ML24270A242
ML24270A242 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Aerotest |
Issue date: | 09/26/2024 |
From: | Slaughter D Aerotest |
To: | Feitel R NRC/OIG, Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
References | |
Download: ML24270A242 (1) | |
Text
AEROTEST OPERATIONS, INC.
3455 FOSTORIA WAY
- SAN RAMON, CA 94583 * (925) 866-1212
- FAX (925) 866-1716 September 26, 2024 Robert J Feitel Inspector General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of the Inspector General Mail Stop O12-A12 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852 RE: OIG case 21-012 Response to your Letter dated September 4, 2024
Dear Mr. Robert J. Feitel:
In your letter, you said the NRC-OIG office decided to carry over case 21-012 investigation findings to the report for case 21-016. Case 21-012 memorandum was 13 pages long with detailed explanations. Aerotest information in case 21-016 is 6 pages long (page17-22) with some details on the fuel oversite, damages, and mixed core with aluminum and stainless-steel elements of different weights. The other areas of concern 10 CFR 50.59, ALARA Program and inadequate oversight on technical specification under 50.36 were just mentioned briefly if at all. The NRC-OIGs action of closing the 21-012 investigation with only a few of the confirmed allegations rolled over into the 21-016 investigation resulting in narrowing not broadening the reported maleficence experienced at Aerotest.
One of a number of glaring omissions in the investigation is why Aerotest was given a level III TS violation in 2013 for an action that the NRC said occurred sometime between 2006-2010 with no specific action or date. Per the OIG 21-012 memorandum
- Our review of inspection reports for the ARRR revealed there had been reports of stuck fuel rods as far back as 1980; likewise, we reviewed Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer from 1994 to 2012 and found that of the 22 cracked elements initially identified, 7 had been stuck in the reactor core since the 1990s.
- The RTR inspector did not say why no violation was issued until 2013, except that the decision would have been a consensus judgement call Did NRC OIG investigators follow up to identify the party and the reason for the issuance of level III violation in 2013 or why they picked 2006-2010 as the date of the violation?
You also mentioned in your letter the OIG did not find any misconduct i.e., deliberate, or willfully negligent actions - by NRC employees relevant to the findings in these reports, and which might have warranted DOJ referral. I disagree.
- Under 18 U.S. Code § 1038 - False information and hoaxes a) Criminal Violation. (1) In general.Whoever engages in any conduct with intent to convey false or misleading information under circumstances where such information may reasonably be believed and where such information indicates that an activity has taken, is taking, or will take place that would constitute a violation of chapter 2, 10, 11B, 39, 40, 44, 111, or 113B of this title, section 236 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2284), or section 46502, the second sentence of section 46504, section 46505(b)(3) or (c), section 46506 if homicide or attempted homicide is involved, or section 60123(b) of title 49, shall.
- Licensees are held to the following standards, why would the NRC staff not be held to the same standard?
o 10 CFR 30.10 Deliberate misconduct. (a) Any licensee, certificate of registration holder, applicant for a license or certificate of registration, employee of a licensee, certificate of registration holder or applicant; or any contractor (including a supplier or consultant), subcontractor, employee of a contractor or subcontractor of any licensee or certificate of registration holder or applicant for a license or certificate of registration, who knowingly provides to any licensee, applicant, certificate holder, contractor, or subcontractor, any components, equipment, materials, or other goods or services that relate to a licensee's, certificate holder's or applicant's activities in this part, may not:(1) Engage in deliberate misconduct that causes or would have caused, if not detected, a licensee, certificate of registration holder, or applicant to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order; or any term, condition, or limitation of any license issued by the Commission; or(2) Deliberately submit to the NRC, a licensee, certificate of registration holder, an applicant, or a licensee's, certificate holder's or applicant's, contractor or subcontractor, information that the person submitting the information knows to be incomplete or inaccurate in some respect material to the NRC.(b) A person who violates paragraph (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section may be subject to enforcement action in accordance with the procedures in 10 CFR part 2, subpart B.(c)
For the purposes of paragraph (a)(1) of this section, deliberate misconduct by a person means an intentional act or omission that the person knows (1)
Would cause a licensee, certificate of registration holder or applicant to be in violation of any rule, regulation, or order; or any term, condition, or limitation, of any license issued by the Commission; or(2) Constitutes a violation of a requirement, procedure, instruction, contract, purchase order, or policy of a licensee, certificate of registration holder, applicant, contractor, or subcontractor.
