ML23251A033
| ML23251A033 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/31/2023 |
| From: | NRC/OCIO |
| To: | - No Known Affiliation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML23251A034 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-2023-000163 | |
| Download: ML23251A033 (1) | |
Text
(P Jt E T P ED RE 2- P-
~PP~RV~LQ EKYXSXQ~ EE~H 4 REV I'~IN~
General Superintendent Nuclear Generation RE B. Abbott for J- L. Willis TW 'ltLP f P t'v 1-12-90 Zest 1 1986 5 December 1987 (TCN-9) 4 August 1988 (TCN-11) ii,l1,13,15,17,19,21,23,25,27, 68 70 y93.,93'pril 29~38,45~54~56~58~60~62~64~66~
72,81,86,89,90,92594-100 November 1988 (Includes TCN-12)
January 1990 2
-b April 1990 (TCN-15 through TCN-17 and Publication Change) 3 November 1990 (Publication Change *2) i,7-10,12,14,16,18,20,22,24,26, 28,30-37,39-44,46-53,55,57,59, 61,53,65,67,69,71,73-80,82-85, 87,88 January 1991 (TCN-18, TCN-19 and Publication Change *3)
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION THIS PROCEDURE NOT TO BE USED AFTER January 1992 SUBJECT TO PERIODIC REVIEW.
9'11031 9305i00321 05000410 PDR ADOCK "
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ZZXXQH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS SYSTEM DESCRIPTION OPERATING REQUIREMENTS PRECAUTIONS/LIMITATIONS STARTUP PROCEDURE 1.0 Startup of RPS Power Supply 2VBB-UPS3A and 2VBB-UPS3B 2.0 Startup of RPS MG sets 2RPM-MG1A and 2RPM-MG1B NORMAL OPERATION SHUTDOWN PROCEDURE 1.0 Shutdown of RPS Power Supply 2VBB-UPS3A and 2VBB-UPS3B 2.0 Shutdown of RPS MG sets 2RPM-MGlA and 2RPM-MG1B OFF NORMAL PROCEDURES 7 1.0 Loss of Protective System Channel 7 2.0 This Section has been Deleted I TCN- 19 PROCEDURE FOR CORRECTING ALARM CONDITIONS 10 Table I Valve Lineup 89 Table II System Power Supply Lineup 90 RKZEE~EN EX 1.0 FSAR Section 1.2.9.1 1.2 Section 7.2.1 1.3 Section 8.3.1.1.3 N2-OP-97 -i January 1991
I REFERENCES (Cont.)
2.0 Flow Diagram 2.1 NONE 3.0 Electrical Diagram 3.1 807E166TY Reactor Protection system 3.2 807E178TY RPS Interconnection Scheme 3.3 115D6268TY Reactor Protection System MG Set Control 4.0 Instruction Manual 4.1 GEK-83433A Electrical Protection Assembly 4.2 GEK-83327A Reactor Protection System 4.3 GEK-42296, Rev. 3 Motor-Generator Package Set 5.0 Nine Mile Point 2 Licensing Issues 5.1 Reg. Guide 1.33 5.2 Service Information Letter (SIL) 143 N2-OP-97 -ii November 1988
I N2-OP-97 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM A. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 1.0 2.2 Limiting Safety System Settings 2.0 3/4.3.1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation 3.0 3/4.3.2 Isolation Actuation Instrumentation 4.0 3/4.3.4 Recirculation Pump Trip Actuation Instrumentation 5.0 3/4.8.4.4 Reactor Protection System Power Supply Monitoring B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1.0 The Reactor Protection System (RPS) initiates a rapid shutdown or "SCRAM" of the reactor when specific operating parameters indicate a potentially unsafe operating condition. The RPS system is designed as a "Fail-Safe" system such that loss of a signal or power will produce a protective action.
The logic of the RPS system is known as a "one out of two-taken twice-coincident" logic.
The RPS utilizes two separately powered trip systems identified as Trip System A and Trip System B. Each trip system is comprised of two automatic trip channels which produce the automatic trip signals. The two trip channels for Trip System A are identified as Trip Channels A-1 and A-2. Similarly, the trip channels for Trip System B are Trip Channels B-1 and B-2.
The trip systems receive power from the 10kVA RPS uninterruptible power supplies 2VBB-UPS3AE3B.
The trip channels recei.ve input from various sensing and initiating devices which monitor plant parameters. Each channel monitors the same plant parameters. All of the control switches, relays, and instruments (except those mounted locally) for Trip System A are located on control room panel 2CEC*PNL609. All of the control switches, relays, and instruments for Trip System B are located on control room panel 2CEC*PNL611. The separation of the two trip systems minimizes the probability of interactions that could increase the possibility of false scrams or failure to scram.
N2-OP-97 April, 1986
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During normal operation, all of the sensor and trip contacts are closed, energizing Trip Channels A-l, A-2, B-l, and B-2. A trip of any device in a trip channel trips the channel. A FULL SCRAM is initiated only when a trip occurs in both trip systems. If only one trip system is tripped, a 1/2 SCRAM exists. A reactor scram is the rapid insertion of the control rods into the reactor core. There are a total of 185 control rods, which are controlled by individual hydraulic control units (HCUs). The HCUs are divided into four groups. Group 1 has 45 units, Group 2 has 45 units, Group 3 has 47 units, and Group 4 has 48 units.
The components of each hydraulic control unit scram section consist of the scram inlet and outlet valves, (AOV126 and 127, respectively) the scram pilot valve (SOV-139), a scram accumulator, and all associated valves and instrumentation.
Trip Systems A and B supply control signals to scram pilot valve RDS-SOV139. The scram pilot valve is a solenoid-operated, 3 three-way valve. It receives power from the RPS buses. RPS Bus
(
A supplies power to the A solenoid and RPS Bus B supplies power to the B solenoid. The RPS buses are energized from the high inertia MG sets (2RPM-MG1A, B). .When energized, the valve provides an instrument air path to the scram inlet and outlet valves. Only one of the two scram pilot valve solenoids need be energized to provide the instrument air path to the scram inlet and outlet valves.
The scram inlet and outlet valves are air-to-close, fail open
~alves. When no scram signal exists, the scram pilot valve is energized and there is a path for instrument air to hold closed the scram inlet and outlet valves. If a trip occurred in trip system A, either as a result of a channel A-1 or A-2 trip, the scram pilot valve A solenoid would de-energize and a control room annunciator and computer point would be energized. The result would be 1/2 SCRAM. The scram inlet and outlet valves would still be closed since a path for the instrument air would still exist. A trip of trip system B would be similar to that described above except that the scram pilot valve B solenoid would de-energize instead of the A solenoid.
If a trip occurs in both trip systems, both scram pilot valve solenoids de-energize, cutting off the instrument air supply to the scram inlet and outlet valves and venting the scram inlet and outlet instrument air lines to atmosphere. The scram inlet and outlet valves fail open and a FULL SCRAM exists. When a full scram exists, the scram discharge volume (SDV) instrument air isolation valves, (2RDS-SOV154-155) are de-energized. The SDV isolation valves, when energized, provide a path for instrument air to the SDV vent and drain valves (2RDS>'<AOV132 and
'<AOV124, and AOV123 and 130 respectively). The SDV vent and drain valves are air-to-open, fail closed globe valves. During a FULL SCRAM,, the SDV vent and drain valves fail closed, isolating the SDV- Also, when a -FULL SCRAM N2-OP-97 -2 January 1990
'V exists, both control rod drive backup scram valves (2RDS"137,
>'<138) energize to vent the air supply from the scram air header. Backup scram ~alves act as a second means of opening the scram valves, thus providing an added safety factor.
Following a 1/2 SCRAM or FULL SCRAM, the RPS must be manually reset. The reset is possible only if the conditions that initially caused the trip have been cleared. Reset is accomplished by utilizing the scram reset switches on control room panel 2CEC>'<PNL603. The switches are control switches with NORMAL RESET positions. The switch spring returns to NORMAL from the RESET position. One switch is utilized in each trip channel- To reset a 1/2 SCRAM, the reset switch in the tripped channel is utilized. A FULL SCRAM cannot be reset for 10 sec after the scram is first initiated. This assures that the control rods have been fully inserted.
2.0 P w 2.1 RPS Trip Systems A and B are energized from individual 10kVA uninterruptible power supplies (2VBB-UPS3A and B, respectively). Each UPS receives a normal 575-V, alternate 120-V regulated ac supply, and a 125-V dc supply (refer to Table II).
Under normal operating conditions, 2VBB-UPS3A is energized from 600VAC non-safety related lighting panel 2LAT-PNL100. In case of loss of its normal supply, UPS3A automatically receives power from its backup dc source provided by non-safety related 125VDC battery 2BYS-BAT1C via the non-safety related switchgear bus 2BYS-SWG001C- This battery is capable of feeding the UPS for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the event of loss of all ac sources. In case of failure of any inverter, the UPS is fed from its alternate 600VAC source from non-safety related distribution panel 2NJS-PNL500 ~
2VBB-UPS3B operates the same as 2VBB-UPS3A. Its normal AC power is received from 2NJS-PNL402 with backup 125dc power supplied from 2BYS-BAT1B via bus 2BYS-SWG001B. It receives alternate 600VAC power from non-safety related distribution panel 2NJS-PNL600-2.2 The scram pilot valve is energized from the RPS buses, which normally receive power from the high inertia motor-generator sets (2RPH-HG1A, B)- Each motor-generator set consists of a horizontal induction motor driving a flywheel and a synchronous generator. The flywheel is provided with the MG set to supply N2-OP-97 -3 November 1990
l sufficient stored energy to maintain voltage and frequency during momentary power interruptions. MG sets 2RPM-MGlA and B provide power for RPS Bus A (2RPM~PNIJL100) and RPS Bus B (2RPM"PNf B100), respectively, via panels 2RPM-PNL1A and 1B respectively and electrical protective assemblies (EPAs, 2RPM>ACBlA S 2A for 2RPM~PNLA100 and 2RPM~ACBlB 8 2B for 2RPM~PNLB100).
The EPAs consist of trip components that disconnect RPS circuitry from input power whenever voltage or frequency exceed their normal tolerance.
An alternate power source is available for each RPS bus to allow for MG maintenance. The alternate power sources for RPS Bus A and RPS Bus B are transformers 2RPM-X1A and B, respectively.
Transformers 2RPM-XlA and B are powered from panels 2LAT-PNL100 and 2LAS-PNL400, respectively.. Transformers 2RPM-X)A and XlB feed the RPS buses via panels 2RPM-PNLlA and 1B, respectively, and the electrical protective assemblies. An interlock prevents both RPS buses from being supplied from the alternate power supply at the same time.
C. OPERATING RE UIRRMRNTS 1.0 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System (RDS) N2-OP-30 2.0 Instrument and Service Air (IAS) N2-OP-19 3.0 Neutron Monitoring System (NMS) N2-OP-92 4.0 Nuclear Boiler Instruments (ISC) N2-OP-34 5.0 Normal AC Distribution as required N2-OP-71 6.0 Standby and Emergency AC Distribution as required N2-OP-72 7.0 Normal DC Distribution as required N2-OP-73A 8.0 Reactor Building Drains N2-OP-63 D. PRECAUTIONS/LIMITATIONS 1.0 Observe normal safety precautions when working with RPS circuits and the RPS motor generator sets.
2.0 The RPS MG sets are equipped with thermal overload heaters which trip the MG set when a thermal overload condition exists. These heaters will automatically reset, after cooldown. Following an MG set trip, an operator should be dispatched to manually depress the "OFF" pushbutton if unexpected restart of the MG set could result in personal injury or equipment damage.
3.0 Following any trip of an RPS channel, that channel must be manually reset using the scram reset switch on P603.
N2-OP-97 -4 August 1988
4.0 Care should be exercised when performing routine surveillances and calibrations on instruments providing input to RPS. When performing surveillances and/or calibrations on more than one instrument loop at a time, it should be verified that these instruments are in the same channel. This will prevent inadvertant scrams.
E. STARTUP PROCEDURE 1.0 Startu of RPS Power Su 1 2VBB-UPS3A and 2VBB-UPS3B Startup 2VBB-UPS3A and 2VBB-UPS3B per the appropriate sections of N2-0P-71.
1.2 Reset the appropriate Electrical Protection Assemblies (EPA's) by placing the EPA's output breaker to the "OFF" position and then back to the "ON" position to energize the RPS instrumentation.
1.3 Reset scram signals at P603 using appropriate scram reset switches.
TCK 1.4 Reset NSSSS isolations by depressing both MSIV and drain valve manual isolation reset switches on P602.
