ML21179A053
| ML21179A053 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Dresden  |
| Issue date: | 06/21/2021 |
| From: | Exelon Generation Co |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML21179A042 | List:
|
| References | |
| RS-21-066 | |
| Download: ML21179A053 (245) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:FPR Volume 5 Part 1
CROSS REFERENCE FROM OLD TO NEW ( .(
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1) CONFIGURATIONS OF FPPDP DRESDEN 2 & 3 HISTORICAL VOLUME - LICENSING BASIS SUPPORT DOCUMENTATION Book 1 I Correspondence Referenced in Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Reports (see Vol. 1 and 2 of FPPDP) Book 2 II Major Ma'jor CECo Submittals Referenced in Fire Fi re Protection Protect i on Safety Evaluation Eva 1uat i on Reports (see Vol. 2 of FPPDP) III General Fire Protection Correspondence (see Vol. 2 of FPPDP) ( Book 3 Fire Protection Drawings (For Reference Only) (see Vol. 3 of FPPDP) LICENSING BASIS VOLUME 1 - lICENSING I Regulatory Documents (see Vol. 4 of FPPDP) II Safety Evaluation Reports for Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and Functional Responsibilities (see Vol. 5 of FPR) III for*10 CFR 50 Appendix R, Sections III.G and Safety Evaluation Reports for,lO III.l III.L and 10 CFR 50.48 (see Vol. 5 of FPR) IV Fire Protection Technical Specifications and Related Safety Evaluation Reports (see Vol. 3 of FPR) V V NRC Inspection Reports (see Vol. 3 of FPR) 1
Cross Reference (cont'd) VOLUME 2 - UPDATED FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS I Fire Hazards Analysis Report (see Vol. 1 of FPR) II Fire Hazards Analysis Preparation Summary (see Vol. 4 of FPPDP) III List of Fire Protection Drawings (see Vol. 4 of FPPOP) FPPDP) VOLUME 3 - APPENDIX R SECTIONS III.G, III.G. III.J, III.J. AND III.L CONFORMANCE Book 1 I Safe Shutdown Report (see Vol. 2 of FPR) II Safe Shutdown Report Preparation Summary and Division of Responsibility, January 27, 1987 (see Vol. 4 of FPPDP) Book 22 Interim Measures/Exemption Requests I Executive Summary (see Vol. 4 of FPR) II Interim Compensatory Measures (see Vol. 4 of FPR) III Appendix R Exemption Requests and Analysis (see Vol. 4 of FPR) IV Appendix R Exemption Requests and Analysis Transmittal Letters (see Vol. 4 of FPPDP) V Generic Letter 86-10 Evaluations (see Vol. 4 of FPR) 2
Cross Reference (cont/d) (cont'd) ( VOLUME 4 - FIRE PROTECTION REPORTS/SUPPLEMENTARY GUIDANCE Book 11 I Combustible Loading (see Vol. 5 of FPPDP) II Structural Steel Analysis (see Vol. 55 of FPPDP) III Fire Rated Barrier Design Support Data (see Vol. 6 of FPPDP) Book 2 IV Supplementary Guidance Review (see Vol. 7 of FPPDP) ( V Emergency Lighting Report (see Vol. 7 of FPPDP) VI Rated Barrier Maintenance and Surveillance Program (see Vol. 7 of FPPDP) VII Communications (see Vol. 7 of FPPOP) FPPDP) VIII Safe Shutdown Equipment Access (see Vol. 7 of FPPDP) IX Volume 4 Microfiche (see Vol. 7 of FPPDP) X OSHA Fire Protection Requirements (see Vol. 7 of FPPDP) VOLUME 5 - NFPA CODE CONFORMANCE (HYDRAULIC CALCULATIONS) Book 1 NFPA Code Review (see Vols. 8 and 9 of FPPDP) ( 3
Cross Reference (cont/d) (cont'd) Book 2 I Fire Suppression System Hydraulic Verification Study (see Vol. 10 of FPPDP) II Drawings Drawi ngs in Support of the Hydraulic Hydraul i c Verification Veri fi cat i on Study (see Vol. Vo 1. -ra
-ro of FPPDP)
III Hydraulic Calculations (see Vol. 10 of FPPDP) Book 33 IV C-Factor Verification Data (C == 80) (see Vol. 11 of FPPDP) V Supplement One - Hydraulic Verification Study (see Vol. 11 of FPPDP) ( VI Supplement Two - Hydraulic Verification Study (see Vol. 11 of FPPDP) VII Supplement Three - Hydraulic Verification Study (see Vol. 11 of FPPDP) VIII Supplement Four - Hydraulic Verification Study (see Vol. 11 of FPPDP) VOLUME 6 - REFERENCE Book 11 I Fire Protection Program Audit and Open Item Closure (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) II Previous Commitment Review and Open Item Closure (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) III PLC Review of Procedures in Support of Technical SpeCifications Specifications (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) 4
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(~- Cross Reference (cont/d) (cont'd) '\, 'l, IV Fire Protection Procedures (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) V Pre-Fire Plans (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) VI Suppression Effects Analysis (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) VII Fire Protection Reevaluation Project Plan (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) VIII Fire Protection Evaluation Plan (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) IX Audit/Inspection Reports Reports,t Responses, and Closure (see Vol. 12 of FPPDP) X Fire Protection Supporting Calculations (see Vol. 13 of FPPDP) ( XI Miscellaneous Letters Letters,t Memos and Meeting Notes (see Vol. 13 of FPPDP) XII Volume 6 Microfiche (see Vol. 13 of FPPDP)
,I/ ~~-
5
Volume Index
( DRESDEN 2 &
&3 FIRE PROTECTION REPORTS Volume Index VOLUME 1 - Updated Fire Hazards Analysis VOLUME 2 - Appendix R Conformance (Sections III.G, III.J, and III.L) - Safe Shutdown Report VOLUME 3 - Technical Specifications, Technical Requirements, and Inspection Reports VOLUME 4 - Interim Measures/Exemption Requests
( VOLUME 5 - Safety Evaluation Reports c
Dresden 2 &3 FIRE PROTECTION REPORTS Volume Index VOLUME 5 - SAFETY EVALUATION REPORTS I Safety Evaluation Reports for Appendix A to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and Functional Responsibilities. 1 March 22, 1978 Initial Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report 2 December 2, 1980 Supplement to March 1978 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report 33 February 12, 1981 Resolution to Fire Protection Open Issues of December 2, 1980 Supplement (Except Safe Shutdown) II Safety Evaluation Reports for 10CFR50 Appendix R Sections III.G and III.L and 10CFR50.48 1 January 19, 1983 10CFR50 Appendix R Fire Protection Safety (c-Evaluation Report 2 February 2, 1983 Safety Evaluation of Exemptions to 10CFR50 Appendix R Section III.G. 3 July 17, 1987 Safety Evaluation of the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50, Items III.G.3 and III.L. 4 September 10, 1987 Safety Evaluation by the Division of Reactor Projects Related to Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50, Item Section III.G. 5 September 28, 1987 Safety Evaluation and Acceptance of Exemption request for Drywell Expansion Gap 6 January 5, 1989 Safety Evaluation and Acceptance of Exemption Requests from 10CFR50 Appendix R, Item III.G 7 July 6, 1989 Safety Evaluation and Acceptance of Exemption Request for Hot Shutdown Repairs 8 August 15, 1989 Granting of Technical Exemptions from 10CFR50 Appendix R
I DRESDEN 2&3 FIRE PROTECTION DOCUMENTATION PACKAGE Safety Evaluation Reports for Appendix ~ to BTP APCSB 9.5-1 and Functional Responsibilities Tab Title 1 March 22, 1978 Initial Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report 2 December 2, 1980 Supplement to March 1978 Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report 3 February 12, 1981 Resolution to Fire Protection Open Issues of December 2, 1980 Supplement (Except Safe Shutdown) c ~ l.
1 c SAFETY EVALUATIO~ E\,Al.U;:\TlO~: REPORT BY HE 8Y THE OFFICE OF
------ NUCLEAR REACTO~ REGULATION
- u. tlUCI.EAR U. S. ~iUCI.EI\"~ CO::'!'ISSION RESULt-TORY CO::*'~ISSION REGULATORY IN THE ~U\TTER t1i,TTER OF CO~~ONWEALTH EDISON CO!':?~NY
( NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNITS 2 AND 3 D~ESGEN ~UCLEAR
-~.
/
DOCKET NO. 237/249
~~crch
~~arch 1978
/
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c( TADLE OF CONTENTS P!\GE 1.0 HfiROJUCnmL...................................................... I1HROullCTIOU.. ...*....... ............ ......................... ..... 1-1 l.O C.O GUIDELINES.............................. ... ........ FIRE PROTECTION GUIDEU/1ES......................................... 2-1 2.1 Overall Objectives............................... ObJectives............................................ ............. 2-1 2.2 General Design Crite':"lon Crite~icn 3 - Fire Protection.................. Protection.......... ........ 2-1
- 3. 0 SU~!r'1ARY SU~:r*1ARY tDDIFICATIONS M:)
OF t*:JDIFICATIONS A,':J n~C01'i?LETE n:CO::'PLETE ITH1S...................... ITEt*1S...................... 3-1
- 3. 1 ~lodifi.:at"ior.s.................................................
~:oGifi"atior.s................................................. 3-1 3.1. 1 3.1.1 Fire Detection Syste;ns.................................
Syst;;ns ................................ . 3-1 3.1.2 .Det"cti:Jn Smoke ,Detect Systc:;ls Tests ion Systc;lIS Tests..........................
......................... . 3-2 3.1.3 Fire Fi ~:ater Supply re \;/ater Supply......................................
.................................... .. 3-2 3.1.4
- 3. 1. 4 Hose H 0 s e Stations..........................................
Sta t i ;) ns ......................................... . 3-2 3 1 5 3.1.5
** \\t'ater
.r"tPf 1 0: _ S"~
S~?/.l!"'2s::;ion
~ ~ /.. C <:
""T'" ~ C'
~ nn, Systems l' ". S"S~
J nm-:;,................
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
- 3-3 3.1.6
- 3. 1. 6 GllS SUPPl'~
Gas Suppl*~ssic*s s k.,.., Syst~;;;sSyst~;;;s...........................
............................... ...... 3-3 3.1 ..7 3.1.7 Portable Extinruishers ................................ ..................... 0_ *** _._.... . 3-~
3-:'
- 3. 1 .. 8 3.1.8 Fire 000 Doorsr s ...***.........................*.
................................. : .......... ............ 3-4
( 3.1.9
- 3. 1.9 3.1.10
$~p2rvision of Fire Doors S:J;Jerliision Fire Dam~)er5 Dam;Jers...........................................
Doors.............................. 3~4 3-4 3-4
!I 3.1.11 Protection fer for Structures .............................
Structures.................... ........... 3-5 3*5 3.1.12 POl'l:-;,~,'e Porl:,:.le Vt'~ti1rltion V2f\tilrltion Equipment. Equipment........... ........................................ 3-5
. 3.1.13-3.1.13 '='-.:.-*thir:
..8:-e2thir.g
;. L e a *p 0:; t.";::a:-ct~s
=.-, ~-
" ... Co i c. _ <: ...........................
-'1'.... .. ~. .. * * * * .. " .. " * " * " 4t .. .. " " .. " " .. .. .. * .. : ........
- .. * * .. .. * ... 3-5 3.1.14 Cable Tray F Cab12 Fireire Steps Stops ......................... ; ....... ......... 3-5 3.1.15 3.1. 15 Control of Co!: ..~u.:.tibles ..........................*.....
Co;:;;;ustibles................................ 3-5 3.1. 16 \oJater Car~G2 Protection viater CaraG2 Protection................................
..*......*........*......*.*..*. 3-5 3.1.17 Enclosures.............................................
Enclosures ................................*..........*. 3-6
- 3. 1. 18 3.1.18 Fire Ba Barrhrt;..........................................
rr i !; r~. _ ............................*....*...... 3-6 3.1.19 Cable Cab Ie Acc~;,s A:ce~5...........................................
**********.***.*.************.**.*..******. 3-6 3.1.20 Fir~
Fire R~tardant Retardant Coatings Coatings................................
.*.............................. 3-6 3.1.21 Manual Actuation Staticn .*...*.........................
Staticn............................... 3-6 3.1.22 Cable Separation ......................................
.* _..................................... : 3-6 3.1.23 Yard Hydrants .**......*.**...................*.........
.**....................................... 3-7 3.2 Incomplete Items Items.... ....... :.............................. ........
........................................... 3-7 3.2.1 Administrative Controls ............................ ............................... :. ;.~. 3-7 3.2.2 ~adiologi~al Consequences of Fires..................... 3-7 3.2.3 Cable Pen;tration Pen=tration Fira Fire Barrier Tests................... 3-7 3.2.4 Shutdown Capability.................................
Capability....................... ......... ..... .... 3-7
c ( CO~;TEtnS (Cor,U TASIE[ OF CONTENTS TASl (Cont;~ued) rl.lcjl PAGE 4.0 [V,\LUATION Of- [V;\LUATION Of PU,rH PLAtiT FEATURES ......................................
************.*.*.**.*..****.***********. 4-1 4.1 Safe Shutdo,/n S3fe Sys~er.1s.........................................
Shutdo;.m Sys7.efi'ls .............. '........................... 4-1 4.2 Detection 2;,d Fire Detecticn 2~d Sign.:!ling Sign~ling Sy5t<:0::5.......................... Syster::s.......... ........*....... 4-1 4.3 Fi re Control Syster.ls Fire Syster.;s ......................................... ;~ 4-2 4.3. 4.3.11 Water Systerr.s.......................................... Systerts........... ............................... 4-2 4.3.1.1 Water Supply ............... ;~ ...........*...*.. Supp ly ...*........... .. .. . . .. .. . * . . . * . . 4- 2 4-2 4.3.1.2 Pumps.................................... Fire Pumps.. ......................... ... ...... 4-2 4.3.1.3 Fire Water Piping System...................... Syster.1...... ........*....... 4-3 1}-3 4.3.1.4 Interior Fire Fire.Hose ,Hose Stations................... Stations. ..... ....*........ 4-4 4.3.1.5 AUtC~:3tic Autc:::atic Sprinkler Syster,~s......... .......... Syster.is........... .*. ..... 4-4 4.3.1.6 Effects of Suppression Systems on Safety teIr.S *. *. * *. *. * *. *. .* * *. .* . . . .* .* *. *. .* *. .* . .* . . .* . .* .* . .* .* *. .* .* .* Sys terr:s 4-4 4.3.2 Gas Fire Su;:>press;on SU;Jpression Syster:'s........... SystH'S.... ....... .......... .... ............. ....... 4-4 4.3.3 Port2ble Port~ble Fire Extir.gu;she~s. Extir.guishe~5. ... ........
..... ............. ...... 4-5 4.4 Vent if11at ion i on Sys terns ond Systems Mid £3reathi Breathi ng Equip:::ent. ....................
Equip:::ent ................. 4-5 c*c~ . 4.4.1 4.4.2 V:-ntilation V8ntilation Systems .............*..............*.***.** Breathi ng Eqtd Breathing pr.;ent ................. Eq,Jipr.;ent .................................... ' .................. . 4-5 4-5 4.5 4.:5 Drains.................................................. Floor Drains..................................... ............. 4-(, 4-6 4.6 light~ng Syste:ns....................... .................. ...... Light~r,.g Syste:ns......................................... 4-6 t.-6 4.7 Co~munic3tions CO"',;nunic3tions 5yste~5 5yste:;l~..............................
.......................................... ~......... 4-6 4.8 Electrical E:p.ctrical Cables ............*......................
................................... ~......... ~.... *.*.. 4-6 4.9 Fire Barrier Penetrations.. ............. ..*.......... ............*.. ............... ..**... ...*... 4-7 4.10
- 4. 10 Separation Sepa Critaria............................
t'd t ion Cri tc ri a ...........................................* ~ .... .. ......* 44-7
-7
- 4. 11 Jl Fi re 8ar:-i Ear:-; ers. . . . . . . ....... ...... . .... .... . . . .... . . . .... . ......
. . . . .*. 4-8 4.12 ~...................................
Access and Egress ......... ,................................... 4-8 4.13 Toxic and Corrosive Combustion Products...... ................. ..........*...... 4-9 5.0 EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC PLAtH PLAIIT AREAS ...............................
....................... , .**.*.**. '.. 5-1 5.11 Reactor Buildi~g.~
- 5. ..*.*...**.**..........*..............*....*
Bui Idi r.9. -. ..*.**..**.****......*.**.*...*.....****..** 5-1 5.1.1
- 5. I. 1 Basement Basemer.t Floor (Elevation 476 feet) .....*.......*.**... .....*.......*.**.*. 5-1 5.1.2 Ground Floor (Elevation 517 feet) ........*....**..**... ......*.*..*.**.***..* 5-1 5.1.3
- 5. 1.3 Hezzanine (Elevatic-n 545 feet) ..........
~fezzanine Floor (Elevatic.n .................. _....... . 5-2
'~Main F1c,r 5.1.4*'Main 5.1.4 (Elevation 570 feet) ......................
F10r (Elevati'on ..........*.*.....***.** .. 5-3 5.1.5 Floor Elevation 589 feet ...........................*...
.......................**..*... 5-5 Refueli~~ Floor (Elevation 613 fe2t) 5.1.6 Refuelir.;J feet) ...................
...............**... 5-5 5.1.7 Corner ReODS Rcocs (El (Elevation evat ion 517 feet) fe~t) ................
............... ;-.... ........ 5-6 5.1.8 High Pre~sur2 Pre35ure Cool C~G1an~ an: Inj2:ticn Inje:ticn Pua.p PUffiP Roo~s ... :~ ........ . 5-7
(
( lA8LE lABLE OF CO~TENTS CC~TENTS (Cont5nu~d) PJ.,GE PP.GE r,. S. 2 Pri~al"Y Pri~al'"Y Containiilent........................................... Containment........................................... 5-7 5.3 Contro.1 Contro.l Room.............................................. Room.................................................. .... 5-8 5.4 Auxiliary Electrical Equipment Roo,-::........................... Roo;:: ..................... , ..... 5-10 5.5 Switchgear S.",i tchgear Rooms.............................................. 5-1i 5-1 j 5.6 Unit 2 8at.tery Battery Room.......................................... 5-11 5.7 Unit 3 Battery Reom........... ............ ........ ............ Ream........................................... 5-12 S.B 5.8 Diesel Generator Rooms ........... Die5el ...........*............................. i ****************************. 5-13 5.9 Turb; Turbine ne Building.............................................. Buil di ng. . . . . . . . . . . * . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1~ 5.9.1 83sement Basement Fleor (Elevation 469 feet f~et and ~81 feet)....... feet) ...... . 5-14 5.9.2 S.9.2 Floor Elevation 495 feet. ......... ...................... feet .............................. 5-15 5.9.3 Unit 3 Cable Tunnel.TunneL ................................ ~.. ~ .. 5-15 5.9.4 Ground Floor (Elevetion (Elev~tion 517 feet) .......... , ........... .......... . 5-16 5.9.5 Mezzanine Floor (Elevation 538 and 534 feet)........... feet) .......... . 5-]8 5-18 5.9.6 Floor (Eleva:ion (Eleva~ion 549 feet)........ ...................... feet) ............................ 5-19 5.9.7 Main Floor (Elevation 551 fcGt) fcat) ........... ,~............ ........... . 5-20 5.10 RedYiaste Building ................. , .......................... . R2dv,'dStC 5-21 5- 21 5. 5.1111 Off**C2.s Recombi ner Area ...... Off"C.::.s :, ................................ '
......*................................ 5-21 S.12
- 5. 12 Pu;np H0use PUiiip HGuse ...................................................
***.**......*******.*.*..*..*..*...*****.*...***.**.. 5-22 5.
5.1313 Yu rd fIr'ea Yard /1 re a ....................................................
................. , ............... , .................. . 5-23
( 5. 14 5.14 Off-GJS Off-C~s Filter Building .......................................
............*...................*.. : .. . 5-23 6.0 ADi*iWISTRATIVE ADi*jIiiISTI\ATIVE CO!HROLS CO:nROLS ..........................................
..............*..............*.....*..*..... .. 5-1 6-1 7.0
].0 SFECIFICAT10~S ..........................................
nw;rCAL SFtCIFICATIO:.;S TECt-;:..nO,L ............................. , ............ . 7-1
- 8. 0 CCXC LUS IlOr,S ...*..****.**.*.**...*.....*..*.... , , * . * . . . . . . . . .*; *. * * *. *. * .
O/,S .************.***********..*.**...**.******..**. 8-1 9.0 CCNSUlTANTS CCNSULTANTS REPORT................................................. Rc:PORT. ................................................ 9-1 APPENDIX APPENGIX A CHRONOLOGY CHRo/,OLOGY .......... *......... .- ............................. :
..*.*............*.*..............*.............. A-l A-1 APPENDIX 8 CONSULTANTS REPORT. ............................ *..............
REPORT........................................... B-1 8-1
- 1. 0 1.0 I:,TR0DUCTION IHTP.0DUCTION Following a fire at the tr,e Browns Ferry Nuclear Station in March 1975.
Feny NuclQar 1975, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission initiated an eva1uation evaluation of the ne2d for improving the fire fil'e protection programs at ~ll .311 licensed nuclear po~er po'Oer plants. As part of this continuing evaluation, the tlRC, NRC, in February 1976, 1975, publi5hed the report by a special review group entitled, IIRecc;';1~~:1d:.tion$
"Recc~~!~d!tions Related to Bro\rf~s Brow~s F~rryFerry Fire,1I NUREG-OOSO. This re>port Fire," 1'UREG-OOSO. recof:1mencec that rt'port recor.:mence:::
improvements in the areas of fire fi re prevention and fire fi :'e control be 8adecade in most mast existing facilitie~ facilities and that consideration be given to design f~dtures features that would increase the ability of ~u~lear nuc.lear facilities facilitias to withst~~d withst.::r,d fires without the los~ los s, of important functions. funct ions. To implement the report's repol't' s recom-mendations. the NRC initiated a program for reevaluation reevaluatiD~ of the fire protection programs at ell licensed nuclear power po~er stations, and fer for a comprehensive review of all new licensee applications. co~prehensive applications, The NRC issued new guidelines for fire protection programs in nuclear power plants ~hich reflect the recoGmendations recoGmendetions in NUREG-Q050. NUREG-0050. These guidelines are contained in the following documents: g~idelines "Starid~rd Review Plan for the Re "Stand2.rd ... iew of Safety Analysis Reror~s Review Repor~s fOI~ for f'cwEor Plants," NUREG-75/027, Section 9.5.1, IlFire Nuclear Pcw~r "Fire Pro:'2:tion," Pro:,,:tion," Nay hich incll.ld~s Hay 1976, .....which includes "Guidelines for Fire Fir'e Protection for 1;;.;-:lr;ar r;;;,::l'Jar Power Plants,1l Plants," (BTP-APCSB 9.5-1), Nay l~ 1976. May 1, c::::
"Guidelines for Fire Protection for ~~ucleal" IIG~idelines Nuclear Po'..:er Power Plants,!!
Plants," (Ap~en:"!;x (Appen~ix A to BTP-A?CS3 BTP-APCSa 9.5-1), August 23, 1976.
"Supple;;'<::'1tary "Suppleffientary Guidance on Infor;'i\ation Infor;nation Needed fCl"*Fire fer' Fire Protection Program Evaluation,U Evaluation," September 30. 30, 1976.
uSampl e Technical Specificatior,s/'
"Sample Specifications," I-lay May 12, 1977.
"Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administra-tive Controls and Quality Assurance," June 14, 1977.
All licensees were requested to: (l) (1) compare their fire protection"programs protection' programs with the new gui6~lines; and (2)* (2)' analyze the consequences of a postulated fire in each plant area. We have reviewed the lic~nsee's licensee's analyses and have visi~edthevisi.tedthe plant to examine the relationship of safety-related components, systems and struc-tUres tures with both c~mbustibles c0mbustibles and the associated fire detection and suppres-systems. OU~, sion systems.- Ou,' review was based upon the licensee's Pl'oposed proposed program for fire protection as described in the following do~keted docketed information: (1) "Fire JlFire Protectio~ Re;:Jort," dated ~~ar":h Re~ort," doted Mar:h 29, 1977, and revision by letter daL~d dated August ;9, 19, 1977; 1317; c " 1- !.
(2) The fire protection review teClrnls tea,g's site dsits visits of Jan~ary J3nJary 10 to It,, l~, 1977 and May 23, 1977;* (3) T,he icensee's resp8nse to reqt:(;st The 1licensee's fo" ,~8dition~1 reqt:est fell' ,18dition~1 infcr ..*~ticlc dat?d inicrc*otic" dated July 19, August 88,t Septeober 9 and 29, ilovc;;,l;er Cece;i1Jer 13 and r;O'.U':;;It.~r 15, CeceiilDer 29, 1977 1977,1 and January 25, 1978. 1978, Our review has been limited to the aspects of fire protection related to the prot~ct protect ion of publ it: ir.: health and safety fl'om the staricpoint r~dio star;cpoint of rndio-cG"sequ~nces. logical consequences. We have not consid~red con5id~red 2spects of fire prJt~ction prot~ction associated with safetysaff.'ty and with property protection, unless they i~pact i;.'p2.ct health and safety of the public due the hea1th dua to the release of radioactive material. matria1. This report summarizes the results of our cvalu3tioil cvalu3tion of the fire protection prog-:-am Commonwf:alth Edison CCr.lpany's prog~am at COlilmonw£oalth CCr.1pany's Dresden Units 2 and 3. The chronology of our evaluation is sUffi:::arized A;Jpendix A of this report. sum~arized in A?pendix { 1-2
.((
- 2. a FIRE PRJTECTIO,'~
2.0 PR,JTECTlO,', Gl!IO~LH:~S Gl!IO~Un~S 2.1 Objectives Overall Ohjectives The overall objectives of the fire protection program in a nuclear powar pOW2r plant are*to: are'to: (1) reduce th~ lik~lihood likelihood of occurrence of fires; (2) promptly detect and cxtingu*jsh cxtingu'jsh fires when they occur; (3) maintain the capabi1ity capability to safely shutdown the plant 'When when "fires
'fires occur; and (4) prevent the release of a significant amount of radioactive ~ate,ie1 mate,iel if fires fi res occur.
2.2 General Desion DesiGn Criterion 3 - Fire Protection The Commission's basic criterion for fire protecticn is set forth in General 025ign D2sign Criterion 3, Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50, which states: c "Structures, systems sys terns and components ;;;:portant designed and located to minimiz2, rnents, I ;;:portant to safety shal1 minimize, consistent \oIoiith sha 11 b2. b2
.. ith other safety re~.,ire ments, the probability and effect of fires and Explosions. explosions.
rt::;~Jire "Noncombustible and heat resistant m~terials
'INoncombustible miterials shall be used wherever practical throughout thrDughout the units.
units, particularly in locations such as t~e containment aoda~d the control roc~. roem.
"Fire detection and. appropl'"iate capacity a~d protection systems of appropriate and,protection capability shall be provided and designed d~signed to mir.imize the cdvers: adverse effects of fires on structures, systems and components important ,0 to safety.
"Fire fighting systems shall be designed to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair inopair the safety capapility capability of these structures, systems and co;nponE::lts."
CO:ilpOnEnts." Guidance on the implementation of General Design Criterion 3 for existing nuclear power plants is provided in Appendix A of Branch Technical Posi-tion 9.5-~, "Guiclelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants. Plants."1I We have used the guidance in Appendix A where appropriate. We ""e have also evaluated alternatives proposed by the licensee to assure that the c'.'e-211 cve~all objectives outlined in Section 2.1 are met for the actual re13tion5~~~ c' c~
,(- combustibles, co~bustible5, saf~ty-rclated equipment, and fire protection features. ,(
2-1
3. 3.11 Modifications The l1t;.ensee lisensee plans to make certain plant modifications to improve the fire protection program as a result of the licensee's and t~e the staff's evaluation. Such proposed mOdif1cations modifications are sum~arized below. Further detai1 detail is provided in tha the licensee's submittals. The s~ctions s!ctions of this report which discuss the modifications ar~ are noted in parentheses. A11 All modifications wi will co"'p 1eted by startup fo 11 be CO:1rp o;~i ng fa 11 O\."i ~9 D.!:.SJ n9 the W-9 derl 3_.,.r~f.u.aJjll;..Q~tligg.l D.!:.s.? den 3.~r~f.lJ.a]j.Jl:;..Q>rt.igg~ Certainn items 11 Certa; listed belec\>,. ., are marked with an asteri sted bel asterisk sk to iindicate ndi cate that the NRC staff will require additional infoomaticn infoomation in the form of design desian details to assure th2t the design is ucceptable ucceptat,le prior to actual i~ple;en i~ple~en tation of these modifications. The balance of the other modifications has been described in an acceptable leval level of datail. 3.1.1 Fire Detection Systems Ea~ly w2rning warning automatic fire ~etection systems will be provided in the ffo011 11 owi ng areas.
~ " _ (l)
C In the area of safety-related motol' building ground floor (5.1.2). mota)' con.trol control centers on the reactor reactol'
,I, I
(2) the-area of the 41:V In the'are3 4J:V s\:itchgear s\:itch;;ear 23-1, 24-1. 24-1.,1 33-1, and 34-1 (5.1.3). (3) In the area cf the 480V switchgear 28, 23, 29, 38, and 39 (5.1.4). (4) 250'/ DC motor cont~ol In the area of 250V control centers 2A, 2B, 3A, and 38 3B (5.1.4). (5) In the area of the standby liquid co~trol control system (5.1.5) .. (0) (6) Reactor building refueling floor (5.1.6). (7) In the *consoles
'consoles and control boards and a~d in the general areas of the control roo;n (5.3).
(8) In the Unit 2 battery room and battery enclosures (5.6). (9) In the Unit 3 battery room (5.7). (10) Unit 3 cable tunnel (5.9.3). (11) In the area cf c~ 4kV switchgear 31 and 32 (5.9.4). (5.9.4) .
.~
( (. (12) In t~e area of ~CCV s~itchgear 25, 25, 35, and 36, the fire detection system will be extended ~est west of switchgear 25 and 26, and east of switchgear 35 and 36 35 t9 provide detection in the areas of re~u~~~nt re~u~~!nt cable trays (5.9.4). 3-1
(13) In th2 area of 4kV switchgearsh'itchgear 21, 22, 24, 33, a~d (5.9.5). 34 (5.9.S).
.2 S~oke
$:.;oke D~~(.:-t D!~cctionion Syslecs Tests SvsteDs The 1licensee i cenS2e wi will confirm 11 confi U.e preoperc:"
rm that tLe boa 1 tcs preoper,,~iona1 t.ests ts demonstrate the adequacy of s!;]oke tile adcq~-3cy smoke detection systems or in situ tests will be .:I)~ :Q~ ducted ducled 0ilh,!ilh a suiteble suitzble smoke generation device to verify that a fire promptly *detected by installed smo~e would be promptly*detected sr;;o!;e detectors and that venti-lation air ail' flow patterns pi!tterns in the area do not significantly significcntly reduce or pravent prevent detection response. Bench tests will be conducted to verify that s~oke detectors will provide prompt response and have adequate sensitivity to the products of com~ustion for the combustibles in the area where smoke detectors are installed (4.2). detect~rs 3.1.3 Fire Water S~oply Additional fire pump capacity will be provided to supplement the Unit 1 fire pump such SUCII that the capability e.xists to r.:eet r;;eet the largr:st larg'.'st Unit 2 and 3 water d2manddamand plus 750 gpm for hose streams with the shortest leg of the fi firere water pi pi ng system out of servi piping ce (4.3. service 1. 2). (4.3.1.2). shutoff, isolation, and sectionalizing valves which would isolate the All shutoffs
~aLer supply to hose stations or fixed
\-:aLer s~pprEssion syster.1s fiied St.;PPi2ss;on syste~5 in the firefit'e water system will be either locked open or provi~ed with tamper prcof seals. These valves will be periodically checked to insure that tLey tl;ey a,e are open (4.3.1.3).
A 8eans neans of leak detection for the fire water system will be provided (4.3.1.3). 2.1.4 3.1.4 HJse Stations Additionai hose stations will be provided at the following locations: (1) Co1u:nn row 43N on the reactor building ~ain Column r.*,ain floor (5.1.4). (2) At the entrance to the control room (5.3). (3) At the entrance to the aux.iliary electrical equipliient equipment room. room (5.4). (4) tn in th~ the area adja~ent adjacent to the Unit 2 battery room (5.6). (5) Near the swing diesel generator room (5.8). (6) In the area of switchgear 23 and 24 (5.9.5). (7) Column 55 and turbine building centerline on the mezzanine floor (5.9.5). (8) Turbine building floor elevation 549 feee (5.9.5). 545 fee~ (S.9.5). ( 3-2
Additional hose will be added to the ho~c hocs st.:ticils st"tic,",s nearneiil' the fo110'::1i1:1 fo11o',:in:1 lccations: lccat ions: ( (1) Colu~n row 45N and 44L o~ the reactor building main floor (5.1.4). (5,1.4). (2) Column row 49E on the turbine building b2S[~2nt b25e~2nt floor (5.9.1). (3) Near the Unit 2 and Unit 3 feedwater pumps (5.9.3).
- 3. 1.5 Water Suppression Systems (1) A water deluge system will be installed in the high pressure cco1ant coolant injection room (5.1.8).
f' (2) The turbine building wet pipe sprinkler system at elevation 495 f2~t will wi 11 be extended to cover the control rod drive feed pu~ps pu:nps and ar.d the th," containment cooling service waterwatel' pumps (5.9.2). ' (3) The sprinkler syste~ system in the Unit 3 cable tunnel will be modif1~d modiflej to adequately protect the cables in this area (5.9.3). (4) (4 ) A fixed water suppression system \vi \'/i 11 be installed in the vicini~,y vicinHy (If of the Unit 2 and Unit 3 ttrack"'<;IYs rac k\~'<;IYs (5.9.4). (5) fi xEd waier suppression system A fixed i llS ~;a 11 ed ;n systeiil will be installed in the vidnity vi ci nHy of EIiC oil reservoirs (5.9.4). the EHC {' (6) A fixed water suppression system will wi 11 be installed in the vicinity of the Unit 2 instrument air compressor (5.9.4). (7) The existing sprinkler system will be extended to provide adequate coverage forfo~ the cable concentrations along the east end of ~he the scuth:cuth wa]1 wa)) (5.9.5). (8) 'AA spray nozzle wi 11 be provided to cover the pump on Unit 3 hydrcgen seal oil unit (5.S.S). (5.9.5). (9) A sprinkler system will be installed to cover the fire pump diesel and fuel oil storage tank (5.12). (10) The bus duct penetration nearest to the reserve auxiliary trar.sfo~mers transformers 22 and 32 will be protected with a di rected "'later water spray syste:-;; syste"- .whose
. . hose feed is independent of the feed to the existing deluge systems (5.13).
3.1.6 Gas Suppression Systems The auxil"ia,'y awd1ia,'y electrical equipment 'and computer rooms will be protected by an automatic Halon suppression system and will be backed up by a ~anually r.1anually actuated carbon dioxide suppression sys~em (5.4). ( 3-3
(( 77 Portable extinguishers suitable for fighting Class A hazards will be p~o enti'"nce to the auxiliary electrical equip;nent vided at the entj'2nce equip;n.ent rooJl rooJ) (S.4). (5.4). 3.1.8 ra Doors Fi re Fire doors will b~ b2 provided with Class A ratings at the following locations: (1) (I) Between the Uni~ 2 and Unit 3 reactor reaclor buildings (5.1.2) (5.1.3) ((5.1.4) 1. 5) . (5'.1.5).
- 5. L 4) (5'.
(2) Set\Jeen Set\leen the corner rooms and the high pressure coolant inje:tion inje;:tion pUliiP pur.;p rooms (5. 1. n. (5.1. 7}. (3) Control room (5.3). (4) Auxiliary electrical equip:nent room (5.4). (5) D1esel g~nerator rooms Diesel generator roo~s (5.8). (6) Between the .turbine building and radwaste buildi~g the.turbine building (5.9.4) (5.9.5). (7) Between the turbine building and reactor building (5.9.7), (5.9.7). c:C 3.1.9
- 3. 1.9
,(8)
*(8) Turbine building access to transformers 21 and 22 (5.13).
SUDervisio~ of Fire Deors Fire COOl'S protectir,g saf~ty-related art'as Hill *c:l~ctrically sl!pervisEj, will be 'electrically supervisej, closed, or zC:-:lirdst.ratively locked clc5ed, irr~Uft?* that they win control~Ed to if/cure* ad~dnistratively control~f.d l>'i11 be effective to limit fires from frem spreading between fire ar~as (4.9). Electric!l supervision will be provided to actuate an alarm for doors to Electrical areas protected by autoffia~ic ga~ sl1ppression automatic gas suppression systems (4.3.2). . 3.1.10, 3.1.10. Fire Damoers Ventilation openirgs in fire barriers protecting safety-related areas will be modified to previde protection' equivalent to the fire barrier or a . ratir,g of three hours. The following areas will be provided maximum fire rating with fire dam~er5: (1) (l) Control room (5.3)'. (2) Compute'r Cornpute"r roo;.: (5.4). (3) ele:~trical equipment room (S.4). Auxiliary ele,;trical (5.4). TUrbine build;ng - clean and (4) Turbine ~nd dirty oil room (5.9.4). (5) Diesel genera:~r rooms (5.8). Off-fas reccmjiner area (5.12). (6) Off-£as c (,. Th~ The rire d3~per lccJted lC~Jtej in :h!the ventilation duct 2 diesel generator room will be relocated tc du;:t above the roof of the Unit to the fire barrier opening or 3-4
I J
\
thrC'e-hol!i' fire l'a:*2d thr;.!i?-hOUi' l'a:2d protection will b'2 be providec.: pl'ovioec: for th2the vent d,}c~ Ode,," to th~ th,:, ( fire damper (5.8). 3.1.11 ProtactiOft for Structures ProtectiDn Structur0S Structural steel su~porting the walls and ceiling of the diesel ge~erator sa~erator rooms will be coated to provide three-houf three-hour fire protection (5.8). Exposed structural steel in the floor of the control room will be coated with a fl e!:"e retardant coc:t fle!~,e co<:ting i ng (s. 3). (5.3). 3.1.12 Portable Ventilation Eouipi.lent Eouip::1ent Portable ventilation equ;p~ent equipment will be provided and procedures will be developed fer re-r its use by the fire brigade such that th;,t smD~e smoke can be vent~d ve:1t~d from enclosed areas to permit access for manual ~anual fire fighting (4.4).
- 3. i. 13 3.i.13 Breathina Acparatus
--~--~--
The supply of breathing apparatus for the fire brigade or control roo~ personnel is being upgr~ded upgrEded to provide a ~inimum of 6 hours (4.4). 3.1.14 Ca~l Ca~lE Tray Fire Stops Fire stops \'il1 be insta'le~ installed in cable trays which p:-ovide a continuity of
\o;hich provide co"bustibles betwaen co~bustibles b;2tYI;?en two t,!(o different divisions eL!isions of safety-related cables.
( ret~rdant coati~gs Fire returdant coatings will be applied to cables on each side of the fire stops for a distance of three feet in horizontal trays and five feet in verticill trays, .,,"'here vertical ..,here stacked or cpen coble cable trays exist (4.10). 3.1.15 Central of Combustibles Control The false ceili~g and the rug in the control roo~ wi11 be replaced with resistant ~aterials (5.3). suitable fire fasistant (5.3),
\*:ill be p:"Qv;ced Curbs \":il1 p~oviced a:' a~ the entrance to the auxiliary electrical eq'Jip-ment room (5.4). .
Air flow ilarmsalarms will be ~rovidedprovided to alarm loss of ventilation air flow from th~ the batterj batte'i rooms (5.6) (S.7). (5.7). Curbs will be provided for tha the diesel generator room and day tank room doors (5.8). Curbs will be be provided for the motor generator set areas (5.9.7). .3.1.16 3.1.16 Water Damage Pt'ct~ction It/ster Pl'etection The top of electric~l electrical equipment located near a redundant division of cable trays will be s23led to prevent water (4.3.1. 7) (5.1~2) watel' damage (4.3.1.7) (5.1'.2) (5.1.4) (5.4) (5.9.4) (5.9.5). (
~-5
tn:lo3ures tn:::103ures An enclos~lrp. t,n enclosure of one-hour fire rated cOilsLruction construction ',:i11 will be installd installej to enclose the batteri~s from the l'cst of tile tile Unit 2 battery b2ttery roo;] rOO:;1 (5.6). 3.1.18 Fi re Bard Barri ers The barrier wall at elevation 545 feet betwQen betwGen switchaear nUElbcrs 23 and switchClear nU8bcrs 24, 33 and 34 will be extended to the underside of th~ t~~ metal water shield (5.1.3). The entrance to the Unit Ur!it 3 cable tunnel .will. . ill be isolc.t.ed isolated from the auxfliary auxiliary equipment room by a 3-hour fil'c electrical equip:r.~nt fire barrier b2.rrier (5.4). Piping penetrations in the dieseJ diese) generator rooms including the Unit 2 and Unit 3 diesel generator exhaust duct will be sealed (5.8). doors to the di The louvered dool's diesel ese 1 generato:* generato)' rooms wi will protected ....with 11 be prot.ected *f th a 3-hour fire barrier (5.8). 3.1.19 Cable Cab Access* 1e Ac c es s - Access will be provided to permit the application ~f extinguishi~g a~2'~5 on cables in risers in the control room (5.3). A fire iadder will be provided in the control room to provide e:ct~s e~ce5S t: ( cable tray fires (5.3). 3.1.20 Fire Retardant Coatings retardant ;:o2tings will be applied to cables Fire retard*~nt cc;tJles ir: the auxili2i:" auxili2~J* ~12.::
~1~:
eq~ipr.1ent. rOOiTI and at 4KV and 430V trical equip~ent.rocm 430'/ switchge2r switchgeel' and motor co:--::,ol cc~~~cl sop&ration of redundant cables is less than five f2e: centers where the separation (se: vertically and three feet horizon:al1y horizon;ally (5.4) (5.9.~). 3.1.21 ~anual Actuation Staticin Manual Stalirin The push button station for the m~nual initiation af the HydrogEn S~~l Seel Oil deluge system .will. . ill be relocated a~-{ay away from the fire "rea a-rea (5.9.5). 3.1 .. 2.2 Cable Sepa.ation Separation The DC feed cable from the Unit 3 battery to the Unit 2, Division 2 DC bus will be rerouted (4.10) .
.The cable from the shared sh:lred battery charger to the Urd: 3 battery \,'1.11 \,'i.ll be disconnected and a spare charger provided for the U;;.i U;:itt 3 battery (4.10).
(0:..10). The reserve DC feeds to equ;p~ent equipiTIent will be rna;nta~ne= maintainej deenergized at the supply a~d lead en~ of the circuit (4.10). (4.10) . .( 3-6
c '.1.23 (.1.23 Y2rd Hydrants Yard Where the location of post indicator valves limits the rotJtion of a hydrant stem wrench, a ratchet stein ste;n wrench \:1 lIill be provi li !.J8 cs:d. The hydra;,t proviced. hydra~t stem nuts will be replaced where whcl'e they are dams£Ed. d;Jr:15£ed. Da~aged Da:naged barricades protecting hose houses and post indicator valves will be repaired. Hose houses will be equipped in accordance with the recommendations of NFPA-14 (4.3.1.3). 3.2 Incomplete Ite~s In addition io to the licensee's proposed modifications, several inco~~lete" inco~plete" items remain, as discussed below. The licensee will complete the evalua-neccssal'Y to resolve these items tions neccssd17 iter.;s in accordance with the sch2Jul~ scheJulc contained in Table 3.1. 3. I. This schedule has be2n established s~ch been 2stablished 5~ch that should these eva1uations evaluations identify the need fol' fOI' additicnnl additional modifications, imple:;]ented on a schedule consistt!nt they can be im;:>le:iJented consistC!nt with ccmplction ccmpletion of the modifications identified in S~ctionSection 3.1. We will address the resolution of these incomplete inco:;]plete items in a supple~ent to this report. 3.2. 3.2.11 Administrative Controls Th~ The lice!)see .,";11 provide ca description of his administrative liceasee "."ill acministrative controls for fire protection. Following'the Follo~ing*the receipt of this information, Information, an evaluation _will
.will be made by the staff (6.0).
C 2,2 Radiological R~diologic21 Conseguences of Fires Consequences The licensee will provide an analysis of th2 th~ radiological consequences of off-gas filter area (5.15). fires in off-gGs 3.2.3 Penetration Fire Barrier Tests Cable Penetraticn The licensee wi!lwi!! provide a description of the test program for ror cabl~ cable subsequent test results. penetration fir~ stops and subseqUent 3.2.4 Caoabil1tv. Shutdown C20abilftv d The lic~nsee licensee wiil confirm that the capability exists to safely shutdo~-:n shutdol-:n in areas where red~ndant systems could be damaged by fires or an alternate means for safe ~hutdown will be providec (4.1) .
.. ~~
( 3-7
c ( Table 3.1 Schedule of Licensee SDb~ittals Schedule 3.2.1 Controls* Administrative Controls' June 1, 1978 3.2,'2 3.2.*2 Radiological Consequences of Fires June 1, 1978 3.2.3 Penetration Fire Barrier Tests
- a. Test Progra;i1 Prcgra:il April 15, 197e
- b. Test ResLilts ReSLiltS July 1, 1978 3.2.4 Shutdown Ccpability Capab il i ty July 1, 1978
( ( 3-8
( 4.0 EVAlUATIml EVALUATIm~ OF D1.A~iT PU,,'iT F[;;I1,.!;::_:_~ F::';iTF,:.~ 4.11
- 4. Safe
- -- Shutdoy.n Systems Svstems ThE!re There are several arrangai.ients arrangei.ients of safe shutdoHn systems which are c2.p2.b sh:Jtdc\m syst.ems 1e ci!p2!ble of shutting dow" down the reactor and cooling the core tJring ~Jring and subsequent to a fire. The EX&ct arrangement available in a fire situation will de~end upon the effects of the fire on such systems, th~ir their power supplies, and control stations. To preclude a single event fro~ fro::1 affecting redundant systeGls, these systems are separated into hID systelils, h/o 01"0 .. o:.':;,;~
~,,=,,:-<! safety divisions either of which ~culd \,Iould be capable ciipable of achieving sc.fe sa.f~ ;shutdo\m.
",hutdolil1.
During or subsequent to a fire, safe shutdown could be ~e achieved using ~sing safety-related eq~ipment eqiJipment such as: the r~actor reactor t~i~ 5ystem~ the isolation tl'ipc system; condenser cooling system or Dr the high pressure core injection ~njectiDn system; syste~; the depressurization system; 5ystem; demineralized r/ater Vlater sto~3.:;? sto':'3-;? tc:nk; t2.nk; and the cO;ltair.- co,;tair.- ment cooling service water system. Suppcrting Supporting SYS~2'~S and equipme~t equipment such as the emergency diesel generators, engineered saf~ty features batteries, 8;1g; nee red safr,ty b"tteri as, service water system, diesel gcne~ator tt.dld-!r:J vt:l~:.ilaticn generator build'in] veil~~i1aticn systerJ, systeCl, and contai nment room containmen'" roo~ coolers Iioul d also coo] ers \Iould a I SO be requi:-ccf. requi :-cd. safety- re I a ted co~ponents The major safety-related components requiredrequi red for ~afc sar,~ shutdown shutdcwn are separated to prevent daffiage.to dar,~age. to redundant equip~entequi p::;ent due to ~() fire. f: reo However, Ho;*;ever, there ( are arf:dS
,are areas of the plant where the physical separati;:-J systems or eelec:rical systE:I!1S 1ec~ri cal c;;b 1as does not Pl'OVl cables separati;:-, for essential su,.por:ing pl'ovidede asst.'rc.n:::e assur~n:e that redL!r:dant.
slJ"por:ing redundant systems would not be daillaged syste~? da;naged by a fire. Although ~~~ifications ~-c,;:jifications have been be9n prop,~sed to inl';ll"cVe prop.:)sed im;lrove the fire protection in these :;r2:::'S, c()nclu~e that.
'=:1'2=5, we conclu:le that .
there is a potential risk for fire danage dam2ge to redunda~t redl!nda",t systems. systec:s. The licensee has not dEter~ined the consequences of fire damage da~age in such areas Brees
',and its in:?3Ct im"act on the capabi 1ity for safe capability shutdo\m. Ttese s2.fe s~utdo\m_ ~reas wi n.ese :?reas 11 be will reviewed for the consequences of fire d3~age r2c:::-do.nt systems. 3re da:olage to r2d~~d~nt _Tre Jj.censee __ ~. . iL1_confjrlj1,that the ca~abi1ity
].U:ensee.,:lIiLLconfjrmthat ca~ability for safe s::l!.itdQW;' exists \-!~i~D saTe s':l!jt.dow;, ~i!;i~D nd:=n~ndent_o_f_.syste.ms :whiC;,h,-could is iind.c[1gndent_o,f_.systems :whi C;,h_-coul d b~ cc1rr:?ged cc1:r.aged ty ;<1 ~l fi firere' in -thc area or in'ihe an alt.e_r.nat~means alt;;.rllat~means ..for Jor "~?-J?_.~~_h.ut~_c'rin
.s~f? ..s.h.utd::.\-in wi 11 b~o<e provided.
pt'OVicec. -- _. These areas are discussed ~n in Section 5.0 of this repo~t~ report'. 4.2 Fire Detection and Sianalinq SionalinQ Systems A fi firere detection and si gna 1i ng sys signaling systemtern is p rov i ded \';h,f. provided \Oh,'kh ch ttransmits ransmi ts ala rm alarm and supervisory signa1s to the control room. Supe!",(';jsory Supe~~sory signals are provided to indicate the location of affecte~ affectep areas or units. A ba~k~p back:.:;> pO'wer s'lurce is available to all systel:ls pO'war squrce systems froi.l fro;:) the leV lEV DC pO'der pO;-Ier supply. The DC supply is connected via the battery chargers ~o the stationls station's ern~rgency AC power supply. emergency At pr'esent, pt'esent, there are a var; vori ety of detectcrs, f:"'om f:-or.; ff xed te~~erc3:ure te>;cera:ure to smQ~e smo~e detec~Jrs. detec~Jrs_ The only syste~ desi9~ed ~~1E1~ f:~ fire cet2::icn is in de5ig~ed ~~1e1~ ( ven.l control room ~hera s20ke d~~2::Cl'S the ccntrol ventilation
*'1 '
atlon and an*dair can d't"
' conditioning all" d9~ac:cr~s ara iGstaii~~
1 10nlng systemsys.em
+ h'"
above auove instali~~ ~ tne h~at~~;,
",e CQ~l th~ co~ 1"0 rol1 roo~
h23t~~;, eel'1'lng. room ceiling. 4-1
The re;;]air:ing re~ai~ing d~te.ction d~tection SystE:i,'S syst~~'s 2re t12d ti2ri ir,w into ext-ir::;ll"i:;hir.g extirglJishi~g f>J'~t:'7:s. ~y~tt~s. ( Therm~stats are used for the actuation of deluge systems or CO 2 systems, with an all alarm signal being tr2:1smitted tra~smitted t(1 to the cOl"lt,ol control rOOm.' room. Earlj Earl y" warning
\-[a rni ng detectors wi will 11 be iinstalle!l nsta II ed over a ssignificant i gnifi cant nL:~ber nu~ber of switchgear switch9~ar and moter control centers where both divisions are in c1cse close proxin ity to each other. Smoke detcctO'f's detectors Hill be installed in U:e t~e cabi-nets and consoles of the control roo~ room and also in the general arE~ are~ of the contra 1 room.
control i.cen~e~_'yj .1.J .. ~.onfi rm...1ha lhe. J icensee,'yj.l.L,confi .. the_R.r~operat;i ona 1lt25 rm..1ha tLthe_Rr~operat .t2;; ts demons t 1"2 f2:e t.e the adequacy of smo<c smo<c, detection systems or in sit"CJ' sit"LI* t>.!sts>:ill* t<2sts.ldll* be"'ccr;ju::tec be***cCG:JUctEi"c wi t'f!i-* ..~_s~uj tab "e-11-' .3.a."_s:uj leO s*r...oke s6okeg*ene*rat
'g'ene'rat ion" ion* dev'fe'e' devic*e to' *ve*r-n'y- that" to've'i-Try that iia-fire' :,; >" 12-
-fi reo ;r;)L: i 2-02De Rl'O~t1y QI'O!l2Pt1y detected d2tected by insfalled smoke*dct.r;ctors'*2nd smoke* dctr;ct6rsand tilatventilatic*l th.ltventilatic*l :;:il' ci:il'
~w -p~1I~.i:lls:..J..~t
-p~1Ie.i:.uSJ!U he~~ai~~.~de he~~~~~.:de..... r.~t no! ..s.!gni.fi j.igni}*i cant lY-:i:edu;;l! lY-~fedt:':c! ~:;t~jr~v~r.~,
o'i~jr~v~r.:,.ceJ_~~*t .~~ti~*t ii cn on r~spOnse, ,Bench _~~~~s [rsponse. willJ?.e ,condu~Jed t!?5..:\cs willJ?e .condu~Jed .. to to.. .ve~ify ver:ify that .s_m_ok~ C~~?~~.sn:$ s.m.oke (~"~2~t.i?r:s vii
.till .pt'ovide prm::pt 11 .pl'ovide. pro[*,pt response and h.?ve he,v'! ad-=C!uate ad=quate sensi sensitivitytivity to thE:. p;-o(u::ts ttl" proc\,'(:ts Q!-cor.,bustion for the combustibles in the area wnere QI=-cor.,bustion where sfiioke smoke dete-:t(;~s detect(;~s 'c:':e- 'c,:e-nstaJjed, i nstaJled.
We find that subject to th~ implementation of the modifications, the fire detection systems satisfy the objectives objective; id~ntif;~d id"ntified in Section 2.1 of th~s t~ljs report and are are, th2refore t therefore,, accept~ble. 4.3 Fire Control Systems
,.. .3.1
. 3. 1 Water Svstf.:lS
\{ater Svste:ls CC 3. 1 . 1 3.1.1 Water S~DD1Y S~PDly Fire water is obtained from a canal supplied from the cooling lake or the Kankakee River. River, One diesel driven fire pu~p is loc~~ed 10c~~ed in the Unit 1 crib house house, Wllich t wldch sUtlplies su~plies water to the ccnmon COi:',m:>n yard loop system feedin] feeji;,~ all three units on the site. The other diesel driven fjr~ fir~ pump is 1o:ated lo:ated in the Unit 2/3 crib house which supplies the same yar~ yare loop syst@~. syst~;n, Tho:
Th~ total volume of water available . for . fire protection protectic~ is adequate: We *find
'find that the fire. water supply satisfies the obiectives ob5ectives identified in Section 2.1 2,1 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
4.3.1.2 Fire Pumps
'diesel-driven 2,000 9pm @ 131 psig vertical shaft fire pump is located A'diesel-driven A
in the Unit 2 and 3 crib house adjacent to the service water pu~~s. PU'11PS, The service water pumps maintain pr~ssure pro:ssure on the fire prote:tion protection ~yste~ syste~ and are the first line of cf defense for water supply in a fire situation. The remaining diesel-d;iven diese1-d:-iven 1,000 gpm @ 100 psig fire pL-:r!p pL-:l'!p ;s is located in the Unit 1 ,crib house. house, The Unit 1 screen wash pumps provide an alternate source of fire water supply for th~ the Unit 1 fire pu~~. The Unit 1 fire pump does not have suffi sufficient c; ent capacity to meet the 13rgest fi fire re '.:ater
',.:ater demand for Units 2 and 3. The li:ensee li~ens2e has haS p'roDsse: p'roDssec the installc~i0r.
installc~icc of additionai add; tiona 1 fire fi re y!ater \-:ater pump capacrty Capac f(v to s~p~le-;erit---::'".~-Unil**r*fir~ s~p~l e-;en-f--:;.~i- Unr£'-f"fir~ ;-:*.;7'~. ~:*.:7*~~
'$'*lj'~~f*"-!-"",,*F*';'h~
'5"ii'~'-'+,"",:,,-F-"'h""~,',::-~~ '~,',:::~~..., ~,.,-
~'"':l- "'\11" c . . ~*:::.I~il!;:*** '"
.l..l,t=I c~-*::."il!~:*'* r' .... ';::'~'- -:..",
.,:,,~,- -;"'.-: 1.~r~ost -Fir 1*~r-ost -Fir':)J 1.:-""'.:-=~'
...* ~,"~ ...,-'";,:~~::-'~~I .. ~~~ t:...~r:~ _,-_.. ~~~~
( **',""I~~
,~: ~.'1~W.,.:\r;.:t~::_~~I o~.JI_9_-!cl....
a"=':;;'?~_9_.-!c .......v!1..!J,.;:' n.!l,.~ _ an,-...~ . . .)3, I~.,. _ an pp,es c~;,\.; ,;-,
. " . c~;.~
,l.:S 1 9P .. ....
