ML21179A052

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Amendment 23 to Fire Protection Report, Volume 2 Safe Shutdown Analysis
ML21179A052
Person / Time
Site: Dresden  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 06/21/2021
From:
Exelon Generation Co
To:
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML21179A042 List:
References
RS-21-066
Download: ML21179A052 (460)
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Text

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2 & 3 FIRE PROTECTION REPORTS Volume Index VOLUME 1 - Updated Fire Hazards Analysis VOLUME 2 - Appendix R Conformance (Sections III.G, III.J, and III.L) - Safe Shutdown Report VOLUME 3 - Technical Specifications, Technical Requirements, and Inspection Reports VOLUME 4 - Interim Measures/Exemption Requests VOLUME 5 - Safety Evaluation Reports i

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2 & 3 FIRE PROTECTION REPORTS Volume Index VOLUME 2 - APPENDIX R CONFORMANCE (SECTIONS III.G, III.J AND III.L)

SAFE SHUTDOWN REPORT

1. Introduction
2. Identification of Fire Areas
3. Methodology and Selection of Appendix R Safe Shutdown Functions, Systems, and Components and their Associated Circuits
4. Safe Shutdown Analysis
5. Supporting Associated Circuits Analysis
6. Modifications
7. Safe Shutdown Procedures A. Hot Shutdown Cable Discrepancies for Dresden Units 2 and 3 B. Potential Spurious Component Operations that Could Affect Safe Shutdown - Dresden 2 and 3 ii

AMENDMENT 23 JUNE 2021 DRESDEN 2 & 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN REPORT August 1985 Amendment 13 (Original Issue) (June 2001)

Amendment 1 Amendment 14 (January 1986) (June 2003)

Amendment 2 Amendment 15 (February 1986) (June 2005)

Amendment 3 Amendment 16 (July 1986) (June 2007)

Amendment 4 Amendment 17 (March 1987) (June 2009)

Amendment 5 Amendment 18 (August 1987) (June 2011)

Amendment 6 & 7 Amendment 19 (Numbers not used) (June 2013)

Amendment 8 May 1990, April 1992 (Used for correlation between Safe Shutdown Amendment 20 Report and Fire Hazards Analysis Amendment (June 2015)

Numbers and Dates)

Amendment 9 Amendment 21 (July 1993) (June 2017)

Amendment 10 Amendment 22 (December 1994) (June 2019)

Amendment 11 Amendment 23 (June 1998) (June 2021)

Amendment 12 (March 1999) iii

AMENDMENT 17 JUNE 2009 DRESDEN 2 & 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1-1 1.1 Objective 1.1-1 1.1.1 Development of the 1985 Safe Shutdown Report 1.1-2 1.2 Safe Shutdown Functions and Assumptions 1.2-1 1.3 Report Overview 1.3-1 1.4 Background 1.4-1 1.5 Governing Regulatory Guidelines 1.5-1 2.0 IDENTIFICATION OF FIRE AREAS 2.1-1 2.1 Zone Interaction Analysis Procedure 2.1-1 2.2 Fire Area Descriptions 2.2-1 2.2.1 Fire Area RB2-I 2.2-1 2.2.2 Fire Area RB2-II 2.2-2 2.2.3 Fire Area - Unit 2 Primary Containment 2.2-3 2.2.4 Fire Area RB3-I 2.2-3 2.2.5 Fire Area RB3-II 2.2-4 2.2.6 Fire Area - Unit 3 Primary Containment 2.2-5 2.2.7 Fire Area RB-2/3 2.2-6 2.2.8 Fire Area TB-I 2.2-6 2.2.9 Fire Area TB-II 2.2-8 2.2.10 Fire Area TB-III 2.2-8 2.2.11 Fire Area TB-IV 2.2-10 2.2.12 Fire Area TB-V 2.2-11 2.2.13 Crib House Fire Area 2.2-11 2.2.14 Radwaste Building Fire Area 2.2-11 2.2.15 Miscellaneous Outside Structures 2.2-12 3.0 METHODOLOGY AND SELECTION OF APPENDIX R SAFE 3.1-1 SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS 3.1 Description of Methods and Paths to Achieve and Maintain Hot 3.1-1 Shutdown 3.1.1 Hot Shutdown Methods 3.1-1 3.1.1.1 Isolation Condenser Method 3.1-1 3.1.1.1.1 Reactivity Control 3.1-1 3.1.1.1.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup 3.1-2 3.1.1.1.3 Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal 3.1-3 3.1.1.1.4 Suppression Pool Cooling 3.1-4 3.1.1.1.5 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 3.1-5 3.1.1.1.6 Support 3.1-5 3.1.1.2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Method 3.1-7 3.1.1.2.1 Reactivity Control 3.1-7 iv

AMENDMENT 17 JUNE 2009 DRESDEN 2 & 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 3.1.1.2.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup 3.1-7 3.1.1.2.3 Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal 3.1-8 3.1.1.2.4 Suppression Pool Cooling 3.1-8 3.1.1.2.5 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 3.1-8 3.1.1.2.6 Support 3.1-9 3.1.1.2.6.1 HVAC Systems 3.1-9 3.1.2 Description of Hot Shutdown Paths 3.1-10 3.1.2.1 Shutdown Path A 3.1-10 3.1.2.2 Alternative Shutdown Path A1 3.1-10 3.1.2.3 Alternative Shutdown Path A2 3.1-10 3.1.2.4 Shutdown Path B 3.1-11 3.1.2.5 Alternative Shutdown Path B1 3.1-11 3.1.2.6 Alternative Shutdown Path B2 3.1-12 3.1.2.7 Shutdown Path C 3.1-12 3.1.2.8 Shutdown Path D 3.1-12 3.1.2.9 Shutdown Path E 3.1-13 3.1.2.10 Shutdown Path F 3.1-13 3.2 Description of Methods to Achieve and Maintain Cold Shutdown 3.2-1 3.2.1 Shutdown Cooling Method 3.2-2 3.2.1.1 Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal 3.2-2 3.2.1.2 Suppression Pool Cooling 3.2-3 3.2.1.3 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2-3 3.2.1.3.1 Reactor Water Level and Pressure 3.2-3 3.2.1.3.2 Suppression Pool Level and Temperature 3.2-3 3.2.1.3.3 Diagnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems 3.2-3 3.2.1.4 Support Functions 3.2-4 3.2.2 LPCI/CCSW Division II Method 3.2-5 3.2.2.1 Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal 3.2-5 3.2.2.2 Suppression Pool Cooling 3.2-6 3.2.2.3 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2-6 3.2.2.3.1 Reactor Level and Pressure 3.2-6 3.2.2.3.2 Suppression Pool Level and Temperature 3.2-7 3.2.2.3.3 Diagnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems 3.2-7 3.2.2.4 Support Systems 3.2-7 3.3 Associated Circuits 3.3-1 3.3.1 Assumptions for Circuit Failures 3.3-2 3.3.2 Common Power Source 3.3-3 3.3.3 Common Enclosure 3.3-3 3.3.4 Spurious Operation 3.3-3 4.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS 4.0-1 4.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Fire Area RB2-I 4.1-1 4.1.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.1-1 v

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2 & 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 4.1.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.1-1 4.2 Unit 2 Reactor Building Fire Area RB2-II 4.2-1 4.2.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.2-1 4.2.2 RB2-I and RB2-II Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.2-2 4.3 Unit 2 Primary Containment (Fire Area 1.2.2) 4.3-1 4.3.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.3-1 4.3.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.3-1 4.4 Unit 3 Reactor Building Fire Area RB3-I 4.4-1 4.4.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.4-1 4.4.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.4-1 4.5 Unit 3 Reactor Building Fire Area RB3-II 4.5-1 4.5.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.5-1 4.5.2 RB3-I and RB3-II Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.5-2 4.6 Unit 3 Primary Containment (Fire Area 1.2.1) 4.6-1 4.6.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.6-1 4.6.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.6-1 4.7 2/3 Diesel Generator and HPCI Rooms (Fire Area RB-2/3) 4.7-1 4.7.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.7-1 4.7.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.7-1 4.8 Turbine Building Eastern Zone Group (Fire Area TB-I) 4.8-1 4.8.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.8-1 4.8.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.8-3 4.9 Turbine Building Central Zone Group (Fire Area TB-II) 4.9-1 4.9.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.9-1 4.9.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.9-3 4.10 Turbine Building Western Zone Group (Fire Area TB-III) 4.10-1 4.10.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.10-1 4.10.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.10-2 4.11 Turbine Building Main Floor (Fire Areas TB-IV) 4.11-1 4.11.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.11-1 4.11.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.11-1 4.12 Control Room and AEER (Fire Area TB-V) 4.12-1 4.12.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.12-1 4.12.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.12-2 4.13 Crib House Fire Area 11.3 4.13-1 4.13.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis 4.13-1 4.13.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis 4.13-2 4.14 Radwaste Building (Fire Zones 14.1, 14.5, and 14.6) 4.14-1 4.15 Miscellaneous Structures 4.15-1 4.15.1 Dresden Units 2 & 3 Safe Shutdown Analysis for a Dresden Unit 4.15-1 1 Fire 4.15.2 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Rooms (Fire Zones 18.7.1 and 4.15-2 18.7.2) 5.0 SUPPORTING ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS 5.1-1 vi

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2 & 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 5.1 Valve Spurious Operation Analysis 5.1-1 5.1.1 Methodology 5.1-1 5.1.2 Results 5.1-2 5.2 Spurious Breaker Operation Analysis 5.2-1 5.3 Current Transformers/Control Power Transformer Analysis 5.3-1 5.3.1 Control Power Transformers 5.3-1 5.3.2 Current Transformers 5.3-1 5.4 Redundant Fusing of Control Circuits Analysis (IE Information 5.4-1 Notice 85-09) 5.5 Coordinated Fault Protection Analysis 5.5-1 6.0 MODIFICATIONS 6.1-1 6.1 Introduction 6.1-1 6.2 Safe Shutdown System Modifications 6.2-1 6.2.1 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown System Modifications 6.2-1 6.2.1.1 Provide Local Isolation Condenser Water Level Indication 6.2-1 6.2.1.2 Provide Local Breaker Control 6.2-1 6.2.1.3 Provide Local Control for Condensate Transfer Pump 2A 6.2-2 6.2.1.4 Provide Alternate Power Feeds to Inboard Isolation Condenser 6.2-2 Valves 6.2.1.5 Deleted 6.2-3 6.2.1.6 Provide Access to Valves in Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase 6.2-3 6.2.1.7 Provide Secondary CRD Pump Cooling Water 6.2-3 6.2.1.8 Provide Inhibit Switch for Auto Blowdown 6.2-4 6.2.2 Unit 3 Safe Shutdown System Modifications 6.2-4 6.2.2.1 Provide Local Isolation Condenser Water Level Indication 6.2-4 6.2.2.2 Provide Local Breaker Control 6.2-5 6.2.2.3 Provide Local Control for Condensate Transfer Pump 3A 6.2-5 6.2.2.4 Provide Alternate Power Feeds to Inboard Isolation Condenser 6.2-6 Valves 6.2.2.5 Deleted 6.2-7 6.2.2.6 Provide Access to Valves in Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase 6.2-7 6.2.2.7 Provide Secondary CRD Pump Cooling Water 6.2-7 6.2.2.8 Provide Inhibit Switch for Auto Blowdown 6.2-7 6.2.3 Units 2 and 3 Safe Shutdown System Modifications 6.2-8 6.2.3.1 2/3 Diesel Generator System Modifications 6.2-8 6.2.3.1.1 Bifurcate 2/3 Diesel Generator Bus Duct 6.2-8 6.2.3.1.2 Electrically Isolate 2/3 Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries 6.2-8 6.2.3.1.3 Relocated Local Control Station for MCC 38-1 Main Feed 6.2-9 6.2.3.1.4 Install Transfer Switch for 2/3 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries 6.2-9 6.2.3.1.5 Reroute Unit 2 Cables for the 2/3 Diesel Generator and 6.2-10 Auxiliaries vii

AMENDMENT 17 JUNE 2009 DRESDEN 2 & 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 6.2.3.1.6 Modification to 2/3 Diesel Generator Breakers Feeding 4-kV 6.2-10 SWGR 6.2.3.2 CRD Pump Discharge Header Crosstie Piping 6.2-10 6.2.3.3 Provide Air Vent Valves for the MSIV Air Lines 6.2-11 6.2.4 Modifications to Provide Access to Valves for Cold Shutdown 6.2-11 6.2.5 Deleted 6.2-11 6.3 Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3-1 6.3.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3-1 6.3.1.1 Provide Fire Detection in Unit 2 Reactor Building 6.3-1 6.3.1.2 Upgrade Fire Barriers in Unit 2 Reactor Building 6.3-3 6.3.1.2.1 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB2-I and RB2-II 6.3-3 6.3.1.2.2 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB2-II and RB- 6.3-6 2/3 6.3.1.3 Provide Protection for Cables in the Unit 2 Reactor Building 6.3-6 6.3.2 Unit 3 Reactor Building Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3-7 6.3.2.1 Provide Fire Detection in the Unit 3 Reactor Building 6.3-7 6.3.2.2 Upgrade Fire Barriers in the Unit 3 Reactor Building 6.3-9 6.3.2.2.1 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB3-I and RB3-II 6.3-9 6.3.2.2.2 Modification to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB3-II and RB-2/3 6.3-11 6.3.2.2.3 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Zone 1.3.1 from Fire 6.3-12 Area RB3-II 6.3.2.3 Provide Protection for Cables in the Unit 3 Reactor Building 6.3-12 6.3.3 Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings Fire Protection System 6.3-13 Modifications 6.3.3.1 Upgrade Barrier Between Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings 6.3-13 6.3.3.2 Protect the 2/3 Diesel Generator Unit 2 Bus Duct in the Unit 3 6.3-13 Reactor Building with 1-Hour Barrier 6.3.3.3 Protect Unit 2 Power and Control Cables for the 2/3 Diesel 6.3-13 Generator and Auxiliaries in the Unit 3 Reactor Building with 1-Hour Barrier 6.3.4 Units 2 and 3 Turbine Building Fire Protection System 6.3-14 Modifications 6.3.4.1 Provide Additional Fire Detection and Suppression Systems on the 6.3-14 Ground and Mezzanine Floor Levels of the Turbine Building 6.3.4.2 Provide Fire Suppression System on Unit 3 CRD Pump Floor 6.3-14 6.3.4.3 Seal All Penetrations to Fire Area TB-V 6.3-14 6.3.4.4 Protect Cable Tray in Ground Floor Access Corridor with 1-Hour 6.3-15 Fire Barrier 6.3.4.5 Protect Cable Risers Adjacent to TB-V 6.3-15 viii

AMENDMENT 17 JUNE 2009 DRESDEN 2 & 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE 6.3.5 Unit 2 and Unit 3 Crib House Fire Protection System 6.3-15 Modifications 6.3.5.1 Protect 2/3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Transfer Switch 6.3-15 with 1-Hour Barrier 6.3.5.2 Provide Automatic Suppression and Detection Systems and 6.3-16 Curbing in the Lower Level of Crib House 6.3.5.3 Provide Curbing and Automatic Suppression in the Upper Level of 6.3-17 the Crib House 7.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN PROCEDURES 7.1-1 7.1 Introduction 7.1-1 7.2 Timelines and Manpower Requirements 7.2-1 7.2.1 Timelines 7.2-1 7.2.1.1 HPCI 7.2-1 7.2.1.2 Isolation Condenser 7.2-1 7.2.2 Manpower 7.2-1 7.3 Procedures Relevant to Hot Shutdown 7.3-1 7.4 Procedures Relevant to Cold Shutdown 7.4-1 7.4.1 Procedures 7.4-1 7.4.1.1 Dresden 2&3 Cold Shutdown Loads Requiring Temporary Cable 7.4-2 Connections 7.4.1.2 Control System Repair Procedures 7.4-3 7.4.1.3 Specific Repairs and Manual Actions Potentially Required for 7.4-3 Cold Shutdown 7.4.1.4 4-kV Breakers to be Used for Temporary Feeds 7.4-5 7.4.2 Materials Needed 7.4-6 7.5 Emergency Lighting 7.5-1 7.6 Communication Capabilities 7.6-1 7.6.1 Effects of Fire on Each Communication System 7.6.1 7.6.1.1 PA System 7.6-1 7.6.1.2 PBX 7.6-1 7.6.1.3 Sound Power Phones 7.6-2 7.6.1.4 Radio 7.6-2 7.6.2 Communication System Availability in the Event of a fire 7.6-3 7.7 Access to Safe Shutdown Equipment 7.7-1 7.7.1 Secondary Containment Airlock Doors 7.7-1 7.7.2 Security Doors 7.7-1 7.7.3 High Radiation Area Doors 7.7-1 7.7.4 Miscellaneous Locked Doors 7.7-2 APPENDIX A Hot Shutdown Cable Discrepancies for Dresden Units 2 and 3 A-1 APPENDIX B Potential Spurious Component Operations that Could Affect Safe B-1 Shutdown - Dresden Units 2 and 3 ix

AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 DRESDEN 2 & 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN REPORT LIST OF TABLES NUMBER TITLE PAGE 2.1-1 Appendix R Shutdown Paths by Fire Zone 2.1-3 3.1-1 Diesel Generator (1) Loading for Hot Safe Shutdown(2)(4) 3.1-14 3.1-2 Outline of Appendix R Shutdown Paths 3.1-15 3.1-3 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path A 3.1-16 3.1-4 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path A1 3.1-20 3.1-5 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path A2/B2 3.1-24 3.1-6 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path B 3.1-29 3.1-7 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path B1 3.1-33 3.1-8 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path C 3.1-37 3.1-9 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path D 3.1-40 3.1-10 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path E 3.1-43 3.1-11 Components Required for Alternative Shutdown Path F 3.1-47 3.2-1 Shutdown Cooling Method - Cold Shutdown Equipment 3.2-9 3.2-2 Shutdown Cooling Method - Power Distribution Equipment 3.2-11 3.2-3 Shutdown Cooling Method (1)(2) - Diesel Generator Loading for Cold 3.2-13 Shutdown 3.2-4 LPCI/CCSW Division II Method - Cold Shutdown Equipment 3.2-14 3.2-5 LPCI/CCSW Division II Method - Power Distribution Equipment 3.2-17 3.2-6 LPCI/CCSW Division II Method (1)(2) - Diesel Generator Loading for 3.2-19 Cold Shutdown 4.0-1 Appendix R Hot Shutdown Paths by Fire Zone 4.0-2 4.2-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in the Unit 2 Reactor Building 4.2-5 Fire Areas RB2-I and RB2-II 4.2-2 Actions to Achieve Cold Shutdown in Unit 2 Using the Shutdown 4.2-8 Cooling System Assuming a Fire in the Unit 2 Reactor Building 4.2-3 Actions to Achieve Cold Shutdown in Unit 2 Using the LPCI/CCSW 4.2-11 System Assuming a Fire in the Unit 2 Reactor Building 4.3-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in the Drywell 4.3-2 4.5-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in the Unit 3 Reactor Building 4.5-5 Fire Areas RB3-I and RB3-II 4.5-2 Actions to Achieve Cold Shutdown in Unit 3 Using the Shutdown 4.5-8 Cooling System Assuming a Fire in the Unit 3 Reactor Building 4.5-3 Actions to Achieve Cold Shutdown in Unit 3 Using the LPCI/CCSW 4.5-10 System Assuming a Fire in the Unit 3 Reactor Building 4.7-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in Fire Area RB-2/3 4.7-2 4.8-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in Fire Area TB-I 4.8-4 4.8-2 Actions to Achieve Cold Shutdown in Unit 2 Using the Shutdown 4.8-6 Cooling System Assuming a Fire in Fire Area TB-I x

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2 & 3 SAFE SHUTDOWN REPORT LIST OF TABLES 4.9-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in Fire Area TB-II 4.9-4 4.9-2 Actions to Achieve Cold Shutdown in Units 2&3 Using the Shutdown 4.9-5 Cooling System Assuming a Fire in Fire Area TB-II 4.10-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment in the Western Zone Group 4.10-3 4.10-2 Actions to Achieve Cold Shutdown in Unit 3 Using the Shutdown 4.10-5 Cooling System Assuming a Fire in Fire Area TB-III 4.12-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in Fire Area TB-V 4.12-3 4.12-2 Actions to Achieve Cold Shutdown in Units 2 and 3 Using the 4.12-4 Shutdown Cooling System Assuming a Fire in Fire Area TB-V 4.13-1 Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in the Crib House 4.13-4 5.1-1 Potential Spurious Valve Operations That Could Affect Safe Shutdown 5.1-3 For Which a Prefire or Postfire Action Was Necessary 5.4-1 List of Circuits per IEIN 85-09 Concerns Which May Require Manual 5.4-2 Action Following a Fire 6.1-1 Completion Schedule For Identified Modifications 6.1-2 7.3-1 Manual Actions Inherent to Assumptions of Analysis or Spurious 7.3-2 Operations 7.3-2 Required Manual Actions by Fire Area 7.3-4 7.3-3 Operations Required for a Control Room Fire Using the Isolation 7.3-10 Condenser Method of Shutdown 7.6-1 Communication System Availability Matrix 7.6-4 xi

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2 & 3 LIST OF FIGURES NUMBER TITLE 1.2-1 Development of Dresden 1982 Associated Circuits Analysis 1.2-2 Development of Dresden 1982 Exemption Requests and Interim Measures 2.2-1 Appendix R Shutdown Paths for Dresden Unit 2 Reactor Building 2.2-2 Appendix R Shutdown Paths for Dresden Unit 3 Reactor Building 2.2-3 Appendix R Shutdown Paths for Dresden Units 2&3 Turbine Building 3.1-1 Isolation Condenser System Sketch 3.1-2 Control Rod Drive System Sketch 3.1-3 Hot Shutdown AC & DC Single Line Diagram 3.1-4 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Sketch 3.1-5 Low Pressure Coolant Injection Torus Cooling Mode 3.1-6 Diesel Generator System Sketch 3.2-1 Shutdown Cooling System Sketch 3.2-2 RBCCW System Sketch 3.2-3 Service Water System Sketch 3.2-4 Cold Shutdown AC & DC Single Line Diagram 3.2-5 L.P. Coolant Injection Cold Shutdown Mode 3.3-1 Typical Cabling Diagram 3.3-2 Typical Schematic 5.1-1 Valves Whose Spurious Operation Could Degrade Operability of Safe Shutdown Systems 5.1-2 Valves Whose Spurious Operation Could Cause Loss of Reactor Inventory 6.2-1 Alternate Feed to Inboard Isolation Condenser Valves 6.2-2 Deleted 6.2-3 Diesel Generator 2/3 Bus 6.2-4 Cable Routing Diagram for 2/3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 7.2-1 Time Intervals Available for Makeup Water Initiation Given Automatic Initiation of Isolation Condenser 7.2-2 Time Interval Available for Makeup Water Initiation Given Initiation of Isolation Condenser 15 Minutes After Scram xii

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 17 JUNE 2009 APPENDIX A A.1 HOT SHUTDOWN CABLE DISCREPANCIES FOR DRESDEN UNITS 2 AND 3 This Appendix documents the cable discrepancies identified using the methodology described in Section 4.0 for each Dresden Units 2&3 fire area and their resolutions. This Appendix provides the technical documentation that supports the fire area by fire area safe hot shutdown analysis described in Section 4.0.

The resolutions to the cable discrepancies are listed on pages A-3 through A-7 and are referenced by number under the resolution column in Tables A-1 through A-10.

The notes referenced by some equipment in Tables A-1 through A-10 are listed on the equipments applicable F-221 / F-222 series drawing. These drawings are of historical status and should be used for reference only.

A-1

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 A.2 Not Used.

A-2

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 A.3 Resolution of Cable Discrepancies The following resolutions of cable discrepancies are referenced in the resolution column of Tables A-1 through A-10.

1. Target rock (mechanical function) and safety valves are available for RPV pressure control.
2. The unaffected unit's Division 1 equipment and power will be used via normally open crossties in the service water and condensate transfer piping. A normally closed valve in Fire Zone 8.2.6.C will be opened to establish a crosstie for the CRD pumps. All valves will be manually opened or provided with an alternate feed from the other unit (see Subsection 6.2.3.2).
3. A new breaker has been added in the 2/3 diesel generator room to prevent a fault in one unit's bus duct from affecting power to the other unit from the 2/3 diesel generator (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.1). The unaffected unit's pumps will be used to provide water to the affected unit's isolation condenser and reactor vessel (see Note 2).
4. An alternate control and power source has been provided from the opposite unit in case these normally open valves (MO1301-1 and MO1301-4) were to spuriously close (see Subsection 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.2.4).
5. Valves MO2(3)-1301-2, MO2(3)-1301-3, MO2(3)-1301-10, MO2(3)-4102 and MO2(3)-

4399-74 will be manually handwheel operated if they were to close.

6. AO2(3)-1301-17 and AO2(3)-1301-20 fail in the closed position. Also, manual operation of AO2(3)-1301-16 is possible.
7. Isolation and local control capability is provided in the 2/3 diesel generator room for the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries (Fire Area RB2/3). 125-Vdc for excitation is available from the unaffected unit.
8. The LPCI and core spray circuits are associated with the 4-kV power distribution.

However, since the opposite unit's power train is utilized, faults in these cables will not affect safe shutdown.

9. 2/3 diesel generator auxiliaries can be controlled and fed from the unaffected unit (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.2). Transfer switches ensure isolation of each unit's feed from the other.

A-3

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001

10. The primary containment isolation, process radiation monitoring, and main steam isolation circuits are associated with the isolation condenser valves. However, the drywell valves will be controlled from the alternate power source by isolating the automatic circuitry. The power train to the remaining valves will be de-energized and the valves will be operated manually. A detailed circuits analysis shows that only control room faults can spuriously open the MSIVs (see Subsections 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.2.4).
11. The required circuit breaker control circuits can be isolated by local isolation switches and then operated locally at the switchgear (see Subsections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.2.2).
12. The control logic for the 2/3 diesel generator feed breakers to SWGR 23-1 and 33-1 has been modified so that the operator can manually configure them to feed both buses simultaneously (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.6).
13. Deleted.
14. The LPCI and core spray circuits are associated with the 4-kV power distribution.

However, since the diesel generator and all necessary breaker controls will be isolated and operated locally, faults on these circuits will not affect safe shutdown (see Subsections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.2.2).

15. Unit 2 cables to the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries, and the bus duct from the 2/3 diesel generator to SWGR 23-1, pass through the corner of Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 nearest to the 2/3 diesel generator room. These cables and bus duct are protected by a one-hour fire wrap (see Subsection 6.3.3.2).
16. This cable affects the feed to MCC 28-1. The 2/3 diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump, 2/3 diesel generator vent fan, and valves MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4 can be fed from MCC 38-1 independent of this area. Transfer switches have been provided so that faults do not affect the alternate feeds (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.3). The local control station for MCC 38-1 has been moved to Fire Area RB2/3.
17. The 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump can be fed from MCC 38-3 independent of this area. A transfer switch has been provided so that faults do not affect the alternate feed (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.4).
18. Fire protection is provided such that the Unit 3 service water pumps are available for a fire in the area of the Unit 2 service water pumps and vice versa.
19. Fire protection is provided such that a single fire will disable only one diesel generator cooling water pump (see Subsection 6.3.5).
20. The loads normally required to be fed from this MCC (28-2) are condensate transfer pump 2A and 125-Vdc battery charger 2A, 250-V Battery Charger 2, 120-Vac panel 902-52A, and 120/240-Vac instrument bus 902-50. If the corresponding Division II feed to condensate transfer pump 2B is also unavailable, the makeup water to the isolation A-4

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 condenser will be taken from the service water system. The 125-Vdc loads will be fed from reserve sources which originate in Unit 3. All 250-Vdc valves are assumed to be manually operated; credit is taken for visual monitoring of local reactor instrumentation in the reactor building. Valves 2-1301-17 and 2-1301-20, which are fed from 902-50, fail closed.

21. While in hot shutdown, it is necessary to prevent the electromatic relief valves from spuriously opening to preserve the reactor vessel coolant inventory. For fires external to the main control room, an AUTO BLOWDOWN INHIBIT switch at the MCB will prevent spurious blowdown. If the fire is in the MCR, it may be necessary to trip all of the power feeds to the blowdown logic. This is covered by procedures. Excessive reactor pressure will be controlled by the mechanically actuated target rock or safety valves.
22. 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump can be fed from MCC 28-3 independent of this area. A transfer switch has been provided so that faults do not affect the alternate feeds (see Subsections 6.2.3.1.2 and 6.2.3.1.4).
23. These cables are protected by a 1-hour barrier, automatic suppression and detection within TB-II (see Subsection 6.3.4.4).
24. A modification moved this control station to the 2/3 diesel generator room (RB2/3). The cable will no longer enter the turbine building (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.3).
25. Spurious operation of the CO2 systems cannot harm the diesels. The associated circuits of concern are interlocks that stop the affected diesel generator room ventilation fan upon activation of the CO2 system. A local bypass switch on the diesel generator control panel will restore normal vent fan operation (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.2). If the CO2 has spuriously discharged, supplied-air breathing apparatus will be needed by personnel entering the diesel generator room.
26. A fault could affect automatic start of 2/3 diesel generator. Manual operation of the diesel is proposed, therefore, this is of no consequence. A spurious UV signal could trip the bus tie between 4-kV buses 23 and 23-1. This is of no consequence in the zones in which this can happen. A fuse isolates this circuit from other 125-Vdc circuits at the switchgear (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.2).
27. The unit dedicated diesels are independent of this fire area. Diesel operation procedures require disabling of breakers to the RAT, which is the source of this circuit association.
28. Cable for all other level recorders is independent of this fire area.
29. 480-V breakers can be manually operated by an operator.
30. Both normally open tie breakers 3938 and 3839 must spuriously close for them to be considered. Only a single spurious operation is assumed (see GL 85-01).

A-5

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001

31. An isolation switch in the turbine building prevents a fire in the crib house from affecting the diesel generator 3 fuel oil transfer pump.
32. The risers containing these cables are protected by a 1-hour fire wrap and suppression and detection in the immediate area.
33. Local instruments will be used to monitor system functions.
34. The separation of the redundant transmitters that feed these instruments is discussed in sections 3.6 (Unit 2) and 4.5 (Unit 3) of the Exemption Requests.
35. Level and pressure indication is provided by instruments 640-106A&B, 640-25A&B, and 640-29A&B.
36. A single spurious signal will cause only one solenoid (either ac or dc) of a valve to fail to perform its function. As a result, for a given fire, one MSIV on each steamline could fail to close. But, the redundant valve on each steamline would isolate the line.
37. The switchgear whose control circuits are fed from this panel will be manually configured.
38. CT will be shorted at generator.
39. Fuses will be installed in the auxiliary relay circuit.
40. The fire pump can be started locally. It will continue to run independent of all cables.

This water is used for isolation condenser makeup, which is not needed until 20 minutes after the initiation of the isolation condenser. This allows more than enough time to start the fire pump.

41. For the CRD discharge valves, 480 VAC power can be removed and valves manually operated locally.
42. Isolation condenser makeup pump day tanks 2/3-5215A and 2/3-5215B can be manually refilled if fuel oil pump 2-5203 or its power cables are damaged in a fire.
43. The isolation condenser makeup pumps can be started and operated locally.
44. Clean Demineralizer Tank depletion can be determined by monitoring Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump flow.

A-6

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-1 FIRE AREA RB2-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 243 Electromatic Relief 25069 P* 1.3.2 1 Valve 2-203-3B 23938 P* 1.3.2 1 244 Electromatic Relief 23905 P* 1.3.2 1 Valve 2-203-3C 23941 P* 1.3.2 1 245 Electromatic Relief 23906 P* 1.3.2 1 Valve 2-203-3D 23944 P* 1.3.2 1 246 Electromatic Relief 23940 P* 1.3.2 1 Valve 2-203-3E 23947 P* 1.3.2 1 242 Target Rock Valve 25061 P* 1.3.2 1 2-203-3A 23935 P* 1.3.2 1 2267 Main Steam Isolation 26342 C 1.3.2 36 Valve AO2-203-1A 26345 C 1.3.2 36 2268 Main Steam Isolation 26356 C 1.3.2 36 Valve AO2-203-1B 26359 C 1.3.2 36 2269 Main Steam Isolation 26370 C 1.3.2 36 Valve AO2-203-1C 26373 C 1.3.2 36 2270 Main Steam Isolation 26384 C 1.3.2 36 Valve AO2-203-1D 26387 C 1.3.2 36

  • Energizes Valve A-7

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 243 Electromatic Relief 23901 C* 1.1.2.2 1 Valve 2-203-3B 1.1.2.3 23938 C* 1.1.2.2 1 1.1.2.3 244 Electromatic Relief 23905 C* 1.1.2.2 1 Valve 2-203-3C 23917 C* 1.1.2.2 1 1.1.2.3 23941 C* 1.1.2.2 1 1.1.2.3 245 Electromatic Relief 23906 C* 1.1.2.2 1 Valve 2-203-3D 25055 C* 1.1.2.2 1 1.1.2.3 23944 C* 1.1.2.2 1 1.1.2.3 246 Electromatic Relief 23902 C* 1.1.2.2 1 Valve 2-203-3E 1.1.2.3 23940 C* 1.1.2.2 1 23947 C* 1.1.2.2 1 1.1.2.3 242 Target Rock Valve 25061 C* 1.1.2.2 1 2-203-3A 25062 C* 1.1.2.2 1 1.1.2.3 23935 C* 1.1.2.2 1 1.1.2.3 22 4160-V Buses 23 & 23- 20627 P 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1 Main Feed Breakers 1.1.2.3 152-2302 & 152-2329 20628 P 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20629 P 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20630 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20851 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20850 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 A-8

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 23 4160-V Bus 23-1 2/3 20441 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 DG Feed Breaker 152- 1.1.2.3 2333 20853 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 1.1.2.3 20857 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 1.1.2.3 20855 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 1.1.2.3 Bus P 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 20360 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 1.1.2.3 20449 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 1.1.2.3 30419 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 1.1.2.3 20445 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 67577 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9,12 1.1.2.3 A-9

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 212 480V SWGR 28 tie to 21390 P 1.1.2.3 42 29 1.1.2.4 21391 P 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21392 P 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21393 P 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21394 P 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21395 P 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21089 C 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 20021 C 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21022 C 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21492 C 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21494 C 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 21396 C 1.1.2.3 42 1.1.2.4 209 480V MCC 29-2 69715 P 1.1.2.2 42 1.1.2.3 69717 P 1.1.2.2 42 1.1.2.3 69718 P 1.1.2.2 42 1.1.2.3 69719 P 1.1.2.2 42 1.1.2.3 222 250Vdc MCC 2A 24179 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 24180 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 24181 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 24182 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 A-10

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 223 250Vdc MCC 2B 34080 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 34081 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 34082 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 34085 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 34089 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 34090 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 34091 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 34092 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 233 Isolation Condenser 22559 C 1.1.2.2 4 Valve MO2-1301-1 77650 C 1.1.2.1 4 77651 C 1.1.2.1 4 67594 P 1.1.2.2 4 67595 C 1.1.2.2 4 234 Isolation Condenser 23774 P 1.1.2.3 5 Valve MO2-1301-2 1.1.2.4 23775 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 23776 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 23777 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 23778 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 A-11

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 235 Isolation Condenser 23754 P 1.1.2.3 5 Valve MO2-1301-3 1.1.2.4 23755 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 23756 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 23757 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 23758 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 236 Isolation Condenser 22576 C 1.1.2.2 4 Valve MO2-1301-4 67593 P 1.1.2.2 4 67592 C 1.1.2.2 4 77650 C 1.1.2.1 4 77651 C 1.1.2.1 4 77692 C 1.1.2.1 4 237 Isolation Condenser 65841 C 1.1.2.2 5 Valve MO2-1301-10 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.4 65843 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 65844 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 65845 P 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 65530 C 1.1.2.2 5 238 Isolation Condenser 26273 C 1.1.2.2 6 239 Valves AO2-1301- 1.1.2.3 17&20 1.1.2.4 26274 C 1.1.2.2 6 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.4 26275 C 1.1.2.3 6 1.1.2.4 26276 C 1.1.2.3 6 1.1.2.4 A-12

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 240 Isolation Condenser 65846 P 1.1.2.3 5 Valve MO2-4102 1.1.2.4 65847 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 65529 C 1.1.2.2 5 65842 C 1.1.2.2 5 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.4 33 4160 V Bus 33-1 20857 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 2/3 DG Feed Brkr 1.1.2.3 152-3333 20360 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20449 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 30419 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20445 C 1.1.2.2 2,3,7,9 3201 2/3 DG Control, 20361 C 1.1.2.2 7 Metering, & Excitation 20359 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 20449 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 20360 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 20446 C 1.1.2.2 7 20356 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 20448 C 1.1.2.2 7 20447 C 1.1.2.2 7 20445 C 1.1.2.2 7 28485 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 20853 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 A-13

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3201 Isolation Condenser 29435 C 1.1.2.3 5 1.1.2.4 Supply Isolation Vlv. 80072 C 1.1.2.4 5 MO2-4399-74 80073 P 1.1.2.4 5 80074 P 1.1.2.4 5 20441 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 67545 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.4 22842 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 67128 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 67554 C 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 67555 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 67577 C 1.1.2.2 7 1.1.2.3 3204 2/3 DG Fuel Oil 67573 P 1.1.2.2 9 Transfer Pump 1.1.2.3 2/3-5203 67572 C 1.1.2.2 9 1.1.2.3 68395 C 1.1.2.2 9 1.1.2.3 3202 2/3 DG Room Supply 67575 P 1.1.2.2 9 Fan 2/3-5790 1.1.2.3 67574 C 1.1.2.2 9 1.1.2.3 68395 C 1.2.2.2 9 1.2.2.3 A-14

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3203 2/3 DG Cooling Water 22395 C 1.1.2.2 9 Pump 2/3-3903B 68395 C 1.1.2.2 9 1.1.2.3 2007 LPCI, Sys. 1, 22696 C 1.1.2.1 8,2,3,7,9 Ckt. A (Note 7) 11.2.2 1.1.2.2 20825 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 1.1.2.3 22733 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20227 C 1.1.2.2 8.2.3.7.9 1.1.2.3 20813 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20826 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 22547 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 65134 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 67201 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 67203 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 20284 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 20226 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 65102 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 65103 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 A-15

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2009 LPCI, Sys. II, Ckt. A 23977 C 11.2.1 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 9) 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 23810 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 23954 C 11.2.1 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 22743 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 20224 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 22738 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 22950 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 23958 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 65106 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 65107 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 22724 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 20225 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 65135 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 67228 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 67230 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 2011 Core Spray Sys. I 22811 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 11) 1.1.2.3 65134 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 67201 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 67203 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 22809 C 1.1.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.3 22812 C 11.2.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.2 65102 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 65103 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 A-16

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2012 Core Spray, Sys. II 20287 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 12) 65106 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 65107 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 22810 C 1.1.2.3 8,2,3,7,9 22819 C 11.2.1 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 23977 C 11.2.1 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.2.2 1.1.2.3 2017 PCIS, Ckt. A (Note 17) 26277 C 1.1.2.2 10 26281 C 1.1.2.3 10 26279 C 1.1.2.3 10 2018 PCIS, Ckt. B (Note 18) 26283 C 1.1.2.3 10 26280 C 1.1.2.3 10 26278 C 1.1.2.2 10 1.1.2.3 2022 Main Steam Isolation 26342 C 1.1.2.2 10 Ckt. Inbd Ckt. A 26356 C 1.1.2.2 10 (Note 22) 26370 C 1.1.2.2 10 26384 C 1.1.2.2 10 2023 Main Steam Isolation 26345 C 1.1.2.2 10 Ckt. Inbd Ckt. B 26359 C 1.1.2.2 10 (Note 23) 26373 C 1.1.2.2 10 26387 C 1.1.2.2 10 2024 PCIS Sensor & Trip 26312 C 1.1.2.3 10 Logic, Ckt. A 26320 C 1.1.2.3 10 (Note 24) 23764 C 11.2.1 10 1.1.2.2 24146 C 11.2.1 10 24011 C 11.2.1 10 1.1.2.2 24148 C 11.2.1 10 A-17

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-2 FIRE AREA RB2-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2025 PCIS Sensor & Trip 26313 C 1.1.2.3 10 Logic, Ckt. B (Note 25) 26321 C 1.1.2.3 10 23824 C 11.2.1 10 1.1.2.2 24147 C 11.2.1 10 24012 C 11.2.1 10 1.1.2.2 24149 C 11.2.1 10 2027 Auto Blowdown Part 1 25050 C 1.1.2.2 21 (Note 27) 1.1.2.3 2028 Auto Blowdown Part 2, 23916 C 1.1.2.3 21 Ckt. A (Note 28) 2029 Auto Blowdown, Part 2 23916 C 1.1.2.3 21 Ckt. B (Note 29) 2036 PCIS Main Steam Isol. 20687 P 1.1.2.2 10 Ckt. A Outbd (Note 36) 1.1.2.3 2039 Fire Protection CO2 20703 C 1.1.2.2 25 3039 System (Note 39) 2267 Main Steam Isolation 26342 C 1.1.2.2 36 Valve AO2-203-1A 26345 C 1.1.2.2 36 2268 Main Steam Isolation 26356 C 1.1.2.2 36 Valve AO2-203-1B 26359 C 1.1.2.2 36 2269 Main Steam Isolation 26370 C 1.1.2.2 36 Valve AO2-203-1C 26373 C 1.1.2.2 36 2270 Main Steam Isolation 26384 C 1.1.2.2 36 Valve AO2-203-1D 26387 C 1.1.2.2 36 A-18

DRESDEN 2 & 3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-3 FIRE AREA RB3-1 Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 342 Target Rock Valve 33668 C* 1.4.1 1 3-203-3A 33935 C* 1.4.1 1 343 Electromatic Relief 33938 C* 1.4.1 1 Valve 3-203-3B 33669 C* 1.4.1 1 344 Electromatic Relief 33670 C* 1.4.1 1 Valve 3-230-3C 33941 C* 1.4.1 1 345 Electromatic Relief 33671 C* 1.4.1 1 Valve 3-203-3D 33944 C* 1.4.1 1 346 Electromatic Relief 33672 C* 1.4.1 1 Valve 3-203-3E 33947 C* 1.4.1 1 3367 Main Steam 36345 C 1.4.1 36 Isolation Valve 36342 C 1.4.1 36 AO3-203-1A 3368 Main Steam 36359 C 1.4.1 36 Isolation Valve 36356 C 1.4.1 36 AO3-203-1B 3369 Main Steam 36373 C 1.4.1 36 Isolation Valve 36370 C 1.4.1 36 AO3-203-1C 3370 Main Steam 36387 C 1.4.1 36 Isolation Valve 36384 C 1.4.1 36 AO3-203-1D

  • Energizes Valve A-19

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 342 Target Rock Valve 33654 C* 1.1.1.3 1 3-203-3A 33668 C* 1.1.1.2 1 1.1.1.3 33673 C* 1.1.1.3 1 33935 C* 1.1.1.2 1 1.1.1.3 34839 C* 1.1.1.3 1 30272 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30275 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30280 P 1.1.1.3 1 30281 P 1.1.1.3 1 343 Electromatic 33657 C* 1.1.1.3 1 Relief Valve 34845 C* 1.1.1.3 1 3-203-3B 33938 C* 1.1.1.2 1 1.1.1.3 34840 C* 1.1.1.3 1 33669 C* 1.1.1.2 1 1.1.1.3 30272 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30275 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30280 P 1.1.1.3 1 30281 P 1.1.1.3 1

  • Energizes Valve A-20

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 344 Electromatic 33661 C* 1.1.1.3 1 Relief Valve 33670 C* 1.1.1.2 1 3-203-3C 1.1.1.3 34849 C* 1.1.1.3 1 33941 C* 1.1.1.2 1 1.1.1.3 34844 C* 1.1.1.3 1 30272 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30275 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30280 P 1.1.1.3 1 30281 P 1.1.1.3 1 345 Electromatic 33662 C* 1.1.1.3 1 Relief Valve 33671 C* 1.1.1.2 1 3-203-3D 1.1.1.3 33674 C* 1.1.1.3 1 33944 C* 1.1.1.2 1 1.1.1.3 34845 C* 1.1.1.3 1 30272 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30275 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30280 P 1.1.1.3 1 30281 P 1.1.1.3 1

  • Energizes Valve A-21

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 346 Electromatic 33667 C* 1.1.1.3 1 Relief Valve 33672 C* 1.1.1.2 1 3-203-3E 1.1.1.3 33674 C* 1.1.1.3 1 34849 C* 1.1.1.3 33947 C* 1.1.1.2 1 1.1.1.3 30272 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30275 P 1.1.1.3 1 1.1.1.4 30280 P 1.1.1.3 1 30281 P 1.1.1.3 1 23 4160-V Bus 23-1 20857 C 1.1.1.2 2,3,7,9 2/3 DG Feed Brkr 1.1.1.3 152-2333 30419 C 1.1.1.2 2,3,7,9,15 1.1.1.3 Bus P 1.1.1.2 2,3,7,9,15 20360 C 1.1.1.2 15 20449 C 1.1.1.2 15 20445 C 1.1.1.2 2,3,7,9 67577 C 1.1.1.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.1.3 322 250Vdc MCC 3A 34179 P 1.1.1.4 5 34180 P 1.1.1.4 5 34181 P 1.1.1.4 5 34182 P 1.1.1.4 5 A-22

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 323 250Vdc MCC 3A 24080 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24081 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24082 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24085 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24089 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24090 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24091 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24092 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 333 Isolation Condenser 32555 P 1.1.1.2 4 Valve MO3-1301-1 32557 C 1.1.1.2 4 32559 C 1.1.1.2 4 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 69995 P 1.1.1.1 4 69996 P 1.1.1.2 4 77658 C 1.1.1.2 4 67566 P 1.1.1.2 4 1.1.1.3 67567 P 1.1.1.2 4 1.1.1.3 77652 P 1.1.1.2 4 77653 P 1.1.1.2 4 77659 C 1.1.1.2 4 334 Isolation Condenser 33774 P 1.1.1.4 5 Valve MO3-1301-2 33775 P 1.1.1.4 5 33776 C 1.1.1.4 5 33777 C 1.1.1.4 5 33778 C 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 A-23

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 335 Isolation Condenser 33754 P 1.1.1.3 5 Valve MO3-1301-3 1.1.1.4 33755 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 33756 C 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 33757 C 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 33758 C 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 336 Isolation Condenser 32572 P 1.1.1.2 4 Valve MO3-1301-4 32574 C 1.1.1.2 4 32576 C 1.1.1.2 4 1.1.1.3 77694 P 1.1.1.2 4 77655 P 1.1.1.2 4 77654 C 1.1.1.2 4 77693 C 1.1.1.2 4 67571 C 1.1.1.2 4 1.1.1.3 77658 C 1.1.1.2 4 67567 P 1.1.1.2 4 1.1.1.3 67566 P 1.1.1.2 4 1.1.1.3 69997 C 1.1.1.1 4 69999 C 1.1.1.1 4 337 Isolation Condenser 75816 C 1.1.1.2 5 Valve MO3-1301-10 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 5 75818 C 1.1.1.4 5 75819 P 1.1.1.4 5 75821 C 1.1.1.4 5 75331 C 1.1.1.2 5 75826 C 1.1.1.2 5 338 Isolation Condenser 36273 C 1.1.1.3 6 A-24

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 339 Valves 1.1.1.4 AO3-1301-17&20 36274 C 1.1.1.3 6 1.1.1.4 36275 C 1.1.1.3 6 1.1.1.4 36276 C 1.1.1.3 6 1.1.1.4 340 Isolation Condenser 75820 P 1.1.1.4 5 Valve MO3-4102 75822 C 1.1.1.4 5 75816 C 1.1.1.2 5 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 75332 C 1.1.1.2 5 75827 C 1.1.1.2 5 A-25

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3201 2/3 DG Control, 20361 C 1.1.1.2 15 Metering, & 34175 P 1.1.1.2 15 Excitation (Note 49) 1.1.1.3 30359 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 20359 C 1.1.1.2 15 20449 C 1.1.1.2 15 20360 C 1.1.1.2 15 30433 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 20446 C 1.1.1.2 15 20356 C 1.1.1.2 15 20448 C 1.1.1.2 15 20447 C 1.1.1.2 15 20445 C 1.1.1.2 15 38485 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 77352 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 67545 C 1.1.1.2 15 67554 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 67555 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 67577 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 A-26

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3204 2/3 DG Fuel Oil 32711 P 1.1.1.2 15 Transfer Pump 2/3- 32712 C 1.1.1.2 15 5203 67573 P 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 67572 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 33793 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 33794 P 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.3.1 33795 P 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.3.1 33796 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.3.1 33797 C 1.1.1.3 15 1.1.1.4 77524 C 1.1.1.2 9 1.1.1.3 A-27

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3202 2/3 DG Room 32988 P 1.1.1.2 15 Supply Fan 2/3-5790 32989 C 1.1.1.2 15 22993 C 1.1.1.2 15 Fan 2/3-5790 67575 P 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 67574 C 1.1.1.2 15 75524 C 1.1.1.2 9 1.1.1.3 A-28

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3203 2/3 DG Cooling 22395 C 1.1.1.2 15 Water Pump 2/3-3903B 32395 C 1.1.1.2 15 33792 C 1.1.1.3 15 1.1.1.4 33789 P 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.3.1 33790 P 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.3.1 75524 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 33791 C 1.1.1.2 15 1.1.1.3 1.1.1.4 1.3.1 Isolation Condenser 39435 C 1.1.1.3 5 Supply Isolation 1.1.1.4 Vlv. MO3-4399-74 80064 C 1.1.1.4 5 80070 P 1.1.1.4 5 80071 P 1.1.1.4 5 A-29

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3007 LPCI, Sys. I, Ckt. A 30226 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 (Note 7) 30284 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 75124 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 75125 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 30825 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 32547 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 30813 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 32696 C 1.1.1.1 2,3,7,9 11.1.2 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.3 30228 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 32733 C 1.1.1.3 2,3,7,9 75197 C 1.1.1.2 2,3,7,9 1.1.1.3 75851 C 1.1.1.2 2,3,7,9 75853 C 1.1.1.2 2,3,7,9 3009 LPCI. Sys. II, 30225 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 Ckt. A (Note) 1.1.1.3 32724 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.3 75128 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 75129 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 33958 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 32950 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 33954 C 11.1.1 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.2 30224 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.3 32738 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 32743 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 32810 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 33977 C 11.1.1 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.2 75198 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.3 75875 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 75877 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 A-30

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3011 Core Spray, Sys. I 32811 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 11) 75124 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 75125 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 32809 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 75197 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 75851 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 75853 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.3 32812 C 11.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.2 1.1.1.3 3012 Core Spray, Sys. II 30287 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 12) 1.1.1.3 75128 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 75129 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 32810 C 1.1.1.3 8,2,3,7,9 32819 C 11.1.1 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.2 33977 C 11.1.1 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.2 75198 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 1.1.1.3 75875 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 75877 C 1.1.1.2 8,2,3,7,9 3017 PCIS Ckt. 36277 C 1.1.1.2 10 A (Note 17) 1.1.1.3 36279 C 1.1.1.3 10 36281 C 1.1.1.3 10 3018 PCIS, Ckt. B 36278 C 1.1.1.2 10 (Note 18) 36280 C 1.1.1.3 10 36283 C 1.1.1.3 10 3022 Main Steam 36342 C 1.1.1.2 10 Isolation Ckt. A Inbd 1.1.1.3 36356 C 1.1.1.2 10 1.1.1.3 36370 C 1.1.1.2 10 1.1.1.3 36384 C 1.1.1.2 10 1.1.1.3 A-31

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3023 Main Steam 36345 C 1.1.1.2 10 Isolation Ckt. B Inbd 1.1.1.3 (Note 23) 36359 C 1.1.1.2 10 1.1.1.3 36373 C 1.1.1.2 10 1.1.1.3 36387 C 1.1.1.2 10 1.1.1.3 3024 PCIS Sensor & Trip 33764 C 11.1.2 10 System Ckt. A 1.1.1.2 (Note 24) 34146 C 1.1.1.1 10 11.1.1 11.1.2 10 34011 C 11.1.2 1.1.1.2 34148 C 1.1.1.1 10 11.1.1 11.1.2 3025 PCIS Sensor & Trip 33824 C 11.1.2 10 System Ckt. B 1.1.1.2 (Note 25) 34147 C 1.1.1.1 10 11.1.1 11.1.2 34012 C 1.1.1.2 10 34149 C 1.1.1.1 10 3027 Auto Blowdown Part 35050 C 1.1.1.3 21 I Ckt. A (Note 27) 33934 C 1.1.1.3 21 3028 Auto Blowdown Part 33934 C 1.1.1.3 21 2 Ckt. A (Note 28) 3029 Auto Blowdown Part 33916 C 1.1.1.3 21 2 Ckt. B (Note 29) 3367 Main Steam 36345 C 1.1.1.2 36 Isolation 1.1.1.3 Valve AO3-203-1A 36342 C 1.1.1.2 36 1.1.1.3 A-32

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-4 FIRE AREA RB3-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3368 Main Steam 36345 C 1.1.1.2 36 Isolation 1.1.1.3 Valve AO3-203-1B 36342 C 1.1.1.2 36 1.1.1.3 3369 Main Steam 36345 C 1.1.1.2 36 Isolation 1.1.1.3 Valve AO3-203-1C 36342 C 1.1.1.2 36 1.1.1.3 3370 Main Steam 36345 C 1.1.1.2 36 Isolation 1.1.1.3 Valve AO3-203-1D 36342 C 1.1.1.2 36 1.1.1.3 A-33

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-5 FIRE AREA RB2/3 Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 233 Isolation Condenser 77656 C 9.0.C 4 Valve MO2-1301-1 77657 P 9.0.C 4 236 Isolation Condenser 77656 C 9.0.C 4 Valve MO2-1301-4 77657 P 9.0.C 4 77691 C 9.0.C 4 333 Isolation Condenser 67566 P 9.0.C 4 Valve MO3-1301-1 67567 P 9.0.C 4 336 Isolation Condenser 67571 C 9.0.C 4 Valve MO3-1301-4 67567 P 9.0.C 4 67566 P 9.0.C 4 2039 Fire Protection CO2 20703 C 9.0.C 25 3039 System (Note 39)

A-34

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 243 Electromatic Relief 23901 C* 8.2.5.A 1 Valve 2-203-3B 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 25069 C* 8.2.5.A 1 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20271 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23927 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23904 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 244 Electromatic Relief 23905 P 8.2.5.A 1 Valve 2-203-3C 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 23917 C* 8.2.5.A 1 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20272 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23927 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23904 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A Energizes Valve A-35

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 245 Electromatic Relief 23906 C* 8.2.5.A 1 Valve 2-203-3D 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 25055 C* 8.2.5.A 1 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20272 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23927 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23904 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 246 Electromatic Relief 23902 C* 8.2.5.A 1 Valve 2-2303-3E 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 23940 C* 8.2.5.A 1 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20272 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23927 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23904 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 242 Target Rock Valve 25061 C* 8.2.5.A 1 2-203-3A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 25062 C* 8.2.5.A 1 8.2.6.A A-36

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 242 8.2.6.B 20271 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23927 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23904 P 7.0.A.1 1 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 22 Brkrs 152-2302 and 20627 P 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9 152-2329 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20628 P 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20629 P 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20630 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20631 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 20632 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 20851 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20850 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20680 C 8.2.6.A 2,3,7,9 23 Brkr 152-2333 20441 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9,12 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20853 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9,12 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B A-37

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 23 20855 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9, 12 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20626 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9, 12 8.2.6.A 20445 C 8.2.5.A 2,3,7,9, 12 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 232 DG2 Fuel Oil Transfer 22202 P 8.2.5.A 42 Pump 9.0A 2-5203 22203 C 8.2.5.A 42 9.0A 22718 C 8.2.5.A 42 66009 C 8.2.5.A 42 212 480V SWGR 28 tie to 21494 C 8.2.6.A 42 29 8.2.5.A 21396 C 8.2.6.A 42 8.2.5.A 219 480V MCC 29-2 69715 P 8.2.5.A 42 69717 P 8.2.5.A 42 69718 P 8.2.5.A 42 69719 P 8.2.5.A 42 233 Isolation Condenser 22559 C 8.2.5.A 4 Valve MO2-1301-1 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 234 Isolation Condenser 23778 C 7.0.A.1 5 Valve MO2-1301-2 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 235 Isolation Condenser 23758 C 7.0.A.1 5 Valve MO2-1301-3 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 236 Isolation Condenser 22576 C 8.2.5.A 4 Valve MO2-1301-4 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B A-38

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 237 Isolation Condenser 65128 C 8.2.5.A 5 Valve MO2-1301-10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 238 Isolation Condenser 26273 C 8.2.5.A 6 239 Valves AO2-1301- 8.2.6.A 17&20 8.2.6.B 26274 C 8.2.5.A 6 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 67258 C 7.0.A.1 6 26275 C 7.0.A.1 6 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26276 C 7.0.A.1 6 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 240 Isolation Condenser 65129 C 8.2.5.A 5 Valve MO2-4102 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B Isolation Condenser 29435 C 8.2.6.A 5 Supply Isolation Vlv. 8.2.6.B MO3-4399-74 A-39

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3201 2/3 DG Control, 20446 C 8.2.5.A 7 Metering, & Excitation 8.2.6.A (Note 49) 8.2.6.B 20448 C 8.2.5.A 7 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20447 C 8.2.5.A 7 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20445 C 8.2.5.A 7 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22842 C 8.2.5.A 7 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 28485 C 8.2.5.A 7 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20853 C 8.2.5.A 7 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20441 C 8.2.5.A 7 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 3203 2/3 DG Cooling Water 22394 P 8.2.5.A 9 Pump 2/3 - 8.2.6.A 3903B 22395 C 8.2.6.A 9 8.2.6.B 3205 Diesel Fire 23729 C 8.2.5.A 40 Pump 2/3-4101 A-40

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2007 LPCI, Sys. I, Ckt. A 22951 P 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 7) 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 22696 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20825 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22733 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20228 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20813 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22547 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 67201 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 67203 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 20284 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20226 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20830 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 20723 P 8.2.1.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.2.A 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 65142 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B A-41

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2009 LPCI, Sys. II, Ckt. A 22952 P 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 9) 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23977 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22810 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 23954 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22743 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20819 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 20840 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 20224 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22738 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22950 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 23958 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B A-42

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2009 67230 C 8.2.6.B 8,2,3,7,9 65144 P 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 22724 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20225 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 69065 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2011 Core Spray, Sys. 22951 P 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 I (Note 11) 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 22811 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 67201 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 67203 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 22809 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22812 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 20809 P 8.2.2.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.5.B 8.2.6.A 65142 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B A-43

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2012 Core Spray, Sys. 22952 P 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 II (Note 12) 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 20287 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 67230 C 8.2.6.B 8,2,3,7,9 65149 C 8.2.5.A 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22810 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22819 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 23977 C 7.0.A.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 67228 C 8.2.6.B 8,2,3,7,9 2017 PCIS,Ckt.A 26277 C 8.2.5.A 10 (Note 17) 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26281 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26279 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 24176 P 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 24211 P 7.0.A.1 10 A-44

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2018 PCIS, Ckt. B 26283 C 7.0.A.1 10 (Note 18) 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26280 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26278 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 24211 P 7.0.A.1 10 2020 Process Radiation 24176 P 7.0.A.1 10 Monitoring System, 8.2.5.A Ckt. A (Note 20) 8.2.6.A 2021 Process Radiation 24211 P 7.0.A.1 10 Monitoring System, Ckt. A (Note 21) 2022 Main Steam Isolation 26342 C 8.2.5.A 10 Ckt. Inboard Ckt. A 8.2.6.A (Note 22) 8.2.6.B 26356 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26370 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26384 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 24176 P 7.0.1.A 10 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 2023 Main Steam Isolation 26345 C 8.2.5.A 10 Ckt. Inboard Ckt. B 8.2.6.A (Note 23) 8.2.6.B 26359 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.A A-45

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2023 8.2.6.B 10 26373 C 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26387 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2024 PCIS Sensor & Trip 26323 C 8.2.6.A 10 Logic, Ckt. A 8.2.6.B (Note 24) 26320 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 24013 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 23840 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 23785 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23784 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23782 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23780 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 24000 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 23834 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23829 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23828 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23786 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 24020 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 23764 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 24011 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B A-46

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2025 PCIS Sensor & Trip 26313 C 8.2.6.A 10 Logic, Ckt. B 8.2.6.B (Note 25) 26321 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 24014 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23841 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 23768 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23767 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23766 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23765 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 24001 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 23773 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23771 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23770 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23769 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 24021 C 8.2.5.A 10 8.2.6.B 23824 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 24012 C 8.2.6.A 10 8.2.6.B 2027 Auto Blowdown, 23927 P 7.0.A.1 21 Part 1 (Note 27) 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23904 P 7.0.A.1 21 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A A-47

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2027 25050 C 8.2.5.A 21 (Cont'd) 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2028 Auto Blowdown, 22952 P 7.0.A.1 21 Part 2, Ckt. A 8.2.5.A (Note 28) 8.2.6.A 23904 P 7.0.A.1 21 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23927 P 7.0.A.1 21 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 23916 C 7.0.A.1 21 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2029 Auto Blowdown 23916 C 7.0.A.1 21 Part 2, Ckt.B 8.2.5.A (Note 29) 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 22952 P 7.0.A.1 21 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 2036 PCIS Main Steam 20687 P 7.0.A.1 10 Isol. Ckt. A-Outbd 8.2.6.A (Note 36) 8.2.6.B 26349 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26350 C 8.2.5.A 10 67256 C 7.0.A.1 10 26362 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26364 C 8.2.5.A 10 26376 C 7.0.A.1 10 A-48

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2036 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26378 C 8.2.5.A 10 67257 C 7.0.A.1 10 26390 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26392 C 8.2.5.A 10 26386 C 8.2.5.A 10 26372 C 8.2.5.A 10 26375 C 8.2.5.A 10 26389 C 8.2.5.A 10 24211 P 7.0.A.1 10 2037 PCIS Main Steam 26348 C 7.0.A.1 10 Isolation Ckt. B 8.2.5.A Outbd (Note 37) 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26379 C 8.2.5.A 10 67256 C 7.0.A.1 10 26363 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26344 C 8.2.5.A 10 26377 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26393 C 8.2.5.A 10 67257 C 7.0.A.1 10 26391 C 7.0.A.1 10 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26347 C 8.2.5.A 10 26358 C 8.2.5.A 10 26386 C 8.2.5.A 10 26372 C 8.2.5.A 10 A-49

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2037 26394 C 8.2.5.B 10 (Cont'd) 26389 C 8.2.5.A 10 26375 C 8.2.5.A 10 26380 C 8.2.5.A 10 2039 Fire Protection 24172 P 7.0.A.1 25 3039 CO2 System 8.2.6.A (Note 39) 8.2.6.B 20702 C 8.2.5.A 25 65829 C 8.2.5.A 25 25009 C 8.2.5.A 25 25010 C 8.2.5.A 25 25020 C 8.2.6.A 25 25029 C 8.2.6.B 25 25030 C 8.2.6.B 25 35035 C 8.2.6.B 25 25015 C 8.2.5.A 25 8.2.6.A 25004 C 8.2.5.A 25 25044 C 8.2.6.B 25 25035 C 8.2.6.B 25 35024 C 8.2.6.B 25 35034 C 8.2.6.B 25 2267 Main Steam 26342 C 8.2.5.A 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.6.A AO2-203-1A 8.2.6.B 26345 C 8.2.5.A 36 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2268 Main Steam 26356 C 8.2.5.A 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.6.A AO2-203-1B 8.2.6.B 26359 C 8.2.5.A 36 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2269 Main Steam 26370 C 8.2.5.A 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.6.A AO2-203-1C 8.2.6.B A-50

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 26373 C 8.2.5.A 36 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2270 Main Steam 26384 C 8.2.5.A 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.6.A AO2-203-1D 8.2.6.B 26387 C 8.2.5.A 36 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2271 Main Steam 26349 C 7.0.A.1 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.5.A AO2-203-2A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26375 C 8.2.5.A 36 26350 C 8.2.5.A 36 67256 C 7.0.A.1 36 26348 C 7.0.A.1 36 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26380 C 8.2.5.A 36 26379 C 8.2.5.A 36 2272 Main Steam 26389 C 8.2.5.A 36 Isolation Valve 26364 C 8.2.5.A 36 AO2-203-2B 67256 C 7.0.A.1 36 26363 C 7.0.A.1 36 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26367 C 8.2.5.A 36 26344 C 8.2.5.A 36 26362 C 7.0.A.1 36 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B A-51

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2273 Main Steam 26376 C 7.0.A.1 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.5.A AO2-203-2C 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26372 C 8.2.5.A 36 26378 C 8.2.5.A 36 67257 C 7.0.A.1 36 26377 C 7.0.A.1 36 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26394 C 8.2.5.A 36 26393 C 8.2.5.A 36 67267 C 7.0.A.1 36 8.2.5.B 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 2274 Main Steam 26390 C 7.0.A.1 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.5.A AO2-203-2D 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26386 C 8.2.5.A 36 26392 C 8.2.5.A 36 67257 C 7.0.A.1 36 26391 C 7.0.A.1 36 8.2.5.A 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 26358 C 8.2.5.A 36 26347 C 8.2.5.A 36 32 4160-V Buses 33, 30632 C 8.2.5.A 32 33-1, 34, 34-1, 8.2.6.A Main Feed Breakers 30850 C 8.2.5.A 32 152-3310 and 8.2.6.A 152-3323 A-52

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 33 4160-V Bus 33-1 30855 C 8.2.5.A 32 2/3 DG Feed Brkr 8.2.6.A 152-3333 30626 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 20999 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 20445 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 310 480-V Transformers 30866 C 8.2.5.A 32 38&39 8.2.6.A Buses 38&39 Main 30867 C 8.2.5.A 32 Brkrs 152-3325 8.2.6.A (Note 52) 310 480-V Transformers 31350 C 8.2.5.A 32 38&39 8.2.6.A Buses 38&39 Main Brkrs 252-MF38 (Note 54) 312 480-V Transformers 31494 C 8.2.5.A 32 38&39 Buses 38&39 8.2.6.A Main Breakers 252-3938 Control Cables (Note 55) 312 480-V Transformers 31350 C 8.2.5.A 32 38&39 Buses 38&39 8.2.6.A Main Breakers 252-3839 Control Cables (Note 55) 323 250 Vdc MCC 2B 34080 P 8.2.6.A 5 34081 P 8.2.6.A 5 34082 P 8.2.6.A 5 34085 P 8.2.6.A 5 34089 P 8.2.6.A 5 34090 P 8.2.6.A 5 34091 P 8.2.6.A 5 34092 P 8.2.6.A 5 A-53

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3027 Auto Blowdown 35054 C 8.2.5.A 32 Part I Ckt. A 8.2.6.A (Note 27) 32604 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 32 3028 Auto Blowdown 33920 C 8.2.5.A 32 Part II, Ckt. A 8.2.6.A (Note 28) 3007 LPCI Sys. I 30227 C 8.2.5.A 32 Ckt. A (Note 7) 8.2.6.A 30828 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 30815 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 30820 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 32606 P 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 32747 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 79055 C 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 8.2.6.B 3009 LPCI Sys. II 79065 C 8.2.6.A 8 Ckt. A (Note 9) 8.2.6.B 8 3011 Core Spray 30864 C 8.2.5.A 32 Sys. I (Note 11) 8.2.6.A 32606 P 8.2.5.A 32 8.2.6.A 3027 Auto Breakdown 35054 C 8.2.5.A 21 Part I, Ckt. A 8.2.6.A (Note 27) 32604 C 8.2.5.A 21 8.2.6.A 3028 Auto Breakdown 33920 C 8.2.5.A 21 Part II, Ckt. A 8.2.6.A (Note 28) 32614 C 8.2.5.A 21 8.2.6.A A-54

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3375 CRD Discharge Valve 69409 P 8.2.2.A 41 MO2-0301-2A 8.2.5.B 8.2.5.A 3376 CRD Discharge Valve 69410 C 8.2.2.A 41 MO2-0301-2A 8.2.5.B 8.2.5.A 3377 CRD Discharge Valve 69411 C 8.2.5.A 41 MO2-0301-2A 3378 CRD Discharge Valve 69412 C 8.2.5.A 41 MO2-0301-2B 3379 CRD Discharge Valve 69413 P 8.2.2.A 41 MO2-0301-2B 8.2.5.A 8.2.5.B A-55

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-6 FIRE AREA TB-I Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3380 CRD Discharge Valve 69414 C 8.2.2.A 41 MO2-0301-2B 8.2.5.B 8.2.6.A Isolation Condenser 69906 C 8.2.5.A 43 Makeup Pump 8.2.6.A 2/3-43122A 69907 C 8.2.5.A 43 8.2.6.A 69916 C 8.2.5.A 43 8.2.6.A 69917 C 8.2.5.A 43 8.2.6.A Isolation Condenser 69908 C 8.2.5.A 43 Makeup Pump 8.2.6.A 2/3-43123B 69909 C 8.2.5.A 43 8.2.6.A 69918 C 8.2.5.A 43 8.2.6.A 69919 C 8.2.5.A 43 8.2.6.A Clean Demineralized 79517 C 8.2.5.A 44 Tank Transmitter 2/3-3441-201 A-56

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 226 RB 125 Vdc Dist. Pnl. 2 24196 P 8.2.5.C 37 24197 P 8.2.5.C 37 233 250 Vdc MCC 2B 34080 P 8.2.6.C 5 34081 P 8.2.6.C 5 34082 P 8.2.6.C 5 34085 P 8.2.6.C 5 34089 P 8.2.6.C 5 34090 P 8.2.6.C 5 34091 P 8.2.6.C 5 34092 P 8.2.6.C 5 323 250 Vdc MCC 3B 24080 P 8.2.6.C 5 24081 P 8.2.6.C 5 24082 P 8.2.6.C 5 24085 P 8.2.6.C 5 24089 P 8.2.6.C 5 24090 P 8.2.6.C 5 24091 P 8.2.6.C 5 24092 P 8.2.6.C 5 342 Target Rock 33673 C* 8.2.5.C 1 Valve 3-203-3A 8.2.6.C 34839 C* 8.2.5.C 1 8.2.6.C 343 Electromatic 34845 C* 8.2.5.C 1 Relief Valve 8.2.6.C 3-203-3B 34840 C* 8.2.5.C 1 8.2.6.C 344 Electromatic 34849 C* 8.2.5.C 1 Relief Valve 8.2.6.C 3-203-3C 34844 C* 8.2.5.C 1 8.2.6.C 345 Electromatic 33674 C* 8.2.5.C 1 Relief Valve 8.2.6.C 3-203-3D 34845 C* 8.2.5.C 1 8.2.6.C

  • Energizes Valve A-57

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 346 Electromatic 33674 C* 8.2.5.C 1 Relief Valve 8.2.6.C 3-203-3E 34849 C* 8.2.5.C 1 8.2.6.C 213 480-V Transformers 21400 C 8.2.6.C 11 28&29 Buses SES 28 & 21401 C 8.2.6.C 29 Main Brkr 252-MF 29 (Note 53) 215 480-V MCC 28-1 21358 C 8.2.5.C 16 219 480-V MCC 29-2 69715 P 8.2.5.C 42 69717 P 8.2.5.C 42 69718 P 8.2.5.C 42 69719 P 8.2.5.C 42

  • Energizes Valve A-58

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 226 RB 125V DC 24196 P 8.2.5.C 37 Dist. Pnl 2 24197 P 8.2.5.C 37 234 Isolation Condenser 23778 C 8.2.6.C 5 Valve MO2-1301-2 235 Isolation Condenser 23758 C 8.2.6.C 5 Valve MO2-1301-3 237 Isolation Condenser 65530 C 8.2.5.C 5 Valve MO2-1301-10 65128 C 8.2.5.C 5 240 Isolation Condenser 65529 C 8.2.5.C 5 Valve MO2-4102 65129 C 8.2.5.C 5 3201 2/3 DG Control, 38485 C 8.2.5.C 23 Metering, & Excitation 3202 2/3 DG Room Supply 22993 C 8.2.5.C 7 Fan 2/3-5790 3203 2/3 DG Cooling Water 75306 P 8.2.5.C 23 Pump 32395 C 8.2.5.C 23 2/3-3903B 2009 LPCI, Sys. II, Ckt. A 23954 C 8.2.6.C 14 (Note 9) 22743 C 8.2.6.C 14 22738 C 8.2.6.C 14 22950 C 8.2.6.C 14 22724 C 8.2.6.C 14 2012 Core Spray, Sys. II 22819 C 8.2.6.C 14 (Note 12) 2017 PCIS, Ckt. A 26281 C 8.2.6.C 10 (Note 17) 2018 PCIS Ckt. B 26283 C 8.2.6.C 10 (Note 18) 2024 PCIS Sensor & Trip 24013 C 8.2.6.C 10 Logic, Ckt. A 24020 C 8.2.6.C 10 (Note 24) 23764 C 8.2.6.C 10 24011 C 8.2.6.C 10 2025 PCIS Sensor & Trip 24014 C 8.2.6.C 10 Logic, Ckt. B 24021 C 8.2.6.C 10 (Note 25) 23824 C 8.2.6.C 10 24012 C 8.2.6.C 10 A-59

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2036 PCIS Main Steam Isol. 20687 P 8.2.6.C 10 Ckt. A - Outboard (Note 36) 2039 Fire Protection CO2 35029 C 8.2.5.C 25 3039 System (Note 39) 25004 C 8.2.5.C 25 25024 C 8.2.5.C 25 8.2.6.C 35024 C 8.2.5.C 25 35025 C 8.2.5.C 25 8.2.6.C 24172 P 8.2.5.C 25 8.2.6.C 20702 C 8.2.5.C 25 20703 C 8.2.5.C 25 65829 C 8.2.5.C 25 25039 C 8.2.6.C 25 35040 C 8.2.5.C 25 8.2.6.C 25044 C 8.2.6.C 25 35034 C 8.2.5.C 25 8.2.6.C 25035 C 8.2.6.C 25 35004 C 8.2.5.C 25 34172 P 8.2.5.C 25 20704 C 8.2.5.C 25 2273 Main Steam 67267 C 8.2.5.C 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.6.C AO2-203-2C 326 RB 125-Vdc Dist 34196 P 8.2.5.C 23 Pnl. 3 Feed 34197 P 8.2.5.C 23 32 4160-V Buses 33, 33-1 30627 P 8.2.5.C 23 Main Feed Brkrs. 152- 30628 P 8.2.5.C 23 3310 and 152-3323 30629 P 8.2.5.C 23 (Note 45) 30630 C 8.2.5.C 11 30851 C 8.2.5.C 11 30850 C 8.2.5.C 11 8.2.6.C 33 4160-V Bus 33-1 30855 C 8.2.5.C 11 2/3 DG Feed Breaker 8.2.6.C 152-3333 A-60

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 310 480-V Transformers 30866 C 8.2.5.C 11 38&39-Buses 38&39 8.2.6.C Main Brkrs 152-3325 30867 C 8.2.5.C 11 (Note 52) 8.2.6.C 310 480-V Transformers 31350 C 8.2.5.C 11 38&39-Buses 38&39 8.2.6.C Main Brkrs.

