may say more about design, environment, and astute use of heat sinks than about safety.
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Each factor was mapped to a range from 0 to 2, and sumed to obtain a single index. There was som' questioning of the mapping procedure which was not the same for all factors. Plots of indices versus time were presented for four plants and the trends reflected were discussed. .
3a. Mr. Boger presented the NRC Staff's view of the operator requali-fication program. He talked about the current regulatory requirements concerning requalification, requalification program evaluction, the check-operator concept, ar.d Comissioner Asselstine's questions on the:e issues.
Operator requalification is regulated according to 8ppendix A to 10
'CFR 55. The program is based on a continuous 2 year cycle with
. pre-planned lectures. Lecture content depends on how the candidates fared on the last annual written exam and on perceived ,
training needs. As part of on-the-job training each facility license holder (R0 and SR0) is required to a) manipulate reactivity controls, b) review facility changes, c) review all emergency and
Summary / Minutes / Human factors 9 April 4, 1985 Meeting
- abnormal procedures, and d) use a plant specific simulator,if available, to perform reactivity manipulations and operations.
There is stipulation for an annual written examination. The operator is expected to demonstrate his ability to perform ,
satisfactorily during normal and abnormal conditions.
Mr. Ward asked for the basis of the annual frequency for examination. Mr. Boger could only say that the requirement has always been there. Mr. Ward said that it was his understanding that the annual examination was to identify deficiencies that could then be corrected with a requalification program. Mr. Boger said that that is the case, and added that each facility is required, as part of their FSAR submittil, to include a requalification program for review. The program (lectures and operator evaluations) is conducted by the facility and evaluated by the NRC. Before TMI-2 the NRC looked at the requalifictcion program, the content of written exams, and the facility's grading of operators. The TMI-2 accident caused the NRC to rethink it's role in the requalification process. Mr. Boger pointed out that the NRC now has Examiner Standards to help r aintain consistency (e.g., ES-601 deals with how to administer examiu tions). Due to regionalization the NRC har beenabletoexpandit'sstaffofexaminers(from10or12to27or
- 30) so as to increase it's involvement in the process.
Mr. Boger said that if a plant has a lot of LER's for operator errors or inattention to details or procedures problems, these may ,
be due to management inattention to requalification, and the. plant is likely to be chosen for evaluation. According to the examination format, each candidate is given a full written examidation (i.e., about 60 percent of a normal NRC examination)
-and an operating test (i.e., either a walk-through or a simulator exam). The NRC now tests 20 percent of the operators in 50 percent
' of the facilities annually. If 80 percent of the operators pass ,
the examination, the program is deemed acceptable. If less than 60 percent pass the facility's program is considered unacceptable and corrective action is required. Whether the examination is given by ;
Sumary/ Minutes / Human Factors 10 April 4, 1985 M:eting the facility or the NRC, an individual operator who does not pass is placed in an accelerated requalification program (the provisions of which are described in the FSAR).
The NRC has produced an Examiner Handbook to guide an examiner on sample information from the Operator Knowledge Catalogue to
- ....sistent examinations.
With regard to the check-operator concept, Mr. Boger said they were reconsidering their initial position that check-operators from one facility examine at another facility (to minimize potential conflict of interest), since check-operators from the same facility should be more knowledgeable examiners. Mr. Remick suggested one benefit of having outsiders give the examinations is the cross-fertilization of ideas that can result.
The NRC Staff sees that the basic duty of a check-operator would be to give operating zests (simulator or oral exams) to licensed operators, not written examinations. The facility would select the check-operator randidate for NRC approval. The NRC would administer some sort of examination to certify the candidate as a check-operator, then would periodically auditsthe check-operator either on a knowledge level or observe him during the conduct of a test (similar to FAA procedures with regard to check-pilots). The benefits are an annual peer evaluation of all operators, and career enhancement for check-operators (which would presumably benefit the profession as a whole). The disadvantages are at least a perceived conflict of interest, the NRC currently lacks the legislative authority for such a program, such a program would be a drain on SR0 resources.