..... 0 9P:.
1-,0 ,or ~,~~~ .-
;~~~~'~-'~'~'1"> It~.~
,," ___;~~~~'~-'~~'i'"
t.. t,.,.*.::>_\._ l..t_._.,- * .)_\,_ ... n__'t~.~
... n_.v" .... _.~;,~::-!)~~
.. ,,~._ ~;,~:~~::~
leg of the fire. I'!ater. 1eg water. piping systel.!_out systei.1 .. out of serv'ice: serv'ice~ 4-2
,:2 find th2~>
We tf:,':, SUbj2Ct to the imple~~ntation subject impl~r.:~ntatior. of 0; the ebove eGO'Ie described ( modificat~on, modificat:on, the fire pu~~s pU~?S satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.1 of this report and are, therefore, acceptable. 4.3.1.3 Fire Water
~!ater Piping System The Unit 1 diesel fire pump and screen wash pumps supply the B-inch 8-inch under-grcund ground main which encircles Unit 1, and is connected co~nected to the 8-inch loop which encircles Units 2 and 3. The Unit 2 and 3 diesel fire pu~p and service wate~ pu~ps supply the a-inch 8-inch undergrounj main which encircles Units,2 Units 2 and 3. A 10-inch discharge feeds directly into the lO-inch discharg~ tlie turbir,e turbj~e bull di r.g.
buil rog. All yard fire hydrants and hose stations in th~ reactor building are fed from the underground loop. Manual and automatic water suppression syste~s in the turbine building are fed by a lO-inch IO-inch unc~rground unG~rground "-ain ~ai~ directly from the crib house with 2a connection to the reactor ~uilding building Unit 2 and Unit 3 fire water distribution system. syste~. Sectionalizing valves of the post-indicator type are provided on the fire loop leop to provide so~e degree flexibility during impairment of the loop. Outside stem and yoke of flexihility valves controlling extinguishing syste~s systems are cl~~trica11y elcztrically supervised.
~_~31~~~_~.iJ
~_~:9l~~~_~-U Lbe_.2q~"!}5.n.istr&t Lbe __ad~1li.nistr"t iiyely_ contr:; 11 ed.
...,e.1y. contrJ ed by by ,.the
__the ~se of. J e'cr*,? use ,.o.( c*c~,? QL.5,~F2.j peri odi c in,sp,ect Qr-_5.~F2.j insp-"ct ions \/; Iii 11 be ~ad2 ~o veri iOad:! :0 verify fy tha:. tha: the vt,l ves v~ 1yes ere in the' pr~per' )o,.i:l.t are :Po_~it ii 00_ on_
- Yard hydrants have been provided at approxim?tely 300-foot ,intervals around the exterior of the plant. An auxiliary auxll iary gateg2te valve or sectionaliz-ing valves are provided to permit isolation of e3ch of the hydrants enci rc 1i ng Ui1i encircling U01its t.5 2' 2 and end 3. Hydrants have halfe .hose houses eqrJi pped Hi eq'Jipped Hithth vari variousOUS a/iiount.s amounts of 2-1/2" 2-1/2" hose and 150 feet of 1-1/2;! 1-1/2" hose and other ether man manualrJ31 fifire re
_fighting*tools. The hydrant hose threads ar~ compatible with the local
,fighting'tools.
fire department's. W~ere \o!;,ere the location loc~!i~ of :Jost ~ost indicator ind~cator valves v9!ves li~its the Ij!'_i.~:,:_0~
!~~
r~~tt forLQ.L a .. hyd.r:.ar:iL.s ~em"_wr.~_nsh ion_Q,La.hydr,ariLs tem_w[!!_nch,,~:~~r~,~c.:~~~~f.feI'C:~E_e.~ch. r~tc'!~~f"teTC.~E_e,l}ch _v:J1'. LQ~ p'ri-~:;T~2d~ v:j lL\Je pr..Qvi.~~; The hvdrallt_5_t£trL-Qut~_"'n,l1 hvdrallLst£[rl-!)ui;.Lwj 11 be l'ep" 'oep laced ,ih-ere trley aced 'r/nere they are dar.iag2d.. dar.;aged.. Da,";1{'lged Da:eogea
~rL1..~ace~ ..J).rQ:te.~tj,ng .llose-:-M.\!"i¥j--
~rLi£ade~.jl.rQte.ctjng a_~c(~§s'CTn-di cator--v"al JJcse-:J}9..~l~j-- 2_ni(j)§sCfri-ji cator--viil ~:~s~. ~*.iJLp~ , -
v'e.S:,I-:',i_llpe, tepa!!!!9.:. __ r.epajr~p.!, __.Hcse hC,t;ses wi 11 be equipped Hcse hO,t:ses equi pped Tii-a-ccc!i'd3!'1:e* -wi th the recc.;::.1ends-
'iii-a-ccc"i-d3~::e- *~*:i recc,~:.:enda
_tions of NFPA-14 NFPA-14.* The 1license~_wjlJ
.The icensee will _provide pro'!i de a meaRS of 1lea~. ea~. detection ~Iil*' k?-r_e_~lude detect i or; and \>ril"'! precl ude
~una_l!j:hor;Zed-tLs_a_ge_D:C
~~na_~.thoriZed Ehe__ Jrre~wa f~r-sYS:t em t.ifaam u_s_a.ge_~f=fhe3ire~wat~r-sYst ffti r_?J..:
.s_t.!;J*~]_ve3()iit r_?~
LiY-a-elm i:~ :s.~!~*~Ly,e_:~ont The fire water system shall be ded1cated dedlcated to em~rgency em2rgeney or unusual occur" occur~ renees of an infrequent nature. The fi re water syst~:!t,~ttLoo,t. rences syst~:!1_~LtLoo,t,ll.g.1!sedQg,l!sed for convenieoce convenieru:.e and house servicesof-a-lrequenr servi eesof-a-Trequent a-r.(Longoing-.natu;'"e_ a-r.iLongoi ng..natu:-e_ We find that, subject to implementation of the a~ove described modifica- ' tions, the tile fire water piping systems satisfy the cbjectiv'es cbjectives identified in Section 2. 2_ 1 cfof this report and are, therefore, acceptable. ( 4-3
(. ( 4.3.1.4 Inter~S'..':.. ..:ir2 Hose Stations Hose stations are located throughout t~roughout tt~c plant ~nd e~ch 0 p12nt Q3ch is Cqtlip~2d eqtlip~Ed rith with SO, 50, .75 or 100 lOG feet of 1-1/2 ...,'oven jac 1-1/2"11 ,,'oven jac\*.et ru;jb2rl ;ned et r:.;;jb2rl ined hose. 5c..::2 SC.::2 ar225 are not protected by hose stations. H(~~L~!*£lt*:(lr}s H('~L2J~lt*:Qr]s .. ~.r ().r__~.9sitiorBl adsitior.31 1engths
.Q.f...
gL.*.. hos e -wUI..
-wll!.. t:_e_p.l:pvi vlnere-.intel':.i or f i re ..hcse b_e.pl:9vi ded "here...inted ..hose s.tat onsao-fl'o~- provf2e-stat ifonsao-~'o:- provf22 adequate covercge.-
coverage.- '.- He find that, subject to the impler.',entation irr.pler.',entation of the above descrited described scdifica-,"edifica-ions, the iinterior ttions, ntEri or fi re hose stations sat fire is fy u;{~ satisfy tt;" (:~ject (;~jectives ce;it i fi ed i yes iica,;tified in Section 2.1 of this report and a.nd are, thE'refore, therefore, acceptable. 4.3.1.5 Auto~atic Sprinkler Syste~s Automatic water ~ater suppression systems protect a number of specific h~z3rd5 h!z!rds in various parts of the th~ plant and a n~mber of general arEas areas i~in t~2 plant. Auto~atic deluge systems protect the yard transfor~ers transfor~er5 and oil sy~~;~ 5ys~5~ equipment in tha turbine building. Autcmalic Autcmallc sprinkler syste8s systems ~~::~:t
~r~:!:t certain areas of the turbinl? turbin!? building bui lding alld Bild thGthe cable tunnel. ~~o;:jJfi::~tions
~:oj..ifi::=-tions to and addf-tion.aJ. <;prtnk.l.er_sy~tcms will be prqyjc<:d_as additionaL sprtnk.1.er_sy£tcms prc.'{5dzd_as... noted in.
~*ectroii--3:T:5--of this report
)-ectfor"l-3:T:-Y'of re;Jor.t .. -Tfie---desTgn-.o*f-fhe_
TI;i>---desTgn-.o"f"Ihe_ a~tom.=tic. sprir.r.:-=r ~:,.d a~tomatic sprir.)r*1..:r ~r.j
~~e-r-sf{~'y~s'Y=~'te~-S-:-~c;fi1P
",~~e-r-s2!.~~y~~*;:~*te~-s~~_comply ly .",lith
.Ii t h ,til?. r.~*gu i r2r.ients 0
.th§!_.r_~-guir2r,lents tanda :'C'3 ";.; 3-a~*.i t~FPA sstanda:~c':i off t:FPA 3-a~-.i 15.
~:e fi findnd that the.!th~ fifirere protect]
protection on spri nkl er sys sprinkler' terns sati systems satisfys fy the cbj;:: cbj~::j'/es i'/es identified in Section 2.1 of this report a~d and are, therefore, acce~:s~1c. acce~:~~lc. ( 4.3.1.6 Effects of SUDprfssionSUDpr~ssion Systems on Safety Systems The presently installed suppression systems will nat not have an adVEr~e adYEr~e effect O~ o~ equipment equip~ant if the system is actuated accidentally accj~ental1y or oy DY fai~u~e fa1;u~e of th~ equipment. There are areas where the application of wa~er water fr~~ fra~ hose streamsstrEams to extinguish a fire involving electrical cables in c!~-e c!:"e trays of one saf£ty-related safsty-related division mdY result in Hcter dlmage tc: ttl;: l1<lter d.lmage th;: other other' division of safety-re1ated safety-related electrical equip:nent.. t.,tnere ~,nere su:~ suc~ :t~:,ji
- (~r,ji cns exi st _p'..!:ot~~:t t iIons ~p.!:ot~c;t i en wi 'Wi 11 Q.e_RrQ.vi.Q~.d_
b_e_RfQyi.Qgd_ t.9_'pJ:even.L"{3J~er-.da.ma9~ t.o_p.r~vef1.L'{3_t.e.r....d.ama9~ 8fEty.~related electrical equipment as iaentifif!d
.§fetv.:-related ioentified in Secti.on 5.0 cf of this repprt.
report. We find that, subject to the implementation of th~ above describad described ~odi caU ons, the effects of supprl!ssion ficat-ions, fi suppr~ss ion sys terns on safety systems sat systems satisfy i s;y the objectives identified in Section 2.1 of of this r2pcrt and are, therefore. therefore, acceptable. 4.3.2 Gas G.]S Fire Suppression SUDpression Systems A total flooding automatic carbon dioxide system p;otects p~otects each of t~= t~e three diesel generators. The carbon dioxida dioxide sysl2msyslem is of the lew ~ressure ~re5sure type ",lith...lith a r.l.5.nifo1d r.lanifold and selector se1ector val'Jes for t";)e the va:--;ous vaiious 3feas E,:;.::-; of 3reas... E~,::--: t~~ t~a ~iesel gene~~tor5 gene=*~tors is widely wide1y separd~ed fro:J Fro~ iLs iL~ r2~u~dant r~du~da~t C0~~:c~~~rt. ca~:~:c~~l;*t. 4-4
A to_t_alJJ,:,oding .9_u~9~Latjc_halon tl._J.0_t_ilLtt,:,od!J1.g .9_u tOiT,ati cha lon 12I)L_systr.~_~~(iJLbe l20Lsys tr.,,_ 11_iJ..Lbe jnstalled_jil j ns ta 11 ed _j i1_J he __ ___tr:e._ ( a2xiU~-y-~1~;Iri a~xlL~~.y- ~J ~;:J.rj ';A ~.a..l_e~l!i 1_e~l!i p8.2nt_ _Y:'jJtl__a ~?_I}t,:}Lca!ho-,~. fP.:')J71 .,,!j.tb pm2nt .. !_O.:JJ71 ~?DYf. _L.c~!h.o:,"!. ._qj q} oxide. p.a_<;:~up_ a,x i,de _pc_<:;:;up_ systcl!'... Sin~e systc~ cO;ltcin.llent of the 5uppr'ssion Sin::e cO;ltcin:nent supprrs>ion ~:gerlt i.g~flt is I:; C?ssential essential to th0 the! cffe',:tive extingui30:::cnt (?ffedive extinglJi3h:::~nt of fir~s in these areas, arE2s, th~ _q?_or.s_.to Jf\2.~.~ th.e .Q9.0r.S_Jo Jf\e_~_~ ... (lreas
~re6.S e:lectri_c.aljy_supervised to actuate an alarm, after da 5uit-will be lectr~i.f.atlY_supervised suit-aDirt rrJ~--d2laY---fo--r' at)l--e-t lrJ~--d21aY-To-r- access or efjres-S::
cl'egres-S:: We find that, subject to the implementation of the above described modi-fications, the gas fire suppression systems satisfy the objectives ident!fed ,in ident~fed -in Section 2.1 of this report and are, tllerefore, acceptable. 4.3.3 Port3ble Fir~ Extinguishers-Extinguishers POl'table POI'table dry cher.:ical and ilnd carbon dioxide fire extinguishers have been distributed throughout the plant. In areas containing sensitive electrical equip~ent, carbon dioxide extinguishers have been installed. instelled. An cdequc1te edequate number of portable fi fire re ext extinguishers i ngui shers have been provi provided. ded. \;:e ¥:e finc that the portable fire extinguishers satisfy the find thn objectives i~enti icenti-fied in Section 2.1 of this report and are, therefore, acceptable. 4.4 Ventilation Svstems and Breathino Eouioment EquiDment 4.4.1 4.4. I Ventilctlon Vent i1 an on sys Syster"s ter;;s ---.L. The plant does not have e~ha~st exha~st systems designGd s~ecifical1y s~2cifically fer s~oke s~Dke ren~val. re~oval. The normal nor~al air handling syste~s in ~~st m~st areas can be used for c.( smoke remov~l;
$moke
. factors. T_he remo\'~l; howcver however,-r their effectiveness ~ay The fans and other equipment in the air hundling designed to withstand high temperatures, and can be rendered inoperative rr:ily be li~~t~d lir.,;t~d by several hanciling syste",s syste~s ar'e are nct by the heat from a signific2nt significant fire. The ccpa::ity capacity and configuration :)f of the normal norr.1al air handling systems systE:ms may be inadequate for effective stJke se.oke remova 1.
remo'.:a The licensee has proposed the fol10~ing following modifications. .Portable _PQ~tQble ~xhaust u,nj Y.n i ts ,and._dj~.t,!,JO_r.K..r~j_LLb.e._p.1 _and__d~~-'.t~ior:k._ ';H.Lb_e._pJ aced _aJ:_ _at_ s trateg t ra teg i c__ 1Iocat:LO,ns Dca t.io.ns ..__ t.o __aj d. t.o-..ai jn d_ in
~xha:~,~~,i.ng
~xha:J,~~i.ng o.~ spok,a., o.f, SJ:10~, and p~dures !D~~.~!.~ ].?p_e~_
wi :D~~_~!_2 !..?p_e~ f~r_t:~e_.u~e ___C!L~t,i_~
. . 11 f<:r, .. !:~~_.u_~~ 9f._~t~.i_~
12Q.;:~ao 1e _.eq-ul QQ..;:J:,ao __equ 1 p.h~r:~._ p:;:~r:;.. ¥1 Fl ectr1 ectrl c.£Ls_uP-';.r.v.ls..LOIL9_LJ.Q~._~~.r;.t]J.?~J Cll.-S_uP-~.\'J..s_l.0D_9..LJD.§.~er;.t !.l.?:~J O_{LSr_s_:.F~ O_rLSJ~,_t.F:1 fol' f 0 I' l?-a1.te.ci...),ocm; will be g.atle..r.:ct'ocms bej_8sta.Lliid_tc
._U~st.aJ.J.ed_ to PCQy' pI:Qv.ida_an_-aJ.al"f:!_ofLthe i da. an..,a.1~!"r:!. .ou.. the 1loss ass of air flow to preclltc2 prec:u-ce the--bui the--buildwp hydrqg"n.
ldL:p of hydrqgAn. We find that, subject to the implementation of the above abOVE described rnodi-' modi-fications, ventilation systems satisfy the obje_ctives objectives identified in Section 2.1 of this raport report and are, a~e, therefore, acceptable. 4.4.2 Breathir.g EguiD~ent Breathing Equipment The emergency air breathing apparatus'at apparatus' at Dresden station st~tion ;s is being upgraded to provid~ provide sufficient supply for five individuals with breathing air for six hours. .The -"li -.li c.e:1s~e_'l'd.1 cens~!ud.1 Lpt'ovide-.9.Q._ch-i::gad_ Lprovide...9iLch-i::gad_ ,Cot tot ttIes 1es _Jor o:j g~~Le _.for..__ fi re __J).;'j g~fLe us~:. us e. Each Each;i ndi vi duQ] o-p~r:aj:.9.r:...tn_J.bS::_~"QlJJ~C2L nd i vidr.!1U o-p?.r.aJ9_L1D_JD.e3.QQ.t!:.'2.L f_OOi;i roo.-;; yi_1J wi 1_L.h9.v~_ .. .h9'y~._ aJ)_-::~~.~~ a_bc.~~ th i ng a1r-st~tion air st~tion which '.dll hill be st.:pplied st..:pplied fran six 300 300' c'.!~ic c'JSic foot air b~:t:~s b~-::tY~s
*,1- r.:><.aI
....1r.~1..'31 _
1C_.~:.*,..I.:~:1
..-... + ,'lc.*.../ ,...,' -.; :. .... -: d
--"'::--:d
..... :1 a.,r::;:;.",;v" 1"'\'
a .. r.:;,.r.;V *. s.):;;l.em. I -
- s';:;l..em. h'-~ .......;,._n!~
"-h~*-':l.**:*~*~~l"i*
I,~;.
. ': .~ ~~ ~ r i '
__== :1,!'.,.",
.......... ,. .. "':'1
;t)::>~::,.-
5yS_~~ I
.;11
*;11
- "I 1 --:"'\-:-:
- ... \--: -~
P,D:I1u,= P,O:llu:: sufficient air f~r fur five individuals fer eiGht hours. 4-5
We
\'[2 iind that, su~ject.
f~nd t.hat, su~ject to ir::plenentation implenentation cf the tl12 above d~s.crihd descrit,ed 1i1~~if1C2. m~~ifica ticns, tiC~S, the breathing equipmenL equipment satisfi~s the objectives identified in Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore) tllerefore, acc(:p~aD1e. acceptable.
.~. 5 Floor Drains Flcor FIcoI' drains from th~ th2 various areas of the ~lant are routed rDuted according to thei~
their" content. Areas which con~ain con:ain fla~mable fla;;;;,able liquids such as the diesel generator rOOi.1Sroo;,)s dr3 drainin thei theirr oil to an on /water separat.or. The li~:I!2Ee oil/water li~:.D~Ee wUL1nstall a nt:ir.~~r wULi,nstal1 nt.:;r.~~r of curbs at ':arious 10catio:1s ifladeq~.acie? locations wr.ere inadeq:.:.acic?
~_i_~J_.3(Jt~~~FX~.~~~nt e::_i.s_La~_Jlle~pXi.~~:nt ~'fi ~fi me.Jo.r. 0"( c:fra{na~e me. Jar. rO:Jt ii ng ."0"( (fr'aina~e -*ai1c(to.-p-r-~c.fude __~~E>_
"ai)c(t.6*p*i-2c.fude.y'~_
s?r~a~J.i.!1g _o.f S?r~.3~t.i.r.g _oX .itre
.fir.e"... Drains fro!1l fro'll potentially rudioactive radioactive areas are analyzed
~~ior to their release.
prior We find the drain systems satisfy the objectives identified in Section 2.1 2. I of this report and are, therefore, acceptable. a"cceptable. 4.6 lichtina li qht r i no Svstems Sys tams rC The normal lig~ting system receives its power po,!er from froi" the staticn station auxiliary transforr.,ars a.nd transformers and a back:.Jp bacbp SO~l"'ce pO'li(~r is provicd source of power proviced by the station diesel g~nerators. E.rner-gency E:mergency lighting is also prov~ded h'hich which ;s powered is pO\.iered fr~i1 frCl;1 the 125V DC station b~tteries. batteries. The licensee has insured the cvail-2vail-ari2quate lighting by pt'ovidfr.g ability o"f ari2QUate seal t::ec~ pr*ovidfr.g sei31 teer.: se1f-cont.ained self-coi):'ained Q3ttery D.3ttery op(;'r'ated operated lights at strategic location.> througllout the plant. These u:-lits locations throughout u1its are equipped with carrying handles. handles, thus making them usa'Jle usable as port3blc portabl(: (c e~~rgency lighting. eMergency
~Ie find that the lighting systems satisfy the objectives ;d~nt;fied He identified in Section 2.1 of this report and are, therefore. therefore, ac~eptable.
4.7 Com~unication Co~~unication SYstems Svstems Normal Norma I cc!::;;;uni Coli on is provided cc~~unicQticn provi ded by a telephone system with extension extens i on handsets at various locations throughout the plant. A pag~ page a~d answer systcr.1 is also provided which is connected syste~ CO;1r:2cted to an a" emergency einergency bus whiCh is supplied po~~r po~er from a diesel generator. A number of voice-powered headset stations provided fo'r
!tations for mainte~ance malnte1ance llse use would be avai lable under emergency available conditions.' A A radio communication system consisting of two channels for two-way voice co:~munication two-"lay co"~mt;nication and repeaters to provide reception throughout the plant is beiJg bei.lg installed~installed. A total of 15 handie-talkie units are available to opel~ating ope,"ating personnel in addition to units used by the plant securi ty force.
We find that the communication equipment to coordinate fire fighting safe shutdown activit'es during shutdow~ activit:es d~ring a fire situation satisfy the objectives identified Secti~n 2.1 o~ in Section 0:" this repdrt report and are) are, therefore,. therefore, acceptable. 4.8 Electrica1 Ca!Jl£s Ca!Jlss (. (" Th~ The: insulated c.one i~slilaticn used in t~~ p12nt cable i!"!sliJaticn c.GiJd ..... . *: consists of ~3in~y butyl rub~~r plant corsists
~n polyvinyl chloride jackets for po~~r tJ r s .....'1'1'j1 ~n
*:t.JfS pOI>-er and control 4-6
cables. The flam2 flame test standard for c~~les. c~jles, IEEE Std 383, was net in ( effect at the time cabJas cablas were purchased and installed at Dresd~n and 3. fJ3;::.~.J:eta.rca;:t.co3t1ngs fJ,;;:e ..J:etarcact. coatin',)s *,.li11 eppl ieci on cabJes
'",ill be 6pplied cab,les in Dresden Cnits 2
..th2.. c.::b12.
in,the.ci!ble. 5fJr~?g51!g sfn"~?g.il~g cl"ea., crca., The f,;ajotity"cf"th'2' *c*2.0 rQ 'l.raY3*-2r*e fl:ajotity"4of--th*2**C*e.brQ tr~ajs--2r'e of soli solidd pa.1 pa" ccn5 tr~c ccnstr:Jc-ti~~. tio*n. Ladder rung trays are used pri~2rily pri:nari Iy wh2re wn2re cables enter motor cO;ltrol centers and switchgear. The fire protection system, includiGg control includir.g proposed modifications,
/Codifications, gives due consideration to the combustibility cOr.1bustibility of electrical cab1es. cables.
We
~le find that the fire prot~ction prot:ction for electrical cables satisfies the
~)jectives identified in Section 2.1 of this re~ort report and is, therefor2, therefore, acceptable.
4.9 Fire Barrier Penetrations Fire barriers are penetrated by docrw3ys, doorways, ventilation ducts, electric~l electrical cables, cab 1e s, piping condu i t. The 1lic~JJs(?e.}'/i.ll._._G pip i ng and condult. ..oD.d.l'.t;:~._a i C-"JJS ee .!'Ii .11....c;,OD.d~,c.!: .te~t._p_~~.,;r~7.tQ "a .te st.p,r~,; r~:c. t,q test electrical penetration seals-:-for sealsJor.f5re .. Lire resistance based on.t,YDic;:!*[ onty"ic;;', JDa'0~_¥fj~'Df;~iints_- JDa*0~.afj~nQeiints* a~d and' ,d~s.i.grl~:_
.des.i.iin~:_'- Fire doors for' safety-reiated a:-,e~s for- s21fety-reiat£!d afe~s ".-i11
\-'ill be either locked closed or administratively controlled to aSSU1'e assure that th"t they are maintained i~ the closed position.
The aceq~acy of fi re barr; fire barrier er penetl'~t1 penetrt!tions cns wi 11 be addressed ina will in a SU~~ ~ e-su,"~~e ment to this report foJlowing following the co~pletioncD~pletion of the above described test program.
,(
( 10 10 Seuaration
, Criteria The licensee's separation criteria rely upon vertical separatic~. separatic~.of of five fiVe feet and horizontal se98ration se~aration of three feet for. fOf.cablecable trays. one 'ne eri criteria teri a rei u;J0n ttlat i £:5 u;J~n reiie;; that protection afforded by cor::uit coduit and sheet r:;~t..C:! r.,et,,11 barriers. .
The separation criteria did not limit. limit.the tIle routing of nonsafety-relat2,j nonsafety-relat2.::i cables to a sin2ie sir,;?;e szparation separation divisicn. division. In sone sane locations a sjng1c sir.g1e tray cha~ges classificati:Jn 'frow one safety-related division to anothEr char.ges classification'from another a~a c.~'J n;nnJn safety-related cables are rOuted routed to provide a continuity of cDmbusti~les combusti~les between divi s ions. Ji divisions. Jire re stops wil.UELi nS~3llad.in aall s~oP~.ULins':.aJ.lej.i.n such_cable...:!:.!:=..~s lJ 5uch_cableWJ:=-_;'s
~revei1t . a fi ~e i none 3'1i l£....P.revent. "oi v~STOi1_f.!..C0_p1:2.pag~J_1!:!rL!O vi s ~ _f.!.,c,,!,p..!:~ag~,!,1I}fL.!-0 the otheLdhis.i:!l.
other-fuis.i:!l. . In other s1tucrtlcns, nonsafe"y-related trays JOln sltu.rtlcns, nonsafe!.y-related JOin or' are routed belov.* beley; h:o t ....*o divisions of sCi~ety-related sa:ety-related trays. _Fire Jire sto~i.LL.be sto~i.il....b~ ins!aJ]edjn ;ns!.aJ]edjn._aJ.l ..aJ.l 5 uc S ab.l~Lt.ray.Lwhic.h-..1.Q r.nLa_~.o.nt j fI(1uiJy.-fl.Lcolnb,y~.tj uchh ccablLtt:aY.Lwhic.bJQrJ1ULC,O.ntj u.i .tY-9_Lcoll1b,y.~_tj bJ.~L.~clL.t.~.A J.f;L~c.h_..t.D.At t fi fire1': Ctrcr'Tdspre_a.f.U~e Cl:rtr'I'aSpre,a9_be*~*"een.
*,:-,y:eil* two*-d two .. dii v.; sa f.ety:- re 1a.te~_.'t:r~x~!
vi s ions of ___.safetY~re ate~_ ~r51X~, ..F.i.r:.e
..F.i.u r..e.tar.dao.L~o.a"j l~gs__\QlLb.e.....9.P'p'l ied r..e.tar.dan.Lc;.p.at.ji~gs_.;.\o!iLLb.e....M>"p'l i ed to cables cab I es on each 'si d~Lt-,'lg.ji;:~
sidLQ.f_t~~.}ir~ s,top.sJ.o.r_~_gJ.~.+~.~~.~~.oJ_thre~LfeefTii~Jlor.1zcjntal.:.:ti_aY~:=-~*nd s.topsJ,o.r_~_fLi.~.~i'I\.~!L .0.Lthre'd eeCrii-:Jior.lzcjntal,:.:tf_ay~::::,a*nd five, fi ve, ffe~t e~t in v.ertical whi:r.e,stacked or open c.2b.1eJ.r,cys v,ertical trays. wner.e.,stacked cabJe_tr.ays exist._ The essential pcwer pC-'Ner system utilizes two tHO batteries to provide a redund2n~ redur.C2n'.: DC power source Which which is cernmon common to both Units 2 and 3._Since the esser.ti~l lo~d~ ~r;:lf1e::ed~o!'lne::ed to a s~n9le s~ngle ba~t~ry ba~t~r.y are aS5~gne~ aS5~gn~~ to the o~:::os~te o~oosite s~~ara~lon C1V1S:~~5 C1V1S:~~,S rc~ 23:n un1t. the rallure to ~alnta1n.separa:lc~ 2!:n un~t. (~. betwee~ th~ thd sas~ sa~~ divi5io~ OJ C~ a unit basis could resul~ result in e~sentiale3sential ca~les ca~l~s powered p*o ..... ered from both batteries being located lecated in the same raceway. A fire involving the one se~aration division common to both units CCJld result in 4-7
the 1055 loss of redundant pO'fler po'",er sources for both units "::lc)'e ',I'wre credit is not c ( ftssumed for isolation devices operated by 72ult Rssl!med indicated th3t fault curi'cnt. that safety-related cables were s~rarated on a unit hasis prevent such failure modes. However) However, in reviewing the curi'ant. The Tne licEnse~ has tha separatian ba5is to separation of cables associated with the shared DC systems, the licensee has n0ted noted that the cable which provices provides power' from the Unit 3 battery to the Unit 2) 2, Division 2 DC bus has been routed i~ the wrong division of cable trays. Thi Thiss cct h1P ~i c"J,I? ~i1l11 be I'erouted r'erouted to correct thi S_~D:Q.r.,. this_-"D:Q.J::..,. H:~ The cab cable 1e fro."! fro.'1 the spare batter~,"i-battery chaY~;"t.o chay~rto 'tne Unitt 3 ba*n.-ery Lne Un; baB.-ery has been found to be ii ncor-rectly rcut?d. rout~d. Ti1e pro;Jos2d ~.Q._jj?_co.n_~~ct The ljce.Qsee has prc;Jos2d +'.CJ._.9J.s_connect this ca~)IE: ca~!lE: and to
~JLide_~LSpaT.'e 2.J:9-'lide_a.._spare battery.. (!~rger_Jor __ ,tn-eLT0.i.J_"
(:)~rger_Jor.. _.b.atfe~Y-';'-Trive5-t iG~tTons tneUn:j.L 3 _.b"atte~Y~-Tri~:est iQ~rlci1s have been made* ma2e by-the" by-the' 1licensee other' areas of the DC syste:i1 i censee into othel' syste;;J cable routing. These studies indicate that routing of reserve DC feeds to equip~ent have not been separated from normal feeds to preclud~ equipment preclude the potential of fire dalilage da:;]age to cables connectE'd to the redurldant redundant pCMcr po"cr sources. The lj censee _.~~'!?_P..r.QP9_~~~~~~:.*~'.e"c.t _.r~<:?_p.r:QP9_~~~~oL*,.ec.t-~~"PX_th.~bx. _ .~_~_e~
~~_e~i ng !hR.!hF' sS e deenergizej at botll cables deene,gizt;d cab1es bottl the source sourc~ and load end of the cables: c~bl~s:
~le
\/e conclud~ :hat phys*ical s~paration that the physlcal separation criteria in itself is in~dcquate in::dcquate to provide protection for redundant safety-related systems syste:;]s from fro:;] th~
th," s:and-s~and point of potential fires. Subsequent sections of this report cdd,eSS cddress existinq fire protection measures Rnd Bnd the licensee1s licensee's modifications for upgradi~g of fire protection in spe~ific areas. . .' We find that, subject to implementation of the modifications id2ntified identified in Section 3.0 0: c S~ction of this report, adequate measures have been taken to cc~~ensa~e in~deql,acies of physical separation.
.- for the in3deqt:acies identified in Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
This satisfies the objectivc:s cc~~ensate objectivEis tt. 11 Fire Fi Barriers re Bard ers Fire are~s are 2:-e enclosed by floors, walls and ceil~ngs ceil:ngs which have a 2-hour rating with a few fC't{ exc~ptions. ex:::(;ptions. In some areas walls are ar'e being upgraded to 3-hour rating. Areas not having a 3-hour 3-houf rating are found accept;hle accept;ole on the basis of a light cOwbustible cOi<1bustible loading or that redund3nt redund~nt safety-related equipment ~"11 '1'111 not be jeopardi7ed. FUl'ther detail is provided* jeopardi;zed. Further pl'ovided' in Sec-tion 5.0 of this report as to which barriers will be upgraded. We find th3t, subject to imple~entation
'We i;nplel~entation of the above described modifica-tions, fire barriers satisfy the objectives identified in Section 2.1 of this report and are, therefore, acceptable.
4.12
- 4. 12 Access and Egress Access to the reactor buildir.g is provided by two elevators and three open stairwells. The Tbe elevators are enclos~d enclosed in l-hour I-hour fire rated constructicin.construction.
The rea:tor building is divided by a concrete Well wall by unit except for the refueling fleor refusling flcor elevation which is one contiguous area. Access openings between units will be protected by 3-hcur 3-hour fire rated doors. With t~i5 t~is separation! adequate separation~ adequat~ p~otecticn p~ot~cticn_isis aff~r~e~ affJr~~~ to t~e fire ~i~e brigade briga~e to reach ar!y floor 1:wcl';ed a:-.y -: :-wc l";ed in1 n a fire. the t'J;'Ji~::; f, reo In t!;e tU:~J, ~::: ::ci1.:!~:-:0
!)Ci 1L!~ :;.:: 2CC23S 2CC235 tc to t~i2 various flo~rs flo~.rs is by three open stairwells stairwelis d~d one e~~losed en~losed stairwell.
Due to the distance between stairs, access to various variDus are3S areas is adeq~ate a;;eq~ate for manual fire righting and evacuation -in aI, safety-r~rated
,in all safety-r.:;:ated areas.
4-8
( We find that the provisions for access and egress satisfy the objectives objec~ivcs identified in Section 2.1 of this report and are, th~refore) th~refore, acce?t~~le. acce?tE~le.
- 4. D Toxic and Corrosive Co~~ustion Co~~ustlon P~0ducts P~oducts The products of combustion for ~any
,"any plastic materials al'e Bl' toxic to hUffi3ns humans cOl'roslve to metals .. Prompt f;r~
and COl'ros;ve fir.:! detection and extinguish;;:2ilt extiilguish;;;ent are ore relied reli~d upon to minimize mini~ize the quantities of such prGdu~ts. Additional o.eans products. Addit;o~al ~eans of smoke removal will be provided as an aid in iil smokE smoke removal as noted in In Section 4.4 of this re~ort. The fire bdgade brigade is provided with and trained in In the use of emerge;;cy emerge:1cy bre~th1ng bre.athing apparatus for fighting fires i~volving ir.volving such materials. We find that the subject of toxic and corrosive products of co~bustion combustion has been adequately addressed. This satisfies the objectives identified in In Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore, acce~table. ( ( \.... \.
~-9 4-9
( 5.0 EVI\LU,A.TIOr{ OF SPEC'IF~C Plft.~n AR[,'\S 5.11
- 5. f.eact~;,
Beact~~ Building :. The following evaluation is applic~ble applicable to the Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactor buildings. bUll di ng5.
- 5. 1. 1 5.1.1 8as~ment Floor (~levation Base~ent Floor 476 feet)
- 5. 1. 1. 1 Eou:p"cnt Safety-~elatcd EQ~:p~c~t Division I ~nd II cable trays are located in this area.
5.1.1.2 Combustibles Co~bustib1es Co~bustibles in this area consist of electrical cable insulation. 5.1.1.3 Consegucr~es COflseguN,.ces ~f if No Fire Fir! Suppression An unmitigated un::1itigated fire in this area w~~ld \I')~ld not result in the loss of red~~:a~t rec'~,,:=~t safety-related electrical cabl~s cables since the cable trays are widely separated. separQ~ed. C.. 1.1.4 4 Fire Fi re Protection System Fire protection is provided by hose stations and portable fire i n~L!i shel'S. extin;;uishel"s. ext 5.1.1.5 S.1.1.S Adequacy of Fire Protection ProtectiDn The fire suppression for this area is adequate to control and to 's~ppress 'suppress a fire in this area. 5.1.1.6 Modifications No modifications have been proposed for this area. We find that the fire protection fer for the reactor building basement floor satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.1 2. I of this report and is, therefore, acceptable. 5.1.2 Gro~nd Ground Floor (Elevaiion (Elevation 517 Feet) 5.1.2. I 5.1.2.1 Safety-Related Ecuip~ent Ecuip~e~t equicment located ;n The safety-related equipment in this area in=ludes instrument shutdown cooling pL.l~pS, panels, sr.utdcwn hy':';-aulic control units, pu::Jps, control rod drive hy-':raulic Division I and II ~~ble ~able trays, a~d motor control ce;.~~rs cen~ers .
. ( CO;:J)us:ibles CO~Jus:ibles Combustibles in this area include cable insulation a~d lubricating oil.
5-1
5.1.2.3
- 5. 1 .2.3 . Cor,s~~usnc~s Cors":lUsnc~s if No Fire SllDpre~sicn SliDpre;sion
( An urmitiQ3ted u~mjtjrated fire in this area could result in the loss of redund~nt redundant safety-related e12ctrical el2ctrical equipme;)t equipme~t and cables.
- 5. 1. 2.4 5.1. 2. 4 Fire Protection Systems Fire protection is provided by hos~ hos2 stations and po~table fire extinguishers.
5.1.2.5 AdeQuc~y*of AdeauacY'of Fire Protection The manual and portable extinguishing systems ar2 are adequate to centrol central a fire in the area. Motor co~trol control centers 28-7 and 39-7 could be damag!d by water use to suppress fires in the rcdu:ldant redu:ldant divisicri divisicf; of cable trays. The lack of fire detection prevents prompt response to fires. As noted in Section 4.1 of this report, the physical separation for essential supporting systems or electrical cables does not provide prcvi~e assurance that redundant systeres syste~s would not be da~agEd by a fire. The. consequences of fire d3mage damage in such su~h aress are5S and th@ the i~pact on the capability to safely shutdown have not been determined. These conditions exist in the area near the motor control centers .
, 28-7 and 39-7. 39-7 .
5.1.2.6 ~\odi fi cat; ons Modifications c*C.' Tile 1i Toe licensee censee has proposed the fo fire.. ...detection
.detection .. system .wi.ll
.win b.e following mcdifications.
11 owi fig mcdifi
.. .installed iii.q~!?
be.Installed in the cat ions. 31.'P;';5 31.*Pi'>S ~f
~.n ..~a . . .1y.. w~.t.£ll ear.ly
.. safety-relate~*
t'Lsafety-refa£ec( warning ng mQ.t.or,.,.contro}...cel.tar.s. JTlQ.t.or..,conto:oJ . A '~~s-A ce,itcr.s.. *A'C1ass fi r.~_.~t??t* A fire doot, ~~21_1_
-wil, .L~ i ~~t.a). Le~ bet\'ieen L:::: installed ?e~\i.~~~ ~~~e the IJnjt.._2 l!nj.t.._2...qf")SL ~_re ect 0 f. b a.nsL~Jeector. ui J.drngS:-TThe buiJdlngs, he "E)~ *of -mo to;:> of motorfo"reo control "ccn nEroY centers tc'rs--2~:-rand 28-7 and 39-7 vii wi 11 be ;.~a.l..cd_to.... prey ent_'Na te r ~mc0e.
,*ea.l.cd._ta.. prevent_'Hater crame!}",.
Where fi fires could da:nage redundant safety-rel res cctlld safety-relat.ed systems, the at.ed systems. consequences wi 11 be deterr.1i detcmi ned to cenfi rm r"; that tb: capabil1 ity to safely tr:e capabi shutdo~n shutdown exists or an altern~te alternate means fer for safe sh~tdc~n shvtdcwn will be provided. We find that. subject to the completion of the p.":odiffcations mdificatiens and evaluation described above, the fire protection for fOl' the reactor building buiiding ground floor satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.1 of this report and is, is. therefore, acceptable. 5.1.3 Mezzanine M~ZZ2~ine Floor (Elevation 545 FeEt) Feet)
- 5. 1. 3. 1 5.1. Safety-Related Equipment*
The safety-related equipment in this area includes shutdown ~eat heat exchangers, reactor building closed cooling water puwps pUwps and heat exchange~s, 4kV switchgear, and Division I and II ~a~le trays. 5.1.3.2 Co:nbustibles ( Corbustibles in this area include electrical cabla oil and paper. cable in5~latic~. in3ulatic~, lubricating 5-2
- 1. 3.3 Con:~CU0n:es Con~~CU0rl:es if No Fi~2 Suoorcssi01 SU~Dres~io1
( An unmitiqated unmitigated fire in this area could result in the loss of redun13n: redun~3n~ saf~ty~reiated saf2ty~related equipment and cables. 5.1.3.4 Fire Protection Systems 2 extinguish!rs Fire hose stations and portable CO extin9uish~rs are located in this area: area~
- ,.i.3.5 3.1.3.5 Adequacy of Fire Protection existing hose stations and portable extinguishers are ad2quate to The exi5ting control a fire fite in this area. The barrier ~all hilll between kb:een redundant switchgear does dOES not provide an effective fire barrier to prevent a fire from affecting both divisions. The lack of fire detection prevents pro~?t pro~~t response to fires.
As noted in Section 4.1 of this report, the physical separation fer supporting systems or electl'ical essential Suppoiting electrical cables does not provide assurance th2t th=t redu~car:t redundant systems would ~ot not be damaged by a fire. The consequences of fire damage in suc~ cons~quences s"Uc~ areas 2nd the impact on the capability to safely shutdown have not be~n betn d~ter~ined. These conditions exist in the area near the 4kV switchgear.
~c 1.3.6 ~lodifict:!tioilS
~!odifications C.( The 1 icense The i cense has proposed the follo*~.'ing fo 11 o*,:i n£1 m.::lcifications.
- Judi f i cat ions. E
- ~n ea:b'_;f.=.l.'.n.inQ_
..:'l ea:1L~,=X.n.ing-r.e .detec t ii on-sy.s.t.~rLwUJ fj r_e on.....sy.s.t.er:'--wUJ__9,e_.tG.sta .. near .. :.r,e
~e_.i.r,sta lJ ed .,near tr,e ..A .4kV swi tct:gcar kV...swl tcr.gCQ r 23-1 23-1,t 24-.1 33::.L_Bnd. 34~J 33.:L._aod_ 34~.l.. 8.._CJ.a_~~._.~
iLCJc_~L.~.fi __do_9L\'{H LP_e._Lns Ji re .do_9LVCi1l.9_e jns ta 1.1 JJ ed .cetvteen._Un J:et\"ieen .. Un itsi ts2.. aild.
-2.. alld 3 reactor bui 1 di r.gs, ngs. The..-ba.;ri er wan TheJ>a.;ri E!r .be..t*...:eE~, 5 w~11 .be..t'1'L2E'\ s~*.;1 tC;iQea!' nll:'7i~2rS
......i tC;iQear nll:'n~ers 23-1 and_ and.
24:1-:1"r1'a 33*;"*a~cr 34.-]--\o;ilLbe_ 2,Fl-:1"riCi 33'-Y-a;1c( ext::r.ced to the underside of* the 34.- (*~;ilLile ext2r.ded of **j;:et:aI theiCet:il
~atet- 'sn; eTa; Water' 'ini eTa, Where fires co~ld d3~ag~ d3:;Jage redunjant redundant s~fety-rclated s~7ety-related systems, the consequences wili will be determined to confirm confir:;J that the ccpc:!Jility c2p2~ility to safelY safc1y shutdown exi exists sts or an aalternate means for safe shutdc\':'n' lter~ate mean~ shutdcI,-n* wi 11 be Pl'OV; pI'ovided.
ded. We find th'at, subject to' the completion of the mo.jific~tions, mo.jific.'ltions, and eva1u~tion e\'alu:!tion described above, the fire protection for the reactor building'mezzanine building* mezzanine floor satisfies the obj2ctives obj~ctives idantified identified in Section 2.1 of this report and is, :herefore, therefore, acceptable. 5.1.4 Main Floor (Elevation' (Elevation* 570 F~et) 5.1.4.1. 5.1.4.1 Safety-Related Eauioment Eouipment The safety-related equipment within this area includ~s includ!s 480V switchg~3rt switchgear,
, reactor building cooling water expansion tank, and Division I and end II ctale c2ble trays.
c ( 5-3
S.1.4.2 Co:.:ous t i b 1es Co:-::bus ( Co;;:~ustibl~5 Coe:~ustib1e5 in this area include electrical c3::1e c3~le insul2.tion. insulation. Consequences if No Fire Suppression Conseauences A fire in this area could result in 1he ~he loss of redundant safety-related equipment and cables. 5.1.4.4 5.1. 4. 4 Fire Protection SYstems Systems Hose stations and portable CO 2 fire extinguishers are provided in this area. 5.1.4.5
- 5. 1.4.5 Ad~qu~cy of Fire Protection The existing hose stations are adequate to control a fire in this area and to prevent a fi re from spread; fire spreading ng to other ar~as, areas, with the excepti exception or. cf of t:l'iO t'>lO hose stations which have insufficient hose reach a~d one hose station which was removed. The lack of fire detection prevents prompt rE3po~s~ rE3pD~S~ to fires.
fi res. The 480V 480\' switchgear could caul d be damaged d~maged by water used to suppress fires in the redu~dant redundant division of cable trays. . As noted in Section 4.1 of this report, the physical separatibn separati~n for suppc>rting systems or electrical cables c::.es essential 5uPP('lrtillg d:.es not provide assurance that redundant syster.ls systems \lould IIou1 d not be damag2d damag.::d by a fire. fi reo TbeThe consequences of fi re damage in such areas and the 1;.;':>3Ct i::';,J.3ct Oil Oi1 the cap.:::" ii ij ty cap;::; i'j ( .to safely shut-::!o',*m haY," n(lt shutdo'.... n have nt,t been determined. deteri!lined. lnes~ lnese conditions exis7. exis';. i!: i!: the area of the 480V switchgear. 5.1.4.6 Modifications The licensee has proposed the fo110w;ng modifications. An early following modification*s. ~..:r.x. warni!i9 warni~J fi ~~ det~!. ~JH1-sys..tel'.Lis_to_be_.J.n.?J:.'::11.ed rg detg:t ~JH1-lys..te.:U..s_to_be.J.n.?J..:!11.ed~n_ in the th~.. area ar~~_.Q.f.))1i::::r8Jy" _.Q.f.J:.b~ __18JL - 2$-s_2.S, 3a_;=t(l~_c3-'1.;! swi tchgea r 2S->_2.S. 3a_~(l~_aJl~ in thij"1~ea_oLJ:.~~~ ths_9rea_oL_t~::~_2_~y.! __2_~P'y DC motor CC:'1.CC~i1. 1'0 ro 1 c~1
~~1 ers 2.L4~.
2L2S. 3A, 3A , amL..3fL assA and~fL A c1 assA fire door is "to be-; rysialTe;1 be-rnsiaTTe;i
~tI-;een the J!ni.L2....and
~t~';:;en .LLeac.~Qr...b.uifdiC19S
'~n iL2...a nd _3 __t:eac.~Qr...b.ui fd:i ng~... "p:fi a~dl:t ro.~a
'--p:r; eddi:t 50_ fes~ o.~,...t.Jse fo.'\a 1 50_.Es.~c_~ t::~Se
,i,11 yil11 oeDe prQ\'~d.e(;La..Lru:tSEL.~t.at prQV.ld..ed_CLLW.5EL.st.at,1 o_nE..~c;.<;iJ.~;Lr~epr~c.o.lY;;:!:L.~Q*'~:i __Ll5~z:;--=_!..~ A o.n2.~c;.aJ...?cLrce"Lc.o.lY;;:;::L.:-:Q"~L~5U.r-_i,-,=
be_r.e.iosta11ed a.t hose station wi 11 be_r.ejnstal1ed at coh:.~n.J*~ow 43IL The top of $",,!itch;;~ar co1.u.;;;n.r:ow.....43H,.. $witch;;ear
~r,3B-.-*an-d39
~r.3B-.-*aii*d39 will be sealed' to' sealed to' prevent water cemag.e. ~ma9.e.. .
~:here fires Where caul d damage redundant safety-related s~5tems, fi res could s:Fs terns, the consequences will be determined to confirm that the ~apabi1ity ~apability to safely shutdown exists or an alternate means for safe shut.ctDwn shut..ct.Dwn will be prcvidad provided...
He find, .that, subject to the compietion fi nd* .that. compl et i on of the modifications modi fi cati ons and e'.'aluatio:l eva 1uati ora describe'd described 'above, above. the fire protection for the reactor building main floor -. ~. satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.1 Gf of this report anG and is, therefore, acceptable. therefore. c 5-4
I( 1.5 Floor Elevati0n Elevation 5S9 SJfety-Rslated 589 Feet 1.5.1 i . 5. 1 SJfety-Related Eguicnent Equicnent The safety-related equipment equipme~t within this zone incluc2s the standby stand~y liquid control system tank, standby liquid control system pumps, fuel storage pool, cnd Division I and 11 cable t~ays. 5.1.5.2 Combustibles Combust ib 1es The combustibles in this area include cable insulation and lubrication
. 0; oi 1.
5.1.5.3 Conseauences Consecuences if No Fire SUDpression An unmitigated fire in this zone could result in the 1055 loss of two tHO divisions of safety-related caoles or the loss of the stancJY standby liquid contrel system. 5.1.5.4 Fire Protection Systems Fire hose stations fire statiDns and a CO extinguisher are provided in the area. 2 5.1.5.5 Adeguacy of Fire Protection The existing hose stations a~d a(,d porta~le extlng~15h~rs are adequate to portablE, extingui511~rs control a fire in the area. The lack of fire detection in In the standby ( liquid control area prevents prompt response to a fire. fire ..
~. 1.5.6 Modifications i cer.se:? has proposed the fo The 1licer.see llowi ng ;,:odifi following cat i O:1S.
",odificatior1s. An early ea rly warl"l;ng warl'ling fire detectt ii on ssystem fi re detec ir....s.talJ".(Lj.!l...!.~~2.t_a..ndby.
ys tern wi 11 be :iJl.s_t9.1J.~~LjJL.1~~-.? J..tg.lU.d_c.Q~ol t.a..ndbY.J..\gt!i.d_cQpol sv~~~ svs.te,1;.. . The pass5ge~ay pil5s-5ge~ay doors between Units 2 and 3 will be rep,iaced rep,laced with clas~ A fire ooors. aoors. We find that, subject to implementation of the 2bove cbove described modifica-tions, the fire protection fo~ the re2ctor re3ctor building floor elevation 589 feet satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.1 2. 1 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable.
- 5. 1. 6 5.1.6 Refueli~g Refueling Floor (Elevation 613 Feet)
- 5. 1. 6. 1 Safety-Related Safety-Re 1ated Em:; oment Em:ioment The safety-related part of this area is the fuel storage pool pool...
5.1.6.2 Co;nbustibles Combustibles in this zone include lubrication oil, cable insulation, duct insulation insulation, and glass fiber roll filters. t 5.J.6.3 Con5eou~ncas Con5eau~ncBS if No Fire SUDoression Suppression (~ 1 **
.)
A fire in this t,his area would not affect systems required for safe shutdown. shutdoWOl. The spent fuel peol pcol is located in this area. 5-5
c( .6.~ Fire Protection System Fire h~5e hose stations and CO 2 portable extinguishers ere 2re located in this it reo. area. 5.1.6.5 Adecuacv of Fire Protection The hose stations and portable extinguishers are adequate a~equate to control centrol any fire which might occur in this zone. The lack of fire detection prevents prompt response to fires. 5.1.6.6 Modifications Th~Jic*~n~~~_~a~_p..r..QRQ~~the The...licE!r~s~3 ha2_Rr_ORQ~~the insta_U~j:ion inst.aU~J.ion of a fJ.r:e.._de.tection fJ.r:e._de.tection syste,l1 syste,ll to
~rovlde
~rov;de warnfng of a flre in this area.
warnlng ~rea. We find that~ that, subject to the implementation of the above described modification, the fire protectionproteclion for the refueling fleor satisfies the objec~ives identified in Section 2.1 2. I of this report and is, therefore,ther~fore, acceptable.
) 1. 7 "). Cerner R00m~
Corner Reoms (Elevation 517 feet)
~,1.7.l ~.1.7.1 Safetv-Relatea EauiD~ent Safetv-Rclatea EauiD~enl Safety-related equipr.lent in each area includE:! include cor' corE' spl'ay spray pcmp, 10,:
10'.: pres-sure coolant injection/containment cooling heat exchanger, pu~ps, ( emergency air cooler, and instrumentinst)'ument rdcks. racks. S.l.7.? 5.1.7*2 CO!:1bustibles COr.1t:ustibles Each area contains cable insulation and some lubrication oil. S,1.7.3
).1.7.3 C~nseguences C~nsequences if No Fire SUDpression The fire in these areas could result in the 10S5 1055 of one train of low pressure coolant injection/containment cooling equip~ent.
5.1.7.4 Fire Protection Protcc.ion System Portable CO, CO? and dry chemical extinguishers and a *hos~ "hose station are provided for fer each a~ea.area. 5.1.7.5 Adequacy of Fire Protection The fire suppression for each area is adequate to co~~rol co~:rol a fire in the area. The existing doors ~o to the .adjacent "adjacent high press~~e coolant injection pump areas are inadequate to prevent an exposure fire fil'e ~azard. 5.1.7.6 ~~odifi cat ions Modifications c( . The ., Ucer.jee
--".' ....willyeolace
--- -- ._---- the e:dstin'~ 2C:2S"
~"::.--
co~nt lnjection Dump area wf[f!i[lass A fire d~ors.
--.- t) t\"-,e
-- -------ce:)"s r.iQ~pr;;Se:E"-
5-6
( We lie find that, subject to imple8Gntation impler,}Gntation of the above d2scribed t:!scribed ~odifica
",odifica-c-( tion, '.:lie
"'t.:lie fire protection for the co-rner rr,O!:lS satisfies the obje(:tivt:s cOr'ner nO!dS identified in Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore, accept~ble.
obje(:tive:s accept!~le. 5, 1,8 5.1.8 High-Pressure Coolant Iiljection High-Pre~sure Injection Pump Rooms 5.1.8.1 Safely-].elatp'c EQuip~ent Sa fety-].e 'j at-eo EQ!.Ji p:;-,ent Safety-related equip~ent in this area include the high pressure coolant inject; injection on pu;nps and the;theirr auxil auxiliary i ary systems. 5.1.8.2 5,1,8.2 Combustibles Combustioles in this area include a large 2r.:ount COlilbustibles lU!>"icating on, 2r;;ount of luh!'icating oil, so::-,e 50;;',e duct insulation. insulation, wire mesh filters and lubricating grease. 5.1.8.3 Conseoue~ces if No Fire Supp-r2ssion Conseouences Suppression The conse~uences consequences of an unmitigatedunmitig1lted fire in these areas would I/ould be the lc~~ k,~ of the high pressure coolant injection system and the possible spread of fire to other areas ereas of Df the plant. 5.1.8.4 Fire Protection Syst0ms Systems The area is served by portable CO , dry c~e~ical c~(';T,j ca I extiilQ1ishers ext i ng'1i shel's and a hose station in the adjacent corner rogms. c: 8.5 Adequacy of Fire Protection The fire protection provisions in this roo~ are not ~dequate adequate to control or to prevent spread of fire to other areas of the plant. 5.1.8,6 5.1.8.6 Modifications The J..iEE,!l:'?-~_~_ JiE£.!'Je~_ wi ].l-}ilga
)2-}IlE:a 11II 2a 'tla.ter lu_g~x~t.e'!'_J~~_gr_e__ h1
'tIa.ter__~~ 1_~.g~x~t~'ILt~r._i!1_e ~! gE-R~~~sy.!"e g~R.~p"'~S_t:re al]!:.J.nJ~£.£.I~':l:::2. ...r.9...9-':!l.