152-MF 38 (Note 54)

A-61

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 312 480-V Transformers 31350 C 8.2.5.C 30 38&39 - Buses 8.2.6.C 38&39 Main Breakers 252-3839 Control Cables (Note 55) 317 480-V MCC 38-3 31371 P 8.2.5.C 23 8.2.6.C 31372 P 8.2.5.C 23 8.2.6.C 31373 P 8.2.5.C 23 8.2.6.C 31374 C 8.2.5.C 23 8.2.6.C 333 Isolation Condenser 32559 C 8.2.5.C 4 Valve MO3-1301-1 8.2.6.C 336 Isolation Condenser 32576 C 8.2.5.C 4 Valve MO3-1301-4 8.2.6.C 338 Isolation Condenser 36273 C 8.2.5.C 6 339 Valves 8.2.6.C AO3-1301-17&20 36274 C 8.2.5.C 6 8.2.6.C 3007 LPCI, Sys. I Ckt. A 30226 C 8.2.5.C 14 (Note 7) 8.2.6.C 30284 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 75851 C 8.2.5.C 14 75142 C 8.2.5.C 14 30825 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 32547 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 30813 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 32696 C 8.2.5.C 14 75853 C 8.2.5.C 14 A-62

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3007 8.2.6.C (Cont'd) 30228 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 32733 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 3011 Core Spray Sys. I 32811 C 8.2.5.C 14 (Note 11) 8.2.6.C 75142 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 75851 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 32809 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 32812 C 8.2.5.C 14 8.2.6.C 75853 C 8.2.5.C 14 3017 PCIS, Ckt. A 36277 C 8.2.5.C 10 (Note 17) 8.2.6.C 36279 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 3018 PCIS Ckt. B 36280 C 8.2.5.C 10 (Note 18) 8.2.6.C 3022 Main Steam Isolation 36342 C 8.2.5.C 10 Ckt A Inbd (Note 22) 8.2.6.C 36356 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 36370 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 36384 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 34085 P 8.2.6.C 10 3023 Main Steam Isolation 36345 C 8.2.5.C 10 Ckt. B Inboard 8.2.6.C (Note 23) 36359 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 36373 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C A-63

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3023 36387 C 8.2.5.C 10 (Cont'd) 8.2.6.C 3024 Sensor & Trip 34013 C 8.2.5.C 10 System, Ckt. A 8.2.6.C (Note 24) 33840 C 8.2.5.C 10 34000 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 33764 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 34020 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 34011 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 3025 PCIS Sensor & Trip 34014 C 8.2.6.C 10 System, Ckt. B 33841 C 8.2.5.C 10 (Note 25) 34001 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 34021 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 33824 C 8.2.5.C 10 8.2.6.C 3027 Auto Blowdown, 35050 C 8.2.5.C 21 Part 1, Ckt. A 8.2.6.C 33934 C 8.2.5.C 21 8.2.6.C 3028 Auto Blowdown, 33934 C 8.2.5.C 21 Part 2, Ckt. A 8.2.6.C (Note 28) 3062 4-kV SWGR 77430 C 8.2.5.C 26 Bus 33-1 UV Relay 77402 C 8.2.5.C 26 (Note 62) 3367 Main Steam Isolation 36345 C 8.2.5.C 36 Valve AO3-203-1A 8.2.6.C 36342 C 8.2.5.C 36 8.2.6.C 3368 Main Steam Isolation 36359 C 8.2.5.C 36 Valve AO3-203-1B 8.2.6.C 36356 C 8.2.5.C 36 8.2.6.C A-64

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3369 Main Steam Isolation 36373 C 8.2.5.C 36 Valve AO3-203-1C 8.2.6.C 36370 C 8.2.5.C 36 8.2.6.C 3370 Main Steam Isolation 36387 C 8.2.5.C 36 Valve AO3-203-1D 8.2.6.C 36384 C 8.2.5.C 36 8.2.6.C A-65

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 ABLE A-7 FIRE AREA TB-II Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3381 CRD Discharge Valve 69413 C 8.2.6.C 41 MO2-0301-2B 3382 CRD Discharge Valve 69414 P 8.2.6.C 41 MO2-0301-2B A-66

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 322 250Vdc MCC 3A 34179 P 1.1.1.4 5 34180 P 1.1.1.4 5 34181 P 1.1.1.4 5 34182 P 1.1.1.4 5 323 250Vdc MCC 3B 24080 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24081 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24082 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24085 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24089 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24091 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 24092 P 1.1.1.3 5 1.1.1.4 342 Target Rock Valve 33673 C* 8.2.4 1 3-203-3A 34839 C* 8.2.4 1 30280 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 30281 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 343 Electromatic Relief 34845 C* 8.2.4 1 Valve 3-203-3B 34840 C* 8.2.4 1 30280 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 30281 8.2.6.E P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E

  • Energizes Valve A-67

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 344 Electromatic Relief 34849 C* 8.2.4 1 Valve 3-203-3C 34844 C* 8.2.4 1 30280 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 30281 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 345 Electromatic Relief 33674 C* 8.2.4 1 Valve 3-203-3D 34845 C* 8.2.4 1 30280 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 30281 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 346 Electromatic Relief 33674 C* 8.2.4 1 Valve 3-203-3E 34849 C* 8.2.4 1 30280 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 30281 P 6.1 1 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 333 Isolation Condenser 32559 C 8.2.4 4 Valve MO3-1301-1 334 Isolation Condenser 33778 C 8.2.4 5 Valve MO3-1301-2 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 335 Isolation Condenser 33758 C 8.2.4 5 Valve MO3-1301-3 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 336 Isolation Condenser 32576 C 8.2.4 4 Valve MO3-1301-4

  • Energizes Valve A-68

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 337 Isolation Condenser 75331 C 8.2.4 5 Valve MO3-1301-10 8.2.5.E 75826 C 8.2.4 5 338 Isolation Condenser 36273 C 8.2.4 6 339 Valves 36274 C 8.2.4 6 AO3-1301-17&20 36275 C 8.2.4 6 8.2.5.E 8.2.5.D 36276 C 8.2.4 6 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 340 Isolation Condenser 75332 C 8.2.4 5 Valve MO3-4102 8.2.5.E 75827 C 8.2.4 5 Isolation Condenser 39435 C 8.2.6.A 5 Supply Isolation Vlv. 8.2.6.B MO3-4399-74 8.2.4 A-69

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2039 34172 P 6.1 25 2039 Fire Protection CO2 34172 P 6.1 25 3039 System (Note 39) 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 24172 P 8.2.5.E 25 35000 C 8.2.5.E 25 20702 C 8.2.5.E 25 20704 C 8.2.5.E 25 20701 C 8.2.5.E 25 20703 C 8.2.5.E 25 25045 C 8.2.6.D 25 35009 C 8.2.5.E 25 35010 C 8.2.5.E 25 35014 C 8.2.5.E 25 8.2.6.E 35019 C 8.2.6.E 25 35040 C 8.2.6.D 25 25044 C 8.2.6.D 25 25024 C 8.2.5.E 25 35015 C 8.2.5.E 25 8.2.6.E 35004 C 8.2.5.E 25 35025 C 8.2.5.E 25 35034 C 8.2.5.E 25 25004 C 8.2.6.E 25 3201 2/3 DG Control 38485 C 8.2.5.E 2,3,7,9 (Note 49) 8.2.6.E 3203 2/3 DG Cooling 32394 P 8.2.4 7,22 Water Pump 2/3 8.2.5.E 3903B 8.2.6.E 32395 C 8.2.5.E 7 8.2.6.E 33792 C 8.2.4 7

8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D A-70

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3007 LPCI Sys. I Ckt. A 32951 P 6.1 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 7) 8.2.4 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 30226 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 30284 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 75142 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 75194 P 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 30825 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32547 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 30227 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 30828 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 30813 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32606 P 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32696 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 30228 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 30830 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 30815 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32733 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 30820 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32747 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 A-71

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3009 LPCI Sys. II 32952 P 6.1 8,2,3,7,9 Ckt. A (Note 9) 8.2.4 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 30225 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 32724 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 75875 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 75149 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 75144 P 6.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E A-72

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3009 75872 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 (Cont'd) 8.2.5.E 33958 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 33950 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 32738 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 33954 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 32743 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 32810 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 33977 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 30224 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 30840 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 75149 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 A-73

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3011 Core Spray, Sys. I 32951 P 6.1 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 11) 8.2.4 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 30864 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32811 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32606 P 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 75142 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32809 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 32812 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 75194 P 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 3012 Core Spray, Sys. II 32952 P 6.1 8,2,3,7,9 (Note 12) 8.2.4 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 30287 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 75875 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 75877 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 32810 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 32819 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 33977 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.5.E 75144 P 6.1 8,2,3,7,9 8.2.4 8.2.5.E 75149 C 8.2.4 8,2,3,7,9 A-74

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3017 PCIS Ckt. A 34176 P 6.1 10 (Note 17) 8.2.4 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 36277 C 8.2.4 10 36279 C 8.2.4 10 36281 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 3018 PCIS Ckt. B 34211 P 6.1 10 (Note 18) 8.2.4 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 36278 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 36280 C 8.2.4 10 36283 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 3020 Process Radiation 34176 P 6.1 10 Monitoring System 8.2.4 Ckt. A (Note 20) 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 3021 Process Radiation 34211 P 6.1 10 Monitoring System 8.2.4 Ckt. B (Note 21) 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E A-75

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3022 Main Steam Isolation 34176 P 6.1 10 Ckt. A Inbd 8.2.4 (Note 22) 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 36342 C 8.2.4 10 36356 C 8.2.4 10 36370 C 8.2.4 10 36384 C 8.2.4 10 34085 C 6.1 10 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 3023 Main Steam Isola- 36345 C 8.2.4 10 tion Ckt. B Inbd 36359 C 8.2.4 10 (Note 23) 36373 C 8.2.4 10 36387 C 8.2.4 10 3024 PCIS Sensor & Trip 33840 C 8.2.4 10 System Ckt. A 8.2.5.D (Note 24) 8.2.6.D 33780 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33781 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33784 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33785 C 8.2.6.E 10 A-76

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3024 8.2.6.D (Cont'd) 34000 C 8.2.4 10 33786 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33828 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33829 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33834 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 34013 C 8.2.4 10 34020 C 8.2.4 10 33764 C 8.2.4 10 34011 C 8.2.4 10 3025 Sensor & Trip System 33841 C 8.2.5.D 10 Ckt. B (Note 25) 8.2.6.D 8.2.4 34001 C 8.2.5.D 10 8.2.6.D 8.2.4 34014 C 8.2.4 10 33769 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33770 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33771 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 33773 C 8.2.5.E 10 8.2.6.D 34021 C 8.2.4 10 33824 C 8.2.4 10 3027 Auto Blowdown 33927 P 6.1 21 Part 1 Ckt. A 8.2.4 (Note 27) 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 33934 C 8.2.4 21 35050 C 8.2.4 21 35054 C 8.2.4 21 32604 C 8.2.4 21 A-77

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3028 Auto Blowdown 33927 PR 6.1 21 Part II Ckt. A 8.2.5.E (Note 28) 8.2.6.E 8.2.4 32952 PM 6.1 21 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 8.2.5.E 8.2.4 33934 C 8.2.4 21 33920 C 8.2.4 21 32614 C 8.2.4 21 3029 Auto Blowdown 32952 PM 6.1 21 Part II Ckt. B 8.2.4 (Note 29) 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 8.2.5.E 33916 C 8.2.4 21 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 3036 PCIS Main Steam 34211 P 6.1 10 Isolation Ckt. A 8.2.4 Outbd (Note 36) 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 8.2.6.E 36349 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36350 C 8.2.5.E 10 36362 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36364 C 8.2.5.E 10 36376 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36378 C 8.2.5.E 10 36390 C 8.2.4 10 A-78

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3036 8.2.5.E (Cont'd) 8.2.6.D 36392 C 8.2.5.E 10 36375 C 8.2.5.E 10 36389 C 8.2.5.E 10 36372 C 8.2.5.E 10 36386 C 8.2.5.E 10 3037 PCIS Main Steam 36379 C 8.2.5.E 10 Isolation Ckt. B 36344 C 8.2.5.E 10 Outbd (Note 37) 36393 C 8.2.5.E 10 36347 C 8.2.5.E 10 36380 C 8.2.5.E 10 36375 C 8.2.5.E 10 36348 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36363 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.5.D 36367 C 8.2.5.E 10 36389 C 8.2.5.E 10 36377 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36394 C 8.2.5.E 10 36372 C 8.2.5.E 10 36391 C 8.2.4 10 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36358 C 8.2.5.E 10 3204 Diesel Generator 33797 C 8.2.4 7, 9 2/3 Fuel Oil 8.2.5.E Transfer Pump 8.2.6.D 2/3-5203 3367 Main Steam 36345 C 8.2.4 36 Isolation Valve 36342 C 8.2.4 36 AO3-203-1A A-79

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3368 Main Steam 36359 C 8.2.4 36 Isolation Valve 36356 C 8.2.4 36 AO3-203-1B 3369 Main Steam 36373 C 8.2.4 36 Isolation Valve 36370 C 8.2.4 36 AO3-203-1C 3370 Main Steam 36387 C 8.2.4 36 Isolation Valve 36384 C 8.2.4 AO3-203-1D 3371 Main Steam 36350 C 8.2.5.E 36 Isolation Valve 36349 C 8.2.4 36 AO3-203-2A 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36379 C 8.2.5.E 36 36375 C 8.2.5.E 36 36348 C 8.2.4 36 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36380 C 8.2.5.E 36 3372 Main Steam 36363 C 8.2.4 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.5.E AO3-203-2B 8.2.6.D 36367 C 8.2.5.E 36 36389 C 8.2.5.E 36 36344 C 8.2.5.E 36 36362 C 8.2.4 36 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36364 C 8.2.5.E 36 3373 Main Steam 36394 C 8.2.5.E 36 Isolation Valve 36377 C 8.2.4 36 AO3-203-2C 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36393 C 8.2.5.E 36 36376 C 8.2.4 36 8.2.5.E A-80

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-8 FIRE AREA TB-III Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3373 8.2.6.D (Cont'd) 36372 C 8.2.5.E 36 36378 C 8.2.5.E 36 3374 Main Steam 36390 C 8.2.4 36 Isolation Valve 8.2.5.E AO3-203-2D 8.2.6.D 36386 C 8.2.5.E 36 36392 C 8.2.5.E 36 36391 C 8.2.4 36 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.D 36358 C 8.2.5.E 36 36347 C 8.2.5.E 36 3383 CRD Discharge Valve 79409 P 8.2.2.B 41 MO3-0301-2A 8.2.5.D 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 3384 CRD Discharge Valve 79410 C 8.2.2.B 41 MO3-0301-2A 8.2.5.D 8.2.5.E 8.2.6.E 3385 CRD Discharge Valve 79411 C 8.2.6.E 41 MO3-0301-2A 8.2.5.E 8.2.4 3386 CRD Discharge Valve 79412 P 8.2.5.B 41 MO3-0301-2B 8.2.5.D 8.2.5.E 3387 CRD Discharge Valve 79413 C 8.2.2.B 41 MO3-0301-2B 8.2.5.D 8.2.6.E 3388 CRD Discharge Valve 79414 C 8.2.6.E 41 MO3-0301-2B 8.2.5.E 8.2.4 A-81

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-9 FIRE AREA TB-IV Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution There are no cable discrepancies in this fire area.

A-82

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 342 Target Rock Valve 33673 C* 6.2 1 3-203-3A 34839 C* 2.0 1 343 Electromatic Relief 34845 C* 2.0 1 Valve 3-203-3B 34840 C* 2.0 1 344 Electromatic Relief 34849 C* 2.0 1 Valve 3-203-3C 34844 C* 2.0 1 345 Electromatic Relief 33674 C* 6.2 1 Valve 34845 C* 2.0 1 3-203-3D 346 Electromatic Relief 33674 C* 6.2 1 Valve 3-203-3E 34849 C* 2.0 1 243 Electromatic Relief 66964 C* 2.0 1 Valve 6.2 2-203-3B 23901 C* 2.0 1 6.2 25066 C* 2.0 1 6.2 25069 C* 2.0 1 6.2 20271 P 2.0 1 6.2 23927 P 6.2 1 23904 P 6.2 1 66966 C* 6.2 1 244 Electromatic Relief 23905 C* 2.0 1 Valve 6.2 2-203-3C 23917 C* 2.0 1 6.2 23943 C* 2.0 1 6.2 20272 P 2.0 1 6.2 23927 P 6.2 1 23904 P 6.2 1 66965 C* 2.0 1 6.2 66967 C* 6.2 1

  • Energizes Valve A-83

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 245 Electromatic Relief 23906 C* 2.0 1 Valve 6.2 2-203-3D 25055 C* 2.0 1 6.2 25074 C* 2.0 1 6.2 20272 P 2.0 1 6.2 23927 P 6.2 1 23904 P 6.2 1 246 Electromatic Relief 23902 C* 2.0 1 Valve 6.2 2-203-3D 23940 C* 2.0 1 6.2 25073 C* 2.0 1 6.2 20272 P 2.0 1 6.2 23927 P 6.2 1 23904 P 6.2 1 242 Target Rock Valve 25061 C* 2.0 1 2-203-3A 6.2 25062 C* 2.0 1 6.2 25065 C* 2.0 1 6.2 25271 P 2.0 1 6.2 23927 P 6.2 1 23904 P 6.2 1 22 4160-V Bus 23&23-1 20631 C 2.0 11 Main Feed Breakers 6.2 152-2302 and 152-2329 20632 C 2.0 11 (Note 45) 6.2 20850 C 2.0 11 6.2

  • Energizes Valve A-84

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 23 4160-V Bus 23-1 20441 C 2.0 11,12 2/3 DG Feed Brkr 6.2 152-2333 (Note 48) 20853 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 30999 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 20855 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 20626 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 20442 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 20445 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 210 480-V Transformers 20866 C 2.0 11 28&29 Buses 28&29 6.2 Main Brkrs 152-2327 20867 C 2.0 11 (Note 52) 6.2 210 480-V Transformers 21396 C 2.0 11 28&29 Buses 28&29 21498 C 2.0 11 Main Brkrs 252-MF28 6.2 (Note 54) 21499 C 2.0 11 6.2 213 480-V Transformers 21400 C 2.0 11 28&29 Buses 28&29 21401 C 2.0 11 Main Brkrs 252-MF29 (Note 53) 212 480-V Transformers 21494 C 2.0 11 28&29 Buses 28&29 Main Brkrs 252-2928 212 480-V Transformers 21396 C 2.0 11 28&29 Buses 28&29 Main Brkr 252-2829 233 Isolation Condenser 22559 C 2.0 4 Valve MO2-1301-1 6.2 24135 C 2.0 4 6.2 A-85

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 234 Isolation Condenser 24122 C 2.0 5 Valve MO2-1301-2 6.2 23778 C 2.0 5 235 Isolation Condenser 23758 C 2.0 5 Valve MO2-1301-3 24123 C 2.0 5 6.2 236 Isolation Condenser 22576 C 2.0 4 Valve MO2-1301-4 6.2 24136 C 2.0 4 6.2 237 Isolation Condenser 65128 C 2.0 5 Valve MO2-1301-10 6.2 238 Isolation Condenser 22848 P 2.0 6 239 Valves AO2-1301- 6.2 17&20 (Note 26) 26273 C 2.0 6 6.2 24098 C 6.2 6 24118 C 2.0 6 6.2 24119 C 2.0 6 6.2 26274 C 2.0 6 6.2 67258 C 2.0 6 24068 C 2.0 6 6.2 26275 C 2.0 6 26276 C 2.0 6 67252 C 2.0 6 6.2 27196 P 2.0 6 6.2 240 Isolation Condenser 65129 C 2.0 5 Valve MO2-4102 6.2 251 Service Water Pump 20660 C 2.0 11 2A-3901 6.2 20661 C 2.0 11 6.2 A-86

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 249 CRD Pump 2A-302-3 20683 C 2.0 11 20684 C 2.0 11 Isolation Condenser 29435 C 2.0 5 Supply Isolation Vlv. 6.2 MO2-4399-74 3201 2/3 DG Control, 20446 C 2.0 7,39 Excitation, and 6.2 Metering (Note 49) 20448 C 2.0 7 6.2 20447 C 2.0 7 6.2 20445 C 2.0 7 6.2 32482 C 2.0 7 20853 C 2.0 38 6.2 20441 C 2.0 38 6.2 20442 C 2.0 7 6.2 22842 C 6.2 7 A-87

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2007 LPCI, Sys. I, Ckt. A 22951 P 6.2 14 (Note 7) 20221 P 6.2 14 20828 C 2.0 14 6.2 22696 C 6.2 14 20825 C 6.2 14 22747 C 2.0 14 6.2 22730 C 6.2 14 20820 C 2.0 14 6.2 22733 C 6.2 14 20200 C 6.2 14 20210 C 6.2 14 20815 C 2.0 14 6.2 20830 C 6.2 14 20228 C 6.2 14 20813 C 6.2 14 20227 C 2.0 14 6.2 22547 C 6.2 14 20286 C 6.2 14 65142 C 6.2 14 65108 C 6.2 14 20284 C 6.2 14 20226 C 6.2 14 22606 C 2.0 14 6.2 69051 C 6.2 14 69055 C 6.2 14 65110 P 6.2 14 65194 P 6.2 14 A-88

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2009 LPCI, Sys. II, Ckt. A 22952 P 2.0 14 (Note 9) 6.2 20222 P 6.2 14 23969 P 6.2 14 22673 C 2.0 14 6.2 23977 C 2.0 14 6.2 22810 C 2.0 14 6.2 23954 C 2.0 14 6.2 22726 C 6.2 14 22745 C 2.0 14 6.2 22749 C 6.2 14 22743 C 2.0 14 6.2 20252 C 6.2 14 20260 C 6.2 14 20819 C 2.0 14 6.2 20840 C 6.2 14 20224 C 2.0 14 6.2 22731 C 2.0 14 6.2 22738 C 2.0 14 6.2 20223 C 2.0 14 6.2 22950 C 2.0 14 6.2 23958 C 2.0 14 6.2 20285 C 6.2 14 65127 C 6.2 14 69065 C 2.0 14 6.2 A-89

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2009 65111 P 6.2 14 (cont'd) 65144 P 2.0 14 6.2 22724 C 2.0 14 6.2 20225 C 2.0 14 6.2 20960 P 2.0 14 6.2 2011 Core Spray, Sys. I 20221 P 6.2 14 (Note 11) 22606 P 2.0 14 6.2 22811 C 6.2 14 65142 C 6.2 14 65108 C 6.2 14 22809 C 6.2 14 22812 C 6.2 14 22808 C 6.2 14 20864 C 2.0 14 6.2 65110 P 6.2 14 65194 P 6.2 14 A-90

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2012 Core Spray, Sys. II 20222 P 6.2 14 (Note 12) 20287 C 2.0 14 6.2 65149 C 6.2 14 22952 C 2.0 14 6.2 22810 C 2.0 14 6.2 22819 C 2.0 14 6.2 23977 C 2.0 14 6.2 22816 C 6.2 14 20863 C 2.0 14 6.2 20960 P 2.0 14 6.2 23969 P 6.2 14 65127 C 6.2 14 65111 P 2.0 14 6.2 65144 P 2.0 14 6.2 A-91

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2017 PCIS, Ckt. A (Note 17) 22409 P 2.0 10 24086 C 2.0 10 6.2 24096 C 2.0 10 6.2 25187 C 2.0 10 24176 P 2.0 10 6.2 26277 C 2.0 10 6.2 24113 C 2.0 10 6.2 26281 C 2.0 10 24110 C 2.0 10 6.2 26279 C 2.0 10 24211 P 2.0 10 24098 C 6.2 10 2018 PCIS, Ckt. B (Note 18) 22409 P 2.0 10 24115 C 2.0 10 6.2 26283 C 2.0 10 24111 C 2.0 10 6.2 26280 C 2.0 10 24099 C 6.2 10 24097 C 2.0 10 6.2 26278 C 2.0 10 24211 P 2.0 10 A-92

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2019 PCIS, Reset Ckt. 22482 P 2.0 10 (Note 19) 6.2 22472 P 2.0 10 6.2 24047 C 2.0 10 6.2 24048 C 2.0 10 6.2 22481 C 2.0 10 6.2 22798 C 2.0 10 22477 C 2.0 10 6.2 22799 C 2.0 10 27291 P 2.0 10 6.2 23412 C 2.0 10 2020 Process Radiation 25187 P 2.0 10 Monitoring System, 24176 P 2.0 10 Ckt. A (Note 20) 6.2 24086 P 2.0 10 6.2 2021 Process Radiation 22409 P 2.0 10 Monitoring System, 24211 P 2.0 10 Ckt. B (Note 21)

A-93

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2022 Main Steam Isolation 24086 P 2.0 10 Ckt. Inbd Ckt. A 6.2 (Note 22) 24025 C 2.0 10 6.2 26342 C 2.0 10 6.2 67250 C 2.0 10 6.2 26356 C 2.0 10 6.2 26370 C 2.0 10 6.2 67251 C 2.0 10 6.2 26384 C 2.0 10 6.2 22470 C 2.0 10 6.2 26354 C 2.0 10 25187 P 2.0 10 24176 P 2.0 10 6.2 A-94

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2023 Main Steam Isolation 22848 P 2.0 10 Ckt. Inbd Ckt. B 6.2 (Note 23) 26345 C 2.0 10 6.2 67250 C 2.0 10 6.2 26359 C 2.0 10 6.2 67251 C 2.0 10 6.2 26373 C 2.0 10 6.2 26387 C 2.0 10 6.2 22488 P 2.0 10 6.2 26368 P 2.0 10 24058 P 2.0 10 6.2 22849 P 2.0 10 6.2 22470 C 2.0 10 6.2 26354 C 2.0 10 2024 PCIS Sensor & Trip 26312 C 2.0 10 Logic, Ckt. A (Note 24) 26320 C 2.0 10 24013 C 2.0 10 23840 C 2.0 10 24000 C 2.0 10 24020 C 2.0 10 23764 C 2.0 10 24011 C 2.0 10 67316 C 2.0 10 6.2 24050 C 2.0 10 24051 C 2.0 10 27239 P 2.0 10 6.2 A-95

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2025 PCIS Sensor & Trip 26313 C 2.0 10 Logic, Ckt. B (Note 25) 26321 C 2.0 10 24014 C 2.0 10 6.2 23841 C 2.0 10 24001 C 2.0 10 27196 C 2.0 10 6.2 24021 C 2.0 10 6.2 23824 C 2.0 10 24012 C 2.0 10 67317 C 2.0 10 6.2 24052 C 2.0 10 24053 C 2.0 10 27241 P 2.0 10 6.2 2027 Auto Blowdown, Part 1 23927 P 6.2 21 (Note 27) 23904 P 6.2 21 25050 C 2.0 21 6.2 25054 C 2.0 21 6.2 22816 C 6.2 21 22604 C 2.0 6.2 A-96

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2028 Auto Blowdown, Part 2, 20273 P 6.2 21 Ckt. A (Note 28) 22952 P 2.0 21 6.2 23969 P 6.2 21 20222 P 6.2 21 20960 P 2.0 21 6.2 23904 P 6.2 21 23927 P 6.2 21 25053 C 6.2 21 23920 C 2.0 21 6.2 22816 C 6.2 21 20738 C 6.2 21 23916 C 2.0 21 6.2 2029 Auto Blowdown, Part 2, 23969 P 6.2 21 Ckt. B (Note 29) 20222 P 6.2 21 20960 P 2.0 21 6.2 23916 C 2.0 21 6.2 20738 C 6.2 21 22952 P 2.0 21 6.2 22808 C 6.2 21 22614 C 2.0 21 6.2 A-97

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2036 PCIS Main Steam Isol. 22409 P 2.0 10 Ckt. A Outbd. (Note 36) 20687 P 2.0 10 26355 C 2.0 10 22471 C 2.0 10 24029 C 2.0 10 6.2 26349 C 2.0 10 67256 C 2.0 10 26362 C 2.0 10 26376 C 2.0 10 67257 C 2.0 10 26390 C 2.0 10 24211 P 2.0 10 2037 PCIS Main Steam Isol. 22848 P 2.0 10 Ckt. B Outbd (Note 37) 6.2 22849 P 2.0 10 6.2 22488 P 2.0 10 6.2 24058 P 2.0 10 6.2 26368 P 2.0 10 24066 C 2.0 10 6.2 26305 C 2.0 10 22489 C 2.0 10 26348 C 2.0 10 67256 C 2.0 10 26363 C 2.0 10 26377 C 2.0 10 67257 C 2.0 10 26391 C 2.0 10 2061 4-kv SWGR Bus 23 67536 P 2.0 26 UV Relay (Note 61) 24213 P 2.0 26 2062 4-kv SWGR Bus 23-1 67431 C 6.2 26 UV Relay (Note 62) 24213 P 2.0 26 A-98

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 2267 Main Steam Isolation 26242 C 2.0 36 Valve AO2-203-1A 6.2 26345 C 2.0 36 6.2 67250 C 2.0 36 6.2 2268 Main Steam Isolation 26356 C 2.0 36 Valve AO2-203-1B 6.2 26359 C 2.0 36 6.2 2269 Main Steam Isolation 26370 C 2.0 36 Valve AO2-203-1C 6.2 26373 C 2.0 36 6.2 67251 C 2.0 36 6.2 2270 Main Steam Isolation 67251 C 2.0 36 Valve AO2-203-1D 6.2 26384 C 2.0 36 6.2 26387 C 2.0 36 6.2 2271 Main Steam Isolation 26349 C 2.0 36 Valve AO2-203-2A 67256 C 2.0 36 26348 C 2.0 36 2272 Main Steam Isolation 67256 C 2.0 36 Valve AO2-203-2B 26363 C 2.0 36 26362 C 2.0 36 2273 Main Steam Isolation 26376 C 2.0 36 Valve AO2-203-2C 67257 C 2.0 36 26377 C 2.0 36 67267 C 2.0 36 6.2 2274 Main Steam Isolation 26390 C 2.0 36 Valve AO2-203-2D 67257 C 2.0 36 26391 C 2.0 36 A-99

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 32 4160-V Buses 33, 33-1, 30631 C 2.0 11 34, 34-1 Main Feed 6.2 Breakers 152-3310 and 30632 C 2.0 11 152-3323 (Note 45) 30850 C 2.0 11 33 4160-V Bus 33-1 30626 C 2.0 11,12 2/3 DG Feed Breaker 30855 C 2.0 11,12 152-3333 (Note 48) 20999 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 67440 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 20445 C 2.0 11,12 6.2 310 480-V Transformers 30866 C 2.0 11 38&39 Buses 38&39 Main Brkrs 152-3325 (Note 52) 310 480-V Transformers 30867 C 2.0 11 38&39 Buses 38&39 Main Brkrs 252-MF38 (Note 54) 31350 C 2.0 11 313 480-V Transformers 31400 C 2.0 11 38&39 Buses 38&39 6.2 Main Brkrs 252-MF39 31401 C 2.0 11 (Note 53) 6.2 312 480-V Transformers 31494 C 2.0 11 38&39 Buses 38&39 Brkrs 252-3938 (Note 55) 312 480-V Transformers 31396 C 2.0 11 38&39 Buses 38&39 6.2 Main Brkrs 252-3839 31350 C 2.0 11 (Note 55) 313 480 V-Transformers 30940 C 2.0 11 38&39 Buses 38&39 6.2 Main Breakers 152- 30941 C 2.0 11 3426 (Note 51) 6.2 A-100

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 333 Isolation Condenser 32559 C 2.0 4 Valve MO3-1301-1 34135 C 2.0 4 6.2 334 Isolation Condenser 33778 C 2.0 5 Valve MO3-1301-2 6.2 34122 C 2.0 5 6.2 335 Isolation Condenser 33758 C 2.0 5 Valve MO3-1301-3 6.2 34123 C 2.0 5 6.2 336 Isolation Condenser 32576 C 2.0 4 Valve MO3-1301-4 34136 C 2.0 4 6.2 337 Isolation Condenser 75826 C 2.0 5 Valve MO3-1301-10 6.2 338 Isolation Condenser 34098 C 6.2 6 339 Valves AO3-1301- 34118 C 2.0 6 17&20 6.2 36273 C 2.0 6 36274 C 2.0 6 36275 C 2.0 6 6.2 36276 C 2.0 6 6.2 32848 P 2.0 6 6.2 34119 C 2.0 6 6.2 75803 C 2.0 6 6.2 75809 C 2.0 6 6.2 34068 C 2.0 6 6.2 340 Isolation Condenser 75827 C 2.0 5 Valve MO3-4102 6.2 A-101

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 351 Service Water Pump 30660 C 2.0 11 3A-3901 6.2 30661 C 2.0 11 6.2 349 CRD Pump 3A-302-3 30683 C 2.0 11 6.2 30684 C 2.0 11 6.2 A-102

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3007 LPCI, Sys. I Ckt. A 32951 P 6.2 14 (Note 7) 30221 P 6.2 14 32606 P 2.0 14 6.2 30226 C 6.2 14 Isolation Condenser 39435 C 2.0 5 Supply Isolation Vlv. 30284 C 6.2 14 MO3-4399-74 75142 C 6.2 14 80075 C 6.2 14 30286 C 6.2 14 30825 C 6.2 14 32547 C 6.2 14 30227 C 2.0 14 6.2 30828 C 2.0 14 6.2 30813 C 6.2 14 32696 C 2.0 14 6.2 30805 C 6.2 14 30228 C 6.2 14 30830 C 6.2 14 30815 C 2.0 14 6.2 30200 C 6.2 14 30210 C 6.2 14 32733 C 6.2 14 32730 C 6.2 14 30820 C 2.0 14 6.2 32747 C 2.0 14 6.0 79055 C 6.2 14 75194 P 6.2 14 A-103

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3009 LPCI, Sys. II, Ckt. A 32952 P 6.2 14 (Note 9) 30222 P 6.2 14 30960 P 2.0 14 6.2 30225 C 6.2 14 32724 C 6.2 14 75149 C 6.2 14 80076 C 6.2 14 30285 C 6.2 14 33958 C 6.2 14 32950 C 2.0 14 6.2 30223 C 6.2 14 75144 P 6.2 14 32731 C 2.0 14 6.2 32738 C 6.2 14 32726 C 6.2 14 30224 C 6.2 14 30840 C 6.2 14 30819 C 2.0 14 6.2 30252 C 6.2 14 30260 C 6.2 14 32743 C 6.2 14 32749 C 6.2 14 32745 C 2.0 14 6.2 33954 C 6.2 14 32810 C 2.0 14 6.2 33977 C 6.2 14 32673 C 2.0 14 6.2 33969 P 6.2 14 79065 C 6.2 14 A-104

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3011 Core Spray, Sys. I 32951 P 6.2 14 (Note 11) 32811 C 2.0 14 6.2 75142 C 6.2 14 80075 C 6.2 14 32809 C 6.2 14 32812 C 6.2 14 32808 C 6.2 14 30864 C 2.0 14 6.2 30221 P 6.2 14 32606 P 2.0 14 6.2 75194 P 6.2 14 3012 Core Spray, Sys. II 32952 P 6.2 14 (Note 12) 30960 P 2.0 14 6.2 30222 P 6.2 14 33969 P 6.2 14 30287 C 2.0 14 6.2 75149 C 6.2 14 80076 C 6.2 14 32810 C 2.0 14 6.2 32819 C 6.2 14 32816 C 6.2 14 33977 C 6.2 14 30863 C 2.0 14 6.2 75144 P 6.2 14 A-105

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3017 PCIS, Ckt. A 34176 P 2.0 10 (Note 17) 6.2 34086 P 2.0 10 35187 P 2.0 10 34096 C 2.0 10 6.2 36277 C 2.0 10 34098 C 6.2 10 34110 C 2.0 10 6.2 36279 C 2.0 10 34113 C 2.0 10 6.2 36281 C 2.0 10 6.2 3018 PCIS Ckt. B 34211 P 2.0 10 (Note 18) 6.2 32409 P 2.0 10 6.2 34097 C 2.0 10 6.2 36278 C 2.0 10 6.2 34099 C 6.2 10 34111 C 2.0 10 6.2 36280 C 2.0 10 34115 C 2.0 10 6.2 36283 C 2.0 10 6.2 A-106

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3019 PCIS Reset Ckt. 32472 P 2.0 10 (Note 19) 6.2 32482 P 2.0 10 32481 C 2.0 10 32798 C 2.0 10 6.2 34047 C 2.0 10 6.2 34048 C 2.0 10 6.2 32477 C 2.0 10 32799 C 2.0 10 6.2 37291 P 2.0 10 6.2 3020 Process Radiation 34086 P 2.0 10 Monitoring System 35187 P 2.0 10 Ckt. A (Note 20) 34176 P 2.0 10 6.2 77360 C 2.0 10 6.2 3021 Process Radiation 34211 P 2.0 10 Monitoring System 6.2 Ckt. B (Note 21) 32409 P 2.0 10 6.2 77361 C 2.0 10 6.2 A-107

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3022 Main Steam Isolation 34176 P 2.0 10 Ckt. A Inbd (Note 22) 6.2 34086 P 2.0 10 35187 P 2.0 10 34025 C 2.0 10 6.2 32470 C 2.0 10 36354 C 2.0 10 36342 C 2.0 10 36356 C 2.0 10 36370 C 2.0 10 36384 C 2.0 10 75800 C 2.0 10 75801 C 2.0 10 3023 Main Steam Isolation 32848 P 2.0 10 Ckt. B Inbd (Note 23) 6.2 34058 C 2.0 10 6.2 32488 C 2.0 10 36368 C 2.0 10 36345 C 2.0 10 36359 C 2.0 10 36373 C 2.0 10 32849 P 2.0 10 6.2 36387 C 2.0 10 75800 C 2.0 10 75801 C 2.0 10 A-108

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3024 Sensor & Trip System 37239 P 2.0 10 Ckt. A (Note 24) 6.2 34013 C 2.0 10 33840 C 2.0 10 6.2 34000 C 2.0 10 33764 C 2.0 10 6.2 34020 C 2.0 10 34011 C 2.0 10 77316 C 2.0 10 6.2 34050 C 2.0 10 34051 C 2.0 10 3025 Sensor & Trip System 37241 P 2.0 10 Ckt. B (Note 25) 6.2 37196 P 2.0 10 6.2 79070 C 2.0 10 34014 C 2.0 10 33841 C 2.0 10 34001 C 2.0 10 34021 C 2.0 10 33824 C 2.0 10 34012 C 2.0 10 77317 C 2.0 10 6.2 34052 C 2.0 10 34053 C 2.0 10 3027 Auto Blowdown Part I 33927 P 6.2 21 Ckt. A (Note 27) 35050 C 6.2 21 35054 C 2.0 21 6.2 33934 C 6.2 21 32816 C 6.2 21 32604 C 2.0 21 6.2 A-109

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3028 Auto Blowdown Part II 33927 PM 6.2 21 Ckt. A (Note 28) 30273 PR 6.2 21 32952 PR 6.2 21 33969 PR 6.2 21 30222 PR 6.2 21 30960 PR 2.0 21 6.2 35053 C 6.2 21 33920 C 2.0 21 6.2 33934 C 6.2 21 32816 C 6.2 21 32808 C 6.2 21 32614 C 2.0 21 6.2 3029 Auto Blowdown Part II 32952 P 6.2 21 Ckt. B (Note 29) 33969 P 6.2 21 30222 P 6.2 21 30960 P 2.0 21 6.2 33916 C 2.0 21 6.2 30738 C 6.2 21 A-110

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3036 PCIS Main Steam 32409 P 2.0 10 Isolation Ckt. A Outbd 6.2 (Note 36) 34211 P 2.0 10 6.2 34029 C 2.0 10 6.2 32471 C 2.0 10 6.2 36355 C 2.0 10 6.2 36349 C 2.0 10 6.2 75806 C 2.0 10 6.2 36362 C 2.0 10 6.2 36376 C 2.0 10 6.2 75807 C 2.0 10 6.2 36390 C 2.0 10 6.2 A-111

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3037 PCIS Main Steam Isol. 75806 C 2.0 10 Ckt. B Outbd (Note 37) 6.2 75807 C 2.0 10 6.2 34066 C 2.0 10 6.2 32489 C 2.0 10 6.2 36305 C 2.0 10 6.2 36348 C 2.0 10 6.2 36363 C 2.0 10 6.2 36377 C 2.0 10 6.2 36391 C 2.0 10 6.2 32848 P 2.0 10 6.2 32849 P 2.0 10 6.2 34058 P 2.0 10 6.2 32488 P 2.0 10 36368 P 2.0 10 3062 4-kV SWGR Bus 33-1 77430 C 6.2 26 UV Relay (Note 62) 3203 Diesel Generator 2/3 33792 C 6.2 7 Cooling Water Pump 35393 C 6.2 7 2/3-3903B 3204 Diesel Generator 2/3 33797 C 6.2 7 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2/3-5203 3205 Diesel Fire Pump 23729 C 6.2 40 2/3-4101 A-112

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3367 Main Steam Isolation 36345 C 2.0 36 Valve AO3-203-1A 36342 C 2.0 36 75800 C 2.0 36 32848 P 2.0 36 6.2 34058 P 2.0 36 6.2 32488 P 2.0 36 36368 P 2.0 36 34086 P 2.0 36 34025 C 2.0 36 6.2 36354 C 2.0 36 32470 C 2.0 36 3368 Main Steam Isolation 36359 C 2.0 36 Valve AO3-203-1B 75801 C 2.0 36 36356 C 2.0 36 32848 P 2.0 36 6.2 34058 P 2.0 36 6.2 32488 P 2.0 36 36368 P 2.0 36 34086 P 2.0 36 34025 C 2.0 36 6.2 36354 C 2.0 36 32470 C 2.0 36 A-113

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3369 Main Steam Isolation 36373 C 2.0 36 Valve AO3-203-IC 36369 C 2.0 36 6.2 75801 C 2.0 36 36370 C 2.0 36 32848 P 2.0 36 6.2 34058 P 2.0 36 6.2 32488 P 2.0 36 36368 P 2.0 36 34086 P 2.0 36 34025 C 2.0 36 6.2 36354 C 2.0 36 32470 C 2.0 36 3370 Main Steam Isolation 78501 C 2.0 36 Valve AO3-203-1D 36387 C 2.0 36 36384 C 2.0 36 32848 P 2.0 36 6.2 34058 P 2.0 36 6.2 32488 P 2.0 36 36368 P 2.0 36 34086 P 2.0 36 34025 C 2.0 36 6.2 36354 C 2.0 36 32470 C 2.0 36 A-114

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3371 Main Steam Isolation 36349 C 2.0 36 Valve AO3-203-2A 6.2 75806 C 2.0 36 6.2 36348 C 2.0 36 6.2 34066 C 2.0 36 6.2 32489 C 2.0 36 6.2 32848 P 2.0 36 6.2 32409 P 2.0 36 6.2 34029 C 2.0 36 6.2 36355 C 2.0 36 6.2 32471 C 2.0 36 6.2 36305 C 2.0 36 6.2 A-115

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3372 Main Steam Isolation 36363 C 2.0 36 Valve AO3-203-2B 6.2 75806 C 2.0 36 6.2 36362 C 2.0 36 6.2 34066 C 2.0 36 6.2 32489 C 2.0 36 6.2 36305 C 2.0 36 6.2 32848 P 2.0 36 6.2 32409 P 2.0 36 6.2 34029 C 2.0 36 6.2 36355 C 2.0 36 6.2 32471 C 2.0 36 6.2 A-116

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3373 Main Steam Isolation 36377 C 2.0 36 Valve AO3-203-2C 6.2 75807 C 2.0 36 6.2 36376 C 2.0 36 6.2 34066 C 2.0 36 6.2 32489 C 2.0 36 6.2 36305 C 2.0 36 6.2 32848 P 2.0 36 6.2 32409 P 2.0 36 6.2 34029 C 2.0 36 6.2 36355 C 2.0 36 6.2 32471 C 2.0 36 6.2 A-117

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3374 Main Steam Isolation 36390 C 2.0 36 Valve AO3-203-2D 6.2 75807 C 2.0 36 6.2 36391 C 2.0 36 6.2 34066 C 2.0 36 6.2 32489 C 2.0 36 6.2 36305 C 2.0 36 6.2 32848 P 2.0 36 6.2 32409 P 2.0 36 6.2 34029 C 2.0 36 6.2 36355 C 2.0 36 6.2 32471 C 2.0 36 6.2 A-118

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-10 FIRE AREA TB-V Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 3389 CRD Discharge Valve 79411 C 6.2 41 MO3-0301-2A 2.0 3390 CRD Discharge Valve 79414 C 6.2 41 MO3-0301-2B 2.0 3391 CRD Discharge Valve 69411 C 6.2 41 MO2-0301-2A 2.0 3392 CRD Discharge Valve 69412 C 6.2 41 MO2-0301-2B 2.0 Isolation Condenser 69906 C 2.0 43 Makeup Pump 69907 C 2.0 43 2/3-43122A Isolation Condenser 69908 C 2.0 43 Makeup Pump 69909 C 2.0 43 2/3-43123A A-119

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE A-11 FIRE AREA CRIB HOUSE Item Cable Cable Location of No. Equipment Discrepancy Type Cable by Zone(s) Resolution 251 Service Water Pump 20659 P 11.3 18 2A-3901 20664 C 11.3 18 24060 C 11.3 18 252 Service Water Pump 20766 P 11.3 18 2B-3901 20769 C 11.3 18 24060 P 11.3 18 230 2 DG Cooling Water 22288 P 11.3 19 Pump 2-3903B 3203 2/3 DG Cooling Water 22394 P 11.3 19 Pump 32394 P 11.3 19 2/3-3903B 77436 P 11.3 19 67680 P 11.3 19 67681 P 11.3 19 3205 Diesel Fire 23729 C 11.3 40 Pump 2/3-4101 23734 C 11.3 40 23735 C 11.3 40 23732 P 11.3 40 23730 P 11.3 40 23727 P 11.3 40 23733 P 11.3 40 351 Service Water Pump 30659 P 11.3 18 3A-3901 30663 C 11.3 18 352 Service Water Pump 30766 P 11.3 18 3B-3901 30769 C 11.3 18 332 3 DG Fuel Oil Transfer 23742 C 11.3 31 Pump 23741 C 11.3 31 3-5203 23739 C 11.3 31 23569 C 11.3 31 23571 C 11.3 31 330 3 DG Cooling Water 32288 P 11.3 19 Pump 3-39038 A-120

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 APPENDIX B B.1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNITS 2 AND 3 This Appendix lists all valves identified using the methodology in Section 5.0. Where spurious operation could affect safe shutdown systems or cause loss of reactor inventory, the justification for no action or the prefire or postfire action taken is stated. The valves for which a prefire or postfire action was deemed necessary are also listed in Table 5.1-1 of the report.

B-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 B.2 Notes to Tables B-1 and B-2 Note 1 Valves identified with an

  • do not appear on the Hot and/or Cold Shutdown Equipment Lists.

Note 2 The following valve operator acronyms apply:

AO - pneumatic operator MO - electric motor operator PCV - pressure control valve TCV - temperature control valve SO - solenoid valve Note 3 The following system acronyms apply:

CS - core spray CRD - control rod drive DG - diesel generator DO - diesel oil FP - fire protection FPC - fuel pool cooling HPCI - high pressure core injection IC - isolation condensation LPCI - low pressure core injection MS - main steam RBCW- reactor building cooling water RF - reactor feedwater RWCU- reactor water cleanup SC - shutdown cooling SW - service water Note 4 This failure mode is not a credible event since leakage through the mechanical check valve is required. This event need not be considered.

B-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 Note 5 Spurious operation of greater than one normally closed valve in a series combination in a branch line is not considered a credible failure mode except for high/low pressure systems. See Note 8.

Note 6 This failure mode impacts cold shutdown only. Manually operated or electrical repairs are permissible. Cold shutdown repairs procedures address potential failures.

Note 7 This air-operated valve involved in this failure mode is a testable air-operated check valve. This valve performs its check valve function no matter what the position of the air operator. Therefore, this failure mode is not credible since it is dependent on the loss of this check valve function.

Note 8 One Dresden 2&3 high-low pressure interface is the reactor coolant system/shutdown cooling system pump suction lines. FSAR Section 10.4 states that the design pressure of the shutdown cooling system is 1,250 psig. The valves, pump casings, and primary sides of the heat exchangers are designed to ASME B&PV Section III, Class C requirements.

The piping is designed to ASA B16.5 requirements.

The two 16-inch inboard pump suction containment isolation valves 1001-1A and 1001-1B are normally closed ac motor-operated valves on ESF Division I from 480-Vac reactor building MCC 28-1. The three outboard pumps suction valves 1001-2A, 1001-2B, and 1001-2C are normally closed dc motor-operated valves on ESF Division II from 250-Vdc reactor building MCC-2, Bus A.

Based on the design pressure, failure of the high-low interface is not considered to be a problem.

Note 9 An ADS inhibit switch has been added in panel 902-3 (903-3) to prevent spurious blowdown from a fire outside of Fire Area TB-V (Control Room & AEER). See Subsections 6.2.1.8 and 6.2.2.8. For a fire in Fire Area TB-V, spurious blowdown is prevented by removing power to the ADS logic by opening circuit breakers at the 125-Vdc turbine building main bus 2A-1 (3A-1) distribution panel and at the 125-Vdc turbine building reserve bus 2B-1 (3B-1) distribution panel. To prevent spurious operation of any single pressure relief valve for a fire in Fire Areas RB2-I, RB2-II, TB-I, TB-III, TB-V, RB3-I or RB3-II, 125-Vdc power to these valves is removed by either tripping breakers or pulling fuses.

B-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2003 Note 10 Modifications have been installed to provide a means to override the effects of spurious signals on these valves. See Subsections 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.2.4.

Note 11 This valve will be manually opened by handwheel operation. A procedure has been implemented. See Section 7.3.

Note 12 LPCI/CCSW Division I is not reviewed in the Associated Circuits Analysis. Therefore, it is not reviewed for fire damage because no credit is taken for this system in regard to safe shutdown capability.

Note 13 LPCI Injection mode is not postulated for safe hot shutdown. Cold shutdown is covered by procedures. Also see Note 6.

Note 14 Closure does not create a condition adverse to safe shutdown. The valve is designed to fail open therefore remaining open also does not create a condition adverse to safe shutdown.

Note 15 Safe shutdown mode is through the heat exchanger.

Note 16 Cables for these valves are independent of all areas for which the HPCI/LPCI method is postulated for shutdown, for the Isolation Condenser Method this valve per the DSSPs will be verified closed.

Note 17 No power operator shown for this valve.

Note 18 Water will go either to the suppression pool or will be confined in CS piping. A flow path to the reactor will be available upon opening of CS valve MO 1402-25B coupled with a decrease in reactor pressure allowing flow through check valve AO 1402-9B. See Note 5.

B-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 Note 19 A spurious signal will cause only one solenoid (either ac or dc) of a valve to fail to perform its function. As a result, for a given fire, one MSIV on each steamline could fail to close. However, the redundant valve on each steamline would isolate the line (see FPPDP, Volume 6,Section X.7)

Note 20 RWCU drain valves PCV 2(3)-1220, MO 2(3)-1201-11, and MO 2(3)-1201-12 are used to reject water from the primary system during plant startup and shutdown. They are normally closed during plant operation except when the RWCU system is inoperable (UFSAR, p 10.3.2.-1). In each drain line there are two normally closed valves in series.

RWCU system relief valve provides protection against high pressure. PCV-1220 is a fail closed valve.

Note 21 Should MO 2(3)-0302-8 or both AO 2(3)-0302-6A and AO 2(3)-0302-6B close, makeup water from the CRD pump via CRD cooling line to the RPV could be disrupted. The AO valves close on loss of air (i.e., loss of normal power). Makeup water is still available to the RPV from the CRD pumps via the charging water line and scram inlet valves CV 2(3)-0305-126 (typical of 177). These valves open for scram and fail open on loss of power or instrument air. Instructions are included in shutdown procedures to ensure that AO 0302-6A or AO 0302-6B and MO 0302-8 are open or another RPV makeup water source is available before resetting the scram system.

Note 22 Spurious operations of AO 2(3)-1904-5-7 and AO 2(3)-1904-5-14 is possible at panels 2252-39 (Unit 2 valves) and 2253-39 (Unit 3), solenoid junction box and cables (24454, 24472, 34454, 34472). This equipment is all located in the reactor building, elevation 589-feet 0-inches, Fire Zones 1.1.2.5A (Unit 2). No credit is taken for the isolation condenser method at shutdown in these fire zones.

Note 23 The scram discharge volume vent and drains are air-operated fail-closed valves. They close on the same signal that opens the scram valves. The backup scram valves also cause these valves to close. There are two valves in series in each vent and drain line. The scram system is a highly reliable system. Certain DSSPs also contain actions to bleed off instrument air to the reactor building.

Note 24 If the RWCU system does not automatically isolate, normally open valve 1201-2 will be closed and normally closed valve 1201-3 will be verified closed or manually closed or, in B-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 the event of a fire in Fire Areas RB2-II and RB3-II, air will be removed to valve 2(3)-

1217 to ensure RWCU isolation.

Note 25 Valves AO (3)-1301-17 and AO (3)-1301-20 fail in the closed position. If they do not close, manual valve 2(3)-1301-16 can be closed.

Note 26 The piping classification changes from S&L Class B (high pressure) to S&L Class L (low pressure) at MO2 (3)-220-4. The low pressure piping consists of 2" and 2-1/2" piping routed to the condenser. Near the condenser, the 2-1/2" piping discharges into an 18" line which then drains to the condenser. Based on maximum steam conditions of 1250 psig at 575ºF and S&L Standard MES-2.5, pressure-temperature ratings for piping, the 2" (Schedule 80) and 2-1/2" (Schedule 40) piping specified per PDT "L" can withstand the above steam conditions. The 18" (standard weight) line cannot withstand the above conditions. However, the pressure of the fluid as it discharges from the 2-1/2" line into the 18" line decreases to an acceptable level.

Note 27 This motor operated valve was replaced with a manually operated valve per EC 404969.

Thus, no spurious Appendix R concerns exist.

Note 28 If the HPCI pump is not delivering water to the reactor, verify closed MO2(3)-2301-5 or trip the HPCI turbine.

Note 29 CRD pump discharge valves MO-0301-2A and 2B could spuriously position to an undesired condition. Manual valve operational capability should be available.

Note 30 DSSPs provide actions to assure these valves are closed.

B-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • AO-2-203-1A MS M12 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 19 and through main steamline.
  • AO-2-203-2A
  • AO-2-203-1B MS M12 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 19 and through main steamline.
  • AO-2-203-2B
  • AO-2-203-1C MS M12 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 19 and through main steamline.
  • AO-2-203-2C
  • AO-2-203-1D MS M12 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 19 and through main steamline.
  • AO-2-203-2D
  • MO-2-220-1 MS M12 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 5 and through drains and restrictive orifices RD-2-220-91A, B,
  • MO-2-220-2 C, and D to main steamline and through RO-2-220-75 to condenser.
  • MO-2-220-1, MS M12 Spurious opening of these three valves combinations Note 5
  • MO-2-220-2 result in loss of reactor coolant through drains to main and steamline.
  • MO-2-220-3 B-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 3 Drawings System Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • MO-2-220-1, MS M12 Spurious opening of these three valves result in loss of Notes 5 & 26

and

  • MO-2-220-4 Target Rock Valve MS M-12 Spurious opening will vent RPV inventory to Note 9 2-203-3A (Sht. 1) suppression pool.

or Electromatic Relief Valves 2-203-3B or 2-203-3C or 2-203-3D or 2-203-3E Check valves and RF M-14 For opening of isolation valves, leakage through check Note 4 isolation valves is lost to condenser valves such as

  • MO-2-3205A
  • MO-2-3205B B-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO2-1201-1 RWCU M-30 Failure in open position may cause pressure to build up Note 24 and in low pressure piping downstream of PCV-2-1217 MO2-1201-2 (with RO) and fluid loss to condenser and/or or equipment drains via the relief valves.

MO2-1201-1A and MO2-1201-2 or MO2-1201-1 and MO2-1201-3 and MO2-1201-4 or MO2-1201-1A and MO2-1201-3 and MO2-1201-4 PCV-2-1217

  • PCV2-1220 RWCU M-30 Opening would vent to condenser. Notes 20, 24 and
  • MO-2-1201-11 B-9

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution System

  • PCV-2-1220 RWCU M-30 Opening would vent to waste tank. Notes 20, 24 and
  • MO-2-1201-12
  • AO-2-1402-9A CS M-27 Spurious opening of both valves will subject the class 300 Note 7 and core spray piping to and from the associated core spray
  • MO-2-1402-25A pump to RPV pressure. Elevated pressures could result in the relief valves opening to the RB equipment drain tanks.
  • AO-2-1402-9B CS M-27 Spurious opening of both valves will subject the class 300 Note 7 and core spray piping to and from the associated core spray
  • MO-2-1402-25B pump to RPV pressure. Elevated pressures could result in the relief valves opening to the RB equipment drain tanks.

MO-2-1301-1 IC M-28 Spurious closure will isolate RPV from isolation Notes 10 & 11 or condenser. Note: MO-2-1301-1 is in drywell and MO-2-1301-2 inaccessible.

MO-2-1301-3 IC M-28 Failure to open prevents condensed steam from returning Note 11 from isolation condenser coil to RPV. This defeats natural circulation path.

B-10

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 3 Drawings System Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1301-4 IC M-28 Spurious closure defeats natural circulation path for Note 10 isolation condenser. Note that this valve is located in drywell and is therefore inaccessible.

MO-2-1301-10 IC M-28 Spurious closure isolates makeup to isolation condenser Note 11 or from service water system.

MO-2-4102 MO-2-4399-74 IC M-39 Spurious closure isolates makeup to isolation condenser Note 11 from the clean demineralized water storage tank.

AO2-1301-17 IC M-28 Spurious failure in open position would allow loss of Note 25 AO2-1301-20 reactor inventory.

Valve-3906 FP M-23 Spurious closure isolates service water from isolation Note 27 condenser. Defeats makeup.

MO-2-3901 SW M-22 Spurious opening diverts service water to main condenser Note 5 and hotwell. Reduces isolation condenser makeup capacity or

  • MO-2-0302-8 CRD M-34 Spurious closure prevents RPV makeup from cooling Note 21 or water line during shutdown with isolation condenser.
  • AO-2-0302-6A and AO-2-0302-6B B-11

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 3 Drawings System Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1001-1A SC M-32 Spurious closure isolates shutdown cooling system from Notes 6 & 8 and RPV.

MO-2-1001-1B MO-2-1001-2A, SC M-32 Spurious closure isolates shutdown cooling system from Notes 6 & 8 MO-2-1001-2B RPV and MO-2-1001-2C MO-2-1001-4A, SC M-32 Spurious closure isolates shutdown cooling system from Note 6 MO-2-1001-4B RPV.

and MO-2-1001-4C MO-2-1001-5A, SC M-32 Spurious closure isolates shutdown cooling system from Note 6 and RPV.

MO-2-1001-5B

  • AO-2-1501-25A LPCI M-29 Spurious closure isolates shutdown cooling system from Note 7 and (Sht. 1) RPV. Note that these valves are inaccessible in that they
  • AO-2-1501-25B are in the drywell.

MO-2-1501-22A, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling flow from Note 6 MO-2-1501-38A (Sht. 1) RPV to wetwell.

and MO-2-1501-20A (Note 1)

B-12

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 3 Drawings System Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1501-22A, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling flow from Note 6 MO-2-1501-21A, (Sht. 1) RPV to torus spray header.

MO-2-1501-18A and MO-2-1501-19A MO-2-1501-22A, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling from RPV to Notes 5 & 6 MO-2-1501-21A, (Sht. 1) drywell spray header.

MO-2-1501-27A and MO-2-1501-28A H MO-2-0202-4A Rx M-26 Spurious opening provides a flow path for shutdown Notes 5 & 6 (N.O.) and Recirc. (Sht. 2) cooling which bypasses RPV and defeats system. Note MO-2-0202-5A that these valves are in the drywell and are inaccessible.

(N.O.)

MO-2-3701 RBCCW M-20 Spurious closure blocks the cooling water for the Note 6 shutdown cooling pumps.

MO-2-3704 RBCCW M-20 Spurious closure blocks cooling water to the shutdown Note 6 cooling heat exchanger.

TCV-2-3904A, SW M-22 Spurious closure blocks service water flow to the Note 6 TCV-2-3904B RBCCWS heat exchangers which remove decay heat via and the shutdown cooling system.

TCV-2-3904C B-13

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • 2-5772-101 DG M-974 Spurious closure of exhaust isolation damper will cause Note 16 (isolation damper) Ventilation M-273 heat load to be trapped in diesel generator room. High 2/3-5772-101 temperatures may prevent 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of operation.
  • SO-3-5201 3 DO M-41 Spurious failure to close while filling day tank (3-5202) Note 16 Transfer (Sht. 2) would overflow diesel oil to drains. This would reduce fuel oil supply for emergency power from Unit 3 diesel.

MO-2-2301-6 HPCI M-51 Spurious closure will isolate the HPCI pumps from Note 16 condensate storage tank 2/38-3303.

MO-2-2301-9 HPCI M-51 Failure of this valve in the closed position will isolate the Note 16 HPCI injection flow from the RPV.

MO-2-2301-8 HPCI M-51 Failure of this valve in the closed position will isolate the Note 16 flow path for HPCI injection into RPV.

MO-2-2301-35 HPCI M-51 Spurious opening of these valves will divert Note 4 and HPCI pump suction from the CST to the MO-2-2301-36 suppression pool.

MO-2-2301-14 HPCI M-51 Spurious opening of valve diverts HPCI flow Note 16 to wetwell thus reducing HPCI injection flow into RPV, also provides a path for CST drain down.

SO-2-3301 Condensate M-51 Spurious operation of these valves could cause CST drain Note 30 down.

SO-2-3302 B-14

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-2301-10 HPCI M-51 Spurious opening of these valves would divert HPCI Note 5 And injection flow from the RPV to CST 2/3B-3303.

MO-2-2301-15

  • PCV-2-2301-46 HPCI M-51 Spurious closure will isolate the HPCI turbine gland seal Note 17 condenser and lube oil cooler coolant flow from HPCI pump discharge.
  • MO-2-2301-48 HPCI M-51 Spurious closure will isolate the HPCI turbine gland seal Note 11 condenser and lube oil cooler coolant flow.

MO-2-2301-3 HPCI M-51 Failure of this valve in the closed position will isolate the Note 16 HPCI turbine from the RPV steam supply.

Spurious opening of this valve would result in loss of Note 28 reactor inventory to the suppression pool.

MO-2-2301-4 HPCI M-51 Failure of these valves in the closed position will isolate Note 16 or the HPCI turbine from the RPV steam supply. Note:

MO-2-2301-5 MO-2-2301-5 is located in the drywell and is inaccessible.

MO-2-1501-5A LPCI M-29 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 2A-1502 Note 12 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool reducing the pool cooling flow.

B-15

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1501-5B LPCI M-29 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 2B-1502 Note 12 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool reducing the pool cooling flow.

MO-2-1501-20A, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 MO-2-1501-38A (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the torus spray header to the and torus full flow test line.

MO-2-1501-21A MO-2-1501-22A, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening could result in loss of reactor inventory Note 7

  • AO-2-1501-25A (Sht. 1) and MO-2-1501-21A MO-2-1501-27A LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 and (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the wetwell to the drywell spray MO-2-1501-28A ring header thus reducing pool cooling flow.

MO-2-1501-22A, SC & LPCI M-32 Spurious opening of these valves would allow shutdown Note 5 MO-2-1501-38A M-29 cooling flow to enter the wetwell through the torus full and (Sht. 1) flow test line.

MO-2-1501-20A B-16

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1501-22A, SC & LPCI M-32 Spurious opening of these valves would allow shutdown Note 6 MO-2-1501-21A, M-29 cooling flow to enter the wetwell through the torus spray MO-2-1501-18A (Sht. 1) header.

and MO-2-1501-19A MO-2-1501-32B LPCI M-29 Spurious closure of these valves will isolate LPCI "A" Note 6 and (Sht. 1) pump from LPCI "B" wetwell injection thus eliminating a MO-2-1501-32A possible wetwell injection path.

MO-2-1501-11A LPCI M-29 Spurious closure will divert all LPCI pump discharge Note 6 (Sht. 1) through containment cooling heat exchangers 2A-1503.

  • MO-2-1402-4A CS M-27 Spurious opening of this valve would divert LPCI pool Note 12 coolant flow to the core spray/RPV injection piping therefore reducing the LPCI return flow to the suppression pool.

MO-2-1501-13A LPCI M-29 Failure of this valve in the open position will direct LPCI Note 6 (Sht. 1) pump discharge to wetwell therefore bypassing heat exchanger 2A-1503. This failure will result in a reduction in the LPCI heat removal capability.