. The following are some comments with regard to Commissioner Asselstine's concerns: Mr. Boger expressed the opinion that the .
training programs are preparing people for the unexpected and if the unexpected doesn't happen, there is no way of really measuring how well they have been trained. Mr. Remick said he thought i
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Summary / Minutes / Human Factors April 4,1985 Meeting
- training was definitely better as a result of having requalification. Mr. Boger emphasized that as a result of regionalization there are additional examiners available to conduct.
examinations. Mr. Remick suggested that there may be too much variation among NRC consultants in their ability to conduct uniformly good examinations. Mr. Beckham acknowledged that the staff has had difficulties in attracting qualified candidates for examiner positions.
3b. Mr. Kister discussed the overall experience in Region I concerning the requalification program. To date, Region I has conducted 8 evaluations of requalification programs, 4 older and 4 newer
- programs. The Region uses input from senior residents and resident inspectors, plant operational history, and inspection experience at the facility to determine the level of program review. Five of.the eight were rated satisfactory (one which was rated unsatisfactory has since been upgraded and rated satisfactory).
With regard to the evaluations, Mr. Kister said the feedback has been positive. The Region has stressed the need for the programs to have an ongoing versus once-a-year approach, and has increased management involvement where needed. For example, Mr. Keller mentioned that it came as a shock to the management of one multi-unit utility that one of their plants had a program that was limited to about two weeks a year prior to the examination, while another plant was conducting a continuous program (note, test scores at the former were significantly lower). Mr. Kister said that operators are responding favorably to the requalification program. Their evaluation looks at the effect of the program on the overall knowledge level of the operators.
Mr. Kister said that they felt more extensive use of the resident
~ inspector in the current requalification process would have many of .
the advantages of the check-operator concept (he could watch operators per#orm on e day-to-day basis). He said that EG&G Idaho
Summary / Minutes / Human Factors 12 )
April 4,1985 Meeting l I
- and Battelle provide examiners for Region I. Mr. Keller said l operator feedback on the examinations was very positive.
3c. Mr. Gibson discussed experiences with the requalification ,
program in Region II. He described inspection findings with regard to training programs. He listed inadequate scope, poor quality ,
lesson plans, licensee examinations too easy, repetitive use of examinations, and excessive dependence on unstructured self-study as perhaps the most significant short comings. He said some utilities have made changes in their NRC approved requalification program without seeking approval for the changes.
Examinations have been administrated at most of the facilities in Region II. They have found that performance on simulators and facility walk-through examinations are generally good. If the plant does not have a simulator only a walk-through examination is given (about 80 percent of the plants in the Region.have plant specific simulators). Performance on the written examinations has '
not been good. Mr. Gibson pointed out that the written examination performance level tends to be inversely proportional to the time licensed. He stressed that initici and requall'ication examinations are similar in secte, e d both a,re afgned ic determine if the operator has an ex: 951e level cf kn61 edge to operate ?'? plant safeh .
Region II has completed I3 evaluations f requalii cation program:
following regionalizaticn. Two progra s have t=en declared unsatisfactory becese c' high failur' rate Mr. Gibson's )
- pinion, pr' TFC acministe not ms,- ificati was not ta h -iously. He su hat the nave etter examination pe<formance at fer' ries where : cr n teve been ac' dited. "r. Osborn n- At failing a tr.3t after havinc m d it the # >
+ time (1, the prt yerr) may reflect U -
^he rel' ability of the '* to do , you want it to do than {
oaut e individuals knowledgt L e _--
(- Summry/ Minutes / Human Factors April 4, 1985 Meeting 13 1 I
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! .' Mr. Gibson said that, in general, industry is opposed to NRC l administered requalification examinations (concerned about ;
shutdowns and operator morale). The most frequent coments received are a) the scope of the exam should be restricted to the -
scope of utility training g, and b) the answers to questions requires knowledge the operator does not need.
- 4. Mr. Peterson, Acting President of the Professional Reactor Operators Society, discuss views of PROS members on a the check operator concept and requalification. He presented the results of a survey which indicated strong support for the check operator concept provided that it would be a replacement for, not an addition to, the current licensing or requalification requirements.
Many operators now take~an annual requalification test from the utility and then another one from the NRC. He called the Subcommittee's attention to the fact that not all licensed operators are actual control room operators; some people are licensed but work elsewhere in the plant or for plant management.
