ML22342B252

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10 Draft Outlines
ML22342B252
Person / Time
Site: Grand Gulf Entergy icon.png
Issue date: 10/14/2022
From: Heather Gepford
Operations Branch IV
To:
Entergy Operations
References
Download: ML22342B252 (1)


Text

Form 4.1-BWR Boiling-Water Reactor Examination Outline Facility: Grand Gulf K/A Catalog Rev. 3 Rev. 0 Date of Exam: 10/10/2022 Tier Group RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

Total A2 G*

Total

1.

Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions 1

3 3

4 4

3 3

20 3

4 7

2 1

1 1

1 1

1 6

1 2

3 Tier Totals 4

4 5

5 4

4 26 4

6 10

2.

Plant Systems 1

2 2

3 2

2 3

2 2

3 3

2 26 3

2 5

2 1

2 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

1 0

11 0

2 1

3 Tier Totals 3

4 4

3 3

4 3

3 4

4 2

37 5

3 8

3.

Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories CO EC RC EM 6

CO EC RC EM 7

2 2

1 1

2 2

1 2

4. Theory Reactor Theory Thermodynamics 6

3 3

Notes: CO = Conduct of Operations; EC = Equipment Control; RC = Radiation Control; EM = Emergency Procedures/Plan These systems/evolutions may be eliminated from the sample when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

These systems/evolutions are only included as part of the sample (as applicable to the facility) when Revision 2 of the K/A catalog is used to develop the sample plan.

ES-4.1-BWR BWR Examination Outline (Grand Gulf)

Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

Item #

E/APE # / Name /

Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

1 (295001) (APE 1)

PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION X

(295001AK2.12) Knowledge of the relationship between the (APE 1) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) Recirculation flow control system 3.5 1

2 (295001) (APE 1)

PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION X

(295001AA2.03) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 1) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF FORCED CORE FLOW CIRCULATION: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Core flow 4

76 3

(295003) (APE 3)

PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF AC POWER X

(295003AA1.06) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to (APE 3) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF AC POWER: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) AC electrical loads 3.8 2

4 (295003) (APE 3)

PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF AC POWER X (295003) (APE 3) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF AC POWER (G2.2.44) EQUIPMENT CONTROL Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.4 77 5

(295004) (APE 4)

PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF DC POWER X

(295004AK1.04) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (APE 4) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF DC POWER: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) Battery capacity 3.9 3

6 (295005) (APE 5)

MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP X

(295005AA1.07) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to (APE 5) MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR TRIP:

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) AC electrical distribution 3.4 4

7 (295006) (APE 6)

SCRAM X

(295006AA1.04) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to (APE 6) SCRAM: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) Recirculation system 3.8 5

8 (295016) (APE 16)

CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT X

(295016AK3.04) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to (APE 16) CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Abandonment criteria 4.1 6

9 (295016) (APE 16)

CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT X (295016) (APE 16) CONTROL ROOM ABANDONMENT (G2.1.25) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, and tables (reference potential) (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.2 78 10 (295018) (APE 18)

PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW)

X (295018AA1.04) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to (APE 18) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER (CCW): (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 /

45.5 to 45.8) Reactor water cleanup system 3.4 7

11 (295019) (APE 19)

PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR X

(295019AK3.03) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to (APE 19) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10

/ 45.6 / 45.13) Service Air isolations 3.3 8

12 (295019) (APE 19)

PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR X (295019) (APE 19) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR (G2.4.50) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response procedure (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3) 4 79

13 (295021) (APE 21)

LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING X

(295021AK2.02) Knowledge of the relationship between the (APE 21) LOSS OF SHUTDOWN COOLING and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) Reactor water cleanup 3.2 9

14 (295023) (APE 23)

REFUELING ACCIDENTS X

(295023AK1.01) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (APE 23) REFUELING ACCIDENTS:

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) Radiation exposure hazards 3.9 10 15 (295024) (EPE 1)

HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE X

(295024EA2.02) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 1) HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE: (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Drywell temperature 4.4 11 16 (295025) (EPE 2)

HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE X (295025) (EPE 2) HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE (G2.4.49)

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Ability to perform without reference to procedures those actions that require immediate operation of system components and controls (CFR: 41.10 /

43.2 / 45.6) 4.6 12 17 (295026) (EPE 3)

SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER X

(295026EA2.02) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 3) SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Suppression pool level 3.6 13 18 (295026) (EPE 3)

SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE X (295026) (EPE 3) SUPPRESSION POOL HIGH WATER TEMPERATURE (G2.4.23) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency operating procedures implementation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 4.4 80 19 (295027) (EPE 4)

HIGH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III CONTAINMENT ONLY)

X (295027EK2.02) Knowledge of the relationship between the (EPE 4) HIGH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III CONTAINMENT ONLY) and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) Components internal to the containment 3.3 14 (295028) (EPE 5)

HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE (MARK I AND MARK II ONLY) / 5 20 (295030) (EPE 7)

LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL X

(295030EK3.01) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to (EPE 7) LOW SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 /

45.6 / 45.13) Anticipated/emergency depressurization 4.0 15 21 (295031) (EPE 8)

REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL X (295031) (EPE 8) REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL (G2.1.20)

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 16 22 (295031) (EPE 8)

REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL X

(295031EA2.04) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 8) REACTOR LOW WATER LEVEL: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Adequate core cooling 4.7 81 23 (295037) (EPE 14)

SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN X

(295037EA2.04) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 14) SCRAM CONDITION PRESENT AND REACTOR POWER ABOVE APRM DOWNSCALE OR UNKNOWN: (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Suppression pool temperature 3.8 17

24 (295038) (EPE 15)

HIGH OFFSITE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE RATE X

(295038EK3.04) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to (EPE 15) HIGH OFFSITE RADIOACTIVITY RELEASE RATE: (CFR: 41.5 /

41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) Emergency depressurization 4.1 18 25 (600000) (APE 24)

PLANT FIRE ON SITE X (600000) (APE 24) PLANT FIRE ON SITE (G2.4.12)

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of operating crew responsibilities during emergency and abnormal operations (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12) 4.0 19 26 (700000) (APE 25)

GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES X

(700000AK1.05) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (APE 25) GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 /

45.8) Voltage disturbance 3.5 20 27 (700000) (APE 25)

GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES X

(700000AA2.02) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 25) GENERATOR VOLTAGE AND ELECTRIC GRID DISTURBANCES: (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Generator voltage limitations 3.3 82 K/A Category Totals:

3 3

4 4

6 7 Group Point Total:

27

ES-4.1-BWR BWR Examination Outline (Grand Gulf)

Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 1/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

Item #

E/APE # / Name /

Safety Function K1 K2 K3 A1 A2 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

(295002) (APE 2)

LOSS OF MAIN CONDENSER VACUUM / 3 28 (295007) (APE 7)

HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE X

(295007AA2.04) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to (APE 7) HIGH REACTOR PRESSURE: (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Bypass valve capacity 4.2 21 29 (295008) (APE 8)

HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL X

(295008AK2.01) Knowledge of the relationship between the (APE 8) HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) RPS 3.9 22 (295009) (APE 9)

LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL / 2 (295010) (APE 10)

HIGH DRYWELL PRESSURE / 5 30 (295011) (APE 11)

HIGH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III CONTAINMENT ONLY)

X (295011) (APE 11) HIGH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III CONTAINMENT ONLY) (G2.1.9) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, Ability to direct licensed personnel activities inside the control room (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.1

/ 45.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 4.5 83 31 (295012) (APE 12)

HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE X

(295012AK3.01) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to (APE 12) HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 /

45.13) Increased drywell cooling 3.8 23 (295013) (APE 13)

HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL TEMPERATURE. / 5 32 (295014) (APE 14)

INADVERTENT REACTIVITY ADDITION X

(295014AK1.08) Knowledge of the operational implications and/or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (APE 14) INADVERTENT REACTIVITY ADDITION: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) Moderator temperature 3.7 24 (295017) (APE 17)

ABNORMAL OFFSITE RELEASE RATE / 9 (295020) (APE 20)

INADVERTENT CONTAINMENT ISOLATION / 5 & 7 33 (295022) (APE 22)

LOSS OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMPS X (295022) (APE 22) LOSS OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMPS (G2.1.20) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.6 25 (295029) (EPE 6)

HIGH SUPPRESSION POOL WATER LEVEL / 5

(295032) (EPE 9)

HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA TEMPERATURE / 5 34 (295033) (EPE 10)

HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA RADIATION LEVELS X (295033) (EPE 10) HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA RADIATION LEVELS (G2.2.44) EQUIPMENT CONTROL Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 4.4 84 35 (295034) (EPE 11)

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGH RADIATION X

(295034EA1.03) Ability to operate or monitor the following as they apply to (EPE 11) SECONDARY CONTAINMENT VENTILATION HIGH RADIATION: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) Secondary containment ventilation 3.8 26 36 (295035) (EPE 12)

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE X

(295035EA2.03) Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to (EPE 12) SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE: (CFR:

41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) Lights and alarms 3.3 85 (295036) (EPE 13)

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT HIGH SUMP/AREA WATER LEVEL / 5 (500000) (EPE 16)

HIGH CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN CONCENTRATION /

5 K/A Category Totals:

1 1

1 1

2 3 Group Point Total:

9

ES-4.1-BWR BWR Examination Outline (Grand Gulf)

Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 2/Group 1 (RO/SRO)

Item #

System / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

37 (203000) (SF2, SF4 RHR/LPCI)

RHR/LPCI:

INJECTION MODE X

(203000A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF2, SF4 RHR/LPCI) RHR/LPCI:

INJECTION MODE in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

System valves 4.2 27 38 (205000) (SF4 SCS)

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE)

X (205000A2.01) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF4 SCS) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)

Recirculation loop high temperature 3.6 28 39 (205000) (SF4 SCS)

SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE)

X (205000) (SF4 SCS) SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM (RHR SHUTDOWN COOLING MODE)

(G2.3.11) RADIATION CONTROL Ability to control radiation releases (CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 /

45.10) 4.3 29 (206000) (SF2, SF4 HPCI) HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM (207000) (SF4 IC)

ISOLATION (EMERGENCY)

CONDENSER 40 (209001) (SF2, SF4 LPCS) LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM X

(209001A4.05) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF2, SF4 LPCS) LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) Manual initiation controls 4.2 30 41 (209001) (SF2, SF4 LPCS) LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM X (209001) (SF2, SF4 LPCS) LOW PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM (G2.1.41) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Knowledge of the refueling process (CFR: 41.2 /

41.10

/ 43.6 / 45.13) 2.8 86 42 (209002) (SF2, SF4 HPCS) HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM X

(209002K1.01) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF2, SF4 HPCS) HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) Condensate system 3.2 31

43 (211000) (SF1 SLCS) STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM X

(211000K6.03) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF1 SLCS) STANDBY LIQUID CONTROL SYSTEM: (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7) AC Power 3.7 32 44 (212000) (SF7 RPS)

REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM X

(212000A3.09) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the (SF7 RPS) REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM including: (CFR: 41.7 /

45.7) System actuation 4.3 33 45 (215003) (SF7 IRM)

INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM X

(215003K2.01) (SF7 IRM)

INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) IRM channels/detectors 3.4 34 46 (215003) (SF7 IRM)

INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM X (215003) (SF7 IRM)

INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM (G2.4.2)

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks and automatic actions associated with emergency and abnormal operating procedure entry conditions (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8) 4.6 87 47 (215004) (SF7 SRMS) SOURCE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM X

(215004K5.01) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF7 SRMS) SOURCE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM : (CFR: 41.5 /

45.3) Detector operation 2.8 35 48 (215005) (SF7 PRMS) AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR X

(215005A2.12) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF7 PRMS) AVERAGE POWER RANGE MONITOR/LOCAL POWER RANGE MONITOR and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 /

45.6) Operation of the OPRM-enabled region of the power to flow map 4

36 49 (217000) (SF2, SF4 RCIC) REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM X

(217000K3.01) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF2, SF4 RCIC) REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.4) Reactor water level 4.2 37

50 (218000) (SF3 ADS)

AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATI ON SYSTEM X

(218000A4.02) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF3 ADS) AUTOMATIC DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) ADS logic initiation 4.2 38 51 (223002) (SF5 PCIS) PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM /

NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF X

(223002K4.05) Knowledge of (SF5 PCIS) PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM / NUCLEAR STEAM SUPPLY SHUTOFF design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: (CFR:

41.7) Single failures will not impair the function ability of the system 3.6 39 52 (239002) (SF3 SRV)

SAFETY RELIEF VALVES X

(239002K4.05) Knowledge of (SF3 SRV) SAFETY RELIEF VALVES design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: (CFR:

41.7) Allows for SRV operation from more than one location 3.7 40 53 (239002) (SF3 SRV)

SAFETY RELIEF VALVES X

(239002A2.02) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF3 SRV)

SAFETY RELIEF VALVES and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) Leaking SRV 3.6 88 54 (259002) (SF2 RWLCS) REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM X

(259002A3.06) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the (SF2 RWLCS) REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Reactor water level setpoint setdown following a reactor SCRAM 3.6 41 55 (259002) (SF2 RWLCS) REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM X

(259002K3.01) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF2 RWLCS) REACTOR WATER LEVEL CONTROL SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.4) Reactor water level 4.3 42 56 (261000) (SF9 SGTS) STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM X

(261000A1.03) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF9 SGTS)

STANDBY GAS TREATMENT SYSTEM including: (CFR: 41.5 /

45.5) Offsite radioactive release limits 3.7 43 57 (262001) (SF6 AC)

AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION X

(262001K5.02) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the (SF6 AC) AC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.3)

Breaker control power 3.5 44

58 (262002) (SF6 UPS)

UNINTERRUPTABL E POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC)

X (262002K2.01) (SF6 UPS)

UNINTERRUPTABLE POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Static switch/inverter 3.3 45 59 (263000) (SF6 DC)

DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION X

(263000A1.03) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF6 DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Voltage 3.5 46 60 (263000) (SF6 DC)

DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION X

(263000A2.03) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF6 DC) DC ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)

Abnormal battery parameters 3.2 89 61 (264000) (SF6 EGE)

EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET)

X (264000A3.05) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the (SF6 EGE) EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) Load shedding and sequencing 3.9 47 62 (264000) (SF6 EGE)

EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET)

X (264000A2.09) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF6 EGE)

EMERGENCY GENERATORS (DIESEL/JET) and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) Loss of safety bus 4.3 90 63 (300000) (SF8 IA)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM X

(300000K3.17) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the (SF8 IA) INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM will have on the following systems or system parameters:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.4) Heater drain system 3.1 48 64 (300000) (SF8 IA)

INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM X

(300000K6.01) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF8 IA) INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) Air compressors 3.7 49

65 (400000) (SF8 CCS)

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X

(400000K1.14) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF8 CCS) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) Fuel pool cooling and cleanup system 3.8 50 66 (400000) (SF8 CCS)

COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM X

(400000K6.12) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF8 CCS) COMPONENT COOLING WATER SYSTEM :

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) Reactor water cleanup system 3.1 51 67 (510000) (SF4 SWS*) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM X (510000) (SF4 SWS*) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (G2.2.41)

EQUIPMENT CONTROL Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings (reference potential)

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13) 3.5 52 K/A Category Totals:

2 2

3 2

2 3

2 5

3 3

4 Group Point Total:

31

ES-4.1-BWR BWR Examination Outline (Grand Gulf)

Emergency and Abnormal Plant EvolutionsTier 2/Group 2 (RO/SRO)

Item #

System / Name K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G*

K/A Topic(s)

IR Q#

68 (201001) (SF1 CRDH) CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM X

(201001A4.01) Ability to manually operate and/or monitor the (SF1 CRDH) CRD HYDRAULIC SYSTEM in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 /

45.5 to 45.8) CRD pumps 3.7 53 (201002) (SF1 RMCS) REACTOR MANUAL CONTROL SYSTEM 69 (201003) (SF1 CRDM) CONTROL ROD AND DRIVE MECHANISM X

(201003A2.01) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Control Rod and Drive Mechanism and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)

Stuck Rod 4.0 91 (201004) (SF7 RSCS) ROD SEQUENCE CONTROL SYSTEM 70 (201005) (SF1, SF7 RCIS) ROD CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM X

(201005A3.01) Ability to monitor automatic operation of the (SF1, SF7 RCIS) ROD CONTROL AND INFORMATION SYSTEM including:

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) Operator control module lights 3.6 54 71 (201006) (SF7 RWMS) ROD WORTH MINIMIZER SYSTEM (202001) (SF1, SF4 RS)

RECIRCULATION SYSTEM X

(202001K3.01) Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the Recirculation System will have on the following systems or system parameters: (CFR: 41.5 to 41.7 / 45.4) Core Flow 4.2 55 (202002) (SF1 RSCTL)

RECIRCULATION FLOW CONTROL SYSTEM

72 (204000) (SF2 RWCU) REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM X

(204000A1.09) Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with operation of the (SF2 RWCU)

REACTOR WATER CLEANUP SYSTEM including: (CFR: 41.5 /

45.5) Reactor water conductivity 3.3 56 (214000) (SF7 RPIS) ROD POSITION INFORMATION SYSTEM 73 (215001) (SF7 TIP)

TRAVERSING IN CORE PROBE X

(215001K4.03) Knowledge of (SF7 TIP) TRAVERSING IN CORE PROBE design features and/or interlocks that provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7) Radiation Shielding 2.9 57 (215002) (SF7 RBMS) ROD BLOCK MONITOR 74 (216000) (SF7 NBI)

NUCLEAR BOILER INSTRUMENTATIO N

X (2160002K5.01) Knowledge of the operational implications or cause and effect relationships of the following concepts as they apply to the Nuclear Boiler Instrumentation:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.3) Vessel level measurement 3.9 58 75 (219000) (SF5 RHR SPC) RHR/LPCI:

TORUS/SUPPRESS ION POOL COOLING MODE X

(219000A2.05) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF5 RHR SPC)

RHR/LPCI:

TORUS/SUPPRESSION POOL COOLING MODE and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations:

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.6) AC electrical failures 3.8 92 (223001) (SF5 PCS)

PRIMARY CONTAINMENT SYSTEM AND AUXILIARIES (226001) (SF5 RHR CSS) RHR/LPCI:

CONTAINMENT SPRAY MODE SYSTEM MODE (230000) (SF5 RHR SPS) RHR/LPCI:

TORUS/SUPPRESS ION POOL SPRAY MODE (233000) (SF9 FPCCU) FUEL POOL COOLING/CLEANU P

76 (234000) (SF8 FH)

FUEL HANDLING X

(234000K1.12) Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause and effect relationships between the (SF8 FH) FUEL HANDLING and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8) Fuel pool cooling and cleanup system 3.1 59 (239001) (SF3, SF4 MRSS) MAIN AND REHEAT STEAM SYSTEM (239003) (SF9 MSVLCS) MAIN STEAM ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE CONTROL SYSTEM 77 (241000) (SF3 RTPRS)

REACTOR/TURBIN E PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEM X

(241000K2.01) (SF3 RTPRS)

REACTOR/TURBINE PRESSURE REGULATING SYSTEM Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Pumps 2.9 60 78 (245000) (SF4 MTGEN) MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS X

(245000K2.04) (SF4 MTGEN) MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR AND AUXILIARY SYSTEMS Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Hydrogen seal oil pumps 2.9 61 79 (256000) (SF2 CDS)

CONDENSATE SYSTEM X

(256000K6.09) Knowledge of the effect of the following plant conditions, system malfunctions, or component malfunctions on the (SF2 CDS) CONDENSATE SYSTEM: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) Offgas system 2.6 62 (259001) (SF2 FWS)

FEEDWATER SYSTEM (268000) (SF9 RW)

RADWASTE SYSTEM (271000) (SF9 OG)

OFFGAS SYSTEM (272000) (SF7, SF9 RMS) RADIATION MONITORING SYSTEM (286000) (SF8 FPS)

FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM (288000) (SF9 PVS)

PLANT VENTILATION SYSTEMS (290001) (SF5 SC)

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT

(290002) (SF4 RVI)

REACTOR VESSEL INTERNALS 80 (290003) (SF9 CRV)

CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION X (290003) (SF9 CRV) CONTROL ROOM VENTILATION (G2.4.42)

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Knowledge of emergency response facilities (CFR: 41.10 / 45.11) 3.8 93 81 (510001) (SF8 CWS*)

CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM X

(510001A2.02) Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the (SF8 CWS*) CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.6)

Abnormal valve positions 3

63 K/A Category Totals:

1 2

1 1

1 1

1 3

1 1

1 Group Point Total:

14

Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Grand Gulf)

Facility: Grand Gulf Date of Exam: 10/10/2022 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) (RO/SRO)

Category K/A #

RO SRO-Only Topic Item #

IR Q#

IR Q#

1.

Conduct of Operations G2.1.28 (G2.1.28) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Knowledge of the purpose and function of major system components and controls (CFR: 41.7) 82 4.1 64 G2.1.46 (G2.1.46) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Ability to use integrated control systems to operate plant systems or components (CFR: 41.10/ 45.12 / 45.13) 83 4

65 G2.1.1 (G2.1.1) Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.10 / 45.13) 84 3.8 94 G2.1.35 (G2.1.35) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Knowledge of the fuel handling responsibilities of SROs (SRO Only) (CFR:

43.7) 85 3.9 95 Subtotal N/A 2

N/A 2

2.

Equipment Control G2.2.13 (G2.2.13) EQUIPMENT CONTROL Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 86 4.1 66 G2.2.35 (G2.2.35) EQUIPMENT CONTROL Ability to determine technical specification mode of operation (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 /

43.2 / 45.13) 87 3.6 67 G2.2.39 (G2.2.39) EQUIPMENT CONTROL Knowledge of less than or equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> technical specification action statements (This K/A does not include action statements of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or less that follow the expiration of a completion time for a technical specification condition for which an action statement has already been entered.) (CFR: 41.7 /

41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13) 88 4.5 96 G2.2.40 (G2.2.40) EQUIPMENT CONTROL Ability to apply technical specifications with action statements of less than or equal to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3) 89 4.7 97 Subtotal N/A 2

N/A 2

3.

Radiation Control G2.3.12 (G2.3.12) RADIATION CONTROL Knowledge of radiological safety principles and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, or alignment of filters (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10) 90 3.2 68 G2.3.14 (G2.3.14) RADIATION CONTROL Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities, such as analysis and interpretation of radiation and activity readings as they pertain to administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures, or analysis and interpretation of coolant activity, including comparison to emergency plan or regulatory limits (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.4

/ 45.10) 91 3.8 98 Subtotal N/A 1

N/A 1

4.

Emergency Procedures / Plan G2.4.47 (G2.4.47) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner using the appropriate control room reference material (reference potential) (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 92 4.2 69 G2.4.20 (G2.4.20) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Knowledge of the operational implications of emergency and abnormal operating procedures warnings, cautions, and notes (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 93 4.3 99

G2.4.38 (G2.4.38) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Ability to take actions required by the facility emergency plan implementing procedures, including supporting or acting as emergency coordinator (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11) 94 4.4 100 Subtotal N/A 1

N/A 2

Tier 3 Point Total N/A 6

N/A 7

Form 4.1-COMMON Common Examination Outline ES-4.1-COMMON COMMON Examination Outline (Grand Gulf)

Facility: Grand Gulf Date of Exam: 10/10/2022 Theory (Tier 4) (RO)

Category K/A #

RO Topic Item #

IR Q#

Reactor Theory 292001 (292001K1.07) NEUTRONS (CFR: 41.1) Define neutron generation time 95 1.9 70 292006 (292006K1.08) FISSION PRODUCT POISONS (CFR: 41.1)

Describe the effects that xenon concentration has on flux shape and control rod patterns 96 3.2 71 292007 (292007K1.02) FUEL DEPLETION AND BURNABLE POISONS (CFR: 41.1) Describe and explain distribution of burnable poisons in the core 97 2.0 72 Subtotal 3

Thermodynamics 293004 (293004K1.08) THERMODYNAMIC PROCESS (CFR: 41.14)

(TURBINES) Define turbine efficiency 98 2.1 73 293008 (293008K1.25) THERMAL HYDRAULICS (CFR: 41.14)

(RECIRCULATION SYSTEM) Explain the reason for forced core recirculation 99 3.2 74 293010 (293010K1.05) BRITTLE FRACTURE AND VESSEL THERMAL STRESS (CFR: 41.14) State the effect of fast neutron irradiation on reactor vessel metals 100 2.8 75 Subtotal 3

Tier 4 Point Total N/A 6

Form 4.1-1 Record of Rejected Knowledge and Abilities Refer to Examination Standard (ES)-4.2, Developing Written Examinations, Section B.3, for deviations from the approved written examination outline.

Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1 / 1 295019 AK3.04 Q# - 8 295019 AK3.03 Original KA: (295019) (APE 19) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR AK3.03 - Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to (APE 19) PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13),

Dryer/filter realignment A licensed operator would not perform any of these actions, all local indications, and actions.

Randomly selected new K/A K3.03, Service Air isolations Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

1 / 1 295027 EK2.06 Q# - 14 295027 EK2.02 Original KA: (295027) (EPE 4) HIGH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III CONTAINMENT ONLY)

EK2.06 - Knowledge of the relationship between the (EPE 4)

HIGH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III CONTAINMENT ONLY) and the following systems or components: (CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3) Reactor/Turbine pressure regulating system.

Grand Gulf Reactor Pressure Control System does not have any relationship with Containment Temperature. This KA will be added to the Rejected KA list for future use.

Randomly selected new K/A EK2.02, Components internal to the containment.

Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1 / 1 600000 G2.2.36 Q# - 19 600000 G2.4.12 Original KA: (600000) (APE 24) PLANT FIRE ON SITE G2.2.36 - Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions for operation (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13).

Analyzing maintenance activities on status of LCOs is an SRO function.

Randomly selected new K/A (G2.4.12)

EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN: Knowledge of operating crew responsibilities during emergency and abnormal operations (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

1 / 2 295012 AK3.02 Q# - 23 295012 AK3.01 (295012) (APE 12) HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE (295012AK3.02) Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses or actions as they apply to (APE 12) HIGH DRYWELL TEMPERATURE: (CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) Venting Grand Gulf does not have guidance to Vent the Dyrwell. This KA will be added to the Rejected KA list for future use.

Randomly selected new K/A AK3.01 Increased drywell cooling Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

1 / 2 295022 G2.1.40 Q# - 25 295022 G2.1.20 (295022) (APE 22) LOSS OF CONTROL ROD DRIVE PUMPS (295022) (APE 22) (G2.1.40) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements (CFR: 41.10 /

43.5 / 43.6 / 45.13)

Grand Gulf does not have guidance on loss of the CRD system in the refueling administrative requirements.

Randomly selected new K/A G2.1.20 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 2 / 1 262002 K2.02 Q# - 45 262002 K2.01 (262002) (SF6 UPS) UNINTERRUPTABL E POWER SUPPLY (AC/DC)

(262002K2.02) (SF6 UPS) UNINTERRUPTABLE POWERSUPPLY (AC/DC) Knowledge of electrical power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7) Motor generator.

Grand Gulf does not have any Motor generators in the UPS system. This KA will be added to the Rejected KA list for future use.

Randomly selected new K/A K2.01, Static switch/inverter Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

2 / 1 510000 G2.2.18 Q# - 52 510000 G2.2.41 (510000) (SF4 SWS*) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM 510000) (SF4 SWS*) SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (G2.2.18)

EQUIPMENT CONTROL Knowledge of the process for managing maintenance activities during shutdown operations, such as risk assessments and work prioritization (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 /45.13)

At Grand Gulf managing maintenance activities, risk assessments and word prioritization are SRO duties.