MO-2-1501-3A SW M-29 Failure of this valve to open would isolate service water Note 6 (Sht. 1) flow from the containment cooling heat exchanger. This failure would defeat the heat removal capability to the LPCI pool cooling system.

B-17

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1501-5C LPCI M-29 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 2C-1502 Note 16 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool.

MO-2-1501-5D LPCI M-29 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 2D-1502 Note 16 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool.

MO-2-1501-18B LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 and (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the torus full flow test line to the MO-2-1501-19B torus spray header.

MO-2-1501-38B, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 MO-2-1501-20B (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the torus spray header to the and torus full flow test line.

MO-2-1501-21B MO-2-1501-21B, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening could result in loss of reactor inventory. Note 7 MO-2-1501-22B (Sht. 1) and

  • AO-2-1501-25B MO-2-1501-27B LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 and (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from wetwell to the drywell spray ring MO-2-1501-28B header.

MO-2-1501-22B, SC & LPCI M-32 Spurious opening of these valves would allow shutdown Note 6 MO-2-1501-38B M-29 cooling flow to enter the wetwell through the torus full and (Sht. 1) flow test line.

MO-2-1501-20B B-18

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1501-22B, SC & LPCI M-32 Spurious opening of these valves would allow shutdown Note 6 MO-2-1501-21B, M-29 cooling flow to enter the wetwell through the torus spray MO-2-1501-18B (Sht. 1) header.

and MO-2-1501-19B MO-2-1501-32B LPCI M-29 Spurious closure of these valves will isolate LPCI "A" Note 6 and (Sht. 1) wetwell injection.

MO-2-1501-32A MO-2-1501-11B LPCI M-29 Spurious closure will divert all LPCI pump discharge Note 15 (Sht. 1) through containment cooling heat exchanger 2-B-1503.

  • MO-2-1402-4B CS M-27 Spurious opening of this valve would divert LPCI pool Note 18 coolant flow to the core spray/RPV injection piping therefore reducing the LPCI return flow to the suppression pool.

MO-2-1501-13B LPCI M-29 Failure of this valve in the open position will direct LPCI Note 16 (Sht. 1) pump discharge to the wetwell therefore bypassing heat exchanger 2B-1503. This failure will result in a reduction in the LPCI heat removal capability.

MO-2-1501-3B SW M-29 Failure of this valve to open would isolate the service Note 16 (Sht. 1) water return from the containment cooling heat exchanger. This failure would completely defeat the heat removal capability of the LPCI system.

B-19

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1501-5A LPCI M-29 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 2A-1502 Note 12 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-2-1501-5B LPCI M-29 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 2B-1502 Note 12 (Sht. 1) suction for the suppression pool therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-2-1501-18A, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI Note 5 MO-2-1501-19A, (Sht. 1) injection flow from the RPV to the wetwell therefore MO-2-1501-20A, reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-2-1501-21A and MO-2-1501-38A MO-2-1501-27A LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI Note 5 and (Sht. 1) injection flow from the RPV to the drywell spray ring MO-2-1501-28A header therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-2-1501-11A LPCI M-29 Spurious closure will divert all LPCI pump discharge Note 12 (Sht. 1) through containment cooling heat exchanger 2A-1503.

MO-2-1501-32A LPCI M-29 Spurious closure of these valves will isolate LPCI "A" Note 13 and (Sht. 1) from LPCI "B" RPV injection piping thus eliminating a MO-2-1501-32B possible RPV injection path.

B-20

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • MO-2-1402-4A CS & LPCI M-27 Spurious opening of the valve would divert LPCI RPV Note 5 MO-2-1501-20A M-29 injection flow to the core spray piping thus reducing the and (Sht. 1) injection to the RPV.

MO-2-1501-38A MO-2-1501-13A LPCI M-29 Failure of this valve in the open position will divert LPCI Note 13 (Sht. 1) pump discharge from RPV to the wetwell therefore bypassing heat exchanger 2A-1503. This failure will result in a reduction in the RPV injection flow.

MO-2-1501-3A SW M-29 Failure of this valve to open will isolate the shutdown Note 12 (Sht. 1) service water from the containment cooling heat exchanger. This failure would defeat the heat removal capability of the LPCI system.

MO-2-1501-5C LPCI M-29 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 2C-1502 Note 13 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-2-1501-5D LPCI M-29 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 2D-1502 Note 13 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

B-21

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1501-18B, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI Note 5 MO-2-1501-19B, (Sht. 1) injection flow from the RPV to the wetwell therefore MO-2-1501-20B, reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-2-1501-21B and MO-2-1501-38B MO-2-1501-27B LPCI M-29 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI Note 5 and (Sht. 1) injection flow from the RPV to drywell spray ring header MO-2-1501-28B therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-2-1501-11B LPCI M-29 Spurious closure will divert all LPCI pump discharge Note 15 (Sht. 1) through containment cooling heat exchanger 2B-1503.

  • MO-2-1402-4B, CS & LPCI M-27 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI RPV Note 5 MO-2-1501-20B M-29 injection flow to the core spray piping therefore reducing and (Sht. 1) the injection flow to the RPV.

MO-2-1501-38B MO-2-1501-32A LPCI M-29 Spurious closure of these valves will isolate LPCI "B" and (Sht. 1) pumps from LPCI "A" RPV injection piping thus MO-2-1501-32B eliminating a possible RPV injection path.

MO-2-1501-13B LPCI M-29 Failure of this valve in the open position will divert LPCI Note 16 (Sht. 1) pump discharge from RPV to wetwell therefore bypassing heat exchanger 2B-1503. This failure will result in a reduction in the RPV injection flow.

B-22

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-1501-3B SW M-29 Failure of this valve in the closed position will isolate the Note 16 (Sht. 1) service water flow from the containment cooling heat exchanger. This will defeat the heat removal capabilities of the LPCI system.

SO-2-220-47 Head Vent M-26 Spurious opening of head vent valves could result in loss Note 5 and (Sht. 1) of inventory.

SO-2-220-46 MO-2-1501-22B, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling flow from Note 6 MO-2-1501-38B (Sht. 1) RPV to wetwell.

and MO-2-1501-20B MO-2-1501-22B, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling from RPV to Notes 6 MO-2-1501-21B, (Sht. 1) torus spray header.

MO-2-1501-18B and MO-2-1501-19B MO-2-1501-22B, LPCI M-29 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling from RPV to Note 13 MO-2-1501-21B, (Sht. 1) drywell spray header.

MO-2-1501-27B, and MO-2-1501-28B B-23

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution AO-3-1904-5-7 FPC M-50 Spurious opening of the valve could divert part of the Note 22 isolation condenser makeup water to the fuel pool cooling and cleanup piping.

AO-3-1905-5-14 FPC M-50 Spurious opening of the valve could divert part of the Note 22 isolation condenser makeup water to the fuel pool cooling and cleanup piping.

TCV-3-3901 SW M-22 Spurious opening diverts isolation condenser makeup or Note 14 shutdown cooling heat removal water to the circulating water discharge header.

MO-3-3901 SW M-355 Spurious operation of these valves could divert Unit 2 Note 5 and service water to the Unit 3 condenser.

MO-3-3902 MO-2-1904-5-7 FPC M-50 Spurious opening of the valve could divert part of the Note 22 isolation condenser makeup water to the fuel pool cooling and cleanup piping. (This assumes that check valve 2-1999-101 is drawn backwards on the P&ID.)

MO-2-1904-5-14 FPC M-50 Spurious opening of the valve could divert part of the Note 22 isolation condenser makeup water to the fuel pool cooling and cleanup piping. (This assumes that check valve 2-1999-101 is drawn backwards on the P&ID.)

B-24

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 2 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution AO-2-0302-158A(B) CRD M-34 Simultaneous opening of the two valves in a scram Note 23 AO-2-0302-157A(B) discharge volume drain or vent line could result in loss of AO-2-0302-160A(B) reactor inventory.

AO-2-0302-161A(B)

MO2-0301-2A(B) CRD M-34 Spurious closure of these valves could result in loss of Note 29 RPV make-up capability.

B-25

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • AO-3-203-1A MS M-345 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 19 and (Shts. 1&2) through main steamline.
  • AO-3-203-2A
  • AO-3-203-1B MS M-345 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 19 and (Shts. 1&2) through main steamline.
  • AO-3-203-2B
  • AO-3-203-1C MS M-345 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 19 and (Shts. 1&2) through main steamline.
  • AO-3-203-2C
  • AO-3-203-1D MS M-345 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 19 and (Shts. 1&2) through main steamline.
  • AO-3-203-2D
  • MO-3-220-1 MS M-345 Spurious opening will result in loss of reactor coolant Note 20 and (Shts. 1&2) through drains and restrictive orifices RO-3-220-91A, B,
  • MO-3-220-2 C and D to main steamline and through RO-3-220-95 to condenser.
  • MO-3-220-1, MS M-345 Spurious opening of these four valves combination Note 5
  • MO-3-220-2 (Shts. 1&2) results in loss of reactor coolant through drains to main and steamline.
  • MO-3-220-3 B-26

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • MO-3-220-1, MS M-345 Spurious opening of these three valves results in loss of Notes 5 & 26

and

  • MO-3-220-4 Target Rock Valve MS M-345 Spurious opening will vent RPV inventory to Note 9 3-203-3A (Sht. 1) suppression pool.

or Electromatic Relief Valves 3-203-3B or 3-203-3C or 3-203-3D or 3-203-3E Check Valves & (MO RF M-347 For opening of isolation valves, leakage through check Note 4 and/or AO) Isolation valves is lost to condenser.

Valves such as

  • MO-3-3205A and
  • MO-3-3205B B-27

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • AO-3-1402-9A CS M-358 Spurious opening of both valves will subject the class Note 7 and 300 core spray piping to and from the associated core
  • AO-3-1402-25A spray pump to the RPV pressure. Elevated pressures could result in the relief valves opening to the RB equipment drain tanks.
  • AO-3-1402-9B CS M-358 Spurious opening of both valves will subject the class Note 7 and 300 core spray piping to and from the associated core
  • MO-3-1402-25B spray pump to the RPV pressure. Elevated pressures could result in the relief valves opening to the RB equipment drain tanks.

B-28

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-1201-1 RWCU M-361 Failure in the open position may cause system pressure Note 24 and to build in low pressure piping downstream of PCV MO-3-1201-2 1217 and fluid inventory may be lost to the condenser or and/or the RB equipment drains via the relief valves.

MO-3-1201-1A and MO-3-1201-2 or MO-3-1201-1 and MO-3-1201-3 and MO-3-1201-4 or MO-3-1201-1A and MO-3-1201-3 and MO-3-1201-4 PCV-3-1217

  • PCV-3-1220 RWCU M-361 Opening will vent system inventory to condenser or Note 20 and waste tank.
  • MO-3-1201-11 B-29

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • PCV-3-1220 RWCU M-361 Opening would vent to condenser or waste tank. Note 20 and
  • MO-3-1201-12 MO-3-1301-1 IC M-359 Spurious closure will isolate RPV from isolation Notes 10 & 11 or condenser. Note: MO-3-1301-1 is in the drywell and is MO-3-1301-2 inaccessible.

MO-3-1301-3 IC M-359 Failure to open prevents the condensed steam from Note 11 returning from the isolation condenser coil to the RPV.

This defeats the natural circulation path.

MO-3-1301-4 IC M-359 Spurious closure defeats the natural circulation path for Note 10 the isolation condenser. Note: This valve is located in the drywell and is therefore inaccessible.

MO-3-1301-10 IC M-359 Spurious closure isolates makeup to isolation condenser Note 11 or from the service water system.

MO-3-4102 MO-3-4399-74 IC M-369 Spurious closure isolates condenser makeup from the Note 11 clean demineralized water storage tank.

AO-3-1301-17 IC M-359 Spurious failure in the open position would allow reactor Note 25 AO-3-1301-20 loss of reactor inventory.

Valve-3906 FP M-23 Spurious closure isolates service water from isolation Note 27 condenser. Defeats makeup.

B-30

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-2-3901 SW M-22 Spurious opening diverts service water flow to main Note 5 and condenser hotwell which reduces isolation condenser

TCV-2-3901 SW M-22 Fails open. Diverts service water from the isolation Note 14 condenser makeup or the shutdown

  • MO-3-0302-8 CRD M-365 Spurious closure prevents RPV makeup from cooling Note 21 or water line during shutdown with the isolation condenser
  • AO-3-0302-6A and AO-3-0302-6B MO-3-1001-1A SC M-363 Failure of these valves to open isolates the shutdown Notes 6 & 8 and cooling system from the RPV.

MO-3-1001-1B MO-3-1001-2A, SC M-363 Failure of these valves to open isolates the shutdown Notes 6 & 8 MO-3-1001-2B, cooling system from the RPV.

and MO-3-1001-2C MO-3-1001-4A, SC M-363 Failure of these valves to open isolates the shutdown Note 6 MO-3-1001-4B cooling system from the RPV.

and MO-3-1001-4C B-31

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-1001-5A SC M-363 Failure of these valves to open isolates the shutdown Note 6 and cooling system from the RPV.

MO-3-1001-5B

  • AO-3-1501-25A LPCI M-360 Spurious closure isolates the shutdown cooling system Note 7 and (Sht. 1) from the RPV. Both valves are inaccessible since they
  • AO-3-1501-25B are located in the drywell.

MO-3-1501-22A, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling flow from Note 6 MO-3-1501-38A (Sht. 1) RPV to wetwell.

and MO-3-1501-20A MO-3-1501-22A, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling flow from Note 6 MO-3-1501-21A, (Sht. 1) RPV injection piping to torus spray heater.

MO-3-1501-18A and MO-3-1501-19A MO-3-1501-22A, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling flow from Notes 5 & 6 MO-3-1501-21A, (Sht. 1) RPV to the drywell spray header.

MO-3-1501-27A and MO-3-1501-28A B-32

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-0202-4A (N.O.) Rx M-357 Spurious opening provides a flow path for the shutdown Note 5 & 6 and Recirc. (Sht. 1) cooling flow which bypasses the RPV and defeats the MO-3-0202-5A (N.O.) system. Note: These valves are located in the drywell and are inaccessible.

MO-3-3701 RBCCW M-353 Spurious closure blocks the cooling water flow for the Note 6 shutdown cooling pumps.

MO-3-3704 RBCCW M-353 Spurious closure blocks cooling water flow to the Note 6 shutdown cooling heat exchangers.

TCV-3-3904A SW M-355 Spurious closure blocks service water flow to the Note 6 and RBCCWS heat exchanger which removes decay heat via TCV-3-3904B the shutdown cooling system.

3-5772-101 DG M-974 Spurious closure of exhaust isolation damper will cause Note 16 (Isolation Damper) Ventilation the heat load to be trapped in the diesel generator cubicle. High temperature may prevent 72-hour operation.

  • S0-3-5201 DO M-41 Spurious failure to close while filling day tank (3-5202) Note 16 (Sht. 2) Transfer would overflow diesel oil to drains. This would reduce fuel oil supply for emergency power.

MO-3-2301-6 HPCI M-374 Spurious closure will isolate the HPCI pumps from Note 16 condensate storage tank 2/3B-3303.

MO-3-2301-9 HPCI M-374 Spurious closure will isolate the HPCI injection from the Note 16 RPV.

B-33

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-2301-8 HPCI M-374 Failure of this valve to open will isolate HPCI injection Note 16 from the RPV.

  • AO-3-2301-7 HPCI M-374 Spurious opening could result in loss of reactor coolant. Note 7 MO-3-2301-35 HPCI M-374 Failure of these valves to open prevents the HPCI pumps Note 4 and from draining water from the suppression pool.

MO-3-2301-36 MO-3-2301-14 HPCI M-374 Spurious opening of valve will divert HPCI injection Note 16 flow to the wetwell thus reducing HPCI injection into RPV, also provides a path for CST drain down.

MO-3-2301-10 HPCI M-374 Spurious opening of these valves would divert part of Note 5 and HPCI injection flow from RPV to CST 2/3B-3303.

MO-3-2301-15

  • PCV-3-2301-46 HPCI M-374 Spurious closure will isolate the HPCI turbine gland seal Note 17 condenser and lube oil cooler coolant flow from the HPCI pump discharge.
  • MO-3-2301-48 HPCI M-374 Spurious closure will isolate the HPCI turbine gland seal Note 11 condenser and lube oil cooler coolant flow and will isolate the HPCI suction from the condenser hotwell.

SO-3-3301 Condensate M-348 Spurious operation of these valves could cause CST Note 30 SO-3-3302 drain down.

B-34

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical 3

Spurious Component1,2 System Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-2301-3 HPCI M-374 Failure of this valve in the closed position will isolate the Note 16 RPB steam supply to the HPCI turbine.

Spurious opening of this valve would result in loss of Note 28 reactor inventory to the suppression pool.

MO-3-2301-4 HPCI M-374 Failure of these valves in the closed position will isolate Note 16 or the HPCI turbine from the RPV steam supply. Note:

MO-3-2301-5 MO-3-2301 is located in the drywell and is inaccessible.

MO-3-1501-5A LPCI M-360 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 3A-1502 Note 12 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool reducing the pool cooling flow.

MO-3-1501-5B LPCI M-360 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 3B-1502 Note 12 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool reducing the pool flow.

MO-3-1501-18A LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 and (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the torus full flow test line to MO-3-1501-19A the torus spray header.

MO-3-1501-20A, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 MO-3-1501-38A (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the torus spray header to the and torus full flow test line.

MO-3-1501-21A B-35

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-1501-22A, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening could result in loss of reactor Note 7

  • AO-3-1501-25A (Sht. 1) inventory.

and MO-3-1501-21A MO-3-1501-27A LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 and (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the wetwell to the drywell spray MO-3-1501-28A ring header thus reducing pool cooling flow.

MO-3-1501-22A SC & LPCI M-363 Spurious opening of these valves would allow shutdown Note 6 MO-3-1501-38A M-360 cooling flow to enter the wetwell through the torus fuel and (Sht. 1) flow test line.

MO-3-1501-20 MO-3-1501-22A, SC & LPCI M-363 Spurious opening of these valves would allow shutdown Note 6 MO-3-1501-21A, M-360 cooling flow to enter the wetwell through the torus spray MO-3-1501-18A (Sht. 1) header.

and MO-3-1501-19A MO-3-1501-32B LPCI M-360 Spurious closure of these valves will isolate LPCI "A" Note 6 and (Sht. 1) pump from LPCI "B" wetwell injection eliminating a MO-3-1501-32A possible injection path.

MO-3-1501-11A LPCI M-360 Spurious closure will divert all LPCI pump discharge Note 6 (Sht. 1) through containment cooling heat exchanger 3A-1503.

B-36

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • MO-3-1402-4A CS M-358 Spurious opening of valve would divert LPCI pool Notes 5, 12 cooling return flow to the core spray/RPV injection piping.

MO-3-1501-13A LPCI M-360 Failure of this valve in the open position would direct Note 6 LPCI pump discharge directly to the wetwell thus bypassing heat exchanger 3B-1503. The end result is a reduction in the LPCI heat removal capacity.

MO-3-1501-3A SW M-360 Failure of this valve in the closed position would isolate Note 6 (Sht. 1) the service water return from the containment cooling heat exchanger. This failure would completely detect the heat removal capability of the LPCI system.

MO-3-1501-5C LPCI M-360 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 3C-1502 Note 16 (Sht. 1) suction from suppression pool.

MO-3-1501-5D LPCI M-360 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 3D-1502 Note 16 (Sht. 1) suction from suppression pool.

MO-3-1501-18B LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 and (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the torus fuel flow test line to MO-3-1501-19B the torus spray header.

MO-3-1501-38B, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 MO-3-1501-20B (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the torus spray header to the and torus fuel flow test line.

MO-3-1501-21B B-37

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-1501-21B, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening could result in loss of reactor Note 7 MO-3-1501-22B (Sht. 1) inventory.

and

  • AO-3-1501-25B MO-3-1501-27B LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI pool Note 5 and (Sht. 1) coolant return flow from the wetwell to the drywell spray MO-3-1501-28B ring header.

MO-3-1501-22B, SC & LPCI M-363 Spurious opening of these valves would allow shutdown Note 6 MO-3-1501-38B M-360 cooling flow to enter the wetwell through the torus fuel and (Sht. 1) flow test line.

MO-3-1501-20B MO-3-1501-22B, SP & LPCI M-363 Spurious opening of these valves would allow shutdown Note 6 MO-3-1501-21B, M-360 cooling flow to enter the wetwell through the torus spray MO-3-1501-18B (Sht. 1) header.

and MO-3-1501-19B MO-3-1501-32B LPCI M-360 Spurious closure of these valves will isolate LPCI "B" Note 6 and (Sht. 1) pump from LPCI "A" wetwell injection MO-3-1501-32A MO-3-1501-11B LPCI M-360 Spurious closure will divert all LPCI pump discharge Note 15 (Sht. 1) through containment cooling heat exchanger 3-B-1503.

B-38

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution

  • MO-3-1402-4B CS M-358 Spurious opening of valve would divert LPCI pool Note 18 cooling return flow to the core spray/RPV injection piping.

MO-3-1501-13B LPCI M-360 Failure of these valve in the open position would divert Note 16 (Sht. 1) LPCI pump discharge directly to the wetwell thus bypassing heat exchanger 3A-1503. This failure would result in a reduction in the LPCI heat removal capability.

MO-3-1501-3B SW M-360 Spurious closure of this valve would isolate the service Note 16 (Sht. 1) water flow from the containment cooling heat exchanger.

This failure would completely defeat the heat removal capability of the LPCI cooling system.

MO-3-1501-5A LPCI M-360 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 3A-1502 Note 12 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-5B LPCI M-360 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 3B-1502 Note 12 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

B-39

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-1501-18A, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI Note 5 MO-3-1501-19A, (Sht. 1) injection flow from the RPV to the wetwell therefore MO-3-1501-20A, reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-21A and MO-3-1501-38A MO-3-1501-27A LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI Note 5 and (Sht. 1) injection flow from the RPV to the drywell spray ring MO-3-1501-28A header therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-11A LPCI M-360 Spurious closure will divert all LPCI pump discharge Note 12 (Sht. 1) through containment cooling heat exchanger 3A-1503.

MO-3-1501-32A LPCI M-360 Spurious closure of these valves will isolate LPCI "A" Note 13 and (Sht. 1) pumps from LPCI "B" RPV injection piping thus MO-3-1501-32B eliminating a possible injection path.

  • MO-3-1402-4A, LPCI & CS M-360 Spurious opening of valves would divert LPCI RPV Note 5 MO-3-1501-38A (Sht. 1) injection flow to the core spray piping thus reducing and M-358 RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-20A MO-3-1501-13A LPCI M-360 Failure of this valve in the open position would direct Note 13 (Sht. 1) LPCI pump discharge directly to the wetwell. The end result being a reduction in the RPV injection flow.

B-40

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-1501-3A SW M-360 Failure of this valve in the closed position would isolate Note 12 (Sht. 1) the service water return from the containment cooling heat exchanger. This failure would completely defect the heat removal capability of the LPCI system.

MO-3-1501-5C LPCI M-360 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 3C-1502 Note 13 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-5D LPCI M-360 Spurious valve closure will isolate LPCI pump 3D-1502 Note 13 (Sht. 1) suction from the suppression pool therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-18B, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI Note 5 MO-3-1501-19B, (Sht. 1) injection flow from the RPV to the wetwell therefore MO-3-1501-20B, reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-21B and MO-3-1501-38B MO-3-1501-27B LPCI M-360 Spurious opening of these valves would divert LPCI Note 5 and (Sht. 1) injection flow from the RPV to the drywell spray ring MO-3-1501-28B header therefore reducing RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-11B LPCI M-360 Spurious closing will divert all LPCI pump discharge Note 15 (Sht. 1) through containment cooling heat exchanger 3B-1503.

B-41

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-1501-32A LPCI M-360 Spurious closure will isolate LPCI "B" pumps from Note 13 and (Sht. 1) LPCI "A" RPV injection piping thus eliminating a MO-3-1501-32B possible injection path.

MO-3-1402-4B, LPCI & CS M-360 Spurious opening of valves would divert LPCI RPV Note 5 MO-3-1501-20B (Sht. 1) injection to the core spray injection piping.

and M-358 MO-3-1501-38B MO-3-1501-13B LPCI M-360 Failure of this valve in the open position would divert Note 16 (Sht. 1) LPCI pump discharge to the wetwell. This failure would result in a reduction in the LPCI RPV injection flow.

MO-3-1501-3B SW M-360 Spurious closure of this valve would isolate the service Note 16 (Sht. 1) water flow from the containment cooling heat exchanger.

This failure would completely defeat the heat removal capability of the LPCI system.

SO-3-220-47 Head Vent M-357 Spurious opening of head vent valves could result in loss Note 5 and (Sht. 1) of inventory.

SO-3-220-46 MO-3-1501-22B, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling flow from Note 6 MO-3-1501-38B (Sht. 1) RPV to wetwell.

and MO-3-1501-20B B-42

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE B-2 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS COMPONENT OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN - DRESDEN UNIT 3 Potential Mechanical/Electrical Spurious Component1,2 System3 Drawings Concern With Malfunction Resolution MO-3-1501-22B, LPCI M-360 Spurious opening diverts shutdown cooling from RPV to Notes 5 & 6 MO-3-1501-21B, (Sht. 1) drywell spray header.

MO-3-1501-18B and MO-3-1501-19B AO-3-0301-156 A(B) CRD M-365 Simultaneous spurious opening of two valves in a scram Note 23 AO-3-0301-157 A(B) discharge volume drain or vent line could result in loss AO-3-0301-160 A(B) of reactor inventory AO-3-0301-161 A(B)

MO3-0301-2A(B) CRD M-365 Spurious closure of these valves could result in loss of Note 29 RPV make-up capability.

B-43

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Objective Paragraph 50.48(b) of 10CFR50, which became effective on February 17, 1981, requires all nuclear plants licensed to operate prior to January 1, 1979, to comply with III.G, III.J and III.O, of Appendix R to 10CFR50, regardless of the status of previous Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reports (FPSERs).

Section III.G requires that fire protection features be provided for those systems, structures, and components important to safe shutdown. These features must be capable of limiting fire damage so that:

1. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the main control room or the emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage, and
2. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the main control room or the emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

Section III.L of Appendix R and Enclosure 1 "Staff Position" of Generic Letter 81-12 (February 20, 1981) provide additional guidance on the NRC Staff's requirements for this safe shutdown capability.

Section III.J requires that emergency lighting units with at least an 8-hour battery power supply shall be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.

Section III.O establishes requirements for oil collection systems for Reactor Coolant Pumps.

This section is not applicable to Dresden 2&3 because the containment is inerted during normal operation.

The objective of this analysis is to provide technical basis for achieving compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R, Sections III.G, III.L and III.J. This objective is achieved by first identifying the minimum set of equipment necessary to achieve safe shutdown. This equipment will be referred to as Appendix R safe shutdown equipment. (Note: Dresden Station has other systems for achieving safe shutdown.) Then, this equipment is evaluated on a fire area basis to determine if there is adequate separation or an alternate shutdown method is available independent of the subject fire area. A plant walkdown was performed to verify the adequacy of emergency lighting to support manual operations. Where deficiencies have been found, a modification has been proposed and/or an exemption from the specific Appendix R requirements has been requested. The exemption requests are found in Volume 3 of the Fire Protection Program Documentation Package (F.P.P.D.P.) and the modifications are discussed in Section 6.0 of this report. For the purposes of this analysis, proposed modifications and procedures are assumed to have been implemented.

1.1-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 1.1.1 Development of the 1985 Safe Shutdown Report The major inputs to the safe shutdown report are the 1982 Associated Circuits Report and the 1984 Interim Measures/Exemption Requests. Additional inputs to the safe shutdown report are listed below along with the associated reports or studies used to prepare them.

1. Associated Circuits Analysis
a. Valve spurious operations analysis
b. Maloperation analysis
c. Spurious breaker operation analysis
d. Current transformer/control power transformer analysis
e. Redundant fusing of control circuit analysis
f. Coordinated fault protection analysis
g. Cable discrepancy study
2. Timeline Analysis
a. Reactor water makeup time consideration
3. Communication Capabilities Review
4. Accessibility Study of Safe Shutdown Equipment
a. Identification of manual actions
5. Location of Emergency Lighting
a. Identification of manual actions
b. Identification of access paths
c. Physical location of the equipment 1.1-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 1.2 Safe Shutdown Functions and Assumptions This report documents the review of the required safe shutdown functions to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions for Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3. The development of this report is described in Subsection 1.1.1.

The specific safe shutdown functions necessary to satisfy the Appendix R criteria of achieving and maintaining hot and cold shutdown, are as follows:

1. Reactivity Control
2. Reactor Coolant Makeup
3. Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal
4. Suppression Pool Cooling
5. Process Monitoring
6. Support.

These safe shutdown functions are described in Chapter 3.

Various analytical methods can be used to determine that sufficient plant systems are available to perform the identified safe shutdown functions. Numerous plant systems are normally available, alone or in combination with other systems, to provide these required functions. However, the exact location and specific effects of fires cannot be precisely determined. In general, recognizing the confined nature of fires in nuclear plant environments, the inherent operational flexibility, physical diversity of system available to achieve safe shutdown, and appropriate plant fire protection features limit the potential fire damage to the extent that unaffected plant systems will be available to attain safe shutdown. An extensive effort would be required to identify the effects of a postulated fire on all of the plant systems that are available to support safe shutdown in any particular fire area. As an alternative to such an approach, a minimum set of plant systems (Appendix R safe shutdown systems) and components were identified in response to the requirements of Appendix R. This minimum set of systems and components can achieve and maintain safe shutdown with or without a loss of offsite power for a fire at any location in the plant. The development of the minimum set of equipment to achieve and maintain safe shutdown was through an iterative process and is shown on Figure 1.2-1. The process of identifying the safe shutdown equipment started with a review of the unit system descriptions. Using the guidance of Generic Letter 81-12, system P&IDs, wiring diagrams, and cable routing diagrams, an essential and associated circuit review was accomplished. The unit cable charts were then produced and used as an aid to identify the minimum set of equipment available to achieve and maintain hot shutdown for each fire area.

Adequate protection of this minimum set of plant systems from the effects of postulated fires constitutes an adequate and conservative approach to show the ability to achieve and maintain cold shutdown for the purpose of fire protection. Spurious operations of components that may adversely affect safe shutdown systems have been identified and are addressed within this report.

(Refer to Sections 5.1 and 5.6.) The number of modifications were minimized by taking credit for manual operation of existing equipment wherever possible. See subsection 3.3 for assumptions for the associated circuits analysis.

1.2-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Figure 1.2-2 describes the development of Exemption Requests and Interim Measures for Dresden Units 2 and 3.

The safe shutdown systems selected for Dresden Station, Units 2 and 3, are capable of achieving and maintaining safe hot shutdown conditions in the reactor, maintaining reactor coolant inventory, commencing activities to achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after scram, and maintaining cold shutdown conditions thereafter assuming a "worst case" fire.

For this analysis, the following assumptions have been made:

1. The "worst case" fires are not postulated to be simultaneous with non-fire related failures in safety systems, plant accidents, outages of components or systems required for safe shutdown or the most severe natural phenomena. Loss of offsite power is assumed possible simultaneous with the fire.
2. The postulated "worst case" fire is assumed to disable all equipment and cabling within each fire area (or equivalent fire area/zone group) except where a) equipment or cables are protected by fire barriers or b) components such as pipes, heat exchangers, valves, and CRD hydraulic units are filled with water. Exceptions to this postulated damage are identified in specific exemption requests.
3. No random single failure is considered other than those failures directly attributable to the fire. Only a single spurious valve operation is postulated to occur as a result of the fire where multiple valves are provided in series except in a high-low pressure interface (see assumption 4).
4. For valves in a high-low pressure interface line the simultaneous spurious operation of all normally closed valves in series is assumed.
5. The station is operating at 100% power upon occurrence of a fire.
6. Credit is taken for reactor scram and verification of control rod insertion from the control room. Should control room evacuation be necessary, reactor scram will be initiated by procedure prior to evacuation. Reactor scram may be either manually or automatically initiated.
7. In respect to the usage of offsite power to provide safe shutdown for the plant, it was assumed that if offsite power is available, it will be utilized.

1.2-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 1.3 Report Overview This report contains seven sections. Section 2 identifies the fire areas and equivalent fire areas that were evaluated to support the Appendix R analyses described in this report. Criteria for establishing fire areas are discussed.

Section 3 describes the minimum safe shutdown system and components analyzed. A description of the relevant types of associated circuits reviewed is provided.

Section 4 describes the results of the hot and cold safe shutdown analysis for each fire area.

Section 5 describes the supporting associated circuits analyses including spurious valve operation, breaker spurious operation, CT/CPT, redundant refusing, and coordinate fault protection.

Section 6 provides a summary description of the various fire protection modifications necessary to achieve conformance or equivalence with the requirements of Appendix R.

Section 7 provides a discussion of the alternative Appendix R shutdown procedures. Also, the cold shutdown repair procedures are described.

1.3-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001

1.4 Background

As part of the continuing NRC evaluation following the fire at the Browns Ferry Nuclear Station in March 1975, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo) has outlined its fire protection program and features at Dresden Nuclear Power Station in a number of documents submitted to the NRC between 1976 and the present.

The document entitled, "Information Relevant to Fire Protection Systems and Programs-Parts 1-3, April 1977," (see F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1-3) provided CECo's response to the NRC's initial request for a comparison of the fire protection provisions of Dresden Station with the guidelines of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1. This was CECo's first Fire Hazards Analysis of Dresden Station and resulted in a number of fire protection modifications.

CECo also responded to NRC guidelines regarding nuclear power plant fire protection programs issued in the following documents:

1. Supplementary Guidance on Information Needed for Fire Protection Evaluation, September 30, 1976,
2. Sample Technical Specifications, May 12, 1977, and
3. Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative Controls, and Quality Assurance, June 14, 1977.

Following the review of these CECo submittals and a plant inspection, the NRC staff docketed a Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report (FPSER) for Dresden Units 2 and 3 in March 1978. A staff letter of February 12, 1981, confirmed that all FPSER items were considered closed with the one exception being "Safe Shutdown Capabilities."

Implementation of these guidelines resulted in additional fire protection measures being incorporated to enhance the existing fire protection program and satisfy the NRC defense-in-depth philosophy. Many studies and much discussion were also associated with the subsequent NRC fire protection guidelines and requirements.

The fire protection rule, Appendix R of 10CFR50, was issued on February 19, 1981, for Dresden Units 2 and 3. At that time the shutdown analyses and subsequent related correspondence for Dresden Station were well underway and being reviewed by the NRC staff. CECo continued to provide the NRC staff with all necessary information for their review of the station's safe shutdown capability.

Generic Letter 81-12, "Fire Protection Rule," was issued on February 20, 1981. It presented the NRC staff positions on safe shutdown capability and contained a request for information regarding associated circuits. Subsequently, a clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 was issued which reworded the staff's positions and information requests regarding associated circuits. This clarification was transmitted to CECo for the Dresden Station by letter dated April 30, 1982.

1.4-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 On July 1, 1982, CECo submitted the final response and position to Generic Letter 81-12 questions, specifically Safe Shutdown Capability, Associated Circuits, and a listing of the exact shutdown methods and necessary safe shutdown modifications for Dresden Station. Submitted with this response was Dresden Station's Fire Protection Associated Circuits Analysis and Modifications Report (see F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1-3). The cable discrepancy report was revised and resubmitted August 13, 1982, as a supplement to the Modifications Report.

Enclosure E of the July 1, 1982, submittal included the first formal exemption request from the requirement of Appendix R Section III.G.3.b for fixed fire suppression. This request was made for 11 fire zones having electrical equipment critical to the power distribution necessary for normal and emergency operation of safety-related equipment for Units 2 and 3 at Dresden. A formal exemption was granted from the requirements of Section III.G.3 on February 2, 1983.

By cover letter dated January 19, 1983 (see F.P.P.D.P. Volume 1), the NRC staff stated that they had completed the review of Dresden 2 and 3 alternate shutdown capability which is used to achieve safe shutdown in the event of a fire. This capability was evaluated against the requirements of Sections III.G and III.L of Appendix R to 10CFR50. Based on this review, the NRC staff concluded that Dresden 2 and 3 was in compliance with Appendix R Items III.G.3 and III.L regarding safe shutdown in the event of a fire. A Safety Evaluation Report (SER) was written on this Appendix R review. The conclusion of this evaluation states:

"We (the NRC staff) have reviewed the licensee's proposed alternate shutdown capability for certain designated areas in Dresden Units 2 and 3 in accordance with Appendix R criteria. Based on that review, we conclude that the performance goals for accomplishing safe shutdown in the event of a fire, i.e., reactivity control, inventory control, decay heat removal, pressure control, process monitoring, and support functions are met by the proposed alternate in these areas.

Therefore, we conclude that the requirements of Appendix R Sections III.G.3 and III.L are satisfied in the areas identified in Section 2.2 of this Safety Evaluation."

On the basis of these conclusions, CECo management was confident that the intent of Appendix R has been satisfied and continued working to implement the identified modifications in accordance with 10CFR50.48 (c) (4).

On October 19, 1983, Generic Letter 83-33, which reemphasized NRC positions on certain requirements of Appendix R, was transmitted to Dresden 2 and 3. As a result, CECo management decided to perform a reevaluation of the previous analysis to verify that misinterpretations did not exist.

1.4-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 1.5 Governing Regulatory Guidelines The criteria used in this analysis are derived from the following regulatory documents that form the basis for the conclusions and recommendations.

1. "Fire Protection Program for Operating Nuclear Power Plants," 10CFR50 Appendix R (45 FR 76611, November 19, 1980, and 46 FR 44735, September 8, 1981).

This program requires reasonable assurance be provided that at least one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown remains free of fire damage in the unlikely event of fire in any plant area. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions may likewise be protected or repaired to the extent that cold shutdown can be achieved within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

2. Letter to All Power Reactor Licensees with Plants Licensed Prior to January 1, 1979, from Mr. D. G. Eisenhut (NRR/DL),

Subject:

"Fire Protection Rule 45 FR 76602, November 19, 1980 - Generic Letter 81-12," dated February 20, 1981.

This letter was issued subsequent to the promulgation of Appendix R. The purpose of the letter was to identify and clarify the information required for Staff review of licensing submittals describing safe shutdown functions, systems, components and their associated circuits. To this end, Generic Letter 81-12 supplements the final rule and provides additional criteria that must be considered.

3. Memorandum to Mr. D. G. Eisenhut (NRR/DL) from Dr. R. J. Mattson (NRR/DSI),

Subject:

"Fire Protection Rule - Appendix R," dated March 22, 1982 (Clarification of Generic Letter 81-12).

Generic Letter 81-12 was clarified by this "Clarification Letter" and transmitted to power reactor licensees between March and May 1982. This letter provided the following:

a. Clarification of the NRC's request for information concerning the alternative or dedicated shutdown system,
b. Clarification of the definition of associated circuits, and
c. Clarification of NRC request for information concerning associated circuits.
4. Memorandum to Mr. R. H. Vollmer (NRR/DE) from Dr. R. J. Mattson (NRR/DSI),

Subject:

"Position Paper on Allowable Repairs for Alternative Shutdown and the Appendix R Requirement for Time Required to Achieve Cold Shutdown, "dated July 2, 1982.

The Mattson to Vollmer memorandum addressed two issues concerning safe shutdown, allowable repairs to achieve safe shutdown, and allowable time to achieve safe shutdown.

1.5-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 These issues had resulted from a lack of definition for the term "repairs" and apparent inconsistencies in requirements for repair and shutdown activities relative to the 72-hour limit. This memorandum resolved the principal aspects of these issues as follows:

a. Repair
1. Repair activities may not be credited in assuming hot shutdown system availability.
2. Manual operation of valves, switches, and circuit breakers is not considered to be a repair activity and, hence, is allowable for hot shutdown systems.
3. Modifications, e.g., wiring changes, are allowed for cold shutdown systems and/or components that are not used for hot shutdown or whose fire-or fire suppressant-induced maloperations could directly affect hot shutdown systems; these repairs must be achievable prior to the maloperations causing an unrecoverable plant condition.
4. Fuse removal (under most circumstances) from control circuitry is not allowed for maintaining hot shutdown system availability or mitigating the consequence of potential spurious operation candidates (i.e., post-fire fuse removal from control circuitry of a MOV does not adequately assure that the MOV did not spuriously operate).
5. Fuse removal from either the circuitry of a dc-powered pilot solenoid controlling an air-operated valve (fail in a safe position) or the control circuitry of an electrically-operated valve starter or switchgear breaker to take manual control of the component is not considered to be a repair activity.
b. Time
1. The sum of the repair time and time to achieve cold shutdown must be less than or equal to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The plant must be capable of achieving cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using onsite power only.
2. Offsite power is assumed to be restored after 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The equipment and systems not needed until 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> may be powered by offsite power only.

The plant must be at cold shutdown before offsite power is postulated as being available.

5. Memorandum to Dr. R. J. Mattson (NRR/DSI) from Mr. L. S. Rubenstein (DSI/AD),

Subject:

"Statement of Staff Position Regarding Source Range Flux, Reactor Coolant Temperature and Steam Generator Pressure Indication to Meet Appendix R, Alternate Shutdown Capability," dated January 7, 1983.

1.5-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 The Staff documented the process monitoring criteria for Appendix R compliance in the Rubenstein to Mattson memorandum. This document identified the following BWR instrument requirements:

a. Reactor Water Level and Pressure,
b. Suppression Pool Level and Temperature,
c. Isolation Condenser Level,
d. Diagnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems, and
e. Level Indication for All Tanks Used.
6. NRC Positions on Certain Requirements of Appendix R to 10CFR50 (Generic Letter 83-
33) dated October 19, 1983. Generic Letter 83-33 addressed the inconsistencies between the Staff and licensees' interpretation of certain requirements of Appendix R subsequent to evaluation of exemption requests. NRC staff position on the following issues were presented.
a. Detection and Automatic Suppression
b. Fire Areas
c. Structural Steel Related to Fire Barriers
d. Fixed Suppression System
e. Intervening Combustibles
f. Transient Fire Hazards 1.5-3

AMENDMENT 12 APRIL 1977 FIRE HAZARD ANALYSIS .

JUNE 1978 SAFE SHUTDOVN <SSD) ANALYSIS

. JANUARY 1980 SSD SUPPLEMENT I <COLD SHUTDO\JN) l SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS i - - . a - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,

GENERC \./IRING CABLE P&.ID LETTER DIAGRAMS ROUTINGS CECO CECO CLARIFICATION SCHEMATIC EQUIPMENT

  • PER. REVIE\J TO GENERIC DIAGRAMS LOCATIONS INPUT LETTER 81-12 1982 ST A TION DESIGN 1982 ESSENTIAL g, ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT REVIEV 1982 CABLE CHARTS NO 1982 FINAL CABLE CHARTS DISCREPANCY TABLE MODS B.

MANUAL ACTIONS ASSOCIATED JULY 1982 DRESDEN STATION CIRCUITS EXEMPTION Units 2 & 3 ANALYSIS REQUESTS JUNE 1982 FIGURE 1.2-1 (ZONE BASIS)

DEVELOPMENT OF DRESDEN 1982 ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS

AMENDMENT 12 JANUARY 1980 JUNE 1982 SAFE SHUTDOVN REPORT ASSOCIATED l SUPPLEMENT I (COLD SHUTDOVN)

..___ _, - CIRCUITS ANALYSIS

<ZONE BASIS)

CHANGE FROM GENERC ZONE TO AREA LETTER APPROACH SYSTEM DESCRIPTION VIRING CABLE PB.ID DIAGRAMS ROUTINGS CECO SCHEMATIC CECO EQUIPMENT

  • PER. REVIE\./ DIAGRAMS LOCATIONS INPUT REVIE\./ OF 1982 TO 1984 MODS 1982 CABLE CHARTS ESSENTIAL 8. ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT REVIE\./

OF 1982 TO 1984 MODS 1984 CABLE CHARTS CONDUIT INCLUDES ALL MODS AS BUILT TO 1984 EXCEPT APP R MODS D\./G'S CABLE ROUTINGS FOR MODS MINI-MAPS RESULT ING FROM 1982 ASSOCIATED CIRCUIT *ANALYSIS PLC 1977 FHA &.

FIRE BARRIER REVIE\.J ZONE INTERACTION ANALYSIS A

DRESDEN STATION Units 2 8x 3 CONT'D ON FIGURE 1.2-2 PAGE 2 OF 2 DEVELOPMENT OF DRESDEN 1982 EXEMPTION REQUESTS AND INTERIM MEASURES (SHEET 1 OF 2)

AMENDMENT 12 CONT'D FROM PAGE 1 OF 2

(

DEFINE FIRE AREAS AND SAFE SHUTDOVN PATHS DISCREPENCY CABLES IDENTIFY IDENTIFY MODIFICATION MANUAL IDENTIFY EXEMPTION REQUIRED REQUESTS REQUIRED ACTIONS REQUIRED INTERIM MEASURES ORIGINAL EXEMPTION REQUESTS SUBMITTED AUGUST 1984 ELECTRICAL MECHANICAL MODIFICATIONS MODIFICATIONS REVISION I TO ORIGINAL EXEMPTIONS IN SEPTEMBER 1985 ADDITIONAL EXEMPTION REQUESTS SUBMITTED IN OCTOBER 1985 MAY 30, 1986 LETTER TO NRR r

l I

I I I VARIOUS EXEMPTIONS VITHDRAVN REQUEST NRR REVIEV VITHDRAVN REVISION I TO OCTOBER 1985 ADDITIONAL EXEMPTIONS REQUESTS EXEMPTIONS EXEMPTIONS: 7.2, 7.3 VRT 3.8,4.10, INDEPENDENCE 9.2 I I SEPTEMBER 1985 OCTOBER 1985 I

EXEMPTION REQUEST SUBMITTAL: SUBMITTAL: FOR DRYVELL 3.2, 3.3, 3.8, 4.8, 4.9 EXPANSION 4.2, 5.2 4.10, 9.1, GAP SUBMITTED 9.2, 10.1 IN JUNE 1986 DRESDEN STATION Units 2 & 3 FIGURE 1.2-2 l DEVELOPMENT OF DRESDEN 1982 EXEMPTION REQUESTS AND INTERIM MEASURES

<SHEET 2 OF 2)

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 2.0 IDENTIFICATION OF FIRE AREAS 2.1 Zone Interaction Analysis Procedure The Dresden 2 and 3 Associated Circuits Analysis and Modifications Report, submitted to the NRC in July 1982 in response to Generic Letter 82-12, was based on fire zones as defined in the 1977 Fire Hazards Analysis, not on fire areas. (See 1978 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report, F.P.R. Volume 5.) The 1982 report identified alternate shutdown methods to be utilized in the event of a fire in any fire zone and presented modifications related to both fire protection and safe shutdown which enhance the station personnel's ability to safely shut down in the event of a "worst case" fire. These modifications were not affected by the 1984 reanalysis. The Appendix R reverification analysis, documented in this report, confirmed that the shutdown methods identified for each fire zone and the modifications proposed in the 1982 report are indeed appropriate. However, in light of the staff positions presented in Generic Letter 83-33, some additional modifications were proposed as a result of the 1984 analysis to ensure separation between shutdown methods commensurate with the requirements of 10CFR50 Appendix R.

The 1984 reevaluation of Dresden Station Units 2 and 3 compliance with Section III.G of Appendix R was accomplished by conducting a fire zone interaction analysis. This method of analysis consists of examining individual plant fire zones and determining (a) what Appendix R safe shutdown components, including associated circuitry, are present in the zone, (b) what safe shutdown components are present in all adjacent zones, and (c) what constitutes the boundary between adjacent zones. Given this information and the location of equipment and cabling associated with the hot shutdown paths identified in the 1982 Associated Circuits Analysis, it was then determined where deviations from the criteria of Sections III.G and III.L of Appendix R existed. Where it was determined that a fire could possibly spread from a zone to an adjacent zone due to unsealed penetration, hatchways, etc., the configuration of equipment, cabling, and barriers was analyzed and a resolution was achieved in one of three ways:

1. The same safe shutdown path was verified to be available for a fire in both zones, so that a fire spread can be tolerated. These zones are now considered part of the same fire area (or equivalent fire area/zone group).
2. A modification was proposed to eliminate the deviation (e.g., upgrading of barriers, installation of suppression systems, rated fire wraps, etc.), or
3. An exemption to Appendix R was requested where the existing and/or proposed level of protection was equivalent to that of Section III.G. These exemption requests provide the justification for treating all equivalent fire areas/zone groups as fire areas in the safe shutdown analysis.

The exemption requests and proposed modifications were transmitted to the NRC by letter of August 10, 1984. Revision 1 to the exemption requests was transmitted to the NRC by letter of September 19, 1985. Subsequent exemption request information was transmitted to the NRC by letter of October 15, 1985. See F.P.R. Volume 4.

2.1-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 As a result of the Zone Interaction Analysis, each fire zone utilized in the 1982 analysis has been, in part or in total, incorporated into a fire area as shown in Table 2.1-1 and Figures 2.2-1, 2.2-2 and 2.2-3. These figures schematically show fire area boundaries and identify the hot shutdown path for each fire zone. The fire areas containing safe shutdown equipment and cable are separated from one another by 3-hour rated fire barriers or barriers that are equivalent to a 3-hour rated barrier. Several "equivalent fire areas" have been identified that are not separated by rated barriers nor are exemption requests provided to justify the boundaries of these "fire areas." These fire areas contain no safe shutdown equipment, are separated by substantial barriers for fire, and do not present a hazard to redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment. For each fire area, a shutdown path has been identified which would be free of fire damage and available to bring the plant to hot shutdown given a fire in that fire area. For each fire area, a cold shutdown path has been identified which would be repairable and capable of bringing the plant to cold shutdown within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> using onsite power only. The Dresden 2&3 fire areas are described in Section 2.2.

2.1-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 TABLE 2.1-1 APPENDIX R SHUTDOWN PATHS BY FIRE ZONE Equivalent Area Safe Shutdown Fire Zone /Zone Group Shutdown Path Analysis Section 1.1.1.1 RB3-II A1 4.5 1.1.1.2 RB3-II A1 4.5 1.1.1.3 RB3-II A1 4.5 1.1.1.4 RB3-II A1 4.5 1.1.1.5.A RB3-I D 4.4 1.1.1.5.B RB3-I D 4.4 1.1.1.5.C RB3-I D 4.4 1.1.1.5.D

  • RB3-II A1 4.5 1.1.1.6* RB3-II B 4.5 1.2.1** Drywell 4.6 1.3.1 RB3-II A1 4.5 1.4.1 RB3-I D 4.4 1.1.2.1 RB2-II B1 4.2 1.1.2.2 RB2-II B1 4.2 1.1.2.3 RB2-II B1 4.2 1.1.2.4 RB2-II B1 4.2 1.1.2.5.A RB2-I C 4.1 1.1.2.5.B RB2-I C 4.1 1.1.2.5.C RB2-I C 4.1 1.1.2.5.D* RB2-II B1 4.2 1.1.2.6* RB2-II A 4.2 1.2.2** Drywell 4.3 1.3.2 RB2-I C 4.1 2.0 TB-V A2 and B2 4.12 6.1 Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 6.2 TB-V A2 and B2 4.12 7.0.A.1 Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 7.0.A.2 Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 7.0.A.3 Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 7.0.B Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 8.1* Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 8.2.1.A Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 8.2.1.B Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 8.2.2.A Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 8.2.2.B Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 8.2.4 Western (TB-III) A1 4.10
  • No shutdown cable or equipment is located in this zone. All methods of shutdown are available.
    • Drywell is inerted, no fire postulated. All methods of shutdown available.

2.1-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 TABLE 2.1-1 APPENDIX R SHUTDOWN PATHS BY FIRE ZONE 8.2.5.A Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 8.2.5.B Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 8.2.5.C Central (TB-II) A2 and B2 4.9 8.2.5.D Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 8.2.5.E Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 8.2.6.A Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 8.2.6.B Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 8.2.6.C Central (TB-II) A2 and B2 4.9 8.2.6.D Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 8.2.6.E Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 8.2.7 Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 8.2.8.A TB-IV A and B* 4.11 8.2.8.B TB-IV A and B* 4.11 8.2.8.C TB-IV A and B* 4.11 8.2.8.D TB-IV A and B* 4.11 9.0.A Eastern (TB-I) B1 4.8 9.0.B Western (TB-III) A1 4.10 9.0.C Diesel Generator 2/3/ E and F 4.7 HPCI Rooms (RB 2/3) 11.1.1 RB3-II A1 4.5 11.1.2 RB3-II A1 4.5 11.1.3 Diesel Generator 2/3/ F 4.7 HPCI Rooms (RB 2/3) 11.2.1 RB2-II B1 4.2 11.2.2 RB2-II B1 4.2 11.2.3 Diesel Generator 2/3/ E 4.7 HPCI Rooms (RB 2/3) 11.3 Crib House E and F or 4.13 A and B 14.1 Radwaste A and B* 4.14 14.2 TB-IV A and B* 4.11

  • No shutdown cable or equipment is located in this zone. All methods of shutdown are available.
    • Drywell is inerted, no fire postulated. All methods of shutdown available.

2.1-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 TABLE 2.1-1 APPENDIX R SHUTDOWN PATHS BY FIRE ZONE 14.3 TB-IV A and B* 4.11 14.4 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 14.5 Radwaste A and B* 4.14 14.6 Radwaste A and B* 4.14 18.1.1 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 18.1.2 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 18.2.1 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 18.2.2 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 18.3.1 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 18.3.2 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 18.4 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 Unit 1 Plant Outdoor A and B* 4.15 Structures 18.6 Outdoor A and B* 4.15 18.7.1 Outdoor E and F 4.15 18.7.2 Outdoor E and F 4.15

  • No shutdown cable or equipment is located in this zone. All methods of shutdown are available.
    • Drywell is inerted, no fire postulated. All methods of shutdown available.

2.1-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 2.2 Fire Area Descriptions 2.2.1 Fire Area RB2-1 Fire Area RB2-I is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 1.1.2.5.A Reactor Building F-6 Elevation 589 feet 0 inch 4th Floor-South 1.1.2.5.B Reactor Building F-5 Elevation 570 feet 0 inch Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase 1.1.2.5.C Reactor Building F-4 Elevation 545 feet 6 inches Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase 1.3.2 Reactor Building F-3 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Shutdown Cooling Pump Room The Unit 2 Fire Area RB2-I is a collection of three main sections. These are: a) the shutdown cooling pump room, b) the isolation condenser pipe chase, and c) the main isolation condenser floor.

The shutdown cooling pump room, Fire Zone 1.3.2, is surrounded by Fire Zone 1.2.2 (inerted drywell) and Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 on elevation 517 feet 6 inches. All of the walls which separate Fire Zone 1.3.2 from Fire Area RB2-I are 3-hour rated fire barriers except for the west wall which contains a ventilation louver and mechanical penetration open to the steam pipe chase. All penetrations in the ceiling are sealed to a 3-hour rating except for an HVAC duct penetration which is protected by a sprinkler. The floor contains unsealed mechanical penetrations (see Section 3.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). The access door to this fire zone is 3-hour rated and is normally held open by a fusible link.

The remaining Reactor Building fire zones which are part of Fire Area RB2-I (1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.B, and 1.1.2.5.C) are interconnected. Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.5.C form the isolation condenser pipe chase. The pipe chase is surrounded and protected from a fire in Fire Area RB2-II by walls and floor which are 3-hour fire barriers. The access doors to the pipe chase (one each on the 545-foot 6-inch and 570-foot 0-inch elevations) are 3-hour rated. The pipe chase is open above to the isolation condenser floor area (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A) through an open steel grating.

Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A, the isolation condenser floor, is enclosed by walls, floor, and ceiling constructed of 3-hour rated reinforced concrete with similarly rated penetrations except that both the floor and ceiling contain large unsealed penetrations, e.g., the equipment hatch, stairwell, 2.2-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 ladder opening and HVAC ducts which do not contain fire dampers. These major penetrations are protected to an equivalent 3-hour protection in the form of wet pipe sprinklers or an automatic closed-head, preaction water curtain, actuated by a linear thermal detection system as described in Generic Letter 83-33. The ceiling also contains unsealed mechanical penetrations (see Exemption Requests Section 3.3, F.P.R. Volume 4.)

The safe shutdown analysis for Fire Area RB2-I can be found in Section 4.1 of the Safe Shutdown Report (SSDR). A detailed analysis of the fire zones comprising this fire area is in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.1 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.2 Fire Area RB2-II Fire Area RB2-II is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 1.1.2.1 Reactor Building F-2 Elevation 476 feet 6 inches Basement Floor 1.1.2.2 Reactor Building F-3 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Ground Floor 1.1.2.3 Reactor Building F-4 Elevation 545 feet 6 inches Mezzanine Floor 1.1.2.4 Reactor Building F-5 Elevation 570 feet 0 inch 3rd Floor 1.1.2.5.D Reactor Building F-6 Elevation 589 feet 0 inch 4th Floor North 1.1.2.6/ Reactor Building F-7 1.1.1.6 Elevation 613 feet 0 inch Refueling Floor 11.2.1 Reactor Building F-2 Elevation 476 feet 6 inches Southwest Corner Room 11.2.2 Reactor Building F-2 Elevation 476 feet 6 inches Southeast Corner Room The Unit 2 Fire Area RB2-II contains all of the Reactor Building fire zones not included in Fire Area RB2-I. It is separated from RB2-I as described in Subsection 2.2.1. This fire area is separated from Unit 3 Fire Area RB3-II by equivalent 3-hour rated fire barriers except for two places. These are: 1) the refuel floor which has no separations between Unit 2 and Unit 3, and 2) the torus basement which is separated by a rated wall except in the equipment drain tank room where the wall contains an unrated door to RB3-II. The wall which separates the Unit 2 LPCI room from the Unit 2 HPCI room contains an HVAC duct which does not contain a fire damper.

(See Section 3.3 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). This fire area is also separated 2.2-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 from the Turbine Building by an equivalent 3-hour wall (see Exemption Requests Section 3.3, F.P.R. Volume 4). Contained within this fire area but still separated from it by equivalent 3-hour rated barriers is the drywell and RB2-I. All of the access doors to the fire area are rated to three hours except as noted above.

The safe shutdown analysis for Fire Area RB2-II can be found in Section 4.2. A detailed description of the fire zones comprising this fire area is in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.2 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.3 Fire Area - Unit 2 Primary Containment The Unit 2 primary containment (Fire Zone 1.2.2) is separated from the rest of the Reactor Building by an equivalent 3-hour rated fire barrier. The primary containment is inerted, thus, a fire cannot start and a safe cold shutdown can be achieved and maintained using any of the shutdown methods. A detailed description of this fire area is in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.3 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.4 Fire Area RB3-1 Fire Area RB3-I is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 1.1.1.5.A Reactor Building F-6 Elevation 589 feet 0 inch 4th Floor-South 1.1.1.5.B Reactor Building F-5 Elevation 570 feet 0 inch Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase 1.1.1.5.C Reactor Building F-4 Elevation 545 feet 6 inches Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase 1.4.1 Reactor Building F-3 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches TIP Room The Unit 3 Fire Area RB3-I is a collection of three main sections. These are: a) the TIP room, b) the isolation condenser pipe chase, and c) the main isolation condenser floor.

The TIP room, Fire Area 1.4.1, is surrounded by Fire Area 1.2.1 (inerted drywell) and Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 on elevation 517 feet 6 inches. The walls and ceiling surrounding Fire Area 1.4.1 are 3-hour rated barriers. The west wall contains unsealed mechanical penetrations. The floor contains unsealed mechanical penetrations in the floor (see Exemption Requests Section 4.2, F.P.R.

Volume 4). The access door to this fire area is 3-hour rated.

2.2-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 The remaining Reactor Building fire zones which are part of Fire Area RB3-I (1.1.1.5.A, 1.1.1.5.B, and 1.1.1.5.C) are interconnected. Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.5.C form the isolation condenser pipe chase. The pipe chase is surrounded and protected from a fire in Fire Area RB3-II by walls and floor which are 3-hour fire barriers. The access doors to the pipe chase (one each on the 545-foot 6-inch and 570-foot 0-inch elevations) are 3-hour rated. The pipe chase is open above to the isolation condenser floor (Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A) through open steel grating.

Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A is enclosed by walls, floor, and ceiling constructed of 3-hour rated reinforced concrete with similarly rated penetrations except that both the floor and ceiling of this fire zone contain large unsealed penetrations, e.g., the equipment hatch, ladder opening and HVAC ducts which do not contain fire dampers. These major openings are protected by equivalent 3-hour protection in the form of wet pipe sprinklers or an automatic closed-head, preaction water curtain actuated by a linear thermal detection system as described in Generic Letter 83-33. The ceiling also contains unsealed mechanical penetrations (see Exemption Requests Section 4.2, F.P.R.

Volume 4).

A safe shutdown analysis for Fire Area RB3-I can be found in Section 4.4. A detailed analysis of the fire zone comprising this fire area is in Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.4 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.5 Fire Area RB3-II Fire Area RB3-II is composed of the following fire zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 1.1.1.1 Reactor Building F-2 Elevation 476 feet 6 inches Basement Floor 1.1.1.2 Reactor Building F-3 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Ground Floor 1.1.1.3 Reactor Building F-4 Elevation 545 feet 6 inches Mezzanine Floor 1.1.1.4 Reactor Building F-5 Elevation 570 feet 0 inch 3rd Floor 1.1.1.5.D Reactor Building F-6 Elevation 589 feet 0 inch 4th Floor North 1.1.1.6/1.1.2.6 Reactor Building F-7 Elevation 613 feet 0 inch Refueling Floor 1.3.1 Reactor Building F-3 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Shutdown Cooling Pump Room 2.2-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 11.1.1 Reactor Building F-2 Elevation 476 feet 6 inches Southwest Corner Room 11.1.2 Reactor Building F-2 Elevation 476 feet 6 inches Southeast Corner Room The Unit 3 Fire Area RB3-II contains all of the Reactor Building fire zones not included in Fire Area RB3-I. It is separated from RB3-I as described in Subsection 2.2.3. This fire area is separated from Unit 2 Fire Area RB2-II by equivalent 3-hour rated fire barriers except for two places. These are: 1) the refuel floor which has no separations between Unit 2 and Unit 3, and 2) the torus basement which is separated by a rated wall except in the equipment drain tank room where the wall contains an unrated door. The wall separating Fire Area RB3-II and the Turbine Building is an equivalent 3-hour rated fire barrier (see Exemption Requests Section 4.2, F.P.R.

Volume 4). Located within the fire area but still separated from it by equivalent 3-hour rated fire barriers are the drywell, Fire Zone 1.3.1 and Fire Area RB3-I. Fire Zone 1.3.1 is considered part of RB3-II but is enclosed in 3-hour barriers except that the west wall contains a ventilation louver and mechanical penetration open to the steam pipe chase, the ceiling contains an HVAC duct penetration that is protected by a sprinkler, and the floor contains open mechanical penetrations (see Exemption Requests Section 4.9, F.P.R. Volume 4). All of the access doors to the fire area are rated to three hours except as noted above.

The safe shutdown analysis for Fire Area RB3-II can be found in Section 4.5 of this report. A more detailed description of the fire zones which comprise this fire area is contained in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.5 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.6 Fire Area - Unit 3 Primary Containment The Unit 3 primary containment (Fire Zone 1.2.1) is separated from the rest of the Reactor Building by a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The primary containment is inerted, thus, a fire cannot start and a safe cold shutdown can be achieved and maintained using any of the shutdown methods. A detailed description of this fire area is in Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.6 (F.P.R.

Volume 1).

2.2-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 2.2.7 Fire Area RB-2/3 Fire Area RB-2/3 is composed of the following zones.

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 9.0.C HPCI Pump Building F-3 Elevation 504 feet 6 inches 2/3 Diesel Generator Room 11.1.3 HPCI Pump Building F-2 Elevation 476 feet 6 inches Unit 3 HPCI Pump Room 11.2.3 HPCI Pump Building F-2 Elevation 476 feet 6 inches Unit 2 HPCI Pump Room This fire area is separated from RB2-II and RB3-II by 3-hour rated barriers with rated seals and doors except for an HVAC penetration to the torus level of RB2-II (see Section 3.3 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4).

The safe shutdown analysis for this fire zone is located in Section 4.7. A detailed description of the fire zones comprising this fire area is in Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.7 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.8 Fire Area TB-I Fire Area TB-I is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 7.0.A Turbine Building F-8 Elevation 549 feet 0 inch Station Battery Room 8.1 Turbine Building F-10 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Clean and Dirty Oil Tank Room 8.2.1.A Turbine Building F-9 Elevation 469 feet 6 inches Basement Floor 8.2.2.A Turbine Building F-9 Elevation 495 feet 0 inch Basement Floor 2.2-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 8.2.5.A Turbine Building F-8, F-10 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Ground Floor - Eastern/Southern Area 8.2.5.B Turbine Building F-10 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Ground Floor - Condenser Area 8.2.6.A Turbine Building F-8, F-13 Elevations 534 feet 0 inch and 538 feet 0 inch Mezzanine Floor - Eastern Area 8.2.6.B Turbine Building F-13 Elevations 534 feet 0 inch and 538 feet 0 inch Mezzanine Floor - Condenser Area 8.2.7 Turbine Building F-8 Elevation 549 feet 0 inch Mezzanine Floor 9.0.A Turbine Building F-10 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Unit 2 Diesel Generator Room This fire area is located on the eastern side of the Turbine Building. It borders the Unit 1 Turbine Building and Fire Area TB-V (control room and AEER) on the east. The wall separating TB-I from Unit 1 is unrated. The boundaries between TB-I and TB-V are 3-hour rated barriers. The walls separating TB-I and TB-II are nonrated substantial shield walls (see Section 5.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). TB-I borders TB-III only along portions of the Unit 3 cable tunnel. The tunnel is separated from this zone by a reinforced concrete barrier except for a locked closed manhole (see Section 5.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). The barrier between this fire area and TB-IV is not rated. However, TB-IV contains no safe shutdown equipment or cables. The wall between TB-I and RB2-II is an equivalent 3-hour rated barrier (see Section 3.3 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). Two of the fire zones which comprise Fire Area TB-I are enclosed by equivalent 3-hour rated barriers (Fire Zones 8.1 and 9.0.A). The walls forming the exterior are unrated except for the walls near the transformer which carry a 3-hour rating to an exterior exposure fire. The door in these walls is unrated.

The safe shutdown analysis is given in Section 4.8. A more detailed analysis of the fire zones comprising this fire area is contained in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.8 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 2.2.9 Fire Area TB-II Fire Area TB-II is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 8.2.5.C Turbine Building F-10, F-11 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Ground Floor - Common Area 8.2.6.C Turbine Building F-13, F-14 Elevation 534 feet 0 inch Mezzanine Floor - Common Area This fire area is located in the central area of the turbine and is separated from Fire Areas TB-I and TB-III by substantial shield walls which are not rated (see Section 5.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). The walls separating Reactor Building Fire Areas RB2-II and RB3-II from TB-II are equivalent 3-hour rated walls (see Sections 3.3 and 4.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). The floor separating this fire area from TB-IV is not rated. The wall adjoining the Radwaste Building is composed of substantial concrete or concrete block and is not rated.

The safe shutdown analysis for this fire area is in Section 4.9 of this report. A more detailed analysis of the fire zones comprising this fire area is in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.9 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.10 Fire Area TB-III Fire Area TB-III is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 6.1 Turbine Building F-14 Elevation 538 feet 0 inch DC Panel Room 7.0.B Turbine Building F-14 Elevation 551 feet 0 inch Station Battery Room 8.2.1.B Turbine Building F-9 Elevation 469 feet 6 inches Basement Floor 8.2.2.B Turbine Building F-9 Elevation 495 feet 0 inch Basement Floor 2.2-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 8.2.4 Turbine Building F-12 Elevation 502 feet 6 inches Unit 3 Cable Tunnel 8.2.5.D Turbine Building F-11 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Ground Floor - Condenser Area 8.2.5.E Turbine Building F-11 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Ground Floor - Western/Southern Area 8.2.6.D Turbine Building F-14 Elevations 534 feet 0 inch and 538 feet 0 inch Mezzanine Floor - Condenser Area 8.2.6.E Turbine Building F-14 Elevations 534 feet 0 inch and 538 feet 0 inch Mezzanine Floor-Western Area 9.0.B Turbine Building R-11 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Unit 3 Diesel Generator Room This fire area is located on the western side of the Turbine Building. The portion of TB-III, which is exposed to the exterior, is unrated except for walls in the northwest corner which are 3-hour rated from the exterior. TB-III borders TB-I only along portions of the Unit 3 cable tunnel. The tunnel is separated from TB-I by a reinforced concrete barrier except for one locked access manhole (see Section 5.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). The walls separating TB-III and TB-II are substantial unrated shield walls (see Section 5.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). The floor separating TB-III from TB-IV is unrated. The wall between TB-III and RB3-II is an equivalent 3-hour rated barrier (see Section 4.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). Contained within this fire area and separated by equivalent 3-hour barriers from it is Fire Zone 9.0.B.

The safe shutdown report is given in section 4.10. A more detailed analysis of the fire zones comprising this fire area is contained in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.10 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2-9

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 2.2.11 Fire Area TB-IV Fire Area TB-IV is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 8.2.8.A Turbine Building F-8, F-16, Elevation 561 feet 6 inches F-17 Main Operating Floor 8.2.8.B Turbine Building F-15 Elevation 581 feet 4 inches Vent Floor 8.2.8.C Turbine Building F-15 Elevation 601 feet 4 inches Vent Floor 8.2.8.D Turbine Building F-22, F-23 Elevation 549 feet 0 inch North Turbine Room Vent Floor 14.2 Turbine Building F-22 Elevations 549 feet 0 inch, 571 feet 0 inch and 590 feet 0 inch Unit 2 Off-Gas Recovery Rooms 14.3 Turbine Building F-23 Elevations 549 feet 0 inch, 571 feet 0 inch and 590 feet 6 inch Unit 3 Off-Gas Recovery Room This fire area contains the Turbine Building main operating floor, the vent floors, and the off-gas recovery rooms. This fire area is separated from the Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings by an equivalent 3-hour rated barrier on the south (see Sections 3.3 and 4.2 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). On the north, east, and top, this fire area is exposed to the exterior. The portion of this fire area which contacts the Radwaste Building is an unrated wall.