EQo 1laI}U_nJe~0:~lJ"!2._I.9..9"~. The access acces s dool's door's wi 11 be rep laced wit.h* wi "h" Class A fire doors as noted in Sect11fil5:'L7.-'6: SectTIin5:-L7.-"6: We find that, subject to imple~entation of the above described modifica-tions, the fire protection for the high pressur~ pressure. coolant injection p~8~ pL:8;: rooms satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.1 2. I of this repor: and is, therefore, acceptable. 5.2 Primary Containment 5.2. 1 Safety-Related EQuipment The safety-related equipment in this area includes control rod drives,
." containment isolation valves and safety/relief valves.
5.2.2 Combustibles Co~bustible5 in this zon~ zone incl~de 50 gallons of lcbricating lebricating oil for E2:~ Ee:~ rec~j'culatio'n reci,culatio"n pump and cables routed in the condLiit. conduit. -. 5-7
( - 2,3 2.3 Consequences Conseguences if I~oliD Fi re Sucpress; Fire Sucpression on During normal plant operation the primary contain~ent During- contain,c;ent has an inert atmo-sphere which would p~eveGt initiction of a fire. During refu21i~g p~event initi2tion refualj~g opera-tions, the plant is shutdown shutdc,;!r1 and-aild fires would not result t'esult in damage dafi1age to prevent ~ainta;ning
~aintaining the plant in a safe condition.
5.2.4 Fire Protection System Fire protection for the containment is provided by hose stations a~d portable extinguishers located near th~ containment entrance. Drains are the co~tair.m~nt provided to mitigcte the consequences of an ail oil spill fire. The contain-ment sprays would be adequate to suppress an oil spill fire. Cor.necticns Connections p:oovid2d to a der.l'ineral arE: p:"'ov;d~d c!lrc iZEld water source for temporary connections dar,l"ineralized connect-ioils of fire hoses. 5,2.5 5.2.5 Adequacy of Fire Protection The fire protection for the cont2in~ent contain~ent is adequate to minimize the poten-tial fire damage to equipment equip~ent and cables in *the containment. 5.2.6 Hodifications
~1odi fi cat ions I:lodifications for the pdmary The licensee has not proposed any r.lodifications primary containment.
We find that the fire protection for the primary containiiient containment satisfies the ( ~bjectives identified in Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefol'e, _ -objectives tflcrefore, acceptable. 5.3 Control Room 5.3. 1 Saretv-Re12ted Eo~;p~ent Eo~ipl:lent The control room contains the controls necessary for station operation and for safe reactor sh~tdown. Operating indication, Indication, controls and a1ar~5alarms are mOiJntE'd on two L-shaped walkthrough control boards, one for each nlountpd eac~ unit. The rear sections of the control boards include the reactor protection system. 5.3.2 " Combustibles The combustibles in the control room consist of electrical cable insula-tion. tion, electrical wiring within the control central boards, boat-ds, floor covering, a luminous false ceiling and paper consisting of operating procedures. Some paper is located in sheet metal filing cabinets. Cables are located in trays above the control ~oards.boards. 5.3.3 Consegu~nces Consequences if Ho No Fire Sup~ression Suppression An unmitiGated fire in the control room has the potential for da~aging sianifica~t amo~nts sianificant equip~ent within ~ot~ amouilts of safetv-related equipment both d;~is1on5 di~isjDn5 of
/ safety~re1ated safety~r£lated systems. ~* ~~""."..--
5-8
.,>.3,4
- 'J.3,4 Fire Protection Systems c ~moke
,Smoke fro~
frD~ th~ detcctc~s 0etcctC~s are located in the heatinJ th0 control CDntrol rcan extinguish~rs and 2. t2:1-pour.d rco~ and above the lumin~~5 t.a~-pour.d portable h-,\!o:l heatin; a~d z~d ventilating return air du:t lumino~s ceilin].cailin]. ?Jrtable CO fire h310:J fire e.,t;;<:;;uish~r 2provic.2o e.~ti;,:;;uish"r* are prOVic.2o in the control rour.l rou~ with additional extiil9IJishers extinguishers located in close proximity outside th~ control room includjng including c:,y c.~y che,~ical chZ;:1ical and a 2-1/2 gal1~n gal1~:J 'Water water tank pump unit. A fire water hose reel station is loca:ed located outside the cont raro 1 rODiil. roonJ. 5.3.5 Adequacy of Fire Fi re PrGtection PrGtect i on The present fire protection for the control room is in~dequate. The false ceiling and floor covering both p~esent present an unnecessafy unnecessar:r contribution to the fire loading in the area. Seme Some sections of the contro~ board do not have barriers or sufficiGrit sufficiGnt separation to insure that a fire would not rcsu1t result in d.3mage
;n d3mage to redundant safe shutdown systems. systEms. No ready' ready means is provided to permit permi t fire fi ght i ng access to cables fi re fighting i n5 ta 11 ed in raceways above the cab 1es installed control boards. In addition to the access eccess problem for these theSE cable trays, a potential fire in this area would seriously threaten the occuj)uncy oecu;:Juncy of the control roo~. The present fire detection system is inadequate to provide prompt response to permit ext.ingu;sh;:"lent extinguisf~ent to lim-it li~it potent.ial potential damage da~age to safety-related systems. Door openings and ventilati.:Jn ventilati:Jn penetrations of cont;*o I r>>om the conti'cJ r;)om fi re area bOlindary are ;i nadeq:.Ja nadaq~a te to preve:-lt prevent an exposure fire from entering th~s thls area~ area, .
/l.s noted in Sectio:1 As Seetio;, 4.1 of this report, the physicai physical ~,e;;aration
~,e~aration for eS!3en- es:;en-( tial. supporting systems or electrica1 tial, that redundant syste:ils Syst"lS woul cables* does net electrical cab1es*doe,;
wouldd not be damaged by a fi not p:--o\!ide fire. p7'ovide aSSU1'ance aSSUl'ance c01sequ~nces re. The c01sequences
. of fire d~~age d~,"aJe in such areas and the iffipact on the capc:.::'ility to safely ccp~~11ity shutdown have no~ no:. been provide~ pro ... i de:! by the 1licensee i censee.. ..
5.3.6 ~'odi Hodifications fi cat ions The licensee has proposed the following follo ..... ing modifications. The floor ~~Y~J:~~Q c.Q'y,gL5~'lQ at".G-faJ.se: ceilin'L*,li 1.1. a<'.G-..fal.se ceilinq._'rri n be roeplacedreplaced wHh with suit2~1_e_fjJ:~...t2.s.ist9.n.L.s suitaol.e_lU::~J:2.siJ;t9nL.s.~b.sJjtu.te. ~tl.sJjtu_te materials*~-~A-*fi*:e materials'~-'A-fi':e ladder wi will proiifd2d to.".iermttJ..i..~~ 11 be provfd2d 0.'i.ermU.J...i:;:.c fighti~9. fighting access f~~j)Je.s ..ap 9ye--t:"\.~0:r,1:toLb~ aros. AJ) 12-~.PJ.e~._.aP9ye--t!'\.~~f!1ro_LbC'arQs. mgi Q.w:ed..i.i.r.~_9~_tg~~ i 2!ljy:'Fe m Aj).....~.r~ii]eer:ed....f.i.r.<;_9~.~gf~i2!L~Y}fem
~i 11 be ii n~.~otUEtctj nst~UEt(U fl.. n. tha.consol?s._.an.(LcQlltrol_boar.d.s tha..coosol!!s__ .an.c1..cQll.troLboards .and i n t . t~g_.9~.fl~rat
_and....iLt.t,\Uj~.flHat a .eas of the con~..roLxoom. aieas con~.ro Lroom. Access doors will wi 11 be replace-c rep 12(;!!"C with 3-hour fire fi re rated class £3i~!.~. £JJ'i.c!.s. fire> .q_c!?i!!P~!'s W]JJ ra..t..e.(U!~i!lP~!"s fire ra..t..e w.:iJJ ~1LlD.;;t~rl~.5!...in_~~[lti1atloll.
~~,;;t~)'l~d .in_~ElDti1atiolJ...
9ducts ucts E~!1efrat R~riefrat in9_ t~.~__ area.. [i i n9 .._.t~Jt_area_ r.!L.b~.!:rteJ:.§. (irLb.1l1:rteJ:,§. ~tru~~.I:1!~}._~~e Exposed structural stee. ~l1.. ~ in the 1'1 parr ...""n-T.b*"COi:.iec._w.ith fl pc fl.aI!l~Letardant.so~Jing~-The-*coriEroTrocm
'ilT.:lfa co.atec..wit b aa f1..3IlU:t..1:..etardant_.~o~tt.il}g. The control rocm
'tii 11 be>
b" prJ?v; pr.ovi d!:!d d~d ~tth. a -f..i..c.e_watet-bo--:O!t..teL.bp_s..LsJ~Q.tj
-til:sLwatel:-bo~,,-teLb9..sLsJ;qtj... on..._..dth.:.a::J.ow Qll.._"<Lith.:.a::Jcw.J~. ..fIO.b:
nozz 1e 1Q...iea<:h nOZl ..1Q... . r_ear:h aaU. lJ. areas....cf_the_con.tr.o.L.ro*om. ..A~.c.es.s_'diJl..jl.?_Qr2.YjpaiLi!l areas....oJ_the_contr.oLro*om. ..A~.t:.es.s_n:.ill..jl.~ __ Qr.9.Yj9e..Li!l
~c;l!ls..ed--f~b
~~d...fab1e ...:J ~er.s ..... :to 1 e .s.2?er.s ...p.ermi t the a~a~
- to.p_ermit li cati on of f:Xti.nguishi allQlication f!J(.Ullguishing ~2ents on ng a.genT.s ceole c&b1e insulation fires. .
Since fires could daffi~g~ da~~ge redundant safety-related syste~s, SystE~S, the consequences wi 11 be d~termi~~::! will d~ter",i r.s j *~O cenfi rm that the cap:lility
'.0 ccnfil"m cap~i 1 i ty to sa;elysa;e ly shut do . .m devin exi~ts o~
exi?ts or ~n altern3te Ge~~s ~ea~s for safe shutdown shutdow~ will be ~rovided.
- c. ~/e lie find that, subject to completion of the modificaticlfIs described above, the fire pro~ectivn modificatioms and evaluation pro'::ection for th~ controlroc*--n eva1u~tion controlroc*'":1 sa isfies th~
objectives identi~i~~ identi~i2~ in i~ Se~ti~~ Se~ti:~ 2.~ 2.i of this rEport repert and ii, herefore, acceptable. acceptab Ie. 5-9
Auxiliar\' Auxiliar','
-_-_ Electrical
-Electric~1
- - -_________ Ea~;i;)~0nt Eqt;iD~ent R~c~
- .:..::.C-::.:.:-=-.:.:
R'.)C':';] C - ' - - - - - - ~-'---'----
~
1.4.1 Safetv-R81ate~ Safetv-Relate~ Equio~ent EquiD~ent The cab1e cabie spreading area is located below belo' the control rrom rC'or:] in the auxiliary auxiliar-j electrical equip~ent eGuip~ent room and includes red~nda~t red~ndant divisions of electrical cables. Ths The plant co~puter ~hich which is not safety-related is enclosed in a sepcr.ate arc.:! sep~ate area \*iithin the room. Safety-related equipr.'.ent locat*::,j S~fety-related equ;pr.:ent locat*,,j in th~ the area includes the re!ctor reactor protection and essential servjce serv5ce motor generatorgenet'ator sets and their associated con~rol control cabin2ts. cabinets. Electrical cabir.sts cabinets are located in the area which contain protective relays, core cooling relays and reactor system switch centers. centers, 5.4.2 Combustibles Th~ Th2 co~bustibles combustibles in this area consist of a large quantity of electrical cable insulation, electrical wiring in electrical equipment panels and paper loc~ted located in the plant computer rocm. room. 5.4.3 Consequer.ces Conseguer.ces if tlo rio Fire Suppression An unmitigated fire in the cable spreading area.woul~ damage redund!nt systems required for safe shutdown with unacceptable consequences. A severe 'fil'e
*fit*D would threaten the support of the control room roo~ f100r floor dua due to ex~osed structural steel in the cable sp~eading the ex~osEd spreading room.
( C;.4.4 S.4.4. Fire Protecti0~ Svstems Systems A smoke detector is installed in the retu~n return ventilation duct fro~ fro~ t~~ t~~
/j ' area. Portable carbon dioxide extinguishers are provided in the are3. area, 5.4.5 Aceguacy Adeguacv of Fire Protect;o~
Protectio~ The fire prote~tion fer for the cable spreading area is' inadequate. The avai1able available f;r~ fire suppression is inadequate to extinguish a fire -in *in the cable' spreading area. The.s~ok~ The.s~oke detection in this area is inadequate to give warnin£ of a fire. Door openings and ventilation penetrations fror.l early warning fro~ and to the acjacentadjacent areas are unprotected resulting in an exposure hazard. The wall facing Unit 1 turbine building does not have a fire rating suf-ficient to prevent an exposure fire ha~2rd ha~ard from that area. The plant .. computer is an exposure hazard to the safety-related cables and electrical systems in the area. As noted in Section 4.1 of this report, the physical separation for essen-tial supporting systems or electrical cables does not provide assurance that redundant systems would not be damaged by a fire. The consequences of fi~re Hre c!ama£~ dama£ in such areas and the impact on tht! the capability to safely shut down have not been provided by the licensee. 5.4.6 Modifications
. The licel:;~:
licel:;-== ~:i~
~~£ !:~'~cos~j c~~c*GO~~j t~e followinG followinc mcdificC!tions.
modi.fications. ft..n
~n au~c;"1~t;:
au~c:;13t;: a.,d c"d
.ffiMlua.Ll:i3..1£lll....s..up~e$s..i
~ ual.:li3J!l!Ls.upfl£~s..i G.iLS. Q.iL..S.y..s..t.~il.LhLi..as.!...JJ y..s.t.e::L:dilLb.~s':"'J 1 pd i Itr.
1 psi tho --ar~3*~~Li..:.~
-are '2 ~:L~' .' ~,"~
.. -~ <.
acti~ate~y a cross zoned ionization fire detection syster.t~ actij[ated.....b.y Systehl* ..AA :nanually
~anually 5-10
( actuated actu~ted CO
~xf.I.~gQ-i system will be provided for ba:kup
~xfI.@Q-i.Sf.efs-slj')tab sr.efs-su1tab 1e 'tor ~fight1nccl ass A.Jj
".01" '""fighflnac*]
b~:kup protec~io~. protec~ic~. res-w'ij1 'F~:p.I(J.vi AJi re"s-w'i]1 Por:a~l~ Por:a~le
'f~=PIO.ili d~d_.,"2.L_~~
d:;d...2Lll'lg
~anc(t-o
~anc(To ~~~r.)". ~~~r.]__ A11 expo~_~Q_C&b~e.s_.,?jJ1..P~.f"Q..~_t5..cL~H~cLfi.!.~",
expos_~'L~b~e.s_.,,!jJ1J>~SQ..at.5!i.~Lt.b7Lfi.::~.. retardant coatln.g, r2tardant coat.1ng. The Th2 entrance to tbe_Unit._3 tbe_Unit.3 cab1ecable tunnel \"111 \"111 b~ 1S0-b;: 150-1ated -~y.~ib~-acdj1t9n=Of.~a'~_I:holj~j}re. lated -~y.Jb~-ac::U.1J.on=-01.~ii~3::hoLi~j:Tre. rat~d ba lTi er~"-l!:.i?t Tilted barri r,lg-.-a"cces's-er-"-l!l,l.st iI ng-.*~cces'3-doors wi loll 11 beJeplace.d_rl.i.t1L3.:.hQurJir.ELr,ated_cJ,a.§s-Lc.cLi?S~. beJeplaced_\'1.i.t~Qur..Jir.ELf.ated_cJ.2..§ s~c!.o.0l'1.. .E.ir_e"_-~_~u~r-? .E.ir_e_-~.fiE6~r..? I nsta 11 ed in th~.nlil,tt;o1:..pen!u'La_~O!lS_QfJJle wi 11 be installed will th!L'Le.n.til<l.t i o1:-pen~.r.a_~ Olls_!U..J;Jle ar~a area fir.~ fi!:.c b':'ir.i~r.. h~;.r:i~I. Jo P!.E EO V1 ~~~_~ur~J;.? ra~§£!....p..r_o.t~.ct P!.EV1~~_.~ur~--,=-e ra.~~.Q..JKot~.ction. str*uc.!-"~I..~l_He.eJ_ .....'511 bp EXllosed strt'c!.u.!:.?1_He.eJ_."511 ion, EXQ.osed b?
~overeo to 1r1c.rease l.t~J1 re res,;
H'ic.rease... 1J5Jl ra.tioQ.. The .....waa 11 between t~e resJ stance ra_r.ilJQ..
£9r.lputer room_anJi..j:.he Q.re~
£?",puter roo::rLartd.-.J.hC! Il.re~ Uni t 1 dlng\'iTn-5eUoc;-aiiea to I turbi ne bui 1dingw"in-5eUoc7-a6ea pro 'J rae pro'J i"CIea 3- ho.ur_Lire...bar de 3 - hOJJrJ.i.r.e.-bar rie r . .
A fire water booster ho~e A hose statiolUllt.h station with a lew low flow capac}tY-D.0zzle capacity nozzle and SuffTc:-i ent hose to reach SuftTc:'ient reach----aiTp.ii"cls-.oCthe_.au;.;}J} ~rre 1e-c t ri cafe:-;-J~f;:;2nt al1p,a"r:j;s_,ofthe_.au~Il}grfy"Edeclrical e~-j~F~2nt
~"L~.JJ
!:2P.::"L prbv:r!)¥.<t,::.a}_ the- e!)J!_~flcELt9-"tbi.~..il.r:~a.
wjJ 1 be prbvJS1?g':'ci1 "IheT§P"_~:rt~.~ eDJr.i!DCEU!Ltbi.~..iI.r:~a. - ttjeI~p _~.f)h;';--eJ:e:£
'-'eJft£-
- tri cabi n~J._s_a.n!=L~q~~
![i ca 1I cab; ne.t_Laj}cL~'ll!.1 I?~_~ill
~~!!.L",-i 11 be sea 1ed t.o prevel]t prevel)l.~aterwater d2:;,~ge d2::i~ge to safety-related satety-rel~~~d~.lect.T'ica1electrical equipmen:t.
equipment. be provided ct Curbs will be_provided at the entrance to teTheroom: the room. . . - Since fires could damage redundant *safety-rclatcd syste:ns, the consequences redundantsafety-rclatcd will be determined to confirm that th2 the capability to safely shut down exists or an alternate means for safe shutdown will be oroviced, oroviced. We find that, subject to completion com~letion of the modifications and ~veluation ~v21uation described above, the fire protection for the auxiliary electdca1 electrical equip-equip* ( ment room satisfies the objectives identified in Section 2.1 of this
- report and is, therefore acceptable.
5.5 Switchgear Rooms Switchgear rooms are not provided at Dresden Units 2 and 3. Essential switchgear is located in the turbine and reactor buildings and is covered in Sections 5.1 and 5.9 of this report. 5.6 Unit 2 Batterv Room 5.6.1 Safety-Related Equipment Eguip~ent The battery room for Unit 2 is located above the control room. The s*afety- safety-related equipment includes the batteries, battery chargers, and DC distrib~ distribll-tion panels. Stacked horizont~l horizont,!l safety-related cable trays are located along two walls of the battery reom. ream. 5.6.2 Combustibles The combustibles in the Unit Z 2 battery room consist of electrical cable insulation and battery cas'cas. cas'es_ . 5.6.3 Consequences if No Fire Suopression SUDPression An unmitioated fire in the Unit 2 battet*y batte'-y rocrn coulG could cause the less lOSS of 07 .((-.:
..........' )
one divisien divisfcn ai of DC po\"~er power for safet.y-reia:~c safety-rela:sd e~u~;;;;-~r.t e~u!~~ent in both ~~,~:~. ~~~~s c",: ~';i cause the loss. loss of ~;rcuits circuits associated w;~h ca!Jles routed through ~r.i5 area .
'o'/ith cables 5-11 "
" 5"'11
C ',,4 (~ "'.4 One port2)leport2Jle CO 2 extin;;uisher extin~uisher is provided in the Unit 2 b~ttery battery roc;:,.rOC::J. 5,6,5 5.6.5 Ad~guacy of Fire Protection In tha absence of fire detection and with a single portable fire extin-gui sher, the protection of the Unit guisher, Uni t 2 battery room is inadequate. i:ladequate. The batteriES present an unacceptat,le batteries lmacceptatle exposure hazard to t~2 tr;e safety-related cables in the area. The lack of air flow supervision cf the ventila~icn ventila~lcn system is in3dequate to insure aga.inst against the possibility possibi1 ity of hydrogen acc:.;.;]U-GCC:';:;ll~ lation in the area. drea. There is no hose h'ose station nearby to aid in extinguishr;;ent. extinguishr;oent. 5.6,5 5.6.6 /*lodifications f*lodifications Th," licensee has proposed the following r.lOdifications. The ~Iodifieations. The b~!(~T.i~s ,,,,ill Th~~~.!(~r.i~s ,,!ql be enclosed in a one-hour fire barrier to isolate the~ fro@ fro~ the re~ai~i~~- re~6i~ir~- ire j!e~_ Q}l:;"t)'c ::t:Ci0;J-*-~) Q.T"-t;!)"c ::tcfP,i}-. -~l--e a): -"e lY-~~ fn"l a!:.IY-"f~ f nll~g~llfe g.e tecil0-D-::'syst r:g~llfe g,;; t cilo~-=-s.~,.s.t-e~~:_~_nj_j)i~ e~rj:_~,nLJi.~>*: P. ~-:. :~~
- ~: ~ ~ ::j
~2D.J--hf.-'J..i}j
_~~.h.e.JliJ-Lt __ ?,..ba
.t_~? batt tte!,y'=!Y _._:?~~_._ ~_Q.c 1" tJ d) ng ..
r00::1._tllc1,udj _"~~
~~,..,ba~. ~~ ~~ t.e ry __e ~cJc ~ u ce s. Ai.r.J t,eT'y_.e~cJc~ur~es. _~J.Lf11;=r.',,' --
~.!E~
---£l.?L!I!~ wlll wll1 be Pl'OVldcd Pl'cvloed t~ __ lo.s.~r~_.~g~n1 ~~~_t.tl~_PQ.s_?_lb.LU_tj~_gf_L!nd~~ec~~"j_
to._lQS\lLiUlga n~Lt,il'U)Q.S_Hb,iJ.~_tj'_.?Lund~t~~~oL hyctt'ogenc?;:C:;:~'iatloJ~****iA hyctl'ogena::c;:S,iiitlo,~iAthe battery cnclo5~res.
'the batt.ery cnclo5~res, A fi.r~
A fi.f~ GQs.ebQse r.eelr.cel E,t2t~:Jn st2t';)" WilT"b-! WilT-b-e r;r-.:)v rJr#,j'vTo£d -.wiin*" ac{c"s's_=f~the fo£cf.wH.n*** aC{2s*s_=r~the .Un; t-2--l':-a"tte t-2°' b-a"ite ry r002 rco:~_... .. We find that, subject to i~plementation implementation of the 2bove above described ~odific2- modificJ-tions, the fire protection for the Unit 2 battery room set{sfies sattsfies the ( objectives identified in Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefor~, acceptable. I
,I 5.
5,77 I Unit 3 Battery Batlerv Roo~ Rco~ 5,7. 1I 5.7. Safety-R21C';td Saiety-Relt=;ted EoJ~ipr::2nt E.J~ipr::2nt The Unit 3 battery b3ttl'ry roc~ roc;;-, is located .located in the Unit 3 turbine building. The only safety-related equipment located ioeated in t~e rcc:n rcc:;) is the batteries. i;--e l~e DC distribution panels for the batteries are enclosed in a separate roc~ below the thi?battery battery room~ roo;n~ 5,7.2 5.7.2 Co;;,bustibles Combustibles The only combustibles in the area are the. the, components *and 'and cases of the batteries. All electrical cables are installed in conduit. 5.7.3 Consequences if No Fire.Protection Fire,Protection An unmitigated fire in the Unit 3 battery ro~~ roo"- ~ould c~use the l?SS l~ss of one division'of the JC ~ower for safety-related equ1pment equlpw.ent In both un1ts. unlts. 5.7.4 Fire Protection Svstems Systems A portable CO" ex:inguisher is t=,rovided CO~ E:x:ir,guisher ;:,rovided at the entrance to the battery ( r ""..,
"~~
,~
'.* ,,, and 2
..01" nearby.
a....."~
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. . ~ .. ."'-'
.:1.",:1"- ., s*~ ~~~C!~I
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....... C! . . . . ~ -::J.~
.: -:::1.. . . ri,;... l.('0
~ ~ 0 2 :..,,.
'" I'n'c,o .~ reei c.:I~
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IL .... rpc. . '1, 5 _ .... t :~ ;~:,.lC. "n 2are.loco-teri. st,_tl'cn _ r c . 1 0 c -
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<"> . . . . ..J 0 .. ..
. 5-12
7.5 l*deglraCY of Fi I-deqll<3cy ro Protect] Fir0 Protection on ( The fifirere protection for th2 the Un it 3 battery ron Unit roo::; is iinad2q1l2'.:e nad2qu2te ct:ec!t:e to the absence of any fire detection and the tt~e lack of air flow su~ervisicn supe~'vi5icn for the ventilation of th2 the battery rooms to insure against the ;:-;otential ;:;otential for hydrogen accumulation. 5.7.6 Hodifi Modifi cat ions The 1licensee the foll prOr:'osed th(? i censee has prorosed o\{i n9 modifi folloHing cat ions. _An early \-,arni modifications. ~Iarnin_g n_9 me detect 1i on __ ~y's5e~~*~_1.1_1
.fir.e c!etect ~ys5e~":*Ii.ll ~le provi d~d_.fQ.r ba prov; __ the_U.:.U~b.atte.ry ro;):;;.
d~(L.fo_r_.the_U"iL.:Lb_'"'t.te.rY roo:;;. Air
.lI, ir flow--a"1arms flow--alarms Vii will 11 b2 provided provic2d forO-the for-*tlie battery 1*00.1 exhaust.
rOOi:.l exh2.ust. We find that, su~ject to the implementation of the t~e above desc;ibed ~odifi4 desc~ibed Qodifi-cations, the fi*re protection fer. for. the U:1it 3 battery recm room satisfies sat.isfies the objectives of Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable. ac~eptable. 5.8 Diesel Generator Roo~s Roo~s* 5.8. 1 ~afetv
~afety Related" EauiJ~ent Related- EotJiJ~ent There are th~eethree dlesel diesel generator rooms each containing a diesel generator. gerlerator.
One diesel is used for one division of each eBch unit (swing diesel). 5.8. 1 CCi;;~ust;bles Cc",~ustibles The major cc~bustible rhe co~bustible loading is the 750 g~llon g~llon day tank -located located in a ( seperate sepzrate room ccrank.:ase. rank.:ase, roo~ and the 350 gallons of lu)ricating lu~ric~t;ng oil in the dies~l diesel 5.8.3 Conseouence if No Fire Su~prEssion Su~pression An unmitigated Ylre di~scl generator room 'Nould*result fire in a dj*:*scl would'result 1n in the loss of the emergency onsite power_ power. source to one or both units. 5.8.4 Fire Protecticr Svstems The diesel generator rooms-are protected by a total flooding CO system, rooms*are protect~d system. The d;esel d~esel day ta~k room, are protected by a wet pipe automatic 2sprinkler ta:,k rooms system and the total flooding CO 2 system. 5.8.5 Adequacy of Fir~ Prote:tion The fixed protection is adequate to extinguish a fire in the diesel generator room. The structural st~uctural steel in a1l all rooms are exposed anti and an unmitigated fire could cause the collapse of the structure. Adequate measures have ;}-)t ,1')t been provided to prevent the t.he spread of oil spi1 i fires to adjacent are~s. Doors and ventilation penetrations are inadequate to prevent a fire exposure to or from adjacent areas. Louvers in the doors facing the turbine building are not fire rated. A backup fire hose is not prcvided for the swing s~i~g diesel generator. ( 5-13
(-").[;.0 (S.<;.6 The 1lic~nsee i C8nsee has proposed th::! the following fo 11 owi ng [!,:;jifica:icns. r::)j i fi cat i ens. 6.~::~s 6.~~ess s _~,:~r:-s d~~rs__ __~0q
~nq. 0 v('rrt iJ ;::":j..:""D_?~;'*;;! tj'a ti ons Hill v('ntiJ:-::"':.L~.I}_?~;-.~~j*ati!)ns Hi 11 be L!~grad2d l.!~~p"ad2d to 3- h()u~ f5!:....e.
3-h(Ju~. f5~e. J.c:'e:: pr*o~..... !.>~_t __r.c~t:~: P!*o' e~_tic~. i cn. tri)-o*r:5_\":i.i;.~~~~:~s~:..:.~~~ iYo-o*r:5_\.:i.:;.t:~~~:_.~s:~~~.~~~ - b~ e b.~_..... pr'?S~fJ..~Jryt.iJrJ~a~J~.b~~!:_.fj r?~~fJ..f:JJ~:~{.Ltb~*a~J~.b~~!'._f.~ r~~.a r~~_? !:ri !~T.i 2e r.* __.. E.ipi.I19~ P..lpi.qg .. pt'il~tr.?,t1ons) peil2tr<?t1ons, 1r;clud~:1gthe 1nclud~rlgthe Ur.lt Ur,lt 2 Cl.nd a.nd .V!1lt..3 .0s;-;e;,ctc_:~._~;:.t;<:.:.;st_ d1(?sel .gs;-;~r'ctC_:~._r:>::.t;2.:':St_
.U!1lt..3.. dlesel aUEf:;"":*,. nr-5(! "5 iii! 1e:f -'The crijEti:*"..n~r-5c***seGler:( -The structural stl'uctura 1 st~E1 i s l!nj)rctect~c:; \-ij11.
Hhi c~ is_.~r:j)rotect,:':. st~E 1 h'hic.:-' hi 11 b_? be
~i.'"t*f*).* 3- hour ratecr'~rotection~'"
i de-do ~ftjl.o pro.\i iced pro.i.; ratecr-protectfon~'" ~tuI'5s... \-[i.\t-_f~~ . ~*2!:~~ ~iced
~tur5~ "'ti.\rX~._2!:~~ pr_~~:ent ced to pr.~::,et1t
\!:teo sprec:..j_c.f
\be. spr2i\..j_0.f 0.51. o.n spill spi 11 'fi 'fir2s i e5e~ge'le.r9t*gc....J:Oc:-=;£ "anj res from the ddiese~gen.er?t'?C...s.oc~;£ .*day ta.~.~
*ailj.day ta.n.ls
~~5':Ti~~*~~~L~~~t_i.E_n.~i11.~p~~~Iq"JJ.ed
~~5iirl~-:-*~q~~~~.at_i..9_n.'y-i 11~t;~~s.!)j.!.eif ~~(iJ.~~._?E~.~~.s :\'il,~_?<:.ce~.s__t~ t'2.. th?_s~Jng.
th?_s;,j.ng d5!se di ese 1 aenerator T'oom. Y'OOiil. The fflr'e 1 r-e d2r::~er dcr::r)er located 1 inn the v~nt i 1Q t i on cJu.::t ventilation c.bcv*~--Ehe eJl1.:t e.ocv*~-*Ehe f.9_o}:Q(f~~**Unit f.9_oLQfJ~"i*"Unit 2' 2'2'2 fe'sergi;)~rato'r' ie'sergi;i~rato'r -room-wfi -room-wi! 1- be-l~e ocatedto ..the. fi..r.e=- be- I:e 11oeated**to fi.r.e=' .. R.qujcLcp*.,nirig
.QqITj.CI'.9P"(:nl three-hour'-}ire rig '01' three-hour-}i re rated protection wi l'iill11 be pr*oviprovic2d C~d for th~ vent dlJECto' the ciiJECto' thO;:: the,*. ffre'dc;2pii':'
fired~2riii':;' . We find that) that, subject to implementation of the above described Godifica- codifica-tions, the fire protection for the diesel generator ardas tion5, ar~as satisfi~5satisfi~s the objectivEs of Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable. objectives 5.9 Buildina, Turbine 8uildina The turbine building ;s is common for Units 2 and 3. 5.9.1 B2se~ent'Floor Basement" Floor (Eleva~~or.s (Eleva~~ons 459 Feet and 2nd 481 Feet) 5.9.1.1 5afej:y-l~c:lat.2d Safety-oRe: 1at-cd r:q,.liDj.~~r.t r:9~.liDi"~~r.t ( SafetY-I'elated electrical cables for both divisions are located in these Safety-related ar~as. 5.9.1.2 Combustibles
**The major "The majJr cC!;lbt..;stible cc~bustible lvading loading ;s is *the::
th2 cable insulation and iubricating lubricating oil for condensate booster pu~ps. 5.9.1.3 COnSEQUenCes Conscu~nces Suppression if No Fire SUDpression unmitigated fire An unmitigat~d 'ire in :h~se areas would cause the 105s loss of one division of engineered safeguard syste~ system cables controlling the contain~ent cooling service water pumps. O~her equipment equipnent exposed is not required for safe shutdown. 5.9.1.4 Fire Protection Svstems Systems Fire protection is provlded by an autcmatic wet pipe sprinkler system, statio'ns, and portable extinguisher. The sprinkler syste~ hose stations, syste:r. protects the conqensate con~ensate rt..;mps, condensat<? booster purn~s rumps, condensate pum?s and all other areas. 5.9.1.5 Adeguacy of Fire Protection Due to th,= sep3T~tion of safety-related cables in this al'ea the sep3r~tion afea of th2 ~hc plant c (- and the fire prctac~i~n prct2c~i~n proviced, the area is adequately a~equ3tely pro:ec:2j. 5-14
c-( 9.1.6 9.1.6 1"0dific.'tions r*'odi fi c-? t ions The licnsee wiJJ.. px?yide lice:nsee wiJ).. pr?yide adcit;0nal adcitiC'nal hose to th'?th0 existing hosE' hose "t5tion
£,t5tion near -'--;l'*-:'~----;'
near-CciE:in-ro:" cc ,.; In ro.\, U:::- 4S::: in
. _~ 1.) t' '---~,r,' p thi5-~re'c(
111.:> "-
~a.:
We find that, subje:t to the implernentatio~ implementation of the above described m0difications,, the m0difications th! fire protection for the turbine building bJSt~2nt bJS[~2nt floor satisfies the objectives of Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore, acceptable acceptab 1e.. 5.9.2 ., Floor Elevation 495 Feet 5.9.2.1 ~f~ty-R~lated S2lfety-Related Ecu1D~ent EcuiD"ent This elevation is divided into three cubicles. One containment service water pump pu:r.p is located in each of the outer cubicles and two pu~ps pu,,',ps located in the center one. T\-.' THoo pumps are required to provide 100% cooling capacity. Unit 2 Division I cables are routed in ceble trays. All other capaclty. safety-related cables cCiDles are routed in CQ'lduit. co~duit. 5.9.2.2 Ccmbustihles combustible loadinQ The co~bustible loadinG at this elevation consists of lubricating 011, oil, cable insulation, and lubricating grease, grease. 5.9.2.3 Consecuences if No Fire Suppression SUDpression ( un:r.itigated fire in this ~rea could da~~g~ An un~itigated equipnent arj da~age rejundant equip~!nt 2r~ associated ca~le5. ca~les. loss of this equ~p~ent The less equip"ent wo~ld result in tne the less lc~s of the low pressure injection system. Shutdown capability ",,'ould would be availcble by the U5~ us~ of o~~e~o:~er systems. 5.9.2.4 Fire Protection Systems Svstems Fire protection is provided by hose stations and portable porta::,le fire extinguishers. ext i ngui shers. 5.9.2.5 Adequacy of Fire Fir~ Protection The Th~ fire protection for this area is ir,2dequate inedequate due ,to
.to the lack of fire detect i on and potential detection potent i a 1 for damage to redundant safety-related sa fety-re 1ated equipment.
equipIT,ent. 5.9.2.6 Modifications The..J.!£I!D~~_Qa.?_,R~oposed ~9_E!._~\{IF'_ft_~~.1I?f;1_~1i£.~~r:i~~1euove!'..C1~e_f~Ltbe contalnment coc 1 ;'r.~.(T~*r\ilCe .",'ater pumps, and control rod drive ha:er PU:1PS. We find that, s'Jbject sJbject to ir.lp1ementation il'lplementation of the 2bove above described i.!o~ifica i:1o!!ifica-tion, th~ the fire ~rotection for the turbine building floor elevation 495 feet satisfies ~he objectives of Section 2.1 of this report end and is, therefore, acceJt3)le. therefore~ c 5-15
9.3 (- ( ~.3.1
'!.3.1 This cahle tlJ:.~el tlJ~~el cOlltains both divisicilS cO!1tains divisic~s of safety-related ~lectI'1::al
~lectri:al ca~ies.
catJies. 5.9.3.2 Coitbl:s':.ibles Combl:stibles The combustibles in In the tunnel consist of cable insulation. 5.9.3.3 Conseguences if No Fire Suppression Consequences An unmitigated fire in the area could result in the loss of both divisions of electrical cables. 5.9.3.4 Fire Protection Systems Two rO',iS of automatic sprinklers run the complete length of the cable TvlO rows tunnel at the ceiling level. 5.9.3.5 A1?quacy Ajeguacy of Fire Protection Due to the atrange:-nent ai"range:nent of cable t.rays, ce i 1 i ng mounted spri trays, ceilil!g nkl ers cay sprinklers [loY not control a fil'e lO'fler cable trc:ys. fl)'e in 10Vler /*ianl!al. fire fighting tr2Ys. I*iar:ual.fire flghtir:g in this i:tea ~,'ea would be extremely difficult. Entrance to the tunnel is Is throu~h s~all hatches in the top of the tun~el and from the cable spreading rGO~. rCD~. c( Existing hose stations near the entrances d6 not have sufficient hose to
./; reach all areas. The lack of fire detection prevents pror.;pt extinguish fires.
pro~pt response to As noted notad in Section 4.1 of this reiJort, rEl10rt, the physical se:paration sEparation for essen-tial electrical cables does not provide assurance that redund2nt redundant syste~s would not be dam3ged by a fire. The consequences of fire damage in this area and the impe:tImp,,:t en capa:,i1 ity to safely shut down hav~ on the capability have* netr,ct been neen deterr.ii deterr.;i ned. 5.9.3~6 5.9.3.6 Modifications The licensee has proposed the following modifications. TQe sprinkler sprinkle!
~steilL.inj.he....tJ.n.1J~lyj.1.1.
~steilLin.-t.hLt.\.!l..r)~LJ'!jJl b~_mo*djf_i~.d be.._mo*djrl~d to ..!9~9..l!~tel:LJ~Totect
~9~9..l!?teJ.Lp.Totect the cables catiles in thliss aa~ea.
th r:.ea. .6.D-Eal:J bn-ea.t:JyY \r:arniogJJJ:.L.d.etec
\<."arniogJir.Ld_etectl tl on.-sy.s te!1L.il..llTJfe_-:pblll.i.detLf9..t..
te!IL.l{11Tl1a-:pbllLi.detCf9.r.... tnecabJ..Lt)..j.!l:v~ t:necab].,Lt\ill:,ei . ~Jiitl.o.n?l_.h..~~.e
~_d.iti.o.n!3l_h.o~e_ i}1
_\oiwil be .Ploy. 19.t;.Q.. _at-tb.e.ohoS.L~ Ll~~.p!..ovi9gcLaLthe :ta~ ions
.. hos.e....~.ta~ Ions locate.cLne.ar:-1.be-.uiUt.2 ..and._Unjt ..3.J~oe9'..:ater 10cate.cLnear:...the-ViUt.2_.and_Unjt 3..fii".e.o'tl2ter pumps to provide adequate noSecoverage no5ecoverage fer the .cable cable tunnel. .-----..
... 0-
~/here
~Ihere fi res couL~
fires coul j damage redundant safety-related systems, systems. the conse-quences will be jeterr.;; jetemlned ned to conf i rm that the capabil confirm capability ity to safesafely iy shut alternate means for safe shutdown will be*provided. down exists or an a1ternate be* provided. c 5-16
( ~!e,
>ie. find that. that, subject to corrpletion con-pletion of the [codifications eval;Jation r::odifications and evC!l:Jction descri~ed descri!"ed above, the fire protection for the ptotection fOi t)";e Unit 3 cable tUllnel satisfies tunnel the objectives of Section 2.1 of this report ~nd and is) is, therefore, a:ceptable.
a~ceptable. 5.9.4 Grou~d GrDu~d
--~
(Elevation 517 Feet) Floor (Elevztion~ c----, 5.9.4.1 5.9.4. I Safety-,{elated Safety-!{elated E~~'prnent E~~'p@ent ground floor* The gl'oi.md flooi cr~a ar~a contains red'Jndantred~ndant electrical cable trays, $\o/itch- switch-gear and ~otor control centers. 5.9.4.2 Comhustihles Combustihles The combustible lo~ding in this area consists of cable insulation, lu~rica ting oil and transient ~ateria1s. ~aterials. This elevation also contains th~ the clean and di rty oi oil1 storage room. 5.9.4.3 Consequences if No Fire Suppression
.An An unmitigated fire in many areas would cause d3~ag~ d3::cage to both divisions of safety-related ele;:trical ele~trical equipr::ent equipment and cab1es. cables.
5.9.4.4 Fi~e Protection Systems 1 ( Fire protectio~ protection in this area is provided by auto~atic wet-pipe sprinklers over the reactor feed pu~ps and in the oil storage ro6m, by carbon dioxide
. hose reels, portable extinguishers and ~ater hose stations.
!I
~.9.4.5* Adequacy of Fire Protection
. Ad2quacy nu~ber of areas, cable se~aration is In a nu@ber not acequate to prevent both divisi~ns from b~i~g b!ing in~olved In involved ~n a single fire due to fixed and transient fire loads. Fire detection 15 ;5 inac.e..qu=.te ir.ade.qu~te to permit prompt response by the fire brigade. ~o~or Eator controlcon~rol center 29-2 is inadequately protected from water da~ace whicn coula co~la result from the use of hose steams to co~bat a fire in a ~edund~nt divi~iori cable tray. Ventilation penetrations for ihe oil storage roo~s rooms are inadequately protected to prevent an exposure hazard safety- re 1 ate*j systems located outside to safety-relate*j outsi de this thi s area.
As noted in Sect~on 5ect;on 4.1 of this report, the physical separation for es~en tial supporting systems or electrical e1ectrical cables does not provide assurance that redundant systems would not be damaged by a fire. The consequences fite damage in such areas and the impact on the capability to safely of fire shut downdo~m have not been deterwined. deterr.rined. The conditions exist where redundant divisions of el~(trical electrical equipment or cables are in close proximity. 5.9.4.6 ~1odi
~lodifi ::at ions fi cat The lic'=!~see h.?s ,)f~??SEj
')r~??sd t~': t~" fo~lc\-!i~g fo~lc\Ji~g m?dif~c7t~~:is. ~ ~ fj>.~e~._'ti~l~T.
c
- l. tJ:iTt) lJ:1'ft Un; lic~~see h2S Si.:P2:~gJ_QrL~y;".E*~*,
Si.:P~;~~~*.iJ';rl._Sy;:.E*~*, 'r:~ tr.aru_av.s. 'the 3 t.r.aru-.cv_s, t.2. instru:-Jent Unit.2. instru::;ent .a y:~ i1 tl'2 b~ 1::3t2.iled i r cc~?rssor:--tar
.air cC:Cj)ressor:--tarly modific~t!o~s ...
.. tn-=_vl':JJ'~:..ty_~_:
1::::'t3iled n]~_.tn~ Harnin.iTil;,i-ly Harn; A__fj.xe~~ __\.'l~t~~ty_~_T .th2. lectronydrau1.ic._~9rl..trol..oi 1 r~servoi the'- et' Tectfon~*draul.ic;,_~9!Lt.fol._oi reservoi rs, __wa.1gr_ _t0 2 . Qi!lL? q~l~? .... ~i)P rs. and the n~ffl**e* de*(ecffon--
~n9_
svsTer.;s de-(ecffori's'!sTer.is W-iTf be.. W"ITf be. ..,pro\l.i prov:i I;=.:d i:1 *.tIe c:::d 1:1 ".'t};e vi (;jnity* .ct ~ 4. kll.
~j n.i ~~i .c( s'n'i tcrsear-3 kV. s\1;tchsear-3r*-a~-1d*""3.2*.*and-r--a~-i"-d'j2' "and* ~SO V 5-17
( sw:i,tchG~.=;_25, sw:i-tch~~_=_r_25, 2.0, h'est of s'..:itchq2ar s'. dtchq2ar 25 and
.35 .. and.35. tb.e 2.6, 35.and,36. l.b.r. fire det2c:1CJi'J det~c:ian SY3L-?:Il a:ld e2stCr-~-1.:'itc~I*:2~r~-35 arl-:r35-U-"j:'
end 26, a:ld'e~sCCr-~*1.::nC:-,*:gr~'35 sy3t . .!;!1 will b~ be ~:"t ajf:j~5-tc-;-"j~' ';'1(2
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ti"Oll:-'::.JjjFdar.:ile;*s ti*on:--=-.fjji- dar.:~frs y'; vii 11 b~,~J.D,5Jc:',.U_~.d.j be~J.r.sJi:'.U.~.Li n..,tt,Lye'!LiJ."~,i tJw_yenLiJYcj ofl __ pene~r:~ t i,o,ns=lQf oD.penetr" i o.ns=ior P"CGl carL.e,l)d~~arrty P"C81 6 n-=-~fo,~cge_ ~,~9.fl!. AJ.i.l'.e.-.dD.O~-'t!..i.t cafU.8d~~ajfty --6n-,-:,sfor'ageJ09.f1!* A.fjr.e....dlloL"tI.i.t h. a_Cl a_s.5 _~ _l~a.ti....r.:..9_ a_Cla.ss.1' .ra'<.j.fJL wi 11 D,D,0.!"! provi pro"i d~j d"j ii ~_~r.,~_p"q:'5.s,2.gQ, fl_the.p'ij~.sa£"',:ay ..;ay b~t'r:een b~tv:eef\ .!.hg !.Q~ Jurb.i
,turb,i ne bujJ.c1i buHdi ng 2nd ~D~. the.
raai;;-!:5te-'hlindiii~~' raii\~::5te"hLiiTi:l incC Fh'e i I'e reta!'oa'iiC'coafi"ric's retard2*nCcoati'nc*s will be apR apRl1ii ed to cc:b cob 1es at
~'~~_:~'ng~,'480
'1~I$Y._?*ri(r480 y.~ '!.~ s~i.~~~g'e s~i.~£OF.geaara'~d ra-~d;;;:l,"o r
',~6"t9 r _~Op'tr:9,{
_~oJl~r:g{ ~enT?-"!~-~~b.ire~*~he cenT~,!s'::-:<tJ.irft~*~h.~**s'epa ::~ '-s-epa tJ~n-
- <;.t.1~ri 9.L.r.f..d~0d2!lt' 9.Lr.f.r.i~!ld2f1t- ca::Jles ca:J,es is less Tess ~ha~ :ha~ five fe~t feet vertically c;rid c;r;d tfi'r'ee' tliree' f::et f~e:
hor; hori zont'ally: zonf<illy: Where fires could damage dar.1age redundant safety-related systems, the con5e~~ences conse:;:Jences will be detEr~ined detcr:nined to confirm confim that the capability capabil ity to 1.(; safely shut dc~n GC',;;i exists or an alternate means for safe shutdown will be provided. We find that, subject to i~plementation of the a~ove described ~odifica ~cdific!' tlons, the fire protection for the turbin2 tions, turbina building ground floor satis~iES satis~ies the objectives of Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore, acce~~~~le. acce?:!~le. 5.9.5 Mezzanine Floor (Elevations 53B 538 and 2nd 534 feet) 5.9.5.1 Safety-Related EQuiD~~nt Safety-Relat2d This 2rea'contai~s area'contair;s standby gas treatment units, instru~ent racks, 4~ ~v switchgear, 80to~ noto~ control center-s centers and both divisions of electrical c3bles. cables. C( 3. l.5.2 5.2 Co;;:bustibles Cor;-:bustib1es The'combustibles in this area consist ef cable insulation, lubricating The'ccmbustibles I! oil, charcoal, and a;'ld hir,h efficiency pari...ic.IJL:te
'high parLic.uL:te air filters.
5.9.5.3 Consequences if No Ho Fire Suopression SUDpression An unmitigated fire in this area would damage redundant divisions of electrica1 equi~~ent electrical equlp~ent and cables. 5.9.5.4 Fire Protection Fira PrDtection Svstens Automatic deluge systems protect the turbine ojl oil reservQirs, and hy~rogen hycrogen seal oil units. Automatic sprinklers protect the general areas of the mezzanine floor. Manual ~~anual carbon dioxide and water hose stations are ate pro-vided at various locations throughout the area. Portable extinguishers exting~ishers are provided in :hese ~hese a~eas. areas. 5.9.5:5 Adequacy: of Fire Protection The lack of adeqJate fire datection detection prevents early detection of fires which could resu~t in damage to redundant electrical equip~ent equipment and cab1es. cables. A large concentrction concentration of redundant cable trays are routed alo~g the 93St east lend of the south w3l1 w!ll which are,:oot are not prcte:ted prctected b¥ by a.fix~~ a fixed suppress;c~ suppressio~ " S J,,<te~ SJ_W;" v-:te""
- " " ' I .* T;"c The "*1 M-l
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ad~qu3te w~ter c0~Era~~ c0'Era~2 in the area of tne seal oil pu~p. The manual 5-18
c actuation station statioi1 for the hydrogen the fire area. Ele*.:trical electrical equ;p8en~. equipment. In such ar2a5, hydro;;en seal oil deluge system is located Ele~trical cables are rout~d areas, the u~e rOt!tQd above or ile2f use of hater~ loci!ted in near re::..::-:d*?;-.t hater to extinguish cable red~~d~nt fire:; fire; in'.'ol involving . . ing o~;e o::e division could f2sult result in wate)' db~3g2 to e'J,u1p!r.ent water do..::-:l92 e~uip~erlt of redundant division. Hose reach is in~dequate the redu~dant inedequate in t~e area of switch-gear 33. noled in Section 4.1 of this report, the ~hysical As noted physical separation for essen-tial supporting systems or electrical ca~les does dees not provide assurance that redundant 5y5te~s 5yste~s would not be d~~Jged da~aged by a fire_ fire. The consequences of' fi re da:nage in 'such areas and the impact on the capabi1 of 'fire capability i ty to safe safely ly shut dow., dow~ have not been determined. These conditions ~xist -exist in the cable routing area at the east end of the south wall Hall and in the vicinity of switchgear 23 and 24. 5.9.5.6 ~1odifi cat;
~10dif; cat ionsons The licensee has proposed the following m~difications. Early warning fire detec~J..Qn__sys.te.I!1~_
dete_c.tj..Qn SY.5tei!1~.\;I.i .~.i 11 be provi ded i.~_!r:.e_.0 i.~. .!:h.e.. 'd ~.i.n ty.oL4-;,Lswi J.;'Gf~.~
~i.n i ty._of_4-k..V_SW.l J.;.~f~." r f.r; ~
24" 3.... 2!i.,.-33_a ~d Ji 27:=-223.r2~-~--3:3_a0d :---]Jicc.exrst. ~09 J:!~~-]Jie.~.exrst. au :o;;:a t i cc...___spr.t~.k]_~!:.?ystE:8 f~g au:.o;-;:,at spr.t!lkJ.2.!:...?ys tE!8 ........ ~jJ_lJ~e_ jHJ)L
~xtenQ~d gxtenq!!..Q to_p r.o.Yl.de adequ'lte to_PI:o.y].de adequi!.te.. C DV.!:: (a ge._~f cov.er:age .. f c.L:t.he_ ..cabJe_c.cI':'C en t rraaU o.L..t.he_.cabl.e_c.cJccent onLa.1 cn9-ti :)iJs_a.l cng..
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J:j.e~lJag Q.d.l!dg....._~y5:em
~jstem for the Unit 3. hydrogen seal seCll oiJ"un5.t *to~.provide V:2~.~r:
oi)""unjJ *to:.provide v:2:..ec.
£Q~crag~, -::;01' fQ'Lcrag'2 actuatJon
-P.1e~pl.Tf:~p-.-Ih~.~,-pa~-:Jal a.c.t!J2tJon .stet;
~for ~the-:-pCrf:,;-p~Ih~""f;ia!!~a.l _stc~ ion on for the h)"drosert hidiosen sY~.'.&~j_.\;IJ..ll p_~e
~~ ce i 1 d~.luge.. $Y~~~"D.?_.~i.ll p~~e 1~~~t~ct..a*",,~y
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- 1. Lb~ *.sea 1ed cd to pre\' prevem. e,n. ",ater c2:"'ge.._ A
,,'ater c2:!*~9-?.
Cl ~.s.~...A-fjr..e C1 ~.s.~..A..fjr:.e.. Q.'~or.. c;!'J.::lr. ~.1.l.!_._be .p.ro~5..~~d." i [1_ th*e*:'p*assageway*.t::e:~we*e*n wil.l..bepro~i~~d. tt1~Cpassageway-f:;eh!een th~:_.~ur.~~!~ the:.tur~i..!1~
@i1di.;-,g_ar~*:Lradl';aste bu1 fu1dL-,g-2f.*::Lradl';aste bui 1laing.
di ng. A )~...9§.e AJ~ .. s.tat ion .wil) 9§e._s.tation .w;1) ~e t::,e located at. at co 1U'lln column 55 and the turb; turbine ne c.enter centerline 1 i ne to f1rotect 'ji"rotect switchgear 33. Where fi res cct!l c!d da;r,age da;r1/3Qe redundar.t redundant safety- safety-rel re 1ated ate::! syster.15, syste~5, the ccnse- conse-quences will be det~rmined det~rr.lined to confirm that the capability to safely shut down exists or an alternate means for. fersafe safe shutdown ~ill I*rill be provided. We find*that, find that, subject to im~lementation if:1;>lementation of the above a~ove described modifica- medifica-tions, the fire protection for the turbine building w2zzanine wezzanine floor fleor satis-objec:ives of Section 2.1 of this report and fies the objec~ives an~ is, therefore, acceptable. . 5.9.6 Floor Elevation ~49 Feet 5.9.6.1 Safety-Related Egul~ment Equi~ment
'The saf.ety-related equipment in'
-The in this area consists of the control room air condt-tioning condi'tioning r,!turn r*!turn fan, control room air handling t,andling unit and Division I and II cable trays.
5.9.6.2 Combustibles c '. ~ The cc~~ustibi~s cc:~~ustibi~':l iiI tion and'air ano'air cc~djtion if I ~h 5 s crea creJ ccnsist ccns;st of cabie i~s~1?:icr. cO:ldition ng filters and vinyl covered insulation. i:1s!.j1~ticr: hE~:i~; -hE3ti~~ ventila-5-19
'c>. 9.6.3
':,.9.6.3 Ccc:;seCJ!..lQ~::r.s Cc~seQUGnCe5 if no ~jre SUDpression
~Io rire
( A~ un~itig3t~d fire could result in the 1055 1~5S of both toth divisions of cables. M3nual cp2r~ticn Manual cp2rGticn of ~8tor ~otor operated valves wo~ld be br necessary for plant sl1utdo,m. The loss of the air tnlndl sJlUtdo'dn. handl ir.g unit r:c'Jld
\o:c'Jld not adversely affect habitability of the tr.e control room.
5.9.6.4 Fire Protectio~ System Portable extinguishers are provided in this area. 5.9.6.5 Adesua:y Adegua:y of Fire Protection Portable fire exting~ishers do not provide adequate protection in this area. 5.9.6.6 Modifications Modificatio~s The JJc~n.s~.~._~.tU_?rQvi lJC$mse.~.J~I.LU_provide de a stancp standpipe with suffi i pe \*:ith sufficient c i ent hose to cover the
. e~nt 1re area.
a rea. We find that. that, subject to i~plementation of the above described modifica-tD i~ple~entation madlfica-ti0ns, the fire protection for the turbine buildin~ buildjn£ floor ele~ation 54S 545 feet "satisfies cbjectivGs identified in Section 2.1 of this report 2n~
.satisfies the objectivGs is, therefore.
is) therefore, acceptable. ( 9.7 ~lain Main Flo_~~JEvat.icn Floor (ElEvation 561 Feet)
- 9. 7. 1
*".9.7.1 ';J. S.~fet'/-R-era::2Q-Safety-Rela:ed EQuioment ;:iJ~.dDiT::?nt I! lio safety-related equipr;;ent.