2.0 Startu of the RPS MG sets 2RPM-MGlA and 2RPM-MGlB 2.1 Verify electrical lineup per Table II of this procedure.
NOTE: If both RPS MG sets have been secured with one RPS channel on its alternate power supply and the other RPS channel de-energized, then the RPS MG sets should be started in the following order:
- a. Start the MG set for the de-energized channel first.
- b. Start the MG set for the channel on the Alternate Power Supply second.
Starting the MG sets in this order will prevent a full scram being caused by both RPS channels being de-energized at the same time.
2.2 At the MG set to be started, depress the START pushbutton.
2.3 When the MG set has reached rated speed and voltage (as indicated by the voltmeter on the MG set control panel), close the MG set output breaker.
NOTE: The RPS EPA's must be reset manually in order to supply MG set power to the RPS channels. To reset the EPA's, place the EPA's output breaker in the "OFF" position and then return it to the "ON" position.
2.4 If the RPS channel powered by the MG set has been on its alternate power supply, then perform the following:
N2-OP-97 December 1987
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- b. Place the Power Source Selector Switch on P610 to the "NORM" position.
- d. Verify appropriate pilot scram valve solenoid lights energize on P603.
2.5 If the RPS channel powered by the MG set has been de-energized, then perform the following:
- b. Verify appropriate pilot scram valve solenoid lights energize on P603.
2.6 Repeat steps 2.2 thru 2.5 for the, other RPS MG set as required-F.,
The RPS system does not require operator action for normal operation except for routine monitoring of power supplies 2VBB-UPS3A and 2VBB-UPS3B.
G. TD PR ED 1.0 Shutdown 2VBB-UPS3A and 2VBB-UPS3B per the appropriate sections of procedure N2-0P-71.
2.0 G t 2.1 Verify that appropriate alternate power supply transformer is available for the MG set to be shutdown (2RPM-X1A for the A MG set and 2RPM-XlB for the B MG set) if required.
ggg o Shifting from normal to alternate supplies will result in a half-scram on that channel. Insure that no scram signals are present on the other channel prior to transferring to the alternate power supply or a full scram will result.
Only one RPs channel may be supplied from its alternate power supply at a time. If both MG sets are to be secured, determine which channel is to be supplied by its alternate power supply and secure that MG set first. After that MG set has been secured and its associated RPS channel is powered by its alternate power supply, the second HG set can be secured without causing a full scram.
2.2 At P610, place the Power Source Selector Switch to "ALT h" if the A MG set is to be secured or has tripped, or "ALT B" if the B MG set is to be secured or has tripped- TCN-16 N2-OP-97 -6 April 1990
~< I 2.3 Locally reset the RPS channels EPA.
2.4 If the over voltage trip will not reset:
2.4. 1 Reduce bus voltage at 2NPS-SWG001 (or 003) to approximately 13.4 KV.
2.4. 2 Reset the EPA.
2.4.3 Restore bus voltage at 2NPS-SWG001 (or 003) to a nominal 13.8 KV.
2.5 Verify appropriate pilot scram valve solenoid lights energize on P603.
2.6 At the MG set to be secured, manually open the MG set output breaker.
2.7 Depress the MG set "STOP" pushbutton and hold until the green "OFF" status light is illuminated.
2.8 If a second MG set is to be shutdown, repeat Steps 2.5 and 2.6 for the other MG set.
H. F 1.0 t t'v t m h Place the inoperative RPS channel in the tripped condition if doing so will not result in a full scram.
1.2 Refer to Technical Specification 3/4.3.1 for required ac tions ~
1.3 After returning the channel to an operable condition, place the channel back in service and reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603.
2.0 This section has been deleted.
N2-OP-97 -7 January 1991
R G N 1.0 QQ191 Reactor Protection System A Drywell Pressure High Trip ReX1auli~
RPS A DRXWELL PRESSURE HIGH TRIP 603101 603101 m t t t Qgg~
ISCUC09 RPS Al DM PRESS HI 2ISC*PIS-1650A TR ISCUC10 RPS A2 DW PRESS HI 2ISC/cPIS-1650C TR 1.2
- a. RPS Channel A Half Scram b ~ Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) System half isolation (Group 3).
c~ RHR sample and Radwaste valves half isolation (Group 4).
d ~ Containment purge valves half isolation (Group 9).
- e. RCIC Vacuum Bkr Isolation Valve half isolation permissive (also requires low RCIC steam supply for half isolation).
- f. Group 8 half isolation.
go Standby Gas Treatment half initiation signal.
N2-OP-97 -10 January 1991
Corrective Action
- a. If a scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Verify all automatic actions have occurred. If any automatic action did not occur, manually initiate that action.
Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- 3. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the following.
- 1. Check drywell pressure indicators 2ISC-PISl 650A and 1650C on P609 and 2ISC-PIS1650B and 1650D on P611 to verify that no scram should have occurred.
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
- 3. If no scram should have occurred then perform the foll owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603 and reset the half NS< isolation using the applicable isolation reset pushbuttons on P601 .
- d. Return any isolated systems to service using the appl icabl e operating procedures.
N2-OP-97 -ll November 1980
l R Q N (Cont.)
2.0 fiQ3'~2 Reactor Protection System A Neutron Monitoring System Trip RPS A NMS TRIP 603102 603102 2.1 m t t t NMEUC01 RPS CH Al NMS TRIP APRM A or E IRMAor E NMEUC02 RPS CH A2 NMS TRIP APRM C or E IRMCor G Setpoints: APRM:
- a. Thermal Power llSX in Run
- b. Flow Biased 51K + .66(W-AW) in Run.
- c. ) 15K not in run.
- d. Inop Setpoints: IRM:
- a. 120/125 of scale (not in run).
- b. Inop (not in run).
N2-OP-97 -12 January 1991
t
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2.2 Automatic Res onse
- a. RPS Channel A Half Scram 2.3 Corrective Pction
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the following:
Check the other IRH or APRM channels on P603 to verify that no Reactor Scram should have occurred.
- 2. If a scram should have occurred, then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
- 3. If no scram shoul d have occurred, then perform the fol 1 owi ng:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm.
I
- c. After correction of the problem, reset the half scram using the Scram Reset switches on P603.
N2-OP-97 "13 November 1988
t ZRKJZP QQH2ZZHES (Cont. )
3.0 ~g Reactor Protection System Tl ip A Reactor Pressure High RPS A REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH TRIP 603103 603103 3.1 Qggp~t~~t t RBG~
ISCUC05 . RPS Al RX PRESS HI 2ISC*PIS-1678A TR ISCUC06 RPS A2 RX PRESS HI 2ISC*PIS-1678C TR Setpoint: 1037 psig 3.2
- a. RPS Channel A Half Scram 3.3 ~~t~v~~t'.
If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-0P-101C.
- 2. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Check reactor pressure indicators 2ISC-PIS1678A and 2ISC-PIS1678C on P609 and 2ISC-PIS1678B and 2ISC-PIS1678D on P611 to verify that no scram should have occurred.
N2-OP-97 -14 January 1991
. ~
7
- 2. If a Reactor Scram should have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating procedures.
- 3. If no scram shoul d have occurred then per form the following
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the al arm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603.
H2-OP-97 -15 november 1988
I. PR N (Cont.)
4.0 gg~lg Reactor Protection System A Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Trip RPS A TURB CONT VLV FAST CLOSE TRIP 603104 603104 4.1 MSSUC09 TURB CV FAST CLS TR 2RPS*PS2A CH A MSSUC10 TURB CV FAST CLS TR 2RPS/cPS2C t'etpoint:
CH C EHC Oil Pressure 530 psig dec.
4.2 t
- a. RPS Channel A Half Scram 4.3 tv
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
N2-OP-97 -16 January 1991
)
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- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the foll owing:
- 1. Check the Main Turbine panel and verify that a turbine trip has not occurred and that no scram was required.
R. If a scram should have occurred, then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
- 3. If no scram should have occurred, then perform the followinq:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the Scram Reset switches on P603.
Np Op g7 -17 November 1988
I RE TING A (Cont. )
5.0 59.'~ Reactor Protection System A Reactor Water Level Low Trip RPS A REACTOR WTR LEVEL LOW TRIP 5.1 Qggp~t~~in t ISCUC01 ISCUC02 603105 Ih ~
RPS Al RX WTR LO TR LVL RPS A2 RX WTR LVL R
603105 2ISC/cLIS1680A 2ISC*LIS1680C LO TR Setpoint: 159. 3 inches 5.2
- a. RPS Channel A Half Scram
- b. Group 4 NS4 half isolation.
- c. Group 5 NS4 half isolation.
N2-OP-97 -18 January 1991
r r II
Corrective Action
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
1 . Verify all automatic actions have occurred. Manually initiate any action that did not occur.
- 2. Refer to N2-OP-1 01C for scram recovery.
h
- 3. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Check that Reactor Water Level is greater than the
. Level 3 trip point per 2ISC*LIS1680A and *LVS168OC on P609 and 2ISC*LISl 680B and *LISl 680D and that no Reactor Scram is required.
If a Reactor Scram should have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedure.
- 3. If no Reactor Scram should have occurred then perform the foll owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the Reactor Scram using the scram reset switches on P603. Reset the group < and group 5 isolation by depressing the appropriate NS4 isolation reset pushbuttons at P602.
- d. Return any isolated systems to service using the appl icabl e operating procedure.
N2-OP-97 -19 November 1988
(Cont.)
6.0 Qg~ Reactor Protection System A Turbine Stop Valve Closure Trip ITCh'll RPS A TURB STOP VLV CLOSURE.
TRIP 603106 603106 6.1 MSSUC13 TURB SV FAST CLS TR 2RPS*ZS1A CH A 2RPS>>ZS1D MSSUC14, TURB SV FAST CLS TR 2RPS>>ZS1C CH C 2RPS>>ZS1E Setpoint: Valve 5X Closed.
6.2 a ~ RPS Channel A Half Scram 6.3 'v t'
~ If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following'.
- 1. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the following:
N2-OP-97 -20 January 1991
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~
II
Check the Main Turbine panel and verify that a turbine trip has not occurred and that no scram was required.
If a scram should have, occurred, then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
If no scram should have occurred, then perform the fol l owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
C. After correction of the al arm condi tion, reset the half scram using the Scram Reset switches on P603.
N2 OP g7 -21 November 1988
II I. R E R G N (Cont.)
7.0 gg3~ Reactor Protection System A Main Steam Line Radiation High Trip (TCN- 18 RPS A MN STM LINE RADN HIGH TRIP 603107 603107 t ' t 7.1 Qggzgp MSSUC05 MN STM LN CHAN A C51A-Z2A RADN HI MSSUC06 MN STM LN CHAN C C51A-Z2C RADN H Setpoint: 3X Normal full power background.
7.2 a RPS Channel A Half Scram b- Group 1 half isolation (MSIV's and MSIV drain lines).
c~ Group 2 half isolation (Recirc. sample valves).
- d. Half trip signal to the Mechanical Vacuum Pumps 2ARC-PlA and PlB.
- e. Half isolation signal to valve 2ARC-AOV105.
N2-OP-97 -22 January 1991
~7 I 7.3 Corrective Action a ~ If a Reactor Scram has occur red, perform the following:
1 . Verify that all automatic actions have occurred.
thnually initiate any automatic action that did not occur.
Refer to the Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the foll owing.
- 1. Check the main steam line radiation monitors 2C51A-ZPA and Z2C on P606 and 2C51A-Z28 and Z2D on P633 to verify that no scram should have occurred.
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating procedures.
- 3. If no scram should have occurred then perform the following:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the Group 1 and Group 2 half isol ations using the appropriate isolation reset pushbuttons on P603.
N2-OP-97 -23 November 1988
(Cont.)
8.0 gg33E Reactor Protection System A Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Trip RPS A MSIV CLOSURE TRIP 603108 603108 8.1 t Qgg~
MSSUC01 MSL ISOL V CLOS 2MS 8>'<AOV6A CHAN A 2MSS<AOV7A MSSUC02 MSL ISOL V CLOS 2MSS*AOV6C CHAN C 2MSSi4AOV7C Setpoint: MSIV 8X Closed.
8.2
- a. RPS Channel A Half Scram 8.3 t'v t n
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- 2. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedure.
N2-OP-97 -24 January 1991
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the foll owing:
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
- 3. If no scram shoul d have occurred, then perform the foll owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603 and reset the Group 1 and Group 7 isolation signal using the appropriate reset pushbuttons on P602.
N2-OP>>97 -25 November 1988
N (Cont.)