Randomly selected new K/A G2.2.41, Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings (reference potential)

(CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

SRO 1 / 2 295011 G2.1.37 Q# - 83 295011 G2.1.9 (295011) (APE 11) HIGH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III CONTAINMENT ONLY)

(295011) (APE 11) HIGH CONTAINMENT TEMPERATURE (MARK III CONTAINMENT ONLY) (G2.1.37) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS, Knowledge of procedures, guidelines, or limitations associated with reactivity management (CFR: 41.1 / 41.5 / 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.6)

Reactivity Management during a refueling outage has no guidance on Primary Containment Temperature.

Randomly selected new K/A (G2.1.9), Ability to direct licensed personnel activities inside the control room (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.1 /

45.5 / 45.12 / 45.13)

Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

Tier/Group Randomly Selected K/A Reason for Rejection 1 / 2 295033 G2.2.15 Q# - 84 295033 G2.2.44 (295033) (EPE 10) HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA RADIATION LEVELS (295033) (EPE 10) HIGH SECONDARY CONTAINMENT AREA RADIATION LEVELS (G2.2.15) EQUIPMENT CONTROL Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, lineups or, tagouts (reference potential) (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

Unable to write discriminatory SRO level question for this K/A Randomly selected new K/A (G2.2.44) EQUIPMENT CONTROL Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 /

45.12)

Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

2 / 1 215003 G2.4.52 Q# - 87 215003 G2.4.2 (215003) (SF7 IRM) INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM 215003) (SF7 IRM) INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITOR SYSTEM (G2.4.52) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan, emergency plan implementing procedures, emergency operating procedures, or severe accident guidelines (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Unable to write discriminatory SRO level question for this K/A due to the IRM system is not covered within the Emergency Procedures/Plan Randomly selected new K/A (G2.4.2) EMERGENCY PROCEDURES/PLAN Knowledge of system setpoints, interlocks and automatic actions associated with emergency and abnormal operating procedure entry conditions (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7 / 45.8)

Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

3 G2.1.6 Q# - 94 G2.1.1 (G2.1.6) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Ability to manage the control room crew during plant transients (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.5 /

45.12 / 45.13)

This K/A is better evaluated in a dynamic simulator setting.

Randomly selected new K/A (G2.1.1) CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.10 / 45.13)

Page 1 point totals not affected by this change.

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility:

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: October 10. 2022 Examination Level:

RO SRO Operating Test Number: GGNS 2022 Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

Conduct of Operations GJPM-OPS-2022AR1, Review Cooldown Record per IOI. The operator will review cooldown data recorded on 03-1-01-3 Attachment 3 and identify the Tech Spec limit of 100F/hr has been exceeded.

2.1.23 Ability to perform general or normal operating procedures during any plant condition (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

IMPORTANCE RO 4.3 This JPM has not been used in the last 5 NRC exams.

R, D Equipment Control GJPM-OPS-2022AR2, RPS Electrical Print Reading. The applicant will use the provided electrical prints to prove that removing C71-F14A will de-energize K14A and K14E relays inserting a Division 1 half scram. Removing C71-27D will de-energize the white light for Reactor Scram Trip Logic D.

2.2.15 Ability to determine the expected plant configuration using design and configuration control documentation, such as drawings, lineups or, tagouts (reference potential)

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.9 This JPM has not been used in the last 5 NRC exams.

R, D

Radiation Control GJPM-OPS-2022AR3, Determine Exposure Limit. The applicant will use the given room RP survey map and first determine the normal administrative dose limits are in effect. An Alert or higher would raise the limits to the federal guidelines. Determine the total amount of dose by using the survey map and the general dose at the location for 0.5 hrs.

2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles and procedures pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as response to radiation monitor alarms, containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, or alignment of filters (CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.2 R, N Emergency Plan GJPM-OPS-2022AR4, Perform Emergency Notifications. This task is to review an Emergency Notification Form and then make the required notifications to state and local agencies using the Operational Hotline (OHL). This task will be simulated using a disconnected telephone.

Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators are designated to perform the duties of Control Room Communicator.

2.4.52 Knowledge of the lines of authority during implementation of the emergency plan, emergency plan implementing procedures, emergency operating procedures, or severe accident guidelines (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE RO 3.0 R, D

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.
3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

  • Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).

Form 3.2-1 Administrative Topics Outline Facility:

GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: October 10. 2022 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: GGNS 2022 Administrative Topic (Step 1)

Activity and Associated K/A (Step 2)

Type Code (Step 3)

Conduct of Operations GJPM-OPS-2022AS1 - Review Requirements for MODE change to STARTUP The candidate will use the given IOI-1 attachments and review for Mode Change restraints from Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown) to Mode 2 (Startup).

2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements (CFR: 41.10 / 43.10 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE SRO 4.2 R, N Conduct of Operations GJPM-OPS-2022AS2 - Determine Shutdown Risk Levels For the stated conditions, the candidate will use the SOPP to determine the plant is in Shutdown Condition 3, then using the SOPP charts, determine the risk levels for Decay Heat Removal, Inventory Control and AC Power Control.

A similar JPM was given during the 10-2020 NRC Exam (GJPM-OPS-10-2020AS3) 2.1.41 Knowledge of the refueling process (CFR: 41.2 / 41.10 / 43.6 / 45.13)

IMPORTANCE SRO 3.7 R, M Equipment Control GJPM-OPS-2022AS3 - Tagout/LCO Determination The applicant will evaluate a tagout for the Tech Spec implications as a Tagout Approver per EN OP102 section 5.8.1. The candidate will also complete a manual LCOTR for the applicable LCO per EN-OP-115-16, Safety Function Determination, and LOCTR Processes.

This JPM was used during the 5/2017 NRC Exam.

2.2.45 Ability to determine or interpret technical specifications with action statements of greater than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3)

IMPORTANCE SRO 4.7 R, D

Radiation Control GJPM-OPS-2022AS4 - Upgrade Classification and Determine Release Data This task is an event classification in accordance with EALs and using the Radiation data given, determines the upgrade criteria.

2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities, such as analysis and interpretation of radiation and activity readings as they pertain to administrative, normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures, or analysis and interpretation of coolant activity, including comparison to emergency plan or regulatory limits (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.4 / 45.10)

IMPORTANCE SRO 3.8 R, N Emergency Plan GJPM-OPS-2022AS5 - Perform Initial Actions of the Shift Manager/ED During an Emergency Event This task is an activation of the ERO during an event in accordance with Emergency Response procedures and is required of all licensed SROs.

2.4.40 Knowledge of SRO responsibilities in emergency plan implementing procedures (SRO Only) (CFR: 43.5 / 45.11)

IMPORTANCE SRO 4.5 R, N

Instructions for completing Form 3.2-1, Administrative Topics Outline

1. For each license level, determine the number of administrative job performance measures (JPMs) and topic areas as follows:

Topic Number of JPMs RO*

SRO and RO Retakes Conduct of Operations 1 (or 2) 2 Equipment Control 1 (or 0) 1 Radiation Control 1 (or 0) 1 Emergency Plan 1 (or 0) 1 Total 4

5

2. Enter the associated knowledge and abilities (K/A) statement and summarize the administrative activities for each JPM.
3. For each JPM, specify the type codes for location and source as follows:

Location:

(C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom Source and Source Criteria:

(P)revious two NRC exams (no more than one JPM that is randomly selected from last two NRC exams)

(D)irect from bank (no more than three for ROs, no more than four for SROs and RO retakes)

(N)ew or Significantly (M)odified from bank (no fewer than one)

  • Reactor operator (RO) applicants do not need to be evaluated on every topic (i.e., Equipment Control, Radiation Control, or Emergency Plan can be omitted by doubling up on Conduct of Operations), unless the applicant is taking only the administrative topics portion of the operating test (with a waiver or excusal of the other portions).

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: October 10, 2022 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2022 Exam Level:

RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems S1 - Operate CRD System/RCIS to bring the Reactor Critical, GJPM-OPS-2022S1, 201005 A4.01 (3.7/3.7); A4.02 (3.7/3.7)

D, L, S 1

S2 - Perform RFPT Thrust Bearing Wear Monthly Test GJPM-OPS-2022S2, 259001 A2.07 (4.1/4.1); A4.02 (4.0)

A, N, S 2

S3 - Turbine Bypass Control Valve Pressure Control Malfunction GJPM-OPS-2022S3, 241000 A4.06 (4.2); A3.08 (4.0)

N, S 3

S4 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test GJPM-OPS-2022S4, 209002 A2.01 (4.5/4.4)

A, D, EN, S 4

S5 - Incomplete NS4 Isolation GJPM-OPS-2022S5, 223002 A4.06 (4.2)

A, N, S 5

S6 - Transfer ESF Bus 17AC Power to XFMR ESF 12 GJPM-OPS-2022S6, 262001 A3.02 (3.7) (RO ONLY)

EN, N, S 6

S7 - Reactor Manual Scram Switch Test GJPM-OPS-2022S7, 212000 A1.11 (3.7); A3.09 (4.3)

A, D, EN, S 7

S8 - Perform Standby Gas Treatment System B Operability GJPM-OPS-2022S8, 212000 A1.11 (3.7); A3.09 (4.3)

A, EN, N, S 9

In-Plant Systems P1 - Manual Diesel / Generator Startup with Auto Start Signal Present GJPM-OPS-2022P1, 264000 A2.11 (4.6/4.3); A2.10 (4.7/4.4)

N, EN 6

P2 - Local Manual Fire Water Pump Start GJPM-OPS-2022P2, 286000 A2.08 (3.7/3.3); A2.01 (2.8/3.1)

N 8

P3 - Perform Attachment IV of Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panel GJPM-OPS-2022P3, 288000 A4.01 (3.2) A4.03 (3.0)

D, E, L, R 9

JPM

Description:

S1 - Operate CRD System/RCIS to bring the Reactor Critical, GJPM-OPS-2022S1, 201005 A4.01 (3.7/3.7); A4.02 (3.7/3.7)

  • When the control rod Block occurs, the operator must recognize that a Data Fault has occurred per the P680-4A2-C5 ARI and will be directed to substitute position per 04-1-01-C11-2 SOI.
  • Bank JPM, however, not used previously on last 5 NRC Exams.

S2 - Perform RFPT Thrust Bearing Wear Monthly Test ALTERNATE PATH GJPM-OPS-2022S2, 259001 A2.07 (4.1/4.1); A4.02 (4.0)

  • This task is a monthly test on the Reactor Feedwater Pumps Thrust Bearing Wear detector.
  • During the test a RFPT B Speed Controller will fail, causing the speed to rise.
  • The Feedwater System Malfunctions ONEP will be entered and actions performed.
  • NEW JPM S3 - Turbine Bypass Control Valve Pressure Control Malfunction GJPM-OPS-2022S3, 241000 A4.06 (4.2); A3.08 (4.0)
  • This task has the applicant manually closing one of the three Turbine Bypass Control Valves during power operation, using the Ovation HDMI control panel

S4 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test GJPM-OPS-2022S4, 209002 A2.01 (4.5/4.4)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • This task requires the ability to manually start the only ECCS-qualified high pressure injection system.
  • This task demonstrates the ability to operate HPCS in the "test return" mode, which puts HPCS flow in a loop from and to the Suppression Pool, one of its two suction sources. HPCS is operated in this mode for surveillance and post-maintenance testing.
  • As HPCS is placed in the test return an inadvertent initiation will occur with reactor core injection. This will require the applicant to per actions per 02-S-01-43, Transient Mitigation Strategy.
  • Bank JPM, however, a similar JPM was performed on 2-2020 NRC Exam (S4).

S5 - Incomplete NS4 Isolation GJPM-OPS-2022S5, 223002 A4.06 (4.2)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • This task is to secure A SSW system and return to Standby.
  • This is an Alternate Path JPM, as SSW A is being secured a small Drywell Leak will occur.
  • NS4 isolation will fail to occur and the applicant will be required to manually isolate the Containment/Drywell/ Auxiliary Building per Automatic Isolation ONEP.
  • NEW JPM S6 - Transfer ESF Bus 17AC Power to XFMR ESF 12 GJPM-OPS-2022S6, 262001 A3.02 (3.7) (RO ONLY)
  • This task is to transfer incoming supply power to ESF Bus 17AC from XFMR 21 to ESF XFMR 12 per SOI.

S7 - Reactor Manual Scram Switch Test GJPM-OPS-2022S7, 212000 A1.11 (3.7); A3.09 (4.3)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • The applicant will perform 06-OP-1C71-Q-0002 (Reactor Manual Scram Switch Test).
  • When the operator depresses the first manual scram switch, the applicant should recognize 3 scrammed rods.
  • The applicant should perform 05-1-02-IV-1, Control Rod/Drive Malfunctions ONEP Immediate actions.
  • Bank JPM, however, not used previously on last 5 NRC Exams.

S8 - Perform Standby Gas Treatment System B Operability GJPM-OPS-2022S8, 212000 A1.11 (3.7); A3.09 (4.3)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • When the applicant places MOV test switch to NORM a 5 second time delay will occur then a high radiation signal from Fuel Pool Sweep/Fuel Handling Area systems will occur. Both SGBT systems will not initiate.
  • The applicant should perform EN-OP-120, Operator Fundamentals, and manually initiate both SGBT trains.
  • NEW JPM P1 - Manual Diesel / Generator Startup with Auto Start Signal Present GJPM-OPS-2022P1, 264000 A2.11 (4.6/4.3); A2.10 (4.7/4.4)
  • This task simulates a failure to start of the Division III, HPCS Diesel Generator, with directions to manually start locally.

P2 - Local Manual Fire Water Pump Start GJPM-OPS-2022P2, 286000 A2.08 (3.7/3.3); A2.01 (2.8/3.1)

  • This task simulates a failure to start of ALL Fire Water Pumps, a remote start has already been attempted.
  • The applicant must manually start all three Fire Water Pumps locally.
  • NEW JPM P3 - Perform Attachment IV of Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panel GJPM-OPS-2022P3, 288000 A4.01 (3.2) A4.03 (3.0)
  • This task is to align the Alternate Shutdown Panels in the Auxiliary Building per 05-1-02-II-1 Attachment IV separating the Main Control Room from the Division I equipment for safe shutdown in the event of a fire or security event in the Main Control Room.
  • This JPM is an Abnormal Operating Procedure requiring entry into the CAA.
  • Bank JPM, however, not used previously on last 5 NRC Exams.