This fire area contains no safe shutdown equipment. A more detailed analysis of the fire zones comprising this fire area is contained in the Fire Hazard Analysis Section 4.11, (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2-10

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 2.2.12 Fire Area TB-V Fire Area TB-V is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 2.0 Turbine Building F-8 Elevation 534 feet 0 inch Main Control Room 6.2 Turbine Building F-8 Elevation 517 feet 6 inches Auxiliary Electric Equipment This fire area contains the control room and the auxiliary electric equipment room (AEER) and is located at the eastern end of the Unit 2 Turbine Building. This fire area is surrounded by 3-hour rated barriers. This fire area is open to the Unit 1 control room. The Unit 1 control room is also surrounded by a substantial unrated concrete wall. The exposed structural steel in the floor has been protected to a 3-hour rating. The control room and AEER are separated by a substantial noncombustible barrier.

The safe shutdown analysis for this fire area can be found in Section 4.12 of this report. A detailed analysis of the fire zones comprising this fire area is in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.12 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.13 Crib House Fire Area The Units 2 and 3 Crib House is physically separated from the rest of the Unit 2 and 3 structures.

The Crib House is shown on F-18. The exterior of the building is constructed of reinforced concrete and unprotected metal siding which contains windows and vents and is therefore unrated. The basement of the Crib House is surrounded by reinforced concrete which is a missile barrier.

The safe shutdown analysis can be found in Section 4.13. A detailed description of the Crib House is in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.13 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.14 Radwaste Building Fire Area The Radwaste Building fire area is composed of the following zones:

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 14.1 Radwaste Building Area F-19, F-20, F-21 14.5 Radwaste Solidification Building Area F-19, F-20 14.6 Maximum Recycle Radwaste Building Area F-19, F-20 The Radwaste Building is designed to process and store Units 2 and 3 radioactive effluent. This 2.2-11

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 18 JUNE 2011 fire area is separated from the Unit 2 and Unit 3 Turbine Building by an unrated wall. The majority of the exterior walls carry no fire rating; a few though are rated for an exterior exposure fire.

There is no safe shutdown equipment or cabling located in the Radwaste Building. This building is designed so that radiological releases after a major fire are controlled.

A detailed analysis of the fire zones comprising this fire area is in the Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.14 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2.15 Miscellaneous Outside Structures The following miscellaneous outside structures are found at Dresden.

Fire Zone Description F-Drawing 14.4 Off-Gas Filter Building -

18.1.1 Unit 3 Main Power Transformer F-25 18.2.1 Unit 3 Auxiliary Transformer F-25 18.3.1 Unit 3 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer F-25 18.1.2 Unit 2 Main Power Transformers F-24 18.2.2 Unit 2 Auxiliary Transformer F-24 18.3.2 Unit 2 Reserve Auxiliary Transformer F-24 18.4 Auxiliary Boiler House F-25

- Unit 1 Plant Structures -

18.6 U2 125VDC Alternate Battery Room -

18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Pumphouse - North F-353 Cubicle 18.7.2 Isolation Condenser Pumphouse - South F-353 Cubicle Each of these structures is physically separated from the Unit 2 & 3 part of the plant except for the Unit 1 plant structures. The Unit 1 plant structures are separated from the Unit 1, 2 & 3 control room by a substantial unrated concrete wall. The exposed structural steel in the floor has been protected to a 3-hour rating. No rated barriers separate the Unit 2 & 3 Turbine Building from Unit 1. The Unit 1 structures can be considered Fire Area TB-I for safe shutdown analysis purposes. With the exception of the Isolation Condenser Pumphouse fire zones (18.7.1 & 18.7.2),

no safe shutdown equipment or cables are located in these fire zones. A detail of the miscellaneous outside structures is found in Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.15 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

2.2-12

AMENDMENT 12 0

l 1.1.2.E,

--613'

© (5 1.1.2.S.A 1SO-COND l.t.2.5.D Access froM Unit 3 up ladders __. --589' froM 570 ft 9 1.1.2.4

© 1.1.2.5.B 8

--570' 8 1.1.2.3

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rx:

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2. Alphonuner ic code in circle identifies hot shutdown po th.

DRESDEN STATION Units 2 8. 3 FIGURE 2 .2-1 APPENDIX R SHUTDOVN PATHS FOR DRESDEN UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING

AMENDMENT 12 l 1.1.t.6

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2. Alpho .nune ric code in circle ident if'ies DRESDEN STAT ION Unit s 2 & 3 FIGURE 2.2-2 APPENDIX R SHUTDOVN PATHS FOR DRESDEN UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILD ING

L AMENDMENT 12 Gv 8 .2.8 Turbin e Opera ting Floor Al ~ c§3 ) ~ .--~ ---- 549 '

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AMENDMENT 12 UNIT ICE SERV 3 _ _ __ SERVICE SERVICE SERVICE VATER VATER VATER PUMP l F.P.SYSTE~ V~TCR PUMPS PUMP PUMP 2A-3 901 213- 3901 2B-3 901 N.E. N.E.

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AMENDMENT 12 SERVICE SERVICE SERVICE \IATER IJATER w'~TER PUMPS PUMP

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2/3-4199-345 AMENDMENT 22 Turbine Building Fire Main L.O.

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DRESDEN STATION 2-3999 -359 ~

UNITS 2 & 3 UNIT M2 r'JGURE 3.1-2 SY Dl!i:CHARGE HEADER UNIT 2 CONTRDL. ROD DRIVE It..-- ---- CDDUNG IJATtR f'DR CRD PUMPS ____ ____ ___ J CROSS TIE:

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-9 -8 DRAIN PUMP 2-230 1-57 AUX COOLING VATER PUMP 2-230 1

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AMENDMENT 12 3-2301

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AMENDMENT 12 F"ROM CRIB HOUSE rROM CRIB HOUSE IJ 0

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AMENDMENT 12

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'DRESDEN STATION Units 2 8. 3 r!GURI: 3.:J-2 TYPICAL SCHCMATIC

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 3.0 METHODOLOGY AND SELECTION OF APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN FUNCTIONS, SYSTEMS, AND COMPONENTS AND THEIR ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS 3.1 Description of Methods and Paths to Achieve and Maintain Hot Shutdown Two primary systems have been selected as the minimum set of systems which can achieve hot shutdown regardless of the location of the fire and concurrent with a loss of offsite power. These two systems are:

1. The isolation condenser system, and
2. The high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system.

These systems are those which normally would be initiated in the event of a loss of offsite ac power.

Subsection 3.1.1 contains descriptions of the operation of the isolation condenser and HPCI hot shutdown methods and details how the required hot shutdown functions are accomplished.

Five different (though not unrelated) Appendix R hot shutdown paths per unit were identified at the Dresden Station. Four of the paths per unit utilize the respective unit's isolation condenser.

These differ only in that they employ different power trains, diesel generators, CRD pumps, and/or operating methods. The fifth path per unit is the HPCI/LPCI method of shutdown. Table 3.1-2 outlines the differences between the Appendix R hot shutdown paths. Detailed descriptions of the shutdown paths are provided in Subsection 3.1.2.

3.1.1 Hot Shutdown Methods 3.1.1.1 Isolation Condenser Method The isolation condenser method for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown is used in nearly all of the fire zones at Dresden 2 and 3. Figure 3.1-1 shows system arrangement. This method was chosen because it relies on a minimum of power-operated equipment. In addition, it is the normal emergency method initiated upon a loss of offsite power event. The isolation condenser can be operated locally by manual actions or automatically from the control room. For fire areas involving a large number of isolation condenser circuits, solutions were determined that minimize the use of electric power in the affected unit. Differences between the eight alternate shutdown paths using the isolation condenser are described in Table 3.1-2.

3.1.1.1.1 Reactivity Control Credit is assumed for reactor trip and verification of control rod insertion in the control room even for a postulated event that requires evacuation of the control room. This rapid action would be initiated prior to evacuation, should it be necessary. Any fire directly affecting the Reactor Protection System (RPS) or Control Rod Drive (CRD) control and fail safe circuitry will cause a 3.1-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 reactor trip even if not manually initiated from the control room. No attempt is made to ensure the availability of neutron monitoring instrumentation since control rod insertion is sufficient to ensure subcriticality (boration is not required). Upon loss of power the control rods are designed to be driven in automatically, and, in case of fire damage to the logic circuitry, the system is designed to fail in the safe position (control rods fully inserted).

3.1.1.1.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup Since the isolation condenser is a closed cooling system for the reactor, large amounts of makeup water to the reactor vessel are not needed. The isolation condenser method of hot shutdown utilizes the Control Rod Drive (CRD) Hydraulic System to provide makeup to the reactor (see Figure 3.1-2). One of the two control rod drive pumps per unit will provide all reactor make up due to leakage and shrinkage during cooldown (see Subsection 7.2.1.2). Each CRD pump takes a suction from the condensate storage tank and the condenser hotwell and pumps water through a piping system consisting of two manual valves and one motor operated valve until reaching the CRD flow control station. At this point, the flow path branches into two parallel paths, each containing an air-operated flow control valve (AO-302-6A&B). These two valves fail closed on loss of instrument air (instrument air is lost with loss of offsite power). This prevents cooling and drive water flow from reaching the CRD hydraulic units by this method. However, the charging water line branches off of the main CRD line upstream of the flow control station. Flow through this line is unaffected. This charging line, which normally charges the scram accumulator water tank, provides a flow path to the control rod drives (and, through leakage through the drive, to the reactor) when the inlet scram valve (CV-305-126) opens. This valve and the outlet scram valves (CV-305-127) open on any scram. These valves fail open upon loss of instrument air.

The flow path from the charging line to the reactor would be defeated if the scram was reset, i.e.,

the inlet and outlet scram valves were closed. However, the reset can only be accomplished with instrument air available to close those valves. If instrument air is available, then the cooling water flow path to the reactor (via the control rod drives) is available because the air-operated flow control valves will be opened.

The control rod drive pumps discharge pressure can be monitored locally on mechanical indicators PI2(3)-302-73A and PI2(3)-302-73B.

Local control pushbutton stations have been installed for the control rod drive pumps. The control rod drive water headers for the two units are connected with a crosstie line (as shown on Figure 3.1-2) which is normally isolated by manual valves. The valves are located on the mezzanine level of the Turbine Building in an area with accessibility to either set of pumps. (See Subsection 6.2.3.2.) Therefore, a fire in one unit will not prevent the other unit's pump from supplying makeup water to the affected unit.

The control rod drive pumps can be cooled by either service water or fire water (see Subsection 3.1.1.1.6) if normal cooling from the TBCCW system is lost.

3.1-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 3.1.1.1.3 Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal Initial pressure control and decay heat removal for the reactor is normally supplied by the electromatic relief valves. However, the target rock valve (mechanical mode) and mechanical safety valves on the steam lines will provide these functions if operation of the relief valves has been affected by a fire.

The long-term (up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) reactor pressure control and decay heat removal system is the isolation condenser system. The isolation condenser is sized to handle the total decay heat load 8.8 minutes after scram.

The isolation condenser consists of two tube bundles in a large water-filled shell. The reactor steam flows through the tubes, is condensed, and returns to the reactor vessel.

The water in the shell is boiled off and vented to the atmosphere. The vent line to the main stream line is isolated upon initiation of the condenser. When reactor pressure rises to or above 1,070 psig for at least 15 seconds, automatic initiation of the isolation condenser is achieved by opening normally closed valve MO2(3)-1301-3.

If a fire has affected automatic operation of the accessible isolation condenser valves MO2(3)-

1301-2 and MO2(3)-1301-3 (Valve MO2(3)-1301-2 is normally open), the operators will remove power from the appropriate motor control centers so that the valves may then be opened by use of handwheels. Normally open valves MO2(3)-1301-1 and MO2(3)-1301-4 are located in the drywell, and are, therefore, not accessible for manual operation. In the event a fire causes these valves to spuriously close, a new alternate 480-V power feed to each of these valves is provided along with a local control station, also isolation switches have been installed for the normal control and power cables. (See Subsections 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.2.4.) If the valves spuriously close, the alternate feed will be energized and the valves opened. The operator will then deenergize the valves in the open position. Valve MO2(3)-1301-3 will be manually throttled to control the cooldown.

Valves AO2(3)-1301-17 and AO2(3)-1301-20 fail in the closed position which isolates the isolation condenser steam line vent as required. The most likely effect of a fire in the controls to these valves is the failure of the valves in the desired position. However, even if this does not occur, the operator can isolate the line by closing manual valve 2(3)-1301-16 located near the isolation condenser. Therefore, power is not required to initiate the isolation condenser unless a fire spuriously closes the inboard valves. In this case, the alternate power feed will be used to reopen the valves.

Normally, makeup to the isolation condenser will be supplied from the clean demineralized water storage tank via two 1,350 gpm diesel driven isolation condenser makeup water pumps (the preferred source). To initiate flow, the Control Room operator will start one of the diesel driven makeup pumps, and recirc flow back to the clean demineralized water storage tank. The operator then admits cooling water to the isolation condenser by opening normally closed valve MO2(3)-

4399-74. MO2(3)-4399-74 is a DC powered valve.

3.1-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 With no makeup, the water stored above the isolation condenser tubes is depleted in 20 minutes after initiation of the condenser. The isolation condenser level is normally monitored in the control room on level indicator LI2(3)-1340-2. The operator can locally monitor the level in the isolation condenser on an existing sight glass by opening four manual valves. As shown on Figure 3.1-1, either of the two isolation condenser makeup pumps can supply makeup water to either unit's isolation condenser through the normally open tie line. Therefore, a fire in one unit will not prevent the other unit's pump from supplying makeup water.

To initiate makeup flow, the operator will start one of the diesel driven makeup pumps and open valve MO2(3)-4399-74. This valve is located near the isolation condenser and is accessible for manual operation if necessary. Each isolation condenser makeup pump is capable of supplying 1350 gpm (less approximately 400 gpm for pump min. flow) at a discharge head of 240 ft. A flow rate of 350 gpm is sufficient to balance the boil off due to the removal of decay heat 35 minutes after scram. Therefore, one isolation condenser makeup pump is sufficient to provide the makeup requirements of both units (but not simultaneously). Isolation condenser makeup pump discharge pressure is read in the isolation condenser makeup pump A & B rooms respectively (Fire Zones 18.7.1 and 18.7.2) on pressure indicator PI 2/3-4341-150A and 2/3-4341-150B.

Station procedures assure that adequate makeup water for both the isolation condenser shell side and the RPV is available. Clean demineralized water storage level is normally monitored in the MCR or MUDs control room with local, alternative monitoring at the tanks drain valve using the dedicated pressure gauge from the SSD Cart.

Should it become apparent that long-term operation (up to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />) of the isolation condenser is necessary, the operator will establish makeup to the isolation condenser from the service water system. Any one of the five service water pumps can supply makeup water to either unit's isolation condenser through the common fire water supply header. Therefore, a fire in either unit will not prevent the other unit's pump from supplying makeup water. In the event that the service water system cannot maintain flow to the isolation condenser, the two fire pumps (Unit 2/3 Fire Pump, 2/3 4102 and Unit 1 Fire Pump, K124) will automatically start.

To establish makeup flow, the operator will open valves MO2(3)-1301-10 and MO2(3)- 4102 from the fire header. Due to the length of time involved (at least two hours) before service water is necessary, the fire is assumed to be out and any suppression systems that may have activated are manually isolated from the main header. Service water header pressure is normally monitored in the control room on pressure indicator PI2/3-3904-4. The service water pump discharge pressure can be monitored on local mechanical instruments PI2/3-3941-29, PI2-3941-8A, PI2-3941-8B, PI2/3-3941-8C, PI3-3941-8A and PI3-3941-8B. The operator can locally monitor the pressure in the fire header on mechanical indicator PI2/3-4141-4A located in the Crib House.

The isolation condenser makeup pumps can be operated locally from Panels 2223-126A and 2223-126B located in Fire Zones 18.7.1 and 18.7.2. Also, local control capability has been provided for the service water pumps (see Subsections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.2.2).

3.1.1.1.4 Suppression Pool Cooling Because the suppression pool is not used as a heat sink except for the first few minutes, suppression pool cooling is not a necessary hot shutdown function when the isolation condenser is utilized. The isolation condenser is designed to handle the total heat load 8.8 minutes after 3.1-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 scram; at this time steam release to the suppression pool will cease, if the isolation condenser has been initiated. The isolation condenser must be initiated within a maximum of 30 minutes after scram (see Subsection 7.2.1.2). The pool temperature will remain under 120ºF if discharge to the pool is terminated within 30 minutes after scram. (See G.E. Task Report T-0611, F.P.P.D.P.

Volume 13.)

3.1.1.1.5 Process Monitoring Instrumentation Reactor Water Level and Pressure Reactor level and pressure are normally monitored in the control room on various instruments which are fed from two independent divisions. The operator can also locally monitor reactor level and pressure in the Reactor Building on instrument racks 2202(3)-5 and 2202(3)-6 on the 545-foot elevation or 2202(3)-7 and 2202(3)-8 at the 517-foot elevation. Reactor temperature can be determined from saturation tables that are included with the safe shutdown procedure.

Suppression Pool Level and Temperature Suppression pool level and temperature are not necessary for the isolation condenser method of hot shutdown (see Subsection 3.1.1.1.4).

Isolation Condenser Level Isolation condenser level can be monitored in the control room or at the isolation condenser on a sight glass (see Subsections 3.1.1.1.3 and 6.2.1.1).

Diagnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems Discharge pressure indication is provided for the CRD pumps, isolation condenser makeup, and service water pumps (see Subsections 3.1.1.1.2, 3.1.1.1.3, and 3.1.1.1.6).

Level Indicator for Tanks The condensate storage tank level is normally monitored in the control room or the operator can locally monitor Tank Level. Level indication is determined locally via a pressure gauge for the clean demineralized water storage tank (see Subsection 3.1.1.1.3).

3.1.1.1.6 Support Power for the isolation condenser shutdown method is provided by one of the emergency diesel generators. The ac and dc power supplies to the hot shutdown equipment are shown on Figure 3.1-3. The diesel will normally start automatically upon a loss of offsite power. In case a fire affects the automatic operation or the control room manual operation of the diesel generators, the 2/3 diesel generator can be isolated from the control room and started locally by the operators (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.2). For the case when the isolation condenser is operated manually, the 2/3 diesel generator will supply the necessary power to the unaffected unit and mechanical crossties will be utilized for shutdown as previously discussed. Table 3.1-1 demonstrates that one diesel generator is capable of supplying the loads necessary to shut down both units 3.1-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 simultaneously. The dedicated diesel generator (2 or 3) is necessary only when the fire directly affects the 2/3 diesel generator; for instance, a fire in the 2/3 diesel generator room or at the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump in the Crib House. In each of these cases, the dedicated diesel generator can supply all necessary loads.

Each diesel generator is supported by the following auxiliaries (see Figure 3.1-6, Sheets 1, 2, and 3):

1 - diesel generator fuel transfer pump 2 - diesel generator room ventilation fan 3 - diesel generator cooling water pump Each diesel generator is supplied from a 750-gallon day tank, which in turn is supplied from a 15,000-gallon fuel oil storage tank. The technical specifications require a minimum of 10,000 gallons of diesel fuel stored on site for each diesel, a one hour fuel supply (245 gallons) in each diesel day tank and additional diesel fuel to be obtained and delivered to the site within an 8-hour period. The diesel loading requirements for hot and cold shutdown are listed in tables 3.1-1 and 3.2-3. The minimum required 10,205 gallons is enough diesel fuel for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of safe shutdown operation.

The diesel generator cooling water pump, fuel oil transfer pump, and ventilation fan normally start automatically when the diesel is started. Provisions have been made so the operator can start these auxiliaries locally for the 2/3 diesel generator (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.4).

The switchgear breakers are normally controlled from the control room or picked up automatically. For most fire areas, the necessary power is supplied by the other unit. Therefore, the necessary breaker control is still available in the control room. However, a fire in the control room or auxiliary electric equipment room could affect breaker control for both units. Local breaker control capability is installed for the 4-kV switchgear diesel feed breakers, the 4-kV switchgear normal feed breakers, the 4-kV to 480-V switchgear feed breakers, and the feeds to the control rod drive pumps, service water pumps and condensate transfer pumps (The 2A and 3A condensate transfer pumps are no longer credited for SSD) (see Subsections 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3, 6.2.2.2, and 6.2.2.3). Sufficient flexibility exists in the 125-Vdc system such that the operator can supply control power from either unit.

The service water system, in addition to being utilized as part of the decay heat removal function as makeup water to the isolation condenser (see Subsection 3.1.1.1.3), is used to cool the control rod drive pumps. The pumps are normally cooled by the Turbine Building closed cooling water system. Since several operator actions would be required to power this system in the event of a loss of offsite power, a new cooling line to each pump is routed from the service water system.

The fire main is tied into the service water and may be used to cool the pumps as well. These lines are normally isolated by manual valves and will only be placed in service if necessary due to fire-induced damage and loss of offsite power (see Subsections 6.2.1.7 and 6.2.2.7). Cooling to the control rod drive pumps must be initiated with 1-1/2 hours of pump start.

The isolation condenser makeup pumps are each powered by their own diesel powered driver (2/3-43123A and 2/3-43123B). Each diesel engine is a 175 bhp, self-cooled engine. Each engine is supplied by a 75 gallon day tank (reference 2) which is, in turn, supplied by the 15,000 gallon Unit 2 fuel oil storage tank. The Unit 2 fuel oil transfer pump is used to transfer fuel from the storage tank to the day tank. The tank can be manually filled. Enough fuel is in the day tank to supply each engine for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Additional diesel fuel can be obtained and delivered to the site within an 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> period.

If one of the diesel driven makeup pumps runs out of fuel, the other pump may be started to provide makeup water.

3.1-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 21 JUNE 2017 3.1.1.2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Method The HPCI method of shutdown is used only for a fire on the isolation condenser floor of the Reactor Building, the isolation condenser pipe chase, and the TIP Room (Unit 3) or shutdown cooling pump room (Unit 2). Such a fire could disable the valves to the isolation condenser. The HPCI system will be used by the operator to control reactor pressure and maintain reactor water level. All of the necessary operator actions are available in the control room including instrument monitoring. Figures 3.1-4 and 3.1-5 show system arrangement.

3.1.1.2.1 Reactivity Control Credit is assumed for reactor trip and verification of control rod insertion in the control room even for a postulated event that requires evacuation of the control room. This rapid action would be initiated prior to evacuation, should it be necessary. Any fire directly affecting control rod drive control circuits will cause a reactor trip even if not manually initiated from the control room. No attempt is made to ensure the availability of neutron monitoring instrumentation since control rod insertion is sufficient to ensure subcriticality (boration is not required). Upon loss of power the control rods are designed to be driven in automatically, and, in case of fire damage to the logic circuitry, the system is designed to fail in the safe position (control rods fully inserted).

3.1.1.2.2 Reactor Coolant Makeup The HPCI system consists of a steam turbine driven pump that can take suction from either the suppression pool or the condensate storage tank and pump water to the reactor vessel. (See Figure 3.1-4.) The steam that runs the turbine comes from the reactor and is exhausted to the suppression pool. The HPCI system automatically initiates on low-low water level signal (-59 inches) or can be manually initiated from the control room.

The HPCI pump injects water from the condensate storage tank to the reactor vessel. The HPCI system pumps makeup water to the reactor at a rate of 5,600 gpm. The operator can manually operate the flow controller in the control room.

Condensate storage tank level is normally monitored in the control room on level indicators LI2/3-3341-3 and LI2/3-3341-4. Level can be monitored on mechanical indicators LI2/3-3341-77A and LI2/3-3341-77B located in the Turbine Building in the southeast corner of the Unit 2 reactor feed pump room. Water can also be added to the reactor vessel via the control rod drive pumps. If long-term operation of the HPCI system depletes the condensate storage supply, the operator will align the suction with the suppression pool by opening valves MO2(3)-2301-35 and MO2(3)-2301-36. The HPCI suction is automatically shifted to the suppression pool when the condensate storage tank contains less than 10,000 gallons. HPCI suction from the suppression pool has been evaluated as acceptable for pool temperatures up to 165°F, which is sufficient for the Appendix R shutdown transient. HPCI pump discharge pressure can be monitored in the control room on pressure indicator PI2(3)-2340-2 and locally on mechanical indicator PI2(3)-

2357.

3.1-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 21 JUNE 2017 3.1.1.2.3 Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal Reactor pressure control and decay heat removal are accomplished by the HPCI turbine, being driven by reactor vessel steam, in conjunction with the electromatic relief valves 2(3)-0203-3B through 2(3)-0203-3E. The HPCI turbine steam supply line, the target rock valve, and the electromatic relief valves discharge to the suppression pool.

3.1.1.2.4 Suppression Pool Cooling Continued operation of the HPCI system can result in heatup of the suppression pool water (see Subsection 3.1.1.2.3). One division of LPCI/CCSW is sufficient to remove decay heat from the suppression pool. (See Figure 3.1-5, Sheets 1 and 2.) The Division II LPCI/CCSW system was selected for this analysis. The operator will manually place the LPCI/CCSW system into operation in the torus cooling mode from the control room, thus maintaining the water temperature within acceptable limits. The operator will throttle flow as appropriate to obtain the desired cooling. Each LPCI pump is capable of providing a flow of 5,000 gpm. Each CCSW pump is capable of providing a flow of 3,500 gpm.

LPCI pump discharge pressure can be monitored on mechanical indicators PI2(3)-1501-48C and PI2(3)-1501-48D. CCSW pump discharge pressure can be monitored on mechanical indicators PI2(3)-1501-59C and PI2(3)-1501-59D. LPCI flow can be monitored on control room recorder 2(3)-1540-7 and flow indicator 2(3)-1540-11A & B. CCSW flow can be monitored on control room indicator FI2(3)-1540-1B. However, no credit is taken in this analysis for availability on control room LPCI or CCSW flow indication.

3.1.1.2.5 Process Monitoring Instrumentation Reactor Level and Pressure Reactor level and pressure are normally monitored in the control room on various instruments which are fed from two independent divisions. The operator can also locally monitor reactor level and pressure in the Reactor Building on instrument racks 2202(3)-7 and 2202(3)-8 at 517-foot elevation. Reactor temperature can be determined from saturation tables that are included with the safe shutdown procedure. However, no credit is taken in this analysis for availability of control room reactor level or reactor pressure indication.

Suppression Pool Level and Temperature Suppression pool level indication is available in the control room on LI2(3)-1602-3. The 3.1-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 suppression pool temperature monitoring system is available as described in the Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2&3 NRC Docket Numbers 50-237 and 50-249 Plant Unique Analysis Volume 1 Section 1-5.2.

Isolation Condenser Level The isolation condenser is not utilized for this shutdown method (see Subsection 3.1.1.2).

Diagnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems.

Discharge pressure indication is provided for the HPCI, LPCI, and CCSW pumps (see Subsections 3.1.1.2.2. and 3.1.1.2.4).

Level Indication for Tanks Level indication is provided for the condensate storage tank (see Subsection 3.1.1.2.2).

3.1.1.2.6 Support The ac and dc power supplies to hot shutdown equipment are shown on Figure 3.1-3.

The necessary loads for the HPCI shutdown method will be supplied by the dedicated diesel generator (2 or 3). The HPCI valves and auxiliary pumps are powered from the 250-Vdc battery.

Action is required by the operator to place the Division II 250-V battery charger into operation for long-term HPCI use. All other electrical distribution will be in service automatically upon loss of offsite power; however, the operator may shed loads from the diesel that are not necessary for safe shutdown. All of the necessary breakers will be operated from the control room.

LPCI/CCSW lineup for torus cooling is also controlled from the control room. All LPCI/CCSW equipment is powered by 4-kV and 480-V power. 125-Vdc power is used for breaker control and HPCI control.

The HPCI and LPCI pump room coolers are supplied with cooling water from the service water or containment cooling service water pumps. (See Figure 3.1-6, Sheets 1 and 2.) The operator will place the HPCI room cooler in operation and verify that the LPCI room cooler is in service.

The operator will also verify that the CCSW room coolers, which are fed by the CCSW pumps, are in service.

3.1.1.2.6.1 HVAC Systems The HVAC systems at Dresden Station were reviewed using the following criteria to determine their impact on safe shutdown.

1. If the area was served by safety-related ventilation, that ventilation was necessary for safe shutdown.
2. If the area was served only by a non-safety-related ventilation system, the equipment in the 3.1-9

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 area was qualified for loss of ventilation conditions. The conditions resulting from a design-basis accident will be the same or worse than the conditions in the event of a fire.

3.1.2 Description of Hot Shutdown Paths 3.1.2.1 Shutdown Path A Shutdown path A is the normal isolation condenser shutdown method for Unit 2. No alternative shutdown system modifications are necessary for this path. All automatic and manual control capability is available from the control room. This path is used to shutdown Unit 2 for a fire on the refueling floor of the Reactor Building (Fire Zone 1.1.2.6) and Fire Area TB-IV, if shutdown is required. Sections 4.2 and 4.11 describe application of shutdown path A in those two fire areas, respectively. These floors contain no safe shutdown equipment or cabling, therefore, shutdown may not be warranted for fires occurring on these floors. The path is also utilized for a fire in the Crib House (Fire Zone 11.3) if the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump is not damaged. Section 4.13 describes application of shutdown path A for a fire in the Crib House.

Table 3.1-3 lists the equipment utilized for shutdown path A.

3.1.2.2 Alternative Shutdown Path A1 Alternative shutdown path A1, a variation of the normal isolation condenser shutdown method, utilizes the Unit 2 pumps and power train via mechanical crossties to shut down Unit 3. The A1 shutdown path is available to shut down Unit 3 for a fire in Fire Area RB3-II and the Western Zone Group of the Turbine Building (TB-III). (Note that shutdown path B is used to shutdown Unit 3 for a fire on the Unit 3 Refuel Floor although it is part of Fire Area RB3-II). Sections 4.5 and 4.10 describe shutdown method A1 for the fire in Fire Areas RB3-II and TB-III.

Fires in these fire areas have the potential for damaging the power and control cables to required isolation condenser valves used for makeup to the isolation condenser, and the CRD pumps and discharge valves used to provide for reactor vessel makeup for Unit 3. However, Unit 2 would be unaffected by fires in those areas and therefore the Unit 2 equipment is available for use. The manual actions required for this shutdown path are identified in Table 7.3-2. Table 3.1-4 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path A1. Modifications made to ensure the availability of this path are identified in Sections 4.5 and 4.10.

3.1.2.3 Alternative Shutdown Path A2 Alternative shutdown path A2 is a variation of the normal isolation condenser shutdown method for Unit 2 (shutdown path A). Shutdown path A2 is available to shut down Unit 2 for a fire in Fire Area TB-V or Fire Area TB-II (Central Zone Group of the Turbine Building).

The major difference between the A2 path and the normal path A is that the A2 path requires a number of manual actions by the operators due to the possibility that fire in the areas utilizing A2 would damage the power and control cables to required Unit 2 isolation condenser valves and/or pumps used for isolation condenser makeup and CRD pumps and/or valves used for reactor 3.1-10

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 vessel inventory makeup. Manual operations are identified in Tables 7.3-1, 7.3-2 and 7.3-3. In addition, a fire in the areas where the use of path A2 is postulated has the potential for affecting both units. In those areas where required Unit 2 equipment may be damaged by a fire but where only Unit 2 is affected, other paths (mainly B1) are available.

Section 4.12 describes the use of shutdown path A2 for a fire in TB-V. Section 4.9 describes the use of shutdown path A2 for a fire in TB-II. The above subsections also identify all modifications made to ensure the availability of this shutdown path. Table 3.1-5 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path A2.

3.1.2.4 Shutdown Path B Shutdown path B is the normal isolation condenser shutdown method for Unit 3. No alternative shutdown system modifications are necessary for this path. All automatic and manual control capability is available for the control room. This path utilizes Unit 3 power and support equipment along with the Unit 3 isolation condenser. This path is used for the shutdown of Unit 3 for a fire on the refueling floor of the Reactor Building (Fire Zone 1.1.1.6) and Fire Area TB-IV, if shutdown is required. Sections 4.5 and 4.11 describe application of shutdown path B in these two areas, respectively. These floors contain no safe shutdown equipment or cabling, therefore, shutdown may not be warranted for fires occurring on these floors. The path is also utilized for a fire in the Crib House (Fire Zone 11.3) if the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump is not damaged. Section 4.13 describes application of shutdown path B for a fire in the Crib House.

Table 3.1-6 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path B.

3.1.2.5 Alternative Shutdown Path B1 Alternative shutdown path B1, a variation of the normal isolation condenser shutdown method, utilizes the Unit 3 pumps and power train via mechanical crossties to shut down Unit 2. The Unit 2 isolation condenser is used with this shutdown method. The B1 shut down path is available to shut down Unit 2 for a fire in Fire Area RB2-II and Fire Area TB-1.(Note that shutdown path A is used to shutdown Unit 2 for a fire on the Unit 2 Refuel Floor although it is part of Fire Area RB2-II.) Sections 4.2 and 4.8 describe shutdown method B1 for a fire in Fire Areas RB2-II and TB-I.

Fires in these areas have the potential for damaging the power and control cables to required isolation condenser valves and pumps used for makeup to the isolation condenser and the CRD pumps and discharge valves used to provide for reactor vessel makeup for Unit 2. However, Unit 3 would be unaffected by fires in those areas and therefore the Unit 3 equipment is available for use. In addition, the Unit 2 isolation condenser makeup valves could be manually operated to enable the isolation condenser makeup pumps to provide makeup water to the isolation condenser. Fire in these areas also have the potential to render inoperable the Unit 2 fuel oil transfer pump which supplies fuel oil to the isolation condenser makeup pump diesel oil day tanks. These tanks, however, can fuel the diesel engines for greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Additional fuel can be brought on site within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> and the day tanks can be manually filled.

3.1-11

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 If one of the diesel driven makeup pumps runs out of fuel, the other pump may be started to provide makeup water.

The manual actions required for this shutdown path are identified in Table 7.3-2. Table 3.1-7 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path B1. Modifications made to ensure the availability of this path are outlined in Section 4.2 and 4.8.

3.1.2.6 Alternative Shutdown Path B2 Alternative shutdown path B2 is a variation of the normal isolation condenser shutdown method for Unit 3 (shutdown path B). Shutdown path B2 is available to shut down Unit 3 for a fire in Fire Area TB-V and Fire Area TB-II.

The major difference between the B2 path and the normal path B is that the B2 path requires a number of manual actions by the operators due to the possibility that fire in the areas utilizing path B2 would damage the power and control cables to required Unit 3 isolation condenser valves and/or pumps used for isolation condenser makeup, and CRD pumps and/or valves used for reactor vessel inventory makeup. Manual operations are identified in Tables 7.3-1, 7.3-2, and 7.3-3. In addition, a fire in the areas where the use of path B2 is postulated has the potential for affecting both units. In those areas where required Unit 3 equipment may be damaged by a fire but where only Unit 3 is affected, other paths (mainly A1) are available.

Section 4.12 describes the use of shutdown path B2 for a fire in TB-V. Section 4.9 describes the use of shutdown path B2 for a fire in TB-II. The above sections also identify all modifications made to ensure the availability of this shutdown path. Table 3.1-5 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path B2.

3.1.2.7 Shutdown Path C Shutdown path C is the only Appendix R shutdown path for Unit 2 that does not utilize the isolation condenser. This path is employed only when a fire directly affects the isolation condenser, the isolation condenser valves, and/or the Division I electrical penetration area (Fire Zone 1.3.2); i.e., when a fire occurs in RB2-I.

This path, using the HPCI and LPCI/CCSW systems, is totally independent of Fire Area RB2-I and all necessary automatic and manual actions can be performed from the control room.

Table 3.1-8 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path C.

3.1.2.8 Shutdown Path D Shutdown path D is the only Appendix R shutdown path for Unit 3 that does not utilize the isolation condenser. This path is employed only when a fire directly affects the isolation condenser, the isolation condenser valves, and/or the Division I electrical penetration area (Fire Zone 1.4.1); i.e., when a fire occurs in RB3-I.

3.1-12

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 This path, using the HPCI and LPCI/CCSW systems, is totally independent of Fire Area RB3-I and all necessary automatic and manual actions can be performed from the control room.

Table 3.1-9 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path D.

3.1.2.9 Shutdown Path E Shutdown path E differs from the Unit 2 isolation condenser shutdown path A in that it utilizes the dedicated diesel generator 2 (Electrical Division II) to power the necessary equipment rather than the 2/3 diesel generator (Electrical Division I). As a result, Division II equipment is utilized rather than Division I.

Shutdown path E is available to shut down Unit 2 for a fire in Fire Area RB 2/3 and in the Crib House (Fire Zone 11.3) if the cooling water pump for the 2/3 diesel generator is affected.

Sections 4.7 and 4.13, respectively, describe the application of shutdown path E in these areas.

All automatic and manual actions required for this shutdown method can be performed from the control room, except for those items listed in Sections 4.7 and 4.13.

Table 3.1-10 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path E.

3.1.2.10 Shutdown Path F Shutdown path F differs from the Unit 3 isolation condenser shutdown path B in that it utilizes the dedicated diesel generator 3 (Electrical Division II) to power the necessary equipment rather than the 2/3 diesel generator (Electrical Division I). As a result, Division II equipment is utilized rather than Division I.

Shutdown path F is available to shut down Unit 3 for a fire in Fire Area RB 2/3 and the Crib House (Fire Zone 11.3) if the cooling water pump for the 2/3 diesel generator is affected.

Sections 4.7 and 4.13, respectively, describe the application of shutdown path F in these areas.

All automatic and manual actions required for this shutdown method can be performed from the control room, except for those items listed in the above sections.

Table 3.1-11 lists the equipment utilized by shutdown path F.

3.1-13

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 TABLE 3.1-1 DIESEL GENERATOR(1) LOADING FOR HOT SAFE SHUTDOWN(2)(4)

Net bhp Loads (Each) Bhp No. Required Service Water Pump(s) 1 950 950 Emergency ac Lighting 2 30 60 480-V Transformer Losses 2 15 30 Essential Instrumentation and Battery Charger 2 141 282 Diesel Auxiliaries (Cooling Water Pump, Fuel Transfer Pump, and Vent Fan and Starting Air Compressor) 1 147.5 147.5 Control Rod Drive Pump(s) 2 250 500 Total 1969.5 kW required = bhp x .746 / .93 (motor Eff) = 1580 kW (1) Each DG is rated at 2600 kW at 0.8 power factor and for 10% overload for 2000 hour0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br />sper year.

(2) Simultaneous hot shutdown of both Unit 2 and Unit 3 on one diesel generator is assumed.

(3) Data from Table 8.3-3 of UFSAR or nameplate .

3.1-14

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-2 OUTLINE OF APPENDIX R SHUTDOWN PATHS Electrical Power Diesel Manual Shutdown Unit Major Shutdown Train To Be Generator Operations Path Shutdown System Utilized* To Be Used Required A Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Unit 2 Swing No A1 Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Unit 2 Swing Yes A2 Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Unit 2 Swing Yes B Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Unit 3 Swing No B1 Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Unit 3 Swing Yes B2 Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Unit 3 Swing Yes C Unit 2 HPCI/LPCI Unit 2 Unit 2 N/A D Unit 3 HPCI/LPCI Unit 3 Unit 3 N/A E Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Unit 2 Unit 2 No F Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Unit 3 Unit 3 No

  • Crossties are provided in the service water, condensate transfer, and control rod drive water piping such that the opposite unit can also be serviced by the unaffected unit's pumps. Normally closed, manually operated valves must be opened to establish the CRD water crosstie. Procedures have been developed to utilize this capability.

3.1-15

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-3 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A Equipment Location By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Control Rod Drive Pump 2A-302-3 8.2.2.A Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units 1.1.2.2

  • Electromatic Relief Valves 2-203-3B through E 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser 2-1302 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-1 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-2 1.1.2.5.B Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-3 1.1.2.5.C Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-4 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-10 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-4102 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve 2-1301-16 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO2-1301-17 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO2-1301-20 1.1.2.5.A
  • RWCU Valve MO2-1201-2 1.1.2.3
  • Target Rock Valve 2-203-3A 1.2.2 Safety Valves 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1A 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1B 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1C 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1D 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2A 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2B 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2C 8.2.5.A
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-16

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 TABLE 3.1-3 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A Equipment Location By Fire Zone TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 2-3899-205 8.2.2.A TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 2-3899-204 8.2.2.A CRD Discharge Valve MO2-0301-2A 8.2.2.A Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 2-301-9A 1.1.2.2 Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 2-301-9B 1.1.2.2 Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3346-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3327-A-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-2301-12 Outside Service Water Connection to Fire System 2-3906 11.3 Isolation Condenser Sightglass 2-1301-644 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-633 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-634 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-39 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-40 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122B 18.7.2 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215A 18.7.1 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215B 18.7.2 Demineralized Water Tank T-105B Outside Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123B 18.7.2 Isolation Condenser Supply Isolation Valve MO2-4399B-74 1.1.2.5.A ISCO Makeup Room A Damper 2/3-57854A 18.7.1 ISCO Makeup Room B Damper 2/3-57854B 18.7.2 DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank 2-5201 Outside Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump 2/3-4102 11.3 Unit 1 Fire Pump K124A Outside TBCCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3904-501 8.2.6.C 3-3904-501 8.2.6.C 2-3904-500 8.2.6.C 3.1-17

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-3 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A Equipment Location By Fire Zone 3-3904-500 8.2.6.C Turbine Oil Cooler Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3906-500 8.2.6.C 3-3906-500 8.2.6.C 2-3906-501 8.2.6.C 3-3906-501 8.2.6.C Concentrator Condenser Outlet Isolation Valves 2/3-3999-241 8.2.6.C 2/3-3999-240 8.2.6.C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Generator 2/3 9.0.C DG Cooling Water Pump 2/3-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 2/3-5790 9.0.C DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2/3-5203 9.0.C 4-kV Bus 23 8.2.6.A 4-kV Bus 23-1 1.1.2.3 4-kV SWGR 40 9.0.C 480-V Bus 28 1.1.2.4 480-V MCC 28-1 1.1.2.2 480-V MCC 28-3 8.2.6.A 250-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 250-Vdc Turbine Building MCC 3 6.1 250-Vdc MCC 2A 1.1.2.4 250-Vdc MCC 2B 1.1.2.4 125-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery Bus 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Main Bus 2A-1 7.0.A Control Panel 2223-126A 18.7.1 Control Panel 2223-126B 18.7.2 250 Vdc MCC 2A 1.1.2.4 250 Vdc MCC3 6.1 250 Vdc MCC 2B 1.1.2.4 250 V Battery #3 7.0.B Control Panel 902-3 2.0 Control Panel 923-1 2.0 480 V MCC 29-2 8.2.5.A 3.1-18

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-3 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A Equipment Location By Fire Zone 480 V Bus 29 1.1.2.4 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 2 1.1.2.4 INSTRUMENTATION Condensate Storage Tank Level Indicator 2/3-3341-77A & B 8.2.5.A Service Water Pressure Indicator 2-3941-8A 11.3 Reactor Local Instrumentation LI2-263-151A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Instrumentation PI2-263-139A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Instrumentation PI2-263-60A & B 1.1.2.3 Reactor Local Instrumentation LI2-263-59A & B 1.1.2.3 Diesel Day Tank A Level Indicator 2/3-5241-22 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Indicator 2/3-5241-24 18.7.2 Clean Demineralizer Tank Drain Valve 2/3-4399-193 and pressure Outside gauge Diesel Day Tank A Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-23 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-25 18.7.2 ISCO Makeup Pump Flow Indicator 2/3-4341-152 18.7.1 Fire Protection System Pressure Indicator PI 2/3-4141-4A 11.3 3.1-19

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-4 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A1 Equipment Location By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Control Rod Drive Pump 2A-302-3 8.2.2.A Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units 1.1.1.2

  • Electromatic Relief Valves 3-203-3B through E 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser 3-1302 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-1 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-2 1.1.1.5.B Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-3 1.1.1.5.C Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-4 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-10 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-4102 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve 3-1301-16 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO3-1301-17 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO3-1301-20 1.1.1.5.A
  • RWCU Valve MO3-1201-2 1.1.1.3
  • RWCU Valve MO3-1201-3 1.1.1.3
  • Target Rock Valve 3-203-3A 1.2.1 Safety Valves 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1A 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1B 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1C 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1D 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2A 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2B 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2C 8.2.5.E

! Spurious operation concern only 3.1-20

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-4 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A1 Equipment Location By Fire Zone TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 2-3899-205 8.2.2.A TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 2-3899-204 8.2.2.A CRD Discharge Valve MO2-0301-2A 8.2.2.A Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 3-301-9A 1.1.1.2 Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 3-301-9B 1.1.1.2 Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3346-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3327-A-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-2301-12 Outside Service Water Connection to Fire System 2-3906 11.3 Isolation Condenser Sightglass 3-1301-644 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1300-202 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1300-203 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1301-39 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1301-40 1.1.1.5.A CRD Cross-tie Valve 2/3-0301-162 8.2.6.C CRD Cross-tie Valve 2/3-0301-163 8.2.6.C Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122B 18.7.2 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215A 18.7.1 Diesel Oil Day Tank B 2/3-5215B 18.7.2 Demineralized Water Tank T-105B Outside Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123B 18.7.2 Isolation Condenser Supply Isolation Valve MO3-4399-74 1.1.1.5.A ISCO Makeup Room A Damper 2/3-57854A 18.7.1 ISCO Makeup Room B Damper 2/3-57854B 18.7.2 DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank 2-5201 Outside Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump 2/3-4102 11.3 Unit 1 Fire Pump K124A Outside TBCCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3904-501 8.2.6.C 3-3904-501 8.2.6.C 2-3904-500 8.2.6.C 3-3904-500 8.2.6.C Turbine Oil Cooler Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3906-500 8.2.6.C 3-3906-500 8.2.6.C 3.1-21

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-4 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A1 Equipment Location By Fire Zone 2-3906-501 8.2.6.C 3-3906-501 8.2.6.C Concentrator Condenser Outlet Isolation Valves 2/3-3999-241 8.2.6.C 2/3-3999-240 8.2.6.C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Generator 2/3 9.0.C DG Cooling Water Pump 2/3-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 2/3-5790 9.0.C DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2/3-5203 9.0.C 4-kV SWGR 23 8.2.6.A 4-kV SWGR 23-1 1.1.2.3 4-kV SWGR 40 9.0.C 480-V Bus 28 1.1.2.4 480-V MCC 28-1 1.1.2.2 480-V MCC 28-2 8.2.6.A 480-V MCC 28-3 8.2.6.A 125-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery Bus 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Main Bus 2A-1 7.0.A 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 2 1.1.2.4 CRD Local Start Panel 2252-76 8.2.2.A Control Panel 2223-126A 18.7.1 Control Panel 2223-126B 18.7.2 250 Vdc MCC 2 6.1 250 Vdc MCC 3A 1.1.1.4 250 Vdc MCC 3B 1.1.1.4 250 V Battery #2 7.0.A Control Panel 902-3 2.0 Control Panel 923-1 2.0 480 V MCC 29-2 8.2.5.A 480 V Bus 29 1.1.2.4 INSTRUMENTATION Service Water Pressure Indicator 2-3941-8A 11.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI3-263-151A & B 1.1.1.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI3-263-139A & B 1.1.1.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI3-263-60A & B 1.1.1.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI3-263-59A & B 1.1.1.3 3.1-22

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-4 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A1 Equipment Location By Fire Zone Condensate Storage Tank Level Indicator 2/3-3341-77A & B 8.2.5.A Fire Protection Systems Pressure Indicator PI 2/3-4141-4A 11.3 Diesel Day Tank A Level Indicator 2/3-5241-22 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Indicator 2/3-5241-24 18.7.2 Clean Demineralizer Tank Drain Valve 2/3-4399-193 and pressure Outside gauge Diesel Day Tank A Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-23 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-25 18.7.2 ISCO Makeup Pump Flow Indicator 2/3-4341-152 18.7.1 3.1-23

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-5 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A2/B2 Equipment Location By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Control Rod Drive Pump 2A-302-3 8.2.2.A Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units 1.1.2.2

  • Electromatic Relief Valves 2-203-3B through E 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser 2-1302 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-1 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-2 1.1.2.5.B Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-3 1.1.2.5.C Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-4 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-10 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-4102 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve 2-1301-16 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO2-1301-17 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO2-1301-20 1.1.2.5.A
  • RWCU Valve MO2-1201-2 1.1.2.3
  • Target Rock Valve 2-203-3A 1.2.2 Safety Valves 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1A 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1B 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1C 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1D 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2A 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2B 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2C 8.2.5.A
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-24

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-5 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A2/B2 Equipment Location By Fire Zone TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 2-3899-204 8.2.2.A CRD Discharge Valve MO2-0301-2A 8.2.2.A Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 2-301-9A 1.1.2.2 Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 2-301-9B 1.1.2.2 Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3346-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3327-A-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-2301-12 Outside Service Water Connection to Fire System 2-3906 11.3 Isolation Condenser Sightglass 2-1301-644 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-633 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-634 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-39 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-40 1.1.2.5.A Control Rod Drive Pump 3A-302-3 8.2.2.B Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units 1.1.1.2

  • Electromatic Relief Valves 3-203-3B through E 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser 3-1302 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-1 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-2 1.1.1.5.B Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-3 1.1.1.5.C Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-4 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-10 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-4102 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve 3-1301-16 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO3-1301-17 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO3-1301-20 1.1.1.5.A
  • RWCU Valve MO3-1201-2 1.1.1.3
  • Target Rock Valve 3-203-3A 1.2.1 Safety Valves 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1A 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1B 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1C 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1D 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2A 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2B 8.2.5.E
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-25

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-5 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A2/B2 Equipment Location By Fire Zone

  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2C 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2D 8.2.5.E Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-360 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-361 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-357 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-348 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-349 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-358 8.2.2.B TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 3-3899-205 8.2.2.B TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 3-3899-204 8.2.2.B CRD Discharge Valve MO3-0301-2A 8.2.2.B Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 3-301-9A 1.1.1.2 Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 3-301-9B 1.1.1.2 Isolation Condenser Sightglass 3-1301-644 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1300-202 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1300-203 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1301-39 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1301-40 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122B 18.7.2 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215A 18.7.1 Diesel Oil Day Tank B 2/3-5215B 18.7.2 Demineralized Water Tank T-105B Outside Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123B 18.7.2 Isolation Condenser Supply Isolation Valve MO2-4399-74 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Supply Isolation Valve MO3-4399-74 1.1.1.5.A ISCO Makeup Room A Damper 2/3-57854A 18.7.1 ISCO Makeup Room B Damper 2/3-57854B 18.7.2 DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank 2-5201 Outside Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump 2/3-4102 11.3 Unit 1 Fire Pump K124A Outside
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-26

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-5 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A2/B2 Equipment Location By Fire Zone TBCCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3904-501 8.2.6.C 3-3904-501 8.2.6.C 2-3904-500 8.2.6.C 3-3904-500 8.2.6.C Turbine Oil Cooler Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3906-500 8.2.6.C 3-3906-500 8.2.6.C 2-3906-501 8.2.6.C 3-3906-501 8.2.6.C Concentrator Condenser Outlet Isolation Valves 2/3-3999-241 8.2.6.C 2/3-3999-240 8.2.6.C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Generator 2/3 9.0.C DG Cooling Water Pump 2/3-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 2/3-5790 9.0.C DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2/3-5203 9.0.C 4-kV SWGR 23 8.2.6.A 4-kV SWGR 23-1 1.1.2.3 4-kV SWGR 40 9.0.C 480-V Bus 28 1.1.2.4 480-V MCC 28-1 1.1.2.2 480-V MCC 28-3 8.2.6.A 125-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery Bus #2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Main Bus 2A-1 7.0.A 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 2 1.1.2.4 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A 6.1 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 3 1.1.1.4 125-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 125-Vdc Battery Bus #3 6.1 4-kV SWGR 33 8.2.6.E 4-kV SWGR 33-1 1.1.1.3 480-V Bus 38 1.1.1.4 480-V MCC 38-1 1.1.1.2 3.1-27

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-5 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH A2/B2 Equipment Location By Fire Zone ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 480-V MCC 38-3 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Main Bus 3 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A-1 8.2.6.E 480 V MCC 29-2 8.2.5.A 480 V Bus 29 1.1.2.4 Control Panel 2223-126A 18.7.1 Control Panel 2223-126B 18.7.2 250 Vdc MCC 2A 1.1.2.4 250 Vdc MCC 2B 1.1.2.4 250 V Battery #3 7.0.B 250 Vdc MCC 3 6.1 250 Vdc MCC 3A 1.1.1.4 250 Vdc MCC 3B 1.1.1.4 250 Vdc MCC 2 7.0.A 250 V Battery #2 7.0.A INSTRUMENTATION Local Mechanical Reactor Level Indicators 1.1.2.2 Local Mechanical Reactor Pressure Indicators 1.1.2.2 Service Water Pressure Indicator 2-3941-8A 11.3 Service Water Pressure Indicator 3-3941-8A 11.3 Fire Protection System Pressure Indicators PI 2/3-4141-4A 11.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI2-263-151A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI2-263-139A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI2-263-60A & B 1.1.2.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI2-263-59A & B 1.1.2.3 Condensate Storage Tank Level Indicator 2/3-3341-77A & B 8.2.5.A Diesel Day Tank A Level Indicator 2/3-5241-22 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Indicator 2/3-5241-24 18.7.2 Clean Demineralizer Tank Drain Valve 2/3-4399-193 and pressure Outside gauge Diesel Day Tank A Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-23 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-25 18.7.2 ISCO Makeup Pump Flow Indicator 2/3-4341-152 18.7.1 3.1-28

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-6 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH B Equipment Location By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Control Rod Drive Pump 3A-302-3 8.2.2.B Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units 1.1.1.2

  • Electromatic Relief Valves 3-203-3B through E 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser 3-1302 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-1 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-2 1.1.1.5.B Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-3 1.1.1.5.C Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-4 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-10 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-4102 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve 3-1301-16 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO3-1301-17 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO3-1301-20 1.1.1.5.A
  • RWCU Valve MO3-1201-2 1.1.1.3
  • Target Rock Valve 3-203-3A 1.2.1 Safety Valves 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1A 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1B 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1C 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1D 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2A 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2B 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2C 8.2.5.E

! Spurious operation concern only 3.1-29

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-6 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH B Equipment Location By Fire Zone TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 3-3899-204 8.2.2.B CRD Discharge Valve MO3-0301-2A 8.2.2.B Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 3-301-9A 1.1.1.2 Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 3-301-9B 1.1.1.2 Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3346-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3327-A-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-2301-12 Outside Service Water Connection to Fire System 2-3906 11.3 Isolation Condenser Sightglass 3-1301-644 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1300-202 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1300-203 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1301-39 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1301-40 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122B 18.7.2 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215A 18.7.1 Diesel Oil Day Tank B 2/3-5215B 18.7.2 Demineralized Water Tank T-105B Outside Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123B 18.7.2 Isolation Condenser Supply Isolation Valve MO3-4399-74 1.1.1.5.A ISCO Makeup Room A Damper 2/3-57854A 18.7.1 ISCO Makeup Room B Damper 2/3-57854B 18.7.2

    • DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A
    • DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank 2-5201 Outside Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump 2/3-4102 11.3 Unit 1 Fire Pump K124 Outside TBCCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3904-501 8.2.6.C 3-3904-501 8.2.6.C 2-3904-500 8.2.6.C 3-3904-500 8.2.6.C Turbine Oil Cooler Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3906-500 8.2.6.C 3-3906-500 8.2.6.C 2-3906-501 8.2.6.C
    • If available, however not credited 3.1-30

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-6 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH B Equipment Location By Fire Zone 3-3906-501 8.2.6.C Concentrator Condenser Outlet Isolation Valves 2/3-3999-241 8.2.6.C 2/3-3999-240 8.2.6.C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Location By Fire Zone Diesel Generator 2/3 9.0.C DG Cooling Water Pump 2/3-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 2/3-5790 9.0.C DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2/3-5203 9.0.C 4-kV SWGR 33 8.2.6.E 4-kV SWGR 33-1 1.1.1.3 480-V Bus 38 1.1.1.4 480-V Bus 39 1.1.1.4 480-V MCC 38-1 1.1.1.2 480-V MCC 38-3 8.2.6.E 480-V MCC 38-4 1.1.1.2 250-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 250-Vdc Turbine Building MCC 2 7.0.A 250-Vdc MCC 3A 1.1.1.4 250-Vdc MCC 3B 1.1.1.4 125-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery Bus 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 125-Vdc Battery Bus 3 6.1 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A-1 6.1 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 3 1.1.1.4 120/240-V Essential Service Distribution Panel 903-49 6.2 120/240-V Instrument Bus 903-50 6.2 CRD Local Start Panel 2253-76 8.2.2.B ADS Inhibit Switch 2.0 Control Panel 2223-126A 18.7.1 Control Panel 2223-126B 18.7.2 Control Panel 903-3 2.0 Control Panel 923-1 2.0

    • 480 V MCC 29-2 8.2.5.A
    • If available, however not credited 3.1-31

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-6 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH B Equipment Location By Fire Zone

    • 480 V Bus 29 1.1.2.4 INSTRUMENTATION Service Water Pressure Indicator 3-3941-8A 11.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI3-263-151A & B 1.1.1.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI3-263-139A & B 1.1.1.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI3-263-60A & B 1.1.1.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI3-263-59A & B 1.1.1.3 Fire Protection System Pressure Indicator PI2/3-4141-4A 11.3 Condensate Storage Tank Level Indicator 2/3-3341-77A & B 8.2.5.A Diesel Day Tank A Level Indicator 2/3-5241-22 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Indicator 2/3-5241-24 18.7.2 Clean Demineralizer Tank Drain Valve 2/3-4399-193 and pressure Outside gauge Diesel Day Tank A Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-23 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-25 18.7.2 ISCO Makeup Pump Flow Indicator 2/3-4341-152 18.7.1
    • If available, however not credited 3.1-32

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-7 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH B1 Equipment Location By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Control Rod Drive Pump 3A-302-3 8.2.2.B Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units 1.1.2.2

  • Electromatic Relief Valves 2-203-3B through E 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser 2-1301 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-1 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-2 1.1.2.5.B Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-3 1.1.2.5.C Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-4 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-10 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-4102 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve 2-1301-16 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO2-1301-17 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO2-1301-20 1.1.2.5.A
  • RWCU Valve MO2-1201-2 1.1.2.3
  • RWCU Valve MO2-1201-3 1.1.2.3
  • Target Rock Valve 2-0203-3A 1.2.2 Safety Valves 1.2.2 Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump 2/3-4102 11.3 Unit 1 Fire Pump K124 A Outside
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1A 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1B 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1C 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1D 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2A 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2B 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2C 8.2.5.A
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-33

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-7 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH B1 Equipment Location By Fire Zone Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-349 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-358 8.2.2.B TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 3-3899-205 8.2.2.B TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 3-3899-204 8.2.2.B CRD Discharge Valve MO3-0301-2A 8.2.2.B Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 2-0301-9A 1.1.2.2 Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 2-0301-9B 1.1.2.2 Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3346-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3327-A-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-2301-12 Outside Service Water Connection to Fire System 2-3906 11.3 Isolation Condenser Sightglass 2-1301-644 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-633 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-634 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-39 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-40 1.1.2.5.A CRD Cross-tie Valve 2/3-0301-162 8.2.6.C CRD Cross-tie Valve 2/3-0301-163 8.2.6.C Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122B 18.7.2 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215A 18.7.1 Diesel Oil Day Tank B 2/3-5215B 18.7.2 Demineralized Water Tank T-105B Outside Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123B 18.7.2 Isolation Condenser Supply Isolation Valve MO2-4399-74 1.1.2.5.A ISCO Makeup Room A Damper 2/3-57854A 18.7.1 ISCO Makeup Room B Damper 2/3-57854B 18.7.2

    • DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A
    • DG Fuel Oil Storage Tank 2-5201 Outside TBCCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3904-501 8.2.6.C 3-3904-501 8.2.6.C 2-3904-500 8.2.6.C 3-3904-500 8.2.6.C
    • If available, however not credited 3.1-34

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-7 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH B1 Equipment Location By Fire Zone Turbine Oil Cooler Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3906-500 8.2.6.C 3-3906-500 8.2.6.C 2-3906-501 8.2.6.C 3-3906-501 8.2.6.C Concentrator Condenser Outlet Isolation Valves 2/3-3999-241 8.2.6.C 2/3-3999-240 8.2.6.C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Generator 2/3 9.0.C DG Cooling Water Pump 2/3-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 2/3-5790 9.0.C DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2/3-5203 9.0.C 4-kV SWGR 33 8.2.6.E 4-kV SWGR 33-1 1.1.1.3 4-kV SWGR 40 9.0.C 480-V Bus 38 1.1.1.4 480-V MCC 38-1 1.1.1.2 480-V MCC 38-2 8.2.6.E 480-V MCC 38-3 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A-1 6.1 125-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 125-Vdc Battery Bus 3 6.1 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 3 1.1.1.4 Control Panel 2223-126A 18.7.1 Control Panel 2223-126B 18.7.2 250 Vdc MCC3 6.1 250 Vdc MCC2A 1.1.2.4 250 Vdc MCC2B 1.1.2.4 250 V Battery #3 7.0.B Control Panel 902-3 2.0 Control Panel 923-1 2.0

    • 480V MCC 29-2 8.2.5.A
    • If available, however not credited 3.1-35

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-7 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH B1 Equipment Location By Fire Zone

    • 480V Bus 29 1.1.2.4 INSTRUMENTATION Service Water Pressure Indicator 3-3941-8A 11.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI2-263-151A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI2-263-139A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI2-263-60A & B 1.1.2.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI2-263-59A & B 1.1.2.3 Condensate Storage Tank Level Indicators 2/3-3341-77A & B 8.2.5.A Fire Protection System pressure Indicator PI 2/3-4141-4A 11.3 Diesel Day Tank A Level Indicator 2/3-5241-22 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Indicator 2/3-5241-24 18.7.2 Clean Demineralizer Tank Drain Valve 2/3-4399-193 and Outside pressure gauge Diesel Day Tank A Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-23 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Transmitter 2/3-4341-25 18.7.2 ISCO Makeup Pump Flow Indicator 2/3-4341-152 18.7.1 Control Rod Drive Pump Suction Gage 8.2.2.B PI 3-302-50 A(B)
    • If available, however not credited 3.1-36

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT14 JUNE 2003 TABLE 3.1-8 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH C Equipment Location By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Containment Cooling Service Water Pump 2C (2-1501-44C) 8.2.2.A Containment Cooling Service Water Pump 2D (2-1501-44D) 8.2.2.A Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Air Cooler 2C (2-5700-30C) 8.2.2.A Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Air Cooler 2D (2-5700-30D) 8.2.2.A

  • Electromatic Relief Valves MO2-203-3B through E 1.2.2
  • Safety Valves 1.2.1 HPCI Pump and Turbine 2-2302/2-2301 11.2.3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump 2-2303-AOP 11.2.3 HPCI Condensate Pump 2-2320-GSLO 11.2.3 HPCI Condenser Air Exhaust Fan 2-2320-GSEF 11.2.3 HPCI Cooling Water Pump 2-2301-57 11.2.3 HPCI Emergency Air Cooler 2-5747 11.2.3 HPCI Emergency Bearing Oil Pump 2-2303-EOP 11.2.3 HPCI Oil Tank Heater2-2303-HTR 11.2.3 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-10 11.2.3 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-14 11.2.3 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-15 11.2.3 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-3 11.2.3 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-35 11.2.3 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-36 11.2.1 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-4 1.2.2 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-5 1.1.2.1 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-6 11.2.3 HPCI Valve MO2-2301-8 8.2.5.A HPCI Valve MO2-2301-9 11.2.3 LPCI Pump 2C (2-1502-C) 11.2.1 LPCI Pump 2D (2-1502-D) 11.2.1 LPCI Emergency Air Cooler 2-5746B 11.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-11B 11.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-13B 1.1.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-18B 1.1.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-19B 1.1.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-20B 1.1.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-21B 1.1.2.2 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-32B 11.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-38B 11.2.1
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-37

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-8 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH C Location By Equipment Fire Zone LPCI Valve MO2-1501-3B 11.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-5C 11.2.1 LPCI Valve MO2-1501-5D 11.2.1

  • Target Rock Valve MO2-203-3A 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1A 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1B 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1C 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1D 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2A 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2B 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2C 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2D 8.2.5.A ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Generator 2 9.0.A DG Cooling Water Pump 2-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 2-5790 9.0.A DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A 4-kV SWGR 24 8.2.6.A 4-kV SWGR 24-1 1.1.2.3 480-V Bus 29 1.1.2.4 480-V MCC 29-1 1.1.2.2 480-V MCC 29-2 8.2.5.A 480-V MCC 29-4 1.1.2.2 480-V MCC 29-7 1.1.2.2 250-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 250-Vdc Turbine Building MCC 3 6.1 250-Vdc MCC 2A 1.1.2.4 250-Vdc MCC 2B 1.1.2.4 125-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 125-Vdc Battery Bus 2 6.1 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Reserve 2B 7.0.A 125-Vdc Reserve 2B-1 7.0.A
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-38

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-8 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH C Location By Equipment Fire Zone 120/240-V Essential Service Distribution Panel 902-49 6.2 120/240-V Instrument Bus 902-50 6.2 INSTRUMENTATION Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI2-263-59A & B 1.1.2.3 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI2-263-60A & B 1.1.2.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI 2-263-151A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI2-263-139A & B 1.1.2.2 3.1-39

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 TABLE 3.1-9 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH D Location Equipment By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Containment Cooling Service Water Pump 3C (3-1501-44C) 8.2.2.B Containment Cooling Service Water Pump 3D (3-1501-44D) 8.2.2.B Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Air Cooler 3C (3-5700-30C) 8.2.2.B Containment Cooling Service Water Pump Air Cooler 3D (3-5700-30D) 8.2.2.B

  • Electromatic Relief Valves MO3-203-3B through E 1.2.1
  • Target Rock Valve 3-203-3A 1.2.1 Safety Valves 1.2.1 HPCI Pump and Turbine 3-2302/3-2301 11.1.3 HPCI Auxiliary Oil Pump 3-2303-AOP 11.1.3 HPCI Condensate Pump 3-2320-GSLO 11.1.3 HPCI Condenser Air Exhaust Fan 3-2320-GSEF 11.1.3 HPCI Cooling Water Pump 3-2301-57 11.1.3 HPCI Emergency Air Cooler 3-5747 11.1.3 HPCI Emergency Bearing Oil Pump 3-2303-EOP 11.1.3 HPCI Oil Tank Heater 3-2303-HTR 11.1.3 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-10 11.1.3 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-14 11.1.3 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-15 11.1.3 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-3 11.1.3 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-35 11.1.3 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-36 1.1.1.1 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-4 1.2.1 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-5 1.1.1.1 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-6 11.1.3 HPCI Valve MO3-2301-8 8.2.5.E HPCI Valve MO3-2301-9 11.1.3 LPCI Pump 3C 3-1502-C 11.1.1 LPCI Pump 3D 3-1502-D 11.1.1 LPCI Emergency Air Cooler 3-5746B 11.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-11B 11.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-13B 1.1.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-18B 1.1.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-19B 1.1.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-20B 1.1.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-21B 1.1.1.2
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-40

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 TABLE 3.1-9 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH D Location Equipment By Fire Zone LPCI Valve MO3-1501-32B 11.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-38B 1.1.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-3B 11.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-5C 11.1.1 LPCI Valve MO3-1501-5D 11.1.1

  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1A 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1B 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1C 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1D 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2A 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2B 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2C 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2D 8.2.5.E ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Generator 3 9.0.B DG Cooling Water Pump 3-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 3-5790 9.0.B DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 3-5203 9.0.B 4-kV SWGR 34 8.2.6.E 4-kV SWGR 34-1 1.1.1.3 480-V Bus 39 1.1.1.4 480-V MCC 39-1 1.1.1.2 480-V MCC 39-2 8.2.6.C 480-V MCC 39-7 1.1.1.2 250-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 250-Vdc Turbine Building MCC 2 7.0.A 250-Vdc MCC 3A 1.1.1.4 250-Vdc MCC 3B 1.1.1.4 125-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery Bus 2 6.1 125-Vdc Main Bus 2A-1 7.0.A 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 3B-1 6.1 125-Vdc Reserve 3A 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 3B 6.1 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 3 1.1.1.4
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-41

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-9 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH D ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 120/240-V Instrument Bus 903-50 6.2 120-240-V Essential Service Distribution Panel 903-49 6.2 Location Equipment By Fire Zone INSTRUMENTATION Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI3-263-59A & B 1.1.1.3 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI3-263-60A & B 1.1.1.3

  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-42

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-10 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH E Equipment Location By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Control Rod Drive Pump 2B-302-3 8.2.2.A Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units 1.1.2.2

  • Electromatic Relief Valves 2-203-3B through E 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser 2-1302 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-1 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-2 1.1.2.5.B Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-3 1.1.2.5.C Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-4 1.2.2 Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-10 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-4102 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve 2-1301-16 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO2-1301-17 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO2-1301-20 1.1.2.5.A Service Water Pump 2B-3901 11.3
  • Target Rock Valve 2-203-3A 1.2.2 Safety Valves 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1A 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1B 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1C 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-1D 1.2.2
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2A 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2B 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2C 8.2.5.A
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 2-203-2D 8.2.5.A Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 2-3999-360 8.2.2.A Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 2-3999-361 8.2.2.A Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 2-3999-357 8.2.2.A Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 2-3999-348 8.2.2.A Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 2-3999-349 8.2.2.A Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 2-3999-358 8.2.2.A TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 2-3899-205 8.2.2.A TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 2-3899-204 8.2.2.A CRD Discharge Valve MO2-0301-2B 8.2.2.A
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-43

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-10 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH E Equipment Location By Fire Zone Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 2-0301-9A 1.1.2.2 Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 2-0301-9B 1.1.2.2 Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3346-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3327-A-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-2301-12 Outside Service Water Connection to Fire System 2-3906 11.3 Isolation Condenser Sightglass 2-1301-644 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-633 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-634 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-39 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 2-1301-40 1.1.2.5.A Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122B 18.7.2 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215A 18.7.1 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215B 18.7.2 Demineralizer Water Tank T 105-B Outside Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123B 18.7.2 Isocondenser Supply Isolation Valve MO2-4399-74 1.1.2.5.A ISCO Makeup Pump Room A Damper 2/3-57854A 18.7.1 ISCO Makeup Pump Room A Damper 2/3-57854B 18.7.2 DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5201 Outside Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump 2/3-4102 11.3 Unit 1 Fire Pump K124A Outside TBCCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3904-501 8.2.6.C 3-3904-501 8.2.6.C 2-3904-500 8.2.6.C 3-3904-500 8.2.6.C Turbine Oil Cooler Outlet Isolation Valves 2-3906-500 8.2.6.C 3-3906-500 8.2.6.C 2-3906-501 8.2.6.C 3-3906-501 8.2.6.C Concentrator Condenser Outlet Isolation Valves 2/3-3999-241 8.2.6.C 2/3-3999-240 8.2.6.C 3.1-44

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-10 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH E Equipment Location By Fire Zone ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Generator 2 9.0.A DG Cooling Water Pump 2-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 2-5790 9.0.A DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A 4-kV SWGR 24 8.2.6.A 4-kV SWGR 24-1 1.1.2.3 480-V Bus 28 1.1.2.4 480-V Bus 29 1.1.2.4 480-V MCC 28-1 1.1.2.2 480-V MCC 29-2 8.2.5.A 250-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 250-Vdc Turbine Building MCC 3 6.1 250-Vdc MCC 2A 1.1.2.4 250-Vdc MCC 2B 1.1.2.4 125-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery Bus 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 125-Vdc Battery Bus 3 6.1 125-Vdc Main Bus 2A-1 7.0.A 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 2B 7.0.A 125-Vdc Bus 2B-1 7.0.A 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 2 1.1.2.4 Control Panel 2223-126A 18.7.1 Control Panel 2223-126B 18.7.2 Control Panel 902-3 2.0 Control Panel 923-1 2.0 INSTRUMENTATION Service Water Pressure Indicator 2-3941-8A 11.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI2-263-151A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI2-263-139A & B 1.1.2.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI2-263-60A & B 1.1.2.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI2-263-59A & B 1.1.2.3 Condensate Storage Tank Level Indicators 2/3-3341-77A and B 8.2.5.A Diesel Day Tank A Level Indicator 2/3-5241-22 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Indicator 2/3-5241-24 18.7.2 3.1-45

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-10 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH E Equipment Location By Fire Zone Clean Demineralizer Tank Drain Valve 2/3-4399-193 and pressure Outside gauge Diesel Day Tank A Level Transmitter 2/3-5241-23 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Transmitter 2/3-5241-25 18.7.2 ISCO Makeup Pump Flow indicator 2/3-4341-152 18.7.1 Fire Protection System Pressure Indicator PI 2/3-4141-4A 11.3 3.1-46

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 3.1-11 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH F Equipment Location By Fire Zone MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Control Rod Drive Pump 3B-302-3 8.2.2.B Control Rod Drive Hydraulic Units 1.1.1.2

  • Electromatic Relief Valves 3-203-3B through E 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser 3-1302 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-1 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-2 1.1.1.5.B Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-3 1.1.1.5.C Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-4 1.2.1 Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-10 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-4102 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve 3-1301-16 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO3-1301-17 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Valve AO3-1301-20 1.1.1.5.A Service Water Pump 3B-3901 11.3
  • Target Rock Valve 3-203-3A 1.2.1 Safety Valves 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1A 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1B 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1C 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-1D 1.2.1
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2A 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2B 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2C 8.2.5.E
  • Main Steam Isolation Valve 3-203-2D 8.2.5.E Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-360 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-361 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-357 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-348 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-349 8.2.2.B Service Water Cooling to CRD Pump Valve 3-3999-358 8.2.2.B TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 3-3899-205 8.2.2.B TBCCW Cooling to CRD Pumps 3-3899-204 8.2.2.B CRD Discharge Valve MO3-0301-2B 8.2.2.B
  • Spurious operation concern only 3.1-47

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-11 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH F Equipment Location By Fire Zone Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 3-0301-9A 1.1.2.2 Drive Water Filter Inlet Valve 3-0301-9B 1.1.2.2 Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3346-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-3327-A-500 Outside Condensate Storage Tank Discharge Valves 2/3-2301-12 Outside Service Water Connection to Fire System 2-3906 11.3 Isolation Condenser Sightglass 3-1301-644 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1300-202 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1300-203 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1301-39 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Sightglass Isolation Valves 3-1301-40 1.1.1.5.A Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump 2/3-43122B 18.7.2 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215A 18.7.1 Diesel Oil Day Tank A 2/3-5215B 18.7.2 Demineralizer Water Tank T 105-B Outside Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123A 18.7.1 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Driver 2/3-43123B 18.7.2 Isocondenser Supply Isolation Valve MO2-4399-74 1.1.2.5.A ISCO Makeup Pump Room A Damper 2/3-57854A 18.7.1 ISCO Makeup Pump Room A Damper 2/3-57854B 18.7.2

    • DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 9.0.A
    • DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5201 Outside Unit 2/3 Diesel Fire Pump 2/3-4102 11.3 Unit 1 Fire Pump K124 Outside TBCCW Heat Exchanger Outlet Isolation Valve 2-3904-501 8.2.6.C 3-3904-501 8.2.6.C 2-3904-500 8.2.6.C 3-3904-500 8.2.6.C Turbine Oil Cooler Outlet Isolation Valve 2-3906-500 8.2.6.C 3-3906-500 8.2.6.C 2-3906-501 8.2.6.C 3-3906-501 8.2.6.C
    • If available, however not credited 3.1-48

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.1-11 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH F Equipment Location By Fire Zone Concentrator Condenser Outlet Isolation Valves 2/3-3999-241 8.2.6.C 2/3-3999-240 8.2.6.C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Diesel Generator 3 9.0.B DG Cooling Water Pump 3-3903 11.3 DG Vent Fan 3-5790 9.0.B DG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 3-5203 9.0.B 4-kV SWGR 34 8.2.6.E 4-kV SWGR 34-1 1.1.1.3 480-V Bus 38 1.1.1.4 480-V Bus 39 1.1.1.4 480-V MCC 38-1 1.1.1.2 480-V MCC 39-2 8.2.6.C 250-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 250-Vdc Turbine Building MCC 2 7.0.A 250-Vdc MCC 3A 1.1.1.4 250-Vdc MCC 3B 1.1.1.4 125-Vdc Battery 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery Bus 2 7.0.A 125-Vdc Battery 3 7.0.B 125-Vdc Battery Bus 3 6.1 125-Vdc Main Bus 2A-1 7.0.A 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 3B 6.1 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 3B-1 6.1 125-Vdc Main Bus 3A 8.2.6.E 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 3 1.1.1.4 Control Panel 2223-126A 18.7.1 Control Panel 2223-126B 18.7.2 Control Panel 902-3 2.0 Control Panel 923-1 2.0

    • 480V MCC 29-2 8.2.5.A
    • 480V Bus 29 1.1.2.4 250Vdc MCC 3A 1.1.1.4 250Vdc MCC 3B 1.1.1.4 250Vdc MCC 2 7.0.A
  • If available, however not credited 3.1-49

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 3.1-11 COMPONENTS REQUIRED FOR ALTERNATIVE SHUTDOWN PATH F Equipment Location By Fire Zone 250 V Battery #2 7.0.A INSTRUMENTATION Service Water Pressure Indicator 3-3941-8B 11.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI3-263-151A & B 1.1.1.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI3-263-139A & B 1.1.1.2 Reactor Local Pressure Instrumentation PI3-263-60A & B 1.1.1.3 Reactor Local Level Instrumentation LI3-263-59A & B 1.1.1.3 Condensate Storage Tank Level Indicators 2/3-3341-77A and B 8.2.5.A Diesel Day Tank A Level Indicator 2/3-5241-22 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Indicator 2/3-5241-24 18.7.2 Clean Demineralizer Tank Drain Valve 2/3-4399-193 and pressure Outside gauge Diesel Day Tank A Level Transmitter 2/3-5241-23 18.7.1 Diesel Day Tank B Level Transmitter 2/3-5241-25 18.7.2 ISCO Makeup Pump Flow indicator 2/3-4341-152 18.7.1 Fire Protection System Pressure Indicator PI 2/3-4141-4A 3.1-50

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 3.2 Description of Methods to Achieve and Maintain Cold Shutdown Cold shutdown is defined in the Dresden Technical Specifications as that condition in which the reactor mode switch is in the shutdown position, no core alterations are being performed, and the reactor coolant temperature is equal to or less than 212F. This analysis considers those systems and components necessary to bring the reactor from hot shutdown to cold shutdown and to maintain the cold shutdown condition.