Ho equipr:;ent or cables are located in this area. 5.9.7.2 Combustibles C0mbustibles The combustibles in this area consi;t consist of lubric2ting lubriccting oil from the r.o~cr r.o~or generator sets. 5.9.7.3 Consequences i~ i" No Fire Suppr~ssion An unmitiaated fire in this area could cause the collapse of,the,tu~bine of the_turbine building roof. 5.9.7.4 Fire Protection Systems Automatic wet-pipe sprinkler systems are provided for the Unit 2 and Unit 3 bearing lift pcmps p~mps and fo~ for the motor generator sets. Manual careon carDon dioxide, and water hose stations are located throughout the area. dioxid~ area .." 5.9.7.5 Adequacy of Fir.: Fir,; Prote:t Protection ion Systems safety-relati'd eq~ip~ent No safpty-relat2d eq~i"rcem. is exposed by a fire in this arEa. ara. Provisions h.3*ve not te~n h.a"ve p7'o\!i~::?: t.o ce2n p:'od::==::: to i-li:::it thE spread of en "bit thE: .fire. ~,:*;;-ra:'ed cn oil spill .fire:.. ~,:*n-ra~ed ( doors pro\iae a~ce55 a~ce5S to the reactor tuilding. 5-20
( 5.9.7.6 ',l1,1 G C3 t ion s G:\d i f i C3 ( Thc l;cens~e The licensee has prcposed the follc\*";r;g n~dificatiofls. follcHing r:'Cldifications. A qc:t'_.'~:Jl_b_~ q!.~J;--.:JlJ)_~ p.rJ~v*j p.r.~~v -j ced 2 2 r~~l~~~ ...t.'::: _!i10.tor-
!~.~:~~~._.t.~ _~:o.tor_ Sf;i'.t::ra ta.r_.::'.2~.Lt~t
£(;I'.~ratcr ~OG t'~.tn
__ ::*.2~.Lt9_ ...coC _2 [ly_.O il. t,~.tn _2ny_.o i l. 5spP L1-1-LC-U.1-te-. wi ttl rri--UI-e with ri'Tl1e a rea prot2c.~.~dJ!~L protec.!.edJ)Y_ 2.11tcr;..at __ ~pdiJk l.er:.s. tc_"~pLink a.lltcP,',.at tc UJ,§.S.L,t fi::;;_c'JOi' ler:.s. UlE-$.~.'~- fi::'LCJor WTT1-D~-pY'bVrjed' W-nrl:ie-pi'()vTded"Tn"the Tn-- the passag~1t.?Y pass~ge.li?Y bet . . . e~:l the turbi betwe2i1 turbine ne bui 1ldinc: a~G d inc: ar:c rea.:.'tor-"bt:i-l rea-c."to r--rJt:i'j di'lrg',di'l1"g*. We find that, subject to iT:1plemer.tation ir::plem2l1tation of the above described i::o:lifi:a- ii;o~ifi::a tlons, the fire protection for the turbine building 8ain t5cns 1 Qain floor s2~isfiessa~isfies the objectives identified id2ntified in Section 2.1 of this report and is, therefore, acce;;tab 1e. 5.10 Raj',iC\ste Buildir:o Raj',in:.te Euildir,a
- 5. 10. 1 5.10.1 S3f~tv-Re)ated S3f"tv-Related toui~~ent
_ _ .. :.1_
.:.l_ tGub:"'ent There is no safety-related equipment which is used to shut down the r~3ctor r~~ctor in this area.
5.10.2 COliJbustir.1es Cor.;bustibles Combustibles in the area include dry low lew contaminated waste in 55 ~El1~n
~allcn drums, cable insulation, spent and dry resins, filters.
5.10.3 Consequences if No Fire Suppression SUDpression C' ( The conseq~ences of no fire suppression in this area would not reSl-~ in the release of radioactive m3terial to the environment in excess o~ resu": D~ 10 CFR 20 limits.
/
5.1 O. ~ Fire Protection Sy~te~s SY5te~s There are fire h~5e h~se stations and portab1e portable CO~ fire extinguishers lcca~ed loc2~ed on various levels of ef the radwaste building. '
- 5. 10.5 5.10.5 Adegua:v Adequa::v of Fire Protection The fire fil'e hose stciions stctions and portable extinguishers are adequate to centrol a fire in the crea. area.
5.10.6 ll:odi I':odifi fi cat ions The licensee ha:; has not pr.oposedproposed any modifications for this area. We find that th~ the fire protection for the radwaste building satisfies the tr.e objectives ide1tified ide~tified in Section 2. i of thi~ t~i& report and is, therefore, acceptatle. ((~ .. 5-21
, - S. I - ~. 11
. 11.}
- 11. 1 C
( equipiC?nt loca:ed There is no equipi7!'?rtt located in this area ldhich Ylhich is safety rela~ed re1a~ed or is used to shut s~ut down the reactor. 5.11.2 Combustibles There are no significant combustibles in this area.
.There 5.11.3 Conseouences if No fire $uDDression I
SUDDression The consequences of an unmitigated fire in this area would result in daffiJge to the off-gas recombiner equipment da~Jge 5.11.4 Fire Protection Svsters fire Systems There are fire hose stations and portable CO 2 extinguishers in this area. 5.11.5 Ad2quacy Adequacy of Fire Protection The fire protection syste~s systen:s in this area are adequate to control any ~n)' fire that mrght might occur in this area.
- 5. 11. 6 Modifi*:ations Mo d i f i .:: at i 0 i! 5 w.:...Jl~.n5..£.!l,...-\l.*.i-ll-p.ro"v;
.tb!>~i <;!:n~*.:i.l1-p.ro.vi de a rated fi re dam?er dam~er in the ve'nt on .ile~:etra at ii on.Re:":etra-ve'n: i1 a"t c.
( tion to thi~_2rE'a. thiLarea. We find that, subject to the imple~entation imple;;;entation of the above
~.bo'ie described modifica-modi fica-
., tion, the fire protection for the off-gas recombiner area satisfies satisfi~s the objectives id~ntified Identified in Section 2.1 of this report arid is, therefore, acceptable.
5.12 'pump HOl}se 5.12.1
- 5. 12. 1 Safetv-~eTated Eaui~ment
-----------------~
The crib house contains the diesel-generator cooling water pumps and both divisions of safety-related cables. 5.12.2 Combustibles The combustibles in this. this* area consist of lubricating oil and diesel fuel oil. 5.12.3 Consequences if No r~o Fire Suppress~on A fire in this ar:a ar~a could adversely affect the service water pumps, diesel fire pump, circulating water pu:nps, the diesel-generator cooling *'",ater . . ater pur.:;:>s and both divisions of safety-related cables. pu~t's
. 5-22
5.12.4 S. 12.4 Fire rrot~:£ion Proteciiofl 5v5te~s SV5te~s () / Portable fire extinguishers' extinguishers and aa hOSE: hos~ stction al'e are provided in this are'a. 5.12.5 Adequacy of Fire Pr0tection Protection Before manual fire fighting could be initiated in this area, substantial fire "damage
~amage could occur. The existing prot~ction prot!ctlon is Is not adequ3te adequate to prevent the loss of saiety-reiated safety-reiated equipGent equlpGent and cables or damage Gamage of the fire pump. Pro~isions Provisions have not been provided to limit an oil 011 spill fire.
5.12.6 Hodiflcaticns Hodificaticns Llle,J J_he.JicenseeIcensee will wi11 provide an auto~atic auto;natic 5~rinkler s;Jrinkler system over the die5el d~e5el fflJ'..e.:'p liroi;i:, a(ld ' fue ir--E-'~'puf;iR:jl)d' rue ro-n--tahk"a-n'c' n,-n--tahk"a-ri'ir~tfl f p'rov'ide'clii':hs f or"the
'~lfl f'jirovice'cl!ib's or'fhe tanks~,fo:
tankS~,to rrec] ude the.'sprea'd precJude the ,sprea'd oT'a-dh~selo:(-a- dies e 1 fuel oil"spil1 0 il "5 Pi n'f I re. He "fire. ~:e will wi 11 require requi re the installation oc-a:" l'nstallation fi'rsGetecti on , sY5'te~ of'-ci" fi'redetecti sys'te::J in inthis*"area.
'thls"'area.
We find that, subject to the implementation Imple~entation ~f the above described modifica- m~difica tions and staff req~irement, reqcirement, the fire protec:ion protection for the pu~p house satisfies the objectives of Section 2.1 of this report a~d and is, therefore, acceptable. acceptabJe. 5.13
- 5. 13 Yard ArC2a Area 5.13.1
- 5. 13. 1 ~ifelv-Related
~¥fetv-Related K
Ecuioment The safety-related equipment in the yard area includes Includes four 250,000 gallon dew.inera1izad d~mi nera 1 i zed H~ter water tanks, one COnCe;)5,~te conce~5,~te 5 sto~age to:--age tank and three burl burieded ( 15,000 gallon diesel fuei fuel oil storage tanks.- tanks.' 5.13.2 ,".' Combustibles I Co~bustibles in the yard include gas cylin~ers, cylinders, fuel 9i1, 911, H, storage tanks, propane tanks, transformer oil and miscellaneous storage. 5.13.3 Consequences Cons~guences if ~o No Fi~eFlpe Suporesslon SupDr~ssion The consequences cf of an un8itigated fire in the yard area could impact Impact safe shutdown of saf?ty-related safety-related systems through some of the non-rated ,turbine turbine . building penEtrationspenetrations adjacent to the r~serve auxiliary transformers. 5.13.4 Fire Protection The fire protection systems for the yard area include automatic deluge systems on the trar.s for/i:t?rs formers and hose hous~s houses on the hydrants for li.anllQ r..anlJa 1I fire fighting. The fuel oil storage tanks are surrounded by a ber~ berm of suffi~ie~t height to contain the entire contents of the tank.
"5.13.5
~5.13.5 Adequacy of Fire ?~ote:tion ?rotection The yard area fire protection syste~5 syste~s are adequate except for the wall
""n"t'
~ _ _ ra*l*o~ b\*
nerietratio:l ..,. ¥ +. . ;::, *D~':~ h\, t:--2 h' .... _ ~ .. -:: t~uct
~ _ _ (';J'C" f:~
.~, '- f ........ ~r:e :"eserve
* .., * .1.1"\;:'
.... * * ' - "oserve Ci:;xili~rl/
.... ~. _ t\a:1:;;~!\r:;,,,_r. s.
~:;xi',* ~?:r"! tra;1sfcr;;;~~s.
... _ -,'"he The
,(
( do~rs lEa:ir:;-:'J dovr's le2~i~; t~ tranSicr::.=::,s transfcr~~~s 21 ailG a~d 2.2 2f2 net f~re-22 2f2 fire- i".:.~eG ra~ed . . 5-23
( 13.6 13,6 t~ 0d i fiC:1 t ion s t~odifiC3tions l.~.~_ l.~.e_ b'J b'JSs duet duct p penet ['ne t ra tt ion ne ~re. s.t. tg. i on ...near~ to. the ... re S~ S(! 1"','
"";'2 .2 'JX ii 1. ii a.ry e .2'JX ary t r.Bre rl.?fpJ.'~,::.r:.$_
'l.?fpJ."c.,=.I":.?_ 22
~D.d_31-:-
,-l)L1.zL3 F iiE
~~i I 1=.~e.-pr6
=.~~.-p~~6 ~,:~.~.~e::J
~~_~.~2:j .by._cQ.C!LJ1f:.lff ' 3 ti
.bY__ 2:}' .._cPJ.!:Qffl3 t.i..f . cJ Lr~ct::J iT~ct.::J .\!d ~e l.~ r ..
r., spr.~Y sPT.c:y _~y.? ~e;n.
~e:n. 1 he yatet, yat.er.su::;p ly to"
.su;::p 1y to 'thf? spr2y .sys
*tnt? SPT2Y te:;) wi 11 syste::l 11, be i nd~~'2i"!dent nd2;"'2;*,dent of HIe the .Jeed
.Jeedtci* .tQ' 'the
*the..
..iran .'dduge- sy5te~. The for{;1er*deTuge*_syste~.
-irans£ fofr.:er The.00t~ o0t~ ij de "({oor to trur1s d2 --(fo'o"r trans former's formers 21 end and 22 t-will be r.:~dif;ed
-.~
to r.:odified to a 3-hour-t"1~;ss 3-hour -Class'A
--A--ffre
.{(fe "doer.'*doer.*.' .....--...
. 1"-'_- .. ___ ....
We find that, subject su~ject to implementation of the above described modifica-tions, the' fire protection fer the yard area satisfies the objectives objectlves of Section 2.1 of this repJrt report and is, therefore, acceptable. 5. 5,1414 Off-Gas Filter Buildin6 Buildina 5, 14. 1 S. Safe tv-Related Equlpment Safety-Related No safety-related equipment is located in the off-£as off-gas filter building. 5.14.2 Combustibles CO!J1bustibles The combustibles cOmbustibles in the area consist of a s;;.311 s".311 quantity of cable in5ul.~ insul.;- tion and charcoal in the off-gas filter units. 5.14.3 Co~seouences if No Fire SupDressio~ Conseauences The consequences of a fire in the off-gas filter units has not been ~sl~:~
~!l!:~
( mined by the l~censee. _. 1';.4 oJ. 1:'.4 Fire Protection Svstems A fire detection system is provided in the area. Two T\oIo hose stations a~j a~:j portable fire extinguishers provide fire fi re ~uppression
'suppression cap~bility. cap:;bil ity.
5.14.5 AdeQ~acy Adeo~acy of Fire Protection We_h~v~_~equestej l.Je_.t).i\v.e;r:equested that the licensee provide provlce an analysis of the conse-quen::es of a fi re ;i nvo 1vi n~f' quen:::es ng' the" tha' char6)al-fil Chare'oarri 1ters. 5.14.6 Modifications No modifications have been proposed for this area. The adequacy of the fire protection for the off-gas filter building will be addressed in a supplement to this report. 5-24
,~
6.0 Am'lnn STR,\TUE CC:;JROlS ( The licensee's d2scription description of the ad~inistrative ad~jnistrative controls is not adeq~ate to ~er~it
~erQit a conclusion by the staff. w~ have recom~ended that the licensee's ad~inistrative controls follow the guidelines set forth in "N~clear Plant Fire Protection Functio~al I'N~clear Functional Responsibilities, A~ministrative Assurance."II Our evaluation of the administ~ative Controls and Quality Assurance, ad~inistratjve
. controls for fire protection will be issued in a supplement to this report.
report . ( . ( 6-1
( 7.0 TECHNICAL TECH~i!CAL SPECIFIChTICNS SPECIFIC~TICNS includ~ limiting condi-The Jechnical Specifications have been modified to include lions for operaticn and surveillance survejlla~ce requirements for existing fire protec-tion 5y5te~s syste~s and ad~inistrativ2 ad~ini5trativ2 controls. Following the implementation imple~entalion of the modifications of fire protection systems and ad81nistrative administrative centrols centrals si~ilarly Sp~cifications will be siQilarly resulting from this review, the Technical Sp2cifications modified to ~ncorporate the limiting conditions for operaticn and surveij-surveil-la~ce requirements for these modifications. ( I! ( 7-1
( 8.0 CO~~CLt.:SIC~l CO~:ClL:SIC~l The licensee has perfortled perfonted a fire hazards hazerds analysis and Bnd h~s hIS propo~~ct proposed cer~~in cer~a!n modification~ ffiodification~ to improve the fire protection program.. Additional ~od;f;ca "-odifica-tions have bean b,"en proposed by the licpnsee licensee during the cnurse c.~urse of ou~ our review of the fir-e th37.ards analysis and our onshe fire th~7.ards onsi,,~ eva1uatio:nevaluatiaorl of the fi~*e fi:*e pl'ctac-pl'ctec-ticn tion program. _ These proposed ~odifications m~difications are sum~a~iZ2d 5umm=,ized in Sect;cn Section 3.1. In addition addition,t we have concluded concludsd th3t tt13t the licensee i~pl~ment certa;n ey~lua i~pl~rnent certain evelua-tic:1s ir.ljlrov(lr:;~nts ie1ated tic;)s or ir.lj)ro\';1r:::nts related to-the to the fire protection ;proigr'aIil. :proigram. Th~se The.se are surr~arized surr~ar;zed in Section 3.2. In summary, ssignificant i gnifi cant steps are be; being n9 taken to pro\l!i pro\fiee de additi o!1~i additio!lai assurance that safe shutdown can be acco~plished accomplished and the plant can be maintained in a safe condition in response to potentjal potential fire situatic~s. situatic~s.* Additional evaluation of inco~plete ite~s, discussed in the prc:2~~rr prc:~~jrr sections, will be necessary before we I'!e can conclude concl ude that tbat the overallavera 11 f-:re f-:rE: protection at the Dresden facilities will satisfy the provisions hich the Staff has established for satisfactory lor,~-:'erm
.....~:hich lor.3-~erm fire prot::c:ion.pro~"c:ion.
We find that the licensee's proposed modificctions modifications G~scribed d~5cribed herein ere Ere acceptable both with ~ith respect to th2 the iffiprove~ents improve~ents in !he the fire pro~e~:~o~ pro:ec:~o~ prcgram that they provid~ prcgrem provide and with res;;ect to safe a-;Jeration G~eration of th2 the c facilitie~, facilities, while the remaining items are completed_ In the repor-::: report of the Special Rev;c\*, 0050) dated February 1975, consideration Reviel" G:o:.;p Gro~p on the BrC\i*lr.s considC?ration of the safety of opera:i~:1 Fer;-y Fire {t;~:;::::G-BrC'.l*Il";S Ferr-y operatic~ ::-:' (:;~:::::G-
- ' ell
/ o~erating operating nuclear power plants pending the corpleticn conpleticn of o~r detail~j fira fire protection evaluationeVcluation was presented. The folluwing quotations fro~ :~e ;he sUITI,iariZE: the basis for our conc1usion report suo.:.'iarize conclusion that 'the "the operation of c;' ,,=
c".! facility, pending resolution of the incomplete ite~5 ite;;;s and the im?le~e~ta~ion implene1tation of all facility ~odifications, dces does not present an undU2 undue risk to t~~ the ~Ealth
~ealth and safety 07 the public.
probability "A prob.1bil ity assessment of publ; publicc safety or risk lI"isk in quantitative terms is given gi ven i r. in the Reactor Sa fety Safety Study (H";SH-1400). As the res!l1t (H;"SH-1400). res~1t of the calculation based on the 8rowns Clrowns Ferry T-;re, f';re, the study con::h:des con:h:des that th~th2 potential for a significant release ri:!lease ~f *o:i' radioactivity fr~~ fr:J3 such a }ire *,'ire is about 20~ 20;; of that calculated fr~m from all other causes analyzed. This indicates that predicted potential accident risks fro", all causes. were not greatly affected by c~nsideration fro~ c:Jnsideration of the Brol1/isrerry Bro\*ms -ferry fire. rire. This is one of the, the reasons that urgent action in regard to reducing risks due to potential fires is not required.
'he st:Jiy (~Ul.SH-1400) ihe (~I.~,SH-1400) also points out Ollt that 'ra_'ther 'ra.'!:her straightforward measures, such as may already exist at other n~clear plants, can Significantly reduce the likelihood of a pote~tial poteutial core melt accident that might result froiT! from a large fire ... .. '
"Fl*r*os ::'::J; "Fir2S .-,..-., .. ra:-l-.ct r::l . . }-;;..*. fr2qu~ntly;
-,...... "'!'- _ .... J..
.:"l..",,~J"i,j*l'* ' ho\*:ever, hr.\.I.::."~r l"nvolv;" eq:.J1p~ent
~l*""o.:'" involv;:;2 fires E":.Jir;r-c.nt
( - ......... '-.... ....~ , __ , I c:;::*;:;~r2;.b-le to the 3rc,-:ns unav;li1~:"il itj c:;::*;:;~r2;.b-je unav;Ii1.:.:'*ilitj
......... \- __ , I Srcv:ns Ferry fire *are
- __ I,;; '1 'l"""'-
"are q;ji~2 l!:fre-que~t (see Section 3.3 of [NUREG-00501]).
quent The Review Group be~ieves beiiev2s that steps already taken since March M3rch 1975 (see Section 3.3.2) have red~c2d this freq~£ncy red~c~d fre~~2ncy significantly. 8-1
( "Based on its revieh' revie\~ of the events transpi rir.9 before, during Clnd transpirir.9 cnd after the 8rm*ir.s 8ro;,;r.s Ferry fire, the Revie' Revie'd. ; Grou? concludes that the
,probabil ity of disruptive fires of the magnitude probability masni:UG" of the Src~ns ErG',ms Ferry event is small, sma 11, and that there is no need to restr; restl'i ct opera-nuclea)' power plants for public safety. However, it is cle~r tion of nuclE:a}'
that much can and should be done to reduce even further the likeli-hood of disabling fires and to improve assurance of rapid extinguish-ment of fires that occur. Consideration should be given elso e1so to features that would increase further the ability abi1 ity of nuclear facil-large fires without loss of i~portant ities to withstand la}'ge i:nportant functions should such fires occur,lI occur." I/e have determined that the amerld~nt h'e amer,dment does not authorize 1Ia change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in pOwer level ~nd \'t'il1 l'Ii11 not resul resultt ;n any si gflificant. in cllY gnificant env; envi ror.:'Y2ntal ron:7'(?nta1 impact. Having !;;ade r.;ade this detenninaticn, determination, we have further concluded that the a;nend;nent a;nend;;,ent involves an Gn action which is insignificant froffi fro~ the standpoint of environmental impact
§5l.5(d)(~), that an environmental il~~act and, pursuant to 10 CFR §S1.5{d)(4), iqact stat:r;)ent stat:r.Jent or negative declaration and environ~ental environ;nental impact appraisal need not be prepared in co~nection with the issuance of this amend~~nt amen dr.r.t,.
c c (
c*c Under contract to Nuclear Regul Citory Com~1i Regul3tory ss i on Brookhaven Nat Commission, I i :inal Natbnal LabQratory has provided the services of fire protection consulicntsconsll1t~nt5 who participated in the evaluation of the lic~nseers licEnsee's fire prote~tion prote:tion program and in the preparation of this report. Their report, "Fire Protection in Operating Nuclear Power Stations - Dresden Units 2 and 3 Safety Evaluation ReDort Review dated February 13. Report Revie'd 13, 1978, 'discusses several matters which have been addressed 1n this report. The elements of the consultants recommendations which we have not adopted are iidentified dent i fi ed in Appendix liB" "B" along "Ii th our bases therefor. with ( c( 9-1
( {IPPENDIX A
!IPPENOIX CHRONOLOGY In February 1976 the report by the NRC Special Review Group was issued as NUREG-005C, IIReco;nmendc:tions "Reco:nmendations Related to the Browns Ferry Fire. Fire."1t On May 1, 1976, Standard Review Plan 9.5.1 I1Fire "Fire Protection Protection"tl was issued, incot--
;ncol'-
reccmmendations contained in NUREG-0050. porating the various recc~mendations By letter dated Hay 11, 1975, Commonwealth Edison Company was requested to compare the existing fire protection provisions at their facilities with new NRC guidelines as set forth in Standard Review Plan 9.5.1 IIFire "Fire Protection" dated May', May 1, 1976 and to describe (1) the imple~entation implementatiDn of the guidelines ~2:, (2) the modifications or changes under'f;ay under",'ay to meet the guidelines that will L2 t-2 met in the near future, and (3) the guidelines that will not b~ th~t wi11 be met and th2 the basis therefor. ' .' 8y letters of September 30, 1976 By 1975 and October 1, 1976, Commonwealth Edison Company was requested to provide the results of a fire hazards analysis an~
*c*
c-. Technical Specifications pertaining to fire protection. Com~onwealth propose Te:hnical Edison was also provided a copy of Appendix A to BTP 9.5-1 which .includes acceptable alternatives to the guidelines of SRP 9.5-1.
. a~ceptable Corr.~onwealth jnc1udes By letter of December 1, 1976 we provided model Technical Specifications requested submittal of firefi~e protection prDtection Technica) Specifications.
S~ecifications. D~cember 28, 1976, and August 19, 1977, Commonwealth Edison On October 1, 1975, O~cember Company prov; ded submi provided tta 1s respond; submittals respondingng to our reql~e5ts requests of May 11, 197£.. 197E., On January 10 to 14, 1977, ,thethe DOR fire protection review teaiilteaw visited the Dresc~n Dre;;;:;,," Units 2 and 3 facility. On March additior.al
~larch 29, 1977 the licensee submitted additiona1 information replying to our r~quest request of May 11, 1976. On May
~lay Jl, ~tay 23, 1977 members of the NRC staff and their consultants met with the licensee at the Dresden facilities to clarify positions and questions which were submitted earlier on 10, 1977. On June 23 and 24 members of the NRC staff
~tay 10. $taff met wi th the 1i 1i censee in Bethesda, Maryland Haryland to discuss staff concerns and positions. The licensee submitted on July 19, 1977 further information in response to the staff's conce'rns and.positions.
concerns and ,positions. A letter forwarding the administrative controls for fire protection was for-
,licensee on July 23, 1977.
wa'rded to the :licensee On October 5, 1977 members of the staff met with the licensee in Silver Spring, ~D MD to discuss unresolved issues which had been forwarded earlier. sub~ittpd his response to fire protection On December.l, 1977 the licensee su~~ittpd protectjo~ (( ~ositions which were a*result of the staff's NC~2ffiber e. a, 1977 telecon with the
- licensee.
A-I
* . I- /
\,- On Dec.'mber Dec~mber 13,1977 licens"e subrrtitted 13, 1977 the licens;:e subntitt.ed a sumntary surnrr,ary of the planned modifica-conc21'ning fire protection. tions concerning protection, On Decem~er 2929,t 1977 and January 25, 1978 1973 the licensee submitted responses to additional information. staff positions and requests for addition61 information, (-( ( t' A-') A-,)
'. ~
i I r
, APPENJIX APPEWlIX 8
( DISCUSSION OF CO~15UL T~Jn I CO~~SULTMiT' S REPORT Commission, Brookhaven National Under Contract to Nuclear Regulatory COwmission, Laboratory ha~has provid<!d provid~d the services sel'vices of fire protection consultants who license~'s fire protection program participated in the evaluation of the licensee1s and in tMe pl'eparation of the safety evaluation report (SER). Their trie preparJtion letter, "Fire IIFire Protection in Operating Hu-:lear Nuclear Pc' .... er Stations - Dresden 2 Power
& 3 Safety Evaluation Report Rev;c'f',11 Ravin/," dated February 13) 13, 1978, concurs with the staff conclusions noted in the SER.
recommendations which we have not adopted, along with our The consultant's reco~mendat;ons basis therefore, is as follows: ConSUltant's R~comm=ncation: Consultant's Recomm:ncation:
"Electrical valve supervision should be provided on all valves controlling fire water systems and sectionalizing valves. The present proposal of administrative controls or locks will increase tte U.e probability of suppres-s;on sion system failure on demand.
demand."1I Staff Response: The NRC guidelines on valve supervision are given in Appeiidix Appe~dix IINI "A" of c.( Branch Technical Position (SIP) guidelines per~it.
/ / trative (BTP) 9.5-1 of the Standard Review Plan. These per~it, as an alternative to electrical supervision. supervision, an admini5-pregran to assure that valves are maintained in the proper tl'ative prcg!'ar, adminis-I POSitiOil. Su::h a ~rogra:n position. Sud: ~rogra:n includes 10d~ing lod~ing valvE? with strict key control
' . or sealing valves with U:;:per
..... t3~per proof seals. Periodic inspections are to be performed to verify that the method of securing the ~alve is intact.
These measures are consis~ent with the requirements imposed for super-valves in safet.y-re12ted vising valvt'5 safety-related systei.ls. syste..,s, and provid~d provid:d adequate asst:rance asst;rance valvEs ~re that valves maintained in the appropriate position. The licenseels BfE Maintained licensee's program for 5upervjsion is consistent with NRC guidelir.es fer valve supervjsion guidelines (see SER Section 4.3.1.3). In addition, the plant Technical Specifications were revised to require a monthly check of all valves in the flow path.to fire suppression systems. We find that a significant increase in plant safety would not result from the use of electrical supervision of all valves controlling fire water systems and sectional;zing sectionalizing valves. ( B-1
2
.0', ***."
r
... 1"-.-/
I: '.' I
)(
D December 11, 1080
~,
.r
( '-- Messrs; '. C. Messrs:" C. Reed/N. A. Kersha~ Kershaw D'. J. Scott H. E. Bliss W. J. Shewski T T... C. Cihlar/G. E.- E.' Peterson W. L. Stiede/G. P. Wagner
,i/ K. L. Graesser - RIll On~y Only P. P. Steptoe-IL&8 (Letters Only Onl; i R. H. Holyoak R.* M.
*M. A. Bowidowicz - S&L S&~
.r . ,'J.'
i 'J. H. Hughes (NLA Sheet Only) M. E. Bray/J. Nash - G.E. R. E. Jortberg . G. State of Wright - state of,Illinois
, Illinois N. J. Kalivianakis J. 0:
D: Kahn - Exxon
.. A. W. Kleinrath/A. -D. D. Rossin NL Distribution
.,,~ :**r. A. Palmer
,'::"F. 'H. K. Stolt Q .. A. Engineer - Dresden Q.A.
Q.A. 'Engineer Q.A.Engineer SNEO SNED In the judgement of the Nuclear Lic~nsing Licensing Administrat6r, the atta=hed Etta=hed document contains the following commitments to the NRC or req0::e~ents req0::E~ents from the .NRC. Identification of Attached Document: Dresden 2/3 - Supplemen:=: SER 5ER for Fire Protection. (T. A. Ippolito letter to J. S. Abel dated 12/2/80) NRC Commitment or ReqUirement: Reguirement:
< Respc:-.si
<":'";, Respc:-.sible bl e
=D~u~e~D~a~t~e~________~C~o~m~m~~~'t~m~e~n~t~o~r~R~e~q~u~i~r~e~m~e~n~t~__________~E~d~i~s~o~r~,~c:par:ment Due Date Commitment or Requirement Edison C~oar:~ent
----~------------~~~~~~~--~~~~~------------~~~~
- , tor For your ~nforrnation information Distribution Note: This letter does not supercede
'the previous' previous request for information and modifications dated 10/27/80.
.... .... ": .. (RFJ transmittal 80-466)
-:~(RFJ
~.
When 1t lt is determined by the responsible department that a due date will not be met, the Nuclear Licensing Administrator should be notified ntit immediately. R. F. Janecek 80-522
. _.. " . ~
~', .
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COr.1MISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 DEC 08 Rlf1l RL!() December 2, 1980 ~
~.:r
~.::r Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 Mr.J.*. s.
S. Abel, Abel. Director of Nuclear Licensing licensing Common'.'/ealth Commomlea 1 th Edison Edi son Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690
Dear Mr. Abel:
Our initial Safety Evaluation Report deali~i dealing* with fire protection at the Dresden Units 2 and 3 facilities was ~Ias issued on Narch f1arch 22,1978. 22, 1978. In Section 3 of the Safety Evaluation Report, certain items were identified as incomplete and requiring further information from the licensee and evaluation by the staff. We have completed our review of information dealing with these incomplete items as provided in licensee responses of January 24, March Harch 20, and July 27, 1978, January 31, and April 30,1979, 3D, 1979, on Administrative Controls, May 25, 1978, on Radiological Consequences of. of Fires, April 14, June 29, "and **and Septellber 29, 1978, on Cable Penetration Fire Barrier Tests, and June 5, 1978, January 24 an~.February and. February 29, 1930, on Shutdown Capability. The resu1 ts of our review are described 'in results *in the enclosed Suppl anent ement to the Safety Evaluation Report. He find that, with one exception, the incomplete items have been acceptably resolved subject to the implementation of proposed modifications identified in Section 3.0 of this report. The one exception is Safe Shutdo\'lO Shutdo~:n Capability, \'lhich ~Ihich was addressed in our .letter to you dated October 1, 1980. If you have any questions. regarding this matter, please contact us.
*Sincere1.y, Sincerel.y,
>~~.Ch;ef
'..dc..A~- d-
.... .'/. Th;;a~a!~o, Chief
.... Opera ti ng Reactors Branch #2 Operating tl2
.... Div; sicn of Li Division censi n9 licensing
Enclosure:
Suppl ernen:t to the Safety Supplement Evaluation Report cc t t w/enclosure: See next page
I("~<., I*lr." J. S. Abel f.lr. 1980* December 2, 1980'
~ ( .
/j
. cc: '",
I
.' Mr. John W. Rowe Isham, lincoln &:& Beale
'Isham, Counselors at Law law One First National Plaza, 42nd Floor
. Chicago, Illinois 60503 £0503 Mr. B. B. Steph~nson Plant Suoerintendent
" Dresden ~uclear Nuclear Po~er Power Station Rural Route ill #1 Morris~ Illinois 60450 50450 Morris Public Library library 604 Liberty Street Morris, Illinois 60451 50451 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Jesident
~esident Inspector's Office Dresden Station RR #1 .
Morris, Illinois 60450
.' .. Susan N. SekulSekuler er Assistant Attorney General Environmental Control Division "188 188 W. Randolph Street Suite 2315 Chicago, Chi cago, Illi n~i s . 60601 Illinois. £0501 John F. Wolf, Wolf. EsqEsq.*
.3409 Shepherd Street
*Chevy Chase. Maryland 20015 Chevy Chase,
- Dr. linda W. Little ".
'0 500 Hermitage Drive Drive'\\ ';\\
Ralei~h, Raleigh. North ,CarolinaCarolina 27612' 27612
- 4
~ .. ...";:-'
t*
' :':"' : ~~
*.' :- ... ~..
~'".' ~.
~'. .
Dr. Dr.*Forrest
'Forrest J. Remick 305 East Hamilton Avenue State College, College. Pennsylvania 16801
,/....
, \
- \:j
cr
.'=-
SUPPLEMENT TO FIRE 'PROTECTION'
. THE F1RE PROTECTION SAFETY "EVALUATION REPORT SAFETY-EVALUATION BY THE OfFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U.S. OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY 'CO~~~!SSION
'CO~:':!SSION
,. IN THE HATTER OF
')
COMI10NWEAL COMI10NWr:ALTH EDISON EDI SON COMPANY
- DRESDEN UNITS 2 AND 3 ,_
50-237 AND 50-249 . ( v t"
CONTENTS
.1.0 1 *.0 Introducti on
.2.0 cati ons Modifi cat;
'. *3.0
'3.0 Evaluation 3.1 A~~inistrative Ad~inistrative Controls 3.2 Radiological Consequences of Fires
." 3.3 Cable Penetration Fire Barrier Tests 3.4 Shutdown Capability Conclusions 4.Q. ...'Conclusions
- \\,
tI ( ",
\,*
t'
1.0 INTRODUCTION
- Our
'Our initial Safety Evaluation Report (SER) pertaining to the reevaluation
. of fire protection at the Dresden Units 2 and 3 facilities ,",'as was issued by
/i letter to Commonweal Commonwealth th Edi son Company, dated 11arch Edison Harch 22, 1978. In Section 3 of the SER, certain items were identified as incomplete and requiring further infonnation from the licensee and evaluation by the staff. The SER also lJsted Hsted several modifications proposed by the licensee to improv.e impro~e fiTe fire protection.
The 1i'censee licensee in his letters dated April .14, September 2.8, 2,8, and JanUal"y Janual'y 24, 1978, March 19, 1979, April 30, .19?~,~~n~ary .~1t 30,19?9,..lan~ary ,~1 * .l980,._.a.nd.f~::-uary.
.l~80 *.. a.ndf~~"u3ry. 29" 29.,
1980, submitted additional information in response to staff recuests and positions-to 'resolve resolve these incomplete-itan*s.' incomplete-nan*s.' --_. . .. __ ... - We have reviewed the additional information submitted by the lice~see to assure that for the incomplete items the fire protection guideli~es suideli~es
.. identified in Section 2.0 of our SER are satisfied.
satisfied
- Section 2.0 of this report addresses the additional modificatic~s modificaticns proposed by the licensee. Section 3.0 of this report provides the results of our evaluation of the incomplete items.
2:0 MODIFICATIONS As a result of the licensee's and the staff's evaluat,ions, evaluat.ions. the licensee proposed a number of plant modifications to improve the fire pro~e:tion pro:er:tion program at Dresden Station. Details of the modifications are given in the licensee's documentation submitted to the staff. All rr;odifica:ions, r.;odifica';ions,
..... with the exception noted below.belo~l. have been completed to date. A list of the completed modifications is given in Table 2.1. The modification item listed as 3.1.2, 3.1.2. Smoke Detection Systems Tests, would require that the' licensee perform.;n perform ,in situ.tests situ .tests as we11 wen as bench tests to de;;',:Jr.strate de~~r.strate the adequacy of smoke detection systems. After further consiceration,
'no such in situ te~ts tests can be devised to satisfactorily yield ~he the desired
'informati on. Therefore,
'information. Therefore. the 1 icensee has been inforned licensee informed by 1 et~er- da let:er. ted dated October 27, 1980 that he 27,1980, 3 .should conduct bench tests to verify that the he.should detectors will respond to combustion products that might be present in'
- each 'area where detectors are located. These bench tests have not yet each-area been completed.
3.0 EVALUATION OF INCOHPLETE INCOl,IPLETE ITEMS The'following provides our evaluation of the incomplete itens iteDs listed in Table 3.1 of our previously issued SER. Numbers in parentheses following each heading refer to the sections of our previously issued SE~ SEK ....which
'hich c.
\
.j address these incomplete items.
"_.- 3~1 3;1 Controls (3.2.1)
Administrative Contro1s
'" Our SER noted that the 1licensee Ou'r ~lOuld icensee "lOul d provide a descripti description on of hi hiss adminis trative control administrative controlss for fire protection and that foll o*. ling the follo',dng receipt of this information we would evaluate and report the results i-of. our evaluation. The licensee has provided a description of his of administrative controls in letters on this subject dated Jan~ary 24, February 24, r~arch Narch 20 and July 27,1978, 27, 1978, January 31 and April 30,1979. 3D, 1979.
We have reviewed the above listed correspondence along with the
.modifications agreed to in Section 2.0 of this report and find that the
,modifications licensee's administrative controls for fire protection are adequate to
, - me~~
1:":" me~t .the, the. objec~ives of Sec-tion Section 2.2 o~ of our S~R, SER, and are acceptab1 e. 3.-2 3.2*',_ ": Radiological Consequences of Fires (3.2.2)
....- Our SER indicated that the- ;'censee woul the 1licensee wouldd provide an analysis of the radiological consequences of fires in the off-gas filter area ~nd and that we would address this topic in our supple~ent. supp1e~ent. The 1icer.see licer.see in
. a letter dated ~'ay ~\ay 25, 1978, referenced a previously submitted report
'. ',(':,.(;. on the Dresden 2 and 3 off-gas system dated June 11, 1974, \~hich was o.ff-gas
- - submitted under Docket
- ~ :-Units
-:.; :*Units 1 and 2, Table 4 50-237. Special 50-237, Spec i a1 Report No.
and Supp1e;nentary No.*1
'1 *of Suppl B'TIentary Infol"'G~tion of Quad Cities Infom~tion for Dresden Units Ci ties
(- . ;:.:' 2 and 3 Special Report
"'",:' Cor:m:n~'. . ealth System, COrnl:m"ealth No. 4A, Modified Off-Gas System:t
~. Edison. "'
~':;/.
<,. Based upon our review of the 1licens~es icens~es referenced reports and arguments
,fccontained. in the letter dated May 25, 1978, we conclude that fire J'.:contained.
.,' protection for the off-gas system areas of the Dresden Units 2 and 3 are adequate and satisfy the objectives of Section 2.2 of our SER and are. therefore, a~e. therefore. "acceptable
*acceptable.*
.~.3 ...,:. Cable Penetration Fire" Fire- Barrier Tests {3.2.3)
(3.2.3)
.- Our:SER indicated that the licensee would*
.:'-'Our'SER would provide a description of the
. ,. test program for cable penetration fire stops and subsequent test
",-' results. The licensee by_letters by letters dated April 14, June 29, September 29
. and April 14, 1978, 1978. addressed the topic of Cable Penetration Fire Barrier Tests. We have reviewed the licensees submittals, including test procedures, and test results. We conclude that the Dresden-Z Dresden-2 and
>.',', 3 cable penetration barriers satisfy the objectives of Section 2.2 of our. SER and are,.therefore. a~ceptab le~
are, therefore. acceptable: tt- . 3.4 Shutdown Capability (-3.2.4) (3.2.4)
,.~. This item was addressed in our letter to you dated October 1, 1980
'.';' 1980.*
( ....
~)
o *. t.,*
** 1.,"
--4 4 -
.~(.-:--::::
,.-r:--(--<:::...
tt .'.
.'4,0
4.0 CONCLUSION
S The'licensee performed a fire hazards analysis and proposed certain modifications to improve the fire protection program as described in our SER of March 22, 1978. Additional modifications were proposed by the licensee to resolve those issues identified in that SER. Those modifications have sin~e.been completed with the excep-
. tion noted in Section 2.0 of this report. Additional r.;odifications ~odifications "
'may be necessary to meet the requifElllents requirEments of Appendix R R to 10 CFR 50 when' Jt
.it is i~p'emented.
impl emented. In summary, significant steps have been taken to improve safe shut-down capability and maintain the plant in a safe conditic~; during and following potential fire situations. Upon implementation of the licensee licensee'ss proposed modifications summarized in Section 3 of l
, 'our our SER a nd Section Sect ion 2 of this thi s report, we fi nd that tha t 'the
~rovisions of Section 2 of our SER are satisfied,
. - provisions
.'- satisfied. except that the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in any fire
- situation has not yet been adequately dem*onstrated. dem'onstrated.
\
~s'f ".
?
'", T,.'
~ ," .
. .0'"',' .. *
,'or .....
,(
-,t-
TABLE 2.1
. *Modifications Completed To Date 3.1.1 Fire Detection Systems 3.1.3 Fire Water Supply 3.1.4 Hose Stations ",
3.1.5 Water Suppression Systems 3.1.6 Gas Suppression Systems
. 3.1.7
- 3. 1. 7 Portable Extinguishers 3.1.8
- 3. L8 Fire Doors 3.1.9 Supervision of Fire Doors 3.1. 10 Fire Dampers 3.1.11 Protection for Structures 3.1.12 Portable Ventilation Equipment 3.1.13 3.1 .. 13 Breathing Apparatus 3.1 ...14 14 Cable Cab 1e Tray Fire Fi re Stops 1.15 Control 'of Combustibles
.3.1.15
.3.
3.1.. 16 Water Damage. Damage, Protection
'3.1.17 Enclosures of Batteries
..'~',. 3.1.1S 3.1.18.. Fire Barriers 3.1.19 Ca b1e Access Cable
. (\ .,
r 3.1.20"
. ,3.1.20 Fire Retard.ent Coatings 3.1.21 Manual Actuation Station 3".1 3.1.22.* 22 Cabie Separation 3.1.23 Yard Hydrants "3.1.23
*Numbers refer to the item numbers in our SER
(, (. ' ( j
3
)< )<. ,".
i ~. , :
\1. L k " .r, ' .....
'-j: '- t, ... ( . ( u. ~ , H D ~ebruary 24, 1981
~ ~(' .
. 2/"2/~1
.-Z{IZ!SI
-1cssrs: . C. Reed/N. A. Kershs
.Acssrs: Kersh;:;.-* 99... J. SeottScot t H. E. 81iss Bliss . ..J(._ J. Shewski
**Ii T. C.,
C.. Cihlar/G. E. ?a:::s:-,;:.-, F~~~~s~~ ~. L. X. Stiede/C. P. Waener
- l. Stiede/G. Waoner K. L. Graesser - RI RII: :~:f I': :.-::j' n. K. Stolt/W. L. Eck-H.
R. H. Holyoak (Bull., eire., Circ., & & 1. ~ot. t-;ot. Only) J. H. Hughes (NLA Sh~~~ Sh~e~ :~:J) :~~j) _. R. Zebus (Bull. Only) E. R. E. Jortberg . P. P. Steptoe-IL&3 (Letters {Lett~rs Only N. J. Kaliyianakis Kalivianakis *M. A. 8owido~iez
.~. Bowidowicz - S!L S~L
- A. W. Kleinrath/A.
Kl~inrath/A. D. ;=s~!~ ;~5s!n ~. E. Bray/J. Nash - G.E.
- f. A. Paimer Palmer *G. Wright - state
-G. State of Illinois illinois Q.A. Engineer Drescen ~. D. Kahn - Exxon Q.A. Engineer - S~ED*
S~ED UL Oi I~L s t r i but i on Distribution In the judgement of the Nuclea: ~!=e~5in2 ~dministrator, the attached L!~s~sin~ document contains the fo11ow!~; follow!~; :~~~~~~a:nts to the NRC or requirements
=~~~!t~~nts from the NRC.
Identification of Attached boc~-e~~: Dresden 2/3 - NRC letter resolving remaining Fire Protecton open !ss_es, iss_~s, ex:ept ex~ept safe shutdcwn. (T. A. Ippolito letter to J. S. Abel da:e: da~;= 2/12/81) NRC' Commitment or Reouirement: Responsible Respcms i bl e Due Date' Date . . . Commitment or ~==uirement
~e:u!rement Edison Oepa!t~ent Deoart~ent 2/12/81 *Complete modificatio~5 identified in Enclosure, Complete modificatio~s Enclosure. SNED/Stolt 1 which do not require shutdown.
Next Complete modificati~ns complete modificati6ns !dentified!~entified in Enclosure SNED/Stolt refuel 1 which require shut~=cn. shutC=~n. outage. When it is determined by the res~=~sible department that a d~e due date will not be met Licensin; ~dministrator met,t the Nuclear licensin; ~jministrator should be notified immediately. R. f. F. Janecek Bl-6S Bl-66
I,
....... ~
UNITED STATES COrviMISSION NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO!V1MtSSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
.Fe~ruarY
,February 12, 1981 FED FEB 2 0 rsCD REL'D
- J~A
- J<;{i Do~ket Docket ~o. 50~237 50-237 50-249 R~.:r
,;"I -.
I Mr. J. S. Abel Director of Nuclear Licensing Commonwealth Commom;eal Edison th Ed; son Company P. O. Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690
Dear Mr. Abel:
The Commission issued on ~'~2rch 22, 1978 our initial Safety Evaluation
- ~rch 22~
protectio;' (FPSER) for Dresden Units 2 and 3. In Secticr 3 Report on fire protectio:.(FPSER) of that Report, certain 1\..;:*ms i,-~'ms were identified as incomplete and requirirg further information from the licensee and evaluation by the staff. In addition, modifications proposed by the licensee to improve fire prctect:on at Dresden Station were ~Iere identified. For certain of these proposed r.,~:i-:i r.,:::i:i-cations, the staff req~ested that additional design details be proYi~ed. By subsequent correspondence you provided to us information regarrlin; regarding incomplete items listed in Table 3.1 of the FPSER and additional desi;n
~etails regarding proposed modifications discussed in Section
.details S,ection 3.1 of th~ thE'
*FPSER.
'FPSER. .'
On December 2, 1980 we ;issued Supplement ssued a Suppl ement to the FPSER for Dresden 2 cnd end 3 which provided the results of our evaluation of incomplete items addr2ssed addressed in the FPSER and 1listed isted the modifications campl completed eted by you at.at, that tke tke..
.,In In letters to you dated October 27 and November 24, 1980, we provided a Summary of Staff Requirements to Resolve Open Items. These open ite:::s Here \-Iere not resolved in our FPSER Supple8ent Supplement of December 2, 1980, since only i~co2- i~co:::
plete information was available availabl e at that time. However, based on subse~~ent su!osec;"ent
. discussions bebleen between our staffs' and information contained in your letter of February 6, 1981, we have concluded that several items previously 1isted listed as
,open items have been resolved. Enclosure 1 pr'ovides
- open provides the tlaffs liaffs ey:::)uat'on pV')!lat'"on of these items. Enclosure 2 provides a 1isting. listing. of the current status of -
ell items identified by the staff as requiring licensee action during. during, the protection review. fire prot~ction Sincerely, .' .....
~
~~rfJ<~'
'--fh~ma~~
1Bl~'
"I .
Thoma ~ Ippolito, Chief Operating Reactors Branch 52 #2 LicenSing Division of Licensing ~~:. ':,
\.
s:") V.....
Enclosures:
As 'stated
'~
cc w/enclosures: See next page
F. r ~r. J. S. A~l Y..
,cc,
.ec i Isham, Lincoln & & Beale Depart~ent of Pt:blic P.[;~lth
.. Departr.:ent EQ~lth Counselors at Law ATTN: Chi Chief,ef, Di vis i en cf Divisicn O~e One Fjrst F,irst National Plaza, 42nd floor Nuc' Nucl earecr $af2~'y Safe~y Chicago, Illinois 60603 Chic~go, 535 West Jefferson Springfield, Illinois 62761 52761 Mr. B. B. Stephenson
'., Pl ant Superi ntendent ., 'Di~ector, Standards 2r.:
.. a~d Crit~ria
,~ " Dresden Nuclear Power Dresden Pewer Stat ion *,*Division "Di vi 5 ion Rura 1 Route il .. Office of Radiation PrCSl"c.:::s Prcsra:::s Morris. Morris, Illinois 60450 '. (At,R-~50)
., (Al\R-~50)
Envirc~:;;-ental Pr::.:r:ction
"., U. S. Envirci:::-ental Pr~:t:ction Agency N.atural Resources' Resources* Defense Councn Council Washinstor., D. C. 2C~:'~
Washinston, 2C~:'8 917 15th Street, N. W. Washington, O. D. C. 20005 . .. . - U. S. Env; Envi roni7ent.al ror.;;-ental Pr\:;tect Prvt.eet ion Agency U. S. Nuclear.RegJlatory Nuclear Re!;ulatory Commission COimrission ede ra 1 Act ffederal i vi ties Bru~ch Activities Brar.eh Resident Inspectors Office Regi on IfV Office Region Dresden Station . ATTN: fl FlSS CO:~Jl~\;'TC?, co:,r:n:i':'TC? II RR 11 ~:" 230 South D=r~~rn 02r~~rn Str~=t Morris, Illinois .60450 Morris. ,60450 Chicago, Illinois 60S0~ Susan N. Sekuler Dr. Forrest J. Re:;.id:. Re:;,,;ck Assistant Attorney General 305 East Ha:;:; Hc:::ilt Aven'.Je It on Avewe Environ~~ntal Control DivisionOivision State Co11 ColleS:!,e;=, P Pennsy1v~nia ennS'ylv~ni a 16301
~. . ,.'
., 188 W. Randolph Street Suite 2315 .'
Chicago, Illinois 60501' 60601 ,Mr. D. R.
-Mr. Stichn~th President Morris Public library Library ., Iowa-Illinois Gas and
" 604 liberty Liberty Street Co~?any Electric Co:::;;any Horri s, I ~ 11 nois
.. Morris, 60~51.
noi s 60451 205 East Second ';venue Avenue I '. Davenport, Ic~a Davenporf, Io~a 52&8152c~1 Chairlmn Chainren ., Mr~ John ~.
!<Ir. ,',1. Rowe*
Ro;.;e
. Board of Supervisors of
*.;~ ~~ Grundy County Isham, Lincoln &Beale
*...- Grundy Gru ndy County Courthouse Counselors at Law .'
Morris. Illinois 60450 . /.i. One.First r,aticna1 Plaza~ One ,First !\ational Plaza, 42nd nO::Jf Flo:)]"
* 'Chicago, Illinois £0533
-Chicago, £0503 John F *. Wolf.
F., Wolf, Esq. Sti'epherd Stree 3409 Sh'eoherd Streett ,Hr. Ni ck' Kal ;i vi anakas
.Hr.
!,~aryland 20015 Chevy Chase, r*1aryland Plant Superintencent Superintendent Quad Cities ~uclear Nuclear Power Station Dr.
Or. Linda W. little Little 22710 - 205th Ayenve Avenue ~- :;orth r;:lrth 500 Hermitage .Drive Drive .. ,' Cordova, Illinois 612~2 Raleigh, North Carolina 27612 PLZ~l ic L
~:ol ine 1'1,;:'1
;, E:,l i~rc.ry Li!;rcry 50~ - 17th S~i=et St;~~t Resident Inspector
- U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss)on Commission Moline.
Moline, 11linois IllinOis 61265 206th Avenue N. 22712 205th . tordov~,
~ordova, Illinois ~1242 61242
,. !~ *
,'ENCLOSURE ENCLOSURE ,1
. FIRE PROTECTION PROTECTIOn REVIEW
_ DRESDEN 2/3
-. DOCKET NOS. 50-237/249 I/
rI' SMOKE Sl10KE DETECTION SYSTEMSYSTE11 TESTS, SECTION 3.1.2 I In In the SER, it was ~Ias our concern that the smoke detectors may not respond to the products of combustion for the types of ex~ected eXFected co~bustibles in
,the protected area.
By: BY: letter dated January 26; 26', 1981, the licensee proposed to provide s2~ples s2:::ples of the fixed and transient combustibles to the smoke detector suppliEr. supplier.
'The smoke detectors will be bench tested to veri
*The fy adequate response t.C' verify tc.1 ~he "products
,products of combustion of these samples. One detector of each type in!t:iled in,t:iled
,will be ~ubjected to the appropriate products of combustion for verif~cation. verif~c:tion.
We find that with acceptable bench testing of smoke detectors, and CO:',~,1::Erir.9 cor.:.i:erir.g that the smoke detection systems meet appropriate NFPA codes, the s:::J~~* s;;:J~.* dE-tectors are acceptable. . WATER SUPPRESSION SYSTEMS, SECTION 3.1.5(2), 3.1.5(2)' (3) In the SER~ SER, it was our concern that the pre-action sprinkler syste::1 syste::l I-:~~\':;
':~;(.~
'protects cabling along the east wall of the turbine mezzanine ma"y ma'y not ::.~!
~,!
adequate. He We recommended that the 1 icensee: "' "'
- a. Provide* line ,detectors in the cable trays or spot type heat de:e:::;:'s Provide*line dete:t):*s
. b,etween between the horizontal trays for actuation of the pre-action syste:~> sJste"~, C!nd ar.d
- b. Verify that the pressure sensing s"'litch s~litch for the 'turbine mezzanine ",;::ter",:"ter
,system is located on the system side of any "regulators 'regulators or check valves.
letter dated February 6, By 1etter ,1980, the licensee provided additional, 6,1980, additional inf:;[';:-~~iali infor::-:ticn on the proposed addition of fire detectors for the cable trays. In acdHicn, 2cdHion, the licensee verified that the pressure sensing switch for the turbine turbi"e ~ez- :.~EZ zanine water system is located on the sprinkler system side of any resu:ators 2anine resu1ators of check valves in the system.
,of The licensee has proposed to provide shields at two" two' levels in the cable tray stack. The shields will act as collectors to entrap the products of co~b~s co",b~s tion in the event of a fire. The shields will be continuous for the length of the tray fC?r for the area covered by the sprinkl er system. Fire de~ctors de~ectors will be located under the shi el ds. Other fire detectors are loca shields. ted at the located ceiling '~vel. level. This t~re~
three level detector contiguration configuration provides reasonabie reasonable assurance that the fire will be detected and insure that the pre-action is
~harged with water
- C'ased on the above, we conclude that the pre-action sprinkl
. n-ased 5prinkl er syste:';1 5yste::l meets Section D.J(c) D.3(c) of Appendix A to STP ASB 9.5-1 and, th~refore, BTP ASS therefore, is ac[e;ta~le~
acceptable;
~
SllPPRESSIOri SYSTEMS, GAS SUPPRESSIO" SYSTE!':S, SECTION SECTIOtl 3.1.6 In the SER, it was our concern that the fire suppression syste~s for the auxiliary electrical equipment room and the computer room may not be ade-quate to suppress a fire in all areas of these rooms. We reco~~~nded recD~~!nded that the licensee provide discharge nozzles in the underfloor area of the com-puter room and in the small area of the tunnel considered consiGered part of the auxil-iary el ectri ca.l equi pment room.
~y By letter dated February 6~ 6, 19801980, the licensee committed to pro\'icle discharge t
nozzles in the underfloor area of the computer room and in the tunnel area of the auxil iarY' e1 auxiliarY' ectrical equipment room. electrical Based on the licensee's commitment, we find that the gas suppression systems are now acceptable. PORTABLE VENT1LATIO~ VENnLATIO~1 EQUIPMENT, EQUIP:mn, SECTION 3.1.12 In the SER~ SER, it was our concern that the installed ventilation syste~ system would not be adequate to remove the smoke and heat from a fire in ~ost wost areas Qf oJ the pl plant. ant.
~ By letter dated February 6, 6,1981, 1981 the licensee indicated'that three smoke t
*ejectors
-ejectors with a combined capacity of 15,600 cfm have been provided. The ejectors can be operated from an onsite power po~;er source.