Code License Level Criteria RO (A)lternate path 5

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 5 (L)ow power/shutdown 2

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 6 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 0 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

(S)imulator

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

(S)imulator

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: October 10, 2022 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2022 Exam Level:

RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems S1 - Operate CRD System/RCIS to bring the Reactor Critical, GJPM-OPS-2022S1, 201005 A4.01 (3.7/3.7); A4.02 (3.7/3.7)

D, L, S 1

S2 - Perform RFPT Thrust Bearing Wear Monthly Test GJPM-OPS-2022S2, 259001 A2.07 (4.1/4.1); A4.02 (4.0)

A, N, S 2

S3 - Turbine Bypass Control Valve Pressure Control Malfunction GJPM-OPS-2022S3, 241000 A4.06 (4.2); A3.08 (4.0)

N, S 3

S4 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test GJPM-OPS-2022S4, 209002 A2.01 (4.5/4.4)

A, D, EN, S 4

S5 - Incomplete NS4 Isolation GJPM-OPS-2022S5, 223002 A4.06 (4.2)

A, N, S 5

S7 - Reactor Manual Scram Switch Test GJPM-OPS-2022S7, 212000 A1.11 (3.7); A3.09 (4.3)

A, D, EN, S 7

S8 - Perform Standby Gas Treatment System B Operability GJPM-OPS-2022S8, 212000 A1.11 (3.7); A3.09 (4.3)

A, EN, N, S 9

In-Plant Systems P1 - Manual Diesel / Generator Startup with Auto Start Signal Present GJPM-OPS-2022P1, 264000 A2.11 (4.6/4.3); A2.10 (4.7/4.4)

N, EN 6

P2 - Local Manual Fire Water Pump Start GJPM-OPS-2022P2, 286000 A2.08 (3.7/3.3); A2.01 (2.8/3.1)

N 8

P3 - Perform Attachment IV of Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panel GJPM-OPS-2022P3, 288000 A4.01 (3.2) A4.03 (3.0)

D, E, L, R 9

JPM

Description:

S1 - Operate CRD System/RCIS to bring the Reactor Critical, GJPM-OPS-2022S1, 201005 A4.01 (3.7/3.7); A4.02 (3.7/3.7)

  • When the control rod Block occurs, the operator must recognize that a Data Fault has occurred per the P680-4A2-C5 ARI and will be directed to substitute position per 04-1-01-C11-2 SOI.
  • Bank JPM, however, not used previously on last 5 NRC Exams.

S2 - Perform RFPT Thrust Bearing Wear Monthly Test ALTERNATE PATH GJPM-OPS-2022S2, 259001 A2.07 (4.1/4.1); A4.02 (4.0)

  • This task is a monthly test on the Reactor Feedwater Pumps Thrust Bearing Wear detector.
  • During the test a RFPT B Speed Controller will fail, causing the speed to rise.
  • The Feedwater System Malfunctions ONEP will be entered and actions performed.
  • NEW JPM S3 - Turbine Bypass Control Valve Pressure Control Malfunction GJPM-OPS-2022S3, 241000 A4.06 (4.2); A3.08 (4.0)
  • This task has the applicant manually closing one of the three Turbine Bypass Control Valves during power operation, using the Ovation HDMI control panel

S4 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test GJPM-OPS-2022S4, 209002 A2.01 (4.5/4.4)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • This task requires the ability to manually start the only ECCS-qualified high pressure injection system.
  • This task demonstrates the ability to operate HPCS in the "test return" mode, which puts HPCS flow in a loop from and to the Suppression Pool, one of its two suction sources. HPCS is operated in this mode for surveillance and post-maintenance testing.
  • As HPCS is placed in the test return an inadvertent initiation will occur with reactor core injection. This will require the applicant to per actions per 02-S-01-43, Transient Mitigation Strategy.
  • Bank JPM, however, a similar JPM was performed on 2-2020 NRC Exam (S4).

S5 - Incomplete NS4 Isolation GJPM-OPS-2022S5, 223002 A4.06 (4.2)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • This task is to secure A SSW system and return to Standby.
  • This is an Alternate Path JPM, as SSW A is being secured a small Drywell Leak will occur.
  • NS4 isolation will fail to occur and the applicant will be required to manually isolate the Containment/Drywell/ Auxiliary Building per Automatic Isolation ONEP.

S7 - Reactor Manual Scram Switch Test GJPM-OPS-2022S7, 212000 A1.11 (3.7); A3.09 (4.3)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • The applicant will perform 06-OP-1C71-Q-0002 (Reactor Manual Scram Switch Test).
  • When the operator depresses the first manual scram switch, the applicant should recognize 3 scrammed rods.
  • The applicant should perform 05-1-02-IV-1, Control Rod/Drive Malfunctions ONEP Immediate actions.
  • Bank JPM, however, not used previously on last 5 NRC Exams.

S8 - Perform Standby Gas Treatment System B Operability GJPM-OPS-2022S8, 212000 A1.11 (3.7); A3.09 (4.3)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • When the applicant places MOV test switch to NORM a 5 second time delay will occur then a high radiation signal from Fuel Pool Sweep/Fuel Handling Area systems will occur. Both SGBT systems will not initiate.
  • The applicant should perform EN-OP-120, Operator Fundamentals, and manually initiate both SGBT trains.
  • NEW JPM P1 - Manual Diesel / Generator Startup with Auto Start Signal Present GJPM-OPS-2022P1, 264000 A2.11 (4.6/4.3); A2.10 (4.7/4.4)
  • This task simulates a failure to start of the Division III, HPCS Diesel Generator, with directions to manually start locally.

P2 - Local Manual Fire Water Pump Start GJPM-OPS-2022P2, 286000 A2.08 (3.7/3.3); A2.01 (2.8/3.1)

  • This task simulates a failure to start of ALL Fire Water Pumps, a remote start has already been attempted.
  • The applicant must manually start all three Fire Water Pumps locally.
  • NEW JPM P3 - Perform Attachment IV of Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panel GJPM-OPS-2022P3, 288000 A4.01 (3.2) A4.03 (3.0)
  • This task is to align the Alternate Shutdown Panels in the Auxiliary Building per 05-1-02-II-1 Attachment IV separating the Main Control Room from the Division I equipment for safe shutdown in the event of a fire or security event in the Main Control Room.
  • This JPM is an Abnormal Operating Procedure requiring entry into the CAA.
  • Bank JPM, however, not used previously on last 5 NRC Exams.

Code License Level Criteria RO (A)lternate path 5

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 4 (L)ow power/shutdown 2

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 5 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 0 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

(S)imulator

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

(S)imulator

Form 3.2-2 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR STATION Date of Examination: October 10, 2022 Operating Test Number: GGNS 2022 Exam Level:

RO SRO-I SRO-U System/JPM Title Type Code Safety Function Control Room Systems S2 - Perform RFPT Thrust Bearing Wear Monthly Test GJPM-OPS-2022S2, 259001 A2.07 (4.1/4.1); A4.02 (4.0)

A, N, S 2

S4 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test GJPM-OPS-2022S4, 209002 A2.01 (4.5/4.4)

A, D, EN, S 4

In-Plant Systems P1 - Manual Diesel / Generator Startup with Auto Start Signal Present GJPM-OPS-2022P1, 264000 A2.11 (4.6/4.3); A2.10 (4.7/4.4)

N, EN 6

P2 - Local Manual Fire Water Pump Start GJPM-OPS-2022P2, 286000 A2.08 (3.7/3.3); A2.01 (2.8/3.1)

N 8

P3 - Perform Attachment IV of Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panel GJPM-OPS-2022P3, 288000 A4.01 (3.2) A4.03 (3.0)

D, E, L, R 9

JPM

Description:

S2 - Perform RFPT Thrust Bearing Wear Monthly Test ALTERNATE PATH GJPM-OPS-2022S2, 259001 A2.07 (4.1/4.1); A4.02 (4.0)

  • This task is a monthly test on the Reactor Feedwater Pumps Thrust Bearing Wear detector.
  • During the test a RFPT B Speed Controller will fail, causing the speed to rise.
  • The Feedwater System Malfunctions ONEP will be entered and actions performed.
  • NEW JPM S4 - Performing HPCS Quarterly Functional Test GJPM-OPS-2022S4, 209002 A2.01 (4.5/4.4)

ALTERNATE PATH

  • This task requires the ability to manually start the only ECCS-qualified high pressure injection system.
  • This task demonstrates the ability to operate HPCS in the "test return" mode, which puts HPCS flow in a loop from and to the Suppression Pool, one of its two suction sources. HPCS is operated in this mode for surveillance and post-maintenance testing.
  • As HPCS is placed in the test return an inadvertent initiation will occur with reactor core injection. This will require the applicant to per actions per 02-S-01-43, Transient Mitigation Strategy.
  • Bank JPM, however, a similar JPM was performed on 2-2020 NRC Exam (S4).

P1 - Manual Diesel / Generator Startup with Auto Start Signal Present GJPM-OPS-2022P1, 264000 A2.11 (4.6/4.3); A2.10 (4.7/4.4)

  • This task simulates a failure to start of the Division III, HPCS Diesel Generator, with directions to manually start locally.

P2 - Local Manual Fire Water Pump Start GJPM-OPS-2022P2, 286000 A2.08 (3.7/3.3); A2.01 (2.8/3.1)

  • This task simulates a failure to start of ALL Fire Water Pumps, a remote start has already been attempted.
  • The applicant must manually start all three Fire Water Pumps locally.
  • NEW JPM P3 - Perform Attachment IV of Shutdown from Remote Shutdown Panel GJPM-OPS-2022P3, 288000 A4.01 (3.2) A4.03 (3.0)
  • This task is to align the Alternate Shutdown Panels in the Auxiliary Building per 05-1-02-II-1 Attachment IV separating the Main Control Room from the Division I equipment for safe shutdown in the event of a fire or security event in the Main Control Room.
  • This JPM is an Abnormal Operating Procedure requiring entry into the CAA.
  • Bank JPM, however, not used previously on last 5 NRC Exams.

Code License Level Criteria RO (A)lternate path 2

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 2

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 3 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 0 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

(S)imulator

1. Determine the number of control room system and in-plant system job performance measures (JPMs) to develop using the following table:

License Level Control Room In-Plant Total Reactor Operator (RO) 8 3

11 Senior Reactor Operator-Instant (SRO-I) 7 3

10 Senior Reactor Operator-Upgrade (SRO-U) 2 or 3 3 or 2 5

2. Select safety functions and systems for each JPM as follows:

Refer to Section 1.9 of the applicable knowledge and abilities (K/A) catalog for the plant systems organized by safety function. For pressurized-water reactor operating tests, the primary and secondary systems listed under Safety Function 4, Heat Removal from Reactor Core, in Section 1.9 of the applicable K/A catalog, may be treated as separate safety functions (i.e., two systems, one primary and one secondary, may be selected from Safety Function 4). From the safety function groupings identified in the K/A catalog, select the appropriate number of plant systems by safety functions to be evaluated based on the applicants license level (see the table in step 1).

For RO/SRO-I applicants: Each of the control room system JPMs and, separately, each of the in-plant system JPMs must evaluate a different safety function, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function in each location. One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature.

For SRO-U applicants: Evaluate SRO-U applicants on five different safety functions.

One of the control room system JPMs must be an engineered safety feature, and the same system or evolution cannot be used to evaluate more than one safety function.

3. Select a task for each JPM that supports, either directly or indirectly and in a meaningful way, the successful fulfillment of the associated safety function. Select the task from the applicable K/A catalog (K/As for plant systems or emergency and abnormal plant evolutions) or the facility licensees site-specific task list. If this task has an associated K/A, the K/A should have an importance rating of at least 2.5 in the RO column. K/As that have importance ratings of less than 2.5 may be used if justified based on plant priorities; inform the NRC chief examiner if selecting K/As with an importance rating less than 2.5.

The selected tasks must be different from the events and evolutions conducted during the simulator operating test and tasks tested on the written examination. A task that is similar to a simulator scenario event may be acceptable if the actions required to complete the task are significantly different from those required in response to the scenario event.

Apply the following specific task selection criteria:

At least one of the tasks shall be related to a shutdown or low-power condition.

Four to six of the tasks for RO and SRO-I applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures. Two to three of the tasks for SRO-U applicants shall require execution of alternative paths within the facility licensees operating procedures.

At least one alternate path JPM must be new or modified from the bank.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall evaluate the applicants ability to implement actions required during an emergency or abnormal condition.

At least one of the tasks conducted in the plant shall require the applicant to enter the radiologically controlled area. This provides an excellent opportunity for the applicant to discuss or demonstrate radiation control administrative subjects.

If it is not possible to develop or locate a suitable task for a selected system, return to step 2 and select a different system.

4. For each JPM, specify the codes for type, source, and location:

Code License Level Criteria RO SRO-I SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 4-6 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9

8 4

(E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1

1 1

(EN)gineered safety feature (for control room system) 1 1

1 (L)ow power/shutdown 1

1 1

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (must apply to at least one alternate path JPM) 2 2

1 (P)revious two exams (randomly selected) 3 3

2 (R)adiologically controlled area 1

1 1

(S)imulator

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 1

Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: GGNS 2022-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:

Turnover:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, EOC Inoperable equipment:

RCIC, LCO 3.5.3, Condition A Other:

Lower power to 1400 MWe due to storms in Louisiana Rotate RFPT A AC oil pumps. Place B pump in service due to leak Transfer 15AA incoming feeder from ESF 12 to ESF 11 CCW pump B is tagged out for pump bearing replacement (it will not be returned on this shift)

SSW A in service with flow through RHR A HX to gather motor vibration data for engineering Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type

  • Event Description 1

N/A R (ATC)

Lower power to 1400 MWe 2

N/A N (ATC)

Rotate RFPT A AC oil pumps. Place B pump in service 3

N/A N (BOP)

Transfer 15AA power supply to ESF 11 4

ct181a I (BOP)

TS (CRS)

(Instr failure replacing reactivity manipulation)

Spurious Div 1 Suppression Pool Makeup (SPMU) 30-minute timer initiation.