9.0 gg1~ Reactor Protection System A Discharge Volume High Level Trip RPS A DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL TRIP 603109 603109 9.1 RDSUC05 RPS Al DIS VOL HI 2RDS*LISX12B LVL TR 2RDS*LSY11A RDSUC06 RPS A2 DIS VOL HI 2RDS*LISY12A LVL TR .'2RDS*LSY11B Setpoint: 46.5" 9.2
- a. RPS Channel A Half Scram 9.3 t'v
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Check the scram discharge volume level indicating switches 2RDS>~LISY12A and 12B on P609 and 2RDS*LISX12A and 12B on P611 to verify that no scram should have occurred.
N2-OP-97 -26 January 1991
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedure.
- 3. If no scram should have occurred, then perform the foll owina:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603.
N2-OP-97 -27 November 1988
~
~
DU (Cont.)
10.0 593119 Reactor Protection System A Auto Trip f '
RPS A AUTO TRIP 603110 603110 10.1 m trP nt m trP i. t t /@ger RPSUC03 REACTOR SCRAN DIV 1 C72A-K14A OR 3 C72A-K14C 10.2 a~ RPS Channel A Half Scram
'b. RPS Scram pilot valve solenoid A de-energizes and ei.ther 2 or 4 of the RPS A pilot valve status lights on P603 de-energize.
10.3 tv t'n a ~ If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Determine the cause of the scram by observing other annunciators on P603.
- 2. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- 3. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures if the parameter causing the scram is an entry condition to an EOP.
N2-OP-97 -28 January 1991
'I l
- a. If no scram has occurred, perform the foll owing:
- 1. Determine the cause of the channel trip and veri fy that no scram should have occurred by observing that no monitored parameter in trip Channel B has exceeded its setpoint.
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then:
- 3. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no scram should have occurred then perform the following:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, perform the foll owing:
- 1. Reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603.
Verify that all scram pilot valve status lights on P603 are energized.
MpOP g7 -29 November 1988
R RE G (Cont.)
@gill Reactor Protection System A Manual Trip TCK- 18 RPS A MANUAL TRIP 603111 603111 RPSUC01 MANUAL SCRAM DIV 1 Channel Al or A2 Manual OR 3 scram pushbuttons on P603 armed aa4 depressed or reactor mode switch in "SHUTDOWN "
- a. RPS Channel A Half Scram t'v t If this annunciator is caused by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in "SHUTDOWN," the scram signal will be bypassed after approximately 10 seconds. The manual scram pushbutton is spring return to normal. Therefore this annunciator will clear when, 1) the manual scram pushbutton is released; and/or 2) 10 seconds after the mode switch is placed in the "SHUTDOWN" position. The half scram signal must still be reset using the scram reset" switches, on P603.
N2-OP-97 -30 January 1991
~
~
I. PR ED RE E ING (Cont.)
12.0 gg112 Reactor Protection System A Control &
Stop Valve Closure Bypassed RPS A CONT & STOP V CLOSURE BYPASSED 603112 603112 12.1 t RPSBC01 RPS Al CV/SV CLSR 2MSS*PIS1652A BYP RPSBC02 RPS A2 CV/SV CLSR 2NSS*PIS1652C BYP Setpoint: 30K power.
- 12. 2
- a. RPS A Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure and Turbine Stop Valve closure scrams are bypassed.
12-3 tv A t'.
Verify that this annunciator clears prior to exceeding 30K power.
N2-OP-97 -31 January 1991
R E (Cont.)
59;~ Reactor Protection System A Manual Scram Switch Armed TCN- 18 RPS A MANUAL SCRAM SWITCH ARMED 603113 603113 RPSBC17 RPS Al MAN SCRAM RPS A manual scram SW ARM switches on P603 armed-RPSBC18 RPS A2 MAN SCRAM SW ARM t t
- a. NONE QaxxmJ;Mv~~n
- a. Rotate the manual scram switch collar on P603 to clear the alarm condition.
N2-OP-97 -32 January 1991
'I ND (Cont.)
59333/ Reactor Protection System Channel Al 120VAC Power Failure ITCN 1<
RPS CHANNEL Al 120VAC POWER FAILURE 603114 603114 QRgRg~~~
RPSBC38 RPS CHAN Al 120VAC Loss of 2VBB-UPS3A PWR
- b. NS4 half isolations due to loss of power (DIV I).
- c. Leak Detection system loss of power (DIV I).
- d. Neutron Monitoring system loss of power (DIV I).
t v
- a. Determine the cause of the loss of power to RPS channel Al ~
- b. Correct the cause of the loss of power.
c~ Restore 2VBB-UPS3A per the appropriate sections of N2-0P-71.
d~ Place the RPS system in its normal configuration.
- e. Reset, Channel A half scram and/or half isolations at panels P602 and P603.
N2-OP-97 -33 January 1991
~
g I
(Cont.)
g~ Reactor Protection System Channel A2 Failure 120VAC Power TCN- 18 ggQ.~h~g RPS CHANNEL A2 120VAC POWER FAILURE 603115 603115 t t ' t m Qgg~
RPSBC40 RPS CHAN A2 120VAC Loss of 2VBB-UPS3A PWR tmt
- b. NS4 half isolations due to loss of power (DIV I).
- c. Leak Detection system loss of power (DIV I).
- d. Neutron Monitoring system loss of power (DIV I).
rr tv t
- a. Determine the cause of the loss of power to RPS channel A2-
- b. Correct the cause of the loss of power.
c~ Restore 2VBB-UPS3A per the appropriate sections of N2-0P-71.
d~ Place the RPS system in its normal configuration.
- e. Reset Channel A half scram and/or half isolations at panels P602 and P603.
N2-OP-97 -34 January 1991
I I. PR ED RE R RE TING ALARM N (Cont.)
16.0 QQ3~ Reactor Protection System A Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Trip Bypassed TCN. 1 g RPS A MSIV CLOSURE TRIP BYPASSED 603116 603116 16.1 m trPint m t t t /@ger RPS Al MSIV CLSR Reactor Switch RPSBC05 TR BYP on P603 5'n Mode RUN.
RPSBC06 RPS A2 MSIV CLSR TR BYP
- 16. 2 tmt'.
NONE 16.3
- a. Verify that the annunciator clears when the reactor mode switch is placed in run.
N2-OP-97 -35 January 1991
R I G A RM D T ~ (Cont.)
gl311Z Reactor Protection System A Scram Discharge Volume High Level Bypassed ITCN- ] 8 1 Y RPS A SDV HIGH LEVEL BYPASSED 603117 603117 m t int m t r t /gal~
I RPSBC13 RPS Al SDV HI LVL Mode switch in Refuel or BYP shutdown and the appropriate channel's +3 RPSBC14 RPS A2 SDV HI LVL bypass switch in bypass.
BYP Q~tm~t~~R~n~
- a. NONE tv t'n This annunciator is actuated when the SDV high level scram bypass switches on F603 are in bypass and the mode switch is in shutdown or refuel. This bypass allows the scram to be reset so that the scram discharge volume can be drained
- a. When scram discharge volume level decreases below the scram setpoint, place the SDV high level scram bypass switches on P603 in normal.
N2-OP-97 -36 January 1991
l (Cont.)
59~0[5 Reactor Protection System A Trip Unit Out of File/Power Failure Y TCN- 18 RPS A TRIP UNIT OUT OF FILE/
POWER FAILURE 603118 603118 m t t t Qgg~
RPSBC22 RPS Al T-U OOF/PWR Anytime trip units FAIL monitoring Rx Press.,
Drywell Pressure, Rx RPSBC27 RPS A2 T-U OOF/PWR water level or turbine FAIL 1st stage pressure are unplugged or experience a loss of power.
- b. Possible NS4 isolations or half isolations (depends on trip unit).
tv
- a. Determine which trip unit is causing the alarm.
- b. Refer to plant Technical Specifications.
- c. Repair or. replace the appropriate trip unit as required.
N2-OP-97 -37 January 1991
- d. Reset any isolations by depressing the appropriate NS4 isolation reset pushbuttons on P602.
- e. Return any isolated systems to service per the appropriate operating procedures.
N2-OP-97 -38 November 1988
gg~ Reactor Protection System Out of File/ Power Failure A Isolation Input Card h' TCN- 18 RPS A ISOL INPUT CD OUT OF FILE/
POWER FAILURE 603119 603119 m t r t t Qgg~
RPSBC23 RPS Al ISOL INP Any Div I NS4 Input CD OOF Card unplugged or power failure.
RPSBC25 RPS A2 ISOL INP CD OOF t
- a. Possible Div I NS4 isolations or half isolations.
- b. Possible RPS Channel A half scram.
v t'.
Refer to plant Technical Specifications for possible LCO's and applicable actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and repair as required.
C ~ Reset any isolations or half isolations received using the reset pushbuttons on P602.
d~ Reset any RPS A half scrams received using the scram reset switches on P603.
- e. Restore any isolated systems to service per the applicable operating procedures.
N2-OP-97 -39 January 1991
(Cont.)
@9~AD Reactor Protection System A Isolator Output Card Out of File iTCN- 18 RPS A ISOLATOR OUTPUT CARD OUT OF FILE 603120 603120 RPSBC24 RPS Al ISO OUTPUT Any Div I NS4 Output CD OOF Card out of file.
RPSBC26 RPS A2 ISO OUTPUT CD OOF
- a. Possible Div I NS4 isolations or half isolations.
- a. Refer to Plant Technical Specifications for possible LCO's and applicable actions.
b ~ Troubleshoot and repair as required.
c~ Reset any isolations or half isolations received using the isolation reset pushbuttons on P602.
d~ Reset any RPS A half scrams received using the scram reset switches on P603.
- e. Return any isolated systems to service per the applicable operating procedures.
N2-OP-97 -40 January 1991
I. R ED E R NG ALARH N (Cont.)
21-0 gglgg Scram Discharge Volume Trip Unit In Calibrate/Gross Failure h: N SDV TRIP UNIT IN CALIB/
GROSS FAILURE 603122 603122 t ' t 21.1 gag~
RPSBC44 SDV T-U IN CAL/GR 2RDS>>LISY12A FAIL 2RDS<<LISY12B 2RDS>>LISX12A 2RDS*LISX12B 21.2
- a. RPS run.
Channel A ~ Channel B half scram (if mode switch is in 21.3 a ~ Refer to plant Technical Specifications for possible LCO's and applicable actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and repair as required.
c~ Reset any half scrams that occur using the scram reset switches on P603.
N2-OP-97 -41 January 1991
ZRKEDU (Cont.)
22.0 &3124 Scram Discharge Volume Trip Unit Out of File/Power Failure SDV TRIP UNIT OUT OF FILE/
POWER FAILED 603123 603123 22.1 RPSBC45 SCRAM DISC VOL TRIP 2RDS*LISY12A GOOF 2RDS*LISY12B 2RDS*LISX12A 2RDS<cLISX12B 22.2 t t'.
Possible RPS Channel A or B half scram.
22.3 'v t'.
Refer to plant Technical Specifications for possible LCO's and applicable actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and repair as required.
b ~ Reset any half scrams that occur using the scram reset switches on P603.
N2-OP-97 -42 January 1991
(Cont.)
23.0 593124 Reactor Protection System A Mode Switch Shutdown Scram Bypass
[TCl",- ] s RPS A MODE SWITCH SHUTDOWN SCRAM BYPASS 603124 603124 23 1 F
RPSBC09 RPS Al MODE SW Reactor Mode switch in SCRAM BYP shutdown and 10 second RPSBC10 RPS A2 MODE SW timer timed out.
NONE.
23 ' t'v HPZK: When the Reactor Mode switch on P603 is placed in the "SHUTDOWN" position, an automatic scram signal is initiated. After approximately 10 seconds, this scram signal is bypassed to allow the scram to be reset.
N2-OP-97 -43 January 1991
I. P ED RE F R RRE TING ALARM NDI I N (Cont.)
24.0 gg'~2 Division I Reactor Water Level Lo-Lo DIVISION I REACTOR WATER LEVEL LO-LO 603125 603125
- 24. 1 t '
t ' t ISCLC01 Dl RX WTR LVL RPS 2ISC*LIS1681A Al ISCLC02 Dl RX WTR LVL RPS 2ISC*LIS1681C AL Setpoint: LL2(108.8")
- 24. 2 a~ Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system half isolation (Group 3).
- b. Recirc sample valve half isolation (Group 2).
C ~ Reactor Water Cleanup (WCS) half isolation (Group 6/7).
d~ Containment purge half isolation (Group 9).
- e. Group'8 half isolation.
Standby gas treatment half initiation signals N2-OP-97 -44 January 1991
II Corrective Action
- a. If actual water 1 evel has decreased to the Lo-Lo 1 evel (level 2) then perform the following:
- 1. Verify that all automatic actions have occurred.