According to the NFPA Handbook, the smoke ejector co~~only co~monly used has aa* 16-inch diameter and is rated at 5,000 cfm at 1750 rp~. rpm. This is the type of smoke ejector which the licensee has provided. The three s~oke ejectors
.,will will permit the use of a number-of number*of smoke ejectors at various locations to move smoke and air as an aid'to aid *to manual fire suppression'activitiES suppression* activities.*
. Based on our review, we conclyde conclpde that the licensee has provided a recognized
" type of smoke ejector and has provided an adequate nu;nber to aid in ",anual manual fi.r.e fighting activit; fi,r,e activities. es. Further, the 1licensee's ejectcrs i censee l s smoke eje: tcrs meet Section 0.4 of Appendix A to BTP ASS ASB 9.5-1 and, therefore, are acceptable.
o 0
.: ~
. :.: : ..~ .
~.o c* -,
c:- , v
I
""ENCLOSURE ENCLOSURE 2 FIRE PROTECTI 0:-.1 REV] EH STATUS O~l REVI DRESDEN U~HlJrn TS T5 2 IiiW filW 3 Item. Description Status 3.1. 2 3.1.2 Smote Smole Detection Systems Tests C 3.1.5 (1)
.'3.1.5 Yater Suppression System C 3.1.5 (2) Water Suppression System C 3.1.5 (3) Water Suppression System C
.3.1.5
.3.1.5(4)(4) Water Suppression System C
'3.1. 5 (7)
"3.1. Water Suppression Supp'ression System C 3.1.5 (9) Water Hater Suppression System C 3.1.6 Gas Suppression Systems tC 3.1.12 Portable Ventilation Equipment C 3.2.1 Administrative Controls Control s C 3.2.2 Radiological Consequences of Fires C 3.2.3 ...._ Cable Penetration Fire Barrier Tests tC 3.2.4 Shutdown , Capabil ity .. '" R
-;I,d
. C C10sed Closed R Requirement
'C"
.~. UR - Under Review Revi eVI
. ; ~
II DRESDEN 2&3 Revision 8 April 1992 ( FIRE PROTECTION DOCUMENTATION PACKAGE 10CFR50, Appendix R Safety Evaluation Reports for 10CFRSO, Sections III.G and III.L and 10CFR50.48 Tab Title 1 January 19, 1983 10CFR50 10CFR50 Appendix R Fire Protection Safety Evaluation Report 2 February 2. 2, 1983 Safety Evaluation of Exemptions to 10CFRSO 10CFR50 Appendix Ap~endix R Section III.G. 3 July 17, 1987 Safety Evaluation by the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Related to Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50, Items III.G.3 and III. II I. L. 4 September 10. 10, 1987 Draft Safety [valuation Evaluation for Appendix R to 50, Item III.G. 10 CFR 50. 5 September 28, 1987 Safety Evaluation and Acceptance of Exemption Request for Drywell Expansion Gap. 6 January 5. 5, 1989 Safety Evaluation and Acceptance of Exemption Requests from Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, Item III.G. \ 6, 1989 Safety Evaluation and Acceptance of Exemption July 6. 7 Request for Hot Shutdown Repairs. 8 15, 1989 Granting of Technical Exemptions from Appendix R August 15. to 10 CFR 50. II.O-i (
1 c( ~ssrs: C. Reed/N. A. Kershaw J. S. Abel R. E. Querio (NC O. D. J. Scott H. E. Bliss '1'1. Shewski
~I. J. She W5 k i T. C. Cihlar/G. E. Peterson ~:. L. Stiede
. G. J. Diederich H. K. Stolt/We Stolt/W. L. Eck E. E. Fitzpatrick Rowley /SNED E. Rowley/SNED D: P. Galle 0:
K; L. Graesser-(RIII & NC Only) C. G. P. Wagner .J/
, I J. F. Gudac (NC Only) E. R. Zeb J. H. Hughes Steptoe-IL&B (Lette~s P. P. Steptoe-IL&8 (Letters Only)
R. E. Jortberg M. A. Bowidowicz - S&L N. J~J. Kalivianakis M. E. Bray/J. Nash - G.£. G.~. A. W. Kleinrath c. G. Wright ~ state State of Illinois Q.A. Engineer - Dresden (N~C/CECo Ltrs only) Q.A. Engineer - SNED G. F. Owsley - Exxon NL Distribution In the judgement of the Nuclear licensing Administrator, the att2:~ed Licensing Administrator; atta:~ed document contains the following commitments to the NRC or require~~nts requir=~~nts from the NRC. Identification of Attached Document: Dresden 2/3 - NRC Safety EV5!ustion EVE!ustion ,._;-= for Appendix
- "-;-~ R Fire Protection Proposed r.1odifications, D. M. Cru:c;-;field t>1. Crutcilfield
"~_
\ etter to L. DelGeorge date~ Ja~uary 19, 1983.
stter
~RC Commitment or Reouirement:
. Respons Respons:::;1
- i. ~l e Due Date Commitment or Requirement Edison ~e:~=t~e~t 2-25-83 This letter, similar to the QC letter of SNED/Zejus SNED/Z"jus 12-30-82, begins the 10 erR eFR 50.48(c)(4) implementation. clock -- essentially 6 (1-19-83) for months after NRC approval {1-19-83)
.mods.not requiring outage and first outage
')80 days from 1-19-83 for mods requiring
")80 an outage. Nati Noti fy NLA by 2-25-83 'of when a detailed implementation schedule will be available for NRC submittal so that formal
.exemptions may be prepared ASAP.
"exemptions ASAP
- L !<.. .. ,
'.. 1 -", .
_. ~
- When it is determined by the responsible department d~partment that a due date will not be met, the Nuclear Licensing Administrator should be notified immediately.
FILE: Fire Protection T. J. Rausch 83-23
.m
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO:~MISSION CO:t.MISSION fJASHII~GTor~. I'JASHIl/GTOr~. o. C. 20::;55 O. 20555 January 19, 1983 Docket No. 50-237/249 '. lS05-~3-01-027 lS05-!l3-01-027 Mr. l. OelGeorge DelGeorge Director of Nuclear Licensing Commonwea 1th Ed*i son Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690
Dear Mr. DelGeorge:
SUBJECT:
FIRE PROTECTION RULE - ALTERNATE SAFE SHUTOmm CAPABILITY SHUTDO~:r; CAPAS ILlTY SECTIONS 111.G.3 III.L OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR 50 III.G.3 AND !ILL Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 We Ne have completed our review of the subject as noted above based on yo~r yOer submittals referenced in Section 1 of the enclosed Safety Evaluation (SE). This SE incorporates the technical input provided by our consultant, th~ .r;:---- "' Brookhaven ~:ational National Laboratory. The proposed modifications .and altcrnc.:e alterne:e rapability rapabi1ity for achieving safe shutdown for certain areas in Dresden 2 and cn~
\ 3 in the event of a fire \-/ere
~tere evaluated against the requirements of Sections III.G.and III.l III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50.
Based on our review, we conclude that Dresden 2 and 3 is in* compliance in-compliance with Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, H, Items III.G.3 and III.L re9arcin£ resarcin£ safe shutdown shutdol'm of the evaluated areas in the event of a fire. The schet~le schet~1e for you to complete required modifications is specified in 10 CFR 'Part -Part 50.48(c)(4). Compliance*with the Fire Protection Rule will be the subj*ct subj~ct of future Corrmission inspections. Sincerely, .
- J '-'- /..;.,
~P;Ia4 //
.#1;-:1#
..;, A~ --I~l A ,j,/-
/t* Vt.d-Vtd- '..
.Dennis M. N. Crutchfi d, Chief Operating Reactors Branch #5 Division of Licensing Enc 1osure':'
Enclosure':' Safety Evaluation cc w/enclosure: See next page
Mr. l. rk. L. DeDel1George January 19, 1933 (~
\
cc Lincoln &Beale Isham, lincoln Counse1ors at Law Counse~ors One First National Plaza. Plaza, 42nd Floor Chicago, th I11jnois i ca go, l1U no; s 60603 Hr. Mr. Doug Scott
-Plant Superintendent Ru ra 1 Route l!1 Rural Horris, Illinois 6045,0 60450 .. ...
Commission U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrrnission Resident Inspectors Office Stat i on Dresden Station
. RR #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Chairman Board ,of Supervisors of Ii Grundy County Grundy County' Courthouse l.
L H?rris, M?rris, Illinois 60450
\, . !l1inois illinois Department of Nuclear Safety -.
1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois .62704 u. U. S. Environ~enta1 Protection Agency Federal Activities Branch Regi on V Off; Offi ce Regi ona 1 Radiation ATn.: Regional
,,ATT~': Radi ati on Representative Representat i \'e 230 SCJth Dearborn Str~et Chicago.
Chicago, Illinois 60604 60504 James "G.b. Keppler; Keppler," Regional Administrator. Nuclear Regulatory COIl'L>>ission. N.uclear Com.lIission, Region 111III 799 Roosevelt Road' Road* .' Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137
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UNITED STATES UNITED NUCLEAR REGULATORY cO:,~r.1ISSI0NcO~\~r.lISSI0N WASHINGTON. O. WASHINGTON, O. C. C. 20555 20555 SAFETY EVALUATJO:*j EVALUATlOrJ BY THE OFn CE OF r:UCL OFFICE EAR r:UCLEAR RE;:.CTC~ RE.CDC~ REG~U.T!C~; REG~LF.T!C:; APPEIlOI APPEriDJ X R REV1 REVm: n:
/ EDISO!': CO~PANY COI*1t*lOfMEALTH EDISON COMMONWEALTH CO!*;PAr,y DRESDEN NUCLEAR pm*:ER PWER STATlOt!,
STATlOU, WET orllT NOS. NOS, 2 J;,~m
;.';0 3 DOCKET NOS.NOS, 50-237 AND 50-249 lNTRODUCTION 1.0 *lNTRODUCTION ,-
On February 17, ?981, 1981, the fire protection rule for nuc~ear power plants, 10 efR eFR 50.48 and A~~encix Appendix R to eFR Part 50, be~ame 10 CFR be.ame effective. This rule re~ui,edrequired all licensees of plants licensed prior ~o to Janu~ry 1, 197,9, to submit by Mal Ma,~h
~h 19, 1981: (1) plans anc schedules for meeting the applicable requirern,n~s requirern~n~s of Appendix R, (2) a design description of any modifica- rnocifica-tions proposed to provid~ alternative alterna~ive safe shutcown' shutdown' pursua~t to Paragraph III.G.3 capability pursuant III.G.~ of Appendi~ Appencii~ R, and (3). exemption .' requests 10r
.,and ior which the tollin; tolling pro-
'vision of Section SO.48(c)(6)SO.48(C) (6) was to' be invol:eo'~
to"be invoked~ III.G of Appendix R is a retrofit item to all Section l1I.G pre-1~79 pte-1~79 re9a~dless of previous SER positions plants regafdless and ~*esolutions. The criteria o'ontained c*ontained.in ,in Seet'ion Section lII.L III.L of Appendix R is used foi those cases where
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licensees are incorporating alternate Dr or dedicat;c dedicat;o ( .shutdown capability.
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( , The staff's previous'fire protection Safety Evaluat10n Evaluation Report (SER) d~teddated March 1978, indicated that for 3D
,~'reas
. ~reas identified, the licenseeLicensee was to confirm that the
-capability for safe shutdovnshutdown exists independ~nt of systems which couldcouLd be damaged by fire in the area, or an alternate means for safe shutdown provided. The li~ensee licensee addressed safe shutdo~n shutdown for fires in th~se areas in subsequent submittals. An evaluation of this capability is provided in this SER.
By submittals dated June 5, 1978, , 978, February 9, 1979, (~. January 23, '980,1980, February 29, 1980, June ~ 9; '198D, June'9;~98D, October 31, 1980, November 5, 1980, January Z3.; t3~ 1981, Febr~ary 10, 1981, March 18~ 1981 (two submittals), Aug u s t ,3, August 3, 11981, u s t 31, 11981, August 981, Aug 981, Jan u a r y 29, 1 January 9 8 ~, 1982,
'March March 16~ 1982, June 1982, July 1, 1982, and October 29, 1982, the licensee described proposed modifications to the Dresden plant, Units 2 and 3.; 3., .to me.et therequ;re-the require-
~ents of Appendix R to 10 CFR Par~ 50, Ite~s Items III.G.! III.G.3 and III.L~ The licensee also respbnded to a staff reque~~~f6r reques~-f6r ~dditional information transmitted to the licensee by letter "dateddated February 20, 1981. Additiona l
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, information and clarification ...was as obtained .through
~elephone conferences of January 15, 1982 and October
*telephone
~2, 1982..
1982. The majority of the information on the safe shutdo~~ shutdo~n capability is provided ;n in the June 1982
~Fire Protection Associated Circuits Analysis and
~fire
* *Modifications Modi.fications Report."
The licensee has provided a safe shutdown analysis for fire events and has'demonstrated that adequate syste~s exist and/or alterna~i~e attern~:tive shut.dow~ Ca9.ability safe shut.dow:. capability is avai lable. available. Our evaluation of this follows. 2.0 POST-EIRE SAF~ SAFE SHUTPOWN SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 2.1 Systems Reouired for Safe Shutdown Shutcown Shutdown of ~he the reactor and reactivity control is pro-vided by the control rod~. Pr~mary coolant inventory
~s majntained by.the control rod drive system. Reactor pressure control is Qaintained coolant preSsure ~aintained by the primary r e l ie f valves.
relief val v e s
- Dec a y heat Decay he a t rem remova"l i s provided 0 va'l is pro;'; d e d by the isolation condenser in hot shutdown
.~ . , and the shutdown cooling system; reactor building closed ~~oling tOO~Un9. system,* eo'oling water system, and service water system in cold shutdow~. The
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,diesel
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generators are .cooled cooled by the diesel cooling tooling water system.
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c~ ( \ 2.2, I Areas Where Alternate Safe Shutdown Shutdo~n is Reoui~ed Recuired I I/ The licensee e~amined the need for alternate safe
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shutdown of Units 2 and 3 for a fire in any 'f ire are
'fire areaa (38 are areas totaL>.
a s tot at). Ass are A a result of his s u l t (:, f tthis siudy, the licensee concluded that alternate shutdown capability was re~uiredrequired for the following fo~lowing plant areas as the requirements of Section III.G.2 are not met: ~et: Unit 2 reactor building, elevation 517'-6" 517'-6" fZone 1.1 (:Zone 1.1.2.2)
.. 2.2)
Unit 2 reDcto~,builcing, reQcto~.builoing, elevation 545'-6"
., (lone Clone 1.1.2.3)
(('~, Unit 2 rea ctt.r b;Ji lding, elevation 570'-0" b;Jilding,
~Zone (Zone 1.1.2.4)
Unit 3 reactor bui lding,. elevation 517 building"elevation 517't -6".
-6"*
(Zone 1.1.1.2)
- Unit 3 rea ct*o ct'o r building, elevation 545'-6" (Zone Clone 1.1.1.3)
Unit 3 reactor bulding, elevati.on 570'-0 570'-0"11
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(Zone 1.1.1.4) Units 2 & 3 control room (Zone "2.0) *'2.0)
,1 Units 2 && 3 auxiliary eLectricelectric equipDent room Clone 6.2)
(Zone I (~ (
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p ( Unit 3 cable tunnel (Zone 8.2.4) Unit 2 turbine building, elevation 5'17 517'-6" 1
-6" (Zone 8.2.5)
Unit 3 turbine buiLding, building, elevation 5171-6" 517'-6"
. (Zone 8.2.5) 2 tur~ine building, eLevations Unit 2.turb*ine elevations 534'-0" 534'-0" and 538'-0" 538 1 (Zones 8.2.6, 8.2.6A, and 8.2.60
-0" CZones 8.2.6C)
Unit 3 turbine building, elevation 534 534'-0" 1
-0" (Zones 8.2.6 and 8.2.68)
Units 2 & 3 crib hoyse (Zone 11.3) The licensee lic.ensee has provided alternate shutdo.un* shutdo.lJn* c*apc:bit"ity capobit"ity independent of cabling and equipment i~ the above areas. 2.3 !!!.G.2 of Apoendjx R Section !!I.G.2 R The licensee at.so al.o indicated that all other'areasother*areas of the pplant 2 4 are l ant ((24 areas) as) *not e qui red tto0 hhave
'n 0 t rrequired a v 'e aann aalternate l t ern ate
'sate
*safe ~hutdown system will comply ~ith with the requirements of Section Ill.G.2 III.G.2 of ~ppendix R pr approval of an exempti~n request has been granted by the staff.
2.4 Alternat- Sate Alternatp Safe Sb'Jtdowp System Sb1)tcioilO $vstlOm The alternate aLternate safe shutdown system required for those
~reas not meeting Section III.G.2 or incLuded in the
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( j" " exemption requests utilizes existing plant systems anG and equipment as identified in Section 2.1 with some rnodi-
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. fications, lo~al manual valve aLignments, alignments, local instru-mentation, and local control of shutdown shutdo~n and support equipment. Modifications include rerouting of *cabling, cabling, installation of bre?kers bre~kers and transfer switches for' for" isolation, and installation of separate and inde~~ndent inde~endent local control stations for the Units 2 and 3 isolation conde~ser motor op~rated valves, shared diesei condenser oiesei generator I!,
2/3 and its suppor:t" suppor~ equipment (incLuding (iricluding 'vent fan, fuel ( , oil transfer pump, and diesel cooling' cooling" water pump), and ~ Units 2 and 3 service water pumps. In addition, a piping cross-tie will be provided for the Units 2 and 3 control rod drive pumps to'permit to permit reactor coolant makeup in the event all control rod drive pumps in one unit are lost due to a fire. A new cooling water line with wi a manual t ham valve a n u a l va lve w will
; l-l also a l sobbee pro provided to each v ; de d toe ach control rod drive pump ~rom the se~vice w~ter ~yitem to provide ~ool;ng cooling assuming 'loss!of loss of offsite power and unavailability *of normal unavai,lability'of no~mal pUl:lp pump cooling cooiing froDfrom the turbine
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b~ilding building closed cooling water system. Existing 'cornmon' common headers between Units 2 and 3 allow pumps in various systems required for' for safe shutdown to provide flew to
the' the othe~ unit in the event of fire damage. Existing Existin;
, power supply interconnections between units are also I / avaiLable available to assure power to safe shutdown shutdo~n eQuip~ent equip~ent fire"damage in one unit.
following fire-damage The existing plant design and modifications BS$ure ~ssure avair~biLity avairibility of equi~-
'mentressential
'ment"essentialfor aehiev~ng safe ~hutdown
,for achieving assOmin~
jhutdown asSOming loss toss ,of of offsite ,p~wer in the event of a fire offsitep~wer i~ any plant area. 3.0 EVALUATI~N 3.1 Performance Goats Goals The aLternate alternate shutdown system described in Section Seetion 2.4 'J':A "J? e ( will enable thea~hie~ement theachie~ement of the performance goals outlined in Section III.L of Appendix R as follows: goaLs 3.1.1 Reactivity Control Safe shutdown of*theof "the reactor is performed by canual'oanual scram of. "
. the
. control rods th,e r9dsfrom from the control controL room. The.
The, control controL rods also provide subsequent reac\ivity c*on-trot" c~ntrol' during cooldown. tooldown.
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3.1.2 Reac£or Coolant Inventprv Reac.for Inventor v Reactor coolant makeup is provided by the control rod drive
,\. pumps which tQKetake suction from the condensate c( .~
c ( storage tank. Control rod drive pump discharge cros~- tie pipin~ with manual valves is provided between 2.and 3 ~n the event of loss of all control Units 2.and. rod dtive pumps in one unit. Control of tbese these pumps is available at local stations. Cooling water. to the controL control rod drive pumps will be provided from the service water system by manually opening the valve in the new cooling line Line as IS discussed in Section 2.4. The main steam isolation valves are closed by deenergizing power at the breakers in order to avoid excessive inventory losss. froll from the reactor vessel .(( during the fire emergency. 3.1. 3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Reactor ~oolant pressure control is provided by the relief valves with backup pressure control and overpressure protection I=lrovided provided by the "target rock" and safety valves. D~cay heat removal in hot Shutdown is accomplished D;Cay t:h- g 1 r ~ ~ h the use 0off the ;isolat!on*condensers.
;~r~~~h sol at 0 n . con den s e r s * ,M. k e-Make-u~ 'to the 1sotltion condens~r is i~itillly isolation condenser initially supplied
.. contami'nated condensate storage tanks v;.
from the contamfnated via .(
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( the condensate trlnsfer transfer pumps. The condensate tr.ns- trans-1er 1fT pumps are w1th ~a co~mon Irt provided with COmmon header between units. Backup makeup fortor" long term oper~tion of 01 the
..;. 99 isolation condensers is provided by the ,service water pumps through the fire protection header. One service water pump can provide sufficient makeup to bot bothh *u
~nits h r 0 ugh a com nit s tthrough common m0 n hheader.
eade r
- li z a t ion 0off Utilization Uti the isolation isoLation condenser requires local manual manuaL valve operations, and local control at the -remote "remote station of the two isolation condenser valves Ioihich lihich °are 'are located inside the dryweLl.
Decay heat removal in cold shutdown ;s is provided by c,
- the shutdown cooL~n9 cooL~ng system, reactor building cooting water system, and service water system tooting buiLding . .
system.* closed
."Uti(ization Utilization of shutdown cooting cooLing requires repair as discussed ~n in .ecti~n Secti"on 3.3, "manual 'manuaL valve ope~ation, ope"ration, and ~emote local locaL pump control. The service water system and reactor. building closed cLosed coolingcooLing water
. system are provided with a common header between units.
unit s.
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3.1.5 :Process Process Monitoring Monitpring Dire c t ;indication Direct n die at; 0 n '0"off pro process c e s s vvariabLes a r ; a b t es ;incLu-ding n c l ud i n g
. '- reactor vessel level, Level, reactor coolant cooLant pressure,
(co isolation ~onden$er isoLation condenser level, and condensate storage tank lev~'l leve'l ;s is provided at local paneLs panels and indica-tors. Diagnostic monitoring available includ~ includes condensate transfer pump discharge pressur~, service water system pressure, reactor building cLosed closed cooling water system pressure, and shutdown cooling system pressure pressure.* .' 3.1.6 Support Suoport Functions The diesel generato~s, dieseL diesel generator cooLing cooling ( water system, reactor building closed cooling water ( system, service servi ce water system,' and essential esse'ntia l venti-Lation lation systems are available to provide necessary support functions for the alternate shutdown system. Control and monitoring capability for these support systems is also provided at local locations. 3.2 7'-H o u r Recuirement 72-Hoqr Recuirement The license~ hiShis indicated that the cap~bility exists to achieve Ichieve cold shutdown within 72 hoJrs after aI fire Issuming no offsite power ls event assuming ~s avai~abLe. avai~able. 3.3 Repair:; Repair$ ( The licensee has identified the ne~d ne'ed for a singLe single l
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repair necessary for achieving cold shutdo~n shutdown in accordance with Ap~endix Appendix R requirements. This repair consists of installation of a temporary power
'cable,'for
*eabl~.*fer the shutdown coolfng pump in the -eve*rit -eve'Tit of fire which causes loss Loss of the redundant switchgea~ switchgear l 0 cat ed' in the same Lecateef sam e fire fi r e zone.
Z 0 n e. T his cable This cab lewwill ill pro-vide power to the' affected unit's pump~frorn*the pump'frorn'the corresponding switchgear in the other unit. The, The* licensee will wiLL develop the necessary repair procedure and will store r.quired mat.~rials t~~ r~quired materials site.* on site
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-~ .. 4 Associated Circuits a~d Isola+jop TSQla+iOD The licensee conducted a review of t~e present elec- eLec-trical systems to determine the plant's capability to meet the associated circuit criteria as stated in Appendix R reLating relating to safe shutdown and concLuded concluded that the existing electrical ins~allation with some electricaL installation additional equipment modif~cations wouLd would satisfy' satisfy* ..
erite.ria. these criteria. Modifi cations :including Modifications :incLuding isoLation isolation de v ; c e s are necessary devices nee e s s a r y to c i r. cui try for the h e ciccuitry t 0 -tthe
;~SDlation condenser
- ~solation con~enser valves, shared dieseL die~~l generator generator*
2/3 and its support equipment, and the ser~ite'water ser~ice'water
, pumps in order to assure ~ssure their operabiLity operability in case
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~f.fire.
~ffire. Licensee has addressed The licensee addresstd associated
.circuits of concern as discussed below.
,circuits 3.4.1 Common Power Source Soure~
the license~ stated that all The licensee aLL instru~entation instrumentation and power circuits are protected or will wilL be provided with
~ith coordinated protection by either circuit breakers or fuses.
3.4.2 Common EncLosure Enclosure As in the common'power common' power source case, the licensee stated that associated circuits that share a common enclosure encLosure with those required for safe shut-d~wn are provided with isolation devices. down 3.4.3 Spurious Sionals T!he licensee stated that fires in some fire zones tan can cause spurious signals which could impair safe
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s*h ut dow n
- The ref 0 r e, ;i sol ate d L0 cal con t r c lL s tat iion s 0 r'\ S f:or safe shutdown equipment wilt for wilt- be provided as
'~reviouslY discussed 1:0 to assure pr'oper proper equipment operation. equi pm'ent whose spurious Circuits to equipment s p Ilr i ou s
,'- operation can cause an unacceptable condition wilt will l
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be de-energized by *the the circuit breakers at the I
/ local LocaL switchgear or motor control center. Where there is sufficient time, local LocaL manual operation of valves vaLves will also be ut~lized utilized in the event spurious signaLs prevent proper valve operation.
signals The licensee also aLso stated that there are no-high-low pressure interfaces utilizing only motor operated valves for isolation. isoLation. Although the shutdown shutdc~n cootins coolin~ system is norm~tty normalLy d,signed d~signed as a high-low pressure interface, this system at Dresden Units 2 and 3 is designed to a pressure of 1250 psig (full reactor c ',"-- design pressure) at 350~F. 350 Q F. Despite a desisn design tem-perature lower Lower than reactor coolant ~ysteo
~ystem design
((57_5°F), S7.5 0 F), ;ittwa wass de t e r m; ned tthat determined Ii a t tth.e Ii.e shu t dow n' coo shutdown- l ; n9 cooling system couLd could likely withstand reactor coolant des1gn' design temperature on a one time basis. This conclusion was
.- reached by the staff during its review of SEP Topic~ of Topics V-10.B, V-11.A, V-11.B, and vu:-:r, Vil~3~ ana"is anc*is reported doc~~ent entitled "SE?
in the document "SEP Revielol Review of Safe Shut-
. down .,
y.s.t ~ ~ "~i~J~ down .. SSystems
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forr tthe
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he D Dresd~n res den 2 N ~uclear u c lea r PoPower.. e r PPlant, l ant, , - :~.
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- 0 R~vision 2, April 1981." On this basis, we conclude the shutdown cooling cooLing system does ~ot not conta~n contafn a high-
""low pressure low pre s sur e ;interface n t e r f ace ". i t h the reo I.'ith c tor coo reactor coolantl ant s)' s*t en
- sys.ten
( 3.5 Saf~ Shutdown Safe Shutdo~n Procedures Procedur~s and end Manoo~er Manoower The licens~e will revise existing safe shutdown proce~~res
~roced~res ~o ~o incorporate th~ the above described alternate shutdown method. The licensee further states that the revisions.revisions will be~made be made to assure
*tbat the necessary shutdown functions can be
*that b~ per-formed at all times by manpower available.
Because a number of .. .manual actions actio~s are required to assure safe shutdown for fires requiring utilization
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-- oft of the l t ern g t e. shu h e aalternate. shutdown a b ; lit capabi t dow n cap lity, °e ~ r e que s t w'e'request y, t,t that the Office of Inspection and Enforcement fire protection. review team conduct a walk-thr.ough of the
!eQuired required procedure and verify that the necessary actions can be taken within the specified time for assuring safe shutdown.
4.0 corm US!ON CONClUSION .* ,*
- we have reviewed the licensee's proposed We alterna~e
. s~utdown B~utdown capability for certain designated areas in Dresden Units 2 and 3 in accordance with Appendix R criteria. Based on that review, we conclude that / ..
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\, \. the performance goals for acco~plishing safe shutdown in the event of a fire, i.e., reacti.v'Lty reacti_v1~y
'control,
-control, inventory c~ntrot, c~ntrol, decay hear removal, pressure control, process monitoring and -support
*functions
-functions are met by the proposed alternate in these areas. Therefore, we conclude that the requirements of Appendix R, Sections 111.G.3 and III.L are satisfied in the areas identified in lII.L Section 2.2 of this SEe SE.
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- 1 s.o 5.0 ACKNOWLEDGEMEr--lT ACKNOWLEDGEME~T Wermeil contriQuted J. Vermeil contributed ,
to this evaluation. Oat e: January 19, 1983 Oate: ((
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2 _7 I' -'/7:' c.. .. _ february February 9, 1983 _ssrs: C. Reed/N. A. Kershaw R. E. Querio (~C Only) J. S. Abel D. J. Scott H. E. 81iss Bliss W. J. She'rlski Shewski T. C. Cihlar/G. E. Peterson W. SUede L. Stiede G. J. Diederich H. K. Stolt/'lL Stolt/W. l.L. Eck E. E. Fitzpatrick ' Circ., & (Bull., Cire., I. Nc~. 3: 1. tic:. :~ly) D. P. Galle Only, R. J. Tamminga (lSI Only) Graesser-{RIII & NC Only) G. P. Wagner K. L. Graesser-(RIII J. f. F. Gudac (NC Only) t. O~lv) E. R. Zebus (Bull. O"lv) J. H. Hughes Steptoe-IL&3 (Le~:!~s P. P. Steptoe-Il&3 (L!~:!~s :~ly) R. E. Jortbero ' M. A. Bowidawicz Bowidowicz - S&L N. J. Kallvianakis Kalivianakis M. E. Bray/J. Nash - G.~. A. W. Kleinrath G. Wright - State of Illi~~:: Q.A. Engineer Dresden (NRC/CECa (NRC/C~Co Ltrs :~:f! :-:~, Q.A. Engineer - SNED G. F. Owsley - Exxon NL Distribution the judgement of the Nuclear Licensing Administrator, the attac~=: attac~:: cument contains the following commitments to the NRC or requ!re~!~:s requ!re=!~:5 om the NRC. ' dentification of Attached Document: Dresden Units units 2 and 3 - A~~e~=:x ~
~esponse response to CECa CECo exemption requests to Appendix R require~ent~'
r!Quir!~ents (1: (l: :~~
- ~~
(f 'ection III.G); L. O. DelGeorge do:=: Cru~chfield letter to l. III .G); D. M. Crui.chfield dc:!: J~_uary Jh.uary 2,1983. 2, 1983. C Commitment or Requirement: Responsi::e Responsi:::e e Date Commitment or Reouirement De:3::-:-: Edison O~==::-~-: For your information Oistr!but::::"l Oistr!but:::n len it is determined by the responsible department that a cue 1en due date ~::: )t be met, th~ Nuclear Licensing Administrator should be notlfiea notifiea e d 1 ate 1 y *
.:nediately.
'.;n LE: fire Fire Protection
'. B. Rybak 83-02
UNITED STATES
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. WASHINGTON, O. C. 20555 L --' February 2, 1983 Mr. L.l. De1George DelGeorge licensing Director of Nuclear Licensing Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Hr. Del George: Dear Mr.
SUBJECT:
FIRE PROTECTION PROTECrrml - REQUEST FOR EXEMPTION FROM REQUIRE1'lENTS OF FRO~l REQUIREMENTS APPENDIX R R TO 10 eFR CFR 50, SECTION III.G Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 The Commission has issued, in Enclosure 1he 1, ten exemptions to certain req"irements of Appendix R to 10 eFR req~irements CFR 50 in response to your letter dated July 1, 1982. These exemptions pertain to fire protection of safe shutdo,/n capabi 1ii ty. shutdorm !( S('- ~u1y 1, 1982 letter Commonwealth Edison requested 13 exefilptions (he '::uly
,he exeli'ptions from 10 eFR CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Item III.G for the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3. That equipment requiring fixed suppression as defined in Section III.G.3 for which an exemption was requested is 1listed isted below:
- 1. All panels located in the control room-
- 2. 4KY SWGR 4KV SWGR'ss 23 and 24 -
1
- 3. 4KY SWGR's 23-1 and 24-1 "
4KV
- 4. 480Y S}:GR 480V St:GR's' s 28 and 29 .-
- 5. 480V 480Y MeC's MCC's 28-7 and 29-7*
- 6. 250V 250Y MCC's'2A and 28 2B ~*
- 7. 125V 125Y Distribution Panels 2A and 28* 2B*
S. 4KV
- 8. 4KY SWGR's St:GR' s 33 and 34 .
4KY SHGR's 33-1 and 34 9. 4KV 34-1
- 10. 480V SWGR s 38 and 39 .
480Y SWGR 480Y 'MCC's
- 11. 480V *1CC IS 38-7 and 39-7 .
250Y HCC's 3A and 3B:
- 12. 250V 3B , ' . .. .
J3. 125VDistrfbution
.J3. 125YDistribution Panels 3A and 3B - w' A total of 10 exemptions \'Iere \*/ere analyzed because the pairs consisting of 1te~s items 4 and 6, 7 and 13, and 10 and 12 were treated as single items since each pair is located in a single fire area.
Hr. L.
- l. Del George DelGeorge 2- February 2, 1983 ff( "~
IC,(art
~art have g*ra~+ed*"th-e-enci"(;sed-:e"x"e-rr.Pti~~"f~;*;;;;--th-;-requi" g"ra~t'e(j" th-e -enciosed-:c'x"e-rr,ptl ;~"f'~';;;;--th'~requi ren:ents
- 50. Appendix R, Item IIl.G.3 per your request. The basis for this 50, Appendix R, Item III.G.3 per your request. The basis for this re:::ents of -, 0" of"l 0 eFR CFR Exemption are given in the enclosed Safety Evaluation.
for,larded to the Office of the Federal Register The Exemption is being fory/arded for publication. Sincerely, 4N~ l#J'~ Dennis 7J1 CJ/;/.;~Ji
;;?/. tf..dh'/';di Dennis ~!. Crutchfield", Chief Crutchfie1d", Chief Operating Reactors Branch Sranch #5 Division of Licensing Ene' osures:
Enclosures:
- 1. Exempt; Exempti on
- 2. Safety Evaluation cc w/enclosures:
See next page ~~(". i:(
Mr. L. Oe1George Del George February 2, 1983 ':'3,. Y,. Isham, Lincoln &Beale Counselors at Law One Fi~st fi~st National Plaza, 42nd Floor Chicago. Illinois 60603 Chicago, Hr. Doug Scott Mr.
- Plant Superintendent Rura 1 Route #1 11 Horris, Illinois 60450 Morris, 604~O U. S. Nuclear Regulatory RegJlatory Co~ission Cor.rnission Resident Inspectors Office Dresden Station, Station .
RR #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Chairman Board .of Supervisors of Grundy County Grundy County' Courthouse Harris, Morris, Illinois 60450 ~(l) '.1no;s Department of Nuclear Safety ""})'.inois ~' -~\ ,Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor
;~ringfield, 111
- I' ...,firingfield,
., Illinois inois 62704 U. S. Environmental Protection.Agency federal Activities Branch Federal Reg; Region on V V Offi Office ce
. ATTN:
ATHI: Regional Radiation Representative 230 South Dearborn Str~et Chicago, Illinois 60604 James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Com~ission, Region III 111 799 Roosevelt Road Glen [llyn, Ellyn. Illinois 60137
~-- ~~ ~ ......-.. "" -.....
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION UNITEO 'J ) -:(0 -:( n the Matter of )I ,J' )I Corl,MONIIEAL Tf! EDISON COMPANY Cm~MONh'EAL ) Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249
)
(Oresden (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, }) Units Nos. 2 and 3) }) EXEMPTION J. I. Commonwealth Edison Company (the lice~see) is the holder of a Provisional Operating License No. DPR-19 and Facility Operating License No. DPR-25 which authorize operation of the Dresden Nuclear Power Station, St~tion, Units 2 and 3, respectively (Dresden or the faciiities). facilities). These licenses provide, among other things, that the facilities are subject to all rules, regulations and Orders
~ '" of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission COllJJ1ission (the Commission) now or hereafter in effect .
je
.l. .J j( The facilities are boiling water reactors located at the licensee's site in Grundy County, Illinois.
II. Section III.G.3 of Appendix R R to 10 CFR 50 requires, among other things, that a fire detection system and a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room or zone for which alternative safe shutdown instal1ed capability has been provided. The licensee, in a July 1, 1982 submittal, requested exemptions for the following equipment.
'" '. All panels located in the control room
- 2. 4KY SWGR's 23 and 24
- 3. 4KY SWGR 's 23-1 and 24-1 4KV
- 4. 480Y SFR's 28 and 29 480V
~(
,/-
- 5. MCC's 28-7 and 29-7 480V Mee's
- 6. MCC's 2A and 2B 250V Mce's 28
- 7. 125V Distribution Panels 2A and 2B
- 8. 4KV SWGR's 33 and 34
- 9. 4KV SWGR's 33-1 and 34-1
- 10. 480V SWGR's 38 and'39 and-39
- 11. 480V MGe's MCC's 38-7 and 39-7
- 12. 250V MCC's 3A and 38 3B
- 13. 125V Distribution Panels 3A and 38 The licensee in the same submittal indicated the following as a basis
-for for its exemption request:
All equipment requiring fixed suppression as defined in Section III.G.3 for which an exemption was requested is critical to the power distribution necessary for normal and emergency operation of safety related equipment for Units 2 and 3. re.. -
- f( The inadvertent actuati actuation on of any fi fixedxed water suppress; suppressicn c,n system located over this po\'I'er po\~er distribution equipment could result in the fault or failure of that equipment. Installation of any type of fixed suppression system other than water, such as cardox, halon or foam, would be ineffective' ineffective- or inappropiate for the areas 1n in which the equipment listed above is located ~r or for the type of fire likely to occur 1n in the area. '~11_'such 'Al'_-such 'equipment 1s is' 1nin high'
~trafffc-'a-r'eas
~traTf1c -'ii-r'eas wh'lch are currently provided with fire detection *.*
- "and
~and manual 'su ppress ; on systems. ,rl,rttleriTl(:~r:~';~
'suppressi 'F"hrthe0nore';_ttie,exi the". exi ?~!'~~_!J,!:e~~:
~J!.~Q_!J.!:e,,:~;
- .detec"i"1on
- detec"i'ion -aocj"suppress1on S'I<".....
~"",'
-an(fsuppresshn . - ..*
systems
~reiltly-installed c :-rently-installed
.~.
.'" "~
..... ,_ .** *~A' . *"
, - . . . .-~ .. I ' . - ". _ .... -
in'the areas-in"the areas-
.~~ntainrng-:the
,=c..qntaiiirng':tiie ~'e'quipine~i
~e'quipinent -l"i ted- abo 1is~ted' above V£! hav~' ,~~.en_~rev.~ ~w~.~,
have ,be,en"rev; ~wed, ~~d: ~nd:~-.:~'~'.:~ approved by_the bY"the tmCNRC .in .. the o'resden'Station';"Units"'2"and-3'Fire-":'"
,in,_the Dresdcn'Station';"UnitS'2"iirid-3-Ffre--="
':"P.fot~,C"tion~
':"Pfot~_cti on"SER. ..SER. As the probabil probabi 1ity of ;inadvertent nadvertent actuation of a
7590-01 C fixed suppression system is of far greater magnitude than the probability of occurrence of a fire severe enough to require the use of the alternate shutdown method independent of the fire area, Commonwealth Edison feels that the installation of such fixed suppression systems would only result in a decrease
;inn pl ant safety.
plant The NRC staff has evaluated the licensee's fire hazards analysis for these areas and has made the following determinations. All of the fire zones for whiCh which exemptions have been requested represent a similar configur-ation, i.e., combustible loading is light, there is alternate shutdown capability, smoke detection, and manual fire suppression equipment is ~"l(~~ai1able. )'(_~ai1able. There is, therefore, reasonable assurance that a fire in any of these areas would be promptly detected and extinguished. The low combustible loading in these areas ensures that safety related equipment in adjacent areas will not be threatened. The installation of a fixed fire suppression system will not significantly increase the level of fire protection in these areas .*
.Based on our evaluation, described in Enclosure 2 to the letter transmitting this exemption, we find that the existing fire protection in conjunction with alternate shutdown capability in the areas for which an exemptio~ has been requested provides 'a°a level lev~l of fire protection equivalent to the technical requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R, and there-fore, the exemptions should be granted.
granted *
.I;ol(.
III. Ill. _Accordi ngly, the Corrnnission
.According1y, Corroni ss i on has determined determi ned that, pursuant to 10 eFR CFR 50.12, these exemptions are authorized by law and will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, are otherwise in the public interest, and hereby grants exemptions for the areas described in Section II above from,that from. that portion of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R which requires that a fixed fire suppression system shall be installed in the area, room or zone for which alternate safe shutdown capability has been provided.
The Commission has determined that the granting of this Exemption will not result in any significant environmental impact a'nd and that pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5{d){4)
§51.5{d)(4) an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with
""( ~~ j' ".ris p (... Iis (::tion.
<:.ction.
This Exemption, Exemption. is effective upon issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COl/MISSION COfIMISSION
~
~.. ((, J-- J-Darre ~isen~1t~ctor Miseri~~~ctor Division of Licensing Dated at Bethesda~
Bethesda; Maryland this 2nd day of February, 1983
\ J( .
, I(
).
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO:~f",ISSIO~~ CO:W,ISSIOc~ WAS*HINGTO~J. v..'AS'HINGTON. o. 0, C. 20555 EVAlUATIO:: BY THE OFFICE OF NUCU:'.R SAFETY EVALUATIO:: R:.t.CTO?, ?'EGU!..ATIO:~ t~UCL(~.R R:.!.CTO?, ?'~GUU,TlO:1 APPENDIX R REV!E~ REVIEW DRESDErl rWCLU_~ DRESDEN PO:*:ER STATIml,
':VCl:;.' PO:-:ER ur~IT ,:os.
STATI Oil, U,lIT r:os. 2 A~;J A:;J 3 DOCi~ET DOC!:ET NOS. 50-237 AND Arm 50- 2~9 50-249 1.0 Introduction By l~tter dated July 1, 1982 the licensee requested 11 exe~pticns exe~ptions from the technical requirements of Section llI.G III.G of A~~endixAppendix R to 10 CFR 50. By letter Gated dated September 23,1582 23, 1982 the licensee provided additional information. Section S~ctiDn III.G.2 requires that one train of cables and equip~ent necessary to achi ,eve and ma; achi.eve nta in s'a maintain s*afefe shutco\o.'n shutco ....'n be ;:-.:d n:a i :-,ed free
;:-.:dn'.:.ai~,ed of fire damage by one of the following means:
- a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated ~on-~afety r,o"n-~afety ci rcuits of redundant trains by a fire circuits fi re barrier barri er having havi ng a 3-nour3- hour rating. Structural steel forming a pa!t part of or s~~porting s~pporting such s~ch protected to provide fire resistance
'fire barriers shall be prote~ted equivalent to that required of the barrier; h.
- b. Separation of cables and equipment and associatec non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal di*stance of r;;ore r.:ore than 20 feet with no intervening combustib1es combustibles or fire hazares. hazards.
In addition, fire* detectors and an auto~atic au'.:.o~atic fire sup~ression suppression '. system shall be installed in the fire area~ area; 'or '01'
- c. Enclosure of cables and equipment and associated non-safety
, circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a
" ( I-hour rating. In addition, fire dete:tc~s l-hour dete::tc~s a~d and 2n z'n a~tc~atic autc;:-.atic
- ~ '-
fire suppression system shall be insta11ed inst2l1ed in fire area. 2rea. I
2 \( \,
- . If these conditions are not met, Section I1I.G.3* III.G.3* requires alternative shutdown capabi1ity capability independent of the area _. of concern. It also requires a fixed 'suppression system in the fire area of concer'n if it concentl~ation of cables or other combustibles.
contains a large concentration These alternative a lternat i ve requirements ~re not deemed to be equivalent; requi rements ilre hO',;ever, th2Y equi va 1ent; ho~everJ they provide equivalent protection for those configurations in which they are are accepted. Because it is not possible to predict the specific conditions under which fires may occur and propagate, the design basis protective ,-
.~
features are specified in the rule rather than the design basis fire. Plant specific features may require protection different than the measures specified in Section III.~. In such a case, the licensee must demonstrate, by means of a detailed fire hazards analysis, that existing protection or existing protection in conjunction with pro-posed modifications will provide a level of safety equivalent to the technical requirements of Section llI.G III.G of Appendix R.
,III.G is .related In summary, Section .III.G featt;res for related to fire protection fsatt:res
~nsuring e'nsuring that systems ind circuits. used to achieve and ~ain and associated circuits r.:ain-tain $afe safe shutdown are free of fire damage. Fire protection configur-
. ations must either meet the specific requirements of Section JII.G or an alternative fire protection configuration must be justified by a fire hazard, analysis.
, Our general criteria for accepting an alternative fire protection con-
~iguration fi gurat i on are ar,e the following:
fo 11 owi ng: The alternative assures that one train of equipment necessary
'to acnieve hot shutdown from either the control room or e~ergency control stations is free of fire damage.
The alternative assures that fire damage to at least one train of equipment necessary to achieve cold shutdo'ttn shutdo,m is limited li~ited such that be, repaired within a reasonable time (minor repairs with it can be* components stored on-site).
')C j( c02t.in;s are Fire retardant coat.in;s ;);~ ~Sc'""~
;):~ ~£;<::1~~~; iis fire barriers.
Modifications required to r.,ec~ l7ec~ 3~:-:: 5~:-: "'n IILG \,,'Ould
;,\1) IlLG h'ould not enhance fire protection 'safety abo .. e ~~'J:
abo\'e :~",!\'ided by either existing or
'J: ::",'\,ided proposed alternatives:
Hodifi cat ions required Modifications l:'Iec~ S2:::';z-,i\ requ*i red to r.,e(;~ 52 =-:~)Z'li) l1I.G 11 1. G would woul d be detrimental to overall facility safety. .. 2.0 Discussion Exe~ptions are requested from th£ Exemptions thE ~~X5'~
~!~!,~ i1re ilre suppression require~ent requirement in Section III.G.3.b of h~ptncix h~pEn~ix '~' ~~',1 '0
- ~ 10 CFR 50 for fire zones for which alternate shutdown capabii':::capabi1::~: :-. .!~ !'ren provided.
~,.=.~ provided, The equipment' locations requiring fixed supprs'~;:"'
suppre!"=~ 3~ ~.~ ,jefined defined in Section IILG.3.b III.G.3.b for which an exemption is reques~~~ reques~:~ ~~~ a~: )c I;l 1. I, All panels located in the c;*:~:~ c;'::-':' ~~~m -:':""m
- 2. 4KV SWGR's 23 and 24
- 3. 4KV SWGR's SWGR IS 23-1 and 24-1
- 4. 480V SWGR's 4S0V S'n'GR' s 28 and 29
- 5. 480V MCe's MCC's 28-; and 29-7
- 6. 250V ~1CC'
~lCC' s 2A and 28 2B
,7.
. 7. 125V Distribution P~~els Pc~els 2A J~6 no:: Z~ ::::
,,8.-8. 4KV S'S'n'GR' n'GR ISs 33 and 34 9.
9.'- 480V SWGR SWGR'I s 33-1 and 34-1
- 10. 480V S\o.' GR IS 38 and 39 SWGR's
- 11. 480V HCe's HCC's 38-7 and 39-7 '.
*12:
12: 250V MCCls 2S0V MCC IS 3A and 3! 3B ~
- 13. 125V Distribution Panels 3A ~~d 33 A brief descri pt i on of ecch equir;:~~t bri ef description equi r;,C'~t ~(,':~tiorr
-: "qt i orr follows:
fo 11 ows:
4 ~(
- '(
- j . All Panels Located in the Control Room
_ The Dresden Unit 2 and 3 and Dresden Unit 1 control roc~s roo~s form a combined control room that is separated from the re~a;nder rewainder of the respective plant areas by a concrete and concrete block wall that has a 3-hour fire rating. The floor and ceiling are of concrete construct,ion. construction. The control room has a fire detection system, hose station, and f~re fire extinguishers. An alternative safe shutdown syste~ system is also available for the control room. The room is continuously manned and the fire load in the control room is low. 4KV S~GRls SII'GR' s 23 and 24 This equipment is located in fire zone 8.2.6.a 8.2.5.a - turbine building
~("
~(.. mezzanine floor at elev. e1ev. 538 538'., This fire zone is sepa:-'ate 1
sepa:--ate frem frc:n
~ other fire zones by spatial separation and by a concrete floor and cei 1i ng supported on exposed ~tructural
~eiling *s tructura 1 steel.
s tee 1. The fleor f1 cor and ceiling ce i1 i ng have numerous penetrations for stairwells, equipment re::'.o'lal re::-.oval hatches and pipe and electrical penetrations. The pipe and electrical pene-trations are sealed. The combustible loading in the locatio~ of the, sw";tchgear is l~ght the sw'itchgear light and consists primarily of cable insulation, d*istributed. Detection, portable fire extinguishers and uniformly dlstributed. manua.l hose stations are provided in the area. manua) 4KV SWGR's 23-1 and 24-1 T~is This equipment
..* ;s is located ;n in fire zone 1.1.2.3 - reactor building mezzanine floor at elevation 5451~6J: 545'~5: This fire zone 'is "is separated from the adjoining fire zones in the reactor building , (Zone 1.1.2.2 -
ground floor elevation 517 feet - 0 inch and Zone 1.1.2.4 - main floor elevaton 570 feet - 0 inch) by both spatial separation and a
5 <~-- "'},-~ ~( -,.,( } } structural concrete floor and ceiling. The floor and ceiling have penetrations for stairways, equipment access ways, piping penetrations,
- and electrical penetrations. Fire stops are provided on all electricaT penetrations.
The 4-kV switchgear 23-1 and 24-1 are separated by a partial fire access,,'ay through it. wall with an open accessr.'ay The combustible loading in this zone is light and consists primarily of cable insulation. A detection system. system, portable fire extinguishers, and manual hose stations are provided in the area. 480V SWGR' s 28 and 29 and 250V ~1CC-' flcc.' s 2A and 28 This equipment is in fire firE zone 1.1.2.4 - reactor building ..~ain ain flbor elev. 570'. This fire zone is separated frorn from the a~joining 2~joining ~_:- ~* ~ fire zones in the *reactor
'reactor building m:zz~r:~ne bui 1di ng (Zone 1.1.2.3 - mez*;:=.nj Ole floor
,...~ elevation 545 feet - 6 inches an-d and Zone 1.1.2.5 - reactor flcerfleor elevation 589 feet - 0 inch) by both spatial separation 2~d a~d a structural c6ncrete floor and ceiling. The floor and ceilini ceilin~ have penetrations for stairways, equipment access ways, piping penetra-tions~ and electrical penetrations. The combustible loading in this zone is light. Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations are provided i~ the zone. A det~ction syste~ is A fire detdction
.,provided provided in the vicinity of the 480V switchgear.-
480V MeCls I1CC's 28-7 and 29-7
.This
.This equipment is located in,fire in. fire zone 1.1.2.2 7 reactor building g~ound ground floor elev. 517 1
-6". This f{re 517'-6". fire zone is separa'ted from the
- adjoining fire zones in the reactor building (Zone 1.1.2.1 - base-ment floor elevation 476 feet - 6 inches) by both spatial separation a~d a structural concrete ceiling and floor. The floor 2nd and ceiling
.,r('
- 6
-*1 .~. have penetrations for stairways, equipment access ways, piping penetrations .... Fire stops are provided penetrations and electrical penetrations.-"
-for all electrical penetrations. The combustible loading in the BTU/FT 2, and is conc~ntrated approxi~ately 31,400 BTU/FT2,
. zone is moderate, approximately in the vicinity of the Meels.
MCC's. Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations are provided in the area. An early warning detection system is provided for the two HCCls. MCC's. .' 125V Distribution Panels 2A and 28 2B and 125V Distribution Panels 3A and 38 This equipment is located in fire zone 7.0 - station battery rooms. Both stations battery rooms are enclosed by concrete and concrete ic.
£. ~.l ""!!!)
possess a 3-hour fire rating. The floor and ceil-block walls which poss"ess ng of the rooms are constructed of concrete supported by exposed 1 n9 structural steel. The combustible.- loading in the battery roo~s consists of battery casings and cable insulation. Portable fire rooms .
~
extinguishers and manual hose stations are provided in ~he vicinity
.of the battery rooms. Early warning detection systems are provided inside the battery rooms.
SWGR's 33 and 34 4KV SWGRls The equipment is located in fire zone 8.2.6B 8.2.68 - turbine building mezzanine floor, elevation 538538'.1
- This fire zone is separate from fire zones by spatial other fire*. spatial separatio.n separation and by a concrete floor and ceiling supported on exposed structural steel. The floor and ceil-ing have numerous penetrations for stairwells, equipment removal hatches and pipe and electrical penetrations. Jhe pipe and elec-trical penetrations are sealed. The combustible loading in the
~f ~i Zone is light. Portable fire extinguisher detectlondetection and menual manual ~ ... ~ hos'l stations are available in the zone.
hOSH
7 4KV SWGR's 33-1 and 34-1 This equipment is located in fire zone 1.1.1.3, reactor building mezzanine floor~el~v. floor~eliv. 545' - 6". This fire zone is separated fro~ from the adjoining fire zones in the reactor building (Zone 1.1.1.2 - ground floor elevation 517 feet - 6 inch and Zone 1.1.1.4 - main
'floor elevation 570 feet - 0 inch) by both spatial separation and structural concrete floor and ceiling. The floor and ceiling are stairways, equipment access ways, piping penetrations, penetrated by s~airways, p;netrations, and electrical penetrations. Fire stops are provided on all elec-trical penetrations. The combustible loading in the locotion location of the 4KV S~GR SWGR is light, and consists primarily of cable ir.sulation.
Portable fire extinguishers and manual hose stations are providec_ provided_. in the zone. An early warning automatic fire detection syste~ is installed in the vicinity of 4-kV switchgear, switchgear. 33-1 and 34-1. 34-1 . ~~(
- ( SWGR'1 5s 38 and' 39 and 250V MCC' 480V SWGR Hee's5 3A and 38
'P' .... This equipment is located in fire zone 1.1.1.4 - rea:to~ reactor building main floor, elev 570570'.* This fire zone is separated frow the adjoin-1 ing fire zones ;n in the reactor building zone 1.1.1.3 - ~ezzanine floor elevation 545 feet - 6 inches and Zone 1.1.1.5 reactor floor elevat'ion 589 feet - 0 inch) by both spatial separation and a structura 1 concrete floo~
'structural fl 00: and ceiling.
cei 1i ng. The floor and ceiling ce i 1i ng
.have penetrations for stairways, equipment access ways, piping
,have penetrat i 6ns, and electrical penetrations, e 1ectri ca 1 penetrations. 'Fire
. Fi re stops
. pr'o-are pro-vided for all electrical penetrations. The combustible loading in the zone is light. Portable extinguishers, manual hose stations and a detection sys'tem system are provided.,
provided . I
8 480V MCC's Hee's 38-7 and 39-7 This equipment i~ located in fire zone !.1.1.2 [.1.1.2 - reactor building ground floor, elev. 517'-6". This fire zone is separated from the adjoining adjoining.two ,two zones in the reactor building (Zone 1.1.1.1 - basement floor elevation 476 feet - 6 inches and Zone 1.1.1.3 - mezzanine
'floor
*floor elevation 545 feet - 6 inches) by both spatial separation and a structural concrete ceiling and floor. The floor and ceiling have penetrations for stairways, equipment access ways, piping penetrations and electrical penetrations. Fire stops are provided penetr~tions =
on all electrical penetrations. The combustible loading in the zone is light. Portable fire extinguishers, manual hose stations, and a detection system are provide~. provide.d. 3.0 Evaluation All of the fire zones for which exemptions ex"emptions have been r~quested re.quested represent a similar configuration, i.e. combustible loading is light, there is alternate shutdown capability, smoke detection,
~nd and manual fire fir~ suppression suppr~ssion equipment is aViilable. There is, therefore, reasonable assurance that a fire in any of ,these .these areas
. would be promptly detected and extinguished. The low combustible loading in these areas ensures that safety related equipment in adjacent areas will'not will*not .be be threatened. The *installation installation of a fixed fire suppression system will not *significantly 'significantly increase the level
,. of fi~e protection in these areas.