LCO 3.6.2.4, Cond C LCO 3.3.6.4, Cond C 5

fw232p n36f011b_f C (BOP, ATC)

MC (BOP)

A (Crew)

High Pressure Feedwater Heater 6B tube leak /

failure to auto isolate 6

n34098 I,MC,A (ATC)

Main turbine lube oil temperature controller failure 7

p42151a C (BOP)

A (Crew)

TS (CRS)

CCW pump trip with standby pump not available.

LCO 3.7.1, Cond D LCO 3.8.1, Cond F 8

ov_555 ov_581 ov_606 M (Crew)

Low generator stator water flow / generator trip /

reactor scram 9

c11164 M (Crew)

ATWS > 5%

CT-1, Terminates and prevents injection to lower RPV level to <-70 WR CT-2, Restore instrument air to the containment and drywell (to maintain MSIVs open) prior to SRVs cycling to control RPV pressure.

10 rf Att. 11 C (ATC)

RWCU fails to isolate on SLC initiation

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal, (TS) Tech Spec, (MC) Manual Control

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 2

Quantitative Attributes Table Attribute E3-301-4 Target Actual Description Malfunctions after EOP entry 1-2 1

  • RWCU fails to isolate on SLC initiation Abnormal Events 2-4 3
  • Turbine lube oil temperature controller failure
  • Main generator trip
  • ATWS EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 1
  • EP-2A, ATWS RPV Control Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions 1

1

  • CT-1, Terminate and prevent feedwater and other injection sources to lower RPV level to <-

70 WR

  • CT-2, Restore instrument air to the containment and drywell (to maintain MSIVs open) prior to SRVs cycling to control RPV pressure.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 3

Initial Conditions:

Plant is operating at 100% power, end of cycle Inoperable Equipment:

RCIC LCO 3.5.3, Condition A.1 Planned activities:

Lower power to 1400 MWe due to storms in Louisiana Rotate RFPT A AC oil pumps. Place B pump in service due to leak Transfer 15AA incoming feeder from ESF 12 to ESF 11 Scenario Notes:

Validation Time: XX minutes

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 4

SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

Event 1 - lower reactor power to 1400 MWe using Recirc system (Normal evolution)

As specified in the turnover, severe thunderstorms are in Louisiana necessitating GGNS to reduce reactor power to 1300 MWe to reduce the possibility of a generator load reject. A marked up copy of 03-1-01-2 (IOI-2) for temporary downpower will be provided. Using the Recirc system FCVs (P680-3B), the ATC will close the FCVs to reduce reactor power until 1400 MWe is achieved.

Event 2 - Rotate RFPT A oil pumps, place B pump in service (Normal evolution)

Using 04-1-01-N21-1, Feedwater System SOI, the ATC will start the RFPT A, B oil pump, secure the A oil pump and place it in standby. (P680-2C)

Event 3 - Transfer 15AA incoming feeder breaker from ESF 12 to ESF 11 (Normal evolution) 04-1-01-R21-15, ESF Bus 15AA SOI, The BOP will perform the following:

  • On P807-1C, the BOP should verify ESF 11 is energized by observing a closed disconnect, multiple breakers closed, and 34.5 KV voltage on bus 11R (P807-1B)
  • On P864-1C, the BOP should:
  • verify the power available light (purple light) is on,
  • place in Sync switch on and verify the running and in-coming sources are in sync
  • close ESF 11 in-coming feeder breaker 152-1514 and observe ESF 12 in-coming feeder breaker 152-1511 trips
  • return sync switch to off Event 4 - Spurious SPMU 30 minute timer initiation (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

A spurious Div 1 Suppression Pool Makeup (SPMU) timer initiation will occur. SPMU will initiate in 30 minutes if its mode select switch is not turned off. With the mode select switch turned off, Div 1 SPMU should be declared inop.

Per 02-S-01-43, Transient Mitigation Strategy, step 6.3.2:

IF Suppression Pool temperature and level are stable AND Suppression Pool level is NOT low, THEN Suppression Pool Make Up (SPMU) can be overridden PER SOI 04-1-01-E30-1.

To defeat the initiation of SPMU, the CRS should direct the BOP to perform 04-1-01-E30-1, SPMU SOI Attachment V hardcard or perform step 5.4.2, MANUAL OVERRIDE OF SPMU (for Div 1 SPMU only).

The CRS should refer to Tech Specs and identify the following LCOs:

3.6.2.4, Cond C 3.3.6.4, Cond C Event 5 - Feedwater Heater 6B tube leak (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

Feedwater Heater 6B will develop a tube leak resulting in receipt of a hi-hi level. The steam isolation valves will fail to auto isolate requiring the BOP to isolate the heater per ARI immediate actions. The CRS should enter 05-1-02-V-5, Loss of Feedwater Heating ONEP and direct lowering core flow to 70 mlbm/hr and then inserting control rods to lower the load line to < 100%. The CRS should also enter 05-1-02-III-3, Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP and ensure plant parameters are stabilized. The ATC should perform a plot on using Attachment 3 hardcard and assume a THI watch without concurrent duties. The BOP should verify the plot on the hardcard and notify the CRS the plot has been verified and 4 of the OPRMs are armed.

Direction may be given to an NLO to monitor the status of feedwater heater 6B drain and dump valves from local panel P171. If this occurs the booth operator will provide status using thunderview.

Direction may be given to isolate the B HP feedwater heater string. Due to potentially excessive time consumption in completing this, it is recommended to move forward after control rods are inserted.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 5

Event 6 - Turbine lube oil temperature controller failure (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

When initiated, main turbine lube oil temperature will slowly rise. A high temperature alarm will be received when lube oil temperature reaches 120°F. The BOP should respond to the ARI while the ATC is diagnosing indications on P680-10B. The ATC should observe a rising lube oil temperature with a lowering controller output and determine the automatic control has failed and place the turbine lube oil temperature controller in manual and restore lube oil temperature to 113°F. If not diagnosed and restored without direction, the ARI provides guidance to do so. If directed to investigate the condition, the booth operator will acknowledge the command but provide no additional feedback.

Event 7 - CCW pump A trip (one pump running) (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

CCW pump B is not available as stated in initial conditions. When initiated, the CCW pump A will trip leaving only one CCW pump running. CCW flow will automatically isolate to the FPCC heat exchangers due to low CCW flow. 05-1-02-V-1, Loss of Component Cooling Water ONEP (partial loss) and 05-1-02-III-1, Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP should be entered.

If an NLO is directed to investigate CCW pump A breaker (52-11506), after 3 minutes the booth operator will report charring at the breaker cubicle with no smoke or flames. In other words, it cannot be restored.

05-1-02-III-1, Inadequate Decay Heat Removal ONEP will direct monitoring of spent fuel pool and containment fuel pool temperatures. If an NLO or another person is directed to monitor pool temperatures, a booth operator will provide feedback that spent fuel pool temperature is 110°F and slowly rising.

A Retainment Override in 05-1-02-V-1, Loss of Component Cooling Water ONEP section D states that if spent fuel pool temperature cannot be maintained < 130°F, then place SSW A or B in service to the FPCC heat exchangers using 04-1-01-P42-1, Component Cooling Water system SOI. With SSW A already running, the CRS should direct the BOP to align SSW A to FPCC HX A using the SOI.

Due to seismic limitations, aligning SSW A to FPCC HX A requires declaring the SSW A subsystem inop.

Also required is turning off Div 1 load shedding and sequencing subsystem (LSS) and declaring it inop. If an NLO is directed to turn LSS off, the booth operator will perform the task and notify the control room.

Tech Specs should be referred to and the following LCOs identified:

3.7.1 Condition D, One SSW subsystem inop, D.1 Restore SSW subsystem to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.8.1 Condition F, One automatic load sequencer inoperable.

F.1 Restore automatic load sequencer to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

Turning off Div 1 LSS effects Div 1 components as follows:

  • Div 1 DG will not auto start when Div 1 ECCS is initiated
  • SSW A will not auto align into LOCA lineup (will align as appropriate for component starts)
  • RHR A will start when Div 1 ECCS is initiated
  • LPCS will indicate amber light on its pump HS indicating a tripped condition when Div 1 ECCS is initiated. It is available if manually started.
  • CRD Pump A will not shed when Div 1 ECCS is initiated
  • 15B42 will not shed when Div 1 ECCS is initiated
  • Div 1 CGCS will not initiate when Div 1 ECCS is initiated

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 6

Event 8 - Low generator stator water flow / generator/turbine trip (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

Stator water flow sensed on the stator outlet will lower and result in a main generator / turbine trip and reactor scram.

The ATC should observe and report a hydraulic block ATWS with reactor power > 5%.

Event 9 - ATWS (Initial setup)

The ATC should perform immediate actions for an ATWS > 5% power:

Initiation of ARI/RPT Inhibiting ADS Termination / prevention of HPCS and LP ECCS injection Verification of SLC injection Placing Suppression pool cooling into service The BOP should perform immediate actions for an ATWS > 5% power:

Initiate SLC Terminate / prevent feedwater and align for startup level control when directed and then control RPV level within a band of -70 to -130 WR.

(CT-1), During failure to scram conditions with power > 5%, terminate feedwater and other injection sources (except boron and CRD) to lower RPV level to below -70 wide range. And, maintain control of RPV level such that an automatic MSIV isolation due to low RPV level does not occur.

RPV pressure should be maintained 800-1060 psig using the main turbine bypass valves. The turbine pressure setpoint should be lowered to 900 psig which will ensure all SRVs will close and remain closed following the generator/turbine trip.

When instrument air automatically isolates on low RPV level (-41.6 WR) and later on high drywell pressure (1.23 psig), instrument air should be restored prior to MSIV closures due to no air.

(CT-2), Restore instrument air to the containment and drywell (to maintain MSIVs open) prior to SRVs cycling to control RPV pressure.

It takes 8.5 minutes for the inboard MSIVs to isolate due to loss of air to the drywell. If all main steam lines isolate, it will result in the unnecessary addition of energy into the suppression pool through SRVs and will require an RPV pressure reduction to allow feeding with condensate booster pumps.

When SLC is initiated, both pumps will inject through the B squib valve (A squib valve failed earlier).

The CRS should direct installation of the following EP attachments. The booth operator will install these attachments when directed:

  • Attachment 8, defeats MSIV isolation on RPV level 1 (-150.3 WR)
  • Attachment 18, defeats ARI/RPT logic
  • Attachment 19, defeats RPS logic
  • Attachment 20, defeats RC&IS (rod pattern) interlocks
  • Attachment 12, defeats RHR shutdown cooling interlocks When Div 1 and Div 2 ECCS is manually initiated, only CRD pump B will trip.

CRD flow should initially be maximized using 05-1-02-IV-1, CRD Malfunctions ONEP Attachment 2 hardcard, in attempt to drift control rods in with high cooling water DP.

Once directed, it takes 10 minutes for installation of EP attachments to insert control rods. Once EP attachments 18, 19, 20 are installed, the CRS should direct maximizing CRD for pressure (using same hardcard) and scramming and driving rods.

Event 10 - RWCU fails to auto isolate on SLC injection (Initial Setup)

RWCU will fail to auto isolate on level 2 (-41.6) or SLC initiation. When the immediate action to inject SLC is performed, (a minimum) 1 RWCU MOV will be required to be closed to prevent RWCU from removing SLC from the RPV (G33-F004, RWCU PMP SUCT CTMT OTBD ISOL or G33-F251, RWCU SPLY TO RWCU HXS). With SLC injection, Rx power will lower. Based in the ATWS power level, sufficient SLC content is being injected and combined with rod insertion, the Rx will shutdown.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 7

Once control rods are being inserted and RPV parameters are stable, this scenario can be terminated.

Termination:

When directed by Lead Evaluator, the booth operator will perform the following:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 8

Critical Task (CT-1), During failure to scram conditions with power > 5%, terminate feedwater and other injection sources (except boron and CRD) to lower RPV level to below -

70 wide range. And, maintain control of RPV level such that an automatic MSIV isolation due to low RPV level does not occur.

Event 6

Safety Significance Regarding lowering level below -70 wide range, to prevent or mitigate the consequences of any large irregular neutron flux oscillations induced by neutronic/thermal-hydraulic instabilities. RPV water level is lowered sufficiently below the elevation of the feedwater sparger nozzles. This places the feedwater spargers in the steam space providing effective heating of the relatively cold feedwater and eliminating the potential for high core inlet subcooling. For conditions that are susceptible to oscillations, the initiation and growth of oscillations is principally dependent upon the subcooling at the core inlet; the greater the subcooling, the more likely oscillations will commence and increase in magnitude.

24 below the lowest nozzle in the feedwater sparger has been selected as the upper bound of the RPV water level control band. This water level is sufficiently low that steam heating of the injected water will be at least 65% to 75% effective (i.e.,

the temperature of the injected water will be increased to 65% to 75% of its equilibrium value in the steam environment). This water level is sufficiently high that most plants without the capability to readily defeat the low RPV water level MSIV isolation should be able to control RPV water level with feedwater pumps to preclude the isolation.

With reactor power > 5%, an MSIV isolation (when avoidable) would unnecessarily add heat to the suppression pool at a rate greater than that capable of being removed by RHR A and B. This could result in exceeding the Heat Capacity Temperature limit and subsequent loss of the primary containment due to over pressurization.

Cueing A scram is initiated (either automatically or manually) and numerous control rods indicate beyond position 02 and reactor power is > 5% on panel P680 indications and SPDS and RPV level is > -70 wide range on SPDS and PDS.

Measurable Performance Indicators To terminate/prevent Feedwater:

Reduces feedwater discharge pressure to below RPV pressure.

Closes startup level control valve.

Closes N21-F009A, FW HTR 6A OUTL VLV.

Closes N21-F009B, FW HTR 6B OUTL VLV.