Three different cold shutdown trains are available at Dresden 2&3. These trains are shown below:

1. Shutdown Cooling

- Shutdown Cooling System

- RBCCW

- Service Water

2. LPCI/CCSW Division I
3. LPCI/CCSW Division II Of these, the shutdown cooling path is the normal path used by the station. This path was preferred and utilized in this analysis wherever possible. The use of LPCI as a backup to the shutdown cooling system for achieving and maintaining cold shutdown was addressed by the NRC in the SEP Review of Safe Shutdown Systems. It was also proposed as an alternative in Dresden 2&3, Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis Supplement 1, Cold Shutdown Analysis, January 1980 (F.P.P.D.P. Historical Volume). No advantage with regard to cable separation was gained from analyzing the availability of both LPCI/CCSW Divisions. Therefore, because LPCI/CCSW Division II was also analyzed for hot shutdown, it was chosen. Each of these two methods is described in this section.

The cold shutdown procedures are a continuation of the process of bringing the reactor from an operating status to safe shutdown. Since cold shutdown follows hot shutdown, reactivity control will not be addressed. Reactor coolant level is maintained above the core by both of the shutdown systems employed at the Dresden Station by injecting water into the RPV. Only the following items will be discussed for each of the cold shutdown methods:

1. Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal
2. Suppression Pool Cooling
3. Process Monitoring Instrumentation
4. Support Functions 3.2-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 3.2.1 Shutdown Cooling Method 3.2.1.1 Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal The shutdown cooling system would be started as soon as the reactor coolant system has been sufficiently cooled (T<350F) and depressurized. Depressurization can be achieved by the main condenser through the turbine bypass valves, isolation condenser, HPCI or the electromatic relief valves. A system sketch of the Shutdown Cooling System (SDCS) is shown in Figure 3.2-1. All mechanical equipment associated with this method of shutdown is identified in Table 3.2-1. The SDCS design was based upon decreasing reactor coolant system temperatures to 125F within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after reactor shutdown. The system consists of three partial-capacity loops. FSAR Subsection 10.4.2 states that all three are necessary to perform the cooling function. However, plant operating experience has shown that at only eight hours after normal (main condenser) shutdown commencement, when the SDCS would normally be put into service and after reactor coolant system temperature has decreased to 350F, only one pump and one heat exchanger (comprising one loop) are necessary to cool down. Thus, there is substantial excess capacity.

As seen in Figure 3.2-1, the SDCS pumps take suction from the reactor recirculation loops through motor-operated valves 1001-1A and 1001-1B. These valves are inside containment. They are ac-powered from 480-Volt ac MCC 28-1 (38-1) which can be supplied from the emergency diesel generators. They are closed until initiation requirements (reactor coolant system temperature less than 350F) are met and operator action is taken.

The two inlet lines join in one header outside of containment. This header feeds three separate loops. Each loop has a dc-powered motor-operated pump inlet isolation valve (1001-2A, 1001-2B or 1001-2C), a centrifugal pump rated at 6,750 gpm at "full operation", a heat exchanger, and a dc-powered motor-operated pump outlet isolation valve (1001-4A, 1001-4B or 1001-4C).

Downstream of the pump outlet isolation valves, and still outside containment, the three branches again feed a common header. This common header divides into two return lines, each containing an ac-powered motor-operated isolation valve (1001-5A and 1001-5B). Each return line penetrates the containment and rejoins the reactor coolant system through connections into one division of the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system. Each LPCI division connects to one of the reactor recirculation loops. Although the capability exists to permit flow from and to both recirculation loops simultaneously, normally only one loop is selected for such service.

Either recirculation loop valve(s) 0202-5A(B) or 0202-4A(B) must be closed to prevent back flow through the reactor recirculating pump.

The SDCS cannot normally be put into service until various interlocks are met. The first of these is a temperature interlock on all four ac-powered isolation valves (1001-1A and 1001-1B and 1001-5A and 1001-5B), which will not allow their opening until reactor coolant system temperature, sensed on both recirculation loops, has decreased to less than 350F. The dc suction valves (1001-2A, 1001-2B, 1001-2C) will also shut to isolate the SDCS (with check valves on the discharge side), if system temperature, again sensed on the recirculation loops, increases to 350F. Additionally, each pump has interlocks to prevent operation until the following conditions are met: 1) Inlet temperature, as measured in its branch line, must be less than 350F, and 2) pump suction pressure must be greater than 4 psig. If these conditions are not met, then 3.2-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 The SDCS pumps cannot be started. Also, the pumps will trip upon temperature increase to 350F or if suction pressure decreases to less than 4 psig. The system also isolates on a Group III signal,

+ 8 reactor water level.

Power to the ac-isolation valves (1001-1A(B) and 1001-5A(B)) is provided from 480-Volt MCC 28-1 (38-1), and to the pumps from 4-kV buses 23-1 (33-1) (Pumps 2A (3A) and 2C (3C)) and 24-1 (34-1) (Pump 2B (3B)). Each of these is capable of being supplied from the emergency diesel generators. DC power to the three branch suction isolation valves, 1001-2A, 1001-2B, and 1001-2C and the 1001-4A and 1001-4B branch discharge isolation valves is obtained from 250-Volt DC Reactor Building MCC 2 (3), (Bus 2A (3A)). Power for the remaining dc discharge valve 1001-4C is supplied from 250-Volt DC Reactor Building MCC 2 (3) (Bus 2B (3B)).

Recirculation loop valves MO2 (3)-0202-4A and MO2 (3)-0202-5A are fed from MCC 28-7(38-7). Valves MO2 (3)-0202-4B and MO2 (3)-0202-5B are fed from MCC 29-7(39-7).

The heat exchangers of the SDCS are cooled by water from the Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water (RBCCW) system. The heat exchangers of the RBCCW are in turn cooled by the SW system (see Subsection 3.2.1.4). The RBCCW system sketch is shown on Figure 3.2-2.

3.2.1.2 Suppression Pool Cooling The shutdown cooling method of bringing the reactor to cold shutdown does not employ the suppression pool as a heat sink. Therefore, no pool cooling is needed during this phase of safe shutdown.

3.2.1.3 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2.1.3.1 Reactor Water Level and Pressure Reactor level and pressure are normally monitored in the control room on various instruments, which are fed from two independent divisions. The operator can also locally monitor reactor level and pressure in the Reactor Building on instrument racks 2202(3)-5 and 2202(3)-6 at the 546-foot elevation or 2202(3)-7 and 2202(3)-8 at the 517-foot elevation. Reactor pressure is used to determine the saturation temperature in the vessel. When the vessel pressure is reduced, a meter will be attached to a drywell penetration to measure the recirculation loop (A+B) temperature, vessel shell temperature and shell flange temperature if control room indication is unavailable.

3.2.1.3.2 Suppression Pool Level and Temperature Suppression pool level and temperature are not necessary for the shutdown cooling method of cold shutdown because the suppression pool is not employed as a heat sink for this method of cold shutdown.

3.2.1.3.3 Diagnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems Local mechanical discharge pressure indication is provided for the shutdown cooling pumps, RBCCW pumps, and service water pumps.

3.2-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 3.2.1.4 Support Functions The major mechanical auxiliary systems to the shutdown cooling system are the RBCCW and service water systems. Each of the three RBCCW pumps will deliver 8,800 gpm (FSAR Section 10.10). Although the SAR states that two pumps (and heat exchangers) are needed for the cooldown and shutdown modes of operation, plant experience has shown that only one pump and heat exchanger combination is necessary in the assumed scenario. Any combination of one pump with one heat exchanger is possible because of the piping and valving arrangement and any of the loads to be cooled can be isolated, when feasible and necessary, to increase cooling to essential heat loads.

The RBCCW path to the shutdown cooling system heat exchangers begins at the discharge of the three RBCCW pumps which are in parallel branches. Pump 2A (3A) is powered from the 4-kV ac Bus 23-1 (33-1) while pumps 2/3 (not credited) and 2B (3B) receive power from the 4-kV ac bus 24-1 (34-1). These buses can be supplied from the emergency diesel generator. Pump 2/3 is unique in that its discharge can also be routed (through a normally locked-closed valve) to provide cooling to the RBCCW system of Dresden 3 (which has only two pumps and two heat exchangers).

The three pump discharge lines join into a header which feeds all of the components to be cooled (other than SDCS heat exchangers, this includes the drywell coolers, the SDCS pumps, fuel pool heat exchangers, non-regenerative heat exchangers of the reactor water cleanup system, and various other loads). There is an ac-powered motor-operated isolation valve (3704) on the discharge of the SDCS heat exchangers. This valve is supplied power from MCC 29-1 (39-1) which can be fed from the diesel generator. It also is accessible for manual operation if necessary.

Flow to cool the SDCS pumps is routed through a normally-open ac powered motor-operated inlet isolation valve (3701) which also serves to allow flow to or isolate flow from other loads to be cooled. This valve is supplied power from MCC 28-1 (38-1) and is also accessible for manual operation.

Discharge of RBCCW from the cooled components is routed to one header, which feeds the three RBCCW heat exchangers. The cooled heat exchanger effluent (service water is the cooling medium) feeds a single header from which the RBCCW pumps draw suction.

The RBCCW system pressure is lower than that of both the components being cooled and the service water-cooling medium, meaning that any intersystem leakage at the heat exchangers would be leakage into the RBCCW system. This prevents radioactive material from the cooled components from escaping to the environment through the ultimate cooling medium. It also prevents impurities in the cooling medium from entering the reactor coolant system.

As noted above, the RBCCW system is cooled by the service water (SW) system. The SW system sketch is shown in Figure 3.2-3. This system has five pumps, two of which are powered from Dresden 2 buses, two from Dresden 3 buses, and one from both Dresden 2 and 3 buses. All five pumps, with operator action, can be supplied power from the emergency diesel generators.

Pump 2A (3A) is powered from bus 23 (33), Pump 2B (3B) from bus 24 (34), and Pump 2/3 3.2-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 from either bus 24 or bus 34. All five pumps are located in the Crib House and are rated at 15,000 gpm each. A common header connects the Dresden 2 and Dresden 3 systems. All valves in the service water piping which lead to or from the RBCCW heat exchangers are manual with the exception of air-operated temperature control valves on each heat exchanger. These valves fail open on loss of air.

The power distribution equipment necessary to support the shutdown cooling systems and its auxiliaries is shown on Figure 3.2-4 and listed on Table 3.2-2. The load calculation (Table 3.2-3) using FSAR load data shows that one diesel per unit is needed for achieving cold shutdown. It is conservatively assumed for the purpose of this load analysis that two shutdown cooling pumps, two RBCCW pumps, and one service water pump are necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown for one unit. As noted in Subsection 3.2.1.1, station operating experience has shown that only one pump is necessary.

While achieving and maintaining cold shutdown was not considered in the design basis of the diesel generators as described in FSAR Table 8.2.2, Table 3.2-3 shows that the diesel generators have adequate capacity available to carry the shutdown system loads.

Each diesel generator is supported by the following auxiliaries (see Figure 3.1-6):

1. Diesel generator fuel transfer pump
2. Diesel generator room ventilation fan
3. Diesel generator cooling water pump Each diesel generator is supplied from a 750-gallon day tank which in turn is supplied from a 15,000-gallon fuel oil tank. The technical specifications require a minimum of 10,000 gallons of diesel fuel supply on site for each diesel. The diesel fuel supply of 10,000 gallons will supply each diesel generator with a minimum of two days of full load operation or about four days at 1/2 load. Additional diesel fuel can be obtained and delivered to the site within an 8-hour period (Technical Specifications, Page B3/4.9-8).

3.2.2 LPCI/CCSW Division II Method 3.2.2.1 Reactor Pressure Control and Decay Heat Removal If the SDCS was inoperable for any reason (valve failure, damage to SDCS pumps, failure of RBCCW or SW), the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) system could be used to inject cooling water into the core once the injection initiation limits (350 psig) are met. The LPCI/CCSW system sketch is shown on Figure 3.2-5 Sheets 1 and 2. The mechanical equipment necessary to maintain and achieve shutdown by this method is given in Table 3.2-4. These systems are low pressure, high volume systems capable of providing substantial volumes of cooling water to the core. Not too much detail will be devoted to the individual systems here because each is safety-grade and is taken into account in the Dresden 2&3 SAR Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA) Analysis, Chapter 6. The pumps in each system are powered from "emergency" buses, all motor-operated valves inside containment are powered from "emergency" MCCs and all valves outside containment are accessible for manual operation.

3.2-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Reactor vessel pressure will be reduced by opening the electromatic relief valves allowing steam to flow to the pressure suppression chamber (torus) where it will be quenched. The LPCI system will be throttled to maintain reactor vessel level between +8 and +40 inches as measured from instrument zero. LPCI Division II will be used to inject water into the reactor from the torus via the "B" recirculation loop.

As the core cools (decay heat decreases), a path will be established which will allow reactor vessel water to flow to the torus. Water will flow out the `A' recirculation loop, through the inoperative shutdown cooling system by opening the normally closed isolation valve.

The output of the shutdown cooling system will be directed into the LPCI Division I piping.

LPCI valves will be aligned to allow the water to backflow into the LPCI test line, which discharges into the torus.

The electromatic relief valves will remain energized to assure that vessel pressure will not increase more than 2 psi above the drywell pressure.

3.2.2.2 Suppression Pool Cooling The suppression pool water is pumped through the containment cooling heat exchangers. After cooling, the water is injected into the reactor vessel.

The containment cooling service water system (CCSW) provides cooling water to the tube side of the CCSW heat exchangers (see Figure 3.2-5). The CCSW is an open cycle system with the pumps taking suction from the Crib House. The water is pumped through the heat exchanger and then discharged to the 48-inch service water discharge header.

Pumps C&D are fed from bus 24 (34). Bus 24 (34) can be fed by the diesel generators. All valves are outside containment and are accessible for manual operation if necessary. The CCSW pump room coolers for pump C recycle water from the CCSW pump discharge piping through the pump room cooler coils to the pump suction piping. A blower circulates room air through the cooling coils. Blowers C and D are fed from MCC 29-2 (39-2). Pump D does not have an associated room cooler.

3.2.2.3 Process Monitoring Instrumentation 3.2.2.3.1 Reactor Level and Pressure Reactor level and pressure are normally monitored in the control room on various instruments which are fed from two independent divisions. The operator can also locally monitor reactor level and pressure in the Reactor Building on instrument racks 2202(3)-5 and 2202 (3)-6 at the 546-foot elevation or 2202(3)-7 and 2202(3)-8 at the 517-foot elevation. Reactor pressure is used to determine the saturation temperature in the vessel. When the vessel pressure is reduced, a meter will be attached to a drywell penetration to measure the recirculation loop temperature, vessel shell temperature and shell flange temperature if control room indication is unavailable.

3.2-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 3.2.2.3.2 Suppression Pool Level and Temperature Suppression pool temperature and level indication are available in the control room. Local level indication is available in the LPCI Division II corner rooms. Torus water temperature can be determined locally by taking the temperature of a grab sample or by using a surface pyrometer on the torus bottom.

3.2.2.3.3 Diagnostic Instrumentation for Shutdown Systems Local mechanical discharge pressure indication is provided for the LPCI and CCSW pumps.

3.2.2.4 Support Systems The following support systems are necessary for operation of the LPCI/CCSW system to achieve and maintain cold shutdown:

1. LPCI and CCSW Room Coolers
2. Auxiliary Power.

The LPCI and CCSW room cooler fans are fed from a 480-V MCC which is capable of being powered by the emergency diesel generator. Water is provided to the LPCI room cooler from the containment cooling service water or service water pumps. Water for the CCSW room cooler is taken from the pump discharge and routed through the cooler to the pump suction as shown on Figure 3.2-5.

The electrical system to support the LPCI/CCSW system is shown on Figure 3.2-4 and listed in Table 3.2-5. The load calculations using FSAR load data show that one diesel generator per unit is needed to achieve cold shutdown. It is conservatively assumed for the purpose of this analysis that a full train of LPCI and CCSW pumps (i.e., two LPCI pumps and two CCSW pumps) are necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown.

Achieving and maintaining cold shutdown was not considered in the design basis of the diesel generator as described in the FSAR Table 8.2-2. However, Table 3.2-6 shows that adequate capacity is available using the diesel generator.

The loading for 2-LPCI-2-CCSW Pumps situation is similar to that calculated for an accident situation in FSAR Table 8.2-1. Each diesel generator is designed for 2,600 kW at 0.8 power factor. Normal loss of offsite power loads also include four drywell cooling blowers (300 bhp total), the RBCCW system (300 bhp), and a service water pump (1,000 bhp). These loads can be added to the diesel generator without exceeding the design capability but only after the residual heat load has been reduced to where one LPCI pump and one CCSW pump are adequate.

3.2-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Each diesel generator is supported by the following auxiliaries (see Figure 3.1-6):

1. Diesel generator fuel transfer pump
2. Diesel generator room ventilation fan
3. Diesel generator cooling water pump Each diesel generator is supplied from a 750-gallon day tank which in turn is supplied from a 15,000-gallon fuel oil tank. The technical specifications require a minimum of 10,000 gallons of diesel fuel supply on site for each diesel. The diesel fuel supply of 10,000 gallons will supply each diesel generator with a minimum of two days of full load operation or about four days at 1/2 load. Additional diesel fuel can be obtained and delivered to the site within an 8-hour period (Technical Specifications, Page B3/4.9-8).

3.2-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.2-1 SHUTDOWN COOLING METHOD - COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT I. Primary Loop Active Mechanical Components A. Shutdown Cooling Pumps 2A-1002 3A-1002 2B-1002 3B-1002 2C-1002 3C-1002 B. Valves Outside Containment

1. Shutdown Cooling Pump Suction Valves MO2-1001-2A (N.C.) MO3-1001-2A (N.C.)

MO2-1001-2B (N.C.) MO3-1001-2B (N.C.)

MO2-1001-2C (N.C.) MO3-1001-2C (N.C.)

2. Shutdown Cooling Pump Discharge Valves (To Common Header)

MO2-1001-4A (N.C.) MO3-1001-4A (N.C.)

MO2-1001-4B (N.C.) MO3-1001-4B (N.C.)

MO2-1001-4C (N.C.) MO3-1001-4C (N.C.)

3. Shutdown Cooling Pump Common Header Discharge Valves (To Recirc Loop)

MO2-1001-5A (N.C.) MO3-1001-5A (N.C.)

MO2-1001-5B (N.C.) MO3-1001-5B (N.C.)

C. Valves Inside Containment

1. Shutdown Cooling Pump Suction Valves MO2-1001-1A (N.C.) MO3-1001-1A (N.C.)

MO2-1001-1B (N.C.) MO3-1001-1B (N.C.)

2. Recirculation Loop Valves MO2-0202-4A (N.O.) MO3-0202-4A (N.O.)

MO2-0202-4B (N.O.) MO3-0202-4B (N.O.)

MO2-0202-5A (N.O.) MO3-0202-5A (N.O.)

MO2-0202-5B (N.O.) MO3-0202-5B (N.O.)

3.2-9

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.2-1 (Continued)

SHUTDOWN COOLING METHOD - COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT II. Secondary Loop Active Mechanical Components A. Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water(RBCCW) Pumps 2A-3701 3A-3701 2B-3701 3B-3701 B. Valve Connecting Shutdown Cooling HXs to RBCCW System MO2-3704 (N.C.) MO3-3704 (N.C.)

III. Active Support Components A. Service Water Pumps 2A-3901 3A-3901 2/3-3901 2B-3901 3B-3901 IV. Potential Spurious Signal Valves A. In-Line Valves Outside Containment That Must Remain in Initial Configuration

1. RBCCW Discharge Valve MO2-3701 (N.O.) MO3-3701 (N.O.)
2. Valves Allowing Service Water Flow Through RBCCW HXs TCV-2-3904A (N.O.) TCV-3-3904A (N.O.)

TCV-2-3904B (N.O.) TCV-3-3904B (N.O.)

TCV-2-3904C (N.O.)

B. Boundary Valves Outside Containment That Must Remain in Initial Configuration RBCCW Valves: MO2-3702 (N.O.) MO3-3702 (N.O.)

MO2-3703 (N.O.) MO3-3703 (N.O.)

(Note: Both valves for a given unit must be open to provide cooling water to drywell coolers and recirculating pumps.)

C. Boundary Valve Inside Containment That Must Remain in Initial Configuration RBCCW Valves: MO2-3706 (N.O.) MO3-3706 (N.O.)

(Note: This valve must be open to provide cooling water to drywell coolers and recirculating pumps.)

3.2-10

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.2-2 SHUTDOWN COOLING METHOD - POWER DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT Unit 2 2/3 Diesel Generator 2/3 Diesel Generator Water Pump 2/3 Diesel Generator Vent Fan 2/3 Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump 2 Diesel Generator 2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2 Diesel Generator Vent Fan 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22*

4-kV SWGR 23 4-kV SWGR 23-1 4-kV SWGR 24 4-kV SWGR 24-1 480-V Bus 28 480-V Bus 29 480-V MCC 28-1 480-V MCC 28-2 480-V MCC 28-7 480-V MCC 29-1 480-V MCC 29-2 480-V MCC 29-7 250-Vdc Battery 3 250-Vdc Battery Charger 3 250-Vdc Turbine Building MCC 3 250-Vdc MCC 2A 250-Vdc MCC 2B 125-Vdc Battery 2 125-Vdc Battery 3 125-Vdc Battery Charger 2 125-Vdc Battery Charger 3 125-Vdc Turbine Building Main Bus 2 125-Vdc Turbine Building Main Bus 3 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 2 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 2 120/240-V Essential Service Distribution Panel 902-49 120/240-V Instrument Bus 902-50

  • Used if offsite power is available. 3.2-11

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.2-2 SHUTDOWN COOLING METHOD - POWER DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT UNIT 3 2/3 Diesel Generator 2/3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2/3 Diesel Generator Vent Fan 2/3 Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump 3 Diesel Generator 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 3 Diesel Generator Vent Fan 3 Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 32*

4-kV SWGR 33 4-kV SWGR 33-1 4-kV SWGR 34 4-kV SWGR 34-1 480-V Bus 38 480-V Bus 39 480-V MCC 38-1 480-V MCC 38-2 480-V MCC 38-7 480-V MCC 39-2 480-V MCC 39-7 250-Vdc Battery 2 250-Vdc Battery Charger 2 250-Vdc Turbine Building MCC 2 250-Vdc MCC 3A 250-Vdc MCC 3B 125-Vdc Battery 2 125-Vdc Battery 3 125-Vdc Battery Charger 2 125-Vdc Battery Charger 3 125-Vdc Turbine Building Main Bus 2 125-Vdc Turbine Building Main Bus 3 125-Vdc Reserve Bus 3 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 3 120/240-V Essential Service Distribution Panel 903-49 120/240-V Instrument Bus 903-50

  • Used if offsite power is available. 3.2-12

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 TABLE 3.2-3 SHUTDOWN COOLING METHOD -

DIESEL GENERATOR (1)(2) LOADING FOR COLD SHUTDOWN Conservative Normal Experience 2-Train Operation 1- Train Operation bhp(4) est. bhp est. bhp Loads each No. required No. required Shutdown Cooling Pump 500 2 1000 1 500 RBCCW Pump 270 2 540 1 270 Service Water Pump 950 1 950 1 950 Emergency ac Lighting 30 1 30 1 30 480-V Transformer Losses 15 1 15 1 15 Essential Instrumentation and Battery 141 1 141 1 141 Charger Diesel Auxiliaries (Cooling Water Pump, 147.5 1 147.5 1 147.5 Fuel Transfer Pump, and Starting Air Compressor and Vent Fan)

Control Rod Drive Pump(s) 250 1 250 1 250 3073.5bhp 2303.5bhp kW required bhp x .746 2465 kW 1848 kW

.93 (motor eff.)

(1) Each diesel-driven standby diesel generator is sized at 2600 kW at 0.8 power factor and for 10% overload for 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> per year.

(2) One diesel generator per unit is needed for cold shutdown.

(3) Data from UFSAR Table 8.3.-3 or nameplate.

3.2-13

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 TABLE 3.2-4 LPCI/CCSW DIVISION II METHOD - COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT I. Primary Active Mechanical Components A. LPCI Pumps ECCS Keep Fill Pump 2C-1502 3C-1502 2-1401-4 3-1401-4 2D-1502 3D-1502 B. 1. Valve Allowing Flow to Core MO2-1501-22B (N.C.) MO3-1501-22B (N.C.)

2. Hx Bypass Valve MO2-1501-11B (N.O.) MO3-1501-11B (N.O.)
3. Minimum Flow Valve MO2-1501-13B (N.O.) MO3-1501-13B (N.O.)
4. Valves Allowing Flow to Suppression Pool MO2-1501-22A (N.C.) MO3-1501-22A (N.C.)
5. Valves Allowing flow to ECCS Keep Fill Pump 2-1402-3AMO3 3-1402-3B C. Valves Inside Containment
1. Target Rock Valves:

2-203-3A 3-203-3A

2. Electromatic Relief Valves:

2-203-3B 3-203-3B 2-203-3C 3-203-3C 2-203-3D 3-203-3D 2-203-3E 3-203-3E

3. Shutdown Cooling Pump Suction Valves MO2-1001-1A (NC) MO3-1001-1A (NC)

MO2-1001-1B (NC) MO3-1001-1B (NC)

4. Recirculation Loop Valves MO2-0202-4A (NO) MO3-0202-4A (NO)

MO2-0202-4B (NO) MO3-0202-4B (NO) 3.2-14

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.2-4 LPCI/CCSW DIVISION II METHOD - COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT II. Active Support Components A. Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) Pumps 2C-1501-44 3C-1501-44 2D-1501-44 3D-1501-44 B. CCSW Pump Coolers 2-5700-30C 2-5700-30D 3-5700-30C 3-5700-30D C. CCSW HX Discharge Valve MO2-1501-3B (N.C.) MO3-1501-3B (N.C.)

D. LPCI Emergency Air Cooler 2-5746B 3-5746B E. Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2-3903B 2/3-3903B 3-3903B III. Potential Spurious Signal Valves A. In-Line Valves Required to Remain in Initial Configuration

1. Valve Allowing Flow to Core MO2-1501-21A (N.O.) MO3-1501-21A (N.O.)

MO2-1501-21B (N.O.) MO3-1501-21B (N.O.)

2. LPCI Pump Suction Valves MO2-1501-5C (N.O.) MO3-1501-5C (N.O.)

MO2-1501-5D (N.O.) MO3-1501-5D (N.O.)

3.2-15

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.2-4 LPCI/CCSW DIVISION II METHOD - COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT B. Boundary Valves Required to Remain in Initial Configuration

1. Valves Allowing Containment Spray MO2-1501-27A (N.C.) MO3-1501-27A (N.C.)

MO2-1501-28A (N.C.) MO3-1501-28A (N.C.)

MO2-1501-27B (N.C.) MO3-1501-27B (N.C.)

MO2-1501-28B (N.C.) MO3-1501-28B (N.C.)

(Note: Both valves associated with a given unit must open to allow flow to containment spray.)

2. Valves Allowing Flow to Spray Ring Header in Suppression Pool MO2-1501-18A (N.C.) MO3-1501-18A (N.C.)

MO2-1501-19A (N.C.) MO3-1501-19A (N.C.)

MO2-1501-18B (N.C.) MO3-1501-18B (N.C.)

MO2-1501-19B (N.C.) MO3-1501-19B (N.C.)

(Note: Both valves associated with a given unit must open to allow flow to suppression spray ring header.)

3. Valves Allowing Flow to Suppression Pool MO2-1501-38B (N.C.) MO3-1501-38B (N.C.)

MO2-1501-20B (N.C.) MO3-1501-20B (N.C.)

(Note: Both valves associated with a given unit would have to open to allow flow to the suppression pool.)

3.2-16

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 TABLE 3.2-5 LPCI-CCSW DIVISION II METHOD - POWER DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT UNIT 2 2/3 Diesel Generator 2/3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2/3 Diesel Generator Vent Fan 2/3 Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump 2 Diesel Generator 2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2 Diesel Generator Vent Fan 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 22*

4-kV SWGR 23 4-kV SWGR 23-1 480-V Bus 28 480-V MCC 28-1 4-kV SWGR 24 4-kV SWGR 24-1 480-V Bus 29 480-V MCC 29-2 480-V MCC 29-4 480-V MCC 29-7 125-Vdc Battery 3 125-Vdc Battery Charger 3 125-Vdc Turbine Building Main Bus 3 120/240-V Essential Service Distribution Panel 902-49 UNIT 3 2/3 Diesel Generator 2/3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2/3 Diesel Generator Vent Fan 2/3 Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump 3 Diesel Generator 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 3 Diesel Generator Vent Fan

  • Used if offsite power is available.

3.2-17

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 3.2-5 LPCI-CCSW DIVISION II METHOD - POWER DISTRIBUTION EQUIPMENT 3 Diesel Generator Fuel Transfer Pump Reserve Auxiliary Transformer 32*

4-kV SWGR 34 4-kV SWGR 34-1 480-V Bus 39 480-V MCC 39-1 480-V MCC 39-2 480-V MCC 39-7 125-Vdc Battery 2 125-Vdc Battery Charger 2 125-Vdc Turbine Building Main Bus 2 125-Vdc Turbine Building Reserve Bus 3 120/240-V Essential Service Distribution Panel 903-49

  • Used if offsite power is available.

3.2-18

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 TABLE 3.2-6 LPCI/CCSW DIVISION II METHOD -

DIESEL GENERATOR (1) (2) LOADING FOR COLD SHUTDOWN 2-LPCI/2-CCSW 1-LPCI/1-CCSW Pumps Pumps Necessary Necessary est. est.

Loads bhp (4) No. bhp. No. bhp.

LPCI Pumps 700 2 1400 1 700 CCSW Pumps 500 2 1000 1 500 Emergency ac Lighting 30 30 30 480-V Transformer Losses 27 27 27 Essential Instrumentation and 141 141 141 Battery Charger Keep Fill Pump 7.5 7.5 7.5 Diesel Generator Aux. including 155.5 155.5 155.5 ECCS Pump Room Coolers AC Power Operated Valves 147 147 147 Drywell Cooling Blowers 75 -- 4 300 (3)

RBCCW System 300 -- 1 270 (3)

Service Water Pump 950 -- 1 950(3) 2908 bhp 3228 bhp kW required bhp x .746 2333 kW 2589 kW

.93 (motor eff.)

(1) Each diesel-driven standby diesel generator is sized at 2600 kW at .8 power factor and for 10% overload for 2000 hours0.0231 days <br />0.556 hours <br />0.00331 weeks <br />7.61e-4 months <br /> per year.

(2) One diesel generator per unit is needed for cold shutdown.

(3) These loads are not considered part of the minimum system for safe cold shutdown, however, they are included here because of the desirability of reestablishing drywell cooling if the system is available and the diesel generator can handle the load.

(4) Data from UFSAR Tables 8.3-2 and 8.3-3 or nameplate.

3.2-19

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 3.3 Associated Circuits In the subsequent clarification to Generic Letter 81-12 (see Section 1.4), in regard to associated circuits, the NRC identified three categories of associated circuits whose fire induced failure could affect safe shutdown:

1. Common Power Source (see Section 3.3.2)
2. Common Enclosure (see Section 3.3.3)
3. Spurious Operation (see Section 3.3.4)

The circuits that may affect the normal automatic and manual operation of safe shutdown systems and components identified in Section 3.1 and 3.2 due to fire-induced faults were identified using the electrical schematic and wiring diagrams. These circuits include the normal control and power circuits for safe shutdown components (required circuitry) and the interlocks between the safe shutdown component control circuit and other circuits (fire protection associated circuitry).

Figure 3.3-1 shows a typical cabling diagram and Figure 3.3-2 shows a typical schematic diagram which both illustrate required, associated and nonassociated circuitry. In Figure 3.3-2, the contacts of Relay B2 are used in the operation of Pumps 1A and 1B which are safe shutdown equipment. This makes Cables 15A, 15B, 16A, 16B, 17A and 17B shown in Figure 3.3-1 required circuitry. Relay B2 will not operate unless Relay A2 and Pressure Switch PS2 operates.

Relay B2 will also not operate without power. This makes Cables 7, 8 and 10 associated circuitry. Relay A2 will not operate unless Pressure Switch PS5 operates and there is power to Relay A2. This makes Cables 14 and 11 associated circuitry.

In addition, a ground on Cables 5, 10, 12 or 13 would blow the fuses at Panel A removing power from Relay A2. A ground on Cables 9 or 10 would blow the fuses at Panel B removing power from Relay B2. This makes Cables 5, 9, 12 and 13 also associated circuitry. Circuit malfunctions on any of these associated cables would lead to the loss of a safe shutdown function.

Cables 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 in Figures 3.3-1 and 3.3-2 do not affect the operation of Pumps 1A and 1B and are considered non-associated circuitry.

After determining cables of concern (required and associated circuitry), the physical routing of these cables was determined by examining the Cable Tabulations and Cable Tray Diagrams. The cables for each component and their physical locations were documented in Appendix A of this volume for hot shutdown. Also, the resolution to each concern is documented in Appendix A.

3.3-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 3.3.1 Assumptions for Circuit Failures Fire damage to electrical power and control cables is assumed to cause either one or a combination of the following circuit failures:

1. Short -Individual conductors within a cable short to each other.
2. Ground -Individual conductors within a cable are grounded to the supporting raceway or other grounded structure.
3. Open -Individual conductors within a cable lose electrical continuity.
4. Hot Short -Individual conductor(s) within a cable are shorted to individual conductor(s) of a different cable. This type of short includes the case of one deenergized circuit becoming energized by shorting to an external source of electrical power through independent conductor-to-conductor shorts.

For the analysis of potential spurious operations, two types of hot short conditions are considered of sufficiently low likelihood that they are not credited as producing spurious component actuations. These are:

1. Three-phase ac power circuit cable-to-cable faults matching each phase-to-phase (4-kV and 480-V).
2. Two-wire ungrounded 125-V/250-V dc circuits cable-to-cable faults positive to positive and negative to negative.

Cable-to-cable connections between one de-energized and one energized power circuit could cause spurious operations. In the case of the three-phase ac circuits, three electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts (hot shorts) matching phases must occur without ground, opens or shorts within a cable in order to power the associated device. Similarly, for the two-wire ungrounded dc circuit, two electrically independent cable-to-cable shorts (hot shorts), positive to positive and negative to negative, must occur without shorts within a cable.

The NRC staff has acknowledged that the events described for types (1) and (2) above have a sufficiently low probability of occurrence to permit exclusion of such conditions from consideration (Federal Register, Vol. 48, No. 86 at 19963). The basis for excluding the cable short conditions listed in types (1) and (2) as a credible cause of spurious operations is that multiple cable-to-cable electrically independent faults are required in order for spurious operations to occur.

With respect to three-phase power cables, in order for a motor to be activated in forward or reverse, it would be necessary for two cables to become severed, and then for all three conductors of those two cables to become independently connected in any combination. It would also require that one of the cables be connected to a power source and the other to a motor. This type of 3.3-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 failure is considered to be incredible and is not considered in the analysis.

With respect to two-wire ungrounded dc power circuit faults, in order for a device to be activated, either of the following would have to occur:

1. The cables would have to be severed and then two wires of one connected to two wires of the other. It would also require that one of the cables be connected to a power source and the other to a susceptible device.
2. The cable to the equipment in question would have to fail such that one wire goes to ground and the other hot shorts to another dc wire of the same polarity. If a ground exists on the battery of the opposite polarity (the grounded leg of the equipment), then the equipment would be activated.

Both case (1) and (2) are considered highly incredible and are not considered in the analysis.

3.3.2 Common Power Source Circuits sharing a common power source are isolated from essential equipment by breakers, fuses, or other isolation devices. Coordinated fault protection is addressed in Section 5.5.

3.3.3 Common Enclosure Circuits that share a common enclosure with essential circuits will not provide a path for fire propagation out of a fire area or zone group since the areas are generally enclosed by substantial barriers to fire which have all electrical penetrations sealed or the circuits are clearly separated from the other zone groups due to other features. On the ground floor of the Turbine Building, no physical boundary exists along the access corridor between TB-I, TB-II, and TB-III. In this part of the plant, automatic fire detection, automatic suppression, wrapping of selected cable trays, and physical distance provide assurance that the fire will not propagate via the cables. (See Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4, and Section 2.0 of this report.)

Also sharing a common enclosure with safe shutdown circuits are cables connected to control power and current transformers. The effects upon safe shutdown circuits of faults on these cables are presented in Section 5.3.

3.3.4 Spurious Operation The spurious operation of the plant components and their associated electrical equipment (safe shutdown or otherwise) from fire-induced spurious circuit malfunctions could affect safe shutdown capability by leading to a loss of a safe shutdown function. The effects of spurious valve operation are analyzed in Section 5.1 and the effects of spurious operation of breakers are addressed in Section 5.2.

3.3-3

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 4.0 SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSIS The hot and cold shutdown equipment and cabling in each fire area or equivalent was examined in this analysis. The physical location of safe shutdown equipment and cabling is shown on the F-drawings. For hot shutdown, damage to all electrical (including cable) and mechanical components within the fire area under consideration was assumed except where physically protected by fire barriers. For cold shutdown, damage to all electrical and mechanical equipment within each fire area is conservatively assumed except for the reactor buildings. In the reactor buildings, all electrical cable and components except for motor operators are assumed damaged in each fire area. All mechanical components and motor operators are assumed damaged only if they are located within the same fire zone. Justification for this assumption is provided in Section 3.8 and 4.10 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4). For each fire area, a shutdown path composed of all mechanical equipment independent of that fire area was identified. While cable routing was considered in this selection, it was not always possible to select a shutdown path independent of all electrical cables in an area. If a cable necessary to operate or associated with equipment in that shutdown path was routed through the fire area under consideration, it was considered a discrepancy.

The disposition of each cable discrepancy was evaluated using the electrical schematic diagrams to identify an appropriate solution of each problem. The various types of solutions proposed for safe shutdown included, but are not limited to:

-local control and isolation capability,

-local mechanical indicators,

-mechanical piping crossties,

-manual valve operation,

-alternate power feeds for inaccessible valves.

Repair procedures are generally identified for each discrepancy for cold shutdown unless a modification was identified for hot shutdown. The resolution of each hot shutdown cable discrepancy on a fire area basis is documented in Appendix A. Specific modifications resulting from these resolutions are discussed in Section 6.0. The specific manual actions and cold shutdown repairs are listed in Section 7.0.

The following sections of this chapter present the hot and cold shutdown analysis on an area-by-area basis. Table 4.0-1 summarizes the fire area and the hot and cold safe shutdown path for each fire zone.

4.0-1

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.0-1 APPENDIX R HOT SHUTDOWN PATHS BY FIRE ZONE Fire Area/ Hot Cold Cold Shutdown Safe Shutdown Equivalent Area/ Shutdown Shutdown DG (Note 1) Analysis Fire Zone Zone Group Path Path Availability Section 1.1.1.1 RB3-II A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.5 1.1.1.2 RB3-II A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.5 1.1.1.3 RB3-II A1 LPCI Div. II 2/3, 2 4.5 1.1.1.4 RB3-II A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.5 1.1.1.5.A RB3-I D SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.4 1.1.1.5.B RB3-I D SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.4 1.1.1.5.C RB3-I D SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.4 1.1.1.5.D RB3-II A1* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.5 1.1.1.6 RB3-II B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.5 1.2.1 Drywell B** SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.6 1.2.2 Drywell A** SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.3 1.3.1 RB3-II A1 LPCI Div.II 2/3, 2 4.5 1.3.2 RB2-I C LPCI Div. II 2/3, 3 4.1 1.4.1 RB3-I D SC 2/3, 2 4.4 1.1.2.1 RB2-II B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.2 1.1.2.2 RB2-II B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.2 1.1.2.3 RB2-II B1 LPCI Div.II 2/3, 3 4.2 1.1.2.4 RB2-II B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.2 1.1.2.5.A RB2-I C SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.1 1.1.2.5.B RB2-I C SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.1 1.1.2.5.C RB2-I C SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.1 1.1.2.5.D RB2-II B1* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.2 1.1.2.6 RB2-II A* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.2 2.0 TB-V A2 and B2 SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.12 6.1 TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 6.2 TB-V A2 and B2 SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.12 7.0.A.1 TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 7.0.A.2 TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8

  • No shutdown cable or equipment is located in this zone. All methods of shutdown are available
    • Drywell is inerted, no fire postulated. All methods of shutdown are available.

4.0-2

AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.0-1 APPENDIX R HOT SHUTDOWN PATHS BY FIRE ZONE Fire Area/ Hot Cold Cold Shutdown Safe Shutdown Equivalent Area/ Shutdown Shutdown DG (Note 1) Analysis Fire Zone Zone Group Path Path Availability Section 7.0.A.3 TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 7.0.B TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 8.1 TB-I B1* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.8 8.2.1.A TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 8.2.1.B TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 8.2.2.A TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 8.2.2.B TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 8.2.4 TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 8.2.5.A TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 8.2.5.B TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 8.2.5.C TB-II A2 and B2 SC 2/3, 2 4.9 8.2.5.D TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 8.2.5.E TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 8.2.6.A TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 8.2.6.B TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 8.2.6.C TB-II A2 and B2 SC 2/3, 2 4.9 8.2.6.D TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 8.2.6.E TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 8.2.7 TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 8.2.8 TB-IV A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.11 9.0.A TB-I B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.8 9.0.B TB-III A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.10 9.0.C RB 2/3 E and F SC 2, 3 4.7 11.1.1 RB3-II A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.5 11.1.2 RB3-II A1 SC 2/3, 2 4.5 11.1.3 RB 2/3 F SC 2, 3 4.7 11.2.1 RB2-II B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.2 11.2.2 RB2-II B1 SC 2/3, 3 4.2 11.2.3 RB 2/3 E SC 2, 3 4.7 11.3 Crib House A,B,E,F SC 2/3, 2, 3 (Note 2) 4.13 14.1 Radwaste A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.14

  • No shutdown cable or equipment is located in this zone. All methods of shutdown are available
    • Drywell is inerted, no fire postulated. All methods of shutdown are available.

4.0-3

AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.0-1 APPENDIX R HOT SHUTDOWN PATHS BY FIRE ZONE Fire Area/ Hot Cold Cold Shutdown Safe Shutdown Equivalent Area/ Shutdown Shutdown DG (Note 1) Analysis Fire Zone Zone Group Path Path Availability Section 14.2 TB-IV A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.11 14.3 TB-IV A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.11 14.4 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 14.5 Radwaste A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.14 14.6 Radwaste A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.14 18.1.1 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 18.1.2 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 18.2.1 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 18.2.2 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 18.3.1 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 18.3.2 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 18.4 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 18.6 Misc A and B* SC 2/3,2,3 4.15 18.7.1 Misc E and F SC 2/3,2,3 4.15 18.7.2 Misc E and F SC 2/3,2,3 4.15 Unit 1 Misc A and B* SC 2/3, 2, 3 4.15 Structures Note 1: a. 2/3 diesel generator implies that Division I power is available for cold shutdown.

b. 2 diesel generator or 3 diesel generator implies that Division II power is available for cold shutdown.
c. One diesel generator must be available for cold shutdown for each unit if offsite power is lost (i.e., 2 of 3).

Note 2. Two of three diesel generator cooling water pumps will be available for cold shutdown depending on location of the fire in the crib house lower level.

  • No shutdown cable or equipment is located in this zone. All methods of shutdown are available
    • Drywell is inerted, no fire postulated. All methods of shutdown are available.

4.0-4

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 4.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Fire Area RB2-I Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-3 (Fire Zone 1.3.2), F-4 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C), F-5 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.B) and F-6 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A).

4.1.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis For a fire in RB2-I, HPCI system shutdown path C (Table 3.1-8) will be used to shut down the unit. Diesel Generator 2 will be used to power essential equipment. The electromatic relief valves are available for initial pressure control except in Fire Zone 1.3.2. In this zone, the target rock valve and the safety valve are available for pressure control. The LPCI system and containment cooling water system are available for suppression pool cooling. All necessary equipment may be operated from the control room. Reactor pressure and level are monitored at local indicators.

Instruments for Torus temperature and level are monitored in the control room. This fire area contains no essential or associated cable for HPCI shutdown path C.

4.1.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis For the cold shutdown analysis, the Unit 2 reactor building was analyzed as a single fire area.

This analysis is in Section 4.2 which follows 4.1-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 4.2 Unit 2 Reactor Building Fire Area RB2-II Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-2 (Fire Zones 11.2.1, 11.2.2 and 1.1.2.1), F-3 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.2), F-4 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.3), F-5 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.4), F-6 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.D) and F-7 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.6).

4.2.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis Alternative isolation condenser shutdown path B1 (Table 3.1-7) is used to shut down Unit 2 using Unit 3 equipment and interunit crossties independent of this fire area. Since the Unit 2 4-kV switchgear, 480-V switchgear, 250-V MCC's and 125-V reactor building distribution center with their associated cables are located in this fire area, the 2/3 diesel generator is used to power essential equipment via the Unit 3 power train. Control rod drive pump 3A is available for reactor water makeup. The electromatic relief valves may not be available for initial pressure control but the target rock valve and safety valves are available if necessary. Makeup to the isolation condenser is available from either isolation condenser makeup pump. Service water pump 3A is available for cooling of the CRD pumps and for makeup to the isolation condenser if long-term operation of the isolation condenser is necessary. Additionally, the Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump cooling line as an alternate cooling source. Local instruments are used to monitor Reactor Pressure and Reactor Vessel water level. See Subsection 3.1.1.1.5 of this report.

The control rod drive pump and service water pump are powered from Unit 3 and are available to support Unit 2 shutdown through mechanical crossties. The bus duct from the 2/3 diesel generator to 4-kV switchgear 23-1 is routed in this area. A fault on the bus duct would not affect operation of the diesel generator because a 4-kV breaker in the diesel generator room would isolate this feed from the diesel generator. The 2/3 diesel generator would remain available to provide power via Unit 3 (see Subsection 6.2.3.1). All cables routed in this area that could affect control and excitation of the 2/3 diesel generator and associated circuits can be isolated in the diesel generator room and panels have been installed to permit local starting and operation of the 2/3 diesel generator. Redundant 125-Vdc control power is available from Unit 3. Redundant power feeds to the 2/3 diesel generator auxiliaries (room ventilation fan and fuel oil transfer pump) area are available from Unit 3. Local transfer switches have been installed in the 2/3 diesel generator room to isolate the Unit 2 feeds. (See Subsection 6.2.3.1)

Cables and power supplies for the Unit 2 isolation condenser valves are located in this fire area.

All isolation condenser motor-operated valves are independent of this fire area and are accessible for manual operation except for valves MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4 which are located in the drywell. The normal power feeds to these drywell valves are routed through Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 from 480-V MCC 28-1 to the drywell penetrations in Fire Zone 1.3.2 (part of RB2-I). To ensure that these valves will be open as required for safe shutdown, alternate power feeds have been routed to the Unit 2 drywell penetrations in Fire Zone 1.3.2 from Unit 3 (see Subsection 6.2.1.4).

The normal access to valves MO2-1301-2 and MO2-1301-3, located in the isolation condenser pipe chase (RB2-I), is through the fire doors to the pipe chase at 41/M on both the 545-foot 6-inch elevation and the 570-foot 0-inch elevation. Access to the pipe chase is also available from Elevation 589 feet 0 inches in Fire Area RB2-I. Intervening grating has been cut and access 4.2-1

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 ladders and platforms provided to ensure that these valves may be manually operated in the event of a fire in this area (see Subsection 6.2.1.6). Vent valves AO2-1301-17 and AO-1301-20 fail in the closed position. In the event these valves fail to close, manual valve 2-1301-16 may be closed to isolate this line. Manual operation of valves MO2-4399-74, MO2-4102 and MO2-1301-10 may be required to add makeup water to the isolation condenser.

480V Bus 29 which supplies power to the Unit 2 fuel oil transfer pump could potentially be affected by a fire in this area. If isolation condenser makeup is required for more than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after shutdown is initiated, the diesel oil day tanks for the isolation condenser makeup pumps can be manually refilled.

If one of the diesel makeup pumps runs out of fuel, the other pump may be started to provide water.

Associated cables routed in this zone include LPCI circuits, core spray circuits, primary containment isolation circuits, and main steam isolation circuits. The LPCI and core spray circuitry is associated with the 4-kV power distribution. However, since the Unit 3 power train is used for this zone, faults on these circuits will not affect safe shutdown. The primary containment isolation, and main steam isolation circuits are associated with isolation condenser valves.

However, the drywell valves will be controlled from the alternate power source by isolating the automatic circuitry and the power train to the remaining valves will be deenergized and the valves operated manually. Therefore, faults on the associated circuitry will not prevent safe shutdown. Spurious auto blowdown initiation is prevented by manual operation of the ADS auto-blowdown inhibit switch installed at the MCB (see Subsection 6.2.1.8) and spurious operation of the individual relief valves is prevented by placing the handswitch of the Electromatic relief valves (ERVs) and the Target Rock safety/relief valve control switches in the "OFF" positions and by racking out the circuit breakers that supply 125-Vdc power to the valves.

Cable discrepancies within RB2-II and their resolutions are presented in Appendix A. A discussion of the instrumentation available to the operators is in Subsection 3.1.1.1.5.

The refueling floor of Fire Zone 1.1.2.6 and Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.D contains no safe shutdown equipment or cabling but is considered part of Fire Area RB2-II. Therefore, the isolation condenser shutdown path A (Table 3.1-3), which would normally be used in case of loss of offsite power, can be utilized for a postulated fire in these fire zones.

There are no cable discrepancies in Fire Zone 1.1.2.6.

4.2.2 RB2-I and RB2-II Cold Shutdown Analysis A significant amount of electrical and mechanical equipment necessary for cold shutdown is located in the Unit 2 reactor building Fire Areas RB2-I and RB2-II. The reactor building is divided into fire zones by floor elevations and rated fire barriers on a particular floor. These floor slabs present a substantial barrier to the spread of fire. However, they are not fire rated.

Additionally, the combustible loading is low and area-wide automatic fire detection would ensure 4.2-2

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 that the fire was detected and extinguished before it spread to adjacent floor elevations disabling the mechanical components and their operators. See the Fire Hazards Analysis, Sections 4.1 and 4.2 (F.P.R. Volume 1) and Section 3.8 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4) for detailed justification for this assumption.

The mechanical and electrical equipment necessary for cold shutdown located by fire zone is identified in Table 4.2-1.

The location of cable and equipment in the reactor building is shown on the drawings listed below.

F Series Fire Zone Drawings Cold Shutdown Method 1.1.2.1 F-2 Shutdown Cooling 1.1.2.2 F-3 Shutdown Cooling 1.1.2.3 F-4 LPCI 1.1.2.4 F-5 Shutdown Cooling 1.1.2.5.A,B,C,D F-4, F-5, F-6 Shutdown Cooling 1.1.2.6 F-7 Shutdown Cooling 1.3.2 F-3 LPCI 11.2.1 F-2 Shutdown Cooling 11.2.2 F-2 Shutdown Cooling In the Unit 2 reactor building fire area, the shutdown cooling system can be used for cold shutdown in every fire zone except for the mezzanine floor, Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 (Fire Area RB2-II) and the shutdown cooling pump room, Fire Zone 1.3.2 (Fire Area RB2-I). On the mezzanine floor, the presence of the RBCCW pumps precludes the use of the shutdown cooling system (see Subsection 3.2.1). In the shutdown cooling pump room, the presence of the shutdown cooling pumps preclude the use of the shutdown cooling systems.

Table 4.2-2 identifies the manual actions and repairs necessary to achieve cold shutdown using shutdown cooling. The actions identified in this table conservatively assume the loss of all electrical cable and equipment in the Unit 2 reactor building. Electrical power is provided to Unit 2 equipment by temporary connections to switchgear and motor control centers in Unit 3. Manual handwheel operation of accessible valves is assumed. Modifications identified in the hot shutdown analysis provide capability to operate the 2/3 diesel generator independent of fire damage in Unit 2 (see Subsection 6.2.3.1); also, diesel generator 3 and its auxiliaries are independent of the Unit 2 reactor building.

Table 4.2-3 identifies the manual actions and repairs necessary to achieve cold shutdown using the LPCI method for Fire Zones 1.1.2.3 and 1.3.2.

Redundant mechanical components of the selected cold shutdown path are located in the same 4.2-3

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 fire zone in two instances. The justification for why a fire will not affect both redundant components is given below.

1. Basement Floor (Fire Zone 1.1.2.1)

Valves MO2-1001-5A, MO2-1001-5B, MO2-3702, and MO2-3703 are located in this fire zone and are associated with the shutdown cooling method. The shutdown cooling method would still be available based on the following justification.

MO2-1001-5A These valves are located 180! apart on opposite sides of the torus. These MO2-1001-5B valves are in separate loops. As stated in Sub-section 3.2.1, only one loop is normally used. Therefore, only one of the two valves needs to be opened. They can be handwheel operated. A single fire would not disable mechanical operation of both valves due to the physical separation, low combustible loading, and lack of intervening combustibles. See Fire Hazards Analysis Section 4.2 (F.P.R. Volume 1) and Section 3.8 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4).

MO2-3702 These valves are normally open and must remain so. The only associated MO2-3703 cables in this zone are from the limit switch and the 480-V power cable. A fault in the limit switch and 480-V power cable cannot cause valves to change position.

2. Mezzanine Floor (Fire Zone 1.1.2.3)

LPCI valves MO2-1501-27B and MO2-1501-28B are located in this zone and are associated with the LPCI/CCSW method. The LPCI/CCSW method would still be available based on the following justification.

LPCI Valve MO2-1501-27B These valves are in the piping to the containment spray LPCI Valve MO2-1501-28B header and are not needed for the LPCI cold shutdown system. They are normally closed and both must spuriously open to have an adverse effect on cold shutdown. The simultaneous opening of two normally closed motor-operated valves in series is not postulated except in a high-low pressure interface. This is not a high-low pressure interface.

4.2-4

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.2-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING FIRE AREAS RB2-I AND RB2-II Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 Shutdown Cooling

1. SC Valve MO2-1001-5A
2. SC Valve MO2-1001-5B
3. RBCCW Valve MO2-3702
4. RBCCW Valve MO2-3703 LPCI, Div. II
1. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-22B
2. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-20B
3. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-38B
4. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-18B
5. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-19B
6. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-13B Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 Electrical Equipment
1. 480-V MCC 28-1
2. 480-V MCC 29-1
3. 480-V MCC 29-4
4. 480-V MCC 29-7
5. 480-V MCC 28-7 LPCI, Div. II
1. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-21B Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 Electrical Equipment
1. 4-kV SWGR 23-1
2. 4-kV SWGR 24-1 4.2-5

AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.2-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING FIRE AREAS RB2-I AND RB2-II Shutdown Cooling

1. SC Heat Exchangers 2A-1003, 2B-1003, 2C-1003
2. RBCCW Pumps 2A-3701, 2B-3701
3. RBCCW Heat Exchangers 2A3702, 2B3702
4. RBCCW Valve MO2-3701
5. RBCCW Valve MO2-3704
6. Service Water Valve TCV-2-3904A
7. Service Water Valve TCV-2-3904B
8. Service Water Valve TCV-2-3904C
9. SC Valve MO2-1001-4A
10. SC Valve MO2-1001-4B
11. SC Valve MO2-1001-4C LPCI, Div. II
1. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-27B
2. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-28B Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 Electrical Equipment
1. 480-V SWGR 28
2. 480-V SWGR 29
3. 250-Vdc Reactor Building MCC 2A
4. 250-Vdc Reactor Building MCC 2B
5. 125-Vdc Reactor Building Distribution Panel Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.B, and 1.1.2.5.C NONE 4.2-6

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.2-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING FIRE AREAS RB2-I AND RB2-II Fire Zone 1.1.2.6 Fire Zone 1.3.2 Shutdown Cooling

1. SC Pumps 2A-1002, 2B-1002, 2C-1002
2. SC Valves MO2-1001-2A, MO2-1001-2B, MO2-1001-2C
3. Electrical Division I Penetrations Fire Zone - 11.2.1 LPCI, Div. II
1. LPCI Pump 2C-1502
2. LPCI Pump 2D-1502
3. LPCI Emergency Air Cooler 2-5746B
4. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-3B
5. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-5C
6. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-5D
7. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-11B
8. LPCI Valve MO2-1501-32B Fire Zone 11.2.2 NONE 4.2-7

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.2-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 2 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING Component Manual Action/Repair MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Shutdown Cooling Pumps 2A-1002 A temporary power cable connection for two pumps to SWGR 33-1 or 34-2B-1002 1 on the Unit 3 side can be provided. A procedure to manually start pumps

  • 2C-1002 at SWGR is available. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Shutdown Cooling Valves MO2-1001-2A Disable feed and manually position the valve.

MO2-1001-2B MO2-1001-2C MO2-1001-4A MO2-1001-4B MO2-1001-4C MO2-1001-5A MO2-1001-5B MO2-1001-1A A temporary power cable from an operable 480-V MCC to the drywell MO2-1001-1B penetration can be provided. A procedure to locally operate valves from the MCC is available. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Recirculation Piping Valves MO2-0202-4A A temporary power cable from an operable 480-V MCC to the drywell MO2-0202-4B penetrations can be provided. A procedure to locally operate valves from the MCC is available. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Pumps 2A-3701 A temporary power cable connection for two pumps to SWGR 33-1 or 34-2B-3701 1 in Unit 3 can be provided. A procedure to start pumps at the SWGR is available. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Valves MO2-3701 Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO2-3704 4.2-8

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.2-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 2 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING Component Manual Action/Repair MO2-3702 Spurious operation concern only. This valve is normally open for drywell MO2-3703 cooling. The drywell cooling function, while important, is not considered MO2-3706 essential to cold shutdown. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Service Water Pumps 2A-3901 Unit 3 service water pumps 3A-3901, 3B-3901, and 2/3-3901, which are 2B-3901 powered from SWGR 33 and 34, are available independent of the Unit 2 reactor building. The normal feeds to SWGR 23 and 24 are disabled.

TCV-2-3904A Spurious operation concern. These valves fail open, which is the position TCV-2-3904B necessary for cold shutdown.

TCV-2-3904C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Division I The 2/3 diesel generator is operable from the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C, Fire Area RB-2/3). See Subsections 4.2.1 and 6.2.3.1 for the modifications identified in the Hot Shutdown Analysis to ensure this operability. All other Unit 3 Division I components and associated circuits are independent of the Unit 2 reactor building except for 4-kV Buses 23-1 to 33-1 breaker interlock control cables which can be manually isolated at SWGR.

Division II All Unit 3 diesel generator and Unit 3 Division II components and associated circuits are independent of the Unit 2 reactor building.

250-Vdc Primary feed to Unit 3 is from Unit 2, however, a secondary feed can be made from TB 250- Vdc MCC#3. Unit 2 250-V valve can be operated manually.

125-Vdc Unit 2 motor operators will be temporarily connected to Unit 3 switchgear for power and control via temporary power cable connections as described above. Therefore, no 125-Vdc to Unit 2 in necessary. All Unit 3 125-Vdc is independent of the Unit 2 reactor building.

Process Monitoring Equipment RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop A If RPV water, shell and shell flange temperature indicators RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop B are not available in the control room, then establish RPV Shell Temperature local indication monitoring capability in accordance RPV Flange Temperature with cold shutdown repair procedure DSSP-0200-T9.

4.2-9

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.2-3 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 2 USING THE LPCI/CCSW SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING Component Manual Action/Repair MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LPCI Pumps 2C-1502 A temporary cable connection for the pumps to SWGR 33-1 or 34-1 in 2D-1502 Unit 3 can be provided. Procedures to manually start pumps at the SWGR are available. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

CCSW Pumps 2C-1501-44 These pumps will be powered by a temporary feed from SWGR 33 and 2D-1501-44 34 if normal power feed to the pump cannot be established (see Subsection 7.4.1 for details.

LPCI Valves MO2-1501-22B Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO2-1501-3B Of concern in regard to spurious operation only. Disable the feed and MO2-1501-21B manually position the valve.

MO2-1501-5C MO2-1501-5D MO2-1501-27B MO2-1501-28B MO2-1501-18B MO2-1501-19B MO2-1501-38B MO2-1501-20B MO2-1501-11B MO2-1501-32B MO2-1501-13B Target Rock/Electromatic Relief Valves 2-203-3A Temporary 125-Vdc power connection to the drywell penetration can be 2-203-3B provided. Procedures to manually operate these valves are available.

2-203-3C (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

2-203-3D 2-203-3E 4.2-10

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.2-3 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 2 USING THE LPCI/CCSW SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN THE UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING Component Manual Action/Repair CCSW Pump Coolers 2-5700-30A A temporary cable connection can be provided to an operable 480-V 2-5700-30B MCC in Unit 3. Procedures to locally start cooler fans are available. (See Section 7.4.1 for details.)

LPCI Emergency Air Cooler 2-5746B A temporary cable connection can be provided to an operable 480-V MCC in Unit 3. Procedures to locally start cooler fans are available. (See Section 7.4.1 for details.)

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Division I The 2/3 diesel generator is operable from the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C, Fire Area RB-2/3). See Subsections 4.2.1 and 6.2.3.1 for the modifications identified in the Hot Shutdown Analysis to ensure this operability. All other Unit 3 Division I components and associated circuits are independent of the Unit 2 reactor building except for 4-kV Bus 33-1 to 23-1 breaker interlock control cables which can be manually isolated at SWGR.