4.0 Conclusion
""-'0,".
B~sed~~*our Basedon'our evaluation, we find th~t
, , f that the existing fire protection in"conjunction in *conjunction with altel"nate alte~nate shutdown capability in the areas for which an exemption has b~en requested provides a level of fire pro-tection equivalent to the technical requirements of Section III.G.3
- ('lf of Appendix R, and therefore, the exemptions should be granted.
~ &~"
9 ( Acknowledcement 5.0 Acknowledqement
.The following indi~idual contributed to this evaluation:
R. Eberly Date: February 2, 1983
'I..
Volume 5 Part 2 Tab 3
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY REGULA TORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON. O. D. C. 20555 c_ ( July 17,
- 17. 1987 Docket Nos. 50-237/249 Mr. L. D. Butterf1eld.
Butterfield. Jr. Nuclear l1censing Licensing Manager Commonwealth Edison Company C~.ny Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Chicago. Illinois 60690
Dear Mr. Butterfie1d:
Butterfield:
SUBJECT:
FIRE PROTECTION APPENDIX R ITEMS III.G.3 AND III.L (TAC 59853 59B53 AND 59854) Re: Dresden" Nuclear Power Station. Unft Unit Nos. 2 and 3 By letter dated August 10. 1984 and March 1. I, 1985 you provfded provided informltion infOrMation
.( regarding Section IIl.G III.G and III.l III.L of Appendix R. In these submittals,-you submitta1s,*you stated that a reverification of compliance with Appendix R requirements at Dresden. which was required based on your review of our Generic Letter 83-33 dated October 19, 1983 has been completed. In your submittals. su~fttals, you presented findings which fncluded included 1) revfsed revised alternate shutdown paths based on their zonal interaction analysis 2) the current status of already c~ftted c~itted modifica-tions 3) newly proposed MOdifications with the schedules for their COMpletion, completion, and 4) interim compensato~
compensatory leasures measures for applicable IOdfffcat1ons lOdifications until their thefr completion. By 1etter'dated letter "dated July 1. 1985. we identified the need for additional additiona 1 infonnation in the area of associated cfrcuits 1nfonnatfon circuits concerns such IS as electrical isolation deficiency. fire-induced spurfous operations. and high impedance spurious operations, faults. By letters dated August 9, 9. 1985, 1985. January 9, 9. 1986 and May 30. 1986 you provided the requested 1nforl8t1on. info~tion. Also. by letter dated September 18. 1985, you suba1tted submitted Rev1sion Revision 1 to your August 10. 1984 submittal. submfttal. As stated tn in the Staff Safety Evaluatfon Evaluation (Enclosure 1), 1). we conclude that your currently proposed revision to the alternate shutdown shutd~n capability capabilfty for Dresden Units 2 and 3 satisfies the require.ent requireDent of Appendix R R.t ItelS 111.6.3 III.6.3 and III.l. III.L. The NRC inspection team tea~ will verify that the needed manual operations can be completed in a timely tf~ly .. nner. We note that the use of the alternative manner. (( II.3-1 II. 3-'
Mr. L. O. Butter~ieldJ Butterfield, Jr. shutdown procedure would be expected during a fire ~hen when other means of shutdown identified 1n in the plant procedures are not considered to be available dvailable by the operating personnel. O~;'m/Jt-9~;m/JJ- Daniel R. Multer, Muller, DirectDr Director Project Directorate 111-2 D1vis1on Division of Reactor Projects - Ill, III, IV, V and Special Projects
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure: See next page ( 11.3-2
Mr. L. O. Butterf.ield, Jr. Dresden Nuclear Power Station Commonwealth Edison Company Units 2 and 3 cc: Mr. Michael I. Miller lincoln &Beale Isham, Lincoln Three First National Plaza Suite 5200 Illinois 60602 Chicago, 1111no1s Mr. J. Een1genburg Eenigenburg Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station Rura 1I Route 11
#l Morris.
Morris, Illinois Illin01s 60450 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commiss1on Commission Resident Inspectors Office Dresden Station Oresden Rural Route 11 #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Chai nnan Chainnan . Board of Supervisors of Grundy County Grundy County Courthouse Morris, Illinois MorriS, Il11nois 60450 ( Regional Regi Adllinistrator ona 1 Adlli ni stra to r Commission, Region III Nuclear Regulatory Commiss10n. 799 Roosevelt Road G1en Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Mr. Michael E. Parker, Chief Division of Engineering IllinoiS Depar~nt of Nuclear Safety Illin01s Department 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704 Springfield. i ( 11.3-3 II. 3-3
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSfONCOMMISSION WASHINGTON. O. D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION 1 RELATED TO APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR PART Sat 50. ITEMS III.S.l III.G.3 AND III.L DRESDEN STATION) STATION. UNITS 2 AND 3 1 COMMONWEALTH EDISON co. COMMONWEAlTH CO. DOCKET NOS. 50*237/249 50-237/249
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letter dated January 19, 1983. a safety evaluation was issued regarding
- 19. 1983, Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50, 50. Items Itens III.S.3 III.G.3 and III.L (alternate and/or dedicated shutdown capability following a fire event 1n in the plant) for Dresden Units 2 and 3. Subsequent to the issuance of the safety evaluation, evaluation. COIIOnwealth Edison Company (the licensee) and its contractors discussed issues relating to Ca..onwealth I 1
compliance in a meeting with the NRC staff on June 14, their Appendix R compl1anc. 14. 1984. meeting, the licensee stated that. based on their review of NRCls In that meeting. NRC's Generic Letter 83-33 dated October 19, reverification effort relating to thetr a reveriffcation 1983. it was found necessary to cQlPlete
- 19. 1983, compliance with Appendix their c~11ance cQIPlete Appendfx R require-I 1
ments at Dresden. The licensee presented its reverification findings, which included revised alternate shutdown paths based on its zonal interaction
- analysis, analysis. which 1itt coaa1tted conIftted to, to. as well as newly proposed non*outage non-outage and outage-related modifications. interim ca.pensatory cOlPlnsatory measures neasures (ICMs)
(ICHs) as required, and associated circuits analys1s. analysiS. On request from the staff. the licensee provided follow-up subaittals submittals dated August 10, 1984, 1984. and March 1, 1985. 1985, wherein they identified ident1fied all the hot shutdown paths, paths. the newly proposed modification coapletion. the previously co.attted with the schedules for their completion, ca.aitted IOdificat1ons modifications with their current status. and the ICM$.ICMs. Additionally, Addit10nally, tn in the August 10,
- 10. 1984 submittal, submittal. the licensee requested both schedular (for ca.pletion COMPletion of the pre-viously coanitted swing dtesel diesel generator .edifications mod1ficat10ns as well as newly proposed modifications) exempt10ns and non-schedular non-SChedular exemptions fro. the requirements of III.G.l, I1I.G.1. III.S.2 III.G.2 and 111.G.3 III.G.3 as applicable and provided justification for the same based on their thetr fire hazards analysis.
analys1s. Based on the stiff's review revt .. of the above submittals, subm1ttals. Ind and clarif1cation clarification provided by the ltcens licens.. in a telephone conversation with w1th the staff on May 28, 28. 1985, 1985. the staff, letter dated July 1. 1985, requested additional infoMlition staff. by let"r infonnation in the area of associated circuits ctrcuits concerns (such as electrical isolation deficiency, deficiency. fire-induced spurious operations, operations. and high t~ance faults whfch wh1ch can iMpair iepair safe shutdown eaPlb111ty). captbl1ity). 8y letters dated August 9. 1985, 1985. January 9. 9, 1986 and May 30,
- 30. 1986, 1986. the Heens licens.. provided the requested infol"NUon.
fnfoMnition. Also, Also. by letter dated September 18. 1985. the 1tcensee SepteMber 18, suo.itted Revision 1 to thetr 1fcensee subaitted their August 10,
- 10. 1984 submittal submfttll *. By letter dated October 16, 16. 1985. the licensee provided their the1r cold shutdown analysts analysis and requested additional exeapt10ns eXeRptions pertaining to alternate hot and cold shutdown capabilities at Dresden with justification for the requested exemptions based on their fire hazards analysis.
In these submittals. submittals, the licensee provided a safe shutdown analysiS based on 11.3-4
2 their fire hazards analysis, including possible zonal interactions, to demonstrate that adequate safe shutdown systems exist and/or alternate shutdown capability is available at Dresden Units 2 and 3. Additionally, in these Addlt1onally, submittals, the licensee proposed repairs, i.e., pulling out fuses or replacing blown fuses, for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown of the plant following certain fire scenarios. Also 1n in the above submittals the licensee requested III.G.1 requirement, i.e., one train ~f exemptions from III.G.l systems needed for hot shutdown be free of fire damage, insofar as the require-ment is interpreted as disallowing repairs for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown. This safety evaluation (5E) (SE) addresses the deviations from the earlier safety Exenptions f~ evaluation (ESE) dated January 19, 1983. Exemptions from the requirements of III.G.2 and from the requ1rements requirements pertaining to alternate hot and cold shutdown capabilities for Dresden Units 2 and 3 are provided separately. 2.0 POST FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 2.1 Systems Required for Safe Shutdown In addition to the systems and components conponents identified for achieving safe shutdown in fn the ESE. ESE, for a fire in certain fire areas or their equivalent fire areas (see Section 2.2 of th1s this SE for a definftion definition of equivalent fire areas). areas), the licensee identif1ed identified the utilization of the High Pressure Coolant Injection/Low . Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI/LPCI) Systems. This approach would achieve hot shutdown in lieu of the isolation condenser (IC) shutdown method identified in the ESE. Additionally, for a fire in certain certa1n plant areas/Zones (RB2-I:Zone (RB2-I: Zone 1.3.2, RB2-II: Zone 1.1.2.3, R83-II: RB3-II: Zones 1.3.1 l.l.1 and 1.1.1.3 - see Section 2.2 ( of this SE for a fire area description), the licensee identified of the LPCI/containment cooling service water (CCSW) systeM fdent1fied the utilization system for decay heat removal to achieve and ma;ntain maintain cold shutdown in lieu of the normal shutdown coo11ng cooling system and its aSSOCiated associated supporting systems identified fn in the ESE. The safe shutdown systems identified above are expected to be used during a severe fire event when other means of shutdown ident1fied identified in the plant pro-cedures are determined to be unavailable. 2.2 Areas Where Alternate Safe Shutdown Is ReqUired Required As part of their thefr reverificatfon reverification effort, the licensee examined the need for providing alternate safe shutdown capability for Units 2 and 3 for a fire in any fire ffre area or its 1ts equivalent fire area. The licensee deffned an equ1valent equivalent fire area as one or .ore
.are fire zones which border other fire areas, and is either separated by a 3-hour rated fireffre barrier or by equivalent fire protection.
protectfon. Where a 3-hour barrier was not provided, the lfcenseelicensee requested an exemption f~ applicable applfcable Appendix Append1x R requirements. requfrements. Further, in their reverification analysts, analys1s, the licensee considered cons1dered the zonal interaction. 1.e., i.e., fire spreading f~ zone to zone (the licensee's spreadfng fro. lfcensee's earlier ear11er sublittals subl1ttals assumed that fires would not spread from zone to zone). When the analysis tnat analys1s indicated fndicated that the requirements of Appendix R were not explicitly let. Ret, the licensee lfcensee verified verif1ed that the same alternate hot shutdown path and the same cold shutdown path (i.e., (f.e., the normal shutdown cooling system path) was available for all the zones within a fire ffre area or its equivalent equ1valent with a few exceptions. The cold 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.l shutdown exceptions are for fire zones 1.3.2, 1.1.2.3. 1.1.1.3 and 1.3.1 as I( 11.3-5
3 discussed in Section 2.1 above. The hot shutdown exceptions are for fire l.l.l.s.d, 1.1.1.6, 1.1.2.Sd and 1.1.2.6 as discussed below. zones 1.1.1.S.d. The licensee also proposed modifications to provide either a 3-hour rated fire barrier~ barrier, or equivalent fire protection feature(s), feature{s), for the affe"cted affected zone(s) zone{s) to interaction analysis, ensure safe shutdown capability. Based on their zonal interact10n analysis the licensee concluded that alternate shutdown capability was required for 10 io areas 'total 13 areas) as the requirements of Section III.G.2 were not met fot for these areas. These are:
- 1. R82-1 RB2-I Unit 2 Reactor Building Equivalent Fire Area I This area contains Unit 2 Ie IC and its pipe chase zones. Elevations 589'-0*, 510'-0" 589'-0". 570'-0* and 545'-6" (zones 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.8 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.5.C)
Z.
- 2. RB2-I Unit 2 Reactor Building Equivalent Fire Area I RB2-1 Unlt Unit 2 shutdown cooling pump room.
This area contains Un1t 517'-6"M Elevation 511'-6 (zone 1.3.2)
- 3. Ra2-I1 RB2-II Unit 2 Reactor Building Equivalent Fire Area II This area contains Unit 2 HPCI and LPCI valves.valves, LPCI pumps, 480-Y 480-V Motor Control Center (MCCs), local reactor level and pressure instrumentation, 4 kv switchgears (SWGRs), 125-V de dc reactor building distribution panel, 250-V de 2S0-V dc MCCs, 480-V SWGRs and the Unit 2 part of the common refueling floor for both the units. Elevation 476'-6" (zones 1.1.2.1, 11.2.1 and 11.2.2), elevat10ns 11.2.2). elevations 517'-6", 545 545'-6",
1
-6", 570'-0", 589'-0* and 613'-0" 1.1.2.S)
(zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.5.0 and 1.1.2.6) (
- 4. RB3-1 Unit 3 Reactor Building Equivalent Fire Area I Ra3-I This area contains Unit 3 Ie and its pipe chase zones. Elevations 589'-0",
S89 j 570'-0" and 545'-6"
-0", 510'-0" 545'-S" (zones 1.1.1.S.A, 1.1.1.5.A, 1.1.1.S.B 1.1.l.5.B and 1.1.1.S.C) l.l.1.5.C)
- 5. RB3-I Unit 3 Reactor Building Equivalent Fire Area I This area contains the traversing incore probe (TIP) room. Elevation 517'-6" (zone 1.4.1)
- 6. RB3-II Unit 3 Reactor Building Equivalent Fire Area II conta1ns Unit 3 HPCI and LPCI valves, LPCI pumps, 480-V MCCs, This area contains local reactor level and pressure instrumentation, shutdown cooling pump, 4 kv SWGRs, 125~Y de SWGRs. 125-V dc reactor building buildin9 d1str1but1on d1str1bution panel, 250-Y dc MeCs.
250-V de MCCs, refue11ng floor for both 480-V SWGRs and the Un1t 3 portion of the common refueling un1ts. Elevation 476'_6" the units. 476'-6" (zones 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.1. 11.1.1, 11.1.2), elevation 517'-6" (zones 1.1.1.2. 545'-6", 570'-0*, 1.1.1.2, 1.3.1), elevations 545'-6". 570'-0", 589'-0", and 613'-0" (zones 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4, 1.1.1.5.0 and 1.1.1.6) 1.1.I.S) II. 3-6
4
- 7. TS-I TB-I Turbine Building Eastern Zone Group Fire Area This area contains essentially the Unit 2 cabling and equipment.
Elevations 469'-6", 495'-0" (zones S.Z.l.A, 8.2.l.A, S.Z.2.A), 8.2.2.A), elevation 517'-6 517'-6"u 8.2.5.A, 8.2.5.8, (zones S.Z.S.A, 8.2.5.B, Unit 2 dlesel diesel generator (OG) room 9.O.A, 9.0.A, dirty oil tank room 8.1), elevations 534'-0", 534'-0*, 538'-0" (zones 8.2.6.B, S.2.6.A), 8.2.6.A), elevation 549 -0" (zones 8.2.7, station battery rooms 7.0.A) 549'-0" 1 7.a.A)
- 8. TS-II Turbine Building Central Zone Group Fire Area TB-II This area is common for both the unttsunits and contains the mechanical control rod drive (eRO)
(CRD) cross-tie valve and a 480-V MeC. Mee. Elevations 8.2.5.C and 8.2.6.C) 517'-6" and 534'-0* (zones S.2.s.C
- 9. TS-III Turbine Building Western Zone Group Fire Area TB-III This area contains Unit 3 cabling and equipment.
equ1pment. EleYations Elevat10ns 469'-6-, 469'-6", 8.2.2.B), elevation 502'-6" {Unit 495'-0" (zones 8.2.1.B, 8.2.2.8), (Unit 3 cable tunnel zone 8.2.4), B.Z.4}, elevation 517'-6" (8.2.5.0, 8.2.5.E, 8.2.5.E. Unit Un1t 3 06 OS room 9.0.8), elevation 534'-0" 534'-0* (zone 8.2.6.0), elevation 538 -0. (zones 8.2.6.E, DC 538'-0" 1 551'-0" (statton panel room (6.1)), elevation 551'-0* (station battery rooM 7.0.8) 7.0.B)
- 10. This area contains Units 2 and 3 control room and auxiliary auxi11ary electric equipment room. Elevations 534'-0" 534'-0* and 502'-6" 5021 (zones 2.0 and 6.2)
The licensee has provided alternate hot shutdown capability for a fire in any independent of the required hot shutdown equipment specific area listed above 1ndependent and cabling for the specific area as required by Appendix R, Section III.G.3. Additionally, the-l1censee the-licensee has identified the fire zones listed above which ( f1xed f1~ lack fire detection and/or fixed Tire sU~~~sslon sUP.I!-t::'-ss1on sntetll s~tem as require~ reouire~ I~ The licensee has requested exemptions from the III.S.3 requirements for the above zones and has provided just1fication justification based on their fire hazards analysis. analys15. submittals, the licensee listed six alternate hot shutdown paths, (four In its submittals. utilize the respective unit IC Ie and two utilize the respective unit HPCI/LPCI HPCI/lPCI ma1nta1ning hot shutdown of either system) for achieving and maintaining e1ther Unit 2 or Unit 3, depend1ng upon where a fire may occur. Two of the Ie alternate hot or both, depending shutdown paths (B1(Bl for Unit 2 shutdown for a f;re in T8*1 fire 1n TB-l area or RB2-I1 area, except for zones 1.1.2.6 and 1.1.2.5.0; Al for Unit 3 shutdown for a fire in TS-III area or RB3-11 T8-II1 RB3-II area, except for zones 1.1.1.6 and 1.I.S.D) 1.1.5.0) utilize the unit IC, Ie, the Units 2/3 swing diesel generator (OG 2/3), the other unit power manual operation of the Ie valves. The re.a1n1ng train, and local ~null reaeining two ICIe alternate hot shutdown paths (both A2 and 82 B2 for shutdown of both Units 2 and 3, respectively, respect1vely, for a fire either in TB-IlTB-II or TB-Y TB-V lrel) area) utilize the swing DG OG un1t Ie and power train, and local Nnual 2/3, the respective unit manual operation operat1on of the . Ie valves. The HPCI/LPCI alternate hot shutdown paths (C for Unit 2 shutdown for a fire 1n RB2-I arel; in RB2-1 area; 0 for Unit 3 shutdown for a fire 1n RB3-1 area) use in RB3-I the respective unit HPCI/LPCI systea, systea. power train and DG. OG. For a fire in the Unit 2/3 reactor building common refueling floor {R82-II-Zone(R82-II-Zone 1.1.2.6/RB3-II-Zone 1.1.1.6}, 1.1.1.6). or TB-IV (turbine building bu1ld1ng operating floor and vent floors), the two normal h9t shutdown paths A and B are generally used for Units 2 and 3 shutdown, respectively, since the refueling floor and T8-IV TB-IV area
\I do not contain any safe shutdown equipment or cables. These nonnal normal hot \.
11.3-7 II.3-7
5 shutdown paths utilize the swing OG 2/3 and the respective unit Ie and power train and do not require any manual operation of the Ie IC valves. These normal paths are also to be used for a fire in either zone 1.1.2.5.0 (R82-II) (RB2-II) or (RBl-II) fo~ 1.1.1.5.0 (R83-II) for the same reason mentioned above, provided the fire does not spread into another zone. In such a case, the alternate hot shutdown path B1 or At 61 Al described above is to be used. For a fire in one of the two remaIning remafning fire areas (i.e., (f.e., the RB-2/3 area which contains the Unit 2 HPCIHPeI room (zone 11.2.3), Unit 3 HPCI HPel room (zone 11.1.3), 11.1.l), and the swing OG 2/32/l room (zone 9.0.C}), 9.0.C>>, normal hot shutdown paths E and F (which involve the respective unit Ie. Ie, power train and OG and not requiring manual operation of the IC Ie valves) are to be used for Units 2 and 3 shutdown, respectively (zone 11.2.3 11.2.l - path Ei E; zone 11.1.3 - path FiF; zone 9.0.C 9.0.e - paths E and F). The required equipment equipnent and cabling for these paths are independent of the fire area RB-2/l. Also. the zones in this area are provided with wfth fire detection and suppression features. The remaining fire area (1.e (i.e ** the crib house - zone 11.3) 11.l) is discussed in Section Sectfon 2.3 of th1s SEe The staff has reviewed the above mentioned alternate hot shutdown paths for Dresden Units 2 and 3. and finds then acceptable. 2.3 Section III.S.2 III.G.2 of App!ndix R The licensee indicated that the crib cr1b house (i.e., zone 11.3) whfch which contains contafns the service water and diesel generator cooling water PUMps conpl1es conplies with the Il1.G.2 with a few exceptions dealing requirements of III.G.2 ,with barrier design and dealing.with cable separation for which the licensee has requested exemptions. The licensee provided justification justificat10n based on their fire hazards analysis. For a fire in the above area, area. either no~l normal hot shutdown paths A and B or E and F ( described above ~y occurs. may be used for Units 2 and 3, l. depending upon where the fire The licensee lfcensee also indicated that for SOleSOMe of the fire zones in RB2-II and RB3-II areas listed in Sectton Section 2.2 of this SEt some of the safe shutdown functions will be protected in accordance with the requirements of III.G.2, IIl.G.2, with a few exceptions. The licensee has requested exemptions for these exceptions. which have been evaluated separately. exceptions, 2.4 Alternate Safe Shutdown SYsteaSystea Besides the modifications identified Identified 1n in the earlier SE for achieving safe shutdown utilizing safe shutdown paths. the lfcensee licensee has identified the following new .ad1f1cltions 1Od1flcations in their recent subntttals: subMittals:
- 1. Relocation of the local control station for MCC 38-1 l8-1 main feed which powers the swing OS DG 2/3 auxiliaries froM fro. its present location in the .
turbine building .ezz.nine
..zzanine floor (zone 8.2.6.C) 8.2.6.e) to the DG 2/3 2/l rooa rooD in In the RB-2/l artl.
area. This ensures the availability of one of the two redundant sources of power to the DG 2/3 auxiliaries outside the turbine building (the control station forfo~ the other redundant source of MeC 28-1 main feed to the DG 2/3 auxiliaries auxiliar1es 15is located in the turbine building ground floor (zone 8.2.5.e>>. B.2.S.C>>. I1.3-8 11.3-8
6
- 2. ?rovision for alternate feeds to reactor pressure and level transmitters.
This is in addition to the rerouting of the pressure and level instrumenta-tion cables in the Units 2 and 3 reactor buflding building mez%~nine mezzanine floors. This ensures availability of the reactor pressure and level indicat10n indication in the control room for a fire below the reactor building mezzanine floors. In the interim (i.e., until the alternate feeds are completed during the fall 1986 and 1987 outages for Units 2 and 3. 3, respect1vely), respectively), local instrumenta-tion which is available either at the mezzanine floor or the ground floor of the reactor buildings will be used as appropriate. IlL.-a~1tion Ill--addition to the aboy e ..mod1fications..lb.e. lJc;~1!!~~_has~1tted above.JllOdif'ications.t/)~ licensee hIS cOlllllftted to provide a num~~-or-otjfer numberiOr-~er protectjQ~~~ The fire prottctiQ~t~~ The-idequacy adequacy of these modifications w1t~ regard to ensuring separation of alternate Shutdown with-regard shutdown paths piths has hiS been considered in the evaluation eVllultion of the exemption requests. The staff stiff has reviewed the interim compensatory measures (ICM) for applicable appliclble modifications referred to above and/or existing features feltures that will ensure the alternate safe shutdown capability in the interfm interim period and finds thea acceptable. Icceptable. 3.0 EVALUATION The safe shutdown systems identified 1n in the above Sections 2.2 and Ind 2.4 are expected to be used during aI severe fire event when wnen other leans of shutdown identified 1n in the plant prpcedures procedures are determined to be unavailable. The followfng following Sections (3.1.1* through 3.5) identify how the performanceperfonnance goals outlined in Section 111.L III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 are .. Mett when alternate shutdown paths described in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of this SE are utilized: Reactivity Control 3.1.1 Reactivfty Reactivfty Reactivity control is achieved by following follow1ng the procedures as stated in the ESE. 3.1.2 Reactor Coolant Inventory Reactor coolant inventory is proposed to be.controlled by following the procedures as stated 1n in the ESE except for the following:
- 1. relctor coolant Excessive loss of reactor coollnt inventory f~ the reactor relctor vessel via the main steam lines during a fire event is prevented by closing the stelm 11nes MSIYs HSIVs from the main control panel.pinel. For a fire in TB-Y area this pro~edure is followed prior to evacuation evacultion of the control rca. roa. and.
Ind. additionally. the air supply to the outboard MSIVs is cut off utilizing the afr air valves located loclted in the turbine building after evacuating eVlculting the control rooI rooa to prevent possible fire-induced spurious opening of these vllves. The above procedures will valves. w1ll be followed rather rlther than securing the HSIVs closure by deenergizing the power to the MSIVs It the applicable MSIVs Ipplicable breakers a5as stated 1n in the ESE.
- 2. For a fire in either R82-1 or RB3-I lrea. the HPCI/lPCI RB3-1 atea. HPCI/LPCI shutdown path pith is utilized to achieve hot* shutdown. The operator fro.
ut111zed f~ the control roOlroom places the HPCI into Qperat10n operation to maintain proper reactor water wlter level. The reactor coolant inventory control is accomplished by manually operating the flow-controller to regulate water supply to the reactor vessel by the HPCI pump which takes its suction from either the ( I1. 3-9 11.3-9
7 condensate storage tank (CST), (CST). or the torus after depletion of the CST supply. During this mode of operation, operation. the operator will place the HPCI
*room room cooter cooler in operation, operation. supplying it with cooling water from the service water system or the DGOG cooling water pump.
3.1.3 Reactor Coolant Pressure Control Coolant pressure control is 1s established initially by utilizing the electromatfc electromati:: relief valves. Should these be affected by a fire, fire. the "Target Rock"N valve (mechanical mode) and the mechanical safety valves on the steam Rock lines will be utilized for reactor coolant pressure control. 3.1.4 Reactor Decay Heat Removal For a fire in any plant area other than R82-1 or RB3-I, RB3-I. decay heat removal during hot shutdown is accomplished through the use of the isolation condenser (Ie), (IC). associated supporting equipment and procedures as described in the ESE. For a fire in R82-1 RB3-1 area using the HPCI/lPCI R82-I or R83-1 HPCI/LPCI hot shutdown path, path. the operator will place the RHR system in the torus cooling MOde to accomplish decay heat removal during hot shutdown. In this mode of RHR operation, operation. the operator will start two RHR pumps (Division II) III and open valves in either the torus test return line, line. or the torus spray line,line. to return water to the torus after it 1$is cooled by the conta1nment containment cooling heat exchanger. The operator will also start two containment cooling service water (CCSW) pumps (Division II) to provide cooling water flow to the tube stde side of the heat exchanger and, and. additionally, additionally. open the discharge valve for the coo11ngcooling water discharge header. The operator will throttle flow as appropriate to obtain the desired cooling and verffy verify that the RHR and CCSW room coolers are in service. ( For a fire in any plant area/zone other than RB2-I/l.3.2, RB2-I/1.3.2. RB2-II/1.l.2.3, RB2-II/1.1.2.3. RB3-II/I.3.I RB3-1I/1.3.1 and 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.3. decay heat removal during cold shutdown is accomplished by using the normal shutdown cooling system,system. reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system, system. the service water system, system. and the procedures outlined in the ESE. For a fire in the zones identified above, above. the wl11 be utilized to accomplish decay heat removal LPCI/CCSW (Division II) method will method. the vessel is filled using LPCI, during cold shutdown. In this method, LPCI. with hotwater overflowing to the torus through the relief valves. This method yields continuous cycle of water though the core, core. through the relief valves to the torus and back again after cooling via the containment cooling heat exchanger. Water to the RHR roOM cooler is provided using the unit OGls OG's cooling water pumps or service water pu~s. Water to the CCSW room cooler 1s is provided from the CCSW pump discharge and routed through the cooler to the pump suction. 3.1.5 Process Monitoring Direct indication of process variables (such as reactor vessel water level, level. reactor coolant systeM pressure and condensate storage tank water level) are provided both locally and at the control room. Also. indication of Ie IC water level for the IC hot shutdown paths, paths. and suppression pool water level for the HPCI/lPCI HPCI/LPCI hot shutdown paths, paths. are available both locally and at the control room. Suppression pool temperature indication for the HPCI/LPCI roOm. HPCI/LPCl shutdown path Diagnostic monitoring includes local and is provided in the control room. DiagnostiC control room indications for service water system pressure and condensate C.( transfer pump di scharge pressure for the Ie discharge IC path and HPCI and RHR pumps II.3-10 II. 3-1 0
8 discharge pressure for the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path. Diagnostic monitoring available for cold shutdown systems include indications of system pressures for the RBCWS, normal nonnal shutdown cooling cool ing system and the CCWS. 3.1.6 Support Functions In addition to the systems needed to support the Ie IC hot shutdown paths and the shutdown path identified in the ESE, the nonnal shutdown cooling system cold Shutdown normal HPCI, RHR and CCSW room coolers are also available to provide necessary support for the alternate shutdown systems. The control and monitoring capability for these systems are provided locally and at the control room. 3.2 72-Hour Requirement The lfcensee licensee has reaffirmed that Dresden Units 2 and 3 have the capability to achieve cold shutdown within 72 hours after a ffre fire event 1n in any plant area, offsite power. even assuming a loss of offs1te 3.3 Repairs Besides the single cold shutdown repair identified in the ESE, the licensee has identified additional repairs 1n in their recent submittals. These are d1scussed discussed below: be 1ow:
- 1. IC hot shutdown paths A2 and 82 Ie B2 which are utilfzed utilized for achieving hot shutdown of Units 2 and 3 for a fire in T8-I1TB-II area or TB-V area requires two condensate transfer pumps for the units (located in TB-I/S.2.S.A TB-I/S.2.5.A and TB-III/S.2.5.E) to be placed under local control. Th1s T8-1Il/8.2.5.E) This in turn.
turn, requires ( electrical isolation of these pumps. The licensee proposes to aChieveachieve isolation by pulling out one fuse per pump at the applicable MeC on the floor above the pumps. The licensee. further fUrther states that the pumps are not needed to provide makeup water to the Its Ies until at least 20 minutes after the scram and initiation of the Ies, ICs, and that th1s this provides ample time to remove the fuses. The staff concludes that the licensee's from the III.G.l exemption request froa III.G.1 requirement for the above hot shutdown since it involves only pulling out two fuses and repairs is acceptable Since there is reasonable assurance that this can be done in a timely manner.
- 2. Until alternate power feeds to the normallj normally open Units 2 and 3 IC inboard valves are fn in place (previously committed to be completed by Fall 1985 19S5 and 1986 Units 3 and 2Z outages), possible spurious closures of these f~ a fire in either zone 1.1.2.2 (R82-II) valves resulting fran (RB2-II) or zone 1.1.1.2 (RB3-II) wtl1 wl1l be mitigated by reopening these vllve$
valves by lifting the leads and installing a jumper for each applicable valve. The staff concludes that this hot shutdown repair. repair, which is an interim compensatory cOII1pensatory measure. measure, is acceptable.
- 3. The licensee has identified the need for possible repairs in seven circuits for achieving hot shutdown, as a result of electrical isolation circu1ts deficiency in these circu1ts.
circuits. The staff has evaluated these repairs in Subsection 3.4.4 of this SEe SE. 11.3-11 II.3-11
9 3.4 Associated Circuits t1rcuits and Isolation As part of their reverification effort, the licensee has also examined the associated circuits concerns, such as common power source including the elimination of high impedance faults, common enclosure. enclosure, fire-induced spurious operations including possible high/low pressure interfaces, and electrical isolation deficiency. The l1censee licensee has addressed all these concerns in their recent submittals as discussed below. 3.4.1 Common Power Source Instrumentation and power circuits sharing a common power source are protected with coordinated fault protection for safe shutdown equipment by breakers, fuses, or other isolation devices with spec1al special fus1ng arrangeMents (for further fusing arrangements devices, see Section 3.4.4 below). The licensee has discussion of isolation devices. . also considered fire-induced high impedance fault(s) fault(s} (i.e ** faults 1n (i.e., in circuit(s) supplying power to non-safe shutdown loads froM c1rcuit(s) froa a cOIMOn cOllOn power . source) which may cOlP~ise ca.promise the power supply to safe shutdown loads lOlds froM from the same power source. Regarding the above, the licensee states that thlt the s.fe slfe shutdown procedures require the operator to manually trip all the non-safe shutdown loads supplied by a canlOn conlOn bus. Additionally, for a fire in one of two specific plant pllnt areas, these procedures require the .. nUll action of pulling manual the 125-V dc control power fuses. The above acttonIction will. will, however, be required only for electrically operated breakers associated aSSOCiated with non-safe shutdown lOlds supplied by the essential 480-Y 480-V or 4kv switchgear COMmOn CORnen buses. The licensee identifiable, readily further states that the needed equipment will be easily identiffable, accessible, and under periodic surveillance. Based on the above, the staff accessible. concludes that contingent upon verification by the NRC inspection team the licenseels licensee's ab;lity ability to complete the needed manual operatfons operations in a timely tilely manner, the procedures for handling fire-induced high i_pedance faults are acceptable. The staff further concludes that the licensee's request for exemption from III.G.l requirements, which will be needed for performing the above mentioned hot shutdown repair, repair. be granted. 3.4.2 Common Enclosure Regarding common enclosures, the licensee states that Dresden uses alternate shutdown paths independent of the fire area of concern instead of redundant shutdown paths within a fire area. Additionally. Additionally, associated circuits cirCUits that share a common enclosure with those required for safe shutdown are provided with isolation devices. The staff finds the above acceptable. 3.4.3. Spurious Operations SOle are.s can tmpair Fire in sa.. impair safe shutdown due to fire-induced spurious operations of safe operattons and its support equ1pt11!nt, equipment, and the* servtce
.s Therefore, isolated local control slfe shutdown equipment. Therefore.
equipment such as Ie stations for safe shutdown equ1p1ent IC valves, thl service water pUIIPS the shared swing OG puMPS Mve have been or w11 DG 2/3 will1 be te~. Loss of reactor coolant (RC) inventory resulting provided in the near terM. from fire induced spuriOUS opening of the .otor_tor operated HPCI steaa ste.. supply valves (when the HPCI is not supp1ying supplying reactor vessel makeup). makeup), and the spurious operation of the RWCU valves, is prevented by tripping the applicable breakers (for the RWCU. RWCU, the aSSOCiated breaker for a normally no~lly open motor operated upstream RWCU valve) at the 250 VDC Met MCC 2A or 3A located at Unit 2 or .(- 11.3-12 I I.3-12
10 3 reactor buildihgs buildings (El. 570'.0"), 570'-0"l. or by tripping the feed to the MCC MeC at the voe Met 1n 250 VDC buflding. The above procedure will in the turbfne building. w111 close the HPCI steam supply valve and isolate fsolate the RWCU system. The "Target Rock-Rock" valves, valves. or electromat1c e1ectromatic relief valves. and the MSlVs MSIVs can spuriously operate only due to a fire in the TB-V area. These valves are closed from the main control panel within a minute after initiation of a manual scram for a fire in any plant area. The "Target Rock- Rock" or electromat1c electromatic relief valves, valves. in particular, particular. are closed from the main control panel by by turning the newly installed "inhibit*
"inhibit" switch to the "inhibit- "inhibit" position (in this position. the inhibit* switch disables the "low glow reactor water level level"N and the "high drywell drywe11 pressure-pressure" inputs to auto blowdown) and the NManual-off-Auto N switch to -OFF" previously-existing key-operated "Manual-off-Auto" "OFF" poSition.
For a fire in TB-Y TB-V area, area. the operators wtll will additionally cut off the air supply to the outboard MSIYs MSIVs utilizing atr air valves located in the turbine building and remove the 125 YDC VDC power from the "Target Rock" or electromattc NTarget RockN e1ectronatfc relief valves at the turbine buildtng buildtni MeCs after evacuating the control room. ReMOving power fro. the -Target "Target Rock- Rock valve will not disable 1ts its mechanical' mechanical* operatfon mode. which 15 operation fs required for reactor coolant pressure control 1n in the electromatic relief valves are d1sabled event the electronatic disabled by Ia fire. The above-described procedure wtllw111 prevent loss of RC inventory via MSIYs MSIVs in steam-ste~* lines lfnes and venting to the suppresston suppressfon pool via autonat1c autOftltic operation of the "Target Rock-
-Target Rock" or electroMltic electroaatic relief valves, valves. and also prevent spurious operation of the valves. -.
operat1on Spurious opening openfng of the solenoid solenofd operated reactor head vent valves resulting in RC inventory loss wtll w111 be prevented by a pre-fire pre-f1re actton, action; 1.e ** ensuring ensurfng closures by renovfng reDDvfng power frolft from these valves. Ste.. venting of the 1111n .,'n steall stea. lines via spurious operation of the air operated IC Ie valves 1s is prevented by manually clos1ng closing the applicable applfcable upstreaM valve. To prevent fire-tnduced fire-induced spurious closure of the motor IOtor operated IC Ie valves that are Ire requtred required to be open during Ie IC operation, operation. power to these valves is fire ffre reaoved reMOVed by tripping the applicable breakers located at the 250 VOC VDC Mee MeC 2A or 28,28. or by tripping the feed to the applicable MCCMeC at the 250 VDC MeC 1n in the turbfne turb1ne building. These valves may be subsequently opened .anually. Mlnually. The spurious closure of the control rod drive (eRD) (CRD) valves in the cooling water line wtll wfll not disrupt dfsrupt the supply of makeup water to thl the reactor vessel during durfng Ie operation. This Thfs is because flow will be available through the charging chargfng water line and the scraM inject10n injection valves. and .150 also by ensuring that thlt the scrIM signal s1gnal is not reset. Regarding htgh/low pressure interfaces, interfaces. the 11censee licensee stated that their reverification reverificatton analyses analysts did not indicate indtcate existence of any such interface utilizing utflizing only .ator operated valves for isolat1on. fsolation. Further, Further. as dtscussed discussed in the ESE. the staff hiShas concluded that the shutdown cooling sYStei systeM does not contain a h19h!~ow high/low pressure interface with the reactor coolant systeM. systea
- reviewed the above mentioned procedures for handling
. The staff has reYiewed fire-induced spurious oplrat1o~s operations _nd and concludes that they are acceptable *
. " .,.?
.. -- ,~.
3.4.4 Electrical Isolation DeficiencY Deficiency Regardfng electrical isolation deficiency deffciency (i.e ** a fault on a remote circuit blowing a fuse needed for 10CIl local control prior to isolation. isolatfon. and consequently impatring impairing the capability for local control of the needed safe shutdown equipment), equipment). the licensee lfcensee 1dentifted identified a total of 19 safe shutdown circuits as 11.3-13
11 sin9l~' sin91~' fused. Tbe licensee stated that 12 of these are 4 kv switchgears which are equipped with local mechanical "trip" and "close" *close" buttons that are good for one close and one trip operation without the benefit of electrical control. Additionally, two lnvolve involve 480-V sw1tchgears switchgears which can be jacked closed following a fire event. The remaining five Circuits circuits involve local controls for the in-board IC valves (4 of them) and engine starting controls at the 2/3 OG (1 of them). They may need fuse replacement due to a fire event. However, a maximum of four circuits may need fuse replacement due to a single slngle fire. A concern was a fire 1n in the OG 2/3 room may affect the local controls for IC valves located 1n in that room. For a fire ln oG 2/3 room, in the OG the licensee proposes to replace a fuse at each of the lsolation isolation switches in the Unit 2 shutdown cooling pump room (zone 1.3.2) and the Unft 3 TIP room lfcensee has committed (zone 1.4.1). The licensee commftted to maintain the replacement fuses and the fuse pullers under surveillance in the prox1mity proximity of the zones 1.3.2 and 1.4.1 and DG oG 2/3 start1ng starting controls to facilitate fuse replacement(s) 1n in a timely manner. The l1censee licensee further states that all these areas where the replacement fuses w1ll will be stored wilt will be readily accessible and that sufficient tfme time wl1l
'001111 be available for replacfng these fuses.
The staff concludes that the above procedures are acceptable contingent upon veriffcation by the NRC 1nspect10n verification inspection tea. that access to the needed areas are not compromised compromfsed by the ffre event and that the lfcensee licensee has the abflity ability to complete theserepaf theserepafrs rs w1t~1n the -tlme time periods perfods identified identffied for thell. The staff further conclUdes concludes that the 1fcensee's exa.ption f~ III.G.l, licensee's request for eXelPtfon III.G.1. which whfch will wfll be needed for perfo~lng performing the hot shutdown repair, repair. be granted. 3.5 Safe Shutdown Procedures and Manpower In recent submfttals. submittals. the 11censee licensee states that safe shutdown procedures have been developed to incorporate the above-descrfbed alternate shutdown paths, -( fncludfng procedures for handlfng includfng handling possible possfble fire-induced ffre-fnduced spurious spurfous operatfon operation of equipment needed for accomplishing accomplfshing safe shutdown. The lfcensee licensee further states that these procedures will provideprovfde reasonable assurance that the necessary shutdown functions can be perfonned at all times by available manpower. Since utilization of alternate shutdown capability may require a nuMber of manual actions 1nin some cases, final approval 1s is contfngent contingent upon verificatfon verification by an NRC 1nspection inspection team walkthrough of the requfredrequired procedures and verification that the necessary actions can be completed withfn within the specified times for assuring safe shutdown.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The safe shutdown systelS identified in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of this SE are expected to be available during a severe fire event when other ~ans of shutdown identified in the plant procedures are determined to be unavailable. The staff has reviewed the licensee's currently proposed revisfon revision to their originally subMitted and approved alternate shutdown capability for Dresden Units 2 and 3 in accordance with Unfts wfth Appendix Appendfx R criteria. As stated in Section 1.0. this revision 1.0, revfsfon has been necessitated necessftated due to the license's reverification of their fire protection program at Dresden Units 2 and 3. This included consfderation of zonal interaction,
- 1) consideration interaction. high hfgh fmpedance faults and electrical electrfcal isolation deficiency; 2} proposed new modffications modifications and hot shutdown repairs capability; and 3) to ensure alternate shutdown capabilfty; interim compensatory 3} proposed 1nterim c_
11.3-14 II.3-14
12 measures for applicable modifications and/or discussion of existing design features that will ensure alternate shutdown capability capabillty in the interim period. The staff concludes that the performance goals for accomplishing safe shutdown in the event of a fire (i.e., reactivity control, inventory control, decay heat removal, pressure control, process monitoring, support functions and handling associated circuit concerns) are met by the proposed alternate Shutdown methods. As noted above, evaluation of licensee's request for exemptions from applicable III.G.2 and III.G.3 requirements 1sis provided separately. separate ly. Based on the above, the staff concludes that the licensee's currently proposed revision to the alternate shutdown capability capabll fty at Dresden Units 2 and 3 satisfies the requirements of Appendix R, Section III.G.3 and III.l. contignent cont1gnent upon verification by the NRC inspection team of the licensee's capability to complete needed manual operatfons operations and hot shutdown repairs 1n in a timely manner (3.4.1, 3.4.4 and 3.5). Principal Contributor: T. Chandra Princfpal Dated: July 17, 1987 ( ( 11.3-15
4 c UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 September 10. 10, 1987 Docket Nos. 50-249 and 50-237 Mr. l. L. O. D. Butterfield, Jr. Nuclear licensing Licensing Manager COlmlonwealth COlllllonwea 1til Edison Ed i son Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, Illino;s Illinois 60690
Dear O~dr Mr. Butterfield:
SUBJECT:
DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION FOR APPENDIX R TECHNICAL EXEMPTION Re: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 By letter dated August 18, 1984 as supplemented September 18, 1985, March 12, MdrchMarch 20 ana May 30. 30, 1986 and April 14, 1987, you requested exemption from Section III G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. Enclosed is our c EvaluatioTI for the Appendix R Technical Exemption for your Draft Sdfety EvaluatioT. information. intormation. The Final Saf~ty Evaluation and the Exemption will follow. Daniel R. Muller, Director Project Directorate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and SpeCial Projects cc: J. Holmes D. Notley
Contact:
Contdct: M. Grotenhu;s, Grotenhuis, NRRjDRSP NRR/DRSP 49-27358 49-2735A .( II. I I. 4-1 4- J
r" .t':, . '"., .~ ( UNITED STATES lMJU' , NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. D. C. 20555 SAFETY EV~LUATrON EV.~LUATlON BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATIVE TO APPENDIX R EXEMPTIONS REQUESTED FOR DRESDEN UNITS 2 AND 3 DOCKET NOS. 50-237 AND 50-249 1.0 INTROUUCTION By letters dated August 10, 1984 as supplemented September 18, 1985.1985, March 12 dnd March 20, 1986, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo, the Licensee) requested exemptions from Section 1Il.G III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. By letter dated 1985, the Licensee submitted additional fire protection exemption October 16, 1985. requests that were paginated paginatea as an extension of the Licensee's September 18, 1985 submittal. By letter dated May 30, 1986, the Licensee further revised the exemption request submittals based on a meeting held at the NRC on April 8, 1986. This evaluation ;s is based on the information provided in the above submittals, as well as information/clarification made available during the site visits on August 29, 1986 and April 6 and 7, 1987 and by letter dated April 14, 1987. This evaluation is based in part on the attached Technical Evaluation Report (TER) written by the NRR contractor. contractor, Franklin Research Center (FRC). This TER has been reviewed by the staff and it is in agreement with the conclusions reached in the FRC TER. Section IIl.G.1 Appenalx R requires fire protection features to be provided Ill.G.l of Appendlx for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown and capable of limiting fire damage so that:
- a. One train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) is free of fire damage; and
- b. Systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) can be repaired within 72 hours.
Section lII.G.2 111.G.2 of Appendix R requires that one train of cables and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown be maintained free of fire aamage bY.:Qge by ~e of the fo 11 ow; ng means: owi n9
- a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural redundant traifl~
formin9 a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be steel forming protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required of the barrier. II. I I. 4-2
(
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- I'Illr.: 'a~ !," ;~
2
- b. Separation of cdbles cables and equipment
~quipment and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no r~dundant intervening combustibles or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
- c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a I-hour rating. In addition. addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed 10 1n the fire area.
If the above conditions are not met. met, Section 111.G.3 III.G.3 requires that there be an alternative shutdown capability independent of the fire area of concern. It dlso d I SCI requires requ ires that t.ha t a fixea fix~d suppression suppress i on and fire fi re detection system sys tem be installed ins ta II ed in the fire area of concern if it contains a large concentration of cable or other combustibles. These alternative requirements are not deemed de~med to be equivalent. equivalent; however, they provide equivalent protection for those configurations in which they are accepted. Becaus~ it is not possible to predict pr~dict the specific conditions under which fires may occur and ana propagate. propagate, the design basis protective features rather des1gn basis fire are specified in the rule. Plant-specific features than the design may requi re protection different from the measures specified in Section require III.G. In such a case, the licenseeLicensee must demonstrate, by means of a detailed fire hazards analysis that existing existin9 protection or existing existin9 protection in con- -( junction with proposed modifications will provide a level of safety equivalent to the requirements of Section 111.G th~ technical r~quirements III.G of Append1x R. In summary. summary, Section III.G is related to fire protection features for ensuring that systems and associated circuits used to achieve and maintain safe shut-down are free of fire damage. Either fire prutection protection configurations must meet the specific requirements of Section III.G or an alternative fire protection configuration must be justified by a fire hazards hazardS analysiS. analysis. Generally. Generally, the staff will accept an alterndtive alternative fire protection configuration if; if: o The alternative ensures that 'one train of equipment necessary to achieve hot shutdown from either the control room or emergency control stations is free of fire damage. o The alternative ensures that fire damage to at least one train of
-The alternativ~
equipment eqUipment necessary to achieve cola colo shutdown is limited so that it can be repaired within a reasonable time (minor repairs using components stored on the site). o Fire-retardant coatings are not used as fire barriers. o MOdifications required to meet Section III.G would not enhance fire protection safety levels above that provided by either existing or proposed alternatives. o Modifications required to meet Section IIl.G III.G would be detrimental to cverall facility facl1ity safety. II. 4-3 11.4-3
( 3 t I'. t '. 2.0 HOeSE tUPPE.R CRIB HOLSE \UPPtR AND LOWER LEVELS), FIRE AREA 11.3 2.1 Z. I Exemptions Exempt ions Requested Reques ted EX~fIlvtions Exelll~tions were requeHed reque~ted from Section III.G.2 of Appendix R to the extent tllot tI,,,t it requires separation of cables, equipment, and associated nonsafety circuits or redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards. 2.2 Discussion 2.2.1 Upper Crib House The upper crib house is located on elevation 509 feet, 6 inches and 517 feet, 6 inches of the crib house, which is physically separated from the main plant buildings. This zone is separated from the lower crib house by a reinforced concrete floor slab penetrated by unenclosed stair openings, pipe penetrations and floor drains. The zone contains five service water pumps and associated cabling, the diesel fire pump and associated equipment, and six Circulating circulating water rumps. pumps. Saf~ shutdown equipment include the fiv~ fivE' service water pumps (two Unit L '- pumps, two Unit 3 pumps, and a Unit 2/Unit 3 "swing!!
"swing" pump). Both units can be brought to hot shutdown using anyone of the five pumps, but trJO t>lO pumps are needed for cold shutdown. The pumps discharge to a common header; therefore.
therefore, all are available for either unit. Adjacent pumps are separated by approximately 28 feet, with intervening combustibles consisting of lubricating ( 'oil
*oil in pump motors and water pumps and short lengths service len9ths of cabling between the servic~ water pumps and the lower crib house (routed through the Wall wall less than Ie feet south of the pumps).
lhe Ihe combustible loading in the zone is 13.800 13,800 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent severity of 10 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-tEmperdture curve. It consists primarily of lubricating oil in the six circulating water pump motors and the five service water pumps, diesel fue1 fuel oil in the fire pum~ ana ano day tank, and a short length of cabling associated with each pump. The oiese1 Th~ oiesel fitefi,'e pump and day tank are provided with a local automatic deluge
>ystem. Curbs are proposed on this level along east-west and north-south ~ystem.
centerlines and around the diesel fire pump day tank to prevent the spread of 01 I to redundant pumps. 011 The Licensee has committed to install an auto~atic sprinkler system to cover the entire upper crib house.
~prinkler 2.2.2 Lower Crib House The lower crib house is located on elevation 490 feet of the crib house.
Separation from the upper crib house is de5cribed described above. The zone contains the di~sel cool i ng water pumps {o~e d i "se 1 generator cooling (aile for each unit, uni t, and a "swing" "swi ng" pump able to serve either unit and associated cabling, and cabling for the service water pumps. pumps, dl1 dll of which are safe shutdown-related. Cables are routed in trays alony along the four exterior walls of this level and in conduit and trays from the north wall to the south wall at the east-west centerline. An automatic transfer switch installed in this zone s~lects selects the appropriate power feed for the diesel generator 2/3 ("swing") cooling water pump.' pump.* II. 4-4
~
Ji{iir I ( J,{f{r 4 Only one of the three diesel generator cooling water pumps is required for hot shutdown of both u~its. urits. These pumps are separated from each other by a minimum of 35 feet, with intervening combustibles consi~ting consisting of cable trays between the pumps, and lubricating oil in pump sumps. The combustible loading in this zone, consisting
;n cvnsisting primarily of the previously described lubricating oil in the six circulating water pumps and electrical cabling is 11,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent severity of 8 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. The licensee committed to install a curb druund aruund the diesel generator 2/3 cooling water pump to prevent any oil spills from spreading to other equipment.
The Licensee has co~ittedcor.vnitted to install automatic sprinkler systems along the north-south centerline centerl ine of this level to prevent the spread of fire fron! fronl one side to the other and to separate thp the cables from each unit at OPPOSite opposite ends oi the building alony the south wall. A deluge system, actuated by a linear 01' heat detection system (cdble), has been installed to protect cable trays along the north, edst, and west walls. The Licensee has committed to install a heat detector-actuated automatic deluge system over the diesel generator 2/3 cooling water pump to prevent the spread of fire to other equipment. The Licensee has committed to enclose cable conduits between Units 2 and 3 cable trays to the diesel generator 2/3 cooling wdter water pump automatic transfer switch, and from the switch to the pump in a I-hour l-hour rated fire barrier, and to install da complete ceiling level early warning fire detection cietection system
- c."C throughout this zone.