Closes N21-F040, FW SU BYP VLV.

To control RPV level once in band:

Selects Speed Auto on RFP used and raises RFP discharge pressure > reactor pressure.

Opens startup level control valve as required to control RPV level.

Performance Feedback To terminate/prevent Feedwater:

1C34-LK-R600, Feedwater level master controller output indicates -5.00%.

1C34-LK-R602, Startup level controller output indicates -5.00%.

N21-F009A/B, and N21-F040 indicate green light on and red light out.

Feedwater flow to the RPV indicates 0.

To control RPV level once in band:

Speed Auto pushbutton is backlit.

RFP discharge pressure indicates > reactor pressure on indicator N21-R612A or B.

Raises output of 1C34-LK-R602, Startup level controller output indicates > 0.

Observes feedwater flow to the RPV.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 1 Revision 0 5/3/2022 9

Critical Task CT-2, Restore instrument air to the containment and drywell (to maintain MSIVs open) prior to SRVs cycling to control RPV pressure.

Event 6

Safety Significance Instrument air to the containment and drywell automatically isolates on either high drywell pressure (1.23 psig) or low RPV level (-41.6 WR).

Failure to restore instrument air to the containment and drywell will result in closure of the inboard MSIVs (after 8.5 minutes). If this occurs, the use of the main condenser as a heat sink is lost and energy will thereby be transferred to the suppression pool/containment through SRVs. This would in turn unnecessarily challenge the containment.

Also, since both GGNS reactor feed pumps are steam driven, the reactor feed pumps would stop injecting once steam pressure downstream of the MSIVs deplete.

This would require the crew to lower RPV pressure with SRVs to a band of 450-600 psig to enable condensate booster pumps to inject. Failure to lower RPV pressure would result in RPV level lowering to < -191 CFZ and require emergency depressurization.

The lowering of RPV pressure would also add positive reactivity and result in a slightly higher reactor power level.

Cueing An automatic isolation signal is received and:

  • P53-F001, INST AIR SPLY HDR TO CTMT indicates closed (P870-3C)
  • P53-F007, INSTR AIR SPLY HDR TO DRWL indicates closed (P870-9C)

(Note: valve position indication can also be observed on the isolation status board)

Measurable Performance Indicators 30 seconds after the isolation signal is received, places the handswitches for P53-F001 and P53-F007 to the open position.

Performance Feedback Observes red (open) lights for both valves.

(Note: valve position indication can also be observed on the isolation status board).

  • If an operator or the crew significantly deviates from, or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review (NUREG 1021, Appendix D). An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 1

Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: GGNS 2022-2 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:

Turnover:

Initial Conditions: 90% power, BOC Inoperable equipment:

Div 3 DG LCO 3.8.1, Condition B, SR 3.8.1.1 (AC/DC lineup) due in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Other:

A sequence exchange has been completed and Rx power is being restored. Presently Rx power is 90%. Raise reactor power using Recirc FCVs to achieve 1400 MWe.

Place RWCU F/D A in service.

Rotate TBCW pumps. Place C pump in service and remove B pump.

Event No.

Malf. No.

Event Type Event Description 1

N/A R (ATC)

Raise power to 1400 MWe using Recirc 2

rf g33035 N (ATC)

Place RWCU F/D A in service 3

N/A N (BOP)

Rotate TBCW pumps 4

o/r DI_1D17K612 TS (CRS)

Fuel handling area rad monitor fails downscale 5

o/r c11r600 I, MC (BOP)

CRD flow controller failure 6

fw118a C (ATC)

A (Crew)

Condensate booster pump A trip 7

e51188 o/r e51m612c I, MC (BOP)

A (Crew)

TS (CRS)

(Instr failure replacing reactivity manipulation)

Spurious RCIC Initiation / trip PB fails LCO 3.3.5.3, Cond B LCO 3.5.3, Cond A,B 8

r21134f C (BOP, ATC)

A (Crew)

BOP Transformer 23 lockout 9

rr063a M (Crew)

Recirc system leak 10 fw171a b21f065a_i C (BOP)

M (Crew)

Feedwater line break in drywell with inability to isolate 11 e22177 I, MC (ATC)

HPCS fails to auto initiate CT-1, injects with HPCS 12 r21180 A (Crew)

ESF 21 lockout CT-2, restore power to 17AC (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal (TS) Tech Spec

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 2

Quantitative Attributes Table Attribute 2.3-2 Target Actual Description Malfunctions after EOP entry 1-2 2

  • HPCS fails to auto initiate
  • ESF 21 lockout Abnormal Events 2-4 3
  • Condensate booster pump trip
  • Spurious RCIC initiation
  • Recirc system leak
  • Feedwater break in drywell / unisolable EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 2
  • EP-3, Containment Control Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions 1

1

  • Alternate level control Preidentified critical tasks 2-3 2
  • CT-1, injects with HPCS
  • CT-2, restore power to 17AC

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 3

Initial Conditions:

Plant is operating at 90% power, BOC following a sequence exchange Generator load is 1334 MWe Inoperable Equipment:

Div 3 DG LCO 3.8.1, Condition B Planned activities:

A sequence exchange has been completed and Rx power is being restored. Presently Rx power is 90%. You are directed to raise reactor power using Recirc FCVs to achieve 1400 MWe.

Place RWCU F/D A in service.

Rotate TBCW pumps. Place C pump in service and remove B pump.

Scenario Notes:

New scenario Validation Time: XX minutes

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 4

SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

Event 1 - lower reactor power to 1400 MWe using Recirc system (Normal evolution)

As specified in the turnover, the sequence exchange is complete and thermal limits are verified. The crew is directed to raise reactor power / generator load to achieve 1400 MWe. A marked up copy of 03-1-01-2 (IOI-2), Attachment VIII will be provided. Using the Recirc system FCVs (P680-3B), the ATC will open the FCVs to raise reactor power / generator load until 1400 MWe is achieved.

Event 2 - Place RWCU F/D A in service (Normal evolution)

Using 04-1-01-G33-1, Reactor Water Cleanup System SOI section 4.5.3, the ATC will Place RWCU F/D A in service. The ATC should direct an NLO (booth operator) to place the A F/D in service while the ATC maintains total system flow at 450 gpm by throttling closed on G33-F044, RWCU FLTR DMIN BYP VLV. P680-11A-D5, RWCU FILTR DMIN CONT TROUBLE alarm will annunciate when the F/D is placed in the filter mode (due to low flow) and will clear once F/D flow is > 162 gpm. All ATC actions /

indications are located on P680-11A/B/C.

Event 3 - Rotate TBCW pumps. Place C pump in service and remove B pump (Normal evolution)

Using 04-1-01-P43-1, Turbine Building Cooling Water System SOI section 5.2, the BOP will coordinate with an NLO to rotate TBCW pumps. The BOP should remove the C pump from standby by placing its associated pump start handswitch to stop. The BOP will then place the pump handswitch to start to start the C pump. Once the C pump is running, the BOP should direct the NLO (booth operator) to close P43-F006B (B pump discharge valve). Once the discharge valve is closed, the BOP should stop the B pump with its B pump handswitch. Note: The booth operator does not have a remote function for manipulating the pump discharge valve (not needed). With the B pump secured, the BOP should direct the NLO (booth operator) to open P43-F006B (B pump discharge valve). When that is complete, the BOP should place the B pump in standby by depressing TBCW PMP B STBY pushbutton.

Event 4 - Fuel handling area exhaust radiation monitor downscale (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

This is a Tech Spec exercise only.

D17-K617B, FHA Exhaust Radiation Monitor B will fail downscale and result in the following alarms:

P601-19A-C9, FH AREA EXH DIV 2,3 RAD HI-HI/INOP P601-19A-E9, FH AREA EXH RAD MON DNSC When investigated per the ARI, the radiation monitor should be declared inop.

If I&C is directed to investigate the condition, the Booth operator will inform the control room D17-K617B, FHA Exhaust Radiation Monitor B is indicating downscale and more investigation is required.

The CRS should refer to 17-S-06-5, Technical Specification Instrumentation Loop Logic and Tech Specs and identify the following:

3.3.6.2, Secondary Containment Isolation Instrumentation A.

One or more channels inoperable.

A.1 Place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> (Function 3).

TRM 6.3.1, RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION B.

One or more radiation monitoring channels nonfunctional.

B.1 Enter the Condition Referenced in Table 6.3.1-1 for the channel immediately (Function 7, G).

G.

As required by Required Action B.1 and referenced in Table 6.3.1-1.

G.1 Declare the associated instrument channel inoperable per LCO 3.3.6.2 immediately.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 5

Event 5 - CRD flow controller failure (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

The CRD flow controller will slowly fail resulting in the FCV slowly closing. Annunciator P680-4A1-A4, CRD HYD TEMP HI will alarm. The ARI directs observing CRD parameter on P601. The responding RO should diagnose the indications and determine the CRD flow controller has failed and place the CRD flow controller in manual and restore CRD system flow to 60 gpm. EN-OP-120, Step 5.1.1 b 10 states ENSURE appropriate manual action is taken when automatic systems do not actuate when required or when equipment has not responded as expected.

Event 6 - Condensate booster pump A trip (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

The CRS should enter 05-1-02-V-7, Feedwater System Malfunctions ONEP subsequent actions and direct core flow reduced to 70Mlbm/hr to achieve 78% RTP. The ONEP also requires the following to be verified:

  • Condensate Booster Pump Suction Pressure > 100 psig (P680-1B)
  • Reactor Feed Pump suction pressure > 300 psig (P680-2D)
  • Reactor Feed pump speed < 5200 rpm (P680-2D) 05-1-02-III-3, Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP should be entered to establish THI monitoring and ensure recirc system parameters are normal. The CRS should direct the following:
  • PLOT Reactor Power and Core Flow using using Attachment 2 Power / Flow Map
  • Verifies Recirculation Pump Loop Flow Rates are matched within allowable limit of 4460 gpm
  • Directs Chemistry to perform 06-CH-1D17-V-0061, Startup, Shutdown, and 15% Power Change.

The BOP should refer to ARI P680-1A-A1, CNDS PMP A TRIP and close 1N19-F024A, CNDS PMP A DISCH VLV (P680-1C).

If an NLO is directed to investigate 152-1301, CNDS Bst Pmp A breaker, after 3 minutes the booth operator will report the breaker tripped on overcurrent.

Event 7 - Spurious RCIC initiation (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

RCIC will initiate due to a spurious level 2 (-41.6) initiation signal. The following will confirm the initiation is spurious:

  • No Rx scram on level 3 (11.4) (independent instruments)
  • No Auxiliary building isolation signal (-41.6) (independent instruments)
  • No HPCS initiation (-41.6) (independent instruments)
  • Wide range RPV level indication (P601-20B, P601-17B) indicates normal level 05-1-02-V-5, Loss of Feedwater Heating ONEP should be entered and the CRS should direct RCIC to be tripped per subsequent actions.

When the RCIC trip pushbutton is depressed, RCIC will fail to trip. The BOP operator should secure RCIC per 04-1-01-E51-1, RCIC SOI Attachment VI hardcard by closing the trip/throttle valve, placing the RCIC flow controller in manual, and reducing the controller output to minimum.

I&C should be directed to investigate the spurious initiation and the failure of the RCIC trip pushbutton. If directed, the booth operator will inform the control room trip units B21-LS-N692E and B21-LS-N692F momentarily tripped but are now indicating not tripped. Also, still investigating RCIC trip pushbutton.

The CRS should refer to 17-S-06-5, Technical Specification Instrumentation Loop Logic and Tech Specs and identify the following:

3.3.5.3 Condition A, One or more channels inoperable.

A.1 Enter the Condition referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1 for the channel. (Condition B)

Condition B, As required by Required Action A.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.5.3-1.

B.2 Place channel in trip within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

3.5.3 Condition A, RCIC system inoperable.

A.1 Verify by administrative means HPCS is operable within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

AND A.2 Restore RCIC to operable status within 14 days.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 6

If the work control center is contacted to verify by administrative means HPCS is operable, the booth operator will respond that HPCS is operable.

Event 8 - BOP transformer 23 lockout (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

(The 10/2020 exam 2 included a loss of power that effected 2 radial well pumps and the pumps were not recoverable. The BOP raised PSW flow on the operating pumps to restore parameters to pre-event values. In this scenario, the intent is for the crew to restore power to the lost bus and restore the tripped PSW pumps. The ability to restore power and restore multiple pumps has not previously been tested.)

Based on alarms received, the crew should recognize a loss of multiple PSW pumps and BOP transformer 23 lockout. The crew should enter 05-1-02-I-4, Loss of AC Power ONEP and re-energize 28AG from BOP13 transformer. 05-1-02-V-11, Loss of Plant Service Water ONEP should be entered and radial well pumps restored after power is restored. With core flow already at 70Mlbm/hr, control rods should be inserted with the intent to lower Rx power to < 50%. Once PSW pressure is restored, the CRS should direct control rod insertion to be stopped.

If an NLO is directed to investigate BOP 23 lockout, the booth operator will acknowledge the command.

No feedback will be provided.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 7

Event 9 - Recirc system leak in the drywell / scram (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

A Recirculation system leak will occur that will result in a reactor scram on high drywell pressure (1.23 psig). The CRS should recognize entry conditions in EP-2, RPV Control and EP-3, Containment Control and direct actions accordingly.

The ATC should perform the following actions per 05-1-02-I-1, Reactor SCRAM ONEP:

Performs Immediate Operator Actions per 05-1-02-I-1, Reactor Scram ONEP:

PLACE Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN CHECK ALL Control Rods FULLY INSERTED CHECK Reactor Power is LOWERING PERFORM REACTOR SCRAM Hard Card Turbine and Generator Trip:

Verifies the following Automatic Actions have occurred and determines no immediate actions are required per 05-1-02-I-2, Turbine and Generator Trips ONEPs:

Turbine Stop and Control Valves Close Generator Output Breakers J5228 AND J5232 Open Reports all rods in.

Event 10 - A Feedwater break in the drywell / B21-F065A breaker trip (Automatically Triggered) 10 seconds after the reactor scram, the A feedwater line will break in the drywell. The 10 second time delay will allow RPV level to be recovered following the reactor scram.