Division II All Unit 3 diesel generator and Unit 3 Division II components and associated circuits are independent of the Unit 2 reactor building.

250-Vdc Primary feed to Unit 3 is from Unit 2, however, a secondary feed can be made from TB 250-Vdc MCC#3. Unit 2 250-V valve can be operated manually.

125-Vdc Unit 2 motor operators will be temporarily connected to Unit 3 switchgear for power and control via temporary power cable connection as described above. Therefore, no 125-Vdc to Unit 2 is necessary. All Unit 3 125-Vdc is independent of the Unit 2 reactor building.

Process Monitoring Equipment RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop A If RPV water, shell and shell flange temperature indicators RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop B are not available in the control room, then establish RPV Shell Temperature local indication monitoring capability in accordance RPV Flange Temperature with cold shutdown repair procedure DSSP-0200-T9 .

4.2-11

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 4.3 Unit 2 Primary Containment (Fire Area 1.2.2)

Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-3 through F-6.

4.3.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis The Unit 2 primary containment (Zone 1.2.2) is separated from the rest of the reactor building by a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The primary containment is inerted, thus, a fire cannot start and a safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained using any of the shutdown methods.

4.3.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis The Technical Specifications require that the drywell be inerted during normal reactor operation.

Therefore, no fire is postulated. The mechanical equipment associated with cold shutdown located in the drywell is identified in Table 4.3-1.

4.3-1

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 TABLE 4.3-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE DRYWELL Fire Zone 1.2.2 Fire Zone 1.2.1 Shutdown Cooling Shutdown Cooling

1. Recirculation Loop A Valves 1. Recirculation Loop A Valves MO2-0202-4A MO3-0202-4A MO2-0202-5A MO3-0202-5A
2. Recirculation Loop B Valves 2. Recirculation Loop B Valves MO2-0202-4B MO3-0202-4B MO2-0202-5B MO3-0202-5B
3. RBCCW Valve MO2-3706 3. RBCCW Valve MO3-3706
4. SC Valves 4. SC Valves MO2-1001-1A MO3-1001-1A MO2-1001-1B MO3-1001-1B LPCI DIV. II LPCI DIV. II
1. Target Rock Valve 2-203-3A 1. Target Rock Valve 3-203-3A
2. Electromatic Relief Valves 2. Electromatic Relief Valves 2-203-3B 3-203-3B 2-203-3C 3-203-3C 2-203-3D 3-203-3D 2-203-3E 3-203-3E 4.3-2

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 4.4 Unit 3 Reactor Building Fire Area RB3-I Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-3 (Fire Zone 1.4.1), F-4 (Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C), F-5 (Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.B) and F-6 (Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A).

4.4.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis For a fire in RB3-I, the HPCI system shutdown path D (Table 3.1-9), will be used to shut down the unit. Diesel generator 3 will be used to power essential equipment. Control rod drive pump 3B is available for reactor water makeup if the operator chooses to use the HPCI turbine for steam condensing only. The electromatic relief valves are available for initial pressure control except for Fire Zone 1.4.1. In this zone the target rock valve and the safety valves are available for pressure control. The LPCI system and containment cooling service water system are available for suppression pool cooling.

All necessary equipment may be operated from the control room. Local instrumentation is used for monitoring Reactor Pressure and Reactor Water Level indication. This fire area contains no essential or associated cables for the HPCI shutdown path D.

4.4.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis For the cold shutdown analysis, the Unit 3 reactor building was analyzed as a single fire area in Section 4.5.

4.4-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 4.5 Unit 3 Reactor Building Fire Area RB3-II Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-2 (Fire Zones 1.1.1.1, 11.1.1, and 11.1.2), F-3 (Fire Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.3.1), F-4 (Fire Zone 1.1.1.3), F-5 (Fire Zone 1.1.1.4), F-6 (Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.D) and F-6 (Fire Zone 1.1.1.6).

4.5.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis Isolation condenser shutdown path A1 (Table 3.1-4) is used to shut down Unit 3 using Unit 2 equipment and interunit crossties independent of this fire area. Since the Unit 3 4-kV switchgear, 480-V switchgear, 250-V MCC's and 125-V reactor building distribution center are located in this fire area, the 2/3 diesel generator is used to power essential equipment via the Unit 2 power train. Control rod drive pump 2A is available for reactor water makeup. The electromatic relief valves are not available for initial pressure control but the target rock valve and safety valves are available. Makeup to the isolation condenser is available from either isolation condenser makeup pump. Service water pump 2A is available for cooling of the CRD pump and for makeup to the isolation condenser, if long-term operation is necessary. Additionally, the Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump cooling line as an alternate cooling source. Local instruments are used to monitor Reactor Pressure and Reactor Vessel Water level. Instruments for monitoring Torus temperature and level are available in the control room.

The necessary control rod drive pump and service water pump are powered from Unit 2 and are available to support Unit 3 shutdown through mechanical crossties. The bus duct from the 2/3 diesel generator to 4-kV switchgear 33-1 is routed in this area. A fault on the bus duct would not affect operation of the diesel generator because a 4-kV breaker in the diesel generator room would isolate this feed from the diesel generator. The 2/3 diesel generator would remain available to provide power via Unit 2 (see Subsection 6.2.3). All Unit 3 cables routed in this area that could affect control and excitation of the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries are isolated in the diesel generator room to permit local starting and operation. Cables to the 2/3 diesel generator from Unit 2 and the bus duct from the 2/3 diesel generator to SWGR 23-1 pass through the corner of Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 nearest to the diesel generator room. These cables are provided with a 1-hour fire wrap. See Subsections 6.2.3.1.5 and 6.3.3.2 and Section 4.7 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4). Redundant 125-Vdc control power is available from Unit 2.

Redundant power feeds to the 2/3 diesel generator auxiliaries (room ventilation fan and fuel oil transfer pump) are available from Unit 2. Local transfer switches have been installed in the 2/3 diesel generator room to isolate the Unit 3 feeds. See Subsection 6.2.3.1.

Cables and power supplied for Unit 3 isolation condenser valves are located in this fire area. All isolation condenser motor-operated valves are independent of this fire area and are accessible for manual operation except for valves MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4 which are located in the drywell. The normal power feeds to these drywell valves are routed through Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 from 480-V MCC 38-1 to the drywell penetrations in Fire Zone 1.4.1 (part of RB3-I). To ensure that these valves will be open as required for safe shutdown, alternate power feeds have been routed to Unit 3 drywell penetrations in Fire Zone 1.4.1 from Unit 2 (see Subsection 6.2.2.4).

The normal access to valves MO3-1301-2 and MO3-1301-3, located in the isolation condenser pipe chase (RB3-I), is through fire doors located at roughly 47/M on both the 545-foot 6-inch 4.5-1

AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 elevation and the 570-foot 0-inch elevation. Access to the pipe chase is also available from the 589-foot 0-inch elevation in Fire Area RB3-I. Intervening grating has been cut and access ladders and platforms provided to ensure that these valves may be manually operated in the event of a fire in this area (see Subsection 6.2.2.6). Vent valves AO3-1301-17 and AO3-1301-20 fail in the closed position. In the event these valves fail to close, manual valve 3-1301-16 may be closed to isolate this line. Manual operation of valves MO3-4399-74 or MO3-4102 and MO3-1301-10 may be required to add makeup water to the isolation condenser.

Associated cables routed in this zone include LPCI circuits, core spray circuits, primary containment isolation circuits, and main steam isolation circuits. The LPCI and core spray circuitry are associated with the 4-kV power distribution. However, since the Unit 2 power train is used for this zone, faults on these circuits will not affect safe shutdown. The primary containment isolation, and main steam isolation circuits are associated with isolation condenser valves. However, the drywell valves will be controlled from the alternate power source by isolating the automatic circuitry and the power train to the remaining valves will be deenergized and the valves operated manually. Therefore, faults on the associated circuitry will not prevent safe shutdown. Spurious auto blowdown initiation is prevented by manual operation of the ADS Auto-blowdown Inhibit Switch installed at the MCB (see Subsection 6.2.2.8) and spurious operation of the individual relief valves is prevented by placing the handswitch of the Electromatic relief valves (ERVs) and the Target Rock safety/relief valve control switches in the "OFF" position and by racking out the circuit breakers that supply 125-Vdc power to these valves.

Cable discrepancies within RB3-II and their resolution are presented in Appendix A. A discussion of the instrumentation available to the operators is in Subsection 3.1.1.1.5.

The refueling floor of Fire Zone 1.1.1.6 and Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.D contains no safe shutdown equipment or cabling but is considered part of Fire Area RB3-II. Therefore, the isolation condenser shutdown path B (Table 3.1-6), which would normally be used in case of loss of offsite power, can be utilized for a postulate fire in these fire zones.

There are no cable discrepancies in Fire Zone 1.1.1.6.

4.5.2 RB3-I and RB3-II Cold Shutdown Analysis A significant amount of electrical and mechanical equipment necessary for cold shutdown is located in the Unit 3 reactor building Fire Areas RB3-I and RB3-II. The reactor building is divided into fire zones by floor elevations and rated fire barriers on a particular floor. These floor slabs present a substantial barrier to the spread of fire. However, they are not fire rated.

Additionally, the combustible loading is low and area-wide automatic fire detection would ensure that the fire was detected and extinguished before it spread to adjacent floor elevations disabling the mechanical components and their operators. See the Fire Hazards Analysis, Sections 3.4 and 3.5 (F.P.R. Volume 1), and Section 4.10 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4) for a detailed justification of this assumption.

The mechanical and electrical equipment necessary for cold shutdown and located by fire zone 4.5-2

AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3 are identified in Table 4.5.1. The cable and equipment in the reactor building are shown on the drawings listed below.

F Series Cold Shutdown Fire Zone Drawings Method 1.1.1.1 F-2 Shutdown Cooling 1.1.1.2 F-3 Shutdown Cooling 1.1.1.3 F-4 LPCI 1.1.1.4 F-5 Shutdown Cooling 1.1.1.5.A,B,C,D F-4, F-5, F-6 Shutdown Cooling 1.1.1.6 F-7 Shutdown Cooling 1.3.1 F-3 LPCI 1.4.1 F-3 Shutdown Cooling 11.1.1 F-2 Shutdown Cooling 11.1.2 F-2 Shutdown Cooling In the Unit 3 reactor building fire areas, the shutdown cooling system can be used for cold shutdown in every fire zone except for the mezzanine floor, Fire Zone 1.1.1.3 (Fire Area RB3-II) and the shutdown cooling pump room, Fire Zone 1.3.1 (Fire Area RB3-II). On the mezzanine floor, the presence of the RBCCW pumps precludes the use of the shutdown cooling system. In the shutdown cooling pump room, the presence of the shutdown cooling pumps precludes the use of the shutdown cooling systems.

Table 4.5-2 identifies the manual actions and repairs necessary to achieve cold shutdown using shutdown cooling. The actions identified in this table conservatively assume the loss of all electrical cable and equipment in the Unit 3 reactor building. Electrical power to Unit 3 equipment is provided by temporary connections to switchgear and motor control centers in Unit

2. Manual handwheel operation of accessible valves is assumed. Modifications identified in the hot shutdown analysis Subsection 6.2.3.1 provide capability to operate the 2/3 diesel generator independent of fire damage in Unit 3. Also, Unit 2 diesel generator and auxiliaries are independent of the Unit 3 reactor building.

Table 4.5-3 identifies the manual actions and repairs necessary to achieve cold shutdown using the LPCI method.

Additionally, redundant mechanical components of the selected cold shutdown path are in the same fire zone in two instances. The justification for why a fire will not affect both redundant components is given below.

4.5-3

AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 DRESDEN 2&3

1. Basement Floor (Fire Zone 1.1.1.1)

Valves MO3-1001-5A, MO3-1001-5B, MO3-3702, and MO3-3703 are located in this fire zone and are associated with the shutdown cooling method. The shutdown cooling method would still be available based on the following justification.

MO3-1001-5A These valves are located 180! apart on opposite sides of the torus. These MO3-1001-5B valves are in separate loops; as stated in Subsection 3.2.1 only one loop is normally used. Therefore, only one of the two valves needs to be opened.

They can be handwheel operated. A single fire would not disable mechanical operation of both valves due to the physical separation, low combustible loading, and lack of intervening combustibles. See Fire Hazards Analysis, Subsection 3.5.1 (F.P.R. Volume 1).

MO3-3702 These valves are normally open and must remain so. The only cables in MO3-3703 this zone are from the limit switches and the 480-V power cable. A fault in the limit switch and 480-V power cable cannot cause these valves to change position.

2. Ground Floor (Fire Zone 1.1.1.2)

LPCI Valves MO3-1501-27B and MO3-1501-28B are located in this fire zone and are associated with the LPCI/CCSW method. The LPCI/CCSW method would still be available based on the following justification.

LPCI Valve MO3-1501-27B These valves are in the piping to the containment spray LPCI Valve MO3-1501-28B header and are not needed for the LPCI cold shutdown system. They are to have an adverse effect on cold shutdown. The simultaneous opening of two normally closed motor-operated valves in series is not credible and is not postulated except in a high-low pressure interface. This is not a high-low pressure interface.

4.5-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 TABLE 4.5-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING FIRE AREAS RB3-I AND RB3-II Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 Shutdown Cooling

1. SC Valve MO3-1001-5A
2. SC Valve MO3-1001-5B
3. RBCCW Valve MO3-3702
4. RBCCW Valve MO3-3703 LPCI, Div. II
1. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-22B
2. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-20B
3. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-38B
4. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-18B
5. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-19B
6. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-13B Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 Electrical Equipment
1. 480-V MCC 38-1
2. 480-V MCC 39-1
3. 480-V MCC 39-7
4. 480-V MCC 38-7 LPCI, Div. II
1. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-21B
2. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-27B
3. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-28B 4.5-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.5-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING FIRE AREAS RB3-I AND RB3-II Fire Zone 1.1.1.3 Electrical Equipment

1. 4-kV SWGR 33-1
2. 4-kV SWGR 34-1 Shutdown Cooling
1. SC Heat Exchangers 3A-1003, 3B-1003, 3C-1003
2. RBCCW Pumps 3A-3701, 3B-3701
3. RBCCW Heat Exchangers 3A-3702, 3B-3702
4. RBCCW Valve MO3-3701
5. RBCCW Valve MO3-3704
6. Service Water Valve TCV-3-3904A
7. Service Water Valve TCV-3-3904B
8. SC Valve MO3-1001-4A
9. SC Valve MO3-1001-4B 10 SC Valve MO3-1001-4C Fire Zone - 1.1.1.4 Electrical Equipment
1. 480-V SWGR 38
2. 480-V SWGR 39
3. 250-Vdc Reactor Building MCC 3A
4. 250-Vdc Reactor Building MCC 3B
5. 125-Vdc Reactor Building Distribution Panel 3 Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.A, 1.1.1.5.B, and 1.1.1.5.C NONE Fire Zone 1.3.1 Shutdown Cooling
1. SC Pumps 3A-1002, 3B-1002, 3C-1002
2. SC Valves MO3-1001-2A, MO3-1001-2B, MO3-1001-2C 4.5-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.5-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING FIRE AREAS RB3-I AND RB3-II Fire Zone 1.4.1 Electrical Division I Penetrations Fire Zone - 11.1.1 LPCI, Div. II

1. LPCI Pump 3C-1502
2. LPCI Pump 3D-1502
3. LPCI Emergency Air Cooler 3-5746B
4. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-3B
5. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-5C
6. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-5D
7. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-11B
8. LPCI Valve MO3-1501-32B Fire Zone 11.1.2 NONE 4.5-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.5-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN THE UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING Component Manual Action/Repair MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Shutdown Cooling Pumps 3A-1002 A temporary cable connection for two pumps to SWGR-23-1 or 24-1 on 3B-1002 the Unit 2 side can be is available. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

  • 3C-1002
  • Loop C is normally connected to fuel pool cooling.

Shutdown Cooling Valves MO3-1001-2A Disable feed and manually position the valve.

MO3-1001-2B MO3-1001-2C MO3-1001-4A MO3-1001-4B MO3-1001-4C MO3-1001-5A MO3-1001-5B MO3-1001-1A A temporary power cable from an operable 480-V MCC to Unit 3 drywell MO3-1001-1B penetration can be provided. A procedure to locally operate valves is available. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Recirculation Piping Valves MO3-0202-4A A temporary power cable from an operable 480-V MCC to Unit 3 drywell MO3-0202-4B penetrations can be provided. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Pumps 3A-3701 A temporary power cable connection for two pumps to SWGR 23-1 or 24-3B-3701 1 in Unit 2 can be provided. A procedure to start pumps at the SWGR is available. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Valves 3A-3701 Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

3B-3701 MO3-3706 This valve are normally open for drywell cooling. The drywell cooling MO3-3702 function, while important, is not considered essential to cold shutdown.

MO3-3703 (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

4.5-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.5-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN THE UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING Component Manual Action/Repair Service Water Pumps 3A-3901 Unit 2 service water pumps 2A-301, 2B-3901, and 2/3-3901, which are 3B-3901 powered from SWGR 23 and 24, are available independent of the Unit 3 reactor building. The normal feed to SWGR 33 and 34 are disabled.

TCV-3-3904A Spurious operation concern. These valves fail open, which is the position TCV-3-3904B necessary for cold shutdown.

TCV-3-3904C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Division I The 2/3 diesel generator is operable from the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C, Fire Area RB-2/3). See Subsection 4.5.1, 6.2.3.1, and 6.3.3.2 for the modifications identified in the Hot Shutdown Analysis to ensure this operability. All other Unit 2 Division I components and associated circuits are independent of the Unit 3 reactor building except for the 4-kV Buses 33-1 and 23-1 breaker interlock control cables which can be manually isolated at SWGR.

Division II All Unit 2 diesel generator and Unit 2 Division II components and associated circuits are independent of the Unit 3 reactor building.

250-Vdc Primary feed to Unit 3 is from Unit 2, however, a secondary feed can be made from TB 250-Vdc MCC#3. Unit 2 250-V valve can be operated manually.

125-Vdc Unit 3 motor operators will be temporarily connected to Unit 2 switchgear for power and control via temporary power cable connections as described above. Therefore, no 125-Vdc to Unit 3 is necessary. All Unit 2 125-Vdc is independent of the Unit 3 reactor building.

Process Monitoring Equipment RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop A If RPV water, shell and shell flange temperature indicators RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop B are not available in the control room, then establish RPV Shell Temperature local indication monitoring capability in accordance RPV Flange Temperature with cold shutdown repair procedure DSSP-0200-T9.

4.5-9

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.5-3 ACTION TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 3 USING THE LPCI/CCSW SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN THE UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING Component Manual Action/Repair MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT LPCI Pumps 3C-1501 A temporary cable connection for the pumps to SWGR 23-1 or 24-1 in 3D-1501 Unit 2 can be provided. Procedures to manually start pumps at the SWGR are available. (See Section 7.4.1 for details.)

CCSW Pumps 3C-1501-44 These pumps will be powered by a temporary feed from SWGR 23 and 3D-1501-44 24 if normal power feed to the pump cannot be established (see Subsection 7.4.1. for details).

LPCI Valves MO3-1501-22B Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO3-1501-3B MO3-1501-21B Of concern in regard to spurious operation only. Disable the feed and MO3-1501-5C manually position the valve.

MO3-1501-5D MO3-1501-27B MO3-1501-28B MO3-1501-18B MO3-1501-19B MO3-1501-38B MO3-1501-20B MO3-1501-11B MO3-1501-32B MO3-1501-13B Target Rock/Electromatic Relief Valves 3-203-3A Temporary 125-Vdc power connection can be provided. Procedures to 3-203-3B manually operate these valves are available. (See Section 7.4.1 for 3-203-3C details.)

3-203-3D 3-203-3E CCSW Pump Coolers 3-5700-30A A temporary cable connection can be provided to an operable 480-V 3-5700-30B MCC in Unit 2. Procedures to locally start cooler fans are available. (See Section 7.4.1 for details.)

4.5-10

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.5-3 ACTION TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 3 USING THE LPCI/CCSW SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN THE UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING Component Manual Action/Repair LPCI Emergency Air Cooler 3-5746B A temporary cable connection can be made to an operable 480-V MCC in Unit 2. Procedures to locally start cooler fans are available. (See Section 7.4.1 for details.)

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Division I The 2/3 diesel generator is operable from the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C, Fire Area RB-2/3). See Subsections 4.5.1, 6.2.3.1, and 6.3.3.2 for the modifications identified in the Hot Shutdown Analysis to ensure this operability. All other Unit 2 Division I components and associated circuits are independent of the Unit 3 reactor building except for the 4-kV Bus 33-1 and 23-1 breaker interlock control cables which can be manually isolated at SWGR.

Division II All Unit 2 diesel generators and Unit 2 Division II components and associated circuits are independent of the Unit 3 reactor building.

250-Vdc Primary feed to Unit 3 is from Unit 2, however, a secondary feed can be made from TB 250-Vdc MCC#3. Unit 2 250-V valve can be operated manually.

125-Vdc Unit 3 motor operators will be temporarily connected to Unit 2 switchgear for power and control via temporary power cable connection as described above. Therefore, no 125-Vdc is necessary. All Unit 2 125-Vdc is independent of the Unit 3 reactor building.

Process Monitoring Equipment RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop A If RPV water, shell and shell flange temperature indicators RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop B are not available in the control room, then establish RPV Shell Temperature local indication monitoring capability in accordance RPV Flange Temperature with cold shutdown repair procedure DSSP-0200-T9.

4.5-11

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 4.6 Unit 3 Primary Containment (Fire Area 1.2.1)

Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-3 through F-6.

4.6.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis The Unit 3 primary containment (Area 1.2.1) is separated from the rest of the reactor building by a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The primary containment is inerted, thus, a fire cannot start and a safe shutdown can be achieved and maintained using any of the shutdown methods.

4.6.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis The Technical Specifications require that the drywell be inerted during normal reactor operation.

Therefore, no fire is postulated. The mechanical equipment associated with cold shutdown located in the drywell is identified in Table 4.3-1.

4.6-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 4.7 2/3 Diesel Generator and HPCI Rooms (Fire Area RB-2/3)

Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-2 (Fire Zones 11.1.3 and 11.2.3) and F-3 (Fire Zone 9.0.C).

4.7.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis For a fire in Fire Area RB-2/3, which contains the 2/3 diesel generator room and the Unit 2 and Unit 3 HPCI rooms, isolation condenser shutdown paths E and F (Tables 3.1-10 and 3.1-11) will be used to shut down Units 2 and 3, respectively. Unit 2 and 3 diesel generators are used to power essential equipment. Control rod drive pumps 2B and 3B are available for reactor water makeup.

The electromatic relief valves are available for initial pressure control, if necessary. Both isolation condenser makeup pumps are available for makeup to the isolation condenser. Service water pump 2B or 3B is available for cooling the CRD pumps and for makeup to the isolation condensers if long-term operation is necessary. Additionally, the Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump cooling line as an alternate cooling source.

All necessary equipment may be operated from the control room. Local instrumentation is used for monitoring Reactor Pressure and Reactor Water level. This area contains no essential or associated cables for shutdown methods E and F except for cables associated with the alternate feeds to the isolation condenser inboard valves. Since the controls for the alternate feeds are located in the 2/3 diesel generator room, the valves may be spuriously closed. To defeat this possibility, the isolation switch in Fire Zones 1.3.2 and 1.4.1 must be manually switched to the isolation position so that control is retained in the control room. In addition, the Division I switchgear 28(38) must be tied to the Division II switchgear 29(39) to ensure power to the inboard valves (Division I) and the dedicated diesel generator auxiliaries (Division II) simultaneously.

4.7.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis The shutdown cooling method of cold shutdown is available independent of this fire zone. As seen on Table 4.7-1, only equipment associated with the 2/3 diesel generator is located in this zone. The Unit 2 and Unit 3 diesel generators are available and are independent of this zone.

4.7-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.7-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN FIRE AREA RB-2/3 Fire Zone - 9.0.C Cold Shutdown Equipment Contained in the Fire Zone:

1. 2/3 Diesel Generator 2/3-5210
2. 2/3 Diesel Generator Supply Fan 2/3-5790
3. 2/3 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2/3-5303 Fire Zone 11.1.3 NONE Fire Zone 11.2.3 NONE 4.7-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 4.8 Turbine Building Eastern Zone Group (Fire Area TB-I)

Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in these fire areas are shown on Drawings F-8 (Fire Zones 7.0.A, 8.2.5.A, 8.2.6.A, and 8.2.7), F-9 (Fire Zones 8.2.1.A and 8.2.2.A), F-10 (Fire Zones 8.1, 8.2.5.A, 8.2.5.B, and 9.0.A), and F-13 (Fire Zones 8.2.6.A and 8.2.6.B).

4.8.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis For a fire in TB-I, the Eastern Zone Group of the turbine building, isolation condenser path B1 (Table 3.1-7) can be used to shut down Unit 2. Cable discrepancies in this zone group are associated with Unit 2 4-kV, 480-V, 250-Vdc, and 125-Vdc power. Also, the 4-kV switchgears 23 and 24, 480-V MCC's 25-2, 26-1, 28-2, 28-3, and 29-2, and the Unit 2 125-Vdc turbine building main and reserve buses are located in this area. Additional control cable discrepancies are associated with Unit 3. These cables originate in the control room and are in risers that pass outside of the control room and AEER to the Unit 3 cable tunnel. They are associated with the controls to breakers associated 4-kV Switchgear 33, 4-KV Switchgear 33-1, and 480-V Switchgear 38. The risers and pull boxes containing these cables are provided with 1-hour fire wraps. In addition, the area in the vicinity of the risers has suppression and detection systems installed. Therefore, the 2/3 diesel generator is used to power essential equipment via the Unit 3 power train. Control rod drive pump 3A is available for reactor water makeup via a mechanical crosstie. The electromatic relief valves may not be available for initial pressure control but the target rock valve and safety valves are available if necessary. Makeup to the isolation condenser is available from both isolation condenser makeup pumps. Service water pump 3A is available for cooling the CRD pump and for makeup to the isolation condenser if a long-term operation of the isolation condenser is necessary. Local instruments can be used to monitor reactor conditions.

Additionally, the Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump line as an alternate cooling source.

The necessary control rod drive pump and service water pump are powered from Unit 3 and are available to support Unit 2 shutdown through mechanical crossties. The isolation condenser makeup pumps can be operated locally from panels 2223-126A and 2223-126B located in fire zones 18.7.1.and 18.7.2. All cables routed in this zone group that could affect control and excitation of the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries were isolated in the diesel generator room to permit local starting and operation (see Subsection 6.2.3). Redundant 125-Vdc control power is available from Unit 3. Redundant power feeds to the 2/3 diesel generator auxiliaries (room ventilation fan and fuel oil transfer pump) are available from Unit 3. Local controls have been installed to isolate these feeds from possible spurious signals which might be a result of a fire in RB2-II (see Subsection 6.2.3.1). All isolation condenser valves are located in the reactor building and are accessible for manual operation except valves MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4 which are located in the drywell. Since a fire in TB-I would affect the Unit 2 power train and control cable to all isolation condenser valves, alternate power feeds to the inaccessible valves have been installed independent of this zone group to ensure that the valves will be open as required for safe shutdown. The routing of these new cables is discussed in Subsection 6.2.1.4. The normal access to valves MO2-1301-2 and MO2-1301-3, located in the isolation condenser pipe chase (RB2-I), is through the fire doors to the pipe chase at 41/M on both the 545-foot-6-inch elevation and the 570-foot 0-inch elevation. Access to the pipe chase is also available from Elevation 589 4.8-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 feet 0 inches in Fire Area RB2-I. Intervening grating has been cut and access ladders and platforms provided to ensure that these valves may be manually operated in the event of a fire in this area (see Subsection 6.2.1.6). Vent valves AO2-1307-17 and AO2-1301-20 fail in the closed position. In the event these valves fail to close, manual valve 2-1301-16 may be closed to isolate the line. Manual operation of valves MO2-4399-74 or MO2-4102 and MO2-1301-10 may be required to add makeup water to the isolation condenser.

The Unit 2 fuel oil transfer pump is located in this fire area and could potentially be affected by a fire in this area. If isolation condenser makeup is required for longer than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after shutdown is initiated, the diesel oil day tanks for the isolation condenser makeup pumps can be manually filled.

If one of the diesel makeup pumps runs out of fuel, the other pump may be started to provide makeup water.

Associated cables routed in this zone include LPCI circuits, core spray circuits, primary containment isolation circuits, process radiation monitoring circuits, and main steam isolation circuits. The LPCI and core spray circuitry is associated with the 4-kV power distribution.

However, since the Unit 3 power train is used for this zone, faults on these circuits will not affect safe shutdown. The primary containment isolation, process radiation monitoring and main steam isolation circuits are associated with isolation condenser valves. However, the drywell valves will be controlled from an alternate location by isolating the automatic circuitry and the power train to the remaining valves will be deenergized and the valves operated manually. Therefore, faults on the associated circuitry will not prevent safe shutdown. Spurious auto blowdown initiation is prevented by manual operation of the ADS Auto-blowdown Inhibit Switch. This switch is installed at the MCB (See Subsection 6.2.1.8). Spurious operation of the individual relief valves is prevented by placing the handswitch of the Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs) and the Target Rock Safety/Relief valve control switches in the OFF position and by removing power to these valves by pulling the fuses at auxiliary equipment room panel 902-32.

Cable discrepancies within TB-I and their resolutions are presented in Appendix A.

4.8-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 4.8.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis The shutdown cooling system is available for shutting down Unit 2 as a result of a fire in any of the zones within the Eastern Zone Group. As seen on Table 4.8-1, no mechanical equipment associated with the shutdown cooling method is located in this zone group.

A significant amount of cable and electrical equipment is located in this area as seen on the drawings listed below:

Fire Zone F Series Drawings 7.0.A F-8 8.1 F-10 8.2.1.A F-9 8.2.2.A F-9 8.2.5.A F-8, F-10 8.2.5.B F-10 8.2.6.A F-8, F-13 8.2.6.B F-13 8.2.7 F-8 9.0.A F-10 Table 4.8-2 lists the repairs necessary to establish onsite power and to establish operability of Unit 2 shutdown cooling method equipment. Both the 2/3 diesel generator and the Unit 3 diesel generator can be made operable.

4.8-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.8-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN FIRE AREA TB-I Fire Zone 7.0.A.1 Electrical Equipment

1. 125-V Battery Charger 2
2. 125-V Battery Charger 2A
3. Turbine Building 125-Vdc Main Bus 2
4. Battery Charger 2/3
5. Turbine Building 250-Vdc MCC 2
6. 250-V Battery Charger 2
7. Turbine Building 125-V Reserve Bus 2 Fire Zone 7.0.A.2 Electrical Equipment
1. 125-V Batteries Fire Zone 7.0.A.3 Electrical Equipment
1. 250-V Batteries Fire Zone 8.2.1.A NONE Fire Zone 8.2.2.A LPCI Div. II
1. CCSW Pump 2C-1501-44
2. CCSW Pump 2D-1501-44
3. CCSW Pump Cooler 2-5700-30C
4. CCSW Pump Cooler 2-5700-30D Fire Zone 8.2.5.A Electrical Equipment
1. MCC 29-2 4.8-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.8-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN FIRE AREA TB-I Fire Zone 8.2.5.B NONE Fire Zone - 8.2.6.A Electrical Equipment

1. 480-V MCC 28-2
2. 4-kV SWGR 23
3. 4-kV SWGR 24
4. 480-V MCC 28-3 Fire Zone 8.2.6.B NONE Fire Zone 8.2.7 NONE Fire Zone 9.0.A Electrical Equipment
1. Unit 2 Diesel Generator 2-5210
2. Unit 2 Diesel Generator Supply Fan 2-5790
3. Unit 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 2-5203 4.8-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.8-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 2 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-I Component Manual Action/Repair MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Shutdown Cooling Pumps 2A-1002 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 23-1 and 24-1.

2B-1002 Division I and Division II power is available as described 2C-1002 below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Shutdown Cooling Valve MO2-1001-2A Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO2-1001-2B MO2-1001-2C MO2-1001-4A MO2-1001-4B MO2-1001-4C MO2-1001-5A MO2-1001-5B MO2-1001-1A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO2-1001-1B control circuits and operate the valves locally at the MCC.

(See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Recirculation Piping Valves MO2-0202-4A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO2-0202-4B control circuits and locally operate the valves at the MCC.

MO2-0202-5A Power is available to Division I and Division II MCC's as MO2-0202-5B described below. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Pumps 2A-3701 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 23-1 and 24-1.

2B-3701 Division I and Division II power is available as described below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Valves Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO2-3701 MO2-3704 4.8-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.8-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 2 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-I Component Manual Action/Repair MO2-3702 Spurious operation concern only. Procedures are available MO2-3703 to isolate existing control circuits and operate at MCC.

MO2-3706 Service Water Pumps 2A-3901 The power and control to the two Unit 3 service water 2B-3901 pumps are unaffected by the fire.

2/3-3901 TCV-2-3904A Spurious operation concern only. These valves fail in the TCV-2-3904B open position.

TCV-2-3904C ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Division I ac Power System Control and operation of the 2/3 diesel generator is ensured in the hot shutdown analysis for TB-I. All 2/3 diesel generator components and auxiliaries and SWGR breakers have isolation and manual control capability installed. (See Subsections 4.8.1 and 6.2.3.1.) 125-Vdc control power can be established as discussed below. Procedures exist to ensure the availability of Division I ac power.

Division II ac Power System Unit 2 diesel generator and its auxiliaries may not be operable. However, Division II power can be provided to Unit 2 via the crosstie between SWGR 34-1 and 24-1.

Procedures are available to establish the crosstie between SWGR 34-1 and 24-1. Unit 3 Division II power is available independent of Unit 2 Eastern Zone Group (TB-I) except for the following associated cables. 125-Vdc control power to 4-kV and 480-V SWGR can be established as discussed below. Procedures exist to ensure the availability of Division II ac Power.

Division I 125-Vdc A temporary 125-V power cable connection must be from Control Power System unit 3 reactor building 125-V distribution panel 3 to the Unit 2 reactor building 125-V distribution panel 2 to establish control power to SWGR 23-1, 24-1, 28 and 29. A procedure is available to ensure the availability of 125-Vdc power to Unit 3.

4.8-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.8-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 2 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-I Component Manual Action/Repair 250-Vdc Power System A fire in the Eastern Zone Group could disable normal 250-Vdc power to both Units 2&3. A procedure is available to establish reserve feed to Unit 3. (See Subsection 7.4.1) Unit 2 250-Vdc power-oriented valves have handwheel operation capability.

Process Monitoring Equipment RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop A If RPV water, shell and shell flange temperature indicators RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop B are not available in the control room, then establish RPV Shell Temperature local indication monitoring capability in accordance RPV Flange Temperature with cold shutdown repair procedure DSSP-0200-T9.

4.8-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 4.9 Turbine Building Central Zone Group (Fire Area TB-II)

Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-10 (Fire Zone 8.2.5.C), F-11 (Fire Zone 8.2.5.C), F-13 (Fire Zone 8.2.6.C) and F-14 (Fire Zone 8.2.6.C).

4.9.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis For a fire in TB-II, the Central Zone Group, shutdown of Units 2 and 3 can be accomplished with shutdown paths A2 and B2 (Tables 3.1-5 and 3.1-8) which utilize Unit 2 and 3 equipment and are powered by the 2/3 diesel generator.

Cable discrepancies in this zone group include cables associated with Unit 2 480-Vac power, 2/3 diesel generator control metering and excitation, 2/3 diesel generator room supply fan and 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump. Unit 3 cable discrepancies include cable associated with 4-kV, 480-V and 125-Vdc power. However, the required circuit breakers can be isolated by existing isolation switches at the switchgear to prevent spurious signal that may result from a fire in the control cables. The switchgear can then be operated locally, if necessary. (See Subsections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.2.2.) Transfer switches in 2/3 diesel generator auxiliary power feed cable prevent a fault in Unit 2 cable from affecting the Unit 3 feed. The 2/3 diesel generator can be started and controlled locally in Fire Zone 9.0.C (see Subsection 6.2.3.1). The Unit 3 feeds to the 2/3 diesel generator auxiliaries are protected by a 1-hour barrier and automatic suppression and detection in Fire Area TB-II and will be available to provide power to the auxiliaries for a fire in this area.

(See Subsection 6.3.4.4.)

The electromatic relief valves may not be available for initial pressure control but the target rock valve and safety valves are available if necessary. Control rod drive pumps 2A and 3A are available for reactor water makeup. Both isolation condenser makeup pumps are available for makeup to the isolation condenser. Service water pump 2A (or 3A not required/credited) is available for cooling the CRD pumps and for makeup to the isolation condensers if long term operation is necessary. Additionally, the Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump cooling line as an alternate cooling source. The control rod drive pump can be operated from the control room. Reactor pressure and level can be monitored through local indicators in the reactor building.

The 2/3 diesel generator feed breaker control logic has been modified to allow the operator to supply power to both Units Division I swtichgear 23-1 and 33-1 simultaneously by manually overriding the unit selection logic (see Subsection 6.2.3.2.6).

Control cables for isolation condenser valves MO2(3)-1301-2, MO2(3)-1301-3, MO2(3)-1301-10, and MO2(3)-4102 are located in this fire area. All of these valves are located in the reactor building and are accessible for manual operation. The normal access to valves MO2(3)-1301-2 and MO2(3)-1301-3, located in the isolation condenser pipe chase (RB2(3)-I), is through the fire doors to the pipe chase at 41/M (47/M for Unit 3) on both the 545-foot 6-inch elevation and 570-foot 0-inch elevation. Access to the pipe chase is also available from Elevation 589 feet 0 inches in Fire Area RB2(3)-I. Intervening grating has been cut and access ladders and platforms provided to ensure that these valves may be manually operated in the event of a fire in this area 4.9-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 (see Subsections 6.2.1.6 and 6.2.2.6). Cables for valves MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4 are located in this fire area. These valves are in the drywell and are not accessible for manual operation. However, alternate feeds have been installed to these valves independent of this fire area. These feeds, operated from Fire Zone 9.0.C, can be used to open the inboard valves in the event that faults on the cables in TB-II cause them to spuriously close (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.6).

Vent valves AO3-1301-17 and AO3-1301-20 fail in the closed position as required for safe shutdown. In the event that they fail to close, manual valve 3-1301-16 may be locally closed to isolate this line. Manual operation of valves MO2-4399-74, MO3-4399-74, MO2-4102, MO2-1301-10, MO3-4102 and MO3-1301-10 may be required to add makeup feedwater to the isolation condensers. Power and control cables for CRD Pump Discharge Valve MO2-0301-2B are located in this fire area. This valve is located in Fire Zone 8.2.2.A and available for manual operation if required.

Cables from 480V Bus 29 which energize 480V MCC 29-2 are routed through this fire area. A fire in this area could potentially affect these cables rendering the Unit 2 fuel oil transfer pump inoperable. If isolation condenser makeup is required at times greater than 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> after shutdown is initiated, the diesel oil day tanks for the isolation condenser makeup pumps can be manually refilled.

If one of the diesel makeup pumps runs out of fuel, the other pump may be started to provide makeup water.

The control cable for breakers feeding 480-V MCC 38-1 and 38-4 is located in this area. This control switch has been moved to Fire Area RB2/3 and the cable in the turbine building is no longer used (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.3).

Associated cables routed in this zone include Unit 2 and Unit 3 LPCI circuits, core spray circuits, primary containment isolation circuits, process radiation monitoring circuits, and main steam isolation circuits. The LPCI and core spray circuitry is associated with the 4-kV power distribution. However, since local control and isolation capability is provided, faults on these circuits will not affect safe shutdown (see Subsections 6.2.1.1 and 6.2.2.2). The primary containment isolation, process radiation monitoring, and main steam isolation circuits are associated with isolation condenser valves. However, the drywell valves will be controlled from an alternate location by isolating the automatic circuitry and the power train to the remaining valves will be deenergized and the valves operated manually. Therefore, faults on the associated circuitry will not prevent safe shutdown.

Cable discrepancies in Fire Area TB-II and their resolutions are presented in Appendix A.

4.9-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 4.9.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis The shutdown cooling system is available for shutting down both units as a result of a fire in any of the zones within the Central Zone Group. As seen in Table 4.9-1, no mechanical equipment associated with the shutdown cooling method is located in this zone group. However, MCC 39-2 and a significant amount of cable and electrical equipment are located in this zone group as seen on the drawings listed below:

Fire Zone F Series Drawings 8.2.5.C F-10, F-11 8.2.6.C F-13, F-14 The repairs necessary to establish operability of both Unit 2 and Unit 3 shutdown cooling equipment are listed in Table 4.9-2. The presence of MCC 39-2 which feeds the Unit 3 diesel generator auxiliaries precludes using the Unit 3 diesel generator as an onsite power source.

However, Table 4.9-2 indicates that both the 2/3 diesel generator and the Unit 2 diesel generator can be made operable.

4.9-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.9-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN FIRE AREA TB-II Fire Zone 8.2.5.C NONE Fire Zone 8.2.6.C Electrical Equipment

1. 480-V MCC 39-2 4.9-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.9-2 ACTION TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNITS 2 AND 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-II Component Manual Action/Repair UNIT 2 MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Shutdown Cooling Pumps 2A-1002 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 23-1 and 24-1.

2B-1002 Division I and Division II power is available as described 2C-1002 below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Shutdown Cooling Valve MO2-1001-2A Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO2-1001-2B MO2-1001-2C MO2-1001-4A MO2-1001-4B MO2-1001-4C MO2-1001-5A MO2-1001-5B MO2-1001-1A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO2-1001-1B control circuits and operate the valves locally at the MCC.

(See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Recirculation Piping Valves MO2-0202-4A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO2-0202-4B control circuits and locally operate the valves at the MCC.

MO2-0202-5A Power is available to Division I and Division II MCC's as MO2-0202-5B described below. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

UNIT 3 MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Shutdown Cooling Pumps 3A-1002 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 33-1 and 34.1.

3B-1002 Division I and Division II power is available as described 3C-1002 below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

4.9-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.9-2 ACTION TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNITS 2 AND 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-II Component Manual Action/Repair Shutdown Cooling Valves MO3-1001-2A Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO3-1001-2B MO3-1001-2C MO3-1001-4A MO3-1001-4B MO3-1001-4C MO3-1001-5A MO3-1001-5B Shutdown Cooling Valves MO3-1001-1A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO3-1001-1B control circuits and operate the valves locally at the MCC.

(See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Recirculation Piping Valves MO3-0202-4A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO3-0202-4B control circuits and locally operate the valves at the MCC.

MO3-0202-5A (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

MO3-0202-5B.

RBCCW Pumps 3A-3701 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 33-1 and 34-1.

3B-3701 Division I and Division II power is available as described below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Valves MO3-3701 Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO3-3704 MO3-3702 Spurious operation concern only. Procedures are available MO3-3703 to isolate existing control circuits and operate at the MCC.

MO3-3706 4.9-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.9-2 ACTION TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNITS 2 AND 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-II Component Manual Action/Repair Service Water Pumps Power and control to Unit 2 Service Water Pumps are unaffected by the fire.

3A-3901 NOTE: Pump 3A-3901 is available (not required/credited) 3B-3901 due to modifications provided to ensure hot shutdown capability. (See Subsections 4.9.1, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.3.1, and 6.3.4.4.)

TCV-3-3904A Spurious operation concern only. These valves fail in the TCV-3-3904B open position, which is the position necessary for cold TCV-3-3904C shutdown.

UNITS 2&3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Division I ac Power All 2/3 diesel generator components and auxiliaries and System (Unit 3) Division I SWGR breakers have isolation and manual control capabilities installed. Protection including 1-hour wrap and suppression and detection is provided to all Unit 3 Division I cables in this fire area except for control cable 31561 which controls breaker 252-385 A and MCC 38-7.

(See Subsections 4.9.1, 6.2.2.2, 6.2.3.1, and 6.3.4.4.)

Procedures are available to isolate these circuits and locally control the breakers. 125-Vdc breaker control power is available as described below. Procedures exist to ensure the availability of Division I ac power.

Division II ac Power Procedures exist to ensure the availability of Division II ac System (Unit 2) power where required.

125-Vdc Control Power Procedures exist to ensure the availability of 125-Vdc System power where required.

4.9-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.9-2 ACTION TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNITS 2 AND 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-II Component Manual Action/Repair 250-Vdc Power System A fire in the Central Zone Group could disable normal 250-V power to both Units 2 and 3.

250-Vdc to Units 2 RX Building 250-V MCC 2 can be established by closing the reserve feed breaker from TB 250-V MCC 2 to RB 250-Vdc MCC 2A until the battery is depleted because cables to both battery chargers could be affected.

250-Vdc to Unit 3 RX Building 250-Vdc MCC 3 can be established by closing the reserve feed breaker from TB 250-Vdc to Unit 3 RX Building 250-Vdc MCC 3 can be established by closing the reserve feed breaker from TB 250-Vdc MCC 3 to RB 250-Vdc MCC 3A.

Process Monitoring Equipment RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop A If RPV water, shell and shell flange temperature indicators RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop B are not available in the control room, then establish RPV Shell Temperature local indication monitoring capability in accordance RPV Flange Temperature with cold shutdown repair procedure DSSP-0200-T9.

4.9-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 4.10 Turbine Building Western Zone Group (Fire Area TB-III)

Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawings F-9 (Fire Zones 8.2.1.B and 8.2.2.B), F-11 (Fire Zones 8.2.5.D, 8.2.5.E and 9.0.B), F-12 (Fire Zone 8.2.4) and F-14 (Fire Zones 6.1, 7.0.B, 8.2.6.D and 8.2.6.E).

4.10.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis For a fire in TB-III, the Western Zone Group of the turbine building, isolation condenser path A1 (Table 3.1-4) can be used to shut down Unit 3. Cable discrepancies in this area are associated with Unit 3 4-kV, 480-V, 250-Vdc, and 125-Vdc power. Also, the 4-kV switchgears 33 and 34, 480 MCC's 35-2, 36-1, 38-2 and 38-3, and Unit 3 125-Vdc turbine building main and reserve buses are located in this area. Therefore, the 2/3 diesel generator is used to power essential equipment via the Unit 2 power train. Control rod drive pump 2A is available for reactor water makeup via a mechanical crosstie. The electromatic relief valves may not be available for initial pressure control but the target rock valve and safety valves are available if necessary. Makeup to the isolation condenser is available from both isolation condenser makeup pumps. Service water pump 2A is available for cooling the CRD pump and for makeup to the isolation condenser if a long-term operation of the isolation condenser is necessary. Additionally, the Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump cooling line as an alternate cooling source. Local instruments can be used to monitor reactor conditions.

The necessary control rod drive pump and service water pump are powered from Unit 2 and are available to support Unit 3 shutdown through mechanical crossties. All cables routed in this zone group that could affect control and excitation of the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries were isolated in the diesel generator room to permit local starting and operation (see Subsection 6.2.3.1). Redundant 125-Vdc control power is available from Unit 3. Redundant power feeds to the 2/3 diesel generator auxiliaries (room ventilation fan and fuel oil transfer pump) are available from Unit 2. Local controls have been installed to isolate these feeds from possible spurious signals which might be a result of a fire in this area (see Subsection 6.2.3.1).

All isolation condenser valves are located in the reactor building and are accessible for manual operation except valves MO3-1301-1and MO3-1301-4 which are located in the drywell. Since a fire in TB-II would affect the Unit 3 power train and control cable to all isolation condenser valves, alternate power feeds to these valves have been installed independent of this zone group to ensure that the valves will be open as required for safe shutdown. The routing of these new cables is discussed in Subsection 6.2.2.4. The normal access to valves MO3-1301-2 and MO3-1301-3, located in the isolation condenser pipe chase (RB3-I), is through the fire doors located at roughly 47/M on both the 545-foot 6-inch elevation and the 570-foot 0-inch elevation. Access to the pipe chase is also available from the 589-foot 0-inch elevation in Fire Area RB3-I.

Intervening grating has been cut and access ladders and platforms provided to ensure that these valves may be manually operated in the event of a fire in this area (see Subsection 6.2.2.6). Vent valves AO3-1301-17 and AO3-1301-20 fail in the closed position. In the event these valves fail to close, manual valve MO3-1301-16 may be closed to isolate the line. Manual operation of valves MO3-4399-74 or MO3-4102 and MO3-1301-10 may be required to add makeup water to the isolation condenser.

4.10-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Associated cables routed in this zone include LPCI circuits, core spray circuits, primary containment isolation circuits, process radiation monitoring circuits, and main steam isolation circuits. The LPCI and core spray circuitry is associated with the 4-kV power distribution.

However, since the Unit 2 power train is used for this zone, faults on these circuits will not affect safe shutdown. The primary containment isolation, process radiation monitoring, and main steam isolation circuits are associated with isolation condenser valves. However, the drywell valves will be controlled from the alternate power source by isolating the automatic circuitry and the power train to the remaining valves will be deenergized and the valves operated manually.

Therefore, faults on the associated circuitry will not prevent safe shutdown. Spurious auto blowdown initiation is prevented by manual operation of the ADS Auto-blowdown Inhibit Switch installed at the MCB (see Subsection 6.2.2.8) and spurious operation of the individual relief valves is prevented by placing the handswitch of the Electromatic Relief Valves (ERVs) and the Target Rock Safety/Relief valve control switches in the OFF position and by removing power to these valves by pulling fuses at Panel 2203-32.

Cable discrepancies within TB-III and their resolutions are presented in Appendix A.

4.10.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis The shutdown cooling system is available for shutting down Unit 3 as a result of a fire in any of the zones within the Western Zone Group. As seen in Table 4.10.1, no mechanical equipment associated with the shutdown cooling method is located in this zone group.

However, a significant amount of cable and electrical equipment is located in this area as seen on the drawings listed below:

Fire Zone F Series Drawings 6.1 F-14 7.0.B F-14 8.2.1.B F-9 8.2.4 F-12 8.2.5.D F-11 8.2.5.E F-11 8.2.6.D F-14 8.2.6.E F-14 9.0.B F-11 Table 4.10-2 lists the repairs necessary to establish onsite power and to establish operability of Unit 3 shutdown cooling method equipment. Both the 2/3 diesel generator and the Unit 2 diesel generator can be made operable.

4.10-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.10-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT IN THE WESTERN ZONE GROUP Fire Zone 6.1 Electrical Equipment

1. 125-V Battery Charger 3
2. 125-V Battery Charger 3A
3. Turbine Building 125-Vdc Main Bus 3
4. Turbine Building 125-V Reserve Bus 3
5. 250-Vdc Battery Charger 3
6. Turbine Building 250 MCC 3 Fire Zone 7.0.B Electrical Equipment
1. 125-V Batteries
2. 250-V Batteries Fire Zone 8.2.1.B NONE Fire Zone 8.2.2.B LPCI, Div. II
1. CCSW Pump 3C-1501-44
2. CCSW Pump 3D-1501-44
3. CCSW Pump Cooler 3-5700-30C
4. CCSW Pump Cooler 3-5700-30D Fire Zone 8.2.4 NONE Fire Zone 8.2.5.D NONE Fire Zone 8.2.5.E NONE 4.10-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Fire Zone 8.2.6.D NONE Fire Zone 8.2.6.E Electrical Equipment

1. 480-V MCC 38-3
2. 480-V MCC 38-2
3. 4-kV SWGR 33
4. 4-kV SWGR 34 Fire Zone 9.0.B Electrical Equipment
1. Unit 3 Diesel Generator 3-5210
2. Unit 3 Diesel Generator Supply Fan 3-5790
3. Unit 3 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 3-503 4.10-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.10-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-III Component Manual Action/Repair MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Shutdown Cooling Pumps 3A-1002 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 33-1 and 34-1.

3B-1002 Division I and Division II power is available as described 3C-1002 below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Shutdown Cooling Valves MO3-1001-2A Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO3-1001-2B MO3-1001-2C MO3-1001-4A MO3-1001-4B MO3-1001-4C MO3-1001-5A MO3-1001-5B MO3-1001-1A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO3-1001-1B control circuits and operate the valves locally at the MCC.

(See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Recirculation Piping Valves MO3-0202-4A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO3-0202-4B control circuits and locally operate the valves at the MCC.

MO3-0202-5A (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

MO3-0202-5B RBCCW Pumps 3A-3701 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 33-1 and 34-1.

3B-3701 Division I and Division II power is available as described below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Valves MO3-3701 Disable the feed and manually position the valves.

MO3-3704 4.10-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.10-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-III Component Manual Action/Repair MO3-3702 Spurious operation concern only.

MO3-3703 MO3-3706 Service Water Pumps 3A-3901 The power and control to the two Unit 2 service water 3B-3901 pumps are unaffected by the fire.

TCV-3-3904A Spurious operation concern only. These valves fail in the TCV-3-3904B open position which is the position necessary for cold TCV-3-3904C shutdown.

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Division I ac Power System All 2/3 diesel generator components and auxiliaries and Division I SWGR breakers have isolation and manual control capability installed. (See Subsections 4.10.1 and 6.2.3.1.) Power to these components via Unit 2 is still available. 125-Vdc DC control power to 4-kV and 480-V SWGR is available as discussed below.

Division II ac Power System The Unit 3 diesel generator and auxiliaries may not be operable. However, Division II power can be provided to Unit 3 via the tie between SWGR 34-1 and 24-1. Procedures are available to establish the tie between SWGR 24-1 and 34-1. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.) The Unit 2 diesel generator is independent of this area. 125-Vdc control power to 4-kV and 480-V SWGR is available as discussed below.

125-Vdc Power System A temporary 125-V power cable connection must be established from Unit 2 reactor building 125-V distribution panel 2 to the Unit 3 reactor building 125-V distribution panel 3 to establish control power to SWGR 33-1, 34-1, 38 and 39. 125-Vdc power is available to Unit 2 except for the 125-Vdc reserve Bus 2 feed cables 32374 and 32375. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

A procedure is available to manually establish an alternate feed to the 125-V reserve bus 2B-1 from the Unit 2 125-V main bus 2 by closing a normally open tie breaker 125-V main bus. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

4.10-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.10-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNIT 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-III Component Manual Action/Repair 250-Vdc Power System A fire in the Western Zone Group would disable normal 250-V power to both Units 2&3. A procedure is available to establish reserve feed to Unit 2 (see Subsection 7.4.1). Unit 3 250-Vdc powered valves have handwheel operation capability.

Process Monitoring Equipment RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop A If RPV water, shell and shell flange temperature indicators RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop B are not available in the control room, then establish RPV Shell Temperature local indication monitoring capability in accordance RPV Flange Temperature with cold shutdown repair procedure DSSP-0200-T9.

4.10-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 4.11 Turbine Building Main Floor (Fire Area TB-IV) 4.11.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis The main operating floor of the turbine building, Fire Area TB-IV, contains no Unit 2 safe shutdown equipment or cabling. No Unit 3 safe shutdown equipment is located in TB-IV and instrument cables are the only safe shutdown cabling located there. Therefore, isolation condenser path A for Unit 2 (Table 3.1-3) and path B for Unit 3 (Table 3.1-6), which would normally be used in case of loss of offsite power, can be used if shutdown is required as a result of a fire in Fire Area TB-IV. All major fire hazards in this zone are protected. Should a fire start on this floor, it is highly unlikely that it could spread to lower elevations where it could damage safe shutdown equipment.

4.11.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis No cold shutdown equipment or cable is located in this area.

4.11-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 4.12 Control Room and AEER (Fire Area TB-V)

Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawing F-8 (Fire Zones 2.0 and 6.2).

4.12.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis A fire in the control room and auxiliary electrical equipment room fire area (TB-V) has the potential for causing the loss of control of all motor-operated equipment associated with both units. Shutdown of Unit 2 and Unit 3 can be accomplished with shutdown paths A2 and B2 (Tables 3.1-5 and 3.1-8) which utilize Unit 2 and Unit 3 equipment powered from the 2/3 diesel generator.

Control rod drive pumps 2A and 3A are available for reactor water makeup. The electromatic relief valves may not be available for initial pressure control but the target rock valve and safety valves are available if necessary. Both isolation condenser makeup pumps are available for makeup to the isolation condenser. Service water pump 2A is available to cool the CRD pump and for either Unit 2 or Unit 3 isolation condenser makeup if long-term operation is necessary.

Additionally, the Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump cooling line as an alternate cooling source. Local instruments will be used to monitor reactor conditions and support systems.

Cable discrepancies in this area include control functions associated with 4-kV and 480-V power for both units. However, the required circuit breakers can be isolated by existing isolation switches at the switchgear to prevent spurious signals which might result from a control room fire. (See Subsections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.2.2.) The switchgear can then be operated locally, if necessary. The diesel generator will also be started and controlled locally. Local control stations have been provided for the diesel fuel transfer pump, diesel cooling water pump, and diesel room vent fan. (See Subsection 6.2.3.1.)

The 2/3 diesel generator feed breaker control logic has been modified to allow the operator to supply power to both Units Division I switchgear 23-1 and 33-1 simultaneously by manually overriding the unit selection logic. (See Subsection 6.2.3.1.6.)

Control cables for the control rod drive pumps, CRD discharge valves, isolation condenser makeup pumps, and service water pumps are located in this area. Local pushbutton stations have been installed for the control rod drive pumps. The isolation condenser pumps can be operated locally from panels 2223-126A and 2223-126B located in fire zones 18.7.1 and 18.7.2. These local controls will isolate faults on control room cables. Local isolation and control capability have also been installed for the service water pumps. (See Subsections 6.2.1.2, 6.2.1.3, 6.2.2.2 and 6.2.2.3). For the CRD discharge valves, 480 VAC power can be removed and valves manually operated in their local area.

Control cables to all isolation condenser valves are located in this area. All of these valves are accessible for manual operation except valves MO2(3)-1301-1 and MO2(3)-1301-4, which are 4.12-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 located in the respective drywells. To ensure that these valves will be open as required for the safe shutdown function in the event a fire in this area affects the normal power feeds, alternate feeds from an alternate power source have been installed along with local control capability located in the diesel generator 2/3 room as discussed in Subsection 6.2.1.4.

The normal access to valves MO2(3)-1301-2 and MO2(3)-1301-3, located in the isolation condenser pipe chase (RB2(3)-I), is through the fire doors to the pipe chase at 41/M (47/M for Unit 3) on both the 545-foot 6-inch elevation and 570-foot 0-inch elevation. Access to the pipe chase is also available from Elevation 589 feet 0 inches in Fire Area RB2(3)-I. Intervening grating has been cut and access ladders and platforms provided to ensure that these valves may be manually operated in the event of a fire in this area (see Subsections 6.2.1.6 and 6.2.2.6). Vent valves AO2-1301-17 and AO2-1301-20 fail in the closed position as required for safe shutdown.

In the event these valves fail to close, manual valve 2-1301-16 may be locally closed to isolate this line. Manual operation of valves MO2-4399-74, MO3-4399-74, MO2-4102, MO2-1301-10, MO3-4102 and MO3-1301-10 may be required to add makeup feedwater to the isolation condensers.

Associated cables routed in this zone include LPCI circuits, core spray circuits, primary containment isolation circuits, process radiation monitoring circuits, and main steam isolation circuits. The LPCI and core spray circuitry is associated with the 4-kV power distribution.

However, since the diesel generator and all necessary breakers will be operated locally, faults on these circuits will not affect safe shutdown. The primary containment isolation, process radiation monitoring, and main steam isolation circuitry are associated with isolation condenser valves.

However, the drywell valves will be controlled locally from the alternate power source by isolating the automatic circuitry. The power train to the remaining valves will be operated manually. Therefore, faults on the associated circuitry will not prevent safe shutdown. Spurious auto blowdown initiation is prevented by manually tripping the 125-Vdc feeds to the auto blowdown logic at the 125-Vdc distribution panels in the turbine building. Additional protection from spurious auto blowdown is provided by placing the ADS Auto Blowdown Inhibit switch in the INHIBIT position and the ERVs Auto Blowdown MANUAL-OFF-AUTO switch in the OFF position. These switches are located in the control room and they will be operated before control room evacuation (see Subsections 6.2.1.8 and 6.2.2.8).

Cable discrepancies in TB-V and their resolutions are presented in Appendix A.

4.12.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis The shutdown cooling method is available for cold shutdown after a fire in this fire area. The equipment associated with cold shutdown and located in this area is identified in Table 4.12-1.

Drawing F-8 shows the location of cable and equipment. No mechanical equipment necessary for the shutdown cooling method is located in this fire area. Only control equipment and cables are located in the control room (Fire Zone 2.0) and AEER (Fire Zone 6.2). Power cables to MCC 29-2 (Division II) and service water pump 2/3-3901 are routed through the AEER. The Unit 2 diesel generator auxiliaries are fed from MCC 29-2. Power to all Division I (2/3 diesel generator) equipment is available for Unit 2 and Division II (diesel generator 3) equipment for Unit 3. Table 4.12-2 lists the repairs necessary to control electrical equipment independent of these fire areas.

4.12-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.12-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN FIRE AREA TB-V Fire Zone 6.2

1. 120/240 Essential Service Distribution Panel 902-49
2. 120/240 Instrument Bus 902-50
3. 120/240 Essential Service Distribution Panel 903-49
4. 120/240 Instrument Bus 903-50 Fire Zone 2.0
1. Control Panel 902-4 (Unit 2 Shutdown Cooling Controls)
2. Control Panel 903-4 (Unit 3 Shutdown Cooling Controls)
3. Control Panel 923-1 (Unit 2&3 RBCCW and Service Water Controls)
4. Control Panel 902-8 (Unit 2 Auxiliary Power Controls)

Control Panel 903-8 (Unit 3 Auxiliary Power Controls) 4.12-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.12-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNITS 2 AND 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-V Component Manual Action/Repair UNIT 2 MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Shutdown Cooling Pumps 2A-1002 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 23-1 and 24-1.

2B-1002 Division I and Division II power is available as described

  • 2C-1002 below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)
  • Loop C is normally connected to fuel pool cooling.

Shutdown Cooling Valve MO2-1001-2A Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO2-1001-2B MO2-1001-2C MO2-1001-4A MO2-1001-4B MO2-1001-4C MO2-1001-5A MO2-1001-5B Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO2-1001-1A control circuits and operate the valves locally at the MCC.

MO2-1001-1B (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Recirculation Piping Valves MO2-0202-4A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO2-0202-4B control circuits and locally operate the valves at the MCC.

Power is available to Division I and Division II MCCs as described below. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Pumps 2A-3701 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 23-1 and 24-1.

2B-3701 Division I and Division II power is available as described below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

4.12-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.12-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNITS 2 AND 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-V Component Manual Action/Repair RBCCW Valves MO2-3701 Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO2-3704 MO2-3702 Spurious operation concern only. Procedures are available MO2-3703 to isolate existing control circuits and operate at MCC.

MO2-3706 Service Water Pumps 2A-3901 Local control capability exists for all service water pumps 2B-3901 (see Subsections 4.12.1 and 6.2.1.2). Procedures are 2/3-3901 available to implement this capability.

TCV-2-3904A Spurious operation concern only. These valves fail in the TCV-2-3904B open position.

TCV-2-3904C UNIT 3 MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT Shutdown Cooling Pumps These pumps can be powered from SWGR 33-1 and 34-1.

3A-1002 Division I and Division II power is available as described 3B-1002 below. Procedures are available to locally operate the

  • 3C-1002 necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)
  • Loop C is normally connected to fuel pool cooling.

Shutdown Cooling Valves MO3-1001-2A Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO3-1001-2B MO3-1001-2C MO3-1001-4A MO3-1001-4B MO3-1001-4C MO3-1001-5A MO3-1001-5B 4.12-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.12-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNITS 2 AND 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-V Component Manual Action/Repair MO3-1001-1A Procedures are available to make repairs to isolate existing MO3-1001-1B control circuits and operate the valves locally at the MCC.

(See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

Recirculation Piping Valves MO3-0202-4A Procedures are available to make repairs to MO3-0202-5A MO3-0202-4B circuits and locally operate the valves at the MCC. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Pumps 3A-3701 These pumps can be powered from SWGR 33-1 and 34-1.

3B-3701 Division I and Division II power is available as described below. Procedures are available to locally operate the necessary breakers. (See Subsection 7.4.1 for details.)

RBCCW Valves MO3-3701 Disable the feed and manually position the valve.

MO3-3704 MO3-3702 Spurious operation concern only. Procedures are available MO3-3703 to isolate existing control circuits and operate at the MCC.

MO3-3706 Service Water Pumps 3A-3901 Local control capability exists for all service water pumps.

3B-3901 (See Subsections 4.12.1 and 6.2.2.2.) Procedures are available to implement this capability.

TCV-3-3904A Spurious operation concern only. These valves fail in the TCV-3-3904B open position which is the position necessary for cold TCV-3-3904C shutdown 4.12-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.12-2 ACTIONS TO ACHIEVE COLD SHUTDOWN IN UNITS 2 AND 3 USING THE SHUTDOWN COOLING SYSTEM ASSUMING A FIRE IN FIRE AREA TB-V Component Manual Action/Repair UNIT 2&3 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT Division I ac Power System All 2/3 diesel generator components and auxiliaries and Division I SWGR breakers have isolation and manual control capabilities installed. (See Subsections 4.12.1, 6.2.1.2, 6.2.2.2, and 6.2.3.1.) Repair procedures are available to establish local control for all other breakers.

Procedures are available to implement this capability. All normal 125-V control power is available.

Division II ac Power System Power cables to MCC 29-2 are routed through the AEER.

Therefore, the Unit 2 diesel generator is assumed to be unavailable.

Division II ac Power System Procedures are available to repair Unit 3 diesel generator control circuits and operate the diesel generator. Local breaker control is provided for breakers. (See Subsections 6.2.1.2 and 6.2.2.2.) All normal 125-V control power is available.

125-Vdc System The 125-Vdc system is not affected by a fire in this area.

250-Vdc System The 250-Vdc system is not affected by a fire in this area.

Process Monitoring Equipment RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop A If RPV water, shell and shell flange temperature indicators RPV Water Temp. Recirc Loop B are not available in the control room, then establish RPV Shell Temperature local indication monitoring capability in accordance RPV Flange Temperature with cold shutdown repair procedure DSSP-0200-T9.

4.12-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 4.13 Crib House Fire Area 11.3 Safe shutdown equipment and cabling located in this fire area are shown on Drawing F-18.

4.13.1 Hot Shutdown Analysis For the cribhouse, the dedicated shutdown path available depends on the location of the postulated fire. Fire protection measures have been taken in accordance with Appendix R to prevent the spread of fire from one area to another. These measures are described in the Fire Hazard Analysis (F.P.R. Volume 1), in Section 6.0, Proposed Modifications of this report, and in the Exemption Requests, Section 6.0 (F.P.R. Volume 4).

The analysis of the crib house can be divided into the following areas:

A. Vicinity of the Unit 2 or Unit 3 diesel generator cooling water pumps B. Vicinity of the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump C. Vicinity of the service water pumps Fire protection modifications have been made which ensure that either: 1) the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump is available, or 2) the 2 and 3 dedicated diesel generator cooling water pumps and at least one service water pump are available. See Subsection 6.3.5 for modifications made.

A. Unit 2 or Unit 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pumps For a fire in the crib house, isolation condenser shutdown path A (Table 3.1-3) will be used to shut down Unit 2 if the Unit 2 dedicated diesel generator cooling water pump (located on the lower level of the crib house) has been damaged. If the Unit 3 dedicated diesel generator cooling water pump (also located on the lower level of the crib house) has been damaged by a fire, isolation condenser shutdown path B (Table 3.1-6) will be used to shut down Unit 3.

The 2/3 diesel generator will be used to power the necessary equipment. The diesel will be cooled by the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump which remains free of fire damage as discussed in Subsection 6.3.5 of this report and Section 6.0 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R.

Volume 4). Control rod drive pumps 2A and 3A are available for reactor coolant makeup. The electromatic relief valves are available for initial pressure control, if necessary. Both isolation condenser makeup pumps are available to provide makeup to the isolation condenser. Service water pump 2A (or 3A not required/credited) is available to cool the CRD pumps and provide makeup to the isolation condensers if long-term operation is necessary. Additionally, The Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump cooling line as an alt cooling source.

All necessary equipment can be operated from the control room. Local instrumentation is used to monitor Reactor Pressure and Reactor Water level.

Cable discrepancies in the crib house and their resolutions are presented in Appendix A.

4.13-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 B. 2/3 DG Cooling Water Pump Isolation condenser shutdown paths E and F will be used to shut down Unit 2 and Unit 3 respectively if the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump (located on the lower level of the cribhouse) has been damaged.

Diesel generators 2 and 3 will be used to power the necessary equipment. The diesel will be cooled by the dedicated cooling water pump which remains free of fire damage as discussed in Subsection 6.3.5 of this report and Section 6.0 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4).

Control rod drive pumps 2B and 3B are available for reactor coolant makeup. The electromatic relief valves are available for initial pressure control, if necessary. Both isolation condenser makeup pumps are available to provide makeup to the isolation condenser. Service water pump 2B or 3B is available to cool the CRD pumps and provide makeup to the isolation condensers if long-term operation is necessary. Additionally, The Fire Protection header has been connected to the CRD pump cooling line as an alternate cooling source.

All necessary equipment can be operated from the control room. Reactor instruments can be monitored in the control room.

C. Service Water Pumps Only one of five service water pumps or backup fire water is needed to cool the CRD pumps for both units. The service water pumps are widely separated on the upper level of the crib house. A complete area suppression system is provided at this level. Curbs are provided to prevent combustible liquid spills from exposing more than half the floor simultaneously (see Subsection 6.3.5). The above measure ensures that at least one service water pump will be operable independent of a fire in this area. See Section 6.2 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4).

4.13.2 Cold Shutdown Analysis The shutdown cooling method is available for cold shutdown after a fire in this zone. Table 4.13-1 identifies mechanical and electrical equipment located in the zone. Drawing F-18 shows equipment and cable locations.