2.3 Evaluation The fire protection in these zones does not comply with the technical reouirements reauirements of Section III.G.2 of Appendix R because intervening combustibles f,,-e hazards or flre f,azards are present between the re:dundant redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment. There was a concern that the intervening combustibles and fire hazards may create a path for the spread Of o. fire between redundant safe shutdown systems and result in a loss lo~s of a safety shutdown capability. However, because of the 1light i ght fuel fue 1 load in these ZOlles, a fire fi re of significant s i gni fi cant magnitude magni tude or duration durat i on to cause a loss of safety shu~down shutdown capability is not expected to occur. In the upper trib house, intervening combustibles do not provide a path for the spread of fire between redundant safe shutdown systems because the combustib"les (cables and lubricating oil) are present only in small quantities combustibles and are not continuous between redundant systems. In the lOlo,er lo ... er crib house, intervening combustibles in the t.he form of cables do provide a path between redundant redulldant dlesel diesel generator cooling water pumps, but cable quantities are small, path distances between redundant pumps dre are approximat.ely 50 to 60 feet. dpproximately feet, and the licensee Licensee has committed to t.o install fire detectors and automatic sprinklers to cover these cables. Cables for redundant service water pumps of each unit are routed in cable trays around the perimeter of this zone; however, cables for Unit 2 pumps are routed in cable trays on the opposite side of the zone from cable trays for the Unit 3 pumps such that the path distance between cables of different units is ( approximatel) 150 feet. Cable quantities are small. The Licensee has committed to install fire detectors throuahout this level and to instoll install sprinklers to ~rotect these cable trdys. trdYs *.- II. I1. 4-5
5 DRAFI DRAFT If a fire occurs, it should not spread from the place or orlgln origin or endanger redundant pumps in the upper or lower crib house because the proposed curbs should contain lubricating oil spills, sprlnkler sprInkler systems installed Installed above cable trays and in other areas should extinguish or control fires to prevent their spreaa VlavIa intervening Intervening combustibles, and the detection systems or water flow alarms should alert the p1ant ala~s plant fire brigade to respond to the fire. Upon arrival, the firetire brigade should extinguish thE:' the fire if the sprinkler systems have not. Therefore, there is reasunable dssurance that a fire in these zones will not result in the loss of safe shutdown capability. The stoff also finds that separating cab1es cables and equipment of redundant trains by a horizontdl horiZontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening Intervening combustibles or fire hazardShazards in the upper ilndand lower crib house wou1d would not Significantly significantly increase the level of fire protection in these two zones. 2.4 Conclusion Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire protectl0n protection features combined with the proposed mOdifications provide an acceptdble level of protection. Therefore. the exemption exemptiun should be granted. 3.0 0a FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.2, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUll8ING, BUILLlNG, ELEVATION 517 FEET, 6 lNCHES 1NCHES 0a FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.3, lJNlT liN iT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION 545 FEET. FEET, 6 INCHeS INCHES ( 0a FIRE ZONE 1. 1. lot-, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION 517 FEET. 1.1.1.2, FEET, INCHES 6 INCHE::i uu FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.3, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILD1NG. BUILDING, ElEVATION ELEVATION 545 FEET, 6 INCHES 3.1 Exem~tions Reguested Exemptions were requested from Section 111. G. 2.b of Apperldix IlI.G.2.b Apper,dix R to the extent that it requires separation of cables, equipment, and associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no interv~nin9 intervening combustibles or fire hazards and automatic fire suppression systems. 3.< 3.~ Discussion 3.2.1 Fire Zone 1.1.2.2. 1.1.2.2, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 517 Feet, 6 Inches Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 surrounds three~quarters three-quarters of the inerted drywell (Fire Zone 1.2.2) and is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 on the west, Fire Zone 1.3.2 and the turbine building on the thE north, and Fire Zone 9.0.C on the south. The zone ;s is separated from adjacent zones by reinforced concrete barriers with fire rated doors and penetration seals Seals with the following exceptions: The south and east exterior walls are nonrated reinforced concrete; th~ floor has nonrated mechanical penetrations to the reactrr react0r ( bunding, building, elevation 476 feet, 6 inches Inches (Flre-(FIre Zone 1.1.2.1); and the ceilinc
,,__ hass opEn ha open hahatches, tches, stastairways, i rways, anQand mecha mechanical penetrations ni Cd 1 penetra thp reactor t ions to thf' I I. 4~6
- 11. 4- 6
( 6 D OA~ .~ D M~'~
°I\.I'"
building, el~vation ~45 545 feet, 6 inches (Fire Zone 1.1.2.3). Electrical p~netrdtions .. ith noncombustible materials. Fire are sealed .,;ith Zone 1.1.2.5.C. 1.1.2.0.C, sepdrated by a 3-hour directly above, is sepdrrJted 3-tlOur fire rated concrete floor-ceiling assembly. Reaundant reactor pressure and reactor Redundant r~actor water level local instrumentation, instrumentdtion, adjacent to the east and west sides of the inerted drywell are located in this fire zone. The separation distance between the redundant instrumentation racks and associated cabling is at least 100 feet (around the drywell wall), b~t intervening combustibles are present in the form of cables in trays. Fire stop~ have been installed 1n these cable trays. loading is The combustible lOading 21,000 Btu per square foot. approximately 21.000 foot, which produces an equivalent severity of 16 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temp~rature curve. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are ar~ available. 3.2.2 FirE Zone 1.1.2.3, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 545 Feet, 6 Inches Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 surrounds the 1nerted lnerted drywell (,ire (rire Zone 1.2.2) and the isolation condenser PiPE chdse (Fire Zone 1.1.2.S.C). cond~nser piPE 1.1.2.5.C). It is abov~ above Fir~ Zone 1.1.2.2 and below Fire Zone 1.1.2.4. It is adjacent to the turbine building buildinp (Fire Zone 1.1.1.3) on the west on the north side and Unit 3 reactor buildin9 side. sidE'. This zone is separated from adjacent zones by 3-hour rated rat~d barriers with the ( following exceptions: The south and east exterior building walls are nonrated fo11owing reinforced concrete; and the floor has unsealed hatches, stairwells.stairwells, and mechanical penetrations to reactor building, elevation 517 feet, 6 inches and the HVAC duct/pipe penetration to Fire Zone 1.3.2 does not contdin contain a rated ElEctrical penetrations are sealed with a damper or fire seal. Electrical ncn-combustible nen-combustible material. consists of redundar't Hot shutduwn equipment in this zone consis.t$ redundant instrument racks
~epdrated separated from each other b) at least a 75-foot horizontal distance wlth w1th cab1es cables as the principal ir,tervening combust;ble~.
combustibles. loading, c~nsisting ThE combustible loading. ccnsisting primarily of cable insulation and switchgear, is approximately 17.00017,000 Btu per square foot. foot, which produces an equivalent severity of 13 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time~temperature time-temperature curve. The licensee Licensee has installed fire stops in the cable trays and installed a fire detection system throughout the zone. 1.1.1.2, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Elevation 517 Feet 3.2.3 Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. 6 Inches 1.1:1.2 surrounds three~qu'arters
. Fire Zone 1.1':1.2 three-quarters of the inerted drywell drywelJ (Fire Zont:
Zone 1.2.2) and is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.3.1, Fire Zone 1.4.1, the turb;n~ turbine building on the north, Fire Zone 9.0.C on the South, and Unit 2 Fire Zone 1.1.7.2 on the east. 1.1.?2 ea~t. Units 2 and 3 are of the same design; therefore, the description of Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 described ;nin Section 3.2.1 also applie~ appliES to Fire ZonE' Zone 1.1.1.2. The I. , combustible load is approximately approximat~ly 23,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent s~verity severity of 17 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. II. I I. 4-7
( 7 HRAFT URAFT In addition. all redundant diesel generator 2/3 and auxiliary controls, power, and excitation cables cable~ are routed through this zone to the diesel generator 2/3 room. The Licensee has installed a fir~ fire detection aetection system throughout the zone, sealed all penetrations in the non-exterior walls of this zone to a 3-hour fire rating, rerouted and install an approved I-hour fire wrap for the power' power* dnd control cables for the 2/3 diesel aiesel generator and bus duct feeding Unit 2, and provided an alternate power feed to the inboard isolation condenser valves independent of this zone. 3.2.4 Fire Zone 1.1.1.3. 1.1.1.3, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Elevation 545 Feet, 6 Inches therefore, the description of Fire Zone Units 2 and 3 are of the same design; therefore. 1.1.2.3 in Section 3.2.2 also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.3. The combustible load is approximately 16,500 Btu per square foot. In addition, the Llcensee has wrapped the Unit 2 power and control cables for the 2/3 diesel generator with an approved I-hour fire rated wrap. [valuation 3.3 Evaluation The fire protection in these zones does not comply with the technical require-ments of Section IIl.G.2 of Appendix R because intervening combustibles or fire hazards are present between the redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment although this equipment is separated by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet and because automatic fire 5uppression suppression systems ar~ are not provided throughout the zones. There was dd toncern that. that the intervening combustibles and fire hazards may create a path for the spread of fire between redundant safe Shutdown shutdown systems and that the lack of fire suppression systems may permit the fire to continue ana result in a loss of safe shutdown capability. However, becaus~ because of the light to moderate fuel 10dd,load, it is not expected that a fire of significant duration or magnitude would occur. Intervening combustibles in Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.2, and 1.1.1.3 provide da path for the spread of fire bptween between redundant safe shutdown systems in the form of cables in trays. However, cable quantities along these paths are small, path distdnces distances are at feet, and the licensee least 75 feet. Licensee has committed to install fire de-tection dE>tection sy~te!l~s syHen,s in these zones. Also, the Licensee has committed to install fire stops in cable trays in Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.2.3 and 1.1.1.3 which cross from side of the Reactor Building Bui Iding to the other. Licensee has COlllTlitted In addition, the licensee committed to reroute and protect in a I-hour fire rated wrap the Unit 2 power and control cables for the 2/3 diesel generator and auxiliaries where they are routed through Unit 3. This wi1l will eliminate th~ the cabling from becoming a potential fire path in Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. The 2/3 diesel generator bus duct in Fire Zone 1.1.1.2, 1~1.1.2, feeding Unit 2, will be simi
- 2. lCirly protected. Should a fire start, it should not spread to Similarly sys teli,S because the detection endanger redundant systelils detect i on systems sys tems will wi 11 alert the plant fire brigade to respond to the fire prior to extensiveextenslve spread. Upon arrival, the tire brigad£ briga~E will extin9uish extinguish the fire. The staff also finds that separating cables ana eqlAlpr,lent equlpfilent of redundant trains by a horizontal distanc:
distance of more than 20 tee: ree: with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards in Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.2, and 1.1.1.3 would not significantly incredse the level of fire protection in these four zones. I I. 4-8 II.4-8
( 8 3.4 Conclusion Ba~ed on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire protection featurE:s combined with the available separation distances dista"ces and light combustible loading in the dbove-described zones provide ar. acceptable level conlbustible of protection. Therefore, the exemptions should be granted. 4.0 (Ju FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.1, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, EL El 476 FEET, 6 INCHES o FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.2, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, EL 517 FEET, 6 INCHES c, FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.3, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, El 545 FEET, FEET. 6 INCHES (; FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.4, U~IT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, EL 1.1.2.4. UNIT El 570 FEET, FEET. 0 INCHES o () FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.5.0, 1.1.2.5.0. UNIT 2 REACTOP BUILOING,BUILDING. NORTH. El 589 FEET, FEET. e INCH o FIRE ZONE 11.2.1, 11.2.1. U~!T ~ REACTOR BUILDING. SOUTHWEST CORNER ROOM, ROOM. EL 476 FEET, FEET. 6 INCHES o FrqE FI~E ZON~ 11.2 2, uprT U~TT 2 REACTOR BUILOING, BUILDING. SOUTHEAST CORNER ROO~, EL El 476 FEET, 66 INCHES ( .. FIRE ZONE 1.3.2, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, ROOM, FEET. 6 INCHES ROOM. El 517 FEET, BUILDING. SHUTDOWN COOLING PUMP o FIRE ZONE 1.1.£:.5.8, l.l.<.5.B, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING. ISOLATION CONDENSER PIPE CHASE. EL El 570 FEET, 0 INCH ()(, FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.5.C, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, BUilDING, ISOLATION CONDENSER CO~DENSER PIPE CHASE. ELEl 545 FEET, FEET. 6.INCHES o FIRE F IRE ZONE 1.1.2.5.A. 1.1. 2.5. A, UNIT UN IT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, BUI lD ING. REACTOR FLOOR SOUTf-i, SOUTfi, EL El 589 FEET. FEET, 0 INCH o FIRE AREA 1.4.1, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING. TIP ROOM o FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.S.C, 1.1.1.5.C, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING.BUILDING, ISOLA110N ISOLATION CONDENSER PIPE CHASE, EL 545 FEET, 6 INCHES o FIRE FI RE ZONE 1.1.1.S.B, 1.1.1. 5. B. UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, BUILD lNG, ISOLATION CONDENSER PIPE CHASE, CHASE. EL El 570 FEET. FEET, 0 INCH o l.l.I.S.A, UNIT ~3 REACTOR BUILDING, SOUTH, EL 589 FEET, FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.5.A, FEET. o INCH ()0 FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.1. FIkE 1.1.1.1, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, EL El 476 FEET, 6 INCHES o0 FIRE. ZO~[ :'1.1.2. 1.1.1.2. l;~jT li~;T J j REACTOR BUILDING, BUILDING. EL El 517 FEET. 6 INCHES ()0 FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.3. U1\IT U~IT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, BUILDING. EL El 545 FEET, '66 INChES INCI1ES I(
'( o0 1.1.1.4. Uf,:,
FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.4, U~:~ 3 REACTOR BUILDING, BUILDING. EL El 570 FEET, FEET. 0 INCHES 4- 9 II.4-9 11.
( 9 DRAF~ o FIRE ZONE 11.1.1. 11.1.1, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, SOUTHWEST CORNER ROOM, EL 476 FEET. FEET, 6 INCHES o FIRE ZONE 11.1.2. 11.1.2, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING. BUILDING, SOUTHEAST CORNER ROOM, ROOf.;, FEET, 6 INCHES EL 475 FEET. o (> FIRE ZONE 1.3.1, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, SHUTDOWN COOLING PUMP ROOM, EL 517 FEET, 6 INCHES 4.1 Exemptions Requestea Exemptions were requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the installation of firE detection aetection and a fixed fire suppres-sion system in an area room or zone for which alternative shutdown capability i5 provided. i~ 4.2 Discussion 4.2.1 Fire Zone 1.1.2.1, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 476 Feet, 6 Inches Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 is th~ the basement floor of the Unit 2 reactor building. The north, south, and east walls of this zone form the exterior ~xterior of the plant, except for the LPGlLPCI pump rooms (Fire Zones 11.2.1 and 11.2.2).11.2.2), which are in the southwest and southeast corners, respectively. of this floor level. The west ( wall sepdrates this zone from Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 of Unit 3. The walls are ra ted reinforced 3-hour rated rei nforced concrete and penetrations penetra t ions sealed sea Ied with noncombustible noncombus t i bIe mdteridls, except for unrated doors, which connect this zone to Unit 3 redctor building equipment drain tank room and LPCr LPCI pump rooms. The ceiling of this zone is constructed of reinforced concrete with all penetratlons to Fire Zones 1.1.2.2 and 8.2.S.A 8.2.5.A nonrated. The combustible loading (electrical cables in trays) is less than 1,000 Btu per square foot, which prOduces produces an equivalent severity of less than 1 minute on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. Hot shutdown equipment consists of LPC! LPCI valves and the redundant inboard isolatlon condenser valves' power and control feeds (in conduit). The Licensee has installed instal led a linear thermal detection system in and under the cable trays and dn dn approved I-hour fire rated wrap on the proposed alternate power ana control feeds to the. inboard isolation condenser valves. Portable stotions are fire extinguishers and hose stdtions arE available in this zone. Alternative shutdown capability for the lPCI LPCI valves. valves, which are part of the HPCI/lPCI HPCI/LPCI shutdown path, is the isolation condenser which is provided independent of this fire zone in Fire Area RB2-1 RB2-I which is comprised of Fire 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.B. Zones 1.1.2.S.A. 1.1.2.5.B, 1.1.2.5.C and Fire Zone 1.3.2. 4.2.2 Fire Zone 1.1.2.2, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 517 Feet. Feet, 6 Inches Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 surrounds three-quarters of the inerted drywell (Fire Zone 1.2.2) and is adjacent to Fire Flre Zone 1.1.1.2 on the west, to Fire Zone 1.3.2 ana the turbine building on the north, and to Fire Zone 9.0.C on the south. and l( 11.4-10 I I. 4-1 0
DR'U1~. 0 f: r- i'" ( 10 The zone 15 separated from adjacent zones by 3-hour rated fire barriers with is s~parated rated doors and penetration seals, with the following exceptions: The south and east exterior walls are nonrated reinforced concrete; the floor has nonrated mechanical penetrations to the reactor building, elevation 476 feet, 6 inches (Fire Zone 1.1.2.1); and the ceiling has open hatches, stairways, and mechanical penetrations penetratiuns to the reactor building, elevation 545 feet, 66 inches (Fire Zone 1.1.2.3). Electrical penetrations are ~~aled sealed with noncombustible materials. Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C, directly above, is separated by a 3-hour flr flre rated rated. concrete floor-ceillng dssembly. The combustible loading is approximately 21,000 Btu per square foot. foot, which prOduces an equivalent fire severity of 16 minutes on thf:! the ASTN ASH] E-119 time-temperature curve. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are available. The Th~ i j censee has ;n~tal1ed iicensee ins ta I I ed a fire fi re detection detect i on system sys tew throughout th roughout the zone ana fire fi re stops in cable trays which cross from one side of the reactor building to the other as discussed in Section 3 of the safety evaluation. The alternative alternatlve safe shutdown path for this zone is the isolation condenser which is located in da separated Fire Area RB2-1 RB2-I by fire rated barriers or automatic suppression systems protecting all unprotected floor openings. 4.2.3 Fire Zone 1.1.2.3, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 545 Feet, 6 Inches ( Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 surrounds the inerted drywell (Fire Zone 1.2.2) and the isolation conden~er condenser pipe chase (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C). It is above Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 and below Fire Zone 1.1.2.4. It is adjacent to the turbine building on the north side and to the Unit 3 reactor building (Fire Zone 1.1.1.3) on the west 5.ide. side. This zone is separated from adjacent zones by 3-hour rated barriers with the following exceptions: The south and east exterior building walls are configured of nonrated reinforced concrete and the floor assembly have unseaTed unsealed hatche5, hatches, stairwells, HVAC ducts and mechanical penetrations to the building, elevation 517 feet. reactor building. feet, 6 inches (Fire Zone 1.1.2.2) ana to the building elevation 570 feet, 0 inches (Fire Zone 1.1.2.4). reactor builaing 1.1.~.4). Electrical penetrations sea I ed with a noncombustible penetra t ions dre sealed noncombus t i bI e material. materi a 1. The c.ombustible combustible loading. loading, c.onsisting consisting primarily of cable insulation and switchgear. switchgear, is appr0ximately appruximately 17,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of 13 minutes on the AST~1 ASH] E-119 time-temperature time-temperatur~ curve. The licensee has installed fire stops in the cable trays and a fire detection system throughout the zone with exception of the area above the RWCU pumps and heat exchangers. Water shields are installed above switchgear!> switchgears 23-1 and 24-1 to protect them from the water curtain suppression system installed a t the ceil i ng of the 589~ eei ling 589- and 570-foot e 1I evat ions. Alternate shutdown capability for the redundant systems in this zone is provided by equipment and cabling associated with the isolation condenser shutdown path in Fire Zone RB2-1 RB2-I which is comprised of Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.A. 1.1.2.5.B, 1.1.2.5.C and 1.3.2. 4.2.4 Fire Zone 1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.4. Unit 2 Reactor Building. Elevation 570 Feet, Feet. o Inch II. 4-11 11.4-11
( 11 DRAfT The south, east, west, and north walls of Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 are configured of reinforced concrete. There is an unrated HVAC duct penetration 1n in the north wall. There are also unrated penetrations 1n in the concrete floor and ceiling of this fire zone. Vertical openings in the ceiling include hatches, a stairwell, ladder access, and HVAC ducts. These openings are protected by water curtain sprinkler systems. Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 has a zone-wide fire detection system except for the high radiation area associated with the Reactor Water Cleanup System. The fire load is low (5,000 Btu per square foot) . Switchgears 28 and 29 and the 250-Vdc MCCs 2A and 28 2B are located in this zone. Water shields are provided for these components. The alternative safe shutdown path fsIs the isolation condenser which is located in Fire Area RB2-I. Fire hose stations and extinguishers are available for this zone. 4.2.5 Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.0, Unit 2 Reactor Building, North, Elevation 589 Feet, 0 Inch Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.0 is adjacent to the turbine building on the north side, to Unit 2 (Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A and 1.2.2) on the south side, and to Unit 3 (Fire' Zone 1.1.1.5.0) on the west side. The east side is a plant exterior wall. It is above Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 and below Fire Zone 1.1.2.6. ( This fire zone is separated from adjacent zones by 3-hour fire rated barriers, damper, except for a HVAC duct running to the turbine building without a fire damper. unsealed mechanical penetrations and openings in the floor, unsealed mechanical penetrations, electrical penetration are sealed with noncombustible materials open stairway in the ceiling. and an ?pen There is no hot shutdown equipment or cabling located 1n in this zone. The combustible loading, consisting primarily of cables, is less than 2,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent severity of less than 2 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. A fire detection system is provided only over the standby liquid control equipment. No fixed fire suppression systems are installed. Alternative shutdown capability is not provided for this lone. zone. . zone, the Although there is no safe shutdown cabling or equipment in this fire lone, Licensee requested an exemption for this zone because 1t it adjoins Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 by unprotected openings. Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 contains safe shutdown equipment and has an alternat1ve alternative safe shutdown system independent of the zone. The alternative safe shutdown path 1s is the isolation condenser which is located in Fire Area RB2-I. Building, Southwest Corner Room, 4.2.6 Fire Zone 11.2.1, Unit 2 Reactor Building. Elevation 476 Feet, 6 Inches Fire Zone 11.2.1 is on the basement level of the Unit 2 reactor building. bUilding. It is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 on the northeast side, to Unit 3 (Fire Zones ( 11.1.2 and 11.2.3) on the west side, and to the plant exterior on the south
.. side. It is below Unit 2 (Fire Zone 1.1.2.2).
II.
- 11. 4-12
( 12 DRAfT This fire zone is separated from the rest of the reactor building by a nonrated reinforced concrete wall containing a watertight door and unrated penetrations and a nonrated reinforced concrete ceiling containing unsealed p~netrations penetrations (concr~te (concrete plugs, checkered plate hatch covers, and an open stairwell). Cable penetrations to Fire Zones 1.1.1.2 and 11.2.3 are sealed to a 3-hour ratlng. The west wall has a HVAC opening which does not cont?~n cont?~r. a fire damper. The hot shutdown equipment includes LPCI LPC! pumps, valves, valves. cooler, and associated cabling. emergency air cooler. The combustible loading in Fire Zone 11.2.1 is 25.000 25,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent severity of approximately 19 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. The combustible loading consists of electrlcal cables and lubriCating lubricating oil in pump sumps. A *A hose station and portable extinguishers are available io in the zone. The li~ensee Licensee has installed an automatic fire detection system throughout the zone. Alternative shutdown capability for thE equipment in this zone is provided by the isolation condenser shutaown path which ;s is located ;n in Fire Area RB2-I. RB2-!. 4.2.7 Fire Zone 11.2.2, Unit 2 Reactor Buildirlg, Buildir,g, Southeast Corner ROOOI, Roon" Elevation 476 Feet. Feet, 6 Inr.h~s Inr.hes Fire Zone 11.2.2 is on the basement level of the Unit 2 reactor building. It
- c.(. is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 on the northwest side and to the plant exterior on ~he east and south sides. It;s It is below Unit 2, Fire Zone 1.1.2.2.
Unit 2 Fire Zones 11.2.1 and 11.2.2 are of the sarr~ design; therefore, the Unit' description of Fire Zone 11.2.1 in Section 4.2.6 applies to Fire Zone 11.2.2, except for the ceiling, which is penetrated by unprotected HVAC ducts and cable penetrations sealed with noncombustible materials. The combustible loading is 15,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equiv~lent severity of approximately 11 minutes on the ASTM E-119 E-1l9 time-temperature curve. The Licensee has installed a fire detection system throughout this zone. Alternative shutdown capability for the equipment in this zone is provided by the isolation condenser shutdown path which is located in Fire Area RB2-I. RB2-1. 4.2.8 Fire Zone 1.3.2, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Shutdown Cooling Pump Room, Elevation 517 Feet, 6 Inches . Fire Zone 1.3.2 is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.2.2 on un the southwest side, to fire Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 on the east and southeast sides, to the turbine building on the north side, ar.~ the steam pipe chase on the west side. This area is sepdrated from the turbine building by a 3-hour fire rated wall. The ei! s t dnd southea east s t wa southeast 11 s are constructed of rei walls nforced c*oncrete reinforced concrete and concrete block and dre 3-hour fire rated barriers. Access to this fire area is through a 3-hour fir~fire rated door. The west wall contains a ventilation duct and an unsealed mechaniCal penetration open to the steam pipe chase. The ceiling and the floor contain unsealed mechaniCal mechanical penetrations. The Licensee has providec this area with a complete fire detection system Th~ .(1. ( without fixed suppression. A hose station ana fire extinguisher are located in the adjaren: adjacent fire ZorlC zo.,c (1.1.2.2), (l.l.2.2l. II.
- 11. 4-13
( .I..) ORt\Ff DRt\Ff riot s~utdown equipment located in this area consists of power and control feeas to the inboara lsoldtion feea~ Isolation condenser valves located in the inerted drywell. The combustible dryw~ll. combustilile loading in this high radiation area is less than 21,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent severity of approximately 15 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. The appr0ximately Licensee has also committed to seal all penetrations to a 3-hour rating, licensee except for the louver and mechanical penetrations to the steam pipe chase and mechanIcal penetrations to Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 and 1.1.2.1. The mechanical the mechanlcal penetration to Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 will be protected by automatic sprinklers above the steel plate, which surrounds the mechanical penetrations and HVAC duct. AlternatIve shutduwn Alternatlve shutdown capability is provided by the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path which located in Fire .Area RB2-II. is lOCated 4.2.9 1.1.2.5.B, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Condenser Pipe Chase, Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.8, Feet, 00 Inch Elevation 570 Feet. Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.B is adjacent to the inerted drywell (Fire Zone 1.2.2) on the north side and to Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 on the remaining sides. It is dbove above Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C and below Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A. This zone is separated Fir~ Zenes 1.1.2.4 and 1.2.2 by 3-hour rated fire barriers and has a from Fire Zcnes 3-hour rated fire door in thl: 3-huur the east Wall. wall. The Licen~e~ License!: has comitted committed to sedl penetrations to Fire Zone 1.1.2.4 to provide a 3-hour fire rating. pen~trdtions ratin9. The floor and celling dnd ceIling of this zone are open metal gratings to Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.C and l.l.2.5.A, respectively. Access to these two zones is by ladders. 1.1.2.5.A. ( Hot shutdown equipment consists of one isolation condenser valve to be operatea manually. Fire detection operateo detectIon or suppression systems are not prcwided provided in Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.B. The combustible loading is negligible. Alternative shut-down capability is provided independent of this thIs fire zone by the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path located in flre FIre Area RE2-JI. RB2-II. The ceiling is reinforced concrete mechanic;,l penetrations, in addition to four large openings with unsealed mechanichl (stairwell, equipment hatch and two HVAC ducts without fire dampers), ~lec elec-trical penetrations are sealed with noncombustible materials. The alternative tncal shutdown capability is provided independent of this fire zone by the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path located in Fire Area RB2-II. 5hutdown 4.2.10 Isolation Condenser Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Isolatio~ F!:et, 6 Inches Pipe Chase, Eievation 545 F~et, l.l.2.5.C is adjacent to the inerted drywell on the north side and Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C to Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 on the remaining sides. It is above Flre Zone 1.1.2.2 and below Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.B. dnd This zone is similar to Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.B above it, from which it is separated by an open metal grate. The walls and floor of Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.r are 3-hour rated. Access to Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 is by a 3-hour fire door in the
~ast ~a s t wall.
wa 11. The li censee has Llcensee ha s committed conmi! ted to seal sea 1 other penetrations penetra tions to Fire Fi re Zone 1.1.2.3 to a 3-hour fire rating. Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.C l.1.2.3 l.l.2.5.C and 1.1.2.5.B l.l.2.5.B are part thE ~cme of the Same shutdown path. This zone is not provided with fire detection or suppression systems, but a hose station statior. is available in Fire Zone 1.1.2.3. TherE is essentially no combustible loading in this zone. A fire detection There system 15 IS installer. installec at the ceiling of Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A above. Safe 11.4-14 II. 4-14
( 14 ~RAfT shutdown equipment in this zone consists of one valve in the isolation con-denser ShutdOwn path. dens~r Alternative shutdown capabiiity is i5 provided independent of this zone by the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path located RB2-II. 4.2.11 Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A, Building, Reactor Floor South, l.l.2.S.A, Unit 2 Reactor Bu;lding, Elevation 589 Feet. Feet, 0 Inch Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A is aojacent aajacent to Fire Zones 1.2.2 and 1.1.2.5.0 on the north side, to Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A 1.I.l.5.A on the west side, and to the plant exterior on the east and south sides. It is above Fire Zones 1.1.2.4 and 1.1.2.5.S 1.1.2.5.B and below Fire Zone 1.1.2.6. The s0uth and east walls of this zone form the plant exterior. Th~ The north wall is a 3-hour rdted barrier except for HVAC ducts which do not contain fire
;s dampers. Also, a 3-hour rated fire door is installed in the north wall. The west wall is a 3-hour rated barrier with a 3-hour rated fire door. The ceiling is reinforced concrete with unsealed mechanical penetrations, in addition to four large openings (stairwell, equipment hatch and two HVAC ducts without fire dampers), electrical penetrations are sealed with noncombustible materials.
The floor is 3-hour fire rated, except for the openings of a 20*foot 20-foot by 20-foot hatch, a stairway, a ladder hatch, a pipe penetration area and two HVAC duct penetration without fire dampers. An open metal grate in the floor J( !.( of the zone connects it to Fire Zones 1.1.2.S.B 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.5.C. The combustible loading in this zone lone consists mainly of cables and is less than 1,000 Btu per square foot. th~n foot, which produces an equivalent fire severity of less thdn 1 minute on the ASHi [-119 £-119 time*temperature time-temperature curve. Hot shutdown equipment includ~~ includeS the isulation condenser and associated valve~. valves. Hose stations and fire extinguisher"s sti:ltions extinguishe,*s are available in the zone. In addition. addition, the Licensee ha~has installed a fire detection system throughout the zone, a preaction water curtain sprinkler system at the open hatch, stairway, pipe penetration area and two HVAC ducts to Fire Zone 1.1.2.6 and 1.1.2.4, a 3-hour penetrCltion 1.1.2.5.0, an access ladder to the isolation rated fire door to Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.0. l.l.2.5.B) for manual operation of outboard condenser pipe chase (Flre Zone 1.1.2.5.8) valves, anc condenser isolation valves. ar,c a wet pipe sprinkler system for the ladder 1.1.<.4. leading to Fire Zone 1.1.Z.4. Alternative shutdown capability is provided independent of this fire zone by the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path located in Fire Area RB2-II. 4.2.12 4.2.]2 Builaing, TIP Room Fire Zone 1.4.1 Unit 3 Reactor Builaing. Fire Zone 1.4.1 is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.2.1 on the southwest side, to the building on the north side,*and to*Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 on the east and turbine buildinS side5. It is above Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 and below Fire Zone 1.1.1.3. south sides. Fire Zone 1.4.1 ;s is separated trom other sections of the plant by 3-hour rat~o ratea wal15, ceiling. walls, ceiling, and floor except for unsealed mechanlCdl mechanlcdl penetrations in th~ the floor and leading to the steam pipe chase. chase, with access to Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 through a 3-hour rdted fire door. 11.4-15
c 15 IS rh~ rho combustible luading loading i~ this fire ar~a area is 7.000 7,000 Btu per square foot, WhlCh Wh1Ch produces an equi Vi! h:rlt fi equival~nt re 5everity fire severity of less than 6 mi nutes on the ASTM E-119 minutes tilllt'-temper<1wre tinlf:-temperowre curve. A ft. hose station is availabl,= available in dnan adjacent zone. The Licensee lidS has in!>talled in,talled a fire detection system throughout the area. Alternative shutdown capability is provided independent of this area by the HPCI/LPCl HPCI/LPCI shutdown path located in Fire Area RB3-II. 4.2.13 1.1.1.5.C, Unit 3 Reactor Building. Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C. Building, Isolation Condenser Pip~ Chase, Elevation 545 Feet. Feet, 6 Inches 1.1.1.5.C is adjacent to the inerted drywell on the north SiOE Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.l sioe and to Fire Zone 1.1.1.3 on the remaining sides. The walls have a 3-hour fir~ tu rating. Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C is above Fire lone ratinq. Zone 1.1.1.2 and below Fire Zon,= Zone 1.1.1.5.B. Units 2 and 3 are of the same design; therefore, the descri~tion 1.1.1:5.8. description OT Fire Zon~ 1.1.2.5.C in Section 4.2.10 also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C. o~ I.I.I.S.C. There is e~sErltially e5selltially nc ne combustible load in this zone. Fire aetectors oetectors arE' are not in this fire zone, but they are in Fire Zone 1.1.1.S.A, I.I.I.S.A, which is above Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C. i.I.I.S.C. Sdfe Safe shutdown equipment ;n in this zone consists of one valve in the iS01<1tion tne i5(.10tion condenser shutdown path. Altel'Jlat1ve shutdown capabiiity is provided by the HPCljLPCI Alterndtlve HPCI/LPCI shutdown path located in Fire Area RB3-II. locdted ( 4.2.14 Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.B, Unit 3 Reactor Building. Pipe Chase, Elevation 570 Feet, 0 Inch Building, Isolation Condenser Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.B is adjacent to the inerted drywell on the north side a~d ar.d to Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 on the remaining sides. Th~ The walls are 3-hour tire fire roted. Firt rdted. Fire Zone 1.1.1.:*.0 Ll.l.:*.o is above Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C and below Fire Zone
!.I.I.S.A.
1.1.1.5.A. Units 2 (lIlC0110 3 are of the same design~design; thereforE'. therefore., the description of Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.0 1.I.Z.5.b 1n Section 4.,.9 also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.S.B. 1.1.1.5.B. Alternative ~hutdown shutOown capability is provld~d prov1ded independent of this fire zone by the HPCIjLPCI HPCI/LPCI shutdown shotdown path located in Fire Area RB3-II. RB3-11. 4.2.15 Unit 3 Reactor Buildlng. Build1ng, Fire Zone 1.1.1.S.A, 1.1.1.5.A, South. South, Elevatioli 5B9 Feet, 0 Inch Elevatiurl Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A I.I.I.S.A is adjacent to FirE Fire Zones 1.2.1 and 1.1.1.5.0*on 1.1.I.S.O*on the north sidE, to Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A1.1.2.S.A on the east side, and to the plant exterior on the west and south sld~s. sldes. It is above Fire Zones 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.1.S.B 1.1.1.5.B and Delow Fire Zone 1.1.1.6. This zone has reinforced concrete boundaries, penetl'dtions that are either 3-hour fir~ rated or have the equiva-including penetr'dtions lent (If 3-hour- rilting [,f a 3-hour ratin9 hy the instal1ation of fire suppression systems iro ir dccorddl1Le with GL H~-10. dccorddnLe H(,*lO. A fire detection ~ystem has been provided. units 2 and 3 are of the same design except there is no stairway in Unit 3. Therefore, thE aescription Therefore. oescription of Fire Zone 1.1.2.S.A in Section 4.2.11 also applies to Fire Zon~ l.l.1.5.A. Alternative Shutdown capability is provided ZonE 1.1.1.5.A. by th~ the HPCljLPC: HPCI/LPC: s~utdown pdth path located in Fire Area RB3-II. RB3-11.
- r. 4-16 IrI,4-l6
c lE 4.~.16 Fire Zone 1.1.1.1, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Elevation 476 Feet, 6 Inches Fir~ Fire ~one Zone 1.1.1.1 is the basement floor of the Unit 3 reactor building. The north, south, and west walls of this zone form the exterior of the plant, except for th~ the LPCI pump rooms roums (Fire Zones 11.1.1 and 11.1.2).11.1.2), which are in the southwest and southeast corners, respectively, of this floor level. The separates this zone from Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 of Unit 2. The south east wall separate~ wal I olso separates this zone from Fire Zone 11.1.3 (one of two HPCI pump rooms)
- The combustible loadino is 2,OOG 2,000 Btu per square foot. foot, which produces an equivalent severity of "approximately 2 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve.
lin its 2 and 3 are Units a re of the ~ame sarle design; des i gn; therefore, the description descri pt i on of Fire F1 re Zone 1.1.2.1 in Sectlcn Sectlen 4.2.1, frorr. 'Ihich this zone is separated by a 3-hour rated fro," ~Jhich concrete wdll, except as ncted. ncted, also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.1. Alterndtive shutdown capability is provided independent of ttlis zone by at this equipn,ent located in Fire Zones lol.1.S.A.1.1.1.5.A, 1.1.1.5.8, 1.1.1.5.B, 1.1.1.5.C, and Fire Zone 1.4.1. 4.2.17 Fire Zune Zone 1.1.1.2. Unit 3 Reactor Building.Building, Elevation 517 Feet, Inches 6 Inche5 c ( Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 surrounds three-quarters of the inerted drywell and is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 on the east, to Fire Zones 1.3.1 and 1.4.1, to the turbine building on the north. north, and to Fire Zone 9.0.C on the south. Units 2 and 2 are of the same design; therefore. therefore, the description of Fire Zone 1.1.2.Z irIe Section 4.Z.~ 4.:.: ~lsG
.lsG ap~1ies ap~l'es to Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. This zone is separated fro~ adjacent zones by 3-hour rated flre barriers with rated doors dnd and penetration seals with the following exceptions: The south ana west walls are nonrated, the floor has nonrated, mechanical penetrations to Fire Zone 1.1.1.1, the ceiling has open hatChes. hatChes, stairways, and mechanical penetrations to Fire Zone 1.1.1.3. The electrical penetrations are sealed with a noncombustible materiul.
materi,,]. Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C above is s<<:paratedseparated by da 3-hour fire rated floor. The conlbustible combustible loading is approximately 23,000 Btu per s~~are foot, \'/tllch sc;uare "tllch prodlJ<.es produces an equ;val<<:nt equiv"lent severity of 17 minutes on the ASTM E-119 ime-ten,pHature curve. E-1I9 ttime-ten,per'ature The Llcensee has instal lea leo a fire detection system throughout the zone zone,t seclea se"led openings tcto the Unit 2 reactor building to a 3-hour fire rating. AlternativE' Alternatil'P Shutdown cdpability for the redundant redund.nt systems;n systems.in this zone is isolation c?nd;e.n)er. provided by the isoiation condenser located in Fire Area RB3-I. 4.2.1L Fire Zone 1.1.1.3. 1.1.1.3, Unit 3 Reactor Building. Building, Elevation 545 Feet, I tlchps 6 InchE'S Fire Zone 1.1.1.3 Surrounds s"rrounds Fire Zones 1.2.1 and 1.1.1.S.C.1.1.1.5.C. It is above fire Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 and below Fire Zone 1.1.1.4. It is adjacent to the turbine building on the north side and to Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 on the east sid~. Lnfts Gnits 2 ( (-- I r. 4-17
( 17 1, DRAfT and.< and .' are uiuT the 5d:!lt'
,a",,' desi9n; desion; therefore, thp descriptiorl description of Flre Zone 1.1.2.3 in Section SectIon 2.2.3 dlso applies to Flre flre Zone 1.1.1.3 except as noteG.
noteo. The combustible loading is approximately 18.000 18,000 Btu per square foot. foot, which produces an equivalent severity of 14 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. The licensee has installed fire detection throughout the zone except dboveabove the RWCU pumps and heat exchangers, sealed all penetratlons 1.1.1.5.C and 1.1.2.3 to a 3-hour rating. to Fire Zones 1.1.1.S.C Alternative shutdown capability is provided by the isolation condenser located in Fire Area R63-I. RB3-1. 4.2.19 Fire Flre Zone 1.1.1.4, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Elevation 570 Feet, o Inch Fire Zone 1.1.1.4
- 1. 1. 1.4 is surrounded by reinforced concrete barriers that dre not complete 3-hour fire fi re rated bdrriers. The 20-foot by 20-foot hatch and ladder opening have sprinkler system protection. Also, this fire zone has complete fire detection throughout except for high radlation area associated wlth the reactor water cleanu~
r~actor cleanu" system. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are provloed for this zone. prov1aed The combustible loading in this zone is low 10,000 Btu per squar~ square foot, which translate, into a fire severity of only 8 minutes as represented by the translat~s hSTM ASTM E~119 E-119 fire test curve. ( Aiternative safe shutdown capability is provided by the isolation condenser located in Fire Area RB3~I RB3~1 which are independent of this zone. 4.2.20 Fire Zone 11.1.1, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Southwest Corner Roo~, Elevctioll 476 Feetl Elevatiorl Feet, 6 InChes Inches Fire Zone Lone 11.1.1 is on the basementbaser.lent level of the Unit 3 reactor building. It is adjC!cent adj~cent to FirE- Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 all 011 the northeast side and to the plant exterlor on the south and west sides. It is below Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. Units 2 dnd 3 are of the saffie same des1gn; deslgn; therefore, the description of Fire Zone 11.2.1 1n 10 Section 4.2.6 also applies to both units except as noted. The combustible loading is 20 1he 1 000 Btu per square foot, which produces an 20,000 equivalent severity of approximately 13 minutes on the ASTM E-119 till1E'- time-temperoture curve. The licensee has installed a fire detection system temprdture throughout the zone. Hose stativns and fire extinguishers are dvailable to this thi $ fire zor.e. fi re Z(.HIE'. Plternative shutdown capability is provided bj' Plternilt;ve by the isolation condenser shutd(lwn shutd(>wfI path pa th inj n FlI'e F1 re Area RB3-1 of which whi ch 1S 1 s independent of Fire Fi re Zone: Zone 11.1.1.
- 11. I. I.
4.2.21 Fire Zone 11.1.2, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Southeast Corner Room, Elevation 476 Fe~t, Feet, 6 Inches Fire Zone Fir~ Zune 11.1.2 is or. on the basemert level of the Unit 3 reactor building. It is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 on side, to 00 the northwest side. tu Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 on the east side, and to Fire Zones 11.1.3 and 11.2.3 en the south side. Units 2 ( and 3 are of tne same design; therefore, the description of Fire Zone 11.2.1 in Section 4.~.n is also clso applicable to this zone. II.4~18 11.4-18
( 18 DRAFff - DRAF' The combustible locdinglOading is ;s 20,OOC 20.000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equlvalent equlValent severity of ap~rox1mately approxlmately 15 minutes on the ASTM ASTH E-119 time-temperature curve. t;me-temperatur~ Alternative shutdown capability is provided by the isolation condenser located in RB3-I. 4.2.22 Unit 3 Reactor Building, Fire Zone 1.3.1. 1.3.1, Elevation 517 Feet. Feet, 6 Inches Fi re Zone 1. Fire 3.1 is separateo from other zones by 3-hour fi 1.3.1 re rate-d fire rated barriers except for unsealed mechanical penetrations in the floor and ceiling. A fire fir~ detection system has been provided throughout the zone. The combustible loading is 10,0001~,OOO Btu per square foot, which translates into a0 fire severity of 11 mim . tes as represented by thl:! minctes the ASTM E-119 fire test curve. 41ternatlVe
~lternatlVe safe shutdo\.,.r, shutdo,," capabllity is provided by the isolation condenser located in Fire Are~ Area R83-I R82-I which are independent of this fire zone.
4.3 Evaluation The fire protection in the above-described 22 fire zones/areas does not comply with the technical requirements of Section 11I.G.3 lII.G.3 of Appendix R because a flre detection system and/or fixed fire suppression system have not been lnstalled in zone~ 1n~talled znnes or area~ areas for which alternative shutdown capability is provided. The re Wd::; There WdS dd concern \:f:f. t a fi
~I:f,t re iir.r. one of these fi fire re zones cou fire 1(] cause a los coulo losss of normal safe shutou~r.
shutau~n capability. However, the fire loading in all of these fire zones ranges from negligible to low and, in no case, does the equivalent fire severity exce~dexceed 21 minutes with a fire load ranging from 5-8.000 5-8,000 Btu per square foot. Because of the low combustible loading, a fire of significant sqUare magnitude or duration is not expected to occur. Except for Fire Zones 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.5.D, 1.1.2.5.B, 1.1.2.0.C, 1.1.2.~.C, 1.1.1.5.C, l.l.I.S.C, 1.1.1.5.B, and 1.1.1.1, fire detection is provided throughout the fire zone. For the aforementioned rire iire zones not having area-wide fire ~etection, there ;s is either linear cable rire detection. tire detection, or SPOt SPOt flre detection. detection, or th~ the fire zones are open to an adjacent fire zone nav1ng navlng fire detection installed throughout. Therefore, there 1SlS reasonable assurance that a fire in any of the 22 subject fire zone~ would be detected in its early stdges and extinguished by the fire brigade before adjacent snfety-related s~fety-related locations are thredtened.threatened. Should a fire damage any safe shutdown components in any of these locations before the fire brlgdde extinguishes it; beforE> it,. an independent alternative shutdown shutdow~
-capability is available to be used to achieve
,capability aChieve and maintain safe shutdown. The qlternotive safe shutdown path is separated from all flre zones by 3-hour fire qlterr.~tive roted barriers dnd any unsenled rdted unsealed opening 1S lS protected by an automatic suppression systew in accordance with GL 86-10 or adequate justification is suppressiun provi ded in provided i r. accordance accorda nee ",*ith
~-ith GL 86-10 for unsealed unsea 1ed penetrations.
penetra t ions. The staff hd~ hos determined that there is reasonable assurance that a fire in any 0f these fir~ zones w:ll of w'll netnct result in the loss of alternative shutdown locateo in other plant areas. capabllity loc~ted ( 11.4-19 I I. 4-19
19 DRAFT The staff also finds that the installation of additional fire detection and/or fixed fire suppression systems would not significantly increase the level of fire protection in these fire zones or areas. 4.4 Conclusion evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing and Based on the above evaluation. proposed fire protection features combined with th~ the alternative shutdown the above-described zones and areas provide an capability independent of thp Therefore, the exemptlons equivalent level of protection. Therefore. exemptions should be granted. 5.0 0 TURSINE TURBINE BUILDING. BU1LDING, CENTRk~ CENTRh~ ZONE GROUP (FIRE (F1RE ZONES 8.2.5.C AND 8.2.6.C) o TURBINE BUILDING, EASTERN ZONE GROUP (FIRE (F1RE ZONES a.2.I.A. 8.2.I.A, B.Z.2.A. S.2.2.A, B.2.S.A. B.2.S.A, 8.2.5.B, 8.2.6.A, S.2.6.A, 8.2.6.B, 8.2.7, 7.0.A, 8.1. B.1, AND 9.0.A) 9.O.A) o TURBINE BUILCING, 8UILCING, WESTERN ZONE GROUP (FIRE ZONES 8.2.1.B, 8.2.2.B, 8.2.5.0, B.2.S.E, 8.2.4, 8.2.5.D, B.2.6.D, 8.2.6.E. 8.2.5.E, 8.2.6.0, 8.2.6.E, 6.1. 6.1, 7.0.8, ANO AND 9.0.B) 9.O.B) 5.1 Exemptions Requested III.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent Exemptions were requested from Section lII.G.3 installation of fire detection and fixed-fire suppression that it requires instalidtion systems in zones for which an alternative shutdown capability is provided.
&ystems
~_ ( 5.£ Uiscussion 5.! 5.2.1 Fire Zones 8.2.5.C and 8.2.6.C, Turbine Building, Central Zone Group This zone group consists of fire zones in common areas of the ground floor (elevation (eleVation 517 feet, 6 inches) and the mezzanine (elevation 534 ieet, feet, 0 inch) of the turbine building. Each zone contains equipment and cabling assoclated Ur.its 2 and 3. This zone group is separated from the adjacent eastern with U~its and western zone group~ dnd groups main1y mainly by shield walls or concrete floors. Where walls are not present, as in the corridor, which runs through the zone group eastern and western zone groups, automatic sprinkler systems and between the east~rn fire detection systems are installed. Separation of the central zone group buildings is by 3-hour rated barriers with from Units 2 and 3 reactor bulldings penetrations sealed by noncombustible materials at Units 2 and 3 equipment drain tank rooms. Safe shutdown equipment and cables 1n zone group include the 480-V MeC in this 20ne MCC vi!lving between units and some cabling 39-2 and the mechanical CRD cross-tie v~lvin9 associated with shutdown path B2.B2, which coula be used to shutdOWn shutdown Unit 3 if a fire occurred in this zone group. The MCC is needed only in case of a fire in alternative Unit 3 (shutdown paths 0 or F). The cross-tie valving is used as dlternative shutdown equipment in case of a fire involving the HPCJ/LPCI HPCI/LPCI shutdown path in one unit. In Fire Zone B.2.S.C, fixed fire detection ana sprink1er sprinkler systems protect al alii sections of the zone south of column/row E on elevatlon sectIons elevation 517 feet, 6 inches; On elevation 534 feet. feet, this zone is pruvided provided with a sprinkler system throughout. T~oTwo turbine oil reservoirs are protected by open-hEad open-t,ead water Sprb} spray ( provlded. The floor are~ systems. Also, partial fire detection coverage is prOYlded. are" I J. 4-20 11.4-20
( 20 DRAfl URAfl is 15.900 square f~~t Is about 15,900 f~et with a ceiling height of 17 feet. The total flr~ f1r~ load (exclusive of turbine oil) is low, 20.000 Btu per square, low. 20,000 square. foot and is in the form of electrical cable. The turbine eil fire hazard was not added to the tvtal tGtal fire load because it ;s is contained in a reserVOir, reservoir. has a high flash pOint, point. and 1S 1~ protected by open-heaa Essentially. th~ open-head water spray systems. Essentially, majority of this fire zone is covered by fire detection and suppression sys terns. tems. Fire Zone 8.2.s.C B.2.S.C does nOl nOL contdin contain any of the alternative shutdown equipment associated a~sociated with isolation condenser, condenser. but it does have cables associatpdassociated wlth w1th it. These cables will bf be provided with a l-hour I-hour fire rated wrdp, wrdp. fire detection. and sprinklen detection, sprinkler~ in accordance with Section 1I1.G.2 III.G.2 of Appendix R. In Fire Zone 8.2.6.(, 8.2.6.C. the floor ar~a area is 11,400 11.400 square feet, feet. with a ceiling height ufof 27 feet. The fire load (exclusive of turbine oil) is low, IB,OOO low. 18.000 Btu per square foot. The turbine oil is contained in a reservoir, reservoir. has a high flash point, point. and bis protected by fire detection and suppression systems. Tht' The majority of this fire zone is covered by a ceiling level sprinkler system. Fire Zune Zone 8.2.6.C does not have any cables/equipment associated with the safe shutdown system. Alternative shutdown capabi lity dlternative saff:: I tty for central zone group is provided by the isolation condenser, condenser. with cable and equipment located in the eastern and western zone groups of the the Turbine Building and
- c
,(H rhe Reactor Building. th~ Manual fire fighting capability in the form of hose stations and fire extinguishers is available to these fire zones. 5.2.2 Fire Zones B.2.1.A, B.2.I.A. 8.2.2.A, 8.2.2.A. B.2.S.A, 8.2.s.A. 8.2.5.8, 8.2.s.B. 8.2.6.A. 8.2.6.8, 8.2.6.B. 8.2.7. 7.0.A. 8.1. and 9.0.A, 7.0.A, 9.0.A. Turbine Building, Building. Eastern Zone Group The eastern zone group consists of 10 fire zones as listed above. Th'is Th*is zOlre zorre jroup consists only of the Unit 2 associated sections
~roup settions of the turbine basement. station battery rooms, building: the basement, rooms. the mezzanine level 01 the building. the Unit 22 diesel turbine building, die5el generator room, room. the clean/dirty oil eil tank grouna floor level. It is s~parated room and the ground separated from the centra) central zone grour group unrated. but substantial, by unrated, substantial. reinforced reinforcea concrete shield-walls shield*walls whose cable penetrations are sealed by noncombustible materials. The eastern zone group is separated from the control 1S corrtrol room/AEER fire areas by 3-hour fire rated barriers. The eastern zone group is separated from the Unit 2 reactor barrier5 with an equivalent 3-hour fire rating and from th~
building by barrien the turbine building main operating floor by a substantial (but unrated) concrete floor supported on unprotected steel with several openings Gpenings to the area abov~. above. The east~rn eastern zone group is separated separatea from the Unit 3 western zone group cable tunnel by a reinforcea concrete flocr containing one unrated penetration (a locked access manhole). Sale shutdown systems Safe syste",s in this zone group include "ectior,s ~ectio~s of the HPC1/LPCI HPCl/LPCI pa th for Unit 2. The fsolation shutdown path fso I a t i on condenser path pa th is the alternative a I terna t i ve caonbiiity for tr.;: shutdown caDilbjiity thi, zone group and it is located in the western dfiC "Ire grour, Of the Turbir,~* central zone grourl Turbirre" Buildin9 ar:c arc the Reactor Building, Building. tr,is zone grc.up, independent of tr.is gr(,uP. except for certdir: certain Unit 3 control cables \'Irich "rich ( are routed in cab l~ ;';"isers cabl~ adjfccr,t tC i sers aejeCE-/.t tC FiFire TB-V. However, re Area T8-V. However. theSE-these cab cabl2s 12S II. 4- 21
- 11. 4-21
22 oils in steE'1 ste~l tanks. These steel tanks are in accorddnce with the provisions of the NFPA standard number 30, "FlalTJ1JdbJe Liquids Code." In "FlallJlJdble dnd Combustible liquids addition, these fire loads are protected by an automatic fire suppression sys tem( s) s).. h'i th these except iions, kith cns. however. however, the fi re loads ra nge from range negligible to moderate and, in no case, do they exceed an equivalent fire severity of 45 minutes. Because of these low to moderate fire loadings, and given that the diesel fuel and oil fire hazards are contained and protected by fire suppression systems, a fire of significant magnitude or duration is not expected to occur. All fire zones have either coverage by fire detection or fire suppression systems or both. Theretore. Theretore, there 15 i5 redsonable assurance that a fire in any of the subject flre zones wi] will1 be oetected tn in its early stages and extinguished by the firE: fir~ adjacent sdfety-related locations are threatened. brigaot before adji!c~lIt brigaot: If ca fire shoulc damage any normal shutdown components in anyone of these zones before It lt is extinguished. extinguished, the alternative shutdown capab11ity, capabllity, which is independent of uf these zones per Section III.L of Appendlx R, is available to be used to achieve dod USEd ar,d maintain safe shutdown. The staff has determined that there is reasonable assurance that a fire in any of these fire zones will not ther~ resujt resuit in th& the loss of safe shutdown capability. Capability. The staff has also dlso determined that the installation of additional fire detection and/or fixed fire suppressiun suppression systems would not significantly increase the level of firp protec t i or; in these fire lanes. protection zones. 5.. 4 5.4 Conclusion ( Based on the above eVdTudtion, eVdluation, the staff concludes thdt the existing ana proposed fire fi re protection protect i on features fea tu res combineo combi ned with wi th the independent alternative a I terna ti ve shutdown capability provide an equivalent level of protection. Therefore, the exe~ptions shculd be granted. exe~rtions 6.0 0 FIRE ZONE 1.1.Z.6, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING. BUILDING, ELEVATION 613 FEET, 0 INCH o FIRE lONEZONE 1.1.1.6, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION ElEVATIO~ 613 FEET, 0 INCH o FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.5.0, 1.1.1.5.D. UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION 589 FEET. FEET, 0 INCH 6.1 Exemptions Requested Exemptions were requested from Section 111.G.3 III.G.3 of Appendi~ Appendix R to the extent that installation of fire detection and/or a fixed fire.suppression it requires the installaticn system in a zone for which alternative shutdown capability is provided. 6.< 6.~ Discussion 6.2.1 Fire Zone 1.1.2.6, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 613, 0 Inch R.actor Building, Elevation 613. 1.1.1.6, Unit 3 R~actor Flre Zone 1.1.1.6. 613, 0 Inch rire Zunes fire Zones 1.1.1.6 d~O ar,d 1.1.2.6 are adjacent to each other at the topmost elevation of the reactor builOinys buildinys and constitute the refueling floor. They are adjacent to the turbine building on the north side. Other wa walls 11s form the exterior of the plant. ( 11.4-22 I I. 4-22
(( nRAfT DRAFT
~rotecteG by i;lc l-hour arc ~rotectea arE- I-hour tire lire ra ted wrClp, rated wrap, automilt i c fi automdtic re detectors, ana an fire dutomdtic automdtic fire suppr~~sjon supprbsion system in accordance with Section III.G.2 of Appendlx R.
The flre loading for the 10 fire zones ranges from 2,000 to 4,640,000 Btu per square foot. However, the zone~ zones having high fire loads are due to e;th~r either diesel or lubricating oils which are contained in steel tanks. These specific tlre hazards are also coverea cove rea by automatic fire suppression systems. The balance of the fire loads are in the form of cable insulation and are under an equivalent fire severity of 45 minutes. All 10 fire zones are either provided with autoRlatic autonlatic fire detection systems and/CJt' and/01' fire suppression systems. All major fire loadings/hazards are covered by a fire suppression system(s). Finally, manual fire fighting capability is available to oll all 10 flrf:' fHe zones in the form of fire extinguishers and hose hose: stations. 5 ta t ions. 5.2.3 Fire Zones 8.2.1.8, 8.2.2.B, 8.2.4,8.2.5.0,8.2.6.0, B.2.5.E, lones 8.2.1.k. 8.2.S.E, 8.2.6.E. 8.2.6.E, 6.1, 7.0.G, and 9.0.B, Turbine Building, Western Zone Group The western zone group consists of 10 fire zones as listed abov~. above. This zonl.': zone 9rouP sroup consists only of the Unlt 3 dssocidted associdted section of the turbine buildin9 buildins mezzanine, ground floor, basement, cable tunnel, DC panel room, station battery room, and diesr::1 diesel generator room. It is separated from the central and eastern zone groups in an identical manner, which Which is described in Section
;( ,( 5.2.2.
Safe shutdown systems ill this zone group lncludf:' include sections of the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path for Unit 3. The isolation condenser path is the alternative shutdown capabl)ity capabllity for thtsthis zone group and all equipment and Cables are independent (f the flre ZGnes zenes in the we~tern zane group. western ZOne The fir~ fire leading for the 10 fir~ fire zones ranges from 1,000 to 162,000 Stu Btu p~r per square foot. However, th~ the higher loads ar~ are in the form of diesel fuel. For these fire hazard~, an automdtic fire suppression system is provideo. The thes~ balance of the fire ioadings are in the form of cables and/or plastics and the associated associateo tire severity is under 41 minutes. All 10 firf fire zones are either provid~d provided with automatic fire fir~ oetection detection and suppression systems. All major fire hazards anc and fire loadings are covered by an automatlc fire suppression system(s). Finally, manual fire flghting capability is available tu al allI 10 fire zones in the form of fire hose stations and extinguishers. extinguiShers. 5.3 Evaluation The tlre ~rotection in the dbove~described Th~ above-described 22 fire zones does not comply with the technlca1 requirempr!s of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R technical requiremp~!s R because fixed fire suprresslun suppresslun systems and/urand/or firE detection systems have not been installed in zor.es lor.es fN" WlilCh an alternative silfe f0r wtllch safe shutduwn shutdown capability is provil1ed. proviaed. The prinCipal principal ccocern CGrcern was that da fire i~ ir, rne cne of these fire zone~ zones could cause a loss of normal safe shutdOwn capability. Although Althougr, some of these fire zone~ zones have a high fire load, the fir~ fire 10ading loading is due to diesel fuel or lubriCating lubricating II .4-23 11.4-23
((, 23 DRAfT These twu zones arE are adjoining. Only the north wall, adjacent to the turbine building, is 3-hour rated. Oth~r walls are building. ~re nonrated. The floors of these zones are the ceilings of Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.0, 1.1.1.5.A, l.1.2.S.A, 1.1.2.5.0. lol.l.S.A, and 1.1.1.5.0 described in Sections 4.2.11. 4.2.11, 4.2.5, 4.2.15, and 6.2.2, respec-tively. Openings to Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.0 and 1.1.1.5.0 consist of a stairway and ar,d unsealed mechanical penetrations. Hose stations and portable extinguishers are provided. The combustible loading, which consists of
~lectrical cabling, is less than 1,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent severity of less than 1 minute on the ASTM ASTH E-119 time-temperature curve. Detection and suppression systems are not im.talled. installed. The Licenset' Licensee has installed d preaction sprinkler system at the hatches and stairway openings to Fire Zones 1.1.2.S.A 1.1.2.5.A and 1.1.1.S.A.