o 10 CFR 50.9 Completeness and accuracy of information.(a) Information provided to the Commission by an applicant for a license or by a licensee or information required by statute or by the Commission's regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the applicant or the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects.(b) Each applicant or licensee shall notify the Commission of information identified by the applicant or licensee as having for the regulated activity a
significant implication for public health and safety or common defense and security. An applicant or licensee violates this paragraph only if the applicant or licensee fails to notify the Commission of information that the applicant or licensee has identified as having a significant implication for public health and safety or common defense and security. Notification shall be provided to the Administrator of the appropriate Regional Office within two working days of identifying the information. This requirement is not applicable to information which is already required to be provided to the Commission by other reporting or updating requirements.
Basically, the NRC inspection report cover letters to Aerotest from 2002-2012 stated that no findings of significance were identified, no safety concerns or noncompliances of NRC requirements were identified. The inspection reports are publicly available on Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession (ADAMS), The information in the cover letter was false and misleading, it is reasonably believed and relied on to purchase Aerotest in 2017. Below are quotes from OIG case 21-012s memorandum which show false information.
- The cover letter of the 2007 Inspection Report, dated June 22, 2007, addressed to the licensee stated, "Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified" (2007); however, when we reviewed the 2007 Data Sheet for Fuel and Graphite Transfer, element 631 E listed "crack" in the Comments and was removed from the core and placed into a storage rack. The NRC Inspection Report No. 50-228/2007-201 states the inspector reviewed the 2007 Data Sheet for Fuel and Graphite Transfer during that inspection.
- NRC Inspection Report No. 50-228/2009-201 states that the inspector reviewed data sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer forms for 2008 and 2009. The inspector repeated information from prior years' inspection reports, including that the licensee was not required to inspect the reactor fuel and that the licensee had a "fuel 'sticking' problem," which prompted it to remove all fuel possible from the core and inspect those elements stuck in place in January 2006. The cover letter of the 2009 inspection Report dated July 1, 2009, addressed to the licensee stated, "Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified."
- Our review of inspection reports for the ARRR revealed there had been reports of stuck fuel rods as far back as 1980; likewise, we reviewed Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer from 1994 to 2012 and found that of the 22 cracked elements initially identified, 7 had been stuck in the reactor core since the l 990s. Three of the initial four fuel elements to be identified by the licensee as cracked-590E, 628E, and 1201E-had been reported on the Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer as stuck in 2003, 1994, and 1994, respectively. Of the 17 fuel elements that were inside the reactor core at the time of discovery, 14 of them had been previously indicated as stuck on the Data Sheets for Fuel and Graphite Transfer (see Exhibits 1 and 2).
- The RTR inspector said that not acting sooner to report and resolve the stuck fuel was his "mistake," and that he should not have closed IFI-50-228/2005-201-02 until he had verified that the licensee completed its plan of action The cover letter of the 2005 inspection Report dated May 23, 2005 (ML051380438), addressed to
the licensee stated Based on the results of this inspection, no safety concerns or noncompliances of NRC requirements were identified.
You asked me to keep your apprised of any matter in which I contend the NRC has failed to exercise appropriate oversight. My concerns include but not limited to:
- Why the NRC inspected Aerotest (AO) yearly from 1996 to 2012 when the NRC inspections procedures clearly stated that for our size reactor the inspection cycle was bi-annually (every two years). AO has had the same inspector for 22 years from 1998-2020. Looking at the publicly available inspection reports, I could not find any identified performance deficiencies to warrant the increased inspections.