Manually initiate any automatic action that has not occurred.
- 2. Refer to H2-OP-101C (scram occurred at level 3).
- 3. Refer to the Fmergency Operating procedures (Rx water 1 evel 3 is an entry condition).
- b. If water 1 evel has not decreased to LLP, perform the foll owing:
- 1. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- 2. Determine the cause of the alarm condition and correct.
- 3. After correction of the condition, reset the half isolations using the isolation reset pushbuttons on P602.
- 4. Return any i sol ated system to servi ce using the appropriate system operating procedure.
N2" OP "97 -45 November .lggp
r I. ZRQQE (Cont.)
25.0 @9139 Scram Discharge Volume Level High TCN- 18 SDV LEVEL HIGH 603130 603130
- 25. 1 t Qgg~
RPSBC17 SCRAM DISCH VOL 2RDS-LS129 LEVEL 2RDS-LS126 25.2 t t a ~ NONE 25.3
- a. Investigate the cause of the high level. Possible causes are:
- 1. Vent and drain valve on SDV not open.
- 2. Hydraulic control units with leaking scram outlet valves.
- 3. Instrument drift.
- b. Determine the cause of the high level and correct.
N2-OP-97 -46 January 1991
(Cont.)
gg;Ql Reactor Pressure High REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH 603131 603131 t t 5gg~
FWSPCOl REACTOR PRESSURE 2ISC-PSH1108
- a. NONE a~ Determine Reactor Pressure by observing the indicated pressure from 2ISC-PI1108 on P603. If 2ISC-PI1108 (C33-R605) indicates high pressure then begin action to restore normal Reactor Pressure and reduce Reactor Pressure to less than 1020 psig within 15 minutes or be in at least hot shutdown within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. Refer to Technical Specification 3.4.6.2.
- b. If 2ISC-PI1108 does not indicate a high pressure condition, then determine the cause of the high pressure alarm and correct.
N2-OP-97 -47 January 1991
(Cont.)
~Q2 Reactor Protection System Non Divisional Trip Unit in CALIBRATE/GROSS FAILURE RPS NON DIV TRIP UNIT IN CALIB/
GROSS FAILURE 603132 603132 t t RPSBC35 RPS NONSF U IN Any non-safety related CAL/GR FL RPS trip unit mode switch in calibrate or unplugged.
gt t
- a. NONE t n
- a. Determine the cause of the alarm condition and correct.
N2-OP-97 -48 January 1991
V DU G ND (Cont. )
28-0 @9335 Reactor Prot'ection System A Scram Discharge Volume Trip Unit in Calibrate/Gross Failure RPS A SDV TRIP UNIT IN CALIB/GROSS FAILURE 603138 603138 28-1 Smack RPSBC42 RPS A T-U IN CAL/GR SDV High Level Trip unit FAIL mode switch not in Operate or trip unit failed.
28.2
- a. NONE 28-3 r t v t
- a. Determine the cause of the annunciator and correct.
N2-OP-97 -49 January 1991
(Cont.)
gg332 Reactor Mater Level High/Low TCbf- 1s REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH/LOW 603139 603139 FMSLC01 REACTOR MATER LVL 2ISC-LS1635 HI/LO Setpoint: 187.3", (L7) 178.3" (L4)
- a. NONE.
t'v t'f water level increases to level 8 (202.3") the reactor feed pumps and main turbine will trip. If water level decreases to level 3 (159.3) a Reactor Scram will occur.
- a. Monitor and main tain reactor water level in the normal operating range.
- b. Determine the cause of the alarm and correct.
N2-OP-97 -50 January 1991
i' (Cont.)
gg~4 Drywell Pressure High/Low iTCN- >8 DRYWELL PRESSURE HIGH/LOW 603140 603140 t t $ gg~
RPSPC01 RPS DW PRESS 2ISC-PS1651 2ISC-PS1653
- a. NONE.
- a. Check Drywell pressure indicators on P609 and P611 to determine whether drywell pressure is high or low.
- b. IF low, refer to OP-61A Section F.5.
- c. IF high, refer to OP-61A Section H.l.
- d. Monitor other primary containment parameters such as:
- 1. Drywell Temperatures
- 2. Drywell Leak Rates
- 3. Radiation Levels
- e. Take action to correct problem.
N2-OP-97 -51 January 1991
I. R (Cont.)
31-0 QQ~4 Reactor Protection System A System Inoperable TCN- 18 RPS A SYSTEM INOPERABLE 603147 603147 31.1 RPSBC21 RPS SYS A OUT OF RPS A bypass pushbutton SERVICE depressed (Amber back-lighted pushbutton) on P603.
31-2 t Trip is bypassed.
t'1
- a. Reactor Recirc Pump end of Cycle Pump
' t v t
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Return the RPS Channel A bypass switch to "NORMAL" when appropriate.
N2-OP-97 -52 January 1991
32.0 ggL~
T NG A Trip h'CN-Reactor Protection System (Cont.)
B Drywell Pressure High 18 RPS B DRYMELL PRESSURE HIGH TRIP 603401 603401 32 ~ 1 t t t ISCUC11 RPS Bl'W PRESS 2ISC*PIS-1650B HI TR ISCUC12 RPS B2 DW PRESS HI TR 2ISC>>PIS-1650D 32.2
- b. Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) System half isolation (Group 3).
- c. RHR sample and Radwaste valves half isolation (Group 4).
- d. Containment purge valves half isolation (Group 9).
- e. RCIC Vacuum Bkr Isolation Valve half isolation permissive (also requires low RCIC steam supply for half isolation).
- f. Group 8 half isolation.
- g. Standby Gas Treatment half initiation signal.
N2-OP-97 -53 January 1991
N Corrective Action
- a. If a scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Verify all automatic actions have occurred. If any automatic action did not occur, manually initiate that action.
- 2. Refer to H2-OP-1 01C for scram recovery.
- 3. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the foll owing.
1 . Check drywel 1 pressure indi cators 2ISC-PISl 650A and 1650C on P609 and 2ISC-PIS1 6508 and 1650D on P611 to verify that no scram should have occurred.
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
- 3. If no scram should have occurred then perform the foll owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603 and reset the half hlS< isolation using the applicable isolation reset pushbuttons on P602.
- d. Return any isolated systems to service using the applicable operating procedures.
N2-OP-97 -54 November 1988
P (Cont.)
33-0 ~~42 Reactor Protection System B Neutron Monitoring System Trip TCbl. 18 RPS B NMS TRIP 603402 603402 33 ' t t t Qgg~
NMEUC03 RPS CH Bl NMS TRIP APRM B or F t"3 IRMBor F NMEUC04 RPS CH B2 NMS TRIP APRM D or F IRMDor H Setpoints: APRM:
- a. Thermal Power 118K in Run
- b. Flow Biased 51K +
.66(W-AW) in Run.
- c. > 15K not in run. h
- d. Inop Setpoints: IRM:
- a. 120/125 of scale (not in run).
- b. Inop (not in run).
N2-OP-97 -55 January 1991
Automati c Res onse
- a. RPS Channel B Half Scram Corrective Action
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the foll owing:
- 1. Check the other IRM or APRM channel s on P603 to verify that no Reactor Scram should have occurred.
- 2. If a scram should have occurred, then:
- a. Fnter the Fmergency Operating Procedures.
- 3. If no scram shoul d have occurred, then perform the fol 1 owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm.
N2-OP-97 -56 November 1988
'i Qg~
Trip h'CN-Reactor Protection System (Cont.)
B Reactor Pressure High 18 RPS B REACTOR PRESSURE HIGH TRIP 603403 603403 m t t t Qgg~
ISCUC07 RPS Bl RZ PRESS 2ISC*PIS-1678B HI TR ISCUC08 RPS B2 RZ PRESS 2ISC*PIS-1678D HI TR Setpoint: 1037 psig
$ gtgggttg If~~
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-0P-101C.
- 2. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Check reactor pressure indicators 2ISC-PIS1678A and 2ISC-PIS1678C on P609 and 2ISC-PIS1678B and 21SC-PIS1678D on P611 to verify that no scram should have occurred.
N2-OP-97 -57 January 1991
H 2.. If a Reactor Scram should have occured then
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating procedures
- 3. If no Reactor Scram should have occurred then perform the foll owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions'.
Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603.
N2-OP-97 -58 Novmnber "1988
'I
'l
I- PR EDURE NG LARM I (Cont. )
35.0 593~4 4 Reactor Protection System B Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Trip h'
RPS B TURB CONT VLV FAST CLOSE TRIP 603404 603404 35.1 m t t r 'nt t Qgg~
MSSUC11 TURB CV FAST CLS TR 2RPSi'cPS2B CH B MSSUC12 TURB CV FAST CLS TR 2RPS>>PS2D CH D Setpoint: EHC Oil Pressure 530 psig dec.
35-2 t m a ~ RPS Channel B Half Scram 35-3 tv t'.
If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
N2-OP-97 -59 January 1991
- b. If no scram has occurred, per form the foll owing
- 1. Check the Main Turbine panel and verify that a turbine trip has not occurred and that no scram was required
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures
- 3. If no scram shoul d have occurred, then perform the foll owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions ~
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condi ti on.
C. After correction of the al arm condition, reset the hal f scram using the Scram Reset switches on P603.
N2-OP-97 '60 November 1988
~ g (Cont.)
Reactor Protection System B Reactor Water Level Low Trip RPS B REACTOR WTR LEVEL LOW TRIP 603405 603405 t t ISCUC03 RPS Bl RX WTR LVL 2ISC>>LIS1680B LO TR ISCUC04 RPS B2 RX WTR LVL 2ISC>>LIS1680D LO TR Setpoint: 159.3 inches
- b. Group 4 NS4 half isolation.
- c. Group 5 NS4 half isolation.
N2-OP-97 -61 January 1991
'I Corrective Action
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Verify all automatic actions have occur red. t"anual ly initiate any action that did not occur.
- 2. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- 3. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Check that Reactor Water Level is greater than the Level 3 trip point per 2ISC*LIS1 680A and *LIS1680C on P609 and 2ISC*LISl 6808 and *LISl 680D and that no Reactor Scram i s required.
- 2. If a Reactor Scram shoul d have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedure.
- 3. If no Reactor Scram should have occurred then perform the foll owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions'.
Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm conditions
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the reactor scram using the scram reset switches on P603. Reset the qroup 4 and group 5 isolation by depressing the appropriate NS" isolation reset pushbuttons on P602.
- d. Return any isolated systems to service using the applicable operating procedure.
N2-OP-97 6~ November ],988
(
a'
(Cont.)
Rgb Reactor Protection System B Turbine Stop Valve Closure Trip RPS B TURB STOP VLV CLOSURE TRIP 603406 603406 NSSUC15 TURB SV FAST CLS TR 2RPS>>ZS1A CH B 2RPS*ZS1E MSSUC16 TURB SV FAST CLS TR 2RPS<<ZSlD CH D 2RPS>>ZS1C Setpoint: Valve 5X Closed.
a RPS Channel B Half Scram t v t a0 If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the following:
N2-OP-97 -63 January 1991
- 1. Check the Main Turbine panel and verify that a turbine trip has not occurred and that no scram was required.
If a scram should have occurred, then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
- 3. If no scram shoul d have occurred, then perform the fol 1 ali ng:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.,
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the Scram Reset switches on P603.
N2-OP-97 -64 November 1988
D I'
(Cont.)
59'5QZ Reactor Protection System B Main Steam Line Radiation High Trip TCN- 18 RPS B MN STM LINE RADN HIGH TRIP 603407 603407 MSSUC07 MN STM LN CHAN B C51A-Z2B RADN H MSSUC08 MN STM LN CHAN D C51A-Z2D RADN H Setpoint: 3X Normal full power background.
Atmt
- c. Group 2 half isolation (Recirc. sample valves).
- d. Half trip signal to the Mechanical Vacuum Pumps 2ARC-P1A and P1B.
- e. Half isolation signal to valve 2ARC-AOV105.
N2-OP-97 -65 January 1991
Corrective Action
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
1 . Verify all automatic actions have occurred. Manually initiate any automatic action that did not occur.
- 2. Refer .to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the foll owing.
- 1. Check the main steam 1 ine radiation monitors 2C51 A-Z2A and Z2C on P606 and PC51 A-Z2B and Z2D on P633 to verify that no scram should have occurred.
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating procedures.
- 3. If no scram shoul d have occurred then perform the fol 1 owing:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603 and reset the Group 1 and Group 2 half isol ations using the applicable isolation reset pushbuttons on P602.
N2 OP g7 -66 November 1988
I (Cont.)