The BOP operator should recognize the line break and secure all condensate pumps and attempt to close B21-F065A, FW INL SHUTOFF VLV to isolate the leak. The B21-F065A breaker will trip on stroke signal and will not be recoverable. This will render feedwater unavailable. If directed to investigate the breaker, the booth operator will report a smell of burnt wires at the breaker cubicle after 3 minutes.

The CRS should enter the Alternate Level Control leg of EP-2 based on RPV level trend and direct inhibiting ADS.

The CRS may direct RCIC injection. If directed, RCIC should be aligned for injection per the same hardcard that was used to shut it down earlier. The leak rate is greater than the combined RCIC, CRD, and SLC injection capability. RPV level will trend down if HPCS is not injecting.

Event 11 - HPCS fails to automatically initiate (Initial setup)

HPCS will normally automatically initiate on low-low RPV level (-41.6 WR) or high drywell pressure (1.39 psig). In this event, HPCS initiation will fail to occur. When the A feedwater line break in the drywell occurs, a high drywell pressure signal will be received. IAW the EOPs, the CRS should direct verification of high drywell pressure isolations, initiations, and diesel generators. The ATC should recognize HPCS failed to automatically initiate and depress the manual initiation pushbutton. The ATC should then observe and report HPCS injection and RPV level trend. An RPV level band of -30 to +50 WR and an RPV pressure band of 800-1060 psig should initially be directed by the CRS. Failure to inject with HPCS will result in RPV level lowering to < -160 WR and require an emergency depressurization of the RPV prior to RPV level lower to < -191 CFZ.

(CT-1), inject with HPCS by manual initiation or starting HPCS pump and opening E22-F004, HPCS INJ SHUTOFF VLV prior to RPV level lowering to < -191 CFZ.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 8

Event 12 - ESF 21 lockout (Automatically Triggered) 4 minutes after the reactor scram, ESF 21 transformer will lockout. This will remove power to ESF busses 16AB and 17AC. The loss of 17AC results in a loss of power to HPCS components and RPV level will trend down. Div 2 DG will automatically restore power to 16AB and DIV 2 ECCS components. With DIV 3 DG not available from the start, manual action will be required to restore power to 17AC. The responding operator should re-energize 17AC by closing the feeder breaker from ESF 11 or ESF 12 (either is acceptable) prior to RPV level lowering to < -191 CFZ.

(CT-2), Re-energize 17AC via ESF 11 or ESF 12 prior to RPV level lowering to - 191 CFZ.

Once RPV parameters have been stabilized, the following should be directed by the CRS:

  • Override injection from all low pressure ECCS by placing their respective injection valve handswitches to close and verifying their respective override annunciators are received
  • To reduce the driving head of the leak, a reduced pressure band of 450-600 psig should be directed per 05-1-02-I-1, Reactor Scram ONEP, Attachment 9 hardcard
  • Div 1 & 2 drywell and containment hydrogen igniters turned on Termination:

When directed by Lead Examiner:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 9

Critical Task (CT-1) After receipt of a high drywell pressure HPCS initiation signal, manually initiates or aligns HPCS system for injection prior to RPV level lowering to < -191 CFZ. For GGNS, -191 CFZ is the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (MSCRWL).

Event 7

Safety Significance MSCRWL is the lowest RPV water level at which the covered portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to prevent any clad temperature in the uncovered part of the core from exceeding 1500°F.

Cueing DRWL PRESS HI annunciator in alarm, P601-21A-E7 LPCS/RHR A INIT RESET white light illuminated, P601-21B DRWL PRESS HI annunciator in alarm, P601-17A-E1 RHR B/RHR C INIT RESET white light illuminated, P601-17B ADS A HI DRWL PRESS RESET white lights illuminated, P601-19B ADS B HI DRWL PRESS RESET white lights illuminated, P601-19B Drywell pressure indication on SPDS (HPCS) DRWL PRESS HI annunciator in alarm, P601-16A-B4 HPCS INIT RESET white light NOT illuminated, P601-16B HPCS pump NOT running Measurable Performance Indicators Operator arms and depresses HPCS MAN INIT pushbutton or manually aligns HPCS for injection by starting the HPCS pump and opening E22-F004, HPCS INJ SHUTOFF VLV (P601-16B/C).

Performance Feedback On P601-16B/C:

HPCS INIT RESET white light illuminated HPCS pump operating E22-F004, HPCS INJ SHUTOFF VLV open HPCS pump flow into the RPV

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 2 Revision 0 5/3/2022 10 Critical Task (CT-2) With Div 3 DG unavailable and receipt of an ESF 21 lockout, the crew re-energizes 17AC to restore power to HPCS system prior to RPV level lowering to

< -191 CFZ. For GGNS, -191 CFZ is the Minimum Steam Cooling RPV Water Level (MSCRWL).

Event 8

Safety Significance MSCRWL is the lowest RPV water level at which the covered portion of the reactor core will generate sufficient steam to prevent any clad temperature in the uncovered part of the core from exceeding 1500°F.

Cueing ESF XFMR 21 INCM FDR 552-2104 TRIP annunciator in alarm, P807-5A-A6 ESF XFMR 21 inlet and outlet breakers indicate tripped (P807-5C):

552-2104 152-2901 152-2902 4.16KV BUS 17AC INCM FDR 152-1705 TRIP annunciator in alarm, P601-16A-E1 17AC FDR FM ESF 21, 152-1705 breaker open and indicates trip (P601-16C) 4.16KV BUS 17AC volt meter indicates 0. (P601-16B)

ESF XFMR 21 ENERGIZED purple light out (P601-16C)

All HPCS MOVs without power.

Measurable Performance Indicators Using 05-1-02-I-4, Loss of ESF AC Power ONEP Attachment 4 hardcard, re-energizes 17AC by closing either 152-1704, 17AC FDR FM ESF 12 or 152-1706, 17AC FDR FM ESF 11 (P601-16C).

Performance Feedback On P601-16B/C, observes the following:

Red light indication on the breaker that was manipulated.

4.16KV BUS 17AC volt meter indicates 4100 volts.

Power restored to HPCS MOVs HPCS pressure and flow rise

  • If an operator or the crew significantly deviates from, or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review (NUREG 1021, Appendix D). An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 1

Facility: Grand Gulf Nuclear Station Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: GGNS 2022-3 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators:

Turnover:

Initial Conditions: 71% power, MOC Inoperable equipment:

RHR A, LPCI mode due to operating in suppression pool cooling LCO 3.5.1, Cond A, (1 LPCI subsystem inop)

Other:

RFPT B tripped late last shift. RFPT B trip reset pushbutton is tagged.

RFPT A vibrations are elevated, perform the first step of the control rod shutdown sequence to lower the load on RFPT A Secure B condensate booster pump and B condensate pump Secure RHR A Suppression Pool Cooling. Suppression pool temperature is 78°F.

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type

  • Event Description 1

N/A R (ATC)

Insert control rods to lower load on RFPT A 2

N/A N (ATC)

Secure 1 condensate booster and 1 condensate pump 3

e12275a N, I, MC (BOP)

TS (CRS)

E12-F064A fails to auto open LCO 3.1.5, Cond A remains active LCO 3.6.1.7, Cond A 4

c71077b C (ATC, BOP)

A (Crew)

RPS MG Set B Failure 5

o/r p601_16a_e_1 rf DI_1E22M716 C, A, MC (BOP)

TS (CRS)

(Component failure replacing reactivity manip)

LO-LO set SRV fails open LCO 3.6.1.6 (CT-1), Closes SRV prior to 110°F supp pool temp 6

fw201 I (ATC)

A (Crew)

Inadvertent Recirc level 3 downshift 7

rr165 A (Crew)

Thermal Hydraulic Instabilities 8

c71076 o/r DI_1C71M602 I, MC (ATC)

M (CREW)

Automatic scram failure Mode switch failure (remains in run)

(CT-2), Insert a manual scram 9

ct218d ct219a e30f002a_i o/r SPMU B stem/disc separation C (CREW)

LPCS suppression pool leak LPCS door failure Both Divisions of SPMU failure (CT-3), E.D. prior to supp pool level lowering to 14.5

  • (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (A)bnormal, (TS) Tech Spec, (MC) Manual Control

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 2

Quantitative Attributes Table Attribute E3-301-4 Target Actual Description Malfunctions after EOP entry 1-2 2

  • Unisolable suppression pool leak LPCS / door failure
  • SPMU failure Abnormal Events 2-4 3
  • LO-LO set SRV fails open
  • Inadvertent Recirc pumps downshift Major Transients 1-2 1
  • THI requiring a reactor scram EOP entries requiring substantive action 1-2 3
  • EP-3, Containment Control
  • EP-4, Auxiliary Building Control Entry into a contingency EOP with substantive actions 1

1

  • EP-2, emergency depressurization Preidentified critical tasks 2-3 3
  • CT-1, Closes SRV prior to 110°F supp pool temp
  • CT-3, Emergency depressurization

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 3

Initial Conditions:

71% power, MOC RHR A, operating in suppression pool cooling RFPT B is tagged Inoperable Equipment:

RHR A, LPCI mode due to operating in suppression pool cooling LCO 3.5.1, Cond A, (1 LPCI subsystem inop)

Planned activities:

Perform step 1 of the RMP shutdown sequence that inserts 4 control rods from position 10 to position 0 Secure condensate booster pump B and condensate pump B Secure RHR A suppression pool cooling Scenario Notes:

Validation Time: XX minutes

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 4

SCENARIO ACTIVITIES:

Event 1 -Perform the first step to insert control rods IAW RMP (Reactivity manipulation)

With core flow already below 70 mlbm/hr, reactor power is 71%. RFPT A vibration levels are just below the alarm setpoint. The vibration engineer is monitoring the value and trend. When directed, the ATC will perform the first step of the reactivity movement plan and insert 4 control rods from position 10 to position

0. Reactor power will lower 4%. When rod manipulations are complete, the CRS should notify the vibration engineer. If notified, the booth operator will respond as the vibration engineer that rod manipulations are complete.

Event 2 - secure condensate booster pump B and condensate pump B (Normal evolution)

Per IOI-2, Attachment III, Step 7.6, when reactor power is 78%, the crew should secure 1 condensate booster pump and then one condensate pump. When directed, the ATC will secure condensate booster pump B and condensate pump B IAW 04-1-01-N19-1, Condensate System SOI. Basically, the pump is stopped and the discharge valve is closed for each pump.

Event 3 - Securing RHR A from suppression pool cooling / F064A fails to automatically open (Normal evolution / Instrument failure requiring manual control / Initial setup)

Using a provided copy of 04-1-01-E12-1, Residual Heat Removal System SOI, performs the following:

Places RHR A MOV TEST switch in TEST and observes alarm P601-20A-H6, RHR A SYS OOSVC alarm and status light RHR A MOV IN TEST STATUS illuminate (P601-20B).

Closes E12-F024A, RHR A TEST RTN TO SUPP POOL When flow lowers to < 1154 gpm (P601-20B) plus an 8 second time delay, should observe E12-F064A, RHR A MIN FLO VLV opening but it doesnt After an undetermined amount of time, the BOP should recognize the E12-F064A, RHR A MIN FLO VLV failed to automatically open, RHR A pump is running dead-headed, and open the E12-F064A. When the handswitch for E12-F064A is taken to the open position, the valve will open.

The BOP should then secure RHR pump A and await further direction.

The CRS should direct restoring RHR A to standby. Time will not be allowed to complete restoration to standby. If an NLO is directed to perform venting, the booth operator will acknowledge the command and report when venting is complete.

SSW A will remain running.

Per 04-1-01-E12-1, Residual Heat Removal System SOI, Precautions and Limitation 3.2.5:

If the Minimum Flow valves on RHR A, B, or C will not perform their intended function, declare the associated RHR loop Inoperable. (For LPCI and CTMT Spray modes only.)

The CRS should refer to Tech Specs and identify the following LCOs:

3.5.1 Condition A, One low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem Inoperable. (remains active)

A.1 Restore low pressure ECCS injection/spray subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

3.6.1.7 Condition A, One RHR containment spray subsystem inoperable.

A.1 Restore RHR containment spray subsystem to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Note: E12-F064A is a manually operated PCIV. This valve remains operable for the isolation function.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 5

Event 4 - RPS motor generator failure (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

RPS MG B set will trip and result in a Division 2 half scram and a loss of power to Division 2 MSIV solenoids. ARI P680-7A-A2, RX SCRAM TRIP should be referred to which identifies a possible cause to be a loss of either Div 2 RPS EPA breakers. The BOP should observe backpanel (P610) indications and identify Div 2 RPS MG set normal feed light is out.

05-1-02-III-2, Loss of One or Both RPS Buses ONEP should be entered. The CRS should direct the BOP to proceed to the backpanel (P610) and select Alternate for RPS Div 2 and the ATC operator should reset the Div 2 half scram.

P622 and P623 MSIV solenoid lights should be verified energized with amperage using the V-Panel.

Note: these light indications are dimly lit and is difficult to verify the lights are illuminated. If the transfer to alternate supply has been performed, the evaluator should notify the BOP that all MSIV solenoid lights are illuminated and indicating normal amperage.

If directed to investigate loss of the MG set, the booth operator will inform the control room the Div 2 MG is not running and is extremely hot to the touch and both RPS MG set B EPA breakers are tripped.

If directed to investigate 52-142229, C71-S001B, MG SET breaker, the booth operator will inform the control room the breaker is tripped.

Event 5 - LO-LO set SRV fails open (Triggered by Lead Examiner)

When initiated, LO-LO set SRV B21-F051F will fail open when the division 2 solenoid energizes.

05-1-02-V-21, Reactor Pressure Control Malfunctions ONEP should be entered. Per ONEP instruction, the BOP should cycle the associated Div 1 and Div 2 SRV handwitches leaving the handswitches in the closed position. Per note 7, "CYCLE the Control Switch" means to take handswitch Open to Close a couple of times, leaving the handswitch in CLOSE. When the division 2 handswitch is cycled, the SRV will close. With both handswitches in the closed position, the LO-LO set function is defeated.