Hot shutdown fire protection measures described in the Fire Hazards Analysis, Section 4.13 (F.P.R. Volume 1), and the Cold Shutdown Exemption Requests, Section 6.2 (F.P.R. Volume 4) ensure that at least two service water pumps and two diesel generator cooling water pumps and their associated cable would not be damaged by a fire in this area.

The following fire protection measures ensure that at least two diesel generator cooling water pumps are available.

1. The transfer switch for the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.4) in the crib house is protected with a 1-hour barrier. This modification, in conjunction with the addition of suppression and detection systems (discussed below),

ensures that a fire affecting either of the dedicated diesel generator's cooling water pumps will not also disable the 2/3 diesel generator's cooling water pump.

4.13-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001

2. A curb is installed around the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump. This prevents the spread of any flammable liquids either from the 2/3 pumps to the dedicated cooling water pumps or from circulating water pumps to the 2/3 pump.
3. An automatic, open-head water suppression system is installed over the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump. As with the curbing, this modification aids in preventing a fire originating at the 2/3 pump from spreading and also prevents a fire outside the 2/3 pump region from affecting the 2/3 pump.
4. A thermal fire detection system is installed throughout the lower elevation of the crib house. This provides early warning of a fire in the region, allowing station personnel to respond rapidly and to extinguish a fire before significant damage can occur.
5. A ceiling level wet pipe sprinkler system is installed to protect the entire central area of the lower level (column/row 3.5-4.5/A-B). This provides additional assurance that a fire in the lower level would be quickly controlled and damage limited to one side of the crib house.
6. An open-head water spray system actuated by a linear thermal detector provides protection to all cable trays and conduit along the north, west, and east walls of the crib house.

The following fire protection measures ensure that at least two service water pumps will be available.

1. Curbs are installed along the entire length of column line B on the 509-foot 6-inch and 517-foot 6-inch elevations and along the entire length of column line 3.75 on the 509-foot 6-inch and 517-foot 6-inch elevations. The curbs prevent the spread of flammable liquids from the 517-foot 6-inch elevation of the upper level to the 509-foot 6-inch elevation as well as preventing the spread of flammable liquids from one side to the other on both elevations. In addition, the diesel fire pump day tank is enclosed in a curb with a drain line to the yard drain system to prevent diesel fuel oil from exposing the service water pumps.
2. A wet pipe sprinkler system is provided which covers the entire upper level of the crib house. This ensures that, should a fire start, it will be quickly contained so that at least two service water pumps and their cabling will remain free of fire damage.

4.13-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 4.13-1 COLD SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT CONTAINED IN THE CRIB HOUSE Fire Zone 11.3 Shutdown Cooling System

1. SW Pump 2A-3901
2. SW Pump 2B-3901
3. SW Pump 2/3-3901
4. SW Pump 3A-3901
5. SW Pump 3B-3901 Electrical Equipment
1. Unit 2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2-3903B
2. Unit 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 3-3903B
3. 2/3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2/3-3903B LPCI-Division II
1. Unit 2 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 2-3903B
2. Unit 3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump 3-3903B 4.13-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 4.14 Radwaste Building (Fire Zones 14.1, 14.5 and 14.6)

The radwaste building contains no Unit 2 or Unit 3 hot or cold safe shutdown equipment or cabling.

4.14-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 4.15 Miscellaneous Structures With the exception of the Isolation Condenser Pumphouse fire zones (18.7.1 & 18.7.2), the Dresden 2&3 miscellaneous structures contain no Unit 2 or Unit 3 hot or cold safe shutdown equipment or cabling. Therefore, the miscellaneous structures not physically attached to Dresden 2&3 structures would not affect safe shutdown.

4.15.1 Dresden Units 2&3 Safe Shutdown Analysis for a Dresden 1 Fire The Dresden 2/3 structure connects to Unit 1 along column row 31, i.e., the Unit 2 turbine building east wall. This wall is generally constructed of unrated metal siding; however, the wall between the Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room and the Unit 1 Battery Room is 3-hour rated.

The Unit 2/3 Control Room is isolated from adjacent Unit 1 areas by 3-hour rated walls, floor, and ceiling. The floor for the control room is supported on 3-hour fire protected structural steel.

The combustible loading in the general area outside the Control Room is low except for directly under the control room, which has a concentration of cables, which are protected by automatic water-spray systems. Transient fire hazards in the area are administratively controlled.

If a fire were to start in the Unit 1 turbine building, it could affect Units 2 and 3 in two ways. The first would be a fire which would migrate from Unit 1 to the Unit 2 turbine building. This type of fire scenario would be no worse than a fire, which initiated in Unit 2 turbine building. An alternate shutdown path has been identified for a fire in the Unit 2 turbine building (Fire Area TB-I).

The second way a fire could affect Units 2 and 3 would be a fire that affected the Control Room.

This fire could start in the Unit 1 Turbine Building near the control room or in adjacent areas at the same level as the control room. Fire rated construction of a 3-hour rating is provided to isolate the control room from a fire originating in these areas.

A fire of sufficient intensity could only occur under the Unit 1 Control Room floor. As stated before, the likelihood of a fire in the trays under the control room floor is remote due to administrative controls, automatic suppression systems and administrative control of ignition sources. Any fire in the Unit 1 Turbine Building near the Control Room would be detected by fire protection systems and quickly extinguished. In addition, structural steel in this area that supports the control room floor is protected with 3-hour rated fire proofing material.

A fire originating in the Unit 1 Turbine Building would have no greater effect on safe shutdown of Units 2 and 3 than a fire that originated in either the Control Room or the Unit 2 Turbine Building. For a fire in these areas, an alternate shutdown method has been identified which is independent of these areas.

4.15-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 16 JUNE 2007 4.15.2 Isolation Condenser Makeup Pump Rooms (Fire Zones 18.7.1 and 18.7.2)

These fire zones are separated from other fire areas by 3-hour rated barriers (See Fire Hazards Analysis Figure 3.3-27, Fire Protection Report, Volume 1). These fire zones contain equipment and cables used for Safe Shutdown paths A, A1, A2/B2, B, B1, E & F. Either IC make-up pump can be cross-tied to the Unit 2 or the Unit 3 Isolation Condenser. These pumps are the preferred source of Isocondenser makeup water. Additional means to provide Isocondenser makeup are identified in section 3.1.1.1.3 of the Safe Shutdown Report.

4.15-2

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.1-1 VALVES \/HOSE SPURIOUS OPERATION COULD DEGRADE OPERABILITY OF SAFE SHUTDO\IN SYSTEMS

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DRESDEN STATION Units 2 &c 3 FIGURE 5.1-2 VALVES \./HOSE SPURIOUS OPERATION

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  • R INVENTORY

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 5.0 SUPPORTING ASSOCIATED CIRCUITS ANALYSIS 5.1 Valve Spurious Operation Analysis 5.1.1 Methodology A review of the P&ID's was performed for Dresden Units 2&3 to assess the impact of spurious valve operation on the safe shutdown of the plant. Two cases were specifically considered. Case 1 examined those valves whose malfunction could impact the operation of the safe shutdown systems. Case 2 considered those valves whose malfunction could result in a loss of reactor inventory. The basis used in Cases 1 and 2 can be found illustrated in Figures 5.5-1 and 5.5-2, respectively. The Dresden 2 & 3 valves which fit either Case 1 or Case 2 are identified in Appendix B.

The assessment considered only electrically operated valve types which include Motor Operated (MO), Solenoid Operated (SO), Air Operated (AO), Pressure Controlled (PC), and Temperature Controlled (TC) Valves.

The concern over spurious operations or malfunctions of a valve or valve combination was resolved if any of the following criteria were met:

1. For valves where spurious operation was of concern, a valve combination was considered acceptable defense against adverse spurious operation if any of the following conditions were met: (a) there were two or more normally closed electrically operated valves in series and these valves did not constitute a high-low pressure interface; (b) there was at least one normally closed, manually operated valve in series; (c) there was a mechanically operated check valve in the line which would prevent flow in the undesirable direction; and (d) the impact of the adverse valve operation would not degrade safe shutdown capability.
2. The control and/or power for the valve or valve combination was independent of any fire area where credit was taken for a shutdown path which included the valve as a component.
3. Manual operation of the valves was acceptable for safe shutdown.
4. The control power for at least one normally closed valve in series was locked out.

For those valves or valve combinations where the above criteria did not apply, the following procedure was used to identify a means of preventing spurious operation, demonstrating that spurious operation cannot happen or identifying a means of defeating spurious operation:

1. Identify the schematics which show the valve controls and all associated circuits.
2. Study each schematic and identify all short circuits that can cause the unwanted effect.

Note whether it is a short between two conductors in the same cable or if it requires two 5.1-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 separate cables to short together. List the cables involved. If the spurious operation cannot occur, state so and proceed to the next item.

3. If separate cables are involved, consult the cable tab to determine the extent of their common routing. List all common routing points.
4. Consider possible prefire actions to prevent spurious operation. These may entail a prescribed combination of control switch settings or the tripping of a breaker when not in use. Any recommended prefire action must not interfere with the automatic operation of an engineered safety feature.
5. If there are no acceptable prefire actions, consider postfire actions to be taken immediately upon determining that a fire in the vulnerable area is severe enough to require the use of alternate shutdown capability. Postfire actions are generally similar to prefire actions but because they are performed only upon detection of a severe fire, they do not affect normal operations. Repair procedures are not permitted for hot shutdown; therefore, any cutting of wires or pulling of fuses other than those normally pulled in the process of racking out breakers cannot be included in the postfire action.
6. Where no prefire nor postfire action is satisfactory, additional modifications will be necessary. These can include fire-retardant cable wraps, isolation switches, etc.

5.1.2 Results Appendix B lists all valves considered under Case 1 or Case 2, the concern in regard to spurious valve operation, and the justification for no action or the prefire or postfire action taken.

Those valves for which a prefire or postfire action was considered to be necessary are listed in Table 5.1-1.

5.1-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 TABLE 5.1-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS VALVE OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN FOR WHICH A PREFIRE OR POSTFIRE ACTION WAS NECESSARY Potential Spurious Mechanical Component System Drawings Concern with Malfunction Resolution AO2(3)-203- MS M-12, Spurious opening will result in loss of A spurious signal will cause only one solenoid 1A,B,C,D M-345 reactor coolant through the main steam (either ac or dc) of a valve to fail to perform its AO2(3)-203- line. function. As a result, for a given fire, one MSIV 2A,B,C,D on each steamline could fail to close, but the redundant valve on each steamline would isolate the line.

Target Rock Valve MS M-12, Spurious opening will vent RPV An inhibit switch has been added in panel 902-2(3)-203-3A M-345 inventory to suppression pool. 3 (903-3) to prevent spurious blowdown from a or (sht. 1) fire outside Fire Area TB-V (Control Room and Electromatic Relief Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room or AEER Valves Area) (see Sub-sections 6.2.1.8 and 6.2.2.8).

2(3)-203-3B or For a fire in Fire Area TB-V, spurious 2(3)-203-3C blowdown is prevented by removing power to or the ADS logic by opening circuit breakers at 2(3)-203-3D the 125-Vdc Turbine Building main bus 2A-1 or (3A-1) distribution panel and at 125-Vdc 2(3)-203-3E Turbine Building reserve bus 2B-1 (3B-1) distribution panel. To prevent spurious operation of any single pressure relief valve for a fire in Fire Areas RB2-I, RB2-II, TB-I, TB-III, TB-V, RB3-I or RB3-II, 125-Vdc power to these valves is removed by either tripping breakers or pulling fuses.

5.1-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 TABLE 5.1-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS VALVE OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN FOR WHICH A PREFIRE OR POSTFIRE ACTION WAS NECESSARY Potential Spurious Mechanical Component System Drawings Concern with Malfunction Resolution Reactor Head Vent Head Vent Spurious opening of Head Vent Valves A Pre-Fire Action to pull fuses has been taken Valves could result in loss of inventory. to prevent both valves from simultaneously opening SO2(3)-0220-46 M-26 (SHT.1)

SO2(3)-0220-47 M-357 (SHT.1)

Condensate SO2(3)-3301 M-15 SO2(3)-3302 Spurious operation of Hotwell Make- DSSPs implement a post fire action to assure up valves would cause drain down of the Hotwell make-up valves are closed.

The CSTs.

5.1-3a

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 5.1-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS VALVE OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN FOR WHICH A PREFIRE OR POSTFIRE ACTION WAS NECESSARY Potential Spurious Mechanical Component System Drawings Concern with Malfunction Resolution MO2(3)-0302-8 CRD M-34, Spurious closure prevents RPV Should MO2(3)-0302-8, both MO2(3)-0301-2A AO2(3)-0302-6A M-357 makeup from cooling water line during and MO2(3)-0301-2B, or both AO2(3)-0302-AO2(3)-0302-6B M-365 shutdown using the isolation 6A and AO2(3)-0302-6B close, makeup water MO2(3)-0301-2A condenser. from the CRD pump via CRD cooling line to MO2(3)-0301-2B the RPV could be disrupted. The AO valves close on loss of air (i.e., loss of normal power).

Makeup water is still available to the RPV from the other unit's CRD pumps via the cross-connect valves 2/3-0301-162 and -163 to the charging water line and scram injection valves CV2(3)-0305-126 (typical of 177). These valves open for scram and fail open on loss of power. Instructions are included in shutdown procedures to insure that MO-0302-8, MO-0301-2A or MO-0301-2B, and either AO-0302-6A or AO-0302-6B are open.

MO2(3)-1201-1 RWCU M-30, Failure in open position may cause A postfire action to isolate the RWCU system MO2(3)-1201-1A M-361 pressure to build-up in low pressure by closing normally open valve MO2(3)-1201-MO2(3)-1201-2 piping downstream of PCV-2-1217 2 and verifying closed manually closed valve MO2(3)-1201-3 (with RO) and fluid loss to condenser MO2(3)-1201-3 will be done to prevent loss of PCV2(3)-1217 and/or equipment drains via the relief reactor coolant from relief valves in the low valves. pressure portion of the RWCU system if the RWCU system does not automatically isolate.

For fires in Fire Areas RB2-II and RB3-II air will be removed to valve 2 (3)-1217 to insure RWCU isolation.

5.1-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 TABLE 5.1-1 POTENTIAL SPURIOUS VALVE OPERATIONS THAT COULD AFFECT SAFE SHUTDOWN FOR WHICH A PREFIRE OR POSTFIRE ACTION WAS NECESSARY Potential Spurious Mechanical Component System Drawings Concern with Malfunction Resolution MO2(3)-1301-1 IC M-28, Spurious closure will isolate RPV from An alternate feed and control arrangement has and M-359 isolation condenser. NOTE: MO2(3)- been developed for valves MO2(3)-1301-1 and MO2(3)-1301-4 1301-1 and MO2(3)-1301-4 are in the MO2(3)-1301-4 which are in the drywell (see drywell and inaccessible. Subsections 6.2.1.4 and 6.2.2.4).

MO2(3)-1301-2 IC M-28, Failure to open or spurious close The Safe Shutdown Procedures (DSSPs) and M-359 prevents condensed steam from implement opening MO2(3)-1301-2 and MO2(3)-1301-3 returning from isolation coil to RPV. MO2(3)-1301-3 should they fail in closed This defeats natural circulation path. position. MO2(3)-1301-3 is normally closed.

MO2(3)-1301-10 IC M-28, Spurious closure isolates makeup to These normally closed valves can be manually or M-359 isolation condenser from service water opened.

MO2(3)-4102 system.

2(3)-1301-17 IC M-28, Spurious failure to open position would A procedure has been developed to insure these 2(3)-1301-20 M-359 allow steam to vent to the main steam valves are closed or close manually valve 2(3)-

lines. 1301-16.

MO2(3)-2301-3 HPCI M-51, Spurious opening of this valve would If the HPCI pump is not delivering water to the M-334 result in loss of reactor inventory to the reactor, verify closed MO2(3)-2301-4 or trip suppression pool. the HPCI turbine.

MO2(3)-2301-14 HPCI M-51, Spurious opening of this valve could Flow from the CST due to spurious operation M-334 result in a drain path for the CST to the of this valve will not result in high water level in the torus. torus. To prevent drain down of the CSTs the DSSPs implement a post fire action to assure this valve remains closed.

MO2(3)-4399-74 IC M-39, Spurious closure potentially isolates These normally closed valves can be manually M369 makeup to insolation condenser opened.

5.1-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 General Notes for Figure 5.1-1

1. Valves in the primary flow path for the safe shutdown system considered must remain in their normally open position or be capable of being opened.
2. Valves in lines that bypass the safe shutdown system must remain in their normally closed position or be capable of being closed.
3. Where multiple valves are in series, the postulated simultaneous failure of all valves in series is considered necessary for system failure.

All systems which require fluid flow for safe shutdown are considered including HPCI, isolation condenser, diesel fuel oil, diesel cooling water, service water, etc.

5.1-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 General Notes for Figure 5.1-2

1. Where a mechanical check valve is in series with a motor operated valve, the check valve is assumed to preserve the isolation function independent of any operation of electrically operated valves downstream.
2. Where multiple valves in series perform the isolation function, the simultaneous opening of all valves must be postulated before system failure is assumed.

All systems that communicate with the reactor vessel were considered including SRVs, MS, HPCI, LPCI, shutdown cooling, RWCU, FW, etc.

5.1-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 5.2 Spurious Breaker Operation Analysis For major loads connected to the safety-related 4-kV switchgear, but not required for safe shutdown, procedures require observation of the breaker status prior to manually loading the diesel onto the bus. Any unwanted load that is closed will be manually tripped and its closing circuit fuse will be removed. After the diesel is loaded onto the bus, this same action will be taken as a precautionary measure for all other unwanted loads that could conceivably overload the diesel if they were to operate coincidentally with the required safe shutdown loads.

5.2-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 5.3 Current Transformers/Control Power Transformer Analysis 5.3.1 Control Power Transformers A concern was raised about the possibility of a secondary fire starting in a motor control center due to a short circuit on the control power transformer's secondary. The secondaries of Dresden motor control center control transformers are unfused and ungrounded. Field experience with shorted MCC control circuits indicates that considerable smoke is produced, but the primary winding shorts and trips the circuit breaker before any flame can erupt. It is unreasonable to assume that such a fire can propagate beyond an individual MCC bucket. Therefore, a safe shutdown can still be achieved.

5.3.2 Current Transformers The current transformer (CT) circuits are special because they function as "current sources" rather than as "voltage sources." Most of the circuits in the station (including all of the power circuits and control circuits) are voltage sources; i.e., they maintain a reasonably constant voltage, while the current varies with the load. The nominal circuit voltage is never exceeded by more than a few percent regardless of any physical damage to the cables. But a CT does just the opposite. It maintains a reasonably constant current through its secondary circuit, in direct proportion to the primary current. The CT secondary produces as much voltage as necessary to force that constant current through the load.

In normal operation the CT secondary current passes through relay coils and meter movements having very low resistances, on the order of a few ohms. The CT secondary current (5A or less) produces less than 30 volts across such normal burdens.

As the burden resistance increases, so does the voltage that the CT must produce to maintain the desired current. In an open circuit (infinite resistance), the CT secondary voltage will theoretically become infinite. In practice, due to core saturation, the CT secondary voltage will be limited to some value ranging from 2-kV to approximately 25-kV. The exact value depends on the CT ratio and design. Smaller ratio CTs (the majority of CTs in the plant) will tend to produce voltages in the low end of this range. Since control board wiring is customarily hi-pot tested at 2-kV, smaller ratio CTs are no cause for concern. The large ratio CTs can exceed the hi-pot test voltage by an order of magnitude and can potentially cause insulation breakdown in equipment and cables.

Because the open-circuit voltage varies with the CT design, no broad generalization can be made regarding the range of CT ratios for which concern is warranted. Therefore, the possible consequences of a CT circuit insulation breakdown were investigated with respect to the continued functional integrity of nearby safe shutdown cables and equipment.

The investigation concluded that any conceivable insulation breakdown will result in a carbon track having a resistance on the order of 2 ohms. The CT secondary current will pass harmlessly through the carbon track, dropping the voltage to its normal (approximately 10 volts). The integrity of adjacent safety-related circuits is not threatened.

5.3-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 5.4 Redundant Fusing of Control Circuits Analysis (IE Information Notice 85-09)

In IE Information Notice 85-09, the NRC is concerned about a possible scenario in which a hot shutdown circuit has an isolation switch, but has only one fuse common to both the local and remote control circuitry. Should a fire-induced fault on the remote circuit blow the fuse before the isolation switch is operated, the local control circuit will not function until the fuse is replaced.

Each safe shutdown equipment item for which local control is utilized was checked to determine whether a fault on the remote circuit (prior to isolation) can blow a fuse needed for local control.

Several items were found to be deficient in this regard (see Table 5.4-1).

Dresden Station does not use a remote shutdown panel in performing safe shutdown procedures.

The shutdown procedures have identified manual operation of switchgear and local control of equipment. A majority of the required safe shutdown circuits protected by a single fuse are 4-kV circuit breakers. These 4-kV breakers are equipped with local mechanical "TRIP" and "CLOSE" buttons that are good for one close and one trip without the benefit of control power. This stored energy within the switchgear is equivalent to redundant fusing since both require a manual action.

Some of the remaining identified circuits are 480-V breakers on buses 28 and 38. If the control circuit is found to be inoperable, then the circuit breaker may be manually closed.

The remaining circuits are associated with the inboard isolation condenser valves and the engine starting controls for the 2/3 diesel generator. For a fire in the reactor buildings where shutdown paths A1 and B1 are used, fuses (2) for the opposite unit's inboard isolation condenser valve isolation switches in the Unit 2 shutdown cooling pump room on the Unit 3 TIP room may need to be replaced. For a fire in the 2/3 diesel generator room where safe shutdown paths E and F are used, fuses (4) for both units' inboard isolation condenser valve isolation switches may have to be replaced. Procedures will require operators to be sent to these rooms to operate the isolation switches and replace fuses as necessary. Replacement fuses and fuse pullers will be maintained under surveillance in the proximity of these rooms and will be readily accessible if fuse replacement is necessary.

The remaining circuit for which fuse replacement (actually four fuses are replaced) will be the only available solution is the engine starting controls at the 2/3 diesel generator. The possibility of fuse replacement arises for a fire in the reactor buildings where safe shutdown paths A1 and B1 are used. Again, replacement fuses and fuse pullers will be maintained under surveillance in the proximity of these controls. An operator will be in the 2/3 diesel generator room to locally control the diesel generator and inboard isolation condenser valves for all paths which use the 2/3 diesel generator.

5.4-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Table 5.4-1 List of Circuits Per IEIN 85-09 Concerns Which May Require Manual Action Following a Fire Time of Use (Minutes After Scram)

I 480-V Breakers A. Bus 28 Main Feed 20 B. Bus 38 Main Feed 20 II Other A. 2/3 Diesel Generator Local Controls (Engine Starting) 10 B. Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-1 Isolation Switch 30 C. Isolation Condenser Valve MO2-1301-4 Isolation Switch 30 D. Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-1 Isolation Switch 30 E. Isolation Condenser Valve MO3-1301-4 Isolation Switch 30 5.4-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 5.5 Coordinated Fault Protection Analysis There has always been a known lack of coordination between the main feeds to the 480-V motor control centers and the branch circuits on those motor control centers. The main feed breakers, located at the 480-V switchgear buses (28, 29, 38 and 39) are equipped with instantaneous trip devices that will operate whenever they experience a fault current of 4800 A or more. These instantaneous trip devices enable the 480-V breakers to interrupt momentary faults greater than the maximum fault current available on the 480-V system. If these devices were changed to short-time delay trips, the interrupting ratings would be degraded to less than the available fault current. Thus, modifying the switchgear will not solve the problem. To prevent potential faults in the branch lines from affecting the 480-V MCCs and the 125-V and 250-Vdc systems, all loads that are not essential for safe shutdown will be tripped after the essential loads are started.

For Dresden all of the safe shutdown loads on a given bus are known to be free of fire induced faults whenever that bus is called upon to power safe shutdown loads. The non-safe shutdown loads that are also connected to the essential buses were not analyzed to determine if a high impedance fault could cause a tripping of the main feed breakers. The safe shutdown procedures address high impedance faults on non-safe shutdown loads by instructing the operator to pull the control power fuses for electrically-operated 4-kV switchgears (23, 24, 33, 34, 23-1, 24-1, 33-1 and 34-1) and 480-V switchgear (28, 29, 38 and 39) breakers that feed non-safe shutdown loads and then to manually trip all such loads. With the fuses pulled, the possibility of spurious closure of the breakers is eliminated. When a breaker at a motor control center is tripped, no further action is required to prevent spurious closure. The same is also true for manually-operated breakers at the 480-V switchgear buses. The tripping of unwanted loads needs to be performed for shutdown paths that use the affected unit's own power train.

5.5-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.0 MODIFICATIONS 6.1 Introduction As a consequence of 1) the original hot shutdown analysis, the results of which are documented in the "Fire Protection Safe Shutdown Analysis Dresden Station Units 2&3," June 1978 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2), 2) the 1982 Appendix R Evaluation, the results of which are documented in the Dresden 2&3 "Fire Protection Associated Circuits Analysis and Modifications Report," (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2), and 3) the 1984 Appendix R Reverification, the results of which are presented in this report, several modifications were identified. These modifications were implemented to upgrade the level of fire protection at the station and to satisfy, in conjunction with certain exemptions, the requirements of Appendix R.

The modifications are of two general types:

1. Safe shutdown system or alternate shutdown modifications, e.g., rerouting of cables, installation of local control capability, and installation of new electrical feeds; and
2. Fire protection system modifications, e.g., upgrading of barriers and installation of detection systems.

The safe shutdown system modifications and the circumstances giving rise to them are described in Section 6.2. The fire protection system modifications are described in Section 6.3. Table 6.1-1 contains the completion dates for all modifications identified in Sections 6.2 and 6.3.

6.1-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Table 6.1-1 Completion Schedule For Identified Modifications Completion Section Modification Date 6.2.1.1 Provide Local Isolation Condenser Water Level Indication Complete 6.2.1.2 Provide Local Breaker Control Complete 6.2.1.3 *Provide Local Control for Condensate Transfer Pump 2A (the 2A Complete pump is no longer credited for SSD) 6.2.1.4 Provide Alternate Power Feeds to Inboard Isolation Condenser Valves Complete 6.2.1.5 Deleted 6.2.1.6 Provide Access to Valves in Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase Complete 6.2.1.7 Provide Secondary CRD Pump Cooling Water Complete 6.2.1.8 Provide ADS Inhibit Switch for Auto Blowdown Complete 6.2.2.1 Provide Local Isolation Condenser Water Level Indication Complete 6.2.2.2 Provide Local Breaker Control Complete 6.2.2.3 *Provide Local Control for Condensate Transfer Pump 3A (The 3A Complete pump is no longer credited for SSD) 6.2.2.4 Provide Alternate Power Feeds to Inboard Isolation Condenser Valves Complete 6.2.2.5 Deleted 6.2.2.6 Provide Access to Valves in Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase Complete 6.2.2.7 Provide Secondary CRD Pump Cooling Water Complete 6.2.2.8 Provide ADS Inhibit Switch for Auto Blowdown Complete 6.2.3.1.1 Bifurcate 2/3 Diesel Generator Bus Duct Complete 6.2.3.1.2 Electrically Isolate 2/3 Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries Complete 6.2.3.1.3 Relocate Local Control Station for MCC 38-1 Main Feed Complete 6.2.3.1.4 Install Transfer Switch for 2/3 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries Complete 6.2.3.1.5 Reroute Unit 2 Cables for the 2/3 Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries Complete 6.2.3.1.6 Modification to 2/3 Diesel Generator Breakers Feeding 4kV SWGR Complete 6.2.3.2 CRD Pump Discharge Header Crosstie Piping Complete 6.2.4 Modification to Provide Access to Valves for Cold Shutdown Complete 6.2.5 Modification to provide alternate access to the Unit 2 CRD pumps Complete 6.2.6 Modification to Provide Motor Operators for CRD Pump Discharge Complete Valves MO2(3)-0301-2A(B) 6.3.1.1 Provide Fire Detection in Unit 2 Reactor Building Complete 6.3.1.2.1 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB2-I and RB2-II Complete

  • Modification installed in 1997 credited the Diesel Driven Isolation Condenser makeup pumps to deliver the preferred source of make-up water to the ISCO during a fire. Therefore, the condensate transfer pumps are no longer credited for SSD but still available.

6.1-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Table 6.1-1 Completion Schedule For Identified Modifications Completion Section Modification Date 6.3.1.2.2 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB2-II and RB 2/3 Complete 6.3.1.3 Provide Protection for Cables in Unit 2 Reactor Building Complete 6.3.2.1 Provide Fire Detection in Unit 3 Reactor Building Complete 6.3.2.2.1 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB3-I and RB3-II Complete 6.3.2.2.2 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB3-II and RB 2/3 Complete 6.3.2.2.3 Modification to Barriers Separating Fire Zone 1.3.1 and Fire Area Complete RB3-II 6.3.2.3 Provide Protection for Cables in Unit 3 Reactor Building Complete 6.3.3.1 Upgrade Barrier Between Units 2 and 3 Reactor Building Complete 6.3.3.2 Protect the 2/3 Diesel Generator Unit 2 Bus Duct in Unit 3 Reactor Complete Building with 1-Hour Barrier 6.3.3.3 Protect Unit 2 Power and Control Cables for the 2/3 Diesel Generator Complete and Auxiliaries in the Unit 3 Reactor Building with 1-Hour Barrier 6.3.4.1 Provide Additional Fire Detection and Suppression Systems on the Complete Ground and Mezzanine Floor Levels of Turbine Building 6.3.4.2 Provide Fire Suppression System on Unit 3 CRD Pump Floor Complete 6.3.4.3 Seal All Penetrations to Fire Area TB-V Complete 6.3.4.4 Protect Cable Tray in Ground Floor Access Corridor with 1-Hour Fire Complete Barrier 6.3.4.5 Protect Cable Risers Adjacent to TB-V Complete 6.3.5.1 Protect Diesel Generator 2/3 Cooling Water Pump Transfer Switch Complete with 1-Hour Barrier 6.3.5.2 Provide Automatic Suppression and Detection Systems and Curbing in Complete Lower Level of Crib House 6.3.5.3 Provide Curbing and Automatic Suppression in Upper Level of Crib Complete House 6.1-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.2 Safe Shutdown System Modifications 6.2.1 Unit 2 Safe Shutdown System Modifications 6.2.1.1 Provide Local Isolation Condenser Water Level Indication A sight glass was installed on the isolation condenser to provide the operator with the capability of local visual monitoring of the shell side water level if the control room indicator LI-2-1340-2 is disabled. The sight glass is located at the isolation condenser on Elevation 589 feet in the Reactor Building and made operable by opening two hand operated valves. Since no cable separation analysis was performed for LI-2-1340-2, credit for the sight glass is taken throughout Dresden 2. This modification is used for alternative shutdown paths B1 and A2. This modification was identified during the 1978 hot shutdown analysis (see F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.1.2 Provide Local Breaker Control Local breaker control is installed for the following Division I breakers:

1. 4-kV SWGR 2/3 diesel generator feed breaker to SWGR 23-1,
2. 4-kV SWGR tie breakers between SWGR 23-1 and SWGR 23,
3. 4-kV to 480-kV SWGR feed breakers from SWGR 23-1 to SWGR 28,
4. Feeds from SWGR 23 to control rod drive pump 2A, and
5. Feed from SWGR 23 to service water pump 2A.

These modifications were installed to allow the operator to isolate faults in the normal breaker controls and to locally control the breaker at the switchgear. These modifications together with the electrical isolation and control capability provided for the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries (see Subsection 6.2.3.2) assure that onsite auxiliary electrical power is available to the control rod drive pump, the service water pump, and the condensate transfer pump (The 2A and 3A pumps are no longer credited for SSD). These modifications are applicable to Fire Area TB-Vwhich is composed of Fire Zones 2.0 (Control Room) and 6.2 (AEER). Fire Area TB-V contains control cables for both Units 2 and 3. Credit is taken for this modification in alternative shutdown path A2, for the above mentioned fire zones. This modification was identified as being needed during the 1978 hot shutdown analysis (see F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

Local breaker isolation and control is also installed for the following Division II breakers:

1. 4-kV SWGR Unit 2 diesel generator 2 feed breaker to SWGR 24-1,
2. 4-kV SWGR tie breakers between SWGR 24 and 24-1,
3. 4-kV to 480-V SWGR feed breaker from SWGR 24-1 to SWGR 29,
4. Feeds from SWGR 24 to control rod drive pump 2B, and
5. Feeds from SWGR 24 to service water pumps 2B and 2/3.

However, no credit is taken in the current safe shutdown analysis for this capability.

6.2-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.2.1.3 Provide Local Control for Condensate Transfer Pump 2A The local control capability has been provided for condensate transfer pump 2A. To locally control the pump, it is necessary to electrically isolate the normal control circuits to the pump.

This isolation is accomplished by pulling one fuse at MCC 28-2 (see Exemption Requests, F.P.R.

Volume 4).

This modification together with local control of 2/3 diesel generator (see Subsection 6.2.3.1) and local breaker control (see Subsection 6.3.1.2) assure that power and control capability is available to the condensate transfer pumps. This modification is applicable to Fire Area TB-V which is composed of Fire Zones 2.0 (Control Room) and 6.2 (AEER.) This fire area contains control cables for both Units 2 & 3. Credit is no longer taken for this modification in alternate shutdown path A2 in the above mentioned fire zones. This modification was identified during the 1978 hot shutdown analysis. Similar isolation and control capability is installed for condensate transfer pump 2B. However, no credit is taken for either pumps capability in the current analysis.

Note: The original 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis used the condensate transfer pump 2A to supply the initial makeup water to the isolation condenser. Initial makeup to the isolation condenser is now provided by the isolation condenser makeup pumps. Therefore, CST transfer pump 2A is no longer credited for SSD.

6.2.1.4 Provide Alternate Power Feeds to Inboard Isolation Condenser Valves Alternate electrical power and control feeds have been installed on each of the two inboard, i.e.,

inside primary containment, isolation condenser valves MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4. These valves are normally open and are required to remain open for isolation condenser operation. The possible spurious closure of these valves due to fire damage of their control circuits would defeat isolation condenser operation. Since the valves are located inside the inerted drywell, a manual operation to rectify the spurious operation is not feasible. The new alternate feeds were installed to provide means to override the effects of spurious signals on these valves (see Figure 6.2-1).

These alternate feeds are routed through the Reactor Building torus area (Fire Zone 1.1.2.1) while the normal feeds to these valves are located on the next elevation up (Fire Zone 1.1.2.2). The alternate feeds are protected by a 1-hour fire wrap in Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 (see Subsection 6.3.1.3 for associated fire protection system modifications).

The alternate control panels for the two Unit 2 inboard valves are located in the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C). This location was chosen because an operator would normally be at the 2/3 diesel generator control panels in the 2/3 diesel generator room in the event of a fire requiring shutdown.

The alternate feeds for the Unit 2 valves are powered from Unit 3 480-V MCC 38-1, located in Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. A transfer switch has been installed in Fire Zone 1.3.2 (part of Fire Area RB2-I) where the cables to the inboard valves enter the drywell. This switch allows the valves to be opened if they spuriously close since it will select that power feed, normal or alternate, which is energized. (Assuming the Unit 2 electrical equipment has been damaged by the fire, the feed which would be energized would be the alternate feed from MCC 38-1.)

6.2-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 This modification is applicable to Fire Areas RB2-II, TB-I, TB-II, and TB-V where control cables to MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4 are routed. Credit is taken for this modification in alternate shutdown paths B1 and A2.

An isolation switch is also installed in Fire Zone 1.3.2 to manually select the power feed to the inboard valves. If a fire in Unit 3 were to damage MCC 38-1 or the new controls in the 2/3 diesel generator room, a spurious signal could possibly close the Unit 2 valves via the newly installed alternate feed. To defend against this, an operator will enter Fire Zone 1.3.2 and set the isolation switch to its isolation position which will allow control to be established from the control room only. (A spurious signal from the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Area RB2/3) control panel or from MCC 38-1 (Fire Area RB3-II) would cause the transfer switch to take control away from the control room. The isolation position on the isolation switch would override the transfer switch thus returning control to the control room.) This capability is applicable to shutdown path E and Fire Areas RB2/3 and RB3-II where the alternate controls are located. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.1.5 (Deleted) 6.2.1.6 Provide Access to Valves in Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase An access ladder was provided in the isolation condenser pipe chase (Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.5.C) to facilitate the manual operation of isolation condenser valves MO2-1301-2 and MO2-1301-3 which are located in Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.5.C, respectively. The ladder allows access to the valves from the isolation condenser floor (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A, Reactor Building elevation 589 feet 0 inches) which is part of Fire Area RB2-I along with the pipe chase.

The grating which acts as flooring between Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A and 1.1.2.5.B and Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.5.C was cut to allow installation of the ladder for access to the valves.

Providing these means of access ensures that an operator can, if necessary, reach the valves without entering the area of the fire. This modification was identified in the 1984 reevaluation and is used in shutdown paths B1 and A2.

6.2.1.7 Provide Secondary CRD Pump Cooling Water The isolation condenser is a closed shutdown system, therefore, the only reduction in reactor water level is caused by shrinkage and leakage. A maximum of 25 gpm leakage is specified by technical specification limits. The CRD pumps are used to inject makeup water into the reactor when shutdown is achieved by using isolation condenser paths A, A1, A2, or E.

The Unit 2 CRD pumps are located in Fire Zone 8.2.2.A on the 495-foot 0-inch elevation of the Turbine Building. The normal pump cooling water is supplied by the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW) system. Upon loss of offsite power, several operator actions would be required to initiate the TBCCW system. Additionally, if the TBCCW system is damaged by a fire no CRD cooling water would be available. Therefore, an alternate source for cooling the CRD pumps has been installed from the service water system with a tie in from the fire main as an additional alternate cooling source. The service water system is capable of being powered from the onsite emergency ac system. The hot shutdown analysis demonstrates at 6.2-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 least one of five pumps is available. Any one of the five service water pumps is capable of handling the necessary cooling loads for shutdown of both units.

In order to initiate the service water flow to a CRD pump, the service water system must be initiated and the locked-closed manual valve to the specific CRD pump must be opened. The valves are located in the CRD pump room (Fire Zone 8.2.2.A) and thus are accessible for opening whenever the CRD pumps are available. This modification is applicable to isolation condenser paths A, A1, A2, or E. It is applicable to fire areas RB3-II, RB-2/3, TB-II, TB-III, TB-IV, TB-V, Radwaste Building, and Crib House. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.1.8 Provide Inhibit Switch for Auto Blowdown An ADS "Auto Blowdown Inhibit" switch has been added to MCB panel 902-3. This switch, if turned to "INHIBIT" while the previously existing key-operated ERVs "MANUAL-OFF-AUTO" switch is in the "OFF" position, will prevent a spurious blowdown from occurring due to a fire anywhere outside of the Control Room and Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room (Zones 2.0 and 6.2, Fire Area TB-V). For a fire in Fire Area TB-V, it is possible for hot shorts to occur which would defeat these switches. However, credit is taken for the operators to actuate these switches immediately after scramming the reactor. Once outside Fire Area TB-V, the operators are directed by shutdown procedures to manually trip all 125-Vdc feeds to the auto blowdown logic. This action is performed at the 125-Vdc distribution panels in the Turbine Building.

This modification was identified in the 1984 reanalysis and is applicable to all fire areas.

6.2.2 Unit 3 Safe Shutdown System Modifications 6.2.2.1 Provide Local Isolation Condenser Water Level Indication A sight glass was installed on the isolation condenser to provide the operator with the capability of local visual monitoring of the shell side water level if the control room indicator LI-3-1340-2 is disabled. The sight glass is located at the isolation condenser on Elevation 589 feet in the Reactor Building and made operable by opening two hand operated valves. Since no cable separation analysis was performed for LI-3-1340-2, credit for the sight glass is taken throughout Dresden 3. This modification is used for alternative shutdown paths A1 and B2. This modification was identified during the 1978 hot shutdown analysis (see F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.2.2.2 Provide Local Breaker Control Local breaker control is installed for the following Division I breakers:

1. 4-kV SWGR 2/3 diesel generator feed breaker to SWGR 33-1,
2. 4-kV SWGR normal feed breakers to SWGR 33-1 and SWGR 33,
3. 4-kV to 480-V SWGR feed breakers from SWGR 33-1 to SWGR 38,
4. Feeds from SWGR 33 to control rod drive pump 3A, and
5. Feeds from SWGR 33 to service water pump 3A.

These modifications were installed to allow the operator to isolate faults in the normal breaker controls and to locally control the breaker at the switchgear. These modifications together with the electrical isolation /control capability provided for the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries, (see Subsections 6.2.3.1 and 6.3.4.4), assure that onsite auxiliary electrical power is available to the control rod drive pump, the service water pump, and the condensate transfer pumps (the 2A and 3A pumps are no longer credited for SSD). These modifications are applicable to Fire Area TB-V which is composed of Fire Zones 2.0 (Control Room) and 6.2 (AEER). TB-V contains control cables for both Units 2 & 3. Credit is no longer taken for this modification in alternative shutdown path B2 for the above mentioned fire zones. This modification was identified as being needed during the 1978 hot shutdown analysis (see F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

Local breaker isolation and control is also installed for the following Division II breakers:

1. 4-kV SWGR Unit 3 diesel generator feed breaker to 34-1,
2. 4-kV SWGR tie breakers between SWGR 34 and 34-1,
3. 4-kV to 480-V SWGR feed breaker from SWGR 34-1 to SWGR 39,
4. Feed from SWGR 34 to control rod drive pump 2B, and
5. Feed from SWGR 34 to the service water pump 3B.

However, no credit is taken in the current analysis for this capability.

6.2.2.3 Provide Local Control for Condensate Transfer Pump 3A The local control capability has been provided for condensate transfer pump 3A. To locally control the pump, it is necessary to electrically isolate the pump. This isolation is accomplished by pulling one fuse at MCC 38-2 (see Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4).

This modification together with local control of diesel generators 2 & 3 (see Subsection 6.2.3.2) and local breaker control (see Subsection 6.2.2.2) assures that power and control capability is available to the condensate transfer pumps. This modification is applicable to Fire Area TB-V which is composed of Fire Zones 2.0 (Control Room) and 6.2 (AEER). This fire area contains control cables for both Units 2 & 3. Credit is no longer taken for this modification in alternate shutdown path B2 in the above mentioned fire zones. This modification was identified during the 1978 hot shutdown analysis (see F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2). Similar isolation and control capability is installed for condensate transfer pump 3B. However, no credit is taken for either pumps capability in the current analysis.

6.2-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 Note: The original 10CFR50 Appendix R analysis used the condensate transfer pump 3A to supply the initial makeup water to the isolation condenser. Initial makeup to the isolation condenser is now provided by the isolation condenser makeup pumps. Therefore, CST transfer pump 3A is no longer credited for SSD.

6.2.2.4 Provide Alternate Power Feeds to Inboard Isolation Condenser Valves Alternate electrical power and control feeds have been installed to each of the two inboard, i.e.,

inside primary containment, isolation condenser valves MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4. These valves are normally open and are required to remain open for isolation condenser operation. The possible spurious closure of these valves due to fire damage to their control circuits would defeat isolation condenser operation. Since the valves are located inside the inerted drywell, manual operation to rectify the spurious operation is not feasible. The new alternate feeds were installed to upgrade the reliability of the isolation condenser system and provide means to override the effects of spurious signals on these valves (see Figure 6.2-1).

These alternate feeds are routed through the Reactor Building torus area (Fire Zone 1.1.1.1) while the normal feeds to these valves are located on the next elevation up (Fire Zone 1.1.1.2). The alternate feeds are protected by a 1-hour fire wrap in Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 (see Subsection 6.3.2.3 for associated fire protection system modifications).

The alternate control panels for the two Unit 3 inboard valves are located in the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C). This location was chosen because an operator would normally be at the 2/3 diesel generator control panels in the 2/3 diesel generator room in the event of a fire requiring shutdown.

The alternate feeds for the Unit 3 valves are powered from Unit 2 480-V MCC 28-1, located in Fire Zone 1.1.2.2. A transfer switch has been installed in Fire Zone 1.4.1 (part of Fire Area RB3-I) where the cables to the inboard valves enter the drywell. This switch allows the valves to be opened if they spuriously close since it will select that power feed, normal or alternate, which is energized. (Assuming that Unit 3 electrical equipment has been damaged by the fire, the feed which would be energized would be the alternate feed from MCC 28-1.) This modification is applicable to Fire Areas RB3-II, TB-II, TB-III, and TB-V where control cables to MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4 are routed. Credit is taken for this modification in alternate shutdown paths A1 and B2.

An isolation switch is also installed in Fire Zone 1.4.1 to manually select the power feed to the inboard valves. If a fire in Unit 2 were to damage MCC 28-1 or the new controls in the 2/3 diesel generator room, a spurious signal could possibly close the Unit 3 valves via the newly installed alternate feed. To defend against this, an operator will enter Fire Zone 1.4.1 and set the isolation switch to its isolation position which will allow control to be established from the control room only. (A spurious signal from the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Area 9.0.C) control panel or from MCC 28-1 (Fire Area RB2-II) would cause the transfer switch to take control away from the control room. The isolation position on the isolation switch would override the transfer switch thus returning control to the control room.) This capability is applicable to shutdown path F and Fire Areas RB2/3 and RB2-II where the alternate controls are located. These modifications 6.2-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 were identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.2.5 (Deleted) 6.2.2.6 Provide Access to Valves in Isolation Condenser Pipe Chase An access ladder was provided in the isolation condenser pipe chase (Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.5.C) to facilitate the manual operation of isolation condenser valves MO3-1301-2 and MO3-1301-3 which are located in Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.5.C, respectively. The ladder allows access to the valves from the isolation condenser floor (Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A, Reactor Building elevation 589 feet 0 inches) which is part of Fire Area RB3-I along with the pipe chase.

The grating which acts as flooring between Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.A and 1.1.1.5.B and Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.5.C was cut to allow installation of the ladder for access to the valves.

Providing these means of access ensures that an operator can, if necessary, reach the valves without entering the area of the fire. This modification was identified in the 1984 reevaluation and is used in shutdown paths A1 and B2.

6.2.2.7 Provide Secondary CRD Pump Cooling Water The isolation condenser is a closed shutdown system, therefore, the only reduction in reactor water level is caused by shrinkage and leakage. A maximum of 25 gpm leakage is specified by technical specification limits. The CRD pumps are used to inject makeup water into the reactor when shutdown is achieved by using isolation condenser paths B, B1, B2, or F.

The Unit 3 CRD pumps are located in Fire Zone 8.2.2.B on the 495-foot 0-inch elevation of the Turbine Building. The normal pump cooling water is supplied by the Turbine Building Closed Cooling Water (TBCCW) system. Upon loss of offsite power, several operator actions would be required to initiate the TBCCW system. Additionally, if the TBCCW system is damaged by a fire, no CRD cooling water would be available. Therefore, an alternate source for cooling the CRD pumps has been installed from the service water system with a tie in from the fire main as an additional alternate cooling source. The service water system is capable of being powered from the onsite emergency ac system. The hot shutdown analysis demonstrates at least one of the five pumps is available. Any one of the five service water pumps is capable of handling the necessary cooling loads for shutdown of both units.

In order to initiate the service water flow to a CRD pump, the service water system must be initiated and the locked-closed manual valve to the specific CRD pump must be opened. The valves are located in the CRD pump room (Fire Zone 8.2.2.B) and thus are accessible for opening whenever the CRD pumps are available. This modification is applicable to all isolation condenser paths B, B1, B2, and F that use the Unit 3 CRD pumps. It applies to Fire Areas RB2-II, RB-2/3, TB-I, TB-II, TB-IV, TB-V, Radwaste Building, and Crib House. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (see F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.2.8 Provide Inhibit Switch for Auto Blowdown An ADS"Auto Blowdown Inhibit" switch has been added to MCB panel 903-3. This switch, if turned to "INHIBIT" while the previously-existing key-operated ERVs "MANUAL-OFF-6.2-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.2-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 AUTO" switch is in the "OFF" position, will prevent a spurious blowdown from occurring due to a fire anywhere outside of the Control Room and Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Room (Zones 2.0 and 6.2, Fire Area TB-V). For a fire in Fire Area TB-V, it is possible for hot shorts to occur which would defeat these switches. However, credit is taken for the operators to actuate these switches immediately after scramming the reactor. Once outside Fire Area TB-V, the operators are directed by shutdown procedures to manually trip all 125-Vdc feeds to the auto blowdown logic. This action is performed at the 125-Vdc distribution panels in the Turbine Building.

This modification was identified in the 1984 reanalysis and is applicable to all fire areas.

6.2.3 Units 2 and 3 Safe Shutdown System Modifications 6.2.3.1 2/3 Diesel Generator System Modifications Several modifications are proposed for the 2/3 diesel generator and Division 1 electrical distribution system. These modifications have three main purposes:

1. To ensure that faults on 2/3 diesel generator control cabling will not interfere with local operation and control of the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries,
2. To ensure that a fire affecting the power feeds from the 2/3 diesel generator to one unit will not affect the ability of the 2/3 diesel generator to feed the other unit, and
3. To ensure that the 2/3 diesel generator can feed both units when necessary.

6.2.3.1.1 Bifurcate 2/3 Diesel Generator Bus Duct The 2/3 diesel generator bus duct was bifurcated as shown in Figure 6.2-3. A new 4-kV SWGR has been installed in the diesel generator room and each branch is provided with breaker isolation. This modification prevents faults on one unit's 4-kV feed from affecting the feed to the other unit. Currently, a fault on the 4-kV feed to one unit could incapacitate the 2/3 diesel generator's ability to feed either unit. The Unit 2 bus duct branch was wrapped to an equivalent 1-hour level of protection for its entire routing in the Unit 3 Reactor Building (Fire Zone 1.1.1.2).

(See Subsection 5.3.3.2.) This modification is necessary for alternate shutdown paths A1 and B1.

It is applicable to Fire Areas RB2-II and RB3-II. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.3.1.2 Electrically Isolate 2/3 Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries The power and control cables for the 2/3 diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump and the 2/3 diesel generator room vent fan run to MCC's located in Fire Areas RB2-II and RB3-II (Fire Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.2.2). The control cables for the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump are routed through Fire Areas RB2-II and RB3-II and into Fire Areas TB-I, TB-II, and TB-III. The control cables from the main control room to the 2/3 diesel generator are routed through Fire Areas TB-V, TB-III, and RB3-II. The isolation condenser shutdown paths utilized by the above fire areas (A1, A2, B1, B2) all make use of the 2/3 diesel generator. A fire in one of the above 6.2-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 fire zones could cause a cable fault making the 2/3 diesel generator unavailable. To prevent this, the power and control cables from both units to the 2/3 diesel generator, the 2/3 diesel generator room vent fan, the 2/3 diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump, and the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump can be electrically isolated and locally controlled in the 2/3 diesel generator room. These modifications protect the diesel and its auxiliaries from faults on either unit's cabling. Additionally, these cables are wrapped in a 1-hour rated wrap as described in Subsection 5.3.3.3. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.3.1.3 Relocated Local Control Station for MCC 38-1 Main Feed The 480-V MCC's 38-1 and 28-1 are each capable of controlling and powering the 2/3 diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump and the 2/3 diesel generator room vent fan. MCC 38-1 is located in the Unit 3 Reactor Building in Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. MCC 28-1 is located in the Unit 2 Reactor Building in Fire Zone 1.1.2.2. Since MCC 38-1 and MCC 28-1 each had a local control station located in the Central Zone Group of the Turbine Building (TB-II) in Fire Zones 8.2.6.C and 8.2.5.C, respectively, a fire in TB-II could affect both local control stations thus affecting the two MCC's in the Reactor Buildings and potentially resulting in the loss of availability of the 2/3 diesel generator vent fan and fuel oil transfer pump. Fire Area TB-II makes use of the isolation condenser shutdown paths A2 and B2.

In order to prevent such an event, the local control station for MCC 38-1 was relocated to the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C). This ensures that at least one source of power for the 2/3 diesel generator auxiliaries will be available for a fire in the Turbine Building. This modification was identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.2.3.1.4 Install Transfer Switch for 2/3 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries The 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump is located in the Crib House (Fire Zone 11.3) and has both Unit 2 and Unit 3 power feeds available to it. Currently, these two feeds are interconnected at a junction box near the cooling water pump. A fault on one feed would result in making the pump inoperable.

An automatic transfer switch was installed at the pump to eliminate the problem. The switch selects that feed which is energized and locks out the other feed. (See Figure 6.2-4.)

This modification along with associated fire protection modifications in the Crib House including a 1-hour barrier around the transfer switch and related conduit (see Subsection 6.3.5) will ensure that either the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump or both cooling water pumps for the dedicated diesels will be available for a fire in the Crib House. In addition, the transfer switch protects the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump from fire related faults in the pump power cable in the Turbine Building. The feeds from the two units run through this building but are located in separate fire areas or protected (see Subsections 6.3.5.1 and 6.3.5.2) so that a fire could not affect both feeds except in the 2/3 diesel generator room itself. (The dedicated diesels are used for a fire in the 2/3 diesel generator room.) This modification was identified in the 1984 analysis 6.2-10

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 A transfer switch also has been installed in the power cable connections to Unit 2 and Unit 3 at both the 2/3 diesel generator vent fan and the 2/3 diesel generator fuel oil transfer pump.

Previously, both the Unit 2 and the Unit 3 power feeds were joined at a junction box near the equipment such that a fault in the Unit 2 or Unit 3 power feed would disable the equipment. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.3.1.5 Reroute Unit 2 Cables for the 2/3 Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries The Unit 2 power and control feeds to the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries (fuel oil transfer pump, cooling water pump, and vent fan) exit the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C) into Unit 3 Reactor Building Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. The cables were routed through this fire zone to approximately column L.5 before entering the Unit 2 Reactor Building. The cables have been rerouted so that they make a much shorter run through the Unit 3 Reactor Building thus entering the Unit 2 Reactor Building at approximately column N. In addition, these cables are protected by a 1-hour cable wrap (see Subsection 6.3.3.2) where they run on the Unit 3 side. These modifications ensure that a fire in RB3-II which would use shutdown path A1 will not prevent the 2/3 diesel generator from powering Unit 2 equipment which would in turn be used to shut down Unit 3. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.3.1.6 Modification to 2/3 Diesel Generator Breakers Feeding 4-kV SWGR The 2/3 breaker's control logic has been modified to allow the operator to supply power to both Units' Division I, 4-kV SWGR simultaneously by overriding the unit selection interlocks. Local operator action at SWGR's 23-1 or 33-1 is necessary. For shutdown paths A2 and B2 in fire areas TB-II and TB-V credit is taken for using the 2/3 diesel generator to supply auxiliary electric power to CRD pumps 2A and 3A and condensate transfer pumps 2A and 3A(the 2A and 3A pumps are no longer credited for SSD) simultaneously because simultaneous use of CRD pumps 2A and 3A and Condensate Transfer Pumps 2A and 3A is necessary. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2.3.2 CRD Pump Discharge Header Crosstie Piping Since the isolation condenser is a closed cooling system for the reactor, large amounts of makeup water to the vessel are not needed. One of the control rod drive pumps taking suction from the condensate storage will provide all necessary makeup required due to primary coolant shrinkage or leakage. Crosstie piping was installed to connect the CRD pump discharge headers of the two units. This crosstie line is normally isolated by hand operated valves located in Fire Zone 8.2.6.C in the Central Zone Group. This valve is opened when the unaffected units CRD pumps are used for makeup to the affected unit's reactor vessel. This modification is necessary for alternate shutdown paths A1 and B1. It is applicable to Fire Areas RB2-I, RB3-II, TB-I, and TB-III. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.2-11

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 17 JUNE 2009 6.2.3.3 Provide Air Vent Valves for the MSIV Air Lines MSIV supply air vent valves have been installed outside the exclusion area in the access corridor.

These valves were installed to provide for positive closure of the MSIVs. The MSIVs are identified for immediate closure in the Appendix R safe shutdown procedures. This modification was identified as part of the 1984 analysis.

6.2.4 Modifications To Provide Access to Valves for Cold Shutdown Access galleries are provided for the following motor-operated valves located above the Unit 2 and 3 shutdown Cooling Heat Exchangers.

MO2-1001-4A MO3-1001-4A MO2-1001-4B MO3-1001-4B MO2-1001-4C MO3-1001-4C Operation of these valves is required for cold shutdown. In the event a fire disables electrical feeds to these valves, cold shutdown can be achieved through manual valve operation. The galleries permit access to these valves for such operation. This modification was identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.2.5 Deleted 6.2-12

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.3 Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3.1 Unit 2 Reactor Building Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3.1.1 Provide Fire Detection in Unit 2 Reactor Building Fire detection systems are installed which provide coverage for virtually all areas of the Unit 2 Reactor Building except for the refuel floor level. The installation of this additional detection has a twofold purpose:

1. To provide the operators with information which will assist them in determining what shutdown paths are available in the event of a fire, and
2. To more closely conform to the criteria of Appendix R as clarified in NRC Generic Letter 83-33.

The type of detection system and the area of coverage are given below by Unit 2 Reactor Building elevation. (The inerted drywell which runs through all elevations is not described.)

Justification for the lack of complete area suppression and detection is provided in Sections 3.4 and 3.5 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4). The addition of this detection was identified in the 1984 analysis.

ELEVATION DESCRIPTION OF FIRE DETECTION 476 feet 6 inches There are three fire zones on this elevation.

Fire Zone 1.1.2.1, the torus area, is provided with linear thermal detection in and under all the cable trays routed in this zone. Since the cabling represents the only significant combustible material in the zone, this method of detection is sufficient to ensure that any fire would be detected.

Fire Zones 11.2.1 and 11.2.2, the southwest and southeast corner rooms, respectively, contain the LPCI and core spray equipment. They are also provided with a linear thermal fire detection system throughout.

517 feet 6 inches Two fire zones, 1.1.2.2 and 1.3.2, are located on this elevation. Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 is provided with an ionization-type fire detection system.

Photo electric detectors are used in Fire Zone 1.3.2 because of environmental conditions.

545 feet 6 inches Two fire zones are located on this elevation, 1.1.2.5.C and 1.1.2.3.

6.3-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 ELEVATION DESCRIPTION OF FIRE DETECTION Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C, which is part of the isolation condenser pipe chase extending down from the 589-foot 0-inch elevation, does not contain any detection system. However, it is directly connected to Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A at the 589-foot 0-inch elevation which is provided with ionization detection.

Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 which occupies the remainder of this elevation is provided with an ionization-type fire detection system everywhere except in the regenerative and nonregenerative heat exchanger areas which are separated from the rest of the zone by substantial shield walls.

570 feet 0 inches Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.4 are located on this elevation. Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.B, which is part of the isolation condenser pipe chase extending down from the 589-foot 0-inch elevation, does not contain a detection system. However, it is directly connected to Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A on the 589-foot 0-inch elevation which is provided with ionization detection.

Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 occupies the remainder of this elevation except where the fuel pool extends down from the 613-foot 0-inch elevation. This fire zone is provided with an ionization-type detection system throughout except in the cleanup filter and demineralizer area which is separated from the rest of the zone by substantial shield walls. Fixed thermal linear detection which activates a preaction water spray system is provided around the open equipment hatch and stairwell in the ceiling. See Subsection 6.3.1.2.1.

589 feet 0 inches Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A and 1.1.2.5.D are located on this elevation.

Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A is provided with an ionization-type fire detection system throughout except for the small fuel pool demineralizer area which is separated from the rest of the zone by shield walls.

Fixed thermal linear detection which activates a preaction water spray system is provided around the open equipment hatch and stairwell in the ceiling and floor. See Subsection 6.3.1.2.1. The rest of this elevation, exclusive of the areas occupied by the fuel storage pool and dryer separator storage area, is designated Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.D. This fire zone is currently provided with ionization detection over the standby liquid control area. Further detection was not deemed necessary due to the low combustible loading and lack of safe shutdown equipment and cabling in the zone.

6.3-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 ELEVATION DESCRIPTION OF FIRE DETECTION 613 feet 0 inches This elevation is common to both Unit 2 and Unit 3 and is designated as Fire Zone 1.1.1.6/1.1.2.6. No detection is proposed for the zone since the high ceiling (approximately 45 feet) severely limits the effectiveness of any possible detection system. A linear thermal detection system is installed around the open equipment hatch and stairwell in the floor.

6.3.1.2 Upgrade Fire Barriers in Unit 2 Reactor Building Several barriers which separate areas containing equipment or cabling for different alternate shutdown paths have been upgraded to provide them with a complete (or equivalent) 3-hour fire rating. The subsections which follow describe the modifications made to upgrade these barriers.

The modifications are grouped on the basis of which fire areas the modified barriers separate.

These modifications were identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.3.1.2.1 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB2-I and RB2-II Fire Area RB2-I contains equipment necessary to the four isolation shutdown paths (A, B1, A2, and E) and Fire Area RB2-II contains equipment and cabling necessary to the other shutdown method, the HPCI shutdown path C. Because of this, it is necessary to keep a fire in either of these fire areas from spreading to and causing damage in the other fire area. The Appendix R required method for preventing this fire spread is providing complete 3-hour barriers between the fire areas. Because of this and the importance of the two fire areas, modifications have been made for upgrading all of the barriers separating the fire areas to a 3-hour rating (or equivalent, in the case of the 20-foot x 20-foot equipment hatchway, HVAC penetrations, a ladder opening, one mechanical penetration, and stairway between Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A and 1.1.2.4). Justification, for all areas where a literal 3-hour barrier is not used, is provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4). The following list describes the modifications. The list presents the fire zones which are separated by the barrier being modified.

6.3-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 FIRE ZONES SEPARATED BY BARRIER (RB2-I ZONE/RB2-II ZONE) DESCRIPTION OF BARRIER MODIFICATION 1.3.2/1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3 Penetrations in the barriers separating Fire Zone 1.3.2 from all other zones except for the louver to the steam chase and adjacent mechanical penetration, the mechanical penetration which contains three pipes and an HVAC duct in the ceiling and a 3' x 4' 3" opening in the floor, are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating. The mechanical penetration in the ceiling is protected by an automatic suppression system which provides a level of protection equivalent to a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> barrier.

Fire Zone 1.3.2 is the electrical Division I drywell cable penetration area. A fire in this zone could render the isolation condenser system inoperable if it resulted in the spurious closure of either valve MO2-1301-1 or MO2-1301-

4. The primary and secondary electrical feeds to the valves are all Division I and located in the zone. Sealing the barriers surrounding Fire Zone 1.3.2 ensures that a fire inside, which could damage the four Unit 2 isolation condenser shutdown paths, could not damage the alternate HPCI shutdown path C which has no associated cabling or equipment inside Fire Zone 1.3.2. Conversely, a fire from outside could not enter Fire Zone 1.3.2 and damage both the inboard valve feeds.

1.1.2.5.C/1.1.2.3 All penetrations into the isolation condenser pipe chase are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating. This provides a complete 3-hour barrier between RB2-I and RB2-II at the 545-foot 6-inch elevation. This modification, in conjunction with others, ensures that: 1) isolation condenser valves in the pipe chase will not be damaged by a fire in RB2-II, and 2) an operator will be able to manually operate the isolation condenser valves in the pipe chase. Isolation condenser path B1 has been identified for use in the event of a fire in RB2-II.

1.1.2.5.B/1.1.2.4 All penetrations into the isolation condenser pipe chase are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating. This modification, in conjunction with others, ensures that: 1) isolation condenser valves in the pipe chase will not be damaged by a fire in RB2-II, and 2) an operator will be able to manually operate the isolation condenser valves in the pipe chase.

Isolation condenser path B1 has been identified for use in the event of a fire in RB2-II.

6.3-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 FIRE ZONES SEPARATED BY BARRIER (RB2-I ZONE/RB2-II ZONE) DESCRIPTION OF BARRIER MODIFICATION 1.1.2.5.A/1.1.2.4 HVAC ducts which penetrate the floor and connect Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A and 1.1.2.4 are protected by sprinklers which will provide adequate protection in lieu of fire dampers. All penetrations from Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 to the isolation condenser floor above (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A) are sealed except for the 20-foot x 20-foot equipment hatch, a ladder opening, a mechanical penetration near the stairway, the stairway and three HVAC ducts.

These openings are protected by an automatic preaction water suppression system actuated by a linear thermal detector or wet pipe sprinklers which provide a level of protection equivalent to a 3-hour barrier. These modifications, along with the sealing of the isolation condenser pipe chase, ensure that: 1) a fire in RB2-II will not affect RB2-I thus ensuring that at least one of the four isolation condenser shutdown paths will be available for a fire in RB2-II, and 2) that a fire in RB2-I will be contained in that fire area and will not affect the HPCI shutdown path C which has components located in RB2-II.

1.1.2.5.A/1.1.2.5.D A 3-hour fire door is installed between these two zones. The doorway represents the only opening in the wall between the zones. Though Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.D contains no safe shutdown equipment or cabling, the zone is part of RB2-II and a fire could conceivably travel from Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 through unsealed penetrations into Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.D.

However, the 3-hour fire door prevents any such fire from propagating to RB2-I.

1.1.2.5.A/1.1.2.6 An automatic preaction suppression system actuated by a linear thermal detector will be installed around the 20-foot x 20-foot equipment hatch and open stairway between the two zones. Other unsealed openings are three HVAC ducts which are afforded protection by an automatic water suppression system and mechanical penetrations. Fire Zone 1.1.2.6, which is part of the refueling floor level, contains no safe shutdown equipment or cabling.

6.3-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.3.1.2.2 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB2-II and RB-2/3 Fire Area RB-2/3 contains equipment and cabling required for shutdown path B1, in particular, the 2/3 diesel generator. This shutdown path has been identified for use in the event of a fire in RB2-II. Fire Area RB2-II contains electrical equipment used for the shutdown path E which has been identified for use in the event of a fire in Fire Area RB-2/3. Modifications were proposed to upgrade all of the barriers between these two fire areas to a 3-hour fire rating. The following list describes these modifications. The list presents the fire zones which are separated by the barrier being modified.

FIRE ZONES SEPARATED BY BARRIER (RB2-II ZONE/RB-2/3 ZONE) DESCRIPTION OF BARRIER MODIFICATION 1.1.2.2/9.0.C A Class "A" fire door is installed at the entrance to the access hall leading to the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C) from Fire Zone 1.1.2.2.

11.2.1/11.2.3 All penetrations from the southwest corner room (Fire Zone 11.2.1) to the Unit 2 HPCI room (Fire Zone 11.2.3) are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating except for an HVAC duct which does not contain a fire damper (see Exemption Requests F.P.R. Volume 4).

6.3.1.3 Provide Protection for Cables in the Unit 2 Reactor Building The alternate power and control feeds to inboard isolation condenser valves MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4 (see Subsection 6.2.1.4) are protected with a 1-hour fire barrier (i.e., 1-hour rated cable wrap) in Fire Area RB2-II. The alternate feeds are routed from MCC 38-1 to Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 of RB2-II (see Subsection 6.2.1.4). The feeds then run through Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 and up into Fire Zone 1.3.2, which is part of RB2-I. The protection for the cables is needed because both the normal feed and the new alternate feed are located in the same fire area. Even though the normal feeds are routed through RB2-II on elevations above Fire Zone 1.1.2.1, it is possible that a single fire, due to the presence of intervening combustibles, would damage the normal and alternate feeds if neither were protected. Because no automatic suppression is provided in Fire Zone 1.1.2.1, Appendix R requires that the cable be protected by a 3-hour barrier. However, the fire loading in the torus area (Fire Zone 1.1.2.1) is very light (less than 1,000 Btu/ft2) and a 1-hour barrier provides adequate protection, ensuring that the alternate feeds are available to open the inboard isolation condenser valves should they spuriously close. An exemption has been requested for the use of a 1-hour rather than 3-hour barrier. (See Section 3.7 of the exemption requests package.) This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.3-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.3.2 Unit 3 Reactor Building Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3.2.1 Provide Fire Detection in the Unit 3 Reactor Building Fire detection systems are installed which provide coverage for virtually all areas of the Unit 3 Reactor Building except for the refuel floor. The installation of the additional detection has a twofold purpose:

1. To provide the operators with information which assists them in determining what shutdown paths are available in the event of a fire, and
2. To more closely conform to the criteria of Appendix R as clarified in NRC Generic Letter 83-33.

The type of detection system and the area of coverage are given below by Unit 3 Reactor Building elevation. (The inerted drywell which runs through all elevations is not described.)

Justification for lack of complete area suppression and detection is provided in Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4). These modifications were identified in the 1984 analysis.

ELEVATION DESCRIPTION OF FIRE DETECTION 476 feet 6 inches There are three fire zones on this elevation.

Fire Zone 1.1.1.1, the torus area, is provided with linear thermal detection in and under all the cable trays routed in this zone.

Since the cabling represents the only significant combustible material in the zone, this method of detection is sufficient to ensure that any fire would be detected.

Fire Zones 11.1.1 and 11.1.2, the southwest and southeast corner rooms, respectively, contain the LPCI and core spray equipment.

They are also provided with a linear thermal fire detection system throughout.

517 feet 6 inches Three fire zones, 1.1.1.2, 1.3.1, and 1.4.1, are located on this elevation. The general floor area (Fire Zone 1.1.1.2) is provided with an ionization fire detection system. Fire Zones 1.3.1 and 1.4.1 utilize photoelectric detectors because of the environmental conditions.

545 feet 6 inches Two fire zones are located on this elevation, 1.1.1.5.C and 1.1.1.3.

6.3-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 ELEVATION DESCRIPTION OF FIRE DETECTION Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C, which is part of the isolation condenser pipe chase extending down from the 589-foot 0-inch elevation, does not contain a detection system. However, it is directly connected to Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A at the 589-foot 0-inch elevation which is provided with ionization detection.

Fire Zone 1.1.1.3, which occupies the remainder of this elevation, is provided with an ionization fire detection system everywhere except in the regenerative and nonregenerative heat exchanger areas, the cleanup recirculation pump rooms, and the cleanup decant pump phase separator room, which are separated from the rest of the zone by substantial shield walls.

570 feet 0 inches Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.4 are located on this elevation.

Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.B, which is part of the isolation condenser pipe chase extending down from the 589-foot 0-inch elevation, does not contain a detection system. However, it is directly connected to Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A on the 589-foot 0-inch elevation which is provided with ionization detection.

Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 occupies the remainder of this elevation except where the fuel pool extends down from the 613-foot 0-inch elevation. It is provided with an ionization detection system throughout except in the cleanup filter and demineralizer area which is separated from the rest of the zone by substantial shield walls. Fixed thermal linear detection which actuates a preaction water spray system is provided around the open equipment hatch in the ceiling. (See Subsection 6.3.2.2.1.)

589 feet 0 inches Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.A and 1.1.1.5.D are located on this elevation.

Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A is provided with an ionization fire detection system throughout except for the small fuel pool demineralizer area which is separated from the rest of the zone by shield walls.

Fixed thermal linear detection which activates operation of a water spray system is provided around the open equipment hatch in the ceiling and the floor. (See Subsection 6.3.2.2.1.) The rest of this elevation, exclusive of the areas occupied by the fuel storage pool and dryer separator storage area, is designated Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.D. This fire zone is currently provided with ionization detection over the standby liquid control area. Further detection was not deemed necessary due to the low combustible loading and lack of safe shutdown equipment and cabling in the zone.

6.3-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 ELEVATION DESCRITION OF FIRE DETECTION 613 feet 0 inches This elevation is common to both Unit 2 and Unit 3 and is designated as Fire Zone 1.1.1.6/1.1.2.6. No detection is proposed for the zone since the high ceiling (approximately 45 feet) severely limits the effectiveness of any possible detection system.

A linear thermal detection system is installed around the open equipment hatch in the floor.

6.3.2.2 Upgrade Fire Barriers in the Unit 3 Reactor Building Several barriers which separate areas containing equipment or cabling for different alternate shutdown paths are being modified to provide them with a complete (or equivalent) 3-hour fire rating. The subsections which follow describe the modifications made to upgrade these barriers.

The modifications are grouped on the basis of which fire areas the modified barriers separate.

These modifications were identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.3.2.2.1 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB3-I and RB3-II Fire Area RB3-I contains equipment necessary to the four isolation shutdown paths (B, A1, B2, and F) and Fire Area RB3-II contains equipment and cabling necessary to the other shutdown method, the HPCI shutdown path D. Because of this, it is necessary to keep a fire in either of these fire areas from spreading to and causing damage in the other fire area. The Appendix R required method for preventing this fire spread is providing complete 3-hour barriers between the fire areas. Because of this and the importance of the two fire areas, modifications have been made, upgrading all of the barriers separating these fire areas to a 3-hour rating (or equivalent, in the case of the 20-foot x 20-foot equipment hatch, HVAC penetrations and ladder opening between Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.A and 1.1.1.4). Justification, for all areas where a literal 3-hour rated barrier is not used, is provided in Section 4.2 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4). The following list describes the modifications. The list presents fire zones which are separated by the barrier being modified.

6.3-9

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 FIRE ZONES SEPARATED BY BARRIER (RB3-I ZONE/RB3-II ZONE) DESCRIPTION OF BARRIER MODIFICATION 1.4.1/1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.3 Penetrations in the barriers separating Fire Zone 1.4.1 from all other zones are sealed to a 3-hour rating except an 8' 6" x 2' 3" opening in the floor covered by a steel plate with openings for pipe, and a mechanical penetration to the pipe chase. Fire Zone 1.4.1 is the electrical Division I drywell cable penetration area. A fire in this zone could render the isolation condenser system inoperable if it resulted in the spurious closure of either valve MO3-1301-1 or MO3-1301-

4. The primary and secondary electrical feeds to the valves are all Division I and located in the zone. Sealing the barriers surrounding Fire Zone 1.4.1 ensures that a fire inside, which could damage the four Unit 3 isolation condenser shutdown paths, could not damage the alternate HPCI shutdown path D which has no associated cabling or equipment inside Fire Zone 1.4.1. Conversely, a fire from outside could not enter Fire Zone 1.4.1 and damage both the inboard valve feeds.

1.1.1.5.C/1.1.1.3 All penetrations into the isolation condenser pipe chase are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating. This provides a complete 3-hour barrier between RB3-I and RB3-II at the 545-foot 6-inch elevation. This modification, in conjunction with others, ensures that: 1) isolation condenser valves in the pipe chase will not be damaged by a fire in RB3-II, and 2) an operator will be able to manually operate the isolation condenser valves in the pipe chase. Isolation condenser path A1 has been identified for use in the event of a fire RB3-II.

1.1.1.5.B/1.1.1.4 All penetrations into the isolation condenser pipe chase are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating. This modification, in conjunction with others, ensures that: 1) isolation condenser valves in the pipe chase will not be damaged by a fire in RB3-II, and 2) an operator will be able to manually operate the isolation condenser valves in the pipe chase. Isolation condenser path A1 has been identified for use in the event of a fire in RB3-II.

6.3-10

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 FIRE ZONES SEPARATED BY BARRIER (RB3-I ZONE/RB3-II ZONE) DESCRIPTION OF BARRIER MODIFICATION 1.1.1.5.A/1.1.1.4 All penetrations from Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 to the isolation condenser floor above (Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A) are sealed except for the 20-foot x 20-foot equipment hatch, HVAC penetrations, and ladder opening. These openings are protected by an automatic preaction water suppression system activated by a linear thermal detector or automatic wet pipe sprinklers which provide a level of protection equivalent to a 3-hour barrier. These modifications, along with sealing the isolation condenser pipe chase, ensures that:

1) a fire in RB3-II will not affect RB3-I, thus ensuring that at least one of the four isolation condenser shutdown paths will be available for a fire in RB3-II, and 2) that a fire in RB3-I will be contained in that fire area and will not affect the HPCI shutdown path D which has components located in RB3-II.

1.1.1.5.A/1.1.1.5.D A 3-hour rated fire door is installed between these two zones. The doorway represents the only opening in the wall between the zones. Though Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.D contains no safe shutdown equipment or cabling, the zone is part of RB3-II and a fire could conceivably travel from Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 through unsealed penetrations into Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.D. However, the 3-hour rated fire door will prevent any such fire from propagating to RB3-I.

1.1.1.6/1.1.1.5.A An automatic preaction suppression system actuated by a linear thermal detector is installed around the 20-foot x 20-foot equipment hatch between the two zones. Other unsealed openings are HVAC ducts two of which are afforded protection by the suppression system around the hatch and mechanical penetrations. Fire Zone 1.1.1.6, which is part of the refueling floor level, contains no safe shutdown equipment or cabling.

6.3.2.2.2 Modifications to Barriers Separating Fire Areas RB3-II and RB-2/3 Fire Area RB-2/3 contains equipment and cabling required for shutdown path A1, in particular, the 2/3 diesel generator. This shutdown path has been identified for use in the event of a fire in RB3-II. Fire Area RB3-II contains electrical equipment used for the shutdown path F which has been identified for use in the event of a fire in Fire Area RB-2/3. Modifications were proposed to upgrade all of the barriers between these two fire areas to a 3-hour fire rating. The following list describes these modifications. The list presents the fire zones which are separated by the barrier being modified. These modifications were identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.3-11

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 FIRE ZONES SEPARATED BY BARRIER (RB3-II ZONE/RB-2/3 ZONE) DESCRIPTION OF BARRIER MODIFICATION 11.1.2/11.2.3 All penetrations from the southeast corner room (Fire Zone 11.1.2) to the Unit 2 HPCI room (Fire Zone 11.2.3) are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating.

11.1.2/11.1.3 All penetrations from the southeast corner room (Fire Zone 11.1.2) to the Unit 3 HPCI room (Fire Zone 11.1.3) are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating and the access doorway between Fire Zones 11.1.2 and 11.1.3 is provided with a 3-hour rated fire door.

6.3.2.2.3 Modification to Barriers Separating Fire Zone 1.3.1 from Fire Area RB3-II The shutdown cooling pump room (Fire Zone 1.3.1) contains equipment necessary for cold shutdown. To assure that this equipment is not damaged by fire in Fire Area RB3-II exclusive of this fire zone the barriers separating the two were upgraded to a 3-hour rating or equivalent. The modifications include sealing mechanical penetrations, provide a 3-hour rated fire door and a 3-hour rated fire damper in the wall on the 517-foot 6-inch elevation. Modifications were made to the floor above Fire Zone 1.3.1 at the 545-foot 6-inch elevation which sealed mechanical penetrations and provided a suppression system over the large mechanical penetration which contains three pipes and an HVAC duct.

6.3.2.3 Provide Protection for Cables in the Unit 3 Reactor Building The alternate power and control feeds to inboard isolation condenser valves MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4 (see Subsection 6.2.2.4) are protected with a 1-hour fire barrier (i.e., 1-hour rated cable wrap) in Fire Area RB3-II. The alternate feeds are routed from MCC 28-1 to Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 of RB3-II (see Subsection 6.2.2.4). The feeds then run through Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 and up into Fire Zone 1.4.1, which is part of RB3-1. The protection for the cables is needed because both the normal feeds and the new alternate feeds are located in the same fire area. Even though the normal feeds are routed through RB3-II on elevations above Fire Zone 1.1.1.1, it is possible that a single fire, due to the presence of intervening combustibles, could damage the normal and alternate feeds if neither were protected. Because no automatic suppression is provided in Fire Zone 1.1.1.1, Appendix R requires that the cable be protected by a 3-hour barrier. However, the fire loading in the torus area (Fire Zone 1.1.1.1) is very light (less than 1,000 Btu/ft2) and a 1-hour barrier provides adequate protection, ensuring that the alternate feeds are available to open the inboard isolation condenser valves should they spuriously close. An exemption has been requested for the use of a 1-hour rather than 3-hour barrier (see Section 4.6 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.3-12

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 14 JUNE 2003 6.3.3 Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3.3.1 Upgrade Barrier Between Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings All penetrations in the common wall along column/row 44 separating the Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings are sealed to a 3-hour rating except for an unrated door between the Units 2 &

3 Reactor Building equipment drain tank rooms at elevation 476 feet 6 inches. This door is in the northwest corner of Unit 2 Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 and northeast corner of Unit 3 Fire Zone 1.1.1.1.

This will prevent a fire from spreading from one Reactor Building to the other where alternate shutdown equipment and cabling are located. This modification was identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.3.3.2 Protect the 2/3 Diesel Generator Unit 2 Bus Duct in the Unit 3 Reactor Building with 1-Hour Barrier The 2/3 diesel generator bus duct which feeds Unit 2 exits the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C) into Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 of the Unit 3 Reactor Building and runs through this zone and Fire Zone 1.1.1.3 before entering the Unit 2 Reactor Building. Since Unit 2 equipment powered by the 2/3 diesel generator would be used to shut down Unit 3 for a fire in Fire Area RB3-II (of which Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 are a part), the Unit 2 bus duct is protected against fire damage by a 1-hour fire barrier (cable wrap) where it is routed in the Unit 3 Reactor Building.

(An exemption has been requested for the use of a 1-hour versus 3-hour barrier. See Section 4.7 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4.) Thus, the Unit 2 feed from the 2/3 diesel generator will be unaffected by a fire in the Unit 3 Reactor Building. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.3.3.3 Protect Unit 2 Power and Control Cables for the 2/3 Diesel Generator and Auxiliaries in the Unit 3 Reactor Building with 1-Hour Barrier The power and control cables for the 2/3 diesel generator, the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump, fuel oil transfer pump, and room vent fan from Unit 2 exit the 2/3 diesel generator room (Fire Zone 9.0.C) into Fire Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 of the Unit 3 Reactor Building and run through only the southeast corner before entering the Unit 2 Reactor Building. Since Unit 2 equipment powered by the 2/3 diesel generator would be used to shut down Unit 3 for a fire in Fire Area RB3-II (of which Fire Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 are a part. 3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries are protected with a 1-hour fire barrier (cable wrap) where they are routed in the Unit 3 Reactor Building. (An exemption has been requested for the use of a 1-hour versus 3-hour barrier. See Section 4.7 of the Exemption Requests, F.P.R. Volume 4). Thus, the Unit 2 feeds to the 2/3 diesel generator and its auxiliaries will be unaffected by a fire in the Unit 3 Reactor Building. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Report, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

6.3-13

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.3.4 Unit 2 and Unit 3 Turbine Building Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3.4.1 Provide Additional Fire Detection and Suppression Systems on the Ground and Mezzanine Floor Levels of the Turbine Building Additional fire detection and suppression was installed on the ground and mezzanine floor levels of the Turbine Building. The type of detection and/or suppression and the area of coverage is given below for the two floor levels. Justification for the lack of complete area detection and suppression is provided in Section 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 of the Exemption Requests (F.P.R. Volume 4). These modifications were identified in the 1984 analysis.

FLOOR LEVEL DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED FIRE DETECTION/ SUPPRESSION Ground (517 feet 6 An ionization fire detection system and a wet pipe sprinkler system were inches) installed which protect the region bounded by column/rows 43-46.5/F-H and the corridor along row line G from column line 40 to 48. These systems provide separation between Fire Zone 8.2.5.A, 8.2.5.C, and 8.2.5.E.

The addition of these systems means that the entire ground floor of the Turbine Building is protected by fire detection and/or suppression except for: 1) the Unit 3 low pressure heater pull region, 2) the region bounded by column/ rows 45-48/C-E, and 3) the region bounded by 40-43/C-E.

The latter two regions contain primarily condensate water treatment equipment and are not needed for safe shutdown.

Mezzanine An ionization fire detection system is installed to protect all portions of (534 feet 0 inches Fire Zone 8.2.6.A not now covered by suppression or detection. An and 538 feet 0 ionization fire detection system is also installed to protect all portions of inches) Fire Zone 8.2.6.E not now covered by suppression or detection. The addition of these systems results in all portions of the mezzanine floor level being protected by fire detection and/or suppression except for the low pressure heater pull regions.

6.3.4.2 Provide Fire Suppression System on Unit 3 CRD Pump Floor The Unit 3 CRD pump floor on Elevation 495-feet 0-inches, Fire Zone 8.2.2.B, was provided with a wet pipe sprinkler system. This additional suppression in Fire Area TB-III helps ensure that a fire will not spread from TB-III to TB-II. This modification was identified in the 1978 analysis.

6.3.4.3 Seal All Penetrations for Fire Area TB-V Fire Area TB-V, the main control room and auxiliary electric equipment room, is the main control area for all functions of the plant. Although alternate shutdown paths have been identified to shut down Units 2 and 3, the loss of this fire area would require extensive manual operations.

6.3-14

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 23 JUNE 2021 Therefore, measures, have been taken which ensure that this fire zone remains free of damage caused by an exterior fire.

All penetrations in the boundary walls of Fire Area TB-V, which consists of Fire Zones 2.0 (control room) and 6.2 (auxiliary electrical equipment room), are sealed to a 3-hour fire rating.

All ceiling penetrations from Fire Zone 2.0 (control room) are similarly sealed. This provides a 3-hour barrier between the Eastern Zone Group (TB-I) and TB-V. TB-I contains equipment and cabling for shutdown path A2 which would be used to shut down Unit 2 in the event of a fire in TB-V. Also, TB-V contains equipment and cabling to be used to shut down Unit 2 in the event of a fire in TB-I. This modification was identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.3.4.4 Protect Cable Tray in Ground Floor Access Corridor with 1-Hour Fire Barrier The cable tray which runs from 44.5/H north to 44.5/G and then west to 48/G on the 517-foot 6-inch elevation is enclosed in a 1-hour fire rated cable wrap. The primary reason for protecting this section of cable tray is that the tray contains the bus tie cable from 4-kV switchgear 33-1 to 4-kV switchgear 33 and cables associated with the 2/3 diesel generator auxiliaries. This bus tie is utilized for shutdown path B2 which would be employed for shutdown of Unit 3 for a fire in TB-II. The protection will cover the cabling for its entire run in Fire Zone 8.2.5.C (part of TB-II) and approximately 25 feet into Fire Zone 8.2.5.E (part of TB-III). In conjunction with the suppression and detection systems covering this region, the cable protection ensures that the cable is available for use after a fire in TB-II. This modification was identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.3.4.5 Protect Cable Risers Adjacent to TB-V The cable risers and pull boxes adjacent to TB-V contain Unit 3 control cables originating in either the control room or auxiliary equipment room and running into the Unit 3 cable tunnel.

Some of the control cables contained in the risers are necessary to retain control room operability of several pieces of Unit 3 equipment. In order to assure the integrity of these control cables for a fire in the Unit 2 trackway area, a 1-hour fire wrap was installed over the risers and pull boxes.

Automatic suppression and detection was also added in the area of the risers. The installation of this modification provides separation of alternative paths per the requirements of Section III.G.2.c of Appendix R to 10CFR50.

6.3.5 Unit 2 and Unit 3 Crib House Fire Protection System Modifications 6.3.5.1 Protect 2/3 Diesel Generator Cooling Water Pump Transfer Switch with 1-Hour Barrier The transfer switch and related conduits for the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump (see Subsection 6.2.3.1.4) in the Crib House are protected with a 1-hour barrier. Note that the firewrap was installed per Modification M12-3-84-105 and does not cover the flexible conduit (identified as 2 LX on Drawings 12E-2096C and F-220, Sheet 4) that leads to the pull box above the pump. This modification, in conjunction with the addition of suppression and detection systems (discussed below), ensures that a fire affecting either of the dedicated diesel generator's cooling water pumps will not also disable the 2/3 diesel generator's cooling water pump. This was identified in the 1984 analysis.

6.3-15

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.3.5.2 Provide Automatic Suppression and Detection Systems and Curbing in the Lower Level of Crib House The lower level of the Crib House (the circulating pump floor) contains all three diesel generator cooling water pumps. In order to accomplish safe shutdown without offsite power, the cooling water pumps for two diesels must be kept free of fire damage. This modification was identified in the Associated Circuits Analysis, June 1982 (F.P.P.D.P. Volumes 1 and 2).

In order to ensure that these conditions are met for a fire in the Crib House, the following modifications were instituted.

1. A curb was installed around the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump. This will prevent the spread of any flammable liquids either from the 2/3 pump to the dedicated cooling water pumps or circulating water pumps to the 2/3 pump.
2. An automatic, open-head water suppression system was installed over the 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump. As with the curbing, this modification aids in preventing a fire originating at the 2/3 pump from spreading and also prevents a fire outside the 2/3 pump region from affecting the 2/3 pump.
3. A photoelectric fire detection system was installed throughout the lower elevation of the Crib House. This provides early warning of any fire in the region, allowing station personnel to respond rapidly in order to extinguish any fire before significant damage can occur.
4. A ceiling level wet pipe sprinkler system was installed to protect the entire central area of the lower level (column/row 3.5-4.5/A-B). This provides additional assurance that a fire in the lower level would be quickly controlled and damage limited to one side of the Crib House.
5. An open-head water spray system actuated by a linear thermal detector provides protection to all cable trays and conduit along the north, west, and east walls of the Crib House.

6.3-16

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 6.3.5.3 Provide Curbing and Automatic Suppression in the Upper Level of the Crib House The upper level of the Crib House consists of two elevations: the 509-foot 6-inch elevation, where the five service water pumps are located, and the 517-foot 6-inch elevation, where the circulating water pump motors and service water pump cables are located. To achieve safe shutdown, at least two service water pumps and their associated cabling must be available. In order to ensure that this would be the case for a fire in Crib House, the following modifications were implemented to further augment the inherent separation between the five redundant service water pumps:

1. Curbs were installed along the entire length of column line B on the 509-foot 6-inch and 517-foot 6-inch elevations and along the entire length of column line 3.75 on the 509-foot 6-inch and 517-foot 6-inch elevations. The curbs prevent the spread of combustible liquids from the 517-foot 6-inch elevation of the upper level to the 509-foot 6-inch Elevation as well as preventing the spread of flammable liquids from one side to the other on both elevations. In addition, the diesel fire pump day tank is enclosed in a curb with a drain line to the yard drain system to prevent a diesel fuel oil spill from exposing the service water pumps.
2. A wet pipe sprinkler system was provided which covers the entire upper level of the Crib House. This ensures that, should a fire start, it will be quickly contained so that at least two service water pumps and their associated cabling will remain free of fire damage.

6.3-17

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AMENDMENT 12 CONTROLLER ALT(RNAT( IN HAIN POVER CONTROL ROOM 1/2 flRE VALL INT(RCONN(CTING

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or VALL TYPICAL UNIT-3 TIP ROCH AND UNIT-2 SHUTDOWN rJR( VALL PUMP ROOM DRESDEN ST ATIDN LOCAL Units 2 8. 3 CONTROLLER IN DIESEL F"JGURE 6.2-1 GENERATOR 2/3 ROCH ALTERNATE rEED TO INBOARD ISOLATION CONDENSER VALVES

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AMENDMENT 12 UNIT 3 - - - - - - - - UNJT 2 1

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  • Units 2 8. 3 rtGURE 6.2-3 DIESEL GENERATOR 2/3 BUS

< r r AMENDMENT 12 CABLE: 1132394 CRIBHOUSt IN DUCT TUNNtL BAStHtNT CABLE:1 22393 COMMON rDR UNIT 2 L 3 TB-III TB-II TB-I CABLE 122394 rut tL. 517'-6" CABLE: 132394 CIN CABLE: TUNNtU rLlt [L. 502'-6" MCC 2B-3 rLR. tL. 539*-o* F~R~h~2~13-~ 0*

CABLE 132394 AttR fLR. EL. 517'-6" RJStR R3B HCC 3B-3 fLR. [L. 538'-0" fLR. tL. 517'-6"

  • HEAVY LINES DENOTE 3-HR BARRIERS DRESDEN STATION D.G. 2/3 AUX. Units 2 8. 3 CONT. PNL.

rJGURE 6.2-4 CABLE ROUTING DIAGRAM r *R 2/3 DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING \/ATER PUMP

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.0 Safe Shutdown Procedures 7.1 Introduction The methods of achieving safe hot and cold shutdown at Dresden 2&3 are discussed in Section 3.0. Credit is taken for manual operation of pumps, valves, and electrical equipment for hot and cold shutdown. Procedures have been implemented to aid the operator in performing these actions as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section III.L.3 and III.L.5. These procedures are available at the station. The local and manual alternative shutdown actions for which credit is taken in the Safe Shutdown Analysis (Section 4.0 of this report) are listed in Table 7.3-1 by applicable fire zone. Cold shutdown repair procedures are identified in Section 4.0 on a fire area/zone basis. Cold shutdown repair procedures are identified in Sections 4.0 and 7.4.

Materials necessary to make these repairs are delineated in Section 7.4. Emergency lighting in the form of 8-hour battery packs has been provided in areas where local operations occur and along access paths as described in Section 7.5. Communications capabilities for achieving alternative safe shutdown are discussed in Section 7.6. Access to safe shutdown equipment is discussed in Section 7.7.

Timeline data has been generated to support the alternative shutdown actions and is given in Section 7.2. Dresden Station personnel have walked down the procedures required for the alternative shutdown paths to ensure adequate manpower is available to accomplish the necessary manual actions in the time available. The minimum manpower available at the station is described in Section 7.2.

7.1-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 7.2 Timelines and Manpower Requirements 7.2.1 Timelines The capability of the shutdown methods employed at Dresden 2 and 3 must meet Appendix R Section III.L.2 performance criteria. A calculation was performed to determine the amount of time available before the performance criteria were violated, specifically, the time available before the water level reaches top of active fuel.

AR #320066 documents the actual time required to perform time critical manual actions. The AR is listed in DFPPDP, Volume 6, Book 1,Section X for reference only.

7.2.1.1 HPCI Credit is taken for the HPCI/LPCI system only in a limited number of fire areas (see Section 4.0).

There are no cable discrepancies or equipment associated with this method of shutdown present in the areas of use. Therefore, normal initiation and control of the HPCI/LPCI systems from the control room is available for these areas.

An analysis performed by General Electric (see FPPDP Volume 6,Section X.12) demonstrates that active fuel will remain covered if the HPCI system is initiated in 30 minutes after reactor scram.

7.2.1.2 Isolation Condenser The isolation condenser automatically initiates on RPV pressure at or above 1,070 psig for 15 seconds. The isolation condenser is sized to accommodate the full decay heat load 8.8 minutes after a scram. The isolation condenser can operate 20 minutes without shell makeup if the minimum level of 11,300 gallons is met. (See UFSAR Chapter 5 Subsection 4.6.3).

An analysis performed by General Electric (see FPPDP Volume 13) demonstrates that active fuel will remain covered if the CRD pumps are initiated 30 minutes after reactor scram.

7.2.2 Manpower The required minimum number of operating staff on shift is addressed in the Dresden Technical Specifications. Administrative limits for minimum staffing can be found in OP-DR-101-111-1001.

7.2-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.3 Procedures Relevant to Hot Shutdown There are five redundant and alternate, though not unrelated, shutdown methods available at Dresden 2 and 3 (see Section 3.0). Four of these methods use the specific unit's isolation condenser. The fifth method uses the HPCI system to inject water into the RPV and the LPCI system to cool the suppression pool.

The following is a comparison of shutdown paths used to shut down Units 2 and 3.

Unit 2 Unit 3 Method A B Isolation Condenser B1 A1 Isolation Condenser A2 B2 Isolation Condenser C D HPCI/LPCI E F Isolation Condenser All operations associated with shutdown paths A, B, C, D, E, and F can be accomplished by the operators from the main control room and are considered redundant shutdown paths.

No alternative shutdown modifications or manual actions are proposed for these methods except those actions inherent in the assumption used in the analysis (e.g., loss of offsite power or spurious operation) that are generic to all paths. These actions are listed in Table 7.3-1.

Shutdown paths A1, A2, B1 and B2 are alternative shutdown paths. Table 7.3-2 lists, by fire area, the alternate shutdown path available and the manual actions that may be required to implement a shutdown path. Table 7.3-3 specifically lists the alternate shutdown actions necessary for a fire causing control room evacuation.

7.3-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 TABLE 7.3-1 MANUAL ACTIONS INHERENT TO ASSUMPTIONS OF ANALYSIS OR SPURIOUS OPERATIONS (These actions are not associated with a particular path or fire location and generally apply to all fire areas.)

I. Manual Actions Inherent to Assumptions of Analysis

1. Establish the service/fire water cooling for the CRD pumps. This action is necessitated by the assumption of loss of offsite power and the subsequent loss of TBCCW. It is applicable to all shutdown paths taking credit for using the CRD pumps for reactor makeup. (Paths A, A1, A2, B, B1, B2, E, F)
2. Verify valves 0302-6A, 0302-6B and 0302-8 are open. Valves 0302-6A & 6B fail close on loss of instrument air or due to a loss of off-site power. Valve 0302-8 could close due to a spurious signal, however CRD flow is still available with or without instrument air. The closure of these valves would cause loss of make-up water to the Reactor via the CRD cooling lines. However, the charging water line branches off of the main CRD line up stream of the FCV. Flow through this line is unaffected. Credit is taken in the analysis for the scram injection valves providing an alternate make-up water flow Path to the Reactor. An alternate make-up water Source is desirable (i.e. FW, HPCI) but NOT required.

It is applicable to all shutdown paths taking credit for using the CRD pumps for reactor water makeup. (Paths A, A1, A2, B, B1, B2, E and F) 2.A Verify that either valve 0301-2A or B are open, or open cross connect valves 2/3-0301-162 and 163 to ensure that reactor water makeup capability exists. This may require taking local control of 0301-2A or 2B by de-energizing their respective power source and manually operating the valves. (Paths A, A1, A2, B, B1, B2, E and F).

3. Close normally open breakers to 2/3 250-V battery charger from either MCC 29-2(Path C) or MCC 39-2 (Path D) to ensure long term 250-V power to HPCI from the dedicated diesel generator if offsite power is lost and 2/3 diesel generator is inoperable. (Paths C&D)
4. Monitor day tank and 15,000 gallon fuel oil tank level to ensure adequate fuel supplies are on site and to secure replacement fuel in a timely manner. No associated circuits for tank level indicator were included in the analysis. (All paths if offsite power is lost.)

7.3-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015

5. Monitor pump amperage at local control station (if indication is not available in the control room). Ensure CRD pump Amps do not exceed 34 Amps to ensure pump operability/discharge pressure. No associated circuits for pump flow or pressure indicators were included in the analysis. (All paths)
6. Monitor isolation condenser level. No associated circuits for the isolation condenser level indicator were included in the analysis. This is applicable to all paths that take credit for the isolation condenser.
7. Monitor condensate storage tank level. No associated circuits for the condensate storage tank level were included in the analysis. (This is applicable to all shutdown paths.)
8. Open diesel driven fire pump day tank refill line Valve 3-5299-301 except for a fire in area TB-II, TB-III, RB3-II and Crib House. Monitor the day tank level.

II Manual Actions to Address Potential Adverse Spurious Operations

1. Remove power to the ADS control circuit at the 125V distribution panels for a control room and AEER (TB-V) fire. An ADS inhibit switch can be manually operated in the control room to prevent spurious auto blowdown for a fire outside the control room or AEER. See Subsections 6.2.1.8 and 6.2.2.8. This is a valve spurious operation concern.

For a fire in Fire Area TB-V, spurious blowdown is prevented by removing power to the ADS logic by opening circuit breakers at the 125-Vdc turbine building main bus 2A-1(3A-1) distribution panel and at the 125-Vdc turbine building reserve bus 2B-1 (3B-1) distribution panel. To prevent spurious operation of any single pressure relief valve for a fire in Fire Areas RB2-I, RB2-II, TB-I, TB-III, TB-V, RB3-I or RB3-II, 125-Vdc power to these valves is removed by either tripping breakers or pulling fuses.

2. Verify that the RWCU has automatically isolated. If necessary close normally open valve MO-2(3)-1201-2 and verify closed or close normally closed valve MO-2(3)-1201-3 or remove air to the main pressure control valve PCV-2(3)-

1217. This is a valve spurious operation concern.

3. Trip HPCI turbine or verify closed MO2(3)-2301-4. This is a valve spurious operation concern associated with spurious opening of MO2(3)-2301-3 and is applicable to all paths which take credit for the isolation condenser.
4. Trip any unwanted loads off of buses and remove closing circuit fuse.

7.3-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 15 JUNE 2005 TABLE 7.3-2 REQUIRED MANUAL ACTIONS BY FIRE AREA Shutdown Alternative Fire Area Path Shutdown Actions General See Table 7.3-1 RB2-I C Locally monitor reactor pressure and level on reactor building instrument racks.

Monitor torus level locally at the sight-glass and torus temperature using a surface pyrometer.

RB2-II B1 Trip breakers at 250-Vdc reactor building MCC 2A to prevent spurious closure of MO2-1301-2 and MO2-1301-3 or allow manual hand wheel operation. Manually open valve MO2-1301-3 in isolation condenser pipe chase (1.1.2.5.C) if automatic action has not occurred.

Manually close isolation condenser steam line vent valve 2-1301-16 (1.1.2.5A) if valves 2-1301-17 and 2-1301-20 do not fail closed.

Verify open MO2-1301-2, manually open (in 1.1.2.5.C) if closed by a spurious signal.

Verify open MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4, remotely open at alternate control switch in 2/3 DG room (9.0C) if closed by a spurious signal.

Then de-energize circuit. If control has been lost for MO3-1301-1 andMO3-1301-4, replace fuses in panel 2203-75 and then remotely open these valves, if required.

Verify Unit 2 isolation condenser flow by observing vented steam on shell side (outside reactor building).

Verify breakers to SWGR 23-1 and 33-1 are open and remotely startup 2/3 diesel generator and auxiliaries in 2/3 DG room (9.0C) if automatic initiation has not occurred.

Manually open valve MO2-4399-74 or MO2-1301-10 and MO2-4102 (1.1.2.5A).

Open manual valve in TB-II to crosstie Unit 3 CRD pump to Unit 2 RPV 7.3-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 7.3-2 REQUIRED MANUAL ACTIONS BY FIRE AREA Fire Area Shutdown Alternative Path Shutdown Actions Inherent to alternate shutdown path B1 is assumption that Unit 3 CRD pump 3A and service water pump 3A will provide water to Unit

2. Start Unit 3 CRD pump 3A remotely then open valve MO3-0301-2A, 3A CRD Pump Discharge Isolation Valve. All other actions to supply power to these pumps and control these pumps can be accomplished from the control room except startup of 2.3 DG.

Trip breaker at 250-Vdc Reactor Building MCC 2B (1.1.2.4) if necessary to facilitate manual opening of MO2-1301-10 and prevent any subsequent spurious closure.

Manually close the following valves to preclude run out of a service water pump:

a. 2-3904-501 or M2-3904-500
b. 3-3904-501 or M3-3904-500
c. 2-3906-500 or 2-3906-501
d. 3-3906-500 or 3-3906-501
e. 2/3-3999-241 or 2/3-3999-240 Locally monitor isolation condenser makeup pump discharge flow.

Monitor the isolation condenser makeup oil day tank level. Obtain fuel from offsite sources and manually refill the tanks as necessary.

Note 1: For a fire in Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 (RB2-II) enter the Unit 3 T.I.P. (Fire Zone 1.4.1) room and change isolation switch from normal to isolation position to return control of the Unit 3 isolation condenser inboard valves to the control room.

RB3-I D Locally monitor reactor pressure and level or reactor building instrument racks.

Monitor torus level locally at the sight-glass and torus temperature using a surface pyrometer.

7.3-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 15 JUNE 2005 TABLE 7.3-2 REQUIRED MANUAL ACTIONS BY FIRE AREA Shutdown Alternative Fire Area Path Shutdown Actions RB3-II A1 Trip breakers at 250-Vdc reactor building MCC 3A (1.1.1.4) to prevent spurious closure of MO3-1301-2, MO3-1301-3 and MO3-4399-74 or allow manual handwheel operation.

Manually open valve MO3-1301-3 in isolation condenser pipe chase (1.1.1.5.C) if automatic operation has not occurred.

Verify open MO3-1301-2, manually open (1.1.1.5.C), if it is closed by a spurious signal.

Verify open MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4, remotely open at alternate control switch in 2/3 DG room (9.0C) if closed by spurious signal. Then de-energize circuit. If control has been lost for MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4, replace fuses in panel 2203-75 and then remotely open these valves, if required.

Manually close isolation condenser steam line vent valves 3-1301-16 (1.1.1.5.A) if valves 3-1301-17 and 3-1301-20 do not fail closed.

Verify Unit 3 isolation condenser flow by observing vented steam on shell side (outside reactor building).

Verify breakers to SWGR 23-1 and 33-1 are open and remotely startup 2/3 DG and auxiliaries in 2/3 DG room (9.0.C) if automatic initiation has not occurred.

Manually open valve MO3-4399-74 or MO3-1301-10 and MO3-4102 (1.1.2.5.A).

Manually open valve in TB-II to crosstie Unit 2 CRD pumps to Unit 3 RPV.

Inherent to alternate shutdown path A1 is the assumption that Unit 2 CRD pump 2A, service water pump 2A, and isocondenser makeup pump will provide water to Unit 3. All actions to supply power to these pumps and to control these pumps can be accomplished from the control room except startup at the 2/3 DG.

Manually operate valve 2-301-2A.

7.3-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 7.3-2 REQUIRED MANUAL ACTIONS BY FIRE AREA Fire Area Shutdown Alternative Path Shutdown Actions Trip breaker at 250-Vdc reactor building MCC 3B (1.1.1.4) if necessary to facilitate manual opening MO3-1301-10 and prevent any subsequent spurious closure.

Manually operate the following valves to provide cooling for CRD pump 2A from the service water system:

a. Open valves 2-3999-357, 2-3999-349, 2-3999-348, 2-3999-358.
b. Close valves 2-3899-205, 2-3899-204, 2-399-360, 2-3999- 361.

Manually close the following valves to preclude run out of the service water pumps.

a. 2-3904-501 or 2-3904-500
b. 3-3904-501 or 3-3904-500
c. 2-3906-500 or 2-3906-501
d. 3-3906-500 or 3-3906-501
e. 2/3-3999-241 or 2/3-3999-240 Locally monitor the isolation condenser makeup pump discharge flow.

Note 1: For a fire in Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 enter the Unit 2 shutdown cooling room (Fire Zone 1.3.2) and change isolation switch from normal to isolate position to return control of the Unit 2 isolation condenser inboard valves to the control room.

7.3-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 7.3-2 REQUIRED MANUAL ACTIONS BY FIRE AREA RB-2/3 E&F Isolation switches for MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4 (Path E), MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4 (Path F) must be changed from normal to isolation position in Fire Zone 1.3.2 (Unit 2) and Fire Zone 1.4.1 (Unit 3), respectively, to open above valves if they spurious close.

Close tie breakers between Unit 2 480-V Division I Switchgear 28 and 480-V Division II Switchgear 29 to provide power to inboard isolation valves MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4 if they should spuriously close(Path E).

Close tie breakers between Unit 3 480-V Division I Switchgear 38 and 480-V Division II Switchgear 39 to provide power to inboard isolation valves MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4 if they should spurious close (Path F).

Locally monitor the isolation condenser makeup pump flow.

TB-I B1 See RB2-II Locally monitor reactor pressure and level on reactor building instrument racks.

Locally start an isolation condenser makeup pump from one of the isolation condenser makeup pump rooms.

7.3-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 7.3-2 REQUIRED MANUAL ACTIONS BY FIRE AREA TB-II A2 & B2 See Table 7.3-3. All shutdown actions are the same as for the control room except 2/3 DG auxiliaries must be fed from Unit 3.

Trip breaker at 250Vdc reactor building MCC 2A (3A) to prevent spurious closure of MO2-4399-74 (M)3-4399-74) or allow manual handwheel operation.

Manually open valves MO2-4299-74 (1.1.2.5A.) and MO3-4399-74 (1.1.1.5.A.).

Locally monitor isolation condenser makeup pump discharge flow.

Monitor the isolation condenser makeup pump diesel oil day tank's level, obtain fuel from offsite sources and manually refill tanks as necessary.

TB-III A1 See RB3-II Locally Monitor Reactor Pressure and level on reactor building instrument racks.

Trip breakers at 250Vdc reactor building MCC 3A to prevent spurious closure of MO-4399-74 or allow manual handwheel operation.

Manually open valve MO3-4399-74 (1.1.1.5.A)

Locally monitor isolation condenser makeup pump discharge flow.

TB-IV A,B,C,D Locally monitor the isolation condenser makeup pump discharge flow.

E or F TB-V A2 & B2 See Table 7.3-3. All shutdown actions must be performed either manually or remotely outside the control room.

Radwaste A,B,C,D Locally monitor the isolation condenser makeup pump discharge flow.

Building E,F Crib House A,B,E,F Locally monitor the isolation condenser makeup pump discharge flow.

11.3 7.3-9

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 19 JUNE 2013 TABLE 7.3-3 OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR A CONTROL ROOM FIRE USING THE ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD OF SHUTDOWN I. In Control Room A. Scram Units 2 and 3 B. Manually Close MSIV's C. Set the ERVs "Auto Blowdown MANUAL-OFF-AUTO" switch to "OFF" and the ADS "Auto Blowdown Inhibit" switch to "INHIBIT."

D. Call 5 fire brigade members to fire scene II Establish Decay Heat Removal and Reactor Water Makeup A. Unit 2 Isolation Condenser Initiation

1) Open valve MO2-1301-3 and verify open MO2-1301-2 in Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C Note: Remove power to 250-Vdc reactor building MCC Bus 2A if necessary to prevent spurious closure of MO2-1301-2 and MO2-1301-3 or to allow manual/handwheel operation.
2) Verify open position of MO2-1301-1 and MO2-1301-4, remotely open at alternate control switch in 2/3 DG room if valves are closed by a spurious signal. Then de-energize circuit.
3) Verify closure of AO2-1301-17 and AO3-1301-20 (manually close 2-1301-16 if necessary)
4) Verify Unit 2 isolation condenser flow by observing vented steam on shell side (outside Rx building)

B. Unit 3 Isolation Condenser Initiation

1) Open valve MO3-1301-3 and verify open MO3-1301-2 in Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C Note: Remove power to 250-Vdc reactor building MCC Bus 3A if necessary to prevent spurious closure of MO3-1301-2 and MO3-1301-3 or to allow manual/handwheel operation 7.3-10

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR A CONTROL ROOM FIRE USING THE ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD OF SHUTDOWN

2) Verify open position of MO3-1301-1 and MO3-1301-4, remotely open at alternate control switch in 2/3 DG room if valves are closed by a spurious signal. Then de-energize circuit.
3) Verify closure of AO3-1301-17 and AO3-1301-20 (manually close 3-1301-16 if necessary)
4) Verify Unit 3 isolation condenser flow by observing vented steam on shell side (outside Rx building)

C. 2/3 DG Initiation (If Offsite Power is Unavailable)

1) Verify breakers to SWGR 23-1 (from DG 2/3 and SWGR 23) are open
2) Verify breakers to SWGR 33-1 (from DG 2/3 and SWGR 33) are open
3) Start 2/3 DG locally and verify proper operation D. Supply Power to Unit 2
1) Close breaker from 2/3 DG to SWGR 23-1 (if open)
2) Strip the loads off of the 4-kV SWGR and the 480-V SWGR and pull the closing circuit fuses.

Notes:

1. The unit selection logic has been modified so that the operator can manually close 2/3 DG feed breakers at 4-kV SWGR 23-1 and 33-1 to allow both to be simultaneously fed.
2. Care must be taken when both units are simultaneously fed so that 2/3 DG is not overloaded.
3) Verify closed breaker from SWGR 23-1 to 480-V Bus 28
4) Verify closed breaker from 480-V Bus 28 to MCC 28-3
5) Verify closed breaker from 480-V Bus 28 to MCC 28-2 7.3-11

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR A CONTROL ROOM FIRE USING THE ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD OF SHUTDOWN

6) Verify closed breaker from 480-V Bus 28 to MCC 28-1
7) Start 2/3 DG vent fan
8) Verify that 2/3 DG cooling water pump automatically starts E. Supply Unit 3 Power
1) Close breakers from the 2/3 DG to SWGR 33-1 (if open)

Notes:

1. The unit selection logic has been modified so that the operator can manually close 2/3 DG feed breakers at 4-kV SWGR23-1 and 33-1 to allow both to be simultaneously fed.
2. Care must be taken when both units are simultaneously fed so that the 2/3 DG is not overloaded.
2) Strip the loads off of the 4-kV SWGR and the 480-V SWGR and pull the closing circuit fuses.
3) Verify closed breakers from SWGR 33-1 to 480-V Bus 38
4) Verify closed breaker from 480-V Bus 38 to MCC 38-3
5) Verify closed breaker from 480-V Bus 38 to MCC 38-2
6) Verify closed breaker from 480-V Bus 38 to MCC 38-1
7) Start 2/3 DG vent fan (2/3 DG vent fan can be fed from either Unit 2 or Unit 3)
8) Verify that 2/3 DG cooling water pump automatically starts.

F. Unit 2 RPV Makeup

1) Ensure breakers to SWGR 23 from unit auxiliary transformer are open
2) Close breakers from SWGR 23-1 to SWGR 23 at both ends 7.3-12

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR A CONTROL ROOM FIRE USING THE ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD OF SHUTDOWN

3) Open manual valves in CRD pump room to provide alternate cooling for CRD pumps
4) Start service water pump 2A at SWGR 23
5) Verify service water flow on local instruments PI2/3-3941-29, PI2-3941-8A, B, and C, and PI3-3941-8A and B
6) Start CRD pump 2A at SWGR 23 6.A) Open CRD pump discharge valve MO2-0301-2A
7) Verify CRD pump flow on FI-2-302-64
8) Verify that a flow path to reactor is open. (i.e., either the scram injection valves are open or AO2-0302-6A or AO2-0302-6B and MO2-302-8 are open)

G. Unit 3 RPV Makeup

1) Ensure breakers to SWGR 33 from unit auxiliary transformer are open
2) Close breakers from SWGR 33-1 to SWGR 33.
3) Open manual valve in CRD pump room to provide alternate cooling from service water system for CRD pumps
4) Start service water pump 3A at SWGR 33 Note: If another service water pump is running, pump 3A need not be started.
5) Verify service water flow on PI2/3-3941-29, PI2-3941-8A, B, and C, and PI3-3941-8A and B
6) Start CRD pump 3A at SWGR 33 6.A) Open CRD pump discharge valve MO3-0301-2A.

7.3-13

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR A CONTROL ROOM FIRE USING THE ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD OF SHUTDOWN

7) Verify CRD pump flow on FI-3-302-64
8) Verify that a flow path to the reactor is open (i.e., either scram injection valves are open or AO3-0302-6A or AO3-0302-6B and MO3-0302-8 are open).

III Maintain Decay Heat Removal Capability A. Unit 2 Short Term Isolation Condenser Shell Makeup

1) Open Valve MO2-4399-74 Note: Remove power to 250-Vdc reactor building MCC Bus 2A if necessary to facilitate manual opening of MO2-4399-74 and prevent any subsequent spurious closure
2) Start isolation condenser makeup pump 2/3-43122A or 2/3-43122B.
3) Verify isolation condenser makeup flow or FI 2/3-4341-152.
4) Verify 480V Bus 29 and 480V MCC 29-2 are energized (Bus 29 is energized from Bus 28).
5) Monitor isolation condenser makeup pump diesel day tank level on LI2/3-5241-22 and L2/3-5241-24.
6) Verify proper operation of fuel oil transfer pump 2-5203.

B. Unit 3 Short Term Isolation Condenser Shell Makeup

1) Open Valve MO3-4399-74.

Note: Remove power to 250-Vdc Reactor Building MCC Bus 3A if necessary to facilitate manual opening of MO3-4399-74 and prevent any subsequent spurious closure.

2) Start isolation condenser makeup pump 2/3-43122A or 2/3-43122B.
3) Verify isolation condenser makeup flow on FI 2/3-4341-152.
4) Verify 480V Bus 29 and 480V MCC 29-2 are energized (Bus 29 is energized from Bus 28).

7.3-14

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR A CONTROL ROOM FIRE USING THE ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD OF SHUTDOWN

5) Monitor isolation condenser makeup pump diesel day tank level on LI2/3-5241-22 and L2/3-5241-24.
6) Verify proper operation of fuel oil transfer pump 2-5203.

C. Unit 2 Cooldown

1) Control Unit 2 cooldown by throttling valve MO2-1301-3
2) Monitor Unit 2 isolation condenser level on local sightglass
3) Monitor RPV pressure and level at instrument racks 2202-5 and 2202-6 (instruments LIS2-263-58A & B, LI2-263-59B, LIS2-263-17B & D, PI2-263-52B and PI2-263-60B)

D. Unit 3 Cooldown

1) Control Unit 3 cooldown by throttling valve MO3-1301-3
2) Monitor Unit 3 isolation condenser level on local sightglass
3) Monitor RPV pressure and level at instrument racks 2203-5 and 2203-6 (instruments LIS3-263-58A & B, LI3-263-59B, PI3-263-52B and PI3-263-60B)

E. Monitor condensate storage tank level on LI2/3-3341-77A & B F. Verify proper operation of Fuel Oil Transfer pump 2/3-5203 G. Monitor local pump discharge pressure indication instrumentation as necessary to ensure proper system operation.

H. Long Term Isolation Condenser Makeup

1) Ensure at least one service water pump operating.
2) Open valve MO2(3)-4102 and MO2(3)-1301-10 IV Address Potential Adverse Valve Spurious Operations A. Remove power to Units 2 & 3 ADS circuits at Units 2 & 3 125-Vdc distribution panels.

7.3-15

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 OPERATIONS REQUIRED FOR A CONTROL ROOM FIRE USING THE ISOLATION CONDENSER METHOD OF SHUTDOWN B. Verify that valves AO-2(3)-0302-6A and 6B and MO-2(3)-0302-8 are open or verify another reactor water makeup source is available (e.g., FW, HPCI) before resetting the scram system (closing scram injection valves).

C. Verify that the RWCU has automatically isolated. If necessary, close remote manual valves 1201-135A, 1201-135B and 1201-205 to isolate system D. Trip HPCI turbine E. Trip any unwanted loads off of buses and remove closing circuit fuses 7.3-16

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.4 Procedures Relevant to Cold Shutdown The procedures and materials needed to achieve cold shutdown are listed in this section. The cold shutdown analysis methodology and zone-by-zone analysis are discussed in Sections 4.0.

Cold shutdown systems are described in Section 3.2.

7.4.1 Procedures Repair procedures are potentially necessary to achieve cold shutdown as identified in Section 3.2.

Repairs may be necessary in the following fire areas as identified in the applicable section or table listed below.

Fire Areas Repairs Identified RB2-I and RB2-II Table 4.2-2 (All Fire Zones except 1.1.2.3 and 1.3.2)

Table 4.2-3 (Fire Zones 1.1.2.3 and 1.3.2)

RB3-I and RB3-II Table 4.5-2 (All Fire Zones except 1.1.1.3 and 1.3.1)

Table 4.5-3 (Fire Zones 1.1.1.3 and 1.3.1) 1.2.1 None 1.2.2 None RB-2/3 None TB-I Table 4.8-2 TB-II Table 4.9-2 TB-III Table 4.10-2 TB-IV None TB-V Table 4.12-2 11.3 None Radwaste None 7.4-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.4.1.1 Dresden 2&3 Cold Shutdown Loads Requiring Temporary Cable Connections Dresden 2&3 cold shutdown loads requiring temporary emergency feeds are listed below per unit.

Quantity (Per Unit) Shutdown Cooling System 2 of 3 Shutdown Cooling Pump 500 HP (ea) 75 A @ 4-kV SWGR (ea) 2 of 2 RBCCW Pump 300 HP (ea) 45 A @ 4-kV SWGR (ea) 2 of 4 Recirc. Loop Vlv 16 HP (ea) 20 A @ 480-V (4A or 5A) MCC (ea) 1 of 2 SDC Vlv 1A or 1B 5 HP 7 A @ 480-V MCC 1 Reactor Building 125-V Feed capable of original Distribution Panel full capacity LPCI/CCSW Div.II 2 of 2 LPCI Pump 700 HP (ea) 105 A @ 4-kV SWGR (ea) 1 LPCI Emg. Air Cooler 5 HP 7 A @ 480-V MCC 5 LPCI Emg. Air Cooler 8A/1A (ea) 40A/5A @ 125-Vdc (all)

(pick up/holding) 2 of 2 CCSW Pumps 500 HP (ea) 75A @ 4-kV SWGR (ea) 2 of 2 CCSW Emg. Air Cooler fans (ea) (2) - 3 HP (total) 20 A @ 480-V MCC The cables necessary to establish the temporary feeds for the above loads are identified in Subsection 7.4.2 and are stored on site.

7.4-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.4.1.2 Control System Repair Procedures The following types of control system repair procedures are necessary. Section 4.0 identifies which equipment must be repaired on a fire area basis.

1. Procedures have been developed for repair of damage to shutdown cooling, RBCCW, service water, main steam relief valves, LPCI/CCSW, auxiliary power, and diesel generator systems.
2. Cable repair procedures have been developed for the following situations:
a. Attach temporary cable to penetrations,
b. Attach temporary cable to motors,
c. Attach temporary cable to switchgear breaker or MCC starter, and
3. Repair procedures to provide the ability to locally control key mechanical and electrical components:
a. Repairs such that a unit dedicated diesel generator and its auxiliaries can be started independently of existing control cable or logic. Modifications to assure local isolation and control capability are made only for the 2/3 diesel generator.

Repair procedures would be applicable to Unit 2 diesel generator and Unit 3 diesel generator.

b. Actions in procedures are available to ensure that the diesel generator capacity is not exceeded (see Tables 3.2-3 and 3.2-6).
c. Procedures are available to transfer from main to reserve 125-Vdc and 250-Vdc power sources.

7.4.1.3 Specific Repairs and Manual Actions Potentially Required for Cold Shutdown A. Shutdown Cooling Pumps and RBCCW

1. If control room start capability is lost, connect temporary cables from the required motors to spare breakers at the opposite unit, as detailed in Subsection 7.4.1.4.A.
2. Jumper the breaker controls (or use local control) to force closure. Verify proper direction of rotation.

7.4-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 B. LPCI Pumps and Auxiliaries

1. If control room start capability is lost, connect temporary cables from the required motors and 480-V switchgear to breakers at the opposite unit as detailed in Subsection 7.4.1.4.B.
2. Jumper the breaker controls (or use local control) to force closure. Verify proper direction of motor rotation.

C. CCSW Pumps If control room start capability is lost, connect temporary cables from the required motors to breakers in the opposite unit SWGR 23-1 and 24-1 or 33-1 and 34-1.

D. Relief Valves If the valves are disabled, remove all relief valve cables from their penetrations, jumper at least three of the penetrations together, and connect a temporary cable from them to the 125-Vdc source at the nearest switchgear that has control power available. Use the opposite unit, if necessary. Verify energization.

(Note: The cable used for this purpose must first be used for repositioning the recirc loop valves, if necessary.)

E. LPCI Emergency Air Coolers/CCSW Emergency Air Cooler Connect temporary cables to a spare breaker or starter at the nearest energized MCC (probably in the opposite unit). Close the breaker, or jumper the starter controls to force start.

F. Recirculation Loop Valves and Shutdown Cooling Valves (Inside Drywell)

Connect temporary cables from the drywell penetration to a spare breaker or starter at the nearest energized MCC. Detailed procedures exist to cover this action.

Once the valve has been repositioned as desired, the temporary cable can be used for other purposes (e.g., relief valves).

G. Reactor Building 125-V Distribution Panel Detailed procedures exist for the installation of a temporary cable to the opposite units 125-Vdc reserve supply and to reconfigure that supply to be fed from the unaffected unit's batteries.

7.4-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 H. All Valves Outside Drywell Manual handwheel operation is assumed. The power feed to the valve will be disabled and the valve manually positioned. The accessibility of these valves for manual operation was reviewed. The valves for which provisions must be made to assure accessibility are identified in Section 6.2.4.

I. Unit 2 and Unit 3 Diesel Generator Local Starting Detailed procedures exist for isolating the unit's dedicated diesels from the control room and establishing local control.

J. Transfer From Main to Reserve 125-V and 250-Vdc Feeds Detailed procedures exist for repositioning slugs and closing breakers to establish reserve dc feeds to distribution panels and switchgear.

K. Process Monitoring Instrumentation Reactor Level and Pressure Reactor level and pressure are normally monitored in the control room on various instruments, which are fed from two independent divisions. The operator can also locally monitor reactor level and pressure in the Reactor Building on instrument racks 2202(3)-5 and 2202(3)-6 at the 546-foot elevation or 2202(3)-7 and 2202(3)-8 at the 517-foot elevation. Reactor pressure is used to determine the saturation temperature in the vessel.

When the vessel pressure is reduced, a meter will be attached to a drywell penetration to measure the recirculation loop temperature, vessel shell temperature and shell flange temperature if control room indication is unavailable.

7.4.1.4 4-kV Breakers to be Used for Temporary Feeds A. Shutdown Cooling 4-kV Bus 23-1 2- Unassigned 1200 A frame w/150A CT's, bkrs 2328 and 2322 Use for 1 - Shutdown Cooling Pump @ Unit 3 and 1 - RBCCW Pump @ Unit 3 4-kV Bus 24-1 2 - Unassigned 1200 A frame w/150A CT's, bkrs 2423 and 2424 Use for 1 - Shutdown Cooling Pump @ Unit 3 and 1 - RBCCW Pump @ Unit 3 4-kV Bus 33-1 7.4-5

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 3 - Unassigned 1200 A frame w/150A and 75A CT's, - bkrs 3328, 3326, and 3321 Use for 1 - Shutdown Cooling Pump @ Unit 2* and 2 RBCCW Pumps @ Unit 2

  • This load may be fed from the 4-kV cable penetration for the bus tie from bus 23 to 23-1 at the nearby wall, if the cable in the turbine building is intact and offsite power is available.

4-kV Bus 34-1 No unassigned breakers.

B. LPCI/CCSW Division II 4-kV Bus 24-1 2- Unassigned 1200 A frame w/150A CT's, bkrs 2423 and 2423 Use for 2 - LPCI Pump 3C and 3D (Div. II) @ Unit 3 4-kV Breaker 34-1 No unassigned breakers.

4-kV Bus 33-1 3- Unassigned 1200 A frame w/150A and 75A CT's, breakers 3328, 3326, and 3321 Use for LPCI Pump 2C.

7.4.2 Materials Needed A. The following cables should be precut to the indicated lengths and maintained in a convenient location, ready for emergency use:

1. 500 feet of 3/c #2 AWG, 5-kV, Cable No. 78400, for any one of the following applications:
a. One shutdown cooling pump at Unit 2.
b. One shutdown cooling pump at Unit 3.
c. One LPCI pump at Unit 3.

7.4-6

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001

2. 500 feet of 3/c #2 AWG, 5-kV, Cable No. 78401, for any one of the following applications:
a. A second shutdown cooling pump at Unit 2.
b. A second shutdown cooling pump at Unit 3.
c. A second LPCI pump at Unit 3.
3. 300 feet of 3/c #2 AWG, 5-kV, Cable No. 78402, for any one of the following applications:
a. One RBCCW pump at Unit 2.
b. One RBCCW pump at Unit 3.
c. One LPCI pump at Unit 2.
4. 300 feet of 3/c #2 AWG, 5-kV, Cable No. 78403, for any one of the following applications:
a. second RBCCW pump at Unit 2.
b. A second RBCCW pump at Unit 3.
c. A second LPCI pump at Unit 2.
5. 350 feet of 3/c #10 AWG, 600-V, Cable No. 78413, for any one of the following applications:
a. Unit 2 LPCI room cooler.
b. Unit 3 LPCI room cooler.
c. Unit 2 shutdown cooling valve.
d. Unit 3 shutdown cooling valve.
6. 500 feet of 4/c #8 AWG, 600-V, Cable No. 78409, for use on the electromatic relief valves and the recirculating loop valves of either unit.

The intent is to connect this cable to one loop valve, force it to the desired position, then remove the cable and proceed to the next valve until all are properly positioned. Finally, if necessary, the same cable can be used to 7.4-7

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 "hot wire" the electromatic relief valves.

7. 800 feet of 3/c #2 AWG, 5-kV, Cable No. 78404, for either of the following applications:
a. One CCSW pump at Unit 2.
b. One CCSW pump at Unit 3.
8. 800 feet of 3/c #2 AWG, 5-kV, Cable No. 78405, for either of the following applications:
a. A second CCSW pump at Unit 2.
b. A second CCSW pump at Unit 3.
9. 700 feet of 4/c #8 AWG, 600-V, Cable No. 78410, for either of the following applications:
a. CCSW room coolers 3C and 3D.
b. CCSW room coolers 2C and 2D.
10. Two 250-foot pieces of 1/c 250 MCM, 600-V, Cable No. 78408, for either of the following applications.
a. Reactor Building 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 2.
b. Reactor Building 125-Vdc Distribution Panel 3.

B. All precut cables have appropriate lugs on both ends to speed the installation of the temporary feeds in time of emergency. When the cables are put to use, any excess lengths should be left lying on the floor, not cut off. An adequate supply of splice kits is also kept on hand so that the lugs may be removed and splice connections made where necessary (e.g., containment penetrations).

7.4-8

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.5 Emergency Lighting A fire at the Dresden facility could cause the loss of various lighting cabinets concurrent with the loss of offsite power. This resulting blackout of sections of the plant would make access to, and control of, safe shutdown equipment impossible. According to Section III.J of Appendix R, 8-hour battery powered emergency lighting packs shall be provided on all access and egress routes and in all areas where safe shutdown equipment needs to be operated.

In order to conform with the Appendix R requirements, a walkdown was performed at the station. This walkdown was performed on all the primary and alternate access routes that the station identified for each manual action in accordance to the guidelines of Dresden Station Special Procedure SP-84-7-62. The resulting 8-hour battery powered emergency lighting unit locations are shown on Drawings F-201-6 through F-214-6.

7.5-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.6 Communication Capabilities The existing communication systems at Dresden Station consist of:

1. Public Address (PA)
2. Dial Telephones (PBX)
3. Sound Power Phones
4. Radio 7.6.1 Effects of Fire on Each Communication System 7.6.1.1 PA System Dresden's PA system has a single 120-Vac power feed from lighting cabinet No. 21, located at Column G-43 on the ground floor of the turbine building (Fire Area TB-II, Central Zone Group).

Lighting cabinet No. 21 is fed from MCC 29-2, located near Column D-32 (Fire Area TB-I, Eastern Zone Group). This MCC is fed from 480-V Bus 29, near Column N-41 at Unit 2 reactor building elevation 570 feet (Fire Area RB2-II). A fire in any of these areas (comprising most of Unit 2) could totally disable the PA system by damaging its only source of power.

The PA system equipment is interconnected by a seven-conductor cable that carries this same 120-Vac feed to all of the local amplifiers. Therefore, a fire anywhere in the plant has the potential to short out the PA power source, tripping the breaker at lighting cabinet No. 21.

Recovery from this condition will require a repair to the damaged cable; this renders the existing PA system totally unavailable for an Appendix R hot shutdown.

7.6.1.2 PBX Dresden's PBX originates in the administration building. A single trunk connects the central system to the main plant via an underground duct run. This trunk terminates in the Unit 2 turbine building. From there, two branches go out to the Unit 2 reactor building and Unit 3 turbine building. An additional branch runs from the Unit 3 turbine building to the Unit 3 reactor building.

Damage to any cable in the PBX system disables only the equipment downstream of the damage.

Therefore, the most vulnerable area is in the vicinity of telephone terminal box 7.6-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 20 JUNE 2015 (TTB) 2-1, on the mezzanine floor of the Unit 2 turbine building (Fire Area TB-I, Eastern Zone Group). A fire at this location could disable all of the telephone equipment in the plant. In contrast, a fire affecting TTB 2-2 on Unit 2 reactor building elevation 545 feet 6 inches, or TTB 3-2 on the same elevation of Unit 3, can disable the PBX in the affected reactor building only.

Minimal damage occurs when the fire is confined to a location distant from the TTB's, which are located along both sides of H-wall; in such a case, only the phones in the immediate vicinity of the fire can be affected. For most plausible fires, the telephones are much more likely to work than the PA system.

7.6.1.3 Sound Power Phones The sound power phone system has the advantage of not requiring an external power source. It essentially consists of a number of jacks, located in (or near) control panels and instrument racks, all wired in parallel. Each jack offers multiple circuits. A matching box in the control room interfaces Units 2 and 3 with Unit 1.

Although it is possible that all of the sound power circuits could be shorted out by a single fire, it is probable that at least one circuit will remain operable. This is a good alternative to the PBX system for areas equipped with sound power jacks.

7.6.1.4 Radio The radio system in use at Dresden is a multi-channel trunked system operating in the 900 MHz band. The base station transceiver equipment is clustered on Turbine Building elevation 549 feet, Rows C-D, 44-45(Fire Area TB-IV, Zone 8.2.8.D, North Turbine Vent Floor). There are over 400 handheld radios in use at Dresden. Each handheld is capable of operating on any unused channel in the system. Each handheld also has multiple channels of talk around which means that a handheld can talk directly to another handheld that is on the same channel. There are remote consoles located in the Control Room, the Central Alarm Station (CAS), and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS). The remote consoles communicate to the base station equipment located in the Turbine Building. There are several antennas fed by coaxial cable from the base station equipment located on the 549 level of the Turbine Building to the various locations throughout the plant, plus bi-directional antennas at the cribhouse and SBO building.

Refer to drawing 12E-6802L for the antenna locations.

7.6-2

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 22 JUNE 2019 A fire in the area of the base station equipment on the 549' level of the plant or in the AEER could disrupt the operation of the entire system. A fire in the area of any of the remote consoles could disrupt communication only from that console in the area of the fire, while communications from the locations of the other remote consoles would not be affected.

Communication from a handheld would not be affected by a fire in the vicinity of any of the remote consoles.

Most fires remote from the base station will have little or no impact. Some of the antennas are sufficiently isolated from the others so that short circuits on one antenna's coaxial cable will not significantly degrade the performance of the remaining antennas.

7.6.2 Communication System Availability in the Event of a Fire The availability of each communication system for a fire in a given fire area is summarized in Table 7.6-1. For most conceivable fires, some portions of the existing communication systems can be expected to remain operational. Procedures allow for the attempted use of normal communication methods, with reliance upon alternate systems only when necessary. However, since there is a remote possibility that a major fire in the turbine building will disable all of the existing communication systems, a field test of hand-held radios communicating on simplex frequencies independent of the base station equipment was performed to determine if that communication mode was an acceptable alternative.

It was found by this test that, generally, hand-held radios on "talk-around" are a reliable means of direct communication between locations within the same building or from one building to another on nearby elevations. Direct communication is not achievable between widely separated points due to the many reinforced concrete walls and floors separating them. However, the test revealed that by the use of intermediate relay points, communication difficulties can be resolved for all Appendix R safe shutdown procedures. A similar test was performed in March 2017, and the results are documented in AR 3975416-06. Additionally, a white paper describing the available communications during a worst case scenario is captured in AR 3975416-07.

Therefore, modifications to the Dresden plant communication systems are not required.

7.6-3

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 TABLE 7.6-1 COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AVAILABILITY MATRIX Prescribed Area in Which Appendix R Anticipated Availability for Fire is Postulated Shutdown Path Manual Actions Sound Radio PA PBX Power (Base)

RB2-I C N/A N/A N/A N/A RB2-II B1 3 1* 2 1 RB3-I D N/A N/A N/A N/A RB3-II A1 3 1* 2 1 RB2/3 E&F N/A N/A N/A N/A TB-I B1 3 3 2 3 TB-II A2 & B2 3 2 2 3 TB-III A1 3 1 2 1 TB-IV A&B N/A N/A N/A N/A TB-V A2 & B2 3 1 2 3**

Crib House A&B N/A N/A N/A N/A Radwaste A&B N/A N/A N/A N/A Misc. Outside A&B N/A N/A N/A N/A Note: 1 - Probably available. Little or no damage is expected.

2 - Partially available. Some circuits may still work.

3 - Probably disabled. Crucial circuits are in fire area.

  • - Except at 2/3 Diesel Generator.
    • - Except repeaters.

N/A - Not applicable. Shutdown path does not require any local control or manual action.

7.6-4

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.7 Access to Safe Shutdown Equipment In order to perform the safe shutdown procedure actions described in Sections 7.3 and 7.4, it is necessary to enter areas which are isolated from the rest of the plant by electrically-controlled or otherwise locked doors. These doors fall into four categories: secondary containment air locks, security doors, high radiation area doors, and miscellaneous locked doors. An evaluation was performed to determine the impact of these doors on access to safe shutdown equipment in the event of a fire. The results of the evaluation are presented in Subsections 7.7.1, 7.7.2, 7.7.3, and 7.7.4.

7.7.1 Secondary Containment Airlock Doors Secondary containment door interlocks are powered by the 125-Vdc system, which is not postulated to be lost in most safe shutdown scenarios. Furthermore, an emergency bypass button is locked at each door, which could be used upon approval of the Shift Engineer to defeat the interlock. If a fire were to disable the 125-Vdc source to these interlocks, they would fail in such a manner that access would not be prevented.

7.7.2 Security Doors The card key system for the security doors would normally be available under a loss of offsite power incident, since the security diesel is designed to start and pick up these loads upon loss of bus 34-1. However, if the security diesel fails to start or if a fire damages the security multiplexer cables, the card key system could be impaired such that normal entrance through the security doors would be prevented. However, egress from the security areas would not be prevented.

Therefore, in most cases, loss of the card key system would not hinder the operators from reaching safe shutdown locations. Current security force procedures call for the prompt posting of guards at certain locations to assist operations personnel by opening the doors, as necessary.

Additionally, the Shift Engineer has keys assigned to him for use in the event that emergency access is needed prior to arrival of the security force personnel. A note is provided in the safe shutdown procedure package to caution the Shift Engineer that use of these keys may be necessary and to issue them as appropriate.

7.7.3 High Radiation Area Doors High radiation area doors are kept locked in accordance with 10 CFR 20. The Radiation/Chemistry Department controls the normal issuance of high radiation area keys.

However, a sufficient number of keys will remain assigned to the Shift Engineer exclusively for use during the performance of the safe shutdown procedures. For personnel safety reasons, a Caution will be provided in the safe shutdown procedure package such that a Radiation/Chemistry Technician or Radiation Protection Foreman should be contacted prior to entry into any high radiation areas. If necessary, he will accompany the Operator and assist him.

7.7-1

DRESDEN 2&3 AMENDMENT 13 JUNE 2001 7.7.4 Miscellaneous Locked Doors There are certain areas of concern which are kept locked (e.g., diesel generator rooms, battery rooms, and the auxiliary electric equipment room). Operations personnel are all assigned a key for the purpose of access to these areas. Additionally, the Shift Engineer is assigned keys which he can issue for this purpose.

7.7-2

Amendm ent 16

solo t ion condens er a utoMo. tic initio. tion X

Makeup to isoto tion condens er ------X shell initio tion Makeup to RPV initio tion (Scale Change) 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />(N ote 1) t=30sec.( MOXiMUM ) t=20Min t=O Scro.n Note 1: Assunes 15° F /hr cooldown s DRESDEN STATI ON AR #32.0066 docume nts the actual time UNITS 2 8x 3 required to perform the actions listed in FIGURE 7 .2-1 this figure . The __\ R is li~tcd in tly ,

TIME INTERVALS AVAILABLE FOR DFPPD P, Volume 6, Book L Section X MAKEUP \./ATER INITIATION GIVEN for referenc e only. AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF ISOLATION CONDENSER

Amendment 16 Isoln tion condens er _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -X initio. tion Makeup to isolo. tion condens er * - - - - - - - - - - - - -X shell initio. tion Mokeup to RPV initio. tion '---- ---- --- -- - - - - - - - x I I I t=20 nin t=SO nin t=o t=30 nin Scron DRESD EN STATIO N AR #320066 documen ts the actual time UNITS 2 & 3 required to perform the actions Iisted in FIGURE 7.2-2 this figure. The AR is listed in the TIME INTERVAL S AVAILABL E FOR DFPPDP , Volume 6, Book 1,Section X MAKEUP \JATER INITIATIO N G1VEN for reference only. INITIATIO N OF ISOLATIO N CONDENSE R 15 MINUTES AFTER SCRAM

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