Only control room operators (past, present, and in training) were included in the survey; 49 percent (185) of those contacted responded in time for this meeting (51 percertt were SR0s and 37 percent were R0s). Without knowing the details of a check operator program, 83 percent favored it. With regard to the current
'4 censing process, 90 percent thought that it did not accurately reasure an individual's ability to safely operate a nuclear power plant (unqualified examiners and non-performance based examinations). Only 65 percent were willing to participate in the crogram if it meant mair.taining additional certification as an examirer, but 88 percent wotild like PROS to pursue the idea with those developing the concept. l Fu ture- Meetings : .
The ACRS is scheduled to discuss Requalification of Nuclear Power Plant Operators during the 300th ACRS meeting, April 11-13, 1985.
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- Summary / Minutes / Human Factors 14 April 4, 1985 Meeting A complete transcript of the meeting is on file at the NRC
- NOTE: , .
Public Document Room at 1717 H St., NW., Washington, D. C. or ,
can be.obtained at cost from ACE Federal Reporter, Inc., 444 N. Capitol St., Washington, D. C. 2001, Telephone (202) 347-3700.
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- Federal R gist:r / Vol. 50. No. 53 / Tuesd:y. March 19. 1985 / Notic s r
- A. Meeting with NRC ACRS subcornmittees and the full NRC Safety Research Program and committee.
Commissioners-discuss ACRS budget for FY 1987 and gather comments / activities regarding safety- May 9-11.1985-Agenda tobe information for use by the ACRS in its announced.
related matters including backfitting of preparation of the annual report to the nuclear facilities, consideration of a June 6-8.1985-Agenda to be '
Commission on the NRC Safety announced.
Research Program. separate board to evaluate accidents at nuclear facilities.and the ACRS role in Dated. March 3.1985.
Decoy neo Remora / Systems. Date John C. Ho>le, to be determined (May), Washington. the civilian radwaste program.
- B. Source Term Consideredin Advisar> comauueeManagement Offar.
DC. The Subcommittee will contmue 1he review of NRR resolution position on Nuclear Pon er Plant Accidents- (FR Doc. 45 4545 FJed 3-18-45. a45 asil ..
USI A-45 " Shutdown Decay Heat briefing by representatives of the American Physical Society regarding the Removal Requirements.
recent APS report on the source term.
Regulatory Activities. June 4.1985 *C. Scram System Reliability in Advisory Committee on Meector (tentative). Washington. DC. The Safeguards, Subcommittee on Human Subcommittee will resiew the following: Water. Cooled Pon er Reactois-discuss the reliabihty of electrical circuit Factors,Mee#ng '
(1) Proposed General Revisions to Appenda J to 10 CFR 50. "kak Tests for breakers used in PWR scram systems The ACRS Subcommittee on Human Primary and Secondary Containments of and NRC activities associated with Factors will hold a meeting on April 4.
1.ight-Water Coofed Nuclear Power ATWS.
- D. Office of fnternationo/ Pmgrom- 1985. Room 1046.1717 H Street. NW.
Plants." (21 Draft Regulatory Guide on Washington. DC.
" Containment kakage Testing." and (3) briefing by Office Director regarding The entire meeting will be open to '
Regulatory Guide 1.23. Rev.1. office activities.
- E. PendorInspection Pmpmm-- public attendance.
" Meteorological Measurement Programs briefing by representatives of the NRC The agenda for subject smeetmg she.Il for Nuclear Power Plants." Office of Inspection and Enforcement be as follows:
Sofety Resecrch Pmgram. lune 5. 330 a.m.
regarding the NRC vendor inspection Thursday. April 4.198' 1985. Washington DC. The Subcommittee will discuss the updated program- untd the cor.clusion ofbusiness
'F. NRC Resectrh Pmgmmmatic .
The Subcommittee will discuss information (possibly the Budget Review Activities ondfo/icies-ACRS Group mark) on the proposed NRC NUREG/CR-3737 a method of comments in response to en inquiry ascertaining managementforganization's Safety Research Program and budget for from Congressman Morris K. Udallcontribution to safety c,. operating FY 1987. Also,it will discuss a draft
- ACRS report to the Commission on the regarding the NRC tesearth and other reactors and NUREG/CR-3215, NRC Safety Fesearch Program and programmatic activities and policies. Organizational Analysis and Safety for budget for FY 1987.