59'~4 Reactor Protection System B Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Trip
[iCN- 15 RPS B MSIV CLOSURE TRIP 603408 603408 Sammy MSSUC03 MSL ISOL V CLOS 2MSS*AOV6B CHAN B 2MSS+AOV7B MSSUC04 MSL ISOL V CLOS 2MSS~AOV6D CHAN D 2MSS+AOV7D Setpoint: MSIV 8X Closed.
A t t
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred,'erform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- 2. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedure.
N2-OP-97 -67 January 1991
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 2. If a scram shoul d have occurred then:
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedures.
- 3. If no scram should have occurred, then perform the following:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603 and reset the Group 1 and Group 2 isolation signal using the appropriate reset pushbuttons on P602.
N2 Op g7 -68 November 1988
I II
~UHI!I1WIE (
QQ~4 Reactor Protection System B Discharge Volume High Level Trip RPS B DISCH VOLUME HIGH LEVEL TRIP 603409 603409 t Bsuu~
RDSUC07 RPS Bl DIS VOL HI 2RDS*LISX12B LVL TR 2RDS*LSXllA t'etpoint:
RDSUC08 RPS B2 DIS VOL HI 2RDS>>LISX12A LVL TR 2RDS>>LSX11B 46.5" t
a4 RPS Channel B Half Scram tv t If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- b. If no scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Check the scram discharge volume level indica ing switches 2RDS>>LISY12A and 12B on P609 and 2RDS>>LISX12A and 12B on P611 to verify that no scram should have occurred.
N2-OP-97 -69 January 1991
I
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then
- a. Enter the Emergency Operating Procedure
- 3. If no scram should have occurred, then perform the following:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions'.
Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
- c. After correction of the alarm condition, reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603.
N2 OP g7 -70 November 1988
(Cont.)
593~ Reactor Protection System B Auto Trip TCN- 18 RPS B AUTO TRIP 603410 603410 m t t t Qgg~
RPSUC04 REACTOR SCRAM DIV 2 C72A-K14B OR 4 C72A-K14D tmt
- b. RPS Scram pilot valve solenoid B de-energizes and either 2 or 4 of the RPS B pilot valve status lights on P603 de-energize.
- a. If a Reactor Scram has occurred, perform the following:
- 1. Determine the cause of the scram by observing other annunciators on P603.
- 2. Refer to N2-OP-101C for scram recovery.
- 3. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures if the parameter causing the scram is an entry condition to an EOP.
N2-OP-97 -71 January 1991
- a. If no scram has occurred, perform the following:
Determine the cause of the channel trip and veri fy that no scram should have occurred by observing that no monitored parameter in trip Channel A has exceeded its setpoint.
- 2. If a scram should have occurred then:
- 3. Refer to Emergency Operating Procedures.
- b. If no scram should have occurred then perform the following:
- a. Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and correct the cause of the alarm condition.
C. After correction of the alarm condition, perform the following:
Verify that all scram pilot valve status lights on P603 are enerqized.
H2-OP-97 -72 November 1988
il I. PR D E RRE NG A RM ND (Cont.)
42.0 QQ<QJ, Reactor Protection System B Manual Trip h: TCN- 18 RPS B MANUAL TRIP 603411 603411 42.1 t '
RPSUC02 MANUAL SCRAM DIV 2 Channel Bl or B2 Manual OR 4 P603 armed or reactor
~
scram pushbuttons on mode depressed switch in "SHUTDOWN."
42.2 t t'.
RPS Channel B Half Scram 42.3 tv If t'XK:
this annunciator i.s caused by placing the Reactor Mode Switch in "SHUTDOWN," the scram signal will be bypassed after approximately 10 seconds. 'he manual scram annunciator 'ill pushbutton is spring return to normal.
clear when, 1)
Therefore this the manual pushbutton is released; and/or 2) 10 seconds after the mode scram switch is placed in the "SHUTDOWN" position. The half scram signal must still be reset using the scram reset switches, on P603.
N2-OP-97 -73 January 1991
li b' G RM N (Cont.)
~~412 Reactor Protection System B Control & Stop Valve Closure Bypassed TCf'J- 18 RPS B CONT & STOP V CLOSURE BYPASSED 603412 603412 m t RPSBC03 RPS Bl CV/SV CLSR 2MSS*PIS1652B BYP RPSBC04 RPS B2 CV/SV CLSR 2MSS*PIS1652D BYP Setpoint: 30K power.
- a. RPS B Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure and Turbine Stop Valve closure scrams are bypassed.
tv t'n a ~ Verify that this annunciator clears prior to exceeding 30~
power.
N2-OP-97 -74 January 1991
4
~
4
E NG D I N (Cont.)
gg<~ Reactor Protection System B Manual Scram Switch Armed TC~,'- l8 RPS B MANUAL SCRAM SWITCH ARMED 603413 603413 RPSBC19 RPS Bl MAN SCRAM RPS B manual scram SW ARM switches on P603 armed.
RPSBC20 RPS B2 MAN SCRAM SW ARM t t
- a. NONE v t
- a. Rotate the manual scram switch collar on P603 to clear the alarm condition.
N2-OP-97 -75 January 1991
E R RR (Cont.)
fj934~1 Reactor Protection System Channel Bl 120VAC Power Failure RPS CHANNEL Bl 120VAC POWER FAILURE 603414 603414 t t ' t m g ggg~
RPSBC39 RPS CHAN Bl 120VAC Loss of 2VBB-UPS3B PWR t t'
- b. NS4 half isolations due to loss of power (DIV II).
c Leak Detection system loss of power (DIV II).
- d. Neutron Honitoring system loss of power (DIV II).
- a. Determine the cause of the loss of power to RPS channel Bl.
- b. Correct the cause of the loss of power.
c~ Restore 2VBB-UPS3B per the appropriate sections of N2-0P-71.
- d. Place the RPS system in its normal configuration.
- e. Reset Channel B half scram and/or half isolations at P603 and P602.
N2-OP-97 -76 January 1991
l E ING (Cont.)
Reactor Protection System B2 120VAC Power Failure TCN- 1~
RPS CHANNEL B2 120VAC POWER FAILURE 603415 603415 RPSBC41 RPS CHAN B2 120VAC Loss of 2VBB-UPS3B PWR t t
- b. NS4 half isolations due to loss of power (DIV II).
ca Leak Detection system loss of power (DIV II).
Neutron Monitoring system loss of power (DIV II).
'v t'.
Determine the cause of the loss of power to RPS channel B2.
- b. Correct the cause of the loss of power.
c~ Restore 2VBB-UPS3B per the appropriate sections of N2-0P-71.
d ~ Place the RPS system in its normal configuration.
- e. Reset Channel B half scram and/or half isolations at panels P603 and P602.
N2-OP-97 -77 January 1991
1 (Cont.)
kg~41 i Reactor Protection System B Main Steam Isolation Valve Closure Trip Bypassed CN- 18 RPS B MSIV CLOSURE TRIP BYPASSED 603416 603416 RPSBC07 RPS Bl MSIV CLSR Reactor Mode Switch TR BYP on P603 HQX in RUN.
RPSBC08 RPS B2 MSIV CLSR TR BYP
- a. NONE rr t'v t
- a. Verify that the annunciator clears when the reactor mode switch is placed in run.
N2-OP-97 -78 January 1991
fig3.QZ h'CN-933'>~3~ZEQXJQ55 (Cont. )
Reactor Protection System Volume High Level Bypassed B Scram Discharge 18 RPS B SDV HIGH LEVEL BYPASSED 603417 603417 C t t Qgg~
RPSBC1S RPS Bl SDV HI LVL Mode switch in Refuel or BYP SHUTDOWN and the appropriate channel's RPSBC16 RPS B2 SDV HI LVL bypass switch in bypass.
- a. NONE t v t This annunciator is actuated when the SDV high level scram bypass switches on P603 are in bypass and the mode switch is in shutdown or refuel. This bypass allows the scram to be reset so that the scram discharge volume can be drained.
- a. When scram discharge volume level decreases below the scram setpoint, place the SDV high level scram bypass switches on P603 in normal.
N2-OP-97 -79 January 1991
@~41( Reactor Protection System B Trip Unit Out of File/Power Failure h: TCN- IB RPS B TRIP UNIT OUT OF FILE/
POWER FAILURE 603418 603418
~gygttt ~t RPSBC28 RPS Bl T-U OOF/PWR Anytime trip units FAIL monitoring Rx Press.,
Drywell Pressure, Rx RPSBC34 RPS B2 T-U OOF/PWR water level or turbine
- FAIL 1st stage pressure are unplugged or experience a loss of power.
$ g~t~tQg p~
- b. Possible NS4 isolations or half isolations (depends on trip unit).
'v t
- a. Determine which trip unit is causing the alarm.
- b. Refer to plant Technical Specifications.
Cs Repair or replace the appropriate trip unit as required.
N2-OP-97 -80 January 1991
C E
- d. Reset any isolations by depressing the appropr iate NS4 isolation reset pushbuttons on P602.
- e. Return any isolated systems to service per the appropriate operating procedures.
- f. Reset the half scram using the scram reset switches on P603.
N2-OP-97 -81 November 1988
C I
V
I. ggg~EDU~RE g~ E G ALARN D (Cont. )
50.0 gg~4 Reactor Protection System B Isolation Input Card Out of File/ Power Failure TCN- 15 RPS B ISOL INPUT CD OUT OF FILE/
POWER FAILURE 603419 603419 50.1 m t RPSBC30 RPS Bl ISOL INP CD Any Div II NS Input ( *S OOF Card unplugged or powerl failure.
RPSBC32 RPS B2 ISOL INP CD OOF
- 50. 2 a ~ Possible Div II NS4 isolations or half isolations.
50.3 t'v A t'.
Refer to plant Technical Specifications for possible LCO's and applicable actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and repair as required.
c~ Reset any isolations or half isolations received using the reset pushbuttons on P602.
d~ Reset any RPS B half scrams received using the scram reset switches on P603.
- e. Restore any isolated systems to service per the applicable operating procedures.
N2-OP-97 -82 January 1991
t I. ggggED E INC (Cont.)
51.0 ~29 Reactor Protection System B Isolator Output Card Out of File Ref h: Y TCN- 1tt RPS B ISOLATOR OUTPUT CARD OUT OF FILE 603420 603420 51.1 t P int m t t RPSBC31 RPS B1 ISO OUTPUT Any Div II NS4 Output CD OOF Card out of file.
o3 RPSBC33 RPS B2 ISO OUTPUT CD OOF 51.2
- a. Possible Div II NS4 isolations or half isolations.
51.3 tv t'.
Refer to plant Technical Specifications for possible LCO's and applicable actions.
- b. Troubleshoot and repair as required.
c~ Reset any isolations or half isolations received using the reset pushbuttons on P602.
d ~ Reset the half scrams if received using the scram reset switches on P603.
- e. Restore any isolated systems to service per the applicable operating procedures.
N2-OP-97 -83 January 1991
D E NG A (Cont.)
52.0 593424 Reactor Protection System B Mode Switch Shutdown Scram Bypass RPS B MODE SWITCH SHUTDOWN SCRAM BYPASS 603424 603424 52.1 RPSBCll RPS Bl MODE SW Reactor Mode switch in f SCRAM BYP shutdown and 10 second f timer timed out.
RPSBC12 RPS B2 MODE SW SCRAM BYP [.s
- 52. 2
- a. NONE
- 52. 3 When the Reactor Mode switch on P603 is placed in the "SHUTDOWN" position, an automatic scram signal is initiated. After approximately 10 seconds, this scram signal is bypassed to allow the scram to be reset.
N2-OP-97 -84 'anuary 1991
R G (Cont. )
59'~4 5, Division II Reactor Water Level Lo-Lo TCN- 18 DIVISION II REACTOR WATER LEVEL LO-LO 603425 603425 ISCLC03 D2 RX WTR LVL RPS 2ISC*LIS1681B Bl ISCLC04 D2 RX WTR LVL RPS 2ISC*LIS1681D B2 Setpoint: LL2(108.8")
~ma&~Ecaauum
- a. Traversing Incore Probe (TIP) system half isolation (Group 3).
- b. Recirc sample valve half isolation (Group 2).
c~ Reactor Water Cleanup (WCS) half isolation (Group 6/7).
d 0 Containment purge half isolation (Group 9).
- e. Group 8 half isolation.
Standby gas treatment half initiation signal.
N2-OP-97 -85 January 1991
C 1
Corrective Action
- a. If actual water 1 evel has decreased to the Lo-Lo 1 evel (level 2) then perform the following
- 1. Veri fy that all automatic actions have occur red Nnual1 y initiate any automatic action that has not occurred.