Tech Specs should be referred to and following LCO identified:

3.6.1.6 Condition A, One LLS valve inoperable.

A.1 Restore LLS valve to OPERABLE status within 14 days.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 6

Event 6,7,8 - inadvertent downshift of Rx Recirculation pumps / THI / RPS automatic scram defeated / Mode switch failure (initial event is Triggered by Lead Examiner)

Both of the recirc pumps will downshift due to faulty low level 3 (11.4 NR) input to the recirc pump cavitation interlock circuitry.

The CRS should enter and direct subsequent actions from 05-1-02-III-3, Reduction in Recirculation System Flow Rate ONEP.

Per the ONEP:

  • Indications of Thermal Hydraulic Instability:
  • Oscillations of APRM readings with peak-to-peak swings of GREATER THAN 10% rated power.
  • Indications of periodic LPRM upscale or downscale alarms in conjunction with the above APRM swings.

IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS CONDITION ACTION II. Thermal Hydraulic Instability is OBSERVED on Neutron Monitoring Indication PLACE Reactor Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN The ATC should perform a plot on the power/flow map and recognize the close proximity to the scram region. The ATC should then assume a THI watch with no concurrent duties.

The ONEP also states if the scram or controlled entry region is unintentionally entered, then exit the region by either inserting control rods or raising core flow. The CRS should direct control rods to be inserted and (if directed) the ATC should insert control rods using the control rod shutdown sequence.

10 seconds after the recirc pumps have downshifted, THI will start ramping in.

45 seconds later, > 10% swings can be observed on the APRMs.

45 seconds after that, the APRM UPSC/OPRM ALM alarm will be received and APRMs are swinging 15% peak to peak.

40 seconds after that, 2 APRM CH UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP alarms are received and the APRMs are swinging 22% peak to peak.

P680-5A-B-10, APRM UPSC/OPRM ALM P680-5A-A-11, APRM CH 1 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP P680-5A-B-11, APRM CH 3 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP P680-7A-A-11, APRM CH 2 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP P680-7A-B-11, APRM CH 4 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP Any 2 of the 4 OPRMs in an upscale/trip condition will normally generate a full reactor scram. However, in this event, the automatic scram is defeated. The reactor mode switch will fail when placed in shutdown (RPS actuation will fail to occur). The ATC should exercise manual control and shutdown the reactor by arming and depressing the 4 manual scram pushbuttons (P680-5C1 & 7C-1).

(CT-1), The ATC manually scrams the reactor prior to receiving any 2 APRM UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP alarms.

Once the reactor scram is inserted, the CRS should enter EP-2 and direct actions to stabilize the RPV.

Startup level control should be directed with a normal level band of 11.4 to 53.5 NR. An RPV pressure band of 800-1060 psig using bypass valve should be directed.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 7

Event 9, LPCS unisolable suppression pool leak / door failure (Automatically triggered) 4 minutes after the scram is inserted, an unisolable suppression pool leak will occur in the LPCS room.

Also, the water tight door will fail resulting in a continuous drain of the suppression pool into the auxiliary building.

If an NLO is directed to investigate the location of the leak, the booth operator will report the leak is located between the containment wall and LPCS suction valve.

If an NLO is directed to investigate the status of the door, the booth operator will report the door is off its hinges and cannot be closed.

The CRS should enter EP-3, Primary Containment Control and EP-4, Auxiliary Building Control. EP-3 provides several options to attempt to maintain suppression pool level > 14.5. Suppression Pool Makeup (SPMU) may be directed to raise suppression pool level. If directed, the ATC should manually initiate both divisions of SPMU per 04-1-01-E30-1, SPMU SOI hardcard. When Div 1 SPMU is initiated, the E30-F002A, SPMU DIV 1 OTBD DUMP VLV will fail to open due to its breaker tripping. When Div 2 SPMU is initiated, a stem/disc separation will occur on E30-F002B, SPMU DIV 2 OTBD and the valve disc will remain closed but will indicate open.

If an NLO is directed to investigate E30-F002A breaker trip (52-152107), after 3 minutes the booth operator will report damage at the breaker cubicle.

In this event, suppression pool level will lower to 14.5 in 12 minutes. Based on the rate of level reduction and makeup options, the CRS should determine suppression pool level lowering to 14.5 is inevitable.

The CRS may consider Anticipating emergency depressurization which fully opens main turbine bypass valves. However, with the mode switch stuck in the Run position, the MSIVs will close once steam line pressure lowers to < 849 PSIG.

The emergency depressurization contingency in EP-2 should be entered and the opening of 8 ADS/SRVs should be directed / performed. RPV water level will be maintained with condensate / feedwater.

(CT-2), Emergency depressurize the RPV prior to suppression pool level lowering to 14.5.

Following emergency depressurization, suppression pool temperature will rise and exceed 95°F and would normally require suppression pool cooling per EP-3. 04-1-01-E12-1, Residual Heat Removal System SOI. P/L 3.2.6 states Except in an emergency, Do NOT take suction on the Suppression Pool with the RHR pumps if level is < 14.5' (NPSH requirements). The CRS may determine an emergency no longer exists and not direct this action.

The CRS should direct energizing Div 1&2 Drywell and Containment hydrogen igniters.

Termination:

When directed by Lead Evaluator:

Take the simulator to Freeze and turn horns off.

Stop and save the SBT report and any other recording devices.

Instruct the crew to not erase any markings or talk about the scenario until after follow-up questions are asked.

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 8

Critical Task (CT-1) With the plant operating at power and with an SRV open, closes the SRV prior to supp pool temperature reaching 110°F.

Event 5

Safety Significance 02-S-01-40, EP Technical Bases, Attachment VI Step SPT-3 The specified temperature of 110°F is the temperature at which Technical Specifications require a reactor scram and the bounding value of the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature.

Cueing Annunciator P601-19A-A5, SRV/ADS VLV OPEN/DISCH LINE PRESS HI in alarm Annunciator P601-18A-G2, ADS/SRV LEAK in alarm P601/19C MSL B SRV:B21-F051F handswitch red pressure switch light illuminated P601/19B SRV STATUS F051F indicates Div 2 solenoid energized light illuminated P631 indicate B21-F051F division 2 solenoid is energized Generator load lowered Steam flow indicating less than feedwater flow Measurable Performance Indicators Places the division 1 and division 2 SRV handswitches to CLOSE:

P601 handswitch placed in CLOSE P631 handswitch placed in CLOSE Performance Feedback P631 division 2 solenoid red light off P601 19B division 2 status red light off P601/19C, B21-F051F handswitch red pressure switch light extinguished

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 9

Critical Task (CT-2), Manually scrams the reactor upon indications of Thermal Hydraulic Instability before any 2 of the 4 APRM CH 1 (2) (3) (4) UPSC TRIP/ OPRM TRIP/INOP alarms are received.

Event 6

Safety Significance The reactor power entry condition in EP-2 is defined to be any control rod withdrawn past position 02 when a reactor scram is required. Reactor scram required includes those conditions for which technical specifications, administrative procedures, or plant policies require a manual scram.

From 02-S-01-40, EP Technical Bases, Core instabilities may occur in a BWR when the reactor is operated at relatively high power-to-flow ratios and recirculation flow is reduced.

The process is theorized to occur as follows:

1. Subcooled water enters a fuel bundle. The resulting reactivity addition increases bundle power.
2. The increased power increases voids and pressure in the channel.
3. The increased voiding pushes moderator from the top and bottom of the bundle and decreases power.
4. Inlet flow is restored and the process repeats.

Core instabilities are manifested by oscillations in reactor power. As long as the oscillations remain small, they tend to repeat on approximately a two second period. Under some conditions, however, large power oscillations may grow and develop into random power pulses. Core geometry is not significantly threatened and widespread core damage is not expected, but localized fuel damage cannot be precluded.

Placing the reactor mode switch in SHUTDOWN is the normal method of performing a manual scram at GGNS.

Cueing Receipt of the following alarms/indications:

  • C51-R603A,B,C,D (APRM recorders) on P680-5B/7B indicating > 10% power swings
  • P680-5A-B-10, APRM UPSC/OPRM ALM alarm
  • P680-5A-A-11, APRM CH 1 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP alarm
  • P680-5A-B-11, APRM CH 3 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP alarm
  • P680-7A-A-11, APRM CH 2 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP alarm
  • P680-7A-B-11, APRM CH 4 UPSC TRIP/OPRM TRIP/INOP alarm Measurable Performance Indicators At a minimum, Initiates a reactor shutdown by performing the following:
  • Arms and depresses 1 division 1 RPS pushbutton (RPS divisions 1 or 3)
  • Arms and depresses 1 division 2 RPS pushbutton (RPS divisions 2 or 4)

Performance Feedback

  • All RPS scram solenoid power lights are extinguished (P680-5C1 & 7C1).
  • On full core display, green (full-in) LED lights illuminated indicating all control rods are fully inserted (P680-6D).

Form 3.3-1 Scenario Outline GGNS 2022 NRC Scenario 3 Revision 0 5/3/2022 10 Critical Task (CT-3), Emergency Depressurize the RPV prior to Suppression Pool level reaching 14.5 ft.

Event 7

Safety Significance 02-S-01-40 Att. VI, EP Steps SPL-6 through 9.

Suppression pool water must be maintained above 14.56 ft. to ensure that steam discharged through the horizontal vents following a primary system break will be adequately condensed. If a primary system break were to occur with suppression pool water level below this elevation, pressure suppression capability would be unavailable and primary containment pressure could exceed structural limits.

If suppression pool water level cannot be maintained above 14.5 ft., emergency RPV depressurization is required since the RPV is not permitted to remain at pressure if pressure suppression capability is unavailable. Consistent with the definition of cannot be maintained a decision that suppression pool water level cannot be maintained above 14.5 ft can be made before level actually reaches this value.

Cueing Receipt of the following alarms/indications:

  • P870-4B, E30-R600A SUPP POOL LVL recorder trending down
  • P870-10B, E30-R600B SUPP POOL LVL recorder trending down
  • SPDS indication of suppression pool level trending down Measurable Performance Indicator Operator manually opens at least 7 SRVs using handswitches on P601.

Performance Feedback Red light indication on at least 7 SRVs.

  • If an operator or the crew significantly deviates from, or fails to follow procedures that affect the maintenance of basic safety functions, those actions may form the basis of a CT identified in the post-scenario review (NUREG 1021, Appendix D). An unintentional or unnecessary RPS or ESF actuation may result in the creation of a post-scenario Critical Task, if that actuation results in a significant plant degradation or significantly alters a mitigation strategy.
    • Per 02-S 01-40, EP-1, Step ED-6: Seven open SRVs is the Minimum Number of SRVs Required for Emergency Depressurization (MNSRED) and is the least number of SRVs which corresponds to a Minimum Steam Cooling Pressure (MSCP) sufficiently low that the ECCS with the lowest head will be capable of making up the SRV steam flow at the corresponding MSCP. The MNSRED is utilized to assure the RPV will depressurize and remain depressurized when emergency depressurization is required.

Form 3.4-1 Events and Evolutions Checklist Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR Date of Exam: 10/10/2022 Operating Test No.:GGNS-2022 A

P P

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C A

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E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M*

POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P RO I

U RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 1

1 2

1 1 1 I/C 3

3 6

4 4 2 MAJ 2

2 4

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

1 2

1 1 0 TS 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 2

1 1 0 NOR 1

2 3

1 1 1 I/C 3

6 9

4 4 2 MAJ 2

2 4

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

2 3

1 1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 2

1 3

1 1 1 I/C 5

4 9

4 4 2 MAJ 2

2 4

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 2

1 3

1 1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 2

2 1

1 1 I/C 5

5 4

4 2 MAJ 2

2 2

2 1 Man. Ctrl 2

2 1

1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 0 NOR 1

1 1 I/C 4

4 2 MAJ 2

2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

1 0 TS 0

2 2

Form 3.4-1 Events and Evolutions Checklist Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR Date of Exam: 10/10/2022 Operating Test No.:GGNS-2022 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M*

POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P RO I

U RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 1

1 2

1 1 1 I/C 3

3 6

4 4 2 MAJ 2

1 3

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

1 2

1 1 0 TS 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 2

1 1 0 NOR 1

2 3

1 1 1 I/C 3

5 8

4 4 2 MAJ 2

1 3

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

3 4

1 1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 2

1 3

1 1 1 I/C 5

3 8

4 4 2 MAJ 2

1 3

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 2

2 4

1 1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 2

2 1

1 1 I/C 5

5 4

4 2 MAJ 1

1 2

2 1 Man. Ctrl 3

3 1

1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 0 NOR 1

1 1 I/C 4

4 2 MAJ 2

2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

1 0 TS 0

2 2

Form 3.4-1 Events and Evolutions Checklist Facility: GRAND GULF NUCLEAR Date of Exam: 10/10/2022 Operating Test No.:GGNS-2022 A

P P

L I

C A

N T

E V

E N

T T

Y P

E Scenarios 1

2 3

4 T

O T

A L

M I

N I

M U

M*

POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P S

R O

A T

C B

O P

S R

O A

T C

B O

P RO I

U RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 1

1 2

1 1 1 I/C 4

3 7

4 4 2 MAJ 2

1 3

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

1 2

1 1 0 TS 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 2

1 1 0 NOR 1

2 3

1 1 1 I/C 3

5 8

4 4 2 MAJ 2

1 3

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

3 4

1 1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 2

1 3

1 1 1 I/C 6

3 9

4 4 2 MAJ 2

1 3

2 2 1 Man. Ctrl 2

2 4

1 1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 1

1 0 NOR 2

2 1

1 1 I/C 6

6 4

4 2 MAJ 2

2 2

2 1 Man. Ctrl 2

2 1

1 0 TS 2

2 0

2 2 RO SRO-I SRO-U RX 1

1 0 NOR 1

1 1 I/C 4

4 2 MAJ 2

2 1 Man. Ctrl 1

1 0 TS 0

2 2