ML24361A151

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Comments on Advance Act Section 507
ML24361A151
Person / Time
Site: Aerotest
Issue date: 12/12/2024
From: Slaughter D
Nuclear Labyrinth LLC
To: Jeannette Arce, Jennifer Dalzell, Jack Parrott
Reactor Decommissioning Branch, NRC/NMSS/DFM/IOB, NRC/NMSS/DMSST/MSLB
References
Download: ML24361A151 (1)


Text

AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC.

3455 FOSTORIA WAY

  • SAN RAMON, CA 94583 * (925) 866-1212
  • FAX (925) 866-1716 December 12, 2024 ADVANCE Act Section 507: Improvements for Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards Oversight and Inspection programs.

Aerotest Operations Incs (AO) general concern and needed improvement identified by our own experiences.

The Concurrence Process operated by the NRC administration hampers the development of Inspectors in the field. Decisions are being made further away from the licensee and direct knowledge of the circumstances. This suggests to the licensee that the inspector is not knowledgeable in his job obligations and/or the NRC administration lacks confidence in the field member. Both situations are frustrating and embarrassing to the inspector and can result in his/her prematurely leaving the agency. The inspector should be educated in relevant technical fields and trained before being placed in the field. The licensee is not a training center (especially when we are being billed for services). I was frustrated with an NRC staff member who stated to AO staff I know nothing about reactors.

Aerotest Operations Incs specific concerns and needed improvements identified by our own experiences.

1. Inspectors need to understand how a procedure works, to understand how it complies with the NRC regulations. The inspector said that Aerotest had a 50.59 policy in place but did not need to understand the process. However, in fact Aerotest had a 50.59 process that was used to monitor and ensure repair and replace console instruments. They had 2 of each instrument required. When the instrument failed, they replaced it with the spare.

However, the 50.59 procedure did not provide information on the control instrument being placed back into service. (what had been the problem/issue, how it was repaired and/or how it was verified operational?). There was no reference available to show the instrument had been reviewed by authorizing personnel before being placed into service. It was not clear if the control instruments installed were 50.59 complaint.

2. NRC inspectors should know the dates of changes to the NRC regulations and be able to tell when a reactors Tech Specs might be out of date (not reflecting the current regulations) if written or amended before the change took effect. For example, AO tech specs were written in the 1960s and amended in the early 1970s. The NRC did not require TS changes when the reactor changed owners in 1974 or 2017. The inspection reports stated that the reactor was incompliance with the current NRC regulations. Nureg 1537 for Test Reactors was issued in 1996. And we all know that the Regulations have changed since the early 1970s. It has been proven that the AOs TS did not meet current NRC Regulations in the 1990s; and beyond, but inspectors did not say they did not meet regulations. The document has been ripe for abuse by the agency to selectively leverage violations.
3. When an inspector finds a problem or issue, they should investigate and understand the circumstances surrounding the issue past and present. Review all prior reports not just the reports since the last inspection as the problem may have existed during prior inspections and not been reported. It is understandable that an issue may have been missed based on data sampling limitations. (There is a concern that inspectors are more concerned about stepping on the toes of previous inspectors than identifying a weakness in previous investigations.)

For example, the NRC stated that TS for TRIGA reactors have specific criteria/or identifying fuel elements as damaged. AO TS did not have a specific criterion for identifying damaged fuel elements. However, per NRC-OIC case 021-012 "Our review of inspection reports for the ARRR revealed there had been reports of stuck fuel rods as far back as 1980; likewise, we reviewed Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer from 1994 to 2012 and found that of the 22 cracked elements initially identified, 7 had been stuck in the reactor core since the 1990s. Three of the initial four fuel elements to be identified by the licensee as cracked-590E, 628E, and 1201E-had been reported on the Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer as stuck in 2003, 1994, and 1994, respectively. Of the 17 fuel elements that were inside the reactor core at the time of discovery, 14 of them had been previously indicated as stuck on the Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer. Why was this problem only brought up in 2012 and the NRC believed it only happened from 2005-2010?

4. The NRC inspectors need to understand ALARA principles. For example, office, accounting personnel and visitors (public) to our administrative offices and conference room are not normally exposed to radiation in their normal assigned duties or activities and are not considered Radiation workers and 10 CFR 20.120J(a)(l)(i) does not apply to them.

The NRC comments (ML24017A135 2/2/2024 Page 8) were confusing if not deceptive on the ALARA concerns at Aerotest; their response was that the worker was never exposed to more than the maximum dosage allowed for an occupational workers established in 10 CFR 20.1201(a)(l)(i). NRC's response suggests that radiation exposure to non-radiation

personnel/guests be treated with the same radiation exposure limits as a radiation worker and the principles of ALARA are irrelevant. The NRC's measured limit is simply the maximum annual dose.

For example, environmental exposure records showed that the AOs Accounting Office ranged from the high 50s to approximately 250 millirems per quarter between October 2010 and June 2017. The RTR inspector stated in an OIG investigation report (NRC-OIC case 021-012) that he was not aware of the ALARA issue in the Accounting Office. His response is unacceptable when the inspector reviews all dosimetry records and ignores ALARA obligations.

5. Inspectors have sited operating procedure in their inspection that did not exist in writing. Did they ask the personnel to see a copy of the procedure, or did they ask the personnel to describe the procedure? Per prior NRC communications, if it is not in writing it does not exist, for example The RTR inspector cited in his inspection reports that AO staff followed their written fuel inspection proceduresSection IV of the Procedures Manual entitled, "Critical Assembly and Power Calibration Procedures," last reviewed May 16, 2002" ADAMS (ML022480411) dated 9/6/02. The citation was incorrect because no written procedure existed. The first written fuel/graphite inspection procedure was written in 2012, two years after the cease of reactor operation.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the statements made in the enclosures are correct and truthful to the best of my knowledge.

Should you have any questions or require additional information regarding this submission, please contact AO President David M. Slaughter, Ph.D. at (801) 631 5919 or dmsraven@gmail.com Respectfully, David M Slaughter, PhD President, Reactor Administrator, General Manager and Manager