- 2. Refer to N2-OP-1 01C (scram occurred at 1 evel 3)
- 3. Refer to the Emergency Operating procedures (Rx water level 3 is an entry condition) ~
- b. If water level has not decreased to LL2, perform the following:
1 . Refer to Technical Specifications for actions
- 2. Determine the cause of the alarm condition and correct
- 3. After correction of the condition, reset the half isolations using the isolation reset pushbuttons on P602.
- 4. Return any i sol ated system to servi ce using the appropriate system operating procedure NP-OP-g7 -86 November 1988
A I. PR E R (Cont.)
54.0 I~4 [ Reactor Protection System B Scram Discharge Volume Trip Unit in Calibrate/Gross Failure CN- 1 s RPS B SDV TRIP UNIT IN CALIB/
GROSS FAILURE 603438 603438 54.1 @gay t RPSBC43 RPS B T-U IN SDV High Level Trip unit)
CAL/GR FAIL mode switch not in Operate or trip unit failed.
54.2 tmt'.
NONE 54.3 v
- a. Determine the cause of the alarm condition and correct.
N2-OP-97 -87 January 1991
I gg<t44 Reactor Protection System B System Inoperable h:
TCN- 18 RPS B SYSTEM INOPERABLE Qgmygt~~nt RPSPC29 603447 C ~
RPS B SYS OUT OF SERVICE k
RPS B (Amber button) 603447 bypass pushbutton backlite push-on P603 depressed.
- a. Reactor Recirc Pump end of Cycle Pump Trip is bypassed.
t'v A t'.
Refer to Technical Specifications for actions.
- b. Return the RPS Channel B bypass switch to "NORMAL" when appropriate.
N2-OP-97 -88 January 1991
I TABLE I VALVE LINEUP REQUIRED ACTUAL IN I I ALS VALVE NO. DESCRIPTION POSITION POSITION 8 DATE REMARKS N/A N2-OP-97 -89 November 1988
1 2RPM-PNL1A TABLE II Page 1 of 11 SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS 2RPM-MG1A RPS MG Set 1A 2NHS-MCC008-7EL CLOSED (ON) 2RPM-PNL1A 2RPM-X1A Alt Feed XFMR 2LAT-PNL100-31 ON 2RPM-MG1A 2RPM-PNL1A Normal Pwr Supply Output Bar 2RPM-PNL1A Alternate Pwr Supply 2RPM-BKR1A ON Alternate Input 2RPM-PNL1A To 2RPM-PNLlA 2RPM-PNL1A-CB1A ON Feed to RPS 2RPM-PNL1A Pilot Solenoids
'A'cram 2RPMAPNL1A-CBSA ON BREAKERS POWERED FROM 2RPM-PNf lA 2RPMAACB1A RPS Protective 2RPMAACB1A EPA BKR EPA ON N2-OP-97 -90 November 1988
2RPM-PNL1A (Cont 'd) /ABLE~ Page 2 of 11 P L L NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS 2RPM+ACB2A RPS Protective 2RPM+ACB2A EPA BKR EPA ON Pilot Scram Valve Sol CKT*2RPSA02 Grp 1) & IND Lite 'C'RPM+PNLA100-3
'A'Scram ON Pilot Scram Valve Sol CKT*2RP SB02 Grp 2) & IND Lite 'G'RPM+PNLA100-2
'A'Scram ON Pilot Scram Valve Sol CKW2RPSC02 Grp 3) & IND Lite 'E'RPM+PNLA100-1
'A'Scram ON Pilot Scram Valve Sol CKV<2RPSD02 Grp 4) & IND Lite 'A'RPM+PNLA100-4
'A'Scram ON N2-OP-97 -91 April 1990
2RPM-PNL1B TABLE II Page 3 of ll SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS 2RPM-MG1B RPS MG Set 1B 2NHS-MCC009-4EL CLOSED (ON 2RPM-PNL 1A 2RPM-X1B Alt Feed XFMR 2LAS-PNL400-25 ON 2RPM-MG1B 2RPM-PNL1B Normal Pwr Supply Output BKR ON 2RPM-PNL1B Alternatic Pwr Supply 2RPM-BRRlB ON Alternate Input 2RPM-PNL1B To 2RPM-PNLlB 2RPM-PNL1B-CB1B ON Feed to RPA 2RPM-PNL1B pilot Solenoids
'B'cram 2RPM-PNL1B-CB2B ON BREAKERS POWERED FROM 2RPM-PNL1B 2RPMAACB1B RPS Protective 2RPMAACB1B EPA BKR EPA ON 2RPMAACB2B PRS Protective 2RPMA'ACB2B ON EPA BKR EPA N2-OP-97 -92 November 1988
2RPM-PNLlB (Cont'd) J~AB E~ Page 4 of 11 Y TE NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS Pilot Scram Valve Sol CKWRP SA03 Grp 1) & IND Lite 'D'RPM+PNLB100-3
'B'Scram ON Pilot Scram Valve Sol CKWRP SB03 Grp 2) & IND Lite 'H'RPM*PNLB100-2
'B'Scram ON Pilot Scram Valve Sol CKTARPSC03 Grp 3) & IND Lite 'F'RPM*PNLB100-1
'B'Scram ON Pilot Scram Valve Sol CKTA'RPSD03 Grp 4) & IND Lite 'B'RPM*PNLB100-4
'B'Scram ON N2-OP-97 -93 April 1990
2VBB-UPS3A TABLE II Page 5 of ll SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS 2VBB-UPS-3A Normal Pwr Supply 2LAT-PNL100-26 ON 2VBB-UPS-3A Alternate Pwr Supply 2NJS-PNL500-2 ON Alt. Supply XFMR 2VBB-XRC503 2VBB-XRC503 To 2VBB-UPS3A Input BKR ON 2VBB-UPS-3A Backup Pwr Supply 2BYS-SWG001C-2D ON 2VBB-UPS-3A Input Power 2VBB-UPS-3A-CB1 ON 2VBB-UPS-3A Battery Input 2VBB-UPS-3A-CB2 ON BREAKERS POWERED FROM 2VBB-UPS-3A 2VBB-UPS3A 2VBB-BKR-3A Output BKR 2VBB-BKR-3A ON 2VBSA'ACB1A RPS Protective 2VBSA'ACB1A EPA BKR EPA ON N2-OP-97 -94 November 1988
~A
2VBB-UPS3A (Cont'd) TABLE II Page 6 of ll SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS 2VBSAACB2A RPS Protective 2VBSAACB2A EPA BKR EPA ON RPS Power 2VBS"PNLA103 Supply PNL 2VBSAPNLA100-1 ON RPS Power 2VBSAPNLA104 Supply PNL 2VBS"PNLA100-2 ON RPS Power 2VBS+PNLA105 Supply PNL 2VBS"PNLA100-3 ON RPS Power 2VBS<PNLA106 Supply PNL 2VBS"PNLA100-4 ON RPS Power 2VBSAPNLA110 Supply PNL 2VBS"PNLA100-6 ON Trip Channel Al CKT*2RPSA01 Sensors 2VBS"PNLA103-14 ON Trip Channel A2 CKTA2RPSC01 Sensors 2VBS~PNLA104-13 ON N2-OP-97 -95 November 1988
"P~ '%i~
2VBB-UPS3A (Cont'd) TABLE II Page 7 of ll SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS
'CKT*2RPSA06 Trip Channel Bl 2VBS"PNLA106-6 ON Scram Disch Vol CKT*2RPANOl ISO, Valve Pos. IND Lites 2VBS"PNLA103-7 ON CKTA2RPSA07 Al Trip ALM CKT 2VBS"PNLA103-5 ON CKTA2RPSC07 A2 Trip ALM CKT 2VBS"PNLA104-1 ON CKTA2RPSC06 Trip Channel B2 2VBS"PNLA110-1 ON N2-OP-97 -96 November 1988
2VBB-UPS3B TABLE II Page 8 of 11 SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS 2VBB-UPS3B Normal Pwr Supply 2NJS-PNL402-32 ON 2VBB-UPS3B Alternate Pwr Supply 2NJS-PNL600-2 ON Alt Supply XFRM 2VBB-XRC603 2VBB-XRC603 To 2VBB-UPS3B Input BKR ON 2VBB-UPS3B Backup Pwr Supply 2BYS-SWG001B-3D ON 2VBB-UPS3B Input Pwr 2VBB-UPS3B-CB1 ON 2VBB-UPS3B Battery Input 2VBB-UPS3B-CB2 ON BREAKERS POWERED FROM 2VBB-UPS3B 2VBB-UPS3B 2VBB-BKR3B Output BKR 2VBB-BKR3B ON 2VBSAACB1B RPS Protective 2VBS+ACB1B EPA BKR EPA ON 2VBSAACB2B RPS Protective 2VBS'AACB2B EPA BKR EPA ON N2-OP-97 -97 November 1988
2VBB-UPS3B (Cont'd) TABLE II Page 9 of 11 SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION . DATE REMARKS RPS Power 2VBS*PNLB103 Supply PNL 2VBS"PNLB100-1 ON RPS Power 2VBS"PNLB104 Supply PNL 2VBS+PNLB100-2 ON RPS Power 2VBSAPNLB105 Supply PNL 2VBSAPNLB100-3 ON RPS Power 2VBS'APNLB106 Supply PNL 2VBSA'PNLB100-4 ON RPS Power 2VBSAPNLB110 Supply PNL 2VBS<PNLB100-6 ON Trip Channel Bl CKTA'2RPSB01 Sensors 2VBS"PNLB103-14 ON Trip Channel B2 CKTA2RPSD01 Sensors 2VBSAPNLB104-13 ON CKT"2RPSB06 Trip Channel Al 2VBSAPNLB105-6 ON N2-OP-97 -98 November 1988
l t I. c~ic 0
2VBB-UPS3B (Cont'd) TABLE II Page 10 of ll SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS CKT~2RPSB07 Bl Trip Alm Ckt 2VBSAPNLB103-6 ON CKTA'2RPSD07 B2 Trip Alm Ckt 2VBS)LPNLB104 1 ON CKTA2RPSD06 Trip Channel A2 2VBSAFNLB110-1 ON N2-OP-97 -99 November 1988
\
TABLE II Page ll of ll SYSTEM POWER SUPPLY LINEUP NORMAL ACTUAL INITIALS/
COMPONENT NO. DESCRIPTION POWER SUPPLY POSITION POSITION DATE REMARKS BACKUP SCRAM CIRCUITS POWER Channel CKT<2RPSA04 Scram Ckt
'A'ackup
'A'BYS'APNL201A-17 ON 6 RPT Sys Channel CKTA'2RPSB04 S.
'B'ackup
'B'BYS+PNL201B-17 N2-OP-97 -100 November 1988
IIi.
i f
INTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE LI T NIAGARA
~( FOAM 112 2 S 0240 66.01.013 l1 4 MOHAWK FROM R. Main ~ ~c DISTRICT Nine Mile Point Unit 2 P ~ l 4H~l NMP-76828 TO File DATE Aug. 26, 1991 FILE CODE SUBJECT Transformer Consultants The following individuals have assisted in the investigation of the B Main Phase Transformer failure:
Harold Light Charlie Raymond ~ G,E.
Kenneth Skinger Stone 6 Webster Doctor Chei Root Cause Jim Riddle Root Cause Mike Petronka Cooper Ind.
George Rushmore McGraw Edison RM/gb
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PRK lDg 2 VF NIAGARA HOHAHK POHER CORPORATIOH NINE HILE POIHT NUCLEAR STATION EPH RICAL PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PROCEDURE ASSfCNK979 ASSOL Egu(p. H- -V
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Approved By:
H. C. Drews S1 riant ent Hafntenance-Huc1ear Da e THIS REVISION IS A GENERAL REWRITE Effect)ve Date:
HOT TO BE USED AFTER. SEPTEMBER 1994 SUBJECT TO PERIODIC REVIEH
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Routine Hafntenance due to Failure
) Post Maintenance Testing
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Hork Request Number ajqI gQK: The following step ts to be performed by all personnel performing this procedure.
6.2.2 Read this procedure. If there fs fnf'ormatfon contained within this procedure that you do not unders,tand,-contact supervision for clarification. Hhen the information contained with1n thfs procedure fs understood, print your name and sign your 1n1tials below.
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. 6.2.3 Obtafn an RHP fn accordance with AP-3.3.2.
RHP Number N/A, no RHP fs required......... ............... ( ) Sxfj(
Page 4 S-EPH-GKN-V060 Rev 01
SEE'- Informat1on 1n Step 6.2.4 may be recorded when each piece of HITE 1s used.