'G.StandardizedNuc/cor Power Utilities with Nuclear Power Plants.
Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Plant--cuntinue review of GESSAR 11. Also to be discussed is the topic of Representatives of the NRC Staff and operator requalification and the check June 12-13.1985. Alliance. 011. The the General Electric Company will Subcommittee will continue the review operator concept.
of the joint NRC/B&WOG/EpRl/B&W participate as appropriate. Oral statements may be presented by
- H. Quantitative Sofety Cools- members of the public with the Joint IST Program. A visit to the MIST facility is also planned. discuss NRC staff evaluation of the two.
concurrence of the Subcommittee year trial period regarding use of River Bend I and2. Date and location Chairmaru written statements will be to be determined (early June).The quantitative safety goals. accepted and made available to tFe
- I. Systematic Review ofNuc/ ear
- Committee. Recordings will be permitted Subcommittee will contmue the review Power P/onts-discuss proposed of Gulf States Ut2hties' application for clarification of ACRS report dated July only during those portions of the an operating license for the River Bend meeting when a transcript is being kept.
18.1984 on proposed NRC Severe Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2. Accident Policy Statement. and questions may be asked only by Polo Verde. Date to be determined. members of the Subcommittee,its l
'l NRCConsidemtionofSofety. consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring l Maricopa County. AZ.The Re/oted/ssues-proposed ACRS Subcommittee will resiew the f nal to make oral statements should notify comments on conduct of NRC reports for various construction the ACRS staff member named below as ,
proceedings. far in advance as is practicable so that deficiencies and the results of the *K. ACRSSubcommittee Activities- l preoperational testing as requested in discuss recent and proposed activities of appropriate arrangements can be made.
ACRS letter dated December 15,1981. ACES subcommittees regarding During the initial portion of the Combined Rehabihty and meeting, the Subcommitte :. elong with designated areas, including presisions Probabilistic Assessment ondhfd/ stone for requalification of reactor operators, a any of its consultants who may be
- 3. Date and location to be determined. long range program plan for NRC present, rnay exchange preliminary The Subcommittee will review the acta ities. emergency core cooling views regarding matters to be probabilistic risk assessment for considered during the balance of the systems. emergency power supphes in Millstone 3. nuclear plants seismic design margins meeting.
P/uidDynamics. Date to be The Subcommittee will then hear determined. Washington DC.The and ACRS procedures and practices. I
- L. AfanagementondDisposolof presentations by and hold discussions I Subcommittee will review the status of Rodwoste-discuss proposed inquiry with representatives of the NRC Staff.
the implementation' effort on the its consultants. and other interested regarding the role of the ACRS in the
NRC evaluation of DOE activities Further information regarding topics Mark 1-III containments. related to the civilian nuclear radwaste ,
ACRS Full Committee Meeting to be discussed. whether the meeting program.
- M. ACRS Activities-discuss has been cancelled or rescheduled. the April 11-13.1985: ltems are Chairman's ruling on requests for the tentatirely scheduled. proposed activities of ACRS members.
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Fid;r:1 R gist r / Vol. 50. No. 53 / Tuesday, hfarch 19, 1985 / Notices opportunity to present oral statements in a shutdown or refueling mode. With anc! the time allotted therefor can be South Custer Road, Monroe. Michigan respect to these exemptions from 48161.
obtained by a prepaid telephone call to Appendix J. the increment of the cognizant ACRS staff member Mr. Dated at Bethesda. Maryland, this 11th day environmentalimpact is related solely of March 1985. l Richard Major (telephone 202/t04-1414) to the potentialincreased probability between 8.15 a.m. and 5.00 p m.. e.s.t. and the magnitude of containemnt For the Nuclear Regulatory Comriission.
Persons planning to attend this meeting leakage during an accident which could nom,, y, y,,,g, are urged to contact the above named lead to potentially higher offsite and 3,,j,,,,, pfyy,,77,, gj,,,,j,,, gjyj,j,, ,7 individual one or two days befor the control room doses. However, the gjc,,,j,g.
scheduled meeting to be advised of any potentialincrease due to the exemption [FR Doc. 85-8549 Filed 3-18-85; 8.41 am]
changes in schedule, etc., which may granted for testing of the airlock is small m w w cootrue.e w have occurred. and would result from the potential Da ted. Ma rch 14.1985, a age og oo !