1.1.1.5.A. There Ther~ h ;, 110 5afe safe shutdown cabllng or equipment in Fi re Zones 1.1.2.6 and Fire 1.1.1.6. The Licensee requested an exer.Jption because these zones are not exe~ption bec~use sepdrated by 3-hour fire barriers from Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.1.S.A, I.I.l.S.A, 1.1.1.5.D, which (except for Fir~ Zones 1.1.1.5.0 and 1.1.2.5.0, and 1.1.1.5.0, 1.1.2.5.0) contdill sdfe shutdown equipmelJt 1.1.('.5.0) equipmellt and hdve have an alternatlVe alternat1Ve shutdown Systt=lf. sy sttll. provided. prov i ded. 6.2.2 Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.0, Unit 3 Reactor BUllaing,BUllding, Elevation 589 Feet, 0a Iller 111c~ Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.0 is adjacent to the turbine building on the north side. side, to Unit 3 (Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.A ana 1.2.2) on the south side, and to Unit 2 (Fire c Zone 1his 1.1.2.5.D) 1.1.2.5.0) on the east side. The west side is the plant exterior wall. zone is above Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 and below Fire lone Zone 1.1.1.6. The fire zone is separdted from adjacent zones by 3-hour fire rated barriers, wal,. except for a HVAC duct runnlng to the turbine building without a fire damper, unsealed mechanical unsedled meChanical penetrations, openings in the floor, unsealed mechanical penetrations and an open stairway in the ceilin9. lh~-I"e There is no hut hvt shutdown equipment or cabling located in this zone. The combustible 10dding, consisting primarily of cables, is less than 1,000 Btu lodding. conSisting pEr square foot, which produces an equivalent severity of less than 1 minute jJH 0n vn the ASTMASH; (-119 tim~-temperdture tim,,-temperature curve. rlre detector5 detectors are pro'v~ded pro~~ded only near the standby 1 iquid control equipmerlt. liquid No fixed-fire supprE:5sion suppr~ssion systems are installed. Alternative shutdown capabilHy capability is not required for this zone. Although there is no sdfe safe shutdown cabling or equipment eqUipment in this fire zone, the Licens~e requested an ex~mption Licens~ exemption for this zone because it adjoins Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 by unprotected openings. Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 contains safe shutdown equipment and has all ar, alternative safe shutdown system. 6.3 baluat;on baluation 11r~ prr.tection Thl 11re prr-tectiun in these zoneszon~s does not comply with the technical fe<;uirements of Section iI!.G.3 f{juirements iILG.3 of Appendix R because Fire Zones 1.1.1.6, 1.1.2.6, and 1.].].5.D 1.1.1.5.0 do not hdVPhoop a fire detection and/or a fixed-flre suppression system systel" and they forn: part of a plant drea area for which an alternative shutdown sys tenl ha systen, hass been prov ided. provided.
'(
1I.4-24 I I .4-24
( DnA*." ... f e* I*' iI The princip()] principill (oncen. concen, for a fire in olle one of these three fire zones is that i:ld fire could develop and s~read s~read' to adjacent fire zones (for which alterni:ltlve alterndtlVe shutdown capability capabil ity has been provided) and damage normal norma I safe shutdown
~ystem components contained therein. ,ystem These three fire zones have fire loads that are essentially negligible and, in no case, does the equivalent fire severity exceed 1.5 minutes. Because of the negligible fire loads. loads, a fire of significant magnltude or duration is not expected to occur. Should d fire occur, then it should develop slowly, remain small, small. and dissipate its heat to the surrounding environment without spreading to adjacent fire lones. zones. The fjre fire detection systems in the adjacent fire zones would detect the fire so fire brigade would be summoned to extinguish the fire manually.
that the fi:e Since there are no safe Shutdown components in these three fire zones, there i, no concern i~ concel'n for any ilmE'diate ilmediate fire damage potential. The staff has detenni ned tha determined thatt ther"!:! there is reasonab I e assurance tha reasonable thatt a fi fe in any of these fire three fire zones will not result in the loss of safety shutdown capcbility thre~ cap.bility in area,. Further, the staff find!; adjacent areas. finds that the installation of fire detectior detection andjor anaior fixed-fire suppression systems would not signiflcantly i"crease the level of fire protection in these f1re i~credse flre zones. zone,. 6.4 COrlclusion Conclusion Based on th~ ~bove evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire above evaluation. protection features ~rovide an adequate level of protection. fedtures ~rov;de Therefore, the exemptlons should be granted. ( c_ 7.0 0 FIRE AREA RB2-2 FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.1, U~rT U~IT 2 REACTOR BUILDING ELEVATION 476 FEET, 6 INCHES u FIRE AREA RB2-1 FIRE ZO~E 1.3.2. 1.3.2, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING SHUTDOWN COOLI~G PUMP ROOM ELEVATION 517 FEET, 6 INCHES o FIRE AkEAAREA RB3-2 FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.1, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING ELEVATION nnm, 47nH1. 6 IINCHES NellES oa FIRE AREA 1.4.1, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING TIP ROOM 7.1 Exenipt ions Reoues ted Exemptions were requested from Section III III.G.2 of Appendix R to the extent
.G.2 of that it requires the installation of all automatic fire suppression system.
7.2 Discussion 7.2.1 Flre Zone 1.1.2.1,
].1.2.1, Unit 2 Reactor Building Elevation 476 Feet, 6 Inch~s Inch"s This 1SlS the basement floor of the Unit 2 reactor bu11aing. builaing. The north, south.
south, and east walls of thlS zone form the exterior of the plant except that the lPCl LPC1 pump rooms (Fire Zones 11.2.1 and 11.2.2) are in iii -the the southwest and southeast corners, respectively, of this floor level. The west wall separdtes separates (his this zon~ from Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 cf ci Unit 3. The wallswdlls are 3-hour rated reinforced r~inforced concrete witr wltr all penetrdtions penetrations sedled sealed to a 3-hour rating except for II. 4-25
( 23 DRAff unrated unratea doors which connect this zon~ zone to the Unit 2 and Unit 3 reactor build1ng equipmer,t drain tank rooms and unsealed pen~tration~ buildlng equipmerlt penetrations to the LPCI pump roon,s. The ceiling roums. ceilin9 of this zone is constructed of reinforced concrete with 01 II electrical penetrdtions sealed except that mechanical penetrations to Fire al Zones 1.1.?.2 8.~.5.A are not rated. 1.1.7.2 and 8.<.5.A The combustible loading (electrical cables in trays) is 1000 Btu per square foot, which produce~ produces an equivalent sev~rlty severity of less than 1I milluteminute on the ASTM E*119 E-119 time-temperature curve. Hot shutdown equipment consists of LPCI valves and the redundant inboard isolation condenser valves power and control feeds (in conduit). The licensee has provided a linedr thermal detection system in and under cable trays, and a I-hour fire rated wrap on the proposed alternate power and control feeds to inboard isolation condenser valves. Portable fire the inbOdrd f1re extinguishers and hose stations arear~ available in this zone. There are two shutdown paths 1n the reactor building, viz., the isolation condenser path B1 BI and the HPCI/LPCI path C. GiVenGiven a fire in any of the fir~ zones, one of the shutdohll shutdohl' paths could be used to shutdown the reactor. These two shutdowr: paths are completely independent except for th~ the redundant inboard condenser valves power and isolation c.ondenser "nd control feeds. That is, path 81 relies on conoenser valvts the isolation conaenser valv~5 being in an open pOSition. The Th~ motor-operated inboard inbOard isolation condenser valves are normally open and they are locdted the} located in the drywell. The drywell is inerted. inert~d. The normal power and control feedsfeed~ are routed such that they are vulnerdble vulnerable to fire damage in ( adjacent Zone 1.1.2.2. Hence, flow would be cut-off and, in addition, equipment and cabling associuted with the alternative HPCl/LPCI HPCI/LPCI path may also be damaged by a fire. Therefore, by Ther~fore, alternative power and control feeds for the motor-operated lnboard isolation condenser valves have been inHalled. These feeds are routed 1nboard DG-2/3 tv Unit 3 MeC from DG-c/3 MCC 3R-l. 3R-I. From tht the MeC, the cables are routed through tht the Unit 3 redctor reactor building bui Idir,s and into a I-hour firE-fire rated wrapped conduit in Fire Zone 1.1.2.1. These cables then pass into Fire Zone 1.3.2. Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 contains cabling and equipment for fur tre HPCI/LPCI shutdown path(C). Therefore, fire 1n Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 dictates a fir~ d1ctates the use of alternative safe shutdown path Bl (isolation condenser) and the condenser valves will be fed by the alternativ~, I-hour fire rated wrapped conduit power and control 1-hour contrc,l feeds. 7.2.2 Fire Zone 1.3.2. Unit 2 Reactor Buildlng Build1ng Shutdown CC01ing Pump Elevation 017 Room E1evation ~17 Fett, Fe~t, 6 Inches. Fire Zone 1.£;.J, Reactor Building TIP Room, elevation 517 feet. 1.~.J, Unit 3 Reac.tor feet, ncl,:S . 6 iinct.E:s. The staff has reviewed the licensee's request for exemptions in these zones and finds thdt betdusebecause alternative shutdown capability is provlded prov1ded for these. exemption zones an exempt ion from the requi requirements rements of Section IIII!.G.2 l.G.2 of Appendix R iis5 not required. Th~ licensee hds has requested exemptions from the requirements of Sectlor III.G.3 tv install'a Sect10r install*a fixed suppression system in these Fire Zones. These exem~tions are evaluated 1n Section 4.0 of this safety evaluation. Tht:se c. II I I..4-26 4-26
( Il r- ,-, 26 OR~:,;= ; 7.2.3 Fire Zone 1.1.1.1. Unit 3 Reactor Building Elevation 476 Feet, 6 Inches Th is zone 1S This 1 s the babasement sement floor f1 oor of the Unit Un i t 3 Reactor Building. Buil di ng. The north, south, and west walls of this zone for~ the exterior of the plant except that the LPCl pump rooms (Fire Zones 11.1.1 and a~d 11.1.2) are in the southwest ~nd respectively, of this floor level. The east wall separates southeast corners, respectively. this zone from F1re Flre Zone 1.1.2.1 of Unit 2. The south wall also separates fro~ Fire ZO/l~ this zone fror.1 ZOlle 11.1.3 (one of two HPCI pump rooms). The combustible loadin9loadins is 2000 Btu per squre foot, which produces an approximately 2 minutes on equivalent severity of apprOXimately en the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. Unit 22 and 3 are the same design; therefore, the description of previously d1scussed dlscussed Fire Zone 1.1.<.1 l.l.~.l in Section 7.2.1 from which this zone ;s is separated by a 3-hour rated concrete wall, also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 except as notE:o. notea. Alterllative Al terJldt i ve shutdown capabl1ity capabll ity is provided independent of this thi s zone by equipment located in Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.A,lol.l.S.A, 1.1.5.B, 1.1.1.5.C, and 1.4.1. With respect to safe shutdown, the issue of alternative powr power and control feeds for thp the inboard isolation condenser valves is the same for Unit 3 as was described for Flrf Flre Zone 1.1.2.1 in Unit 2 (see Section 7.2.1). 7.3 £valuatlun Evaluatlofl ( The fire protection in the above-described four fire zones does not comply technical requirements of Section 111.G.2. with the teChnical III.G.2. of Appendix R because an suppressien system has not been installed. auto~atic fire suppression There was a concern that a fire in one of these tire fire zones could cause da loss of normal safe shutdown capability. However, the fire loading in these fire zones 15 zone~ lS n~gli9ible. r,egligible. Becaus~ Because otat the low combustible loaaing, loaoing, a fire of signif-icant magnituoe or duration is not expected to occur. Fire detection ;s is provided for these fire zones. Th~refore.Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that a fire in any of the subject fire f;r~ zones will be detected in its early stages and extinguished by th~ the fire brigade before redundant sdfety-related safety-related components are th rea tened. provlsion of a I-hour fire rated wrapped conduit that contains the The provlsio~ alternative isolation conaenser condenser valves power ana and control feeds routed through thes fire zones 01 also alternative safe shutdown path remains so ensures that the alternativE! available with respect to the isolation condenser valv~ valve flow path. This is priOlari primarily Iy because of the 10\,110>1 fire severity potential and lack of fire hazards 1n these four fire zones. HIt! 1n Hie staff has determineo det~rminea that there is redsonablt: redsonabl~ assurance that a flre in any of these fire zones will not result in the loss of safe shutdown capability. 01 The staff finas Thp. finos that the ir.stallation of a automatic fire suppression system would not signiflcantly increase the lev~1 levei of fire protection in these fire zoroes. zones. . , ( II. 4-27
( 27 7.4 Conclusion Based on the abuve ab~ve evaluation, the stiff staff concludes that the existing and the proposed fir~ fire prot~ction features combin~d with the alternative shutdown capability independent of the above-described zones provide an adequate level of protection. Therefore, the exemptions should be granted. 8.0 a 0 FIRE ZOt-iE ZONE 1.1.1.2, lIf:!TlI~:!T 3, REACTOR BUILDING ELEVATION 517 FEET, 6 INCHES oa FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.3, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING ELEVATION 545 FEET. FEET, 6 INCHES 8.1 Exemptions R~questeG R~guesteG Exemptions were requestp.o from Section 111.G.2 III.G.2 of Appendix R to the extent that it requIres the installation of an automatic fire suppr2ssicn suppl2ssicn system. 8.2 Discusslvn Discusslun 8.2.1 Fire Z~~e 1.1.1.2, Unit Zur,e ].1.1.2, enit 3 Reactor Building Elevation 517 Feet. Feet, 6 Inch~s Inches This zone surrounds three-quarters of the inerted drywell (Fire Zon~ Zone 1.2.1) and is adjacent to Fir~ Fire Zone 1.1.2.2
],1.2.2 on the east, Fire Zones 1.3.1 and 1.4.1, the turbine building all on the north, and Fire Zone 9.0.C on the south.
( Ur,;ts 2 and 3 are of the same design; then,fore, Uhits discussed Flre therEfore, the description of previou~ly Zone 1.1.2.2 in Section 4.0 also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. FIre Zon~ previou$ly This 'zone is separdted separated frow. fro~ adjacent loneszones by 3-hour rated fire barriers, rated doors, ana pelletratiur; penetratiur; seals with the follo . . ing excepticms: follol'oing exceptiNls: The south ana west walls are nonrated; the floor has n(}nrated nunrated mechanical penetration to tCl Fire Zone 1.1.1.1; the ceiling has open hatches. hatches, stairways, and n:echanical penetrdtion to Eire Zone 1.J.1.3. The electrical penetrations are sealed with noncombustible matrlal. matErIal. Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C, above, lS IS separated by da 3-hour fire rated floor/ceilius floor/ceil iuS assembly. Combustible loading is approximately 23,000 Btu per square
~quare foot, which produces an equivalent severity of 17 minutes (in the ASHl [-))9 time-temperaturE:
ASTN [-119 time-temperature curve. In the viCinity ,icinity of the DG-2/3 bus duct dnG anG cables, th~ the fire load loae is negligible (2,000 Btu per square foot} foot)
- The Licensee has in~tdlled ins td II ed a fire fi re detection detecti on system sys tem throuQh through the zone, sealed sea I ed openings to the Unit 2 Reactor Builaing Builoing to a 3-hour fire ratins, ratir", and rerouted and wrapped 1n In a 1-hour I-hour fire rated enclosure the Unit 2 pOI-IeI' pO~lel' and control cables for the 2/3 diesel aiesel generator and auxiliaries. ThE 2/3 diesel generator is used to provide power for ~.fe shutdown in the event of a fire ir. most f(Jr !:.ofe Unit 2 and and:'3 fire fir~ zones.
zone~. All redundant DG-2/3 cables are rcut~d rcuted through fire zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 otscussedoiscussed below. One DG-2/3 division, per the requirements of Appendix k, h, was provided with a l-hour I-hour fire rated wrap. This provid~d tor the Unit 2 4KV bus duct. wrap was also provided 8.2.L Fire Zone 1.1.1.2, Unit 3 Reactor Building Elevatl0n 8.2.< FirE ElevatIon 545 Feet. Feet, 6 Inches II.4-28 11.4-28
c( This zone surrounds Fire Zone 1.2.1 and Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C. l.l.I.5.C. It is above Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 described previously and below Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 described in Section 4.0. It is adjacent to the turbine tlJrbine building on the north and to Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 on the east. Units 2 and 3 are of the same design; therefore, the description of previously oiscussed Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 in Section 4.0 also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.3 except as noted. The combustible loading ;s is approximately 16,000 Btu per square foot, which produces ~n an equivalent fire severity of 12 minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperdture curve. In the vicinity of the l-hour I-hour fire wrapped
~Irapped cables, there are no combustibles present. The Licensee has installed fire detection through the zone, seal~d all penetrations to Fire Zone 1.I.I.S.C 1.1.1.5.C to a 3-hour rating, and sealed all pt:'netrdtl()n~
rdting, pE:netrat1on, to Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 to a 3-hour ratlOg. ratlng. The redundant DG-2/3 auxiliary control, power, and excitation cables are rOLted ro~ted through this fir~ fire zcne. zene. One division divi~ion is wrapped in a I-huur I-hour tHe rated barrier ano tlr~ ~nQ it 151~ routed appro~imately appro,imately one foot off the floor. 8.3 Evaluation The fire protection in the above-descriued above-descri~ed two fire zones does not comply with the technical requirements of Section II1.G.2.bIII.G.2.b of Appendix k because an automatlc automat1c fire suppression system has not been installed. installed .
- c.(
. f1re protection concern for these two fire zones was that a fire could The flre start and damage redundant DG-2/3 r~dundant divisions of DG-2/3 cables or its bus ducts. DG-2!3 supplies power to both Units and is required for emergency pOWE'r power in the event of a flt"e f1re in most mOSt fire zones. For both of these fire zones. zones, the f1re flr~ load is low and does not exceed. exceed, on the overage, a 17 ]7 minute f1re flr~ severity. In the vicinity of the I-hour wrdpped wrapped divisior. division cf DG-2/3 cables, there is either no combustibles or only a negligible amour.t. amount. Therefure, Therefore, it is expected that a fire would develop slowly ana rema ;i n sma 11. aM 11 . F1re detection is provideo Flre providea for these two fire zones so that there is rease,r.able assurance that the fire brlgade reasor.able bngade would be summoned sUll1lloned in a timely manner. Because of tr.e t~e low fire load, the fire brigade can quickly extinguish the fire. In the interim, the I-hour fire rated wrapped DG-2/3 diviSion 01 tht= cables can successfully cable5 succeSSfully withstand the effects of ad small fire associated with these two fire zones. The staff has determined that there is reasondble reasonable assurance thdt a fire in ie ar.y any of the5~ these two fire zone~ w111 not r~sult ;n zones wlll in the loss of safesafE shutdown capability and, also *. that the installation of an automatic fire suppression also,. system throughout the fire zones would not siynificantly upgrade the level of fire protection. 8.4 Conclusion BaSed Based on the dbove above evaluation, evaluatio~. the staff concludes that the existing and c proposed pruposed fire protecticn i~atures provide dn prutecticn f~dtures Therefore, the exer::ptions should be gra.nt~d. an adequate level of protection. grant~d. 11.4-29 I 1.4-29
( 25 29 9.0 MAl~ MAI~ tO~TROL COtiTROl ROOM A~OAr;Q AUXILIARY ELECTRIC EQUIPMENT ROOM (FIRE AREA IB-V) HECiRle EQUIPMEhT TS-V) 9.1 Exemption Reguestec Requeste~ An exemption was requested from Section lII.G.3 III.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires installation of a fixed-fire suppression system throughout a fire area for which an alternative shutdown capabllity is provided. 9.2 Discussion Flre Ar~a TB-V consists consist5 OT 01 the control rooms for Units 2 and 3 3 (Fire Zone 2.0) and the auxiliary electric equipment room (AEER). dnd thE (AEER), Fire Zone 6.2. Fire Area TB-Y TS-V is separateo trom tram dll other plant fire areas by complete 3-hour fire rated bart'iers. ban'iers. The firE:' fir~ load is 41,500 Btu per square foot for the control room and 118,000 Btu per square foot for the AEER. The fire load is almost totally comprlsed compnsed of cable insulation. Both fire load values translate into a fire severity 5eventy of lESS less than 1-1/2 Hours as represented by the ASTN ASH; E-119 E-1I9 fire test tes t curve. protectl"" for this fire area cons1sts Fire protectlun conslsts of a complete fire detection syst£-ni syster,i in both fire zones. Flre FHe Zone 6.2 has an dutomotic dutomatic halon fire suppress suppressionion systell: systen: and da manUdmanual1 CO tota total1 flood fi ~uppression system. re suppression fire Both flre fire zones have fire ~xtinguishers 2 Extinguishers and hose stations available. The main control contrel roo~ is continuously manned during plant operation. ( Since the control rooms and AEER contain maln control boards, switchgears, and
- ahl ir.g ing for ;7l0st
- lost the sdfety-reJated safety-related safe shutdOn;)
shutdon~ equipment .:ompo"ents compo .. ents ,-or
,'or tht:
th~ plant, a significant fire in Fire Zones 2.0 and 6.2 could affect the normal pla"t safe shutdown systems. This necessitates the use of an independent plallt alternative safe shutdown system(s). Two different alternative alternativE safe shutdown paths are available to the fire zones and are physically and electrically indepenaent of FirE ~rea flrea T~-V. 9.3 Evaluation The firE fire protection 1n ln Fire Area TB~V TB-V does not comply with the technical requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R because a fixed-fire suppression system has not been installed in a fire area for which an alternative shutdown st,utdown capability is pro~ided. provided. " The primdrj primdry concern for this tire fire area was that a fire in the main control room could cause the loss of normal shutdown Capability. capability. However, However. should a fire occur within the main control room, it is expected to be promptly detected by either the automatic fire detection system or by one of the stdtlOn statlon per-sonnel personnel manning theare"d.- the area. The fire is expected to develop slowly dnd be extingu;shea extinguishea prOMptly proMptly by the control room personnel or the firE fire br1gade. bngade. Should fire dar:Jage damage be extensive, requiting evacuation. then an alternative shutdo~n system can be used. dlternative safe shutdohn Because Fire Area TB-V has complet~ 3-hour firt' complete firt: rated barriers. it is expected that a fire would not spread beyond the bdrriers because of thE the low fir~ load (severity of 1.5 hours). The staff finas that the tr.e installation of a flxed fire suppression syste~ in the main control room (Fire Zone 2.0) would not significantly C".......... increase the level of fire protection in this area. The AEER (Fire incr~ase (Fir~ LuneLone 6.2)
;s is already equi:,~ed equi:,;;ed with an automatic automdtic flre suppression system, which exce~ds exceeds the requ Hemt::1 cf Jlpre 1 remen""" > d rl(jb ~f..
fl prpoc1;' .. 30 II.4-30 "II.4-
jO
- >0 DRAFJ DRAFl" 9.4 Conclusion B~s~a BBS~O on the above evaluation, evaluatl0n, the staff concludes that the existlng fire fir~
protection features ieatures in this area, combined with the altern~tive alternBtive shutdown capability, provid~ a level of protection equivalent to the technical JII.G.3 of Appendix R. Therefore, the exemption requirements of Section 111.G.3 should be granted.
- 10.
SUMMARY
Ba~ed Based on the above evaluatlon. evaluatl0n, the staff finds that the level of fire safety in the oreas/zones "reas/zones listed belo~ is equivalent to that achieved by compliance witr, the technical requirements of Section III.G.2. wit~ IIJ.G.2. of of,Appendix Rand, there-Tur*c, the reOUE'st Ture. reOt/fst for fur exemptions in thE:tht following areas/zones should be granted:
- 1. Crib House (Upper clllO oliO Lower Levels), Fire Area.
Area 11.3 to the extent that 20 feet sepdration freE:free uf of intervening combustibles or fire hazaros is not provided between the redundant trains of safe hazara~ shutdown cables, cabl~s, equipment ?nd ~nd associdted associated non~afety circuits. For details, see Section 2.0 detail~,
- 2. Units 2 and 3 Reactor Building, Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.2 ana ano 1.1.1.3 IO,0 the extent that 20 feet separation free of intervening combustibles or fire hazards is not. provided between the: tile redundant trains of Of safe shutdown cables equipment and dssociated associated
( circuits. See Section 3.0 for n~re nunsafety cirCUits. more details.
- 3. Unlt 2 and 3 Reactor Building.
Building, Fire Zones 1.1.2.1 ano 1.1.1.1. See Section 7.0 for fur more information.
- 4. Unlt 3 Reactor Buildipg.
Building, Fire Zon~s Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3. See Section 8.0 for more information. Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the level of firE: safety in fir~ ~afety the areas/zones 11sted below ;s is equivalent to that achieved by compliance co*mpliance with
\'lith the technicdl requirements of Section 111.G.3III.G.3 uf Appendi. R and, therefore, the of Appendix request for exemptions in the following areas/zone shoula shaul a be granted.
- 1. Fire Zones 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4.
1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.5.0, 11.2.1, 11.2.2, 1.1.2.5.B, 1.1.'.5.C, 1.1.2.5.C, 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.I.S.A, 1.1.1.5.A, 1.1.1.S.C. 1.1.1.5.C, 1.1.1.5.B, 1.1.1.1. 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2. 1.1.1.~, 1.1.1.4, 11.1.1, 11.1.2, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.3, 1.3.1, 1.s.2, 1.3.1. l.s.2, and 1.4.1, Units 2 and 3 Reactor Buildings to the extent that firE fire detection and fixed-fire suppression syste~s systems dr~ dre not provided throughout the area/zone. See Section 4.0 for more information.
- i. B.2.5.C, 8.2.6.C, Fire Zones B.e.S.C, B.2.6.C, 8.2.1.A, 8.2.2.A, 8.2,5.A, 8.2.5.A, 8.2.5.8, 8.2.5.B, B.2.6.A, 8.2.6.B.
8.2.6.A, 8.2.6.B, 8.2.7, 7.0.A, 8.1, B.1, 9.0.A, 8.2.1.B, 8.2.2.B, 6.2.2.B, 8.2.4, 8.2.5.0, B.2.6.D. B.2.5.E, 8.2.5.0. 8.2.6.D. 8.2.5.E, 8.2.6.E, 6.1. 6.1, 7.0.B, 7.0.B. and 9.0.B. 9.0.B, Turbine Bui I di ng Zone Groups to the extent that fire lurbi ne Building fi re detection arod a~d fixed-flre suppre~sion suppre5sion systems are nut provided throughout the zones. See S~e Section 5.0 for more information. (' (
. II.4-31
31 DRAFT Fire Zones 1.1.2.6, 1.1.1.6, and 1.1.1.5.0, Units 2 and 3 Reactor Building> to the extent that fire detection and fixed-fire 8uildin9~ suppression systems are not provided throughout the zone. See Section 6.0 for more information.
- 4. Ilre Zones Ine Zone, 2.0 dnd and 6.2 of the contrCll control building for Units 1 and 2 to the extent that a fixed-fire suppression system is not provided Zones(s). See Section 9.0 for more information.
tt,rcughout the Lones(s}. Based on the above evaluation the staff finds the exemptions from section 111.(;.2 for lack of an automatic suppression system in Fire Zones 1.3.2 and 1l1.G.2 1.4.1 are not necessary. This Safety Evaluation WaS prepared based on a Technical Evaluation Report (TER-C5506-581) dated November 7, 1986, pr~pared prepared by Franklin Research Center (FRC) under u contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Corrrnission CO£ll1lission (NRC). Principal Cor:tributors: Prir.cipa) John Stang Dated:
- c.( 11.4-32
5 ( UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, O. D. C. C, 20555 September 28, 1987 otl OCl
,I'"...
Afro 2 tiIO Docket Nos. 50-237 and 50-249 Mr. l..I.. Butterfield, Jr. D. Butterfield. Nucledr Licensing Manager Commonwedlth Edison Company Post Office 80x Box 767 Chicago, Illinois 60690 Chicago.
Dear Mr. Butterfield:
SU8JECT:
SUBJECT:
FIRE PROTECTION APPENDIX R ORYWELl ORYWELL EXPANSION GAP EXEMPTION (TAC #61675 AND 61676) Re: Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3 The romission Cowission has jssued the enclosed Exemption to the technjcal requirements reguirements Sect10D III G 3 of Appendjx of SectloD Append;x R to 1Q CFR Part 10 CER part 50.SQ. relatjng to the instal-latjon alltomatic fire lation of automatic syopressjoo system in the fjre detectors and a fixed syppressjon ( dryweJl expansjon gryweJJ expansion gap at Dresden Units 2 and 3. in response to your request of June 5, 1986. A copy of the Exemption is being forwarded to the Office of the Federal Register for publication. The Notice of Environmental Assessment and Findings of No lio Significant Impact was published in the Federal Register. Daniel R. Muller, Director Project Directorate 111-2 Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V.V, and Special Projects
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure: See next page ( I r. 5-1
- 11. 5- I
( Mr. I1r. L. D. Butterfield, Jr. Dresden Nuclear Power Station Cowmonwealth Cowrnonwea1th Edison Company Units 2 and 3 cc: Mr. 11i chae 1 I. Miller
~1ichael Mill er Isham, Lincoln & Seale Isham. Beale Three First National Plaza Suite 5200 Chicago, Illinois 60602 Mr. J. Eenigenburg Eeniyenburg Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station Rural Rurd 1 Route til ill Morris, Illinois 60450 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office Dresden Station Rural Route #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Cha ii rman Board of Supervisors of Grundy County Grundy County Courthuuse Courthouse
( Morris, Illinois 60450 Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Corrmission, Commission, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Mr. Michael E. Parker, Chief Division of Engineering Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 1035 Cuter Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704
- c. 11.
I I. 5-2
( 7590-01 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the Matter of ) Docket Nos. 50-237
) and 50-249 COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY )
Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 and 3 l
)
EXEMPTION I. The Commonwealth Edison Company (CECa, (CECo. the licensee) is the holder of Provisional Operating License No,No. DPR-19. which authorizes op~rotion operation of Dresden DPR-25. which authorizes Station Unit 2. and Facility Operating License No. DPR-25, operat i on of Unit 3. 1These operation hese licenses provide, provide. among other things, thi ngs. that tha t Dresden Units 2 and 3 are subject to all rules. regulations, and Orders of the Conmission Conmis~jon now or hereafter in effect. licensee's site The station comprises two boiling water reactors at the licensee1s located in Grundy County, Il11no1s. Illinois. II. On November 19, 1980, the Commission published a revised Section 50.48 and a new Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 regarding fire protection features of Appendix R became effective nuclear power plants. The revised Section 50.48 and Appendfx on February 17, 1981. Section III of Appendix R contains 15 subsections, requirements for a particular lettered A through 0, each of which specified reqUirements aspect of the fire protection features at a nuclear power plant. One of these request. subsections, III.G, is the subject of the licensee's exemption reque~t. 11.5-3
2 7590-01 ( Subsection 111.G.2 of Appendix R requires that one train of cables and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown be maintained free of fire damage by one of the following means:
- a. Separation of cables and equipment and anG associated nonsafety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating.
Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that required o~oT the barrier.
- b. Separation Separa ti on of cables cab I es ana equiprnent equi prnent and associated associ ated nonsafety circuits ci rcu its of redundant trains by a horizontal distdnce distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.
c ( c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a I-hour rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area. Subsection III.G.3 of Appendix R requires that where Subsection III.G.2 cannut be met, alternative or dedicdted dedicated shutdown capability should be provided. Also, for areas, rooms, or zones where alternative or dedicated shutdown is provided, fire detection and a fixed-fire suppression system shall be installed. III. By letter dated June 5, 1986, the licensee requested an exemption from Section III.G.3 of Appendix K R to the extent that it requires the installation of automatic fire detection and fixed-fire suppression systems 1n In the drywell expansion gap. c 11.5-4
3 7590-01 ( Th~ drywell is constructed of a steel containment shell that is surrounded by a concrete shield structure. The steel containment shell is spherical on the bottom and cylindrical at the top. The normal operation of the reactor (or accid~nts) will cause the steel ~hell to expand in all dirE:ctions. dire,ctions. This expansion is dccolTll1odated accolTmodated by providing a 2-inch
<-inch gap. During construction, polyurethane foam sheets were installed over the exterior of the steel shell. An epoxy impregnated fiberglass tape was used over the joints and then 1/4- and 3/8-inch 3/B-inch thick fiberglass-epoxy prefabricated cover panels were installed over the foam sheets. Concrete was placed over thls thIS material and, when hardened, the sandwiched materials provide the 2-inch gap because they art;!
art! crushable as the steel containment shell expands. The foam materials serve no other purpose. No fire protection is provided within the 2-inch gap. However, flre fire ( detectors are located in t.he reactor building fire zones adjacent to the mechanical drywell penetrations. 11anual electrical and mechanlcal r~anual fire fighting equipment is available throughout the reactor building. The only safe shutdown components located in the expansion gap are electrical conductors inside the electrical penetration assembly canisters and instrumentation taps in n~chdnical mechdnical penetrations. These electrical conductors are associated with valves required for hot and cold shutdown and associated cables for automatic RHR system functions. The taps for reactor level indicating switches and pressure indicators are routed in mechanical penetrations. The fire load in in.the
.the 2-inch gap is composed of the polyuretnane polyurethane sheets and flberglass fIberglass cover panels, both combustible. The 2-inch gap is bounded on one side by the steel shell and on the other side by a 4-foot thick reinforced concrete shield/wall.
( I I. 5-5 11.5-5
4 7590-01 ( The electrical penetrations all have the same basic configuration. An electrical assembly is sized so that it can be i~serted into the ~lectrical penetration nozzle. The nozzles are 12-inch 12-inch,t schedule 80 steel pipe, with wall tnickness thickness of 0.688 inches. Each assembly is in conformance with the ASME Boiler and PreSsure S~ction Ill, Pressure Code, Saction III, for Class B Vessels. The penetrations penetrdtions extend 1 foot beyond the drywell wall on both sides. The drywell wall in the vicinity of the penetrations is about 6 feat fe~t thick. types, viz The mechanical penetrations are of two types. viz.,
** hot and cold. The hot or.es aces are designed to accommodate thermal expansion and have guard pipes betw~~n between the line and the penetration nozzle. "The *The mechanical penetrations dre are Jlso dlso constructed of thick walled steel pipes and plates. The penetration nozzles conform to the ASME Pressure Vessel Code.Code, Section VIII. The nozzle walls are welded to the steel shell containment structure.
c The fire protection in the drywel1 drywell expansion gap does not comply with the technical requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R because a flxed~fire fixed-fire suppression systeni and a fire detection system have not been installed in an area for drea whic~ alternative shutdown system has been provided. an ijlternative There was a concern that a fire within the drywell expansion gap could damage safe shutdown related penetrations (electrical and/or mechanical). Because of the combustible material sandwiched within the 2-inch expanslon gap, it is possible that a fire could develop and spread through the expansl0n gap. There are tWO fire protection concerns for the drywell expansion gap. The first concern is whether or not da fire in the gap can spread out of the 11.5-6
5 7590-01 ( gap and into other fire areas or fire zones. The second concern revolves around whether or not a fire in the 2-inch gap proper can affect the safe shutdown capabi I ity by damaging the penetrations di capability rectly. directly. With respect to a fire in the drywell expansion gap spreading into other areas, the concern is mitigated rni ti ga ted by the fact that the 2-inch 2-i nch gap is sandwiched sandwi ched between the steel shell containment structure and the 4 to 6 foot thick reinforced concrete shield wall. The total mass of these two boundaries would serve as a hedt heat sink and dissipate most of the energy of a fire in the drywell gap. The penetrations consist of steel penetration nozzles that are welded firmly in place and surrounded by the concrete wall. This forms a complete enclosure of the gap except for a 2-inch annulus around each penetration. The drywell is inerted and the spread of fire into the drywell is, therefore. therefore, not possible during operation. Should a fire in the drywell gap ,( .( spread into the reactor building, it would effect only one fire area of one therefore, an independent safe shutdOWn unit and, therefore. shutdown path would be available. With respect to the effects of a drywell gap fire on the penetrations dnd the possible degradation of safe shutdown capability, it is unlikely that the electrical and mechanical penetrations would be damaged by an expansion gap fire to the extent that their function would be impaired, becaus~ because of the schedule 80 steel pipe, heavy nletal metal plates. plates, and their weld attachment to the However, the licensee did consider this possibility. steel containment shell. However. In Tables 11.2-3 and 11.2-4 of their June 5,1986 5, 1986 submittal, the -licensee
*licensee listed all of the safe shutdown functions that they had identified as being pen.etrations. As a result of that evaluation, the licensee contained within the pen~trations.
concluded that LI~ fire-HI fire"ln the drywell gap would not result in any impairment of safe shutdown capability in either unit for the following reasons: c 11.5-7 II .5-7
6 7590-01 c*(
- 1. Some electrical penetrations contain power cables to individual safe shutdown valves that are normally open and that mu~t mU5t remain open for hot shutdown. A fault in, or loss of, these cables will not cnange change the pOSition position of the valves.
- 2. Other penetrations contain cables which could disable the Target Rock RocK valve if they were damaged. However.
However, the mechanical function of the Target Rock RocK and other safety relief valves will not be affected by a fire ti re in the expansion expans i on gap, thus assuring assuri ng availability ava i I abi I i ty of Reactor Pressure Vessel pressure control capability.
- 3. Instruments are available to monitor reactor vessel level that have their essential and associated circuits routed independent of the expansion gap, and
- 4. Manual
/*1anual actions can be petfonned performed to open valves required for cold c( shutdown or to close valves in lines that are not used as fluid paths for hot shutdown.
A fire. could cause a spurious readout of reactor water level indicator instruments located in the expansion gap. Correct readings could still be obtained from other redundant division instruments because the spacing between the redundant divisions routed through the gap is 45 feet. The amount of urethane is limited and a fire would involve only one division at a time. Once the material burned away from a penetration, the temperature would return to ambient level quickly. Dresden Unit 3 gap fire investigative report In the Oresden Nay 6, 1986, this was found to be the case, and, further, it was also dated Hay concluded that plant safe shutdown capability is still maintained given a drywell expansion gap fire. ( 11.5-8 II.5-8
7 7590-01 c( A flnat flnal reason that d fire detection and a fixed-fire suppression system should not be requlred for the drywell expansion gap space is that it would be physically impossible to remove the existing foam and install the fire protection systems. In any event, th~ installation of a fire detection system
,Hid iIa cHid fixed-fire suppression would not -significantly significantly upgrade the level of fire protection for either Unit 2 or Unit 3.
dbove evaluation, the staff cor.eluded Based on .the above cor.cluded thdt that the existing eXisting fire protection features and physical characteristics of the drywell expansion gap and its boundaries provide a level of fire protection equivalent to the technical requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R. The licensee provided information relevant to the II"special special circumstances circumstances"ll finding flnding required by revised 10 CFR 50.12(a). The licensee stated that eXisting existing and proposed fire protection features at Dresden Nuclear Power Station Units 2 C::_ ( . and 3 dnd accomplish accompl i sh the underlying purpose of the rule. Implementing modifications to provide additional suppression systems ana aetection oetection systems would require the expenditure of engineering and construction resources.resources, as well as the associated capital cests, which would represent an unWdrrantedunwarranted burden on the licensee's resources. The licensee also stated that these costs are significantly ;n in excess of requireo to meet the underlying purpose of the ruI.e. those required rule. The staff concludes that "special circumstances" exist for the licensee's requested exemptions in that application of the regulation in these particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purposes of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. See 10 CFR 50.12(a){2)(ii). 5ee 50.12(a)(2)(ii). IV. Accordingly, the Commission* has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), that (1) these exemptions as described in Section III are authorized by law and (c 11.5-9 II .5-9
6 Revision 8
/ UNITED STATES Apri1 April 1992
\, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. WASHINGTON, 0, D. C. C, 20555 January 5, 1989 Uockef Uock~t ~os.: 50-237 er,cj 50-249 cr.d
~r. Henry E. Bliss Henrv tiuc 1ear' Li Nuclear Lj'~nsing
~cns i ng Manager C orrllTlor,WI)"l :; ;;11 r.o",mor,wl!~ E~ i son Corapany
~h E.~ Company P0st Oftit~ box 767 r~SL rhica9C, 1::1nois rhfcagc, I ::lnois 60690
Dear r*lr. I'ir. Eliss:
Bliss:
~Uo"ECT:
- Uo"ECT
- or SAFETY EVALUATION or EXEMPTIONS I<EQUESTED KEQUESTED FR(lM FR(1M FIRE PROTECTION REQUIRH'FH~ Of APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR PART 50 AT DRESDEN STATION REQUIREt-'n;T!>
UNITS 2 AND 3 (TAC NOS. 59851 AND 59852) Ry 1 liy ~(:tters d ters starting 1C, 1984 through Apri114, sta rt i ng August 10,1984 Apri 1 14, 1987 you requested exemptiOll5 exemptiOlls tor sorllt; sor,le of the specific technical requirements of Section III.G of Ap~'l r~c1;x R to 10 eFR Ap>.",rlix CFR Pdrt 50. In addition, during this time period some of tht= th.o
- e r~que~ts for exemptions have bepn withdrawn and others f'1r.dified.
rt:quf;!~t$ lie have rH;ewt:d We o.!\..ceplab
.!cceptable.
rfviewt:d the thE gguested le:. Cur Safety Eva Iisuested exemptions and determined thut luatioll 'i~ e"c1osed. Evaluatiol1i~ enclosed. Plodified. that they are Sincerely. Sincerely,
~: tl.~rOj.ct
( tl~roject Project Directorate l1I-2 111-2 Manager Divis Division iou of Reactor Projects - Ill. iII. IV, V and Special Projects [I,(.1osure: [lot 1osure: stdted As stdtc:d cc CC w/t:l1closure: w/cl1closure: Set' lIe>:t rage Se~ II(:Xt ( 11.6-1
Revision 8 April 1992 ( Mr. Henry E. Bliss Dresden Nuclear Power Station Commonwealth Edison Company Units 2 and 3 cc: Michael I. Miller, Esq. Sidley and Austin One First National Plaza Illinois 60603 Chicago, 1.111n01s Mr. J. Eenigenburg Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station Rura 1 Route #1 Morris, Illinois 60450 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office Dresden Stati on Station Rura 1 Route n
#l Morris, Illinois 60450 Chairman Board of Supervisors of Grundy County Grundy County Courthouse
-c . Morris, Illinois 60450 Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road, Bldg. #4 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Mr. Michael E. Parker, Chief Division of Engineering Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety Illino;s 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704 c II .6-2 11.6-2
,;," h' Revision 8
.' 11' UNITED STATES April 1992
-' -\~ ~,\ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
( ~- '~iJ!ll* *1# ~
,><,:,. r /
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 4-
~~£ETY
~HETY Ern UATION BY
£\,1:1 BY T~E THE OFFICE or NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION Nl'CLEAR RELkT!VE TO APPErIDIX RElf..T!VE APPEI/DIX R EXEMPTIONS EXlMPTIONS REQUESTED FOR DRESDEN DRES[}Eti UNITS 2 ANGAN[i 3 NOS. 50-237 AND 50-249 DOCKET 1i0S.
1.0 l.OllnODliCTION NT~ODGCTION Py 1etf:crs letters dated August 10, ]0, 1984 a~ as supplemented September 18, 1985 r1Clrch /1arch 12 anCi anG Murch 20, 1986, COI1lTlonwealth COlllllonwealth Edison Company (CECo, the liccnseej licenseel requ~sted exemptions from Sution IIl.G froln Section IIl.C (,fcf Appendix R to 10 CFR 50. fy Ey letter dated October 16, 1985, the licensee submitted additic~al fire pr0tection exe~vtion exc~ptlon requests that were paginated as an extension of the licer.see1s licer.see's September 18, 1985 ]9(:5 stJbmitta1. subffil tta l. By letter dated May 30,1986, i cerlsee further revised 30, 1986, the 1licerlsee rev i sed exemption exempt ion rt;*ouest r~'ouest 5upr ,iittals ba~ed on a meetillg sut>r,;ittals meetl1l9 held at the NRC on April B, 1986. This pvaluatiN: is baseG on the informatior. E'valuatie>r! informatior, provided in the above submittals, as well
~s inform~tion/clarification made available during the sit~
ilS informut,ion/clarification sitp visits on August 29, 198f. and April Apri 1 6 and 7, 1987 and by letter letter' dated AprilApri 1 14, 1987. lhis Ihis evaluation is bas(d bascd in In part on the attacbed attached Technical Evaluation Report (TEk) written by the NRR contractor, ccmtractor, franklin Franklin Re-search RESearch Center (FRC) which has ( (rEf.) bfen rev'; bE'en eweci by the stilff. rell'eweci st~ff. Sectj~~ Sect i0r, II1,G.1 IILG.l of Appendix R requires r'equires fire protection features to be providec providcc
.t'lrl' strucWI'es, systf.nl~,
.rill' structu,'es. syst~nl~, dna conlponents impcr-tant dnd conlpcnents impcrtant to safe shutdown and capab h, h*
(;f limiting of limitin~ fire damage so that:
- u. Or;~
Or:e train of sJ~tsms s,)'~tems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions fronl either the control room or emergency ~r.lCrgency control station(s) is fr~e fil'I! demage; fr",e of fjr~ Q?mage; and b. l:. Syst<"1i15 necessary to Systems achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the toaddeve
~lIntrol room Ot*
l:lIntrol E.!r,~rgencj' control station(s) can be repaired '-/ithin 0" (!r,oergenCjl ~Iithin 72 hours. Section III.G.2 of Appendix R requires that one train of cables and equipment neces$"ry to neCeS$i,ry to* achi~v(> achi~ve dnd mai,,!ain safe shutdown be maintained free of fire and mair.1ain dar.;uge by on(: diitiug~ on" of the following means: iJ. iJ.. ~paratior:
~epara tior: cf ct cables and equipment cab les arid equ i pment and associated nonsafety circuits ci rcu i ts Clf redundant trains by a fire barrier* having a 3-hcUl' 3-hcur rating. Structural
~teel formifi9 fOrr.1illg a part of (.r ~r supporting such fire firE! barriers berriers shall be .
~rottcted
/Jrottcted to prcv~de prcv~Gc fire resistance equivalent tu that requirpd requir£>d of the but'l";f>r.
bdl'l'ipr. ( I I. 6-3 II.
Revision 8 April 1992 b. b, Separatioi. Separatior. of cables and equipment and associated nonsafety cirr.uits circuits of r~dunddllt r~aunddllt trains by a horizontal di~tance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustibles or fir' hazards. In addition, fire detectors fir!" huzards. al,a an autor;lOt.ic arid suppressiun ~Jstem autof;lM.ic fire suppressiort system shall shall*be'be installed ill in the fire areii are"..
- c. Enclosure of cab le: 1~ and equipment and associated nonsafety circuits of orl( or,(
redunaant train 1n a fire barrier having a I-hour rating. In addition, f1re fir!" detectors and ana an automatic fir~fire suppression system shall be inst~lled in the fire area. tI,e ~bove It tilE' Jbove condiiions are not met, Section III.G.3 IIl.G.3 requires that there be an alternative shutdown capability independent of the fire area of concern. It also requires that a fixed suppressiorr suppression and fire detection system be installed in the fire area of concern if it contains a large concentration of cable or other combustiblH. lhese These alternative requirements are not deeliled to be equivalc*"t; I,owever, they provide equivah:llt equ;valc-/lt; equivah:nt protection for those configurations ir, which they are accepted. lrl cecause Iiecausc it "it is
;s not possiLle to predict the specific conditions under whlch which fires may c:ccur r,ccur and prCipagate, prc;pagate, the des i9n basis protect design protectivelve features rather than the desigr, basis firE:
desigr: fire are specified in the rule. Plant-specific features llay IIklY require prot.:ctie;n prot~cti(;n differpnt different from the mf::asures mt:asures specified in Section III.S.IlI.S. In such a c~sp. the licensee must demonstrate, by means of u a detailed fire hazards analysis that e):.istin~ existin!! protection 0" existing protection ir, prcJtection Ot' iT. conjunction with proposed modifications will provid~provide Q ~eve1 of safety equivalent to the technical 0 ~~vel requirements requil'ements of Section I1I.G Ill.G of Appendi~ Appendix R. In SUIilr.lary, Ill.G is related to fire protectior Section IILG sur.rr.lary, Sectlorl protectioT features for ensuring that SySt.H1S SySt.H1S and associated circu*j ts used to achieve and nJainta circuits in safe shutdown maintain are free of fire damage. Either fire protection configurations must meet the ~pecific requirements nf Section III.G !.ipeciflc Ill.G or an alternative fire protection con-figuratiol R,USt be justified by a fire hazards i}na figuratiol'l RIUst lysis. G&riera analysis. GEmerally, thE staff 11y, th~ aCCEpt an alternati~e lIi11 aCcEpt uil1 a1ternetive fire protection configuration if: , He alternative ensures that one train of equipment necess~ry T~e necessary to achieve hot stlutdown frol~ either the control rlJom shutdown frOI;) ruom or emergency control stations is free of fire dar.~ge. o The a1ternative alternative er.sures that fire damage to at least one train of
~quipment. l1'cessary to achieve cold shutdown is limited so that H equipment necessary it can he be rcpaired I'cpaired wit.hin a reasoucb le time h"incr reasollcb1e (elinor repairs using components stored on the site).
o Fir~-retardant Fire-retardant coatings are not used as fire barriers. o ~todifications
~lodifications reau;red reauired to meet Section II ~nhance fire I.G would not enhance III.G protection safety levels above that provided by either existing or proposed alternatives.
propos~d l1odificatiom. l1odifications required to meet Sectior, IU.G IIl.G would be detrimental to Qverall facility safety. overall II .6-4
Revision 8 Aprn 1992 April (
?O rIP! tullE np[ ZONE 11.311.5 t~*lr.
LPIR HOUSE' HOUSE (UPPER (lIPPER AND LOWER LEVELS) 2.1 [;.-elilp l i UII~ [,'ewp U/l~ P.eQue P.eQuess ted EX~/IIr-tiolts EX~IiI~tioll> \~He I,He requested from Sect.ion III.G.2 IILG.2 of Appendix P. t.o the e)(t~nt ext~nt that it requires sepu~tiorl of cab requi res separotion les. equipment. anci cables. iissliciated r.cnsafety and o.ssliciated circuits or redundant redlJnddnt tl'ilir.s triJir.s by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet ',( wit~ wiU, ~o no inter~ening ct'mbustibles or illtenening ccmbustibles 01' tire hazard~. 2.2 Dis(,!.!5!.ion Disr!.!s~ion 2.2.!! 2.2. t~lIJt!i'
~~lP~l' Crib House The Cnb enb Hcuse is physically separated fren: froiT, the main plant buildings. The upppr crib hous~ is located on elevation 509 feet 6 inchos. inches, and 517 feet inch~s of the crib heuse.
6 inchts hcuse. This 20ne zone is separated fr0m frC!lll the lower crib house by cla r~illforced rejnforced concrete fl(.oor fluor slab penet.rated penetrated by enclcsed stair opt:nings, op"nings, r.dpf> pjpr p~IIt:4_r(ltions pellc'.rations aile an" r-Joor noor dl*uins. dl'ains. The zone contains fivf service 'r-!c.ter ~!HH pumps and ar:d asscr~iJ-:':ed asscr'iJ'.;ed cabliu9, dies(:, fire pum~ cabling, the die-sf:; pumli and associated equiplIllnt. equiprnt.nt, and six iat ing water pumps. Saft.! circ.~jating circ.(; Safe shutdown equipment inc.ludesindudes the five service
~f<l':r,r pUITIPS V!,J':t?r pu"'ps (two Unit 2 PIJIiiPS, pumps, two Unit 3 pumps. pumps, am:!
and a Llswing" a Unit 2/Unit 3 "swing" p~li,p). Pumps are designated J,>l.lr.p). deSignated Unit 2., 2, Unit 3 or Unit 2/Unit 3 "swing" depehding wher. tr.e en whert: "Li',e power feee! feed comes from. Both units call can be lJrou~ht llrou~ht to hot shutdown using usin9 anyone of the five pumps, but two pumps are needed for cold shutdown. shutdown, purrr~ discharg0 The puwr~ ciischarge, "to to a commor. header; therefore, all are available for either u,.,i'c.. ullh. Adjacent pumps are s<:parated separated by approximately 28 feet, tlith tilth intervening cOliibustibles cOfl,bustibles consisting of lubricilting lubricatin9 oil in pump moton Gnd and water pumps and short lengti',s lengti".s of cablin£cab I in£ between the tt,e service water pumps anc! anG the lower crib hou$e (routed through the hOU$e thE' wall less than 10 feet south oi th~ pumps). OT tht: The combus'c:ble loading in the zone is 13,000 Btu per square foot, which produces ali an equivt.lent equivo lent severity of approxirr.ately minutes on the ASTH E-119 approxiw.ately 10 mirlutes tir.1l~ temper,l:ure curve. It (.onsists primarily of lubricating oil in the siX tirw .. t.emper.l:ure six (.ir'~lating water tirculating wat.er punlp moturs motors and the five service water pumps, pumps. diesel fuel 0;; irl on in the fire punlp day tallk, and a short length of cabling associated wi th with each pur.:p. The (:it:se t:it:sel1 fire pvmp and day tire pump tal'k are provided with a local aut01ll(lt Clay tarlk automutic ic open ht.'ilC htCac water spl'oy Spt*~y system. Curbs are installed on this level along Column/Row J.7 and Column/Row B ct;nterlint!s ccnterlines and around tht: the diesel fire pump day tank tc. tc prevent the spread_of spread,of oil to redundant pumps. The licensee has ir.stalled all li~tcD1atic sprinkler system to cover the E:ntire upper crib hou~e. an alttcmatic hou;e.
£.2.2 lower Lower Crib House The lower crib house is located on elevation 49C feet 8 inchts of the crib house.
Se~'Clration Se~,aration frc/in trClm the upper crib house is described above. The Z(.lm~ ZC!IiP. contain~ the diesp.l diesel ger.erator generator (;0('l1in9 (u('lling water pumps (one (onE: for each unit, and one for fur the cOlll11on common 2/3 ciicsel diesel generatod. generatod, associated cabling, and cabHng cabling for the $cniceservice watH watt<r purilPS, punlps, all of which are safe saf~ shut.down-rela.ted. shutdown-rel~ted. Cables are routed in trays alorg alor.g the fC'll:r frll:l' exterior .'ans of this lEvel t!xtl:rior .,,'ells level anti i.l ccnduit and trays frOlil antI ii' frow the north wan wali tu to the th~ south w~l1 1i~1l at about Column/Row 4. An automatiC automatic transfer switch
*c:'c _ - installc-c instal1(;c in gCI;erdwr 2:
gCliE-rdWr if; this zone selects 2:ZZ ("swing") se:lects thE' (llswing") coC) appropriate power feed for' the diE-Sl'l the appropriote 1ing water pump. cooling dio=sel I I. 6-5 11.6-5
Revision 8 April 1992 ( Only one 0-: (I: the three diesel generdtor cooling water pumps is required for hot shlJ~r.own shu'down of both boUI units. ThesE' pumps a're separated from each other by about 25 feet \~ith intervEming feet". I,jth comb~Hibles cOf,sisting intervening combt;!.tibles cOI,sisting of cable trays between the pumr-~, pumr- s , and Jubritating lubritating oil in pump sumps. The combustible loading in this lone, ccnsisting primarily prilllilrily of the previously described lubricating 011 ir, the oil ire six <.irculating tirculating water pumps and electrical cabling is 15,000 Btu per square
~:ltich produces an equivalent severity foot, 111,;ch sevel'ity of approximately approxillliltely 