6.2.4 Verify that callbratlon dates of test equ1pment used have not expired. Record HIITE nomenclature, MINUTE number and callbrat1on due date.
Test Equipment NTE Range(s) Callbratlon EEWCIIR HBIIIK II'Rd. lUIJjtlL 6.2.5 Conduct job br1eflng to fam111arlze personnel with procedure, safety concerns, and work to be done.
Lead 6.3 None 7.0 7.1 Pr 7.l.l 01scuss the Plant impact and resulting effect on the plant due to performance of the procedure w1th Stat1on Shift Supervisor (SSS) and the Chief Shift Operator (CSO).
NNE 7.1.2 nSS SO permlsslon to perform the c d e o talnlng their s1gnatu es elow.
SS S n ure Da CSO Signature Q te 7.1.3 Notify CSO of commencement and record Start T1me/Date.
Start Time Date Page 5 S-EPH-GEM-V060 Rev Ql
7.2 Pr
- a. Place Probeye Infrared Viewer upside down on a padded surface ........,,.......: (X )
- b. Disconnect stainless steel strap .......... (~ )
gKK: Fully pressurized cylinders (5000 psi) should be installed to allow for maximum operating time (approximately four hours) ~
C. Place Argon cylinder in frame ,............ (< >
- d. Align cylinder so that cylinder outlet port can be engaged with coupling nut ..... ( <)
- e. Tighten coupling nut to cylinder, finger tight .............................. (~)
Connect stainless steel strap around cylinder and tighten knurled knob ........ ~ ( ~>.
@HE: Use of excessive torque on coupling nut may distort pressure seal and cause pressure loss.
- g. Tighten coupling nut snug tight ........... ( <>
A hissing sound of gas transfer from the argon cylinder should be heard and continue for up to 30 seconds as the infrared detector cools to proper operating temperature.
The storage and use of Argon gas requires adequate vent) lat1on.
- h. Open'gas valve one full turn and wait approximately 30 seconds .'................. ( A)
Page 6 S-EPH-GEN-V060 Rev 01
'I A
l
7.2 (Cont)
Keeping the gas valve open unless the viewer is expected to re'main idle for greater than twenty minutes will assure maximum hours of continuous operation.
Turn BRIGHTNESS and CONTRAST knobs fully counterclockwise................,.... (M)
Turn viewer knob OH........,...:........... (X) 7.3 nfr r rv 1, Potentially lethal voltages may exist on electrical components, such as Transformers, Power Boards and Circuit Breakers.
Z. Removal of manufacturer protective barriers is N(U recommended on energized components.
- a. Select component to be surveyed, and record on Attachment l.
- b. Ensure component is accessible for survey.,
Open 'panel covers as necessary.
- c. Ad)ust BRIGHTNESS knob clockwise until background intensity appears as a uniform "weak" red color.
- d. Ad)ust CONTRAST knob until the ob)ects of warmer temperatures (brighter) begin to appear.
- e. Ad)ust FOCUS knob for optimum focus.
- f. Scan object, noting all "hot" spots as indicated by bright white area on viewer screen. Record results on Attachment l.
Page 7 S-EPH-GEH-V060 Rev 01
~%
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7.3 (Cont) gg o Surface contact temperature can be measured using an infrared thermometer such as Hahi Instrument Heat Spy Digital Infrared Thermometer.
g, IF hot spots detected, measure surface temperature. Record results on Attachment l.
- h. Inspect for foreign material, loose ob)ects and debris. Record results on Attachment l.
Install panel covers if removed 1n Step 7.3.b.
Repeat Steps 7,3.a - 7.3.1 for rema1ning components, if applicable. ~t&yg I 99'1 7,4 Pr frr Vi w
- a. Turn viewer knob OFF....................... (~)
- I I I I I I I I I I
- I I I I I I
- I I I
- I
- GSlMH Failure to shut gas valve may result in Infrared Viewer damage during subsequent,'se.
- I I I
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- I
- I
- I * *
- II III * *
- b. Shut gas ttg 1111 1, valve....,........................ ( <)
IXI ~~. 9 1/
8.0 8.1 8.2 Perform a general cleanup w1thin the work area.
Return the.RHP, of'l'l equipment if applicable.
and space
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. 8.3 Record stop time and date and have CSO and SSS acknowledge complet1on by obtaining their in t als.
rex-2/
Stop Time Oate CSO SSS
&94 Complete the Ca11bration Log Card for each piece of H5TK utilized.
Page 8 S-EPH-QElt-V060 Rev 01
e
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8.5 Return probeye Infrared Viewer to HKTE Issue.
9.0 A TAN T Infrared heat inspection of electrical switchgear or electrical components have been completed and results recorded on Attachment 1.
10.0 10.1 Record remarks concerning procedure performance, WRs, problems that occurred, and method of resolution, as applicable. Attach a copy of any WRs generated as a result of this procedure.
Remarks:
10.2 Personnel:CRrfave performed portions of this procedure, sign initials, pri.nt name, and sign name below:
Leadman Performed by C.~A A'~
Performed by 90 ~frhi~g Performed by Performed by Performed by 10.3 Maintenance supervision shall review data resulting from performance of th rocedure for completeness, accuracy, and acceptability.
Supervision Date 10.4 Haintenance supervision shall ensure records (maintenance or test data) are included in the Work Request Package.
Supervis n Oate Page 9 S-EPH-GKN-V060 Rev 01
l J
ATTACHMENT l Infrared Survey Visual Inspection Umaii
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Surface Teaperature required only if Infrared Survey is checked unsat.
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Surface Temperature required only if Infrared Survey is checked unsat.
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INTERNAL CORRESPONDENCE Y NIAGARA FORM 1122 A 02.80 56 01 013 0 MOHAWK R. Crandallg DISTRICT Nine Mile Point Unit 2 R. G. Randa1 1 June 15, 1988 NMP 32888 SOER 83-3 (Supersedes NI'IP25340)
TITLE: Inverter Failures Resulting in Loss of Power to Vital Systems Resulting in Severe Operational Transients EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
PROBLEM STATEMENT Inverter failures due to internal component failures, electromagnetic interference, and inadequate electrical protection coordination have caused loss of power to reactor protection, vital instrumentation, and control systems. Loss of power to these vital systems has resulted in inadvertent reactor trips and severe operational transients at operating nuclear power plants.
CONCLUSION It should be noted that there has never been an inverter component failure at Nine Mile Point Unit 2 that has directly caused a loss of power to any bus. Lo'ss of power to downstream buses has only occurred by a combination of a component failure with a subsequent (second action) human error.
ACTION REQUIRED Inverter failures are not a problem at NMP2. There has been one Category II uninterruptible power supply (UPS) that experienced failure of an inverter diode thought to be a result of overheating caused by construction dust becoming entrained in the inverter fans. No further action is required.
DETAILED DISCUSSION BACKGROUND More than 200 inverter failures have been reported from various nuclear plants over a period of six years. Inverter failures throughout the industry have caused loss of power to th vital buses supplying Reactor Protection System (RPS), vital instrumentation and annunciation. These losses of power have caused inadvertent reactor scrams as well as unexpected plant transients. The failures have been attributed to internal inverter component failures, electromechanical interference, inadequate electrical protection coordination of fuses as well as some human errors in operation of the inverter units. Older units typically had a mean time between failures of 10,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> ( 1.1 years) while newer units are having a typical mean time between failures of 40,000 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> (or 4 1/2 years) due to the use of more reliable components in the newer model inverters.
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Page 2 NNP 32888 DETAILED DISCUSSION The causes of failures were categorized by a study done by the Nuclear Safety Analysis Center (NSAC Report-44) as follows:
Inverter Internal Components 43 percent Fuses ll percent Human Error 10 percent Transients 7 percent Miscellaneous 29 percent The installation and testing of all inverters was done under strict procedures.
In each case the manufacturers felt that the test group at Nine l1ile Point Unit 2 tested the units far beyond that normally done at most sites. Each unit was tested at full load with transfers of the output to verify no loss of load or component failure. Input power was switched to verify response to loss of input power to the units. Each unit was subjected to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> at full load to eliminate infant mortality of components. It is felt that this testing "weeded out" weak components within each unit and proved that the units can withstand the plant transients. It also should be noted that the units at Nine Nile Point Unit 2 have been operating at their full expected load for approximately two years with a minimal number of component failures - even though they have been subjected to tremendous transients because of the extensive startup program in progress. The startup transients are far worse than those the plant will experience in actual operation.
See attachment for a listing of Unit ¹2 UPS.
DETAILED EVALUATIONS
- l. INPO SOER 83-3, Recomnendation ¹1 RECOtNENDATION: Review and upgrade purchase specifications for capacitors (procured separately or as part of printed circuit boards) to ensure the use of capacitors certif ied for application at higher than expected temperature, voltage, and service conditions. Purchase specifications for capacitors should consider inverter cabinet ambient temperature (not the room ambient temperature), voltage levels at special operating conditions (battery charger in equalizing voltage condition), and'voltage and current surges during transient conditions.
NHPC RESPONSE: Upgrade of our purchase specifications for capacitors is not required at this time. The SOER-referenced report (NSAC/44) is
'oncerned about equalizing current being too high, internal UPS temperatures above manufacturer's expected and adverse voltage/current transients.
a) Our units run at 140 vdc per the vendor recorwendation which is our maximum battery voltage. Our UPS units have blocking diodes that prevent feeding ANY current to the DC system and they 00 NOT charge our DC system (separate chargers are supplied for that purpose). Our batteries are a standby source only.
Page 3 NMP 32888 b) Our internal UPS temperatures are controlled, as suggested in the referenced report, by forced ventilation in eight units and the other two have natural convection cooling to keep all units within manufacturer's expected conditions. One unit has exhibited overheating alarms, found to be caused by cement dust entrained in the cooling fans from construction conditions and lack of heat-sink grease on the inverter SCR's. To correct this the floors have been painted, the SCR's were removed and heat sink grease put on them and they were reinstalled and the unit filters are now checked in conjunction with the battery weekly checks.
c) Operational voltage transients have already been applied to each unit as part of their initial startup and testing and startup of the plant
- full load transfers, loss of each infeed source with full load on output, upstream fast transfer of feeder buses, full load application on output, to point out a few. From initial start to the present, in all ten units, a total of three capacitors have failed, two during first turn-on of two units (in'fant mortality), the third failed as a result of an off-normal maintenance transfer (done to attempt to troubleshoot another problem) - three total failures even though our units have approximately 25,000'ours of operation each.
Based on this operational experience, our units run within the operating envelop expected by the manufacturer. Adequate design features are incorporated to preclude premature aging due to operational transients. By purchasing parts as specified by the vendor we are insuring quality parts designed for the operational conditions expected for the life of our units. DC voltage of 140 VDC per the manufacturer, capacitors that are rated at 175 VDC surge, etc.
CONCLUSION: No further action required,
- 2. INPO SOER 83-3, Recoranendation ¹2 RECOblt1ENDATION: Ensure that storage conditions for spare capacitors and printed circuit boards meet manufacturer's specifications in order to achieve the projected shelf life.
WPC RESPONSE: With each purchase order the manufacturer is required to furnish shelf life and climate control requirements. Per procedure tOP-604 the parts are tracked and verified. Shelf-life is stamped on the component
'pon delivery as well as it being input into the computer. The part is stored in Level A, 8, etc. according to the manufacturer's recommendations. All inside warehouse storage areas have recording thermometers and for Level A storage, humidity as well. These are checked and if readings outside of those required are noted the components in that area are put on hold until materials engineering can evaluate the effects of that temperature (humidity) variation.
y Page 4 NMP32888 Monthly, a computer run is made of all components with shelf life expirations due that month. Those parts are put on hold and will not be released out to the field until released by engineering or they are replaced, if necessary.
Whenever a materials requisition is presented at the storeroom/warehouse, the computer is checked to verify that the component is not past its shelf life and the part itself is checked for its stamped shelf life date. If the component is past its shelf life the part will not be released to the field. The shelf life is written right on the materials issue form at the time of issue as a verification that the date code has been verified.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
- 3. INPO SOER 83-3, Recommendation ¹3 RECOMMENDATION: Review inverter ventilation conditions and improve, if necessary, to preclude overheating of inverter internal components.
NMPC RESPONSE: Per recoomendation of NSAC/44, 8 of our units have forced ventilation - the gA Cat I units have flow sensors on each fan and overtemperature alarms, both of which initiate control room annunciation.
gA Cat II units have forced ventilation with overtemperature alarms
'he also initiating control room annunciation. The remaining CAT II units (two 10 KVA each) have natural convection cooling with wide spacing of components within these units to preclude localized high temperatures.