IDo:kets Nos. 50-277; and 50-2781 f
'Ef"' .
by this modified test. Other tests at each g -
refueling or when maintenance is The Philadelphia Electric Company, et performed on the d@r, will measure the at.(Peach Bottom Atomic Power l
[FR Doc. 854548 Filed 3-18-65. 8 45 ami Station, Units 2 and 3); Exemption w w w coesr *
- leakage through the door mechanism.
Additionally, the reduced pressure when I performing the Type C testing of the i The Philadelphia Electric Com l Detroit Edison Co.t Environmental ma n steam isolation valves will not (the licensee) and three other copany Assessment ano Finding of No mcrease doses. owners Significant impact A/ternc&e to the PmposedAch.on." are the holders of Facility Operating 1.icenses Nos. DpR-44 and DPR-56 Because the staff has concluded that (Docket No. 50-3411 which authorize the operation of the there is no measurable environmental The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory impact associated with the proposed peach Bottom Atomic Power Station.
Commission (the Commission) is exemptions, any alternative to these Units 2 and 3 (the facilities), at steady.
c' onsidering issuance of partial exemptions will have either on state powerlevels not in excess of 3293 exemption from the requirements of environmentalimpact or greater megawatts thermal for each unit. These Appendix J to 10 CFR Part 50 to the environmentalimpact. facilities are boiling water reactors
't Detroit Edison Company (the applicant) The principal alternative would be to - located at the licensee's site in York for the Fermie2 facihty located on I.ake deny the requested exemptions.This County, Pennsylvania. These licenses -
3 Erie in Monroe County, almost 8 miles are subject to all rules, regulations, and would not reduce the environmental
'. tast. northeast of Monroe, Michigan. impacts of plant operations and would orders of the Nuclear Regulatory j Environmental Assessment result in reduced operational flexibility Commluion (the Commission) now or
' and unwarranted delays in power hereafter in effect.
identification clPmposed Action:'lhe ascension. II cxemptions would (1) Allow Type C A/ternatire Use ofResources:This testing of the main steam isolation On November 19.1980, the l action does not involve the use of Commission published in the Federal valves to be conducted at a differential resources not previously considered in pressure less than that required by Register (45 FR 76602) revised to CFR I connection with the " Final Paragraph !!! C.2 of Appendix J. and (2) 50.48 and a new Appendix R to to CFR t Environmental Statement related to the Part 50 regarding fire protection features sliminate the full pressure test required by paragraph Ill.D.2(b)(ii) of Appendix j operation of Enrico Fermi Atomic Power of nucler power plants. The revised Plant, Unit No. 2," dated August 1981.
normal air lock opening and substitute a regulation and new appendix became Agencies andPersons Consulted:The sealleakage test to be conducted at a effective on February 17.1981. Section NRC staff reviewed the applicant's .
pressure specified in the Technical I!! of Appendix R identifies specific fire
- requests that support the proposed protection requiremer.ts in fifteen Specifications. The proposed exemption.The NRC staff did not .
, Exemptions are in accordance with the subsections, lettered A through O.This consult othee agencies or persons.
j applicant's requests dated October 22, exemption relates to certain aspects of 1984 and January 19.1985, as Finding of No Significant Impact Sections III.F and III.G, as follows, from supplemented by letter dated January which the licensee has requested relief:
28,1985. The Commission has determined not (s) A requirement of Section !!!.F of
' to prepare an environmentalimpact Appendix R to provide the installation The needfor the ProposedAction:The statement for the proposed exemptions.
proposed exemptions are required of automatic fire detection systems in cll Based upon the foregoing because of the design of the main steam environmental assessment, we conclude areas of the plant that contain or present isolation valves and to provide the an exposure fire hazard to safe that the proposed actions will not have cpplicant with greater plant availability shutdown or safety-related systems or a significant effect on the quality of the components:
cver the lifetime of the plant. human environment.