- Over billing of Aerotest for both extra inspections and duplicate work they performed and how to recover the overpayment. This led to Aerotests avoidance of needless and bloated charges and contributed to minimizing the interaction with the regulatory agency. Let me state clearly, I have no issue with paying for the delivery of effective services. The billing format has changed more than 5 times since 2005. It is not always clear how tasks and charges are related. Even when the licensee asked for assistance to better understand the current charges of a simple bill, NRC staffs response appeared arrogant and condescending and fell short of providing the needed information to better assign a specific action to a charge. The bloated and untethered charges without services rendered reinforces the licensee choice to minimize the contact with the NRC staff. This licensee does not have taxpayers (for state and federal owned reactors) or ratepayers (for utility reactors) to pass on the charge overages or exempt from fees and charges as the university reactors are.
- Carry-over NRC funds from year to the next. The NRC is responsible for setting reasonable fees for the required activities and circumstances. If done accurately, the agency budget would be fully dispensed by the end of the year given the NRC budget comprises 90 percent by licensee fees and hourly reimbursement. The fact that over 90 million dollars in the 2023 budget was carried over into the next year is a concern. This circumstance was noted in the April (2023) hearing by a US Senator and confirmed by the commissioners that the NRC collects more fees than they used. The collected mandated fees by the NRC resulted in lower value to the licensee. This practice conflicts with agency obligation to 31USC 9701:
Fees and charges for Government services and things of value.. The US Congress must also take responsibility for having accepted NRC assessments of fees and hourly compensation without understanding the timeliness and quality of the services rendered.
- The NRC staff caused a chilling-effect on the circumstances surrounding this licensee due to their ineffective interactions and bloated financial charges. It was believed by the licensees administration, especially the licensed reactor operators, that the actions of NRC staff were punitive and purposefully trying to force the facility into closure. A significant chilling impact is the sheer cost without appreciation of the quality and quantity of the services rendered. The NRC staffs abuses were seen in large unexplained financial charges, claiming new violations from previously NRC accepted practices, influencing American
Nuclear Insurance (ANI) to cancel the licensees nuclear insurance, and provide inaccurate and unsubstantiated information concerning the fuel failure and core condition.
- NRCs stated belief on the cause of fuel failure. NRC Staff met at Aerotest Operations to discuss reactor restart on 9-16-18. NRC Staff stated to me and my employees that he does not believe the Root Cause analysis and continued with his belief without evidence that fuel just fails. There would not have been a need to provide a Root Cause analysis (50-228/2012-205-01) as requested earlier by the NRC Inspector With the increased number of modular and compact nuclear reactors on the horizon and the continued service of operating older reactors, the Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRC) needs an overhaul to be effective in performing its safety mission. While the US Congress recently signed legislation, NEIMA 2019 and the Advance Act 2024 which attempts in part to force needed changes in the NRC to increase morale and personnel numbers, improve on the quality of training, reduce cost, improve on inefficient protocols/processes, and shorten the time to complete tasks. These legislative actions attempt to correct the issues experienced by Aerotest but the NRC choose to ignore the damage caused by them from existing practices and actions. I feel that these recent legislative actions will not be enough to alter the lethargic operation of the NRC, it will take being held financially responsible for the calamities the NRC has and will cause in the future. Unfortunately, in the short term, the failure of the agency and its oversight infrastructure will continue to produce a chilling of a licensee increasing the possibility of nuclear accidents/incidents with significant consequences.
The NRC should be held accountable for their shortcomings and should reimburse Aerotest for the over billings and 1/2 of the damage they caused to Aerotests property.
If any additional information or clarification is required, please contact me at dmsraven@gmail.com or (801) 631-5919.
Respectfully, David M Slaughter, PhD AO President, Reactor Administrator, General Manager. NRC-RO and Manager CEO Nuclear Labyrinth LLC.
CC:
ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Merrick B. Garland Attorney General U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 Cole La Croix (US Representative Curtis Office) cole.lacroix@mail.house.gov Andrew Williams (US Senator Lummis Office) Andrew Williams@lumimis.senate.gov Andrew Zack (US Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works Staff) Andrew Zach@EPW.Senate.gov Andrea Vasquez (US Representative Mark DeSaulnier Office)
AndreaVasguez@mail.house.gov Nate Bentham (US Senator Padilla Office) Nate_Bentham@Padilla.senate.gov