(These units are loaded less than 30% of full rated load). The units at meet the ventilation reconmendation of NSAC/44. 'MP2 As long as the supplied ventilation is operational, there is no need to monitor internal temperatures of our units. There are no vendor recommended temperature limits for the UPS units.
4, INPO SOER 83-3, Recommendation ¹4 RECOMMENDATION: Analyze and, if necessary, improve the electrical protection coordination of the inverter feeder, inverter supplied bus, and, associated branch circuits. The protection coordination should consider inverter output characteristics, over voltage under special operating conditions, inverter associated bus and branch circuit interruption time, fault conditions, and time response characteristics of fuses and circuit
'reakers for various fault conditions.
NHPC RESPONSE: This was done for UPS3A and 38 because it was felt that they were critical to the RPS buses and we wanted to verify that a potential problem did not exist there. The fusing used was found to be within the desired range of response for adequate coordination.
Page 5 NMP 32888 Because our'units are designed with sumaing transformers on their outputs, the maximum output current under bus-fault conditions downstream are current limited. Per Specification N2-E035A, each unit was designed to be able to withstand a "bolted fault" on its output without tripping any upstream breakers or fuses. Each unit was tested for this at the factory.
Our units are designed to sense the fault (or overload condition) and transfer the load to the "maintenance supply" transformer within 1/4 cycle (or ( 4 milliseconds).
It should be noted that the single failure problems of static inverters are not experienced with Uninterruptible Supplies that are fed from A.C. as the primary source with the batteries being only a standby "backup" source, with a third "maintenance" source available. Our units have the NSAC/44 recoomended solid-state "static switch" transfer design to allow transfer to the "maintenance" source without loss of load.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
- 5. INPO SOER 83-3, Recommendation g5 RECOMMENDATION: Plants with manual switching capability 'for inverters should consider adding an automatic bumpless transfer switch to improve power supply reliability.
NMPC RESPONSE: All units at Nine mi le Point Unit 2 have a static switch on their outputs with switching from the inverter output to the maintenance supply and vice versa within 1/4 cycle (or < 4 msec.). These static switches prevent loss of power to the downstream loads with transfers to the maintenance supply whether the transfer is intentional or is an automatic response to an inverter signal.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
- 6. INPO SOER 83-3, Recommendation g6 RECOMMENDATION: Preventive maintenance programs should be reviewed to include periodic replacement of capacitors or printed circuit boards, whichever is feasible, as recomnended by the manufacturer.
NMPC RESPONSE: There are no manufacturer recommendations requiring any periodic component replacement for any Category 2 Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS), UPSlA, B, C, D, G, H or UPS3A/B. For these units parts replacements are done on a "failure of part" basis. As previously stated, any component failure will cause, as a worst case, transfer to the maintenance supply without loss of output to the critical bus.
Page 6 NMP 32888 For UPS2A/B the manufacturer recommends. specific capacitor replacement every 10 years and fan replacement every 2 years. Each fan has a redundant fan and flow sensor associated with it so these are replaced as they fail.
The Equipment ()ualification (Eg) program tracks when the capacitors should be replaced and then Electrical Maintenance Procedure N2-EPM-GEiV-9Y638 (formerly ¹N2-EPM-V15) documents the safe and efficient replacement of each affected capacitor. An equipment ()ualification Maintenance Program Data Sheet (EQMPDS), specifically EQMPDS ¹E305AAA and ¹E305AAB, spell out the specific manufacturer requirements. It also identifies each capacitor by part no. and assembly peart no. in the unit.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
- 7. INPO SOER 83-3, Recomnendation ¹7 RECOMMENDATION: Ensure that maintenance procedures for testing and trouble shooting inverters include sufficient guidance to preclude damage to internal components from human error.
NMPC RESPONSE: Procedures N2-EMP-VBA-623, N2-IMP-UPS-8001 and N2-IMP-VBA-8001 give very specific, direction on how to calibrate certain circuit boards and delineate very specifically how to align the units so that mistakes aren't made in setpoints where these can have an adverse affect upon the unit. N2-OP-71 and N2-OP-72 outline very descriptively the manner in which to startup and shutdown the units. This is the area where component damage is most likely to occur - when the units are capable of being switched "out of proper sequence". The part per part replacement process is controlled by the .WR program and is far more than adequate. Our technicians and electricians have worked hand in hand with the system engineer and vendor representatives on each of the units and are highly qualified. The site craftsmen are highly trained people and it is felt that this is the best mechanism to preclude "sloppy" workmanship that could lead to associated component damage. Procedural controls can not take the place of using skilled craftsmen in 'the field and our practice of using Technicians and Electricians together has proven very effective in assuring quality workmanship.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
'ECOMMENDATION: Procedures or guidelines should be developed to assist in the investigation of fuse failures and to control the replacement of fuses.
1 NMPC RESPONSE: For replacement of fuses in CAT I units, the procedure, N2-EMP-VSA-623 lists every fuse and its appropriate position in the CAT I units. For replacement of fuses in the CAT II units, procedure N2-EflP-GEN-500 and Operations Standing Order ¹14 give guidance for their replacement. A memo has been sent to Electrical Maintenance to incorporate Standing Order ¹14 into their procedure as additional guidance.
~ ~
I ~
Page 7 NMP 32888 As for troubleshooting within the UPS, each vendor manual incorporates a troubleshooting section. In addition, each of our units is "fuse-sectionalized" well enough that fuse failures to date have not had to be "ciphered-out", they have been obvious. The only exception to this was when, through a design-flaw downstream and floating UPS grounds, two units were forced-paralleled causing a fuse failure in one. Because this was an external condition in direct contradiction to the vendor recoranendations, its investigation was very thorough and time-consuming in order to verify that it was indeed a design flaw within the load circuitry that caused the paralleling and not a UPS failure in, and of, itself.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
- 9. INPO SOER 83-3, Recommendation ¹9 RECOMMENDATION: Inverters with unequal and paralleled internal transformers should be investigated for high internal circulating currents. Corrective actions (i.e., capacitor replacement, proper tuning) should be included in maintenance procedures.
NMPC RESPONSE: This is not a problem at Nine Mile Point Unit 2. In the units where high internal circulating currents can occur design fixes have been developed to prevent them from occurring. A typical example is in UPS2A/B and UPS3A/B, when a particular input transient occurs it blows the input fuse to the maintenance supply regulator. A modification is being done that limits the inrush current to those transformers and thus eliminates the high internal circulating currents. Modification
¹PN2Y87HX037, is scheduled in,two parts - neutral grounding of the UPS will be done prior to the September outage, with the Circuit Board and Sensing Circuit change to take place during the September outage. For UPSlA, B, C, 0, G a particular plant evolution being done a certain way caused foldback of the switching inverter silocon controlled rectifiers (SCR's) resulting in inverter input fuses blowing. The existing procedure (NMP2-OP-71) and subsequent operator training has now eliminated that plant evolution from being done in that manner.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
- 10. INPO SOER 83-3, Recommendation ¹10 RECOMMENDATION: Develop a procedure or approved listing that indicates
'hich critical components, instruments, indications, and annunciators are powered from vital power supply buses and inverters.
NMPC RESPONSE: This was done for the RPS inverters, UPS3A/B. In early 1987 Operations had problems identifying some loads off the RPS inverters and an operational event occurred that generated LER 87-17. A direct result of that LER was the creation of the VBS*Load List. This is an extensive list of every circuit off UPS3A/B including a description of the results of opening any individual fuse in those circuits.
Page 8 NMP 32888 Except for the RPS UPS, that have multiple loads off individual fuses, Operations prefers to research load distribution off actual design drawings
- elementaries and connection drawings. The panel connection diagrams show circuit designation directly on the drawing. When load lists are generated from the design drawings the circuit designation directly on the drawing.
When load lists are generated from the design drawings, the possibility exists of making a mistake in extracting that data. With the computer data retrieval system available and the controlled design drawings available within the--control room it is fairly simple to determine which panel a particular load is fed from. All vital bus panels are designated such by their letter code "VBS" in the panel number.
The RPS circuit drawings were not adequately definitive so a "Load List" was developed for those circuits as a guide. Operations still verified each load on the design drawing itself. They use the load list only as a help to get to the design drawing.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
- 11. INPO SOER 83-,3, Recommendation Ill RECOMMENDATION: Operator training should include understanding of inverter operation, arrangement of power supplies, backup computer readings and alarms, techniques for identification of failed inverters, and inverter failure recovery actions.
NMPC RESPONSE: This particular recommendation is being done but more extensively than recommended. A plant engineer who tested the UPS's is presenting a seminar as part of the operator requalification training cycle. The seminar is on UPS operation and terminology. One of the concerns at the plant is that som'e of the terminology is unique to the UPS. The engineer is discussing terms as well as actual design of each of the different types of units on site. He is presenting some of the possible trouble indications and discussing the operator action appropriate for it. In addition, the operating procedure has been updated to describe what each local alarm indicates. The nameplate descriptions on the front of the units are being changed to be more "user friendly" so that operators can readily determine what each indication means.
Nuclear training is developing more extensive UPS training as part of their operator training program. As a starting basis they will use the system
'ng ineer lesson plans and operational history.
Techniques for identification of failed inverters and inverter recovery actions are already incorporated into the operating procedures: N2;OP-71 and shortly into N2-0P-72.
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Page 9 NMP 32888 Nuclear training is developing more extensive UPS training (TMR f02-88.075) as part of their operator training program. As a starting basis they will use the system engineer lesson plans and operational history.
Techniques for identification of failed inverters and inverter recovery actions are already incorporated into the operating procedures: N2-OP-71 and shortly into N2-0P-72.
REQUIRED ACTION: Training Department to complete the program and implement it. (TMR f02.88-075)
This action was a direct result of a failure caused by a human error which resulted in a loss to an inverter output bus (RPS). It was determined that the human error was a direct result of the lack of sufficient training on ~
the UPS operation.
It should be noted that the operating procedure also describes under what conditions the maintenance department should be called in lieu of the Operations department attempting corrective action.
CONCLUSION: No action required.
REFERENCES Manufacturer's Manual (2VBB-UPSlA, B, C, D, G)-
E035A, VI/101 710 343-77223, NMPC Access Number - 430000742 Exide Electronics 75-KVA UPS Manufacturer's Manual (2VBA~UPS2A/B)-
E035A, Inst. 1. 560-5002, NMPC Access Number - 430002188 Elgar Corporation 25-KVA UPS Manufacturer's Manual (2VBB-UPS3A/B)-
E035A, Inst. 1.560-5006, NMPC Access Number 430004490 Exide Electronics 5-KVA UPS Equipment gualification Maintenance Program Data Sheets-PE035AAA, gE035AAB Electrical maintenance Procedure N2-EPM-GEN-9Y638 Uninterruptible Power Supply Ten (10) Year Capacitor Replacement Operating Procedure - N2-0P-71, "13.8KV/4160/600V A.C. Power Distribution", 12/87 CONTACTS Mark McCrobie, Generation Specialist, Electrical Maintenance DISTRIBUTION Standard OEA RC/mjd (0707u)
Attachment OEA CO~A."vilTTEE APPROVED DATE: + ~> ~~~I
NMP 32888 1 NINE MILE POINT <$ 2 HAS 10 UNINTERRUPTIBLE POWER SUPPLIES 2VBB-UPS1A, B, C, D, G - 75 KVA units manufactured in 1981 which use switching SCR's to regulate output.
UPSlA feeds Radwaste Computer, plant instrumentation/annunciation.
UPS18 feeds Lekay-Wire. radio system, instrumentation/annunciation.
UPSlC feeds Gaitronics and Essential Lighting (half of plant).
UPS10 feeds Gaitronics and Essential Lighting (half of plant).
UPS1G feeds the Plant Computer.
2VBA+UPS2A/2B - 25 KVA units manufactured in 1982 which use Pulse Width Modulation design. Class 1-E units.
- each unit feeds one division of Class 1 redundant instrumentation/control circuit loads..
2VBB-UPS3A/3B - 10KVA units manufactured in 1982 which use the Pulse Width Modulation Design.
- each unit is a Category 2 unit feeding one half of the Class 1-E RPS control logic through an electrical protection assembly.
2VBB-UPS1H - 5KVA unit manufactured around 1984. This unit uses the "Line Interactive" design 2/microprocessor controls. The inverter section incorporates Pulse Width Modulation of the voltage output.
- UPS1H feeds the stack radiation monitoriqg panel.
Each type of unit has its own operating characteristics and different transient 'response and different effects on the operation of the plant. Each type of unit has been evaluated according to its own susceptibility to different plant conditions and according to how critical it is to the overall operation of the plant.
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