Enrimnmentallmpacts of the (b) A requirement of Subsection For further details with respect to this !!I.G.2 to provide the installation of 3-PmposedAction:The requested action, see the requests for the cxemptions would allow the Type C hour fire rated barriers to separate exemptions dated October 22,1984, testing of the main steam isolation redundant trains:
- January 19,1985, and January 26,1985, v;lves to be conducted at a differential (c) A requirement of Subsection Ill.G.2 -
which are available for public pressure less than that required by to provide the installation of automatic inspection at the Commission's Public Appendix J and would grant the suppression systems in specific fire Document Room.1717 H Street, NW., areas, and,
- substitution of an airlock seal test for an Washington. D.C. 20555 and at the cirlock pressure test while the reactor is Monroe County Library System. 3700 (d) A requirement of Section I!!.G.3 to provide for the installation of a fixed m
O $
TENTATIVE SCHEDULE ATTACHMENT. B f J
- ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON HUMAN FACTORS ',>
APRIL 4, 1985 WASHINGTON, D.C.
8:30 AM 1. Chairman's Introduction (D. Ward) 10 min a) purpose b) obiectives c) schedule
- 2. Safety Performance Indicators for Nuclear Power Plants 8:40 AM a) discussion of NUREG/CR-3215 (C. Overbey, HFSB) I hr
" Organizational Analysis and Safety for Utilities with Nuclear Power Plants" 9:40 AM b) discussion of NUREG/CR-3737 (P. McLaughlin, LQB) 2 hr "An Initial Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Organization and Its Effect on Safety Performance" 10:30 AM *** BREAK *** 10 min 11:50 AM c) Nuclear Power Plant Safety Measurement (J. MacEvoy, Measurement, ACRS Fellow)
- 1) Nov. 7, 1984, Report on Nuclear Power Plant Safety Measurement ii) Feb. 13, 1985, Power Plant Evaluation Program 1:00 PM *** LUNCH *** I hr 2:00 PM 3. Discussion of Requalification Issues a) Role of DHFS, OLB - Overview (B.Boyer) I hr
- 1) comments on Check Operator Concept ii) discuss Comissioner Asselstine's questions:
- In general, how well is the operator requalification program working?
- How has regionalization affe'cted the program?
- How can requalification pregrams help to increase engineering knowledge on shift?
3:00 PM b) Discussion of Operator Requalifi- (H. Kister) 40 min cations with Region I i) Experience from the field ii) Coments on 3.a.i. and 3.a.ii. above 3:40 PM *** BREAK *** 10 min 3:50 PM c)DiscussionofOperatorRequalification(A.Gibson)40 min with Region II i) Experience from the field ii) Coments on 3.a.i. and 3.a.ii. above .
4:30 PM 4. Future Actions 30 min Response to Comissioner Asselstine during April 11-13, 1985 meeting 5:00 PM ADJOURN
R MAJOR ATTACHMENT C
, 'i HUMAN FACTORS -
"ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON Room 1046, 1717 H St., NW.. Washinntan- DC LOCAT10:1: N April 4,1985 DATEi ATTENDANCE LIST 7p g //MJ PLEASE PRINT:
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R. MAJOR HUMAN FACTORS _
, SUBC0r4MITTEE MEETING ON Room 1046,1717 H St., NW.. Washinntnn- D.C.
. LOCATIO:1:
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April 4,1985 DATE':
ATTENDANCE LIST l
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ATTACHMENT D HANDOUTS FOR APRIL 4, 1985 HUMAN FACTORS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
- 1. NUREG/CR - 3215 " Organizational Analysis and Safety for Utilities With Nuclear Power Plants".
- 2. NRR Staff Presentation to the ACRS - Initial Empirical Analysis of Nuclear Power Plant Organization and its Effect on Safety Perfor-mance.
- 3. Power Plant Safety and Performance Evaluation - John MacEvoy, ACRS Fellow.
4 Overview of Operator Requalification.
- 5. Discussion of Operator Requalification - A. Gibson, Region II
- 6. Operator Viewpoint on Licensing Issues by The Professional Reactor !
Operator Society, April 2, 1985. '
- 7. Table 1 - Ratings of Nine Potential Data Sources on 17 Criteria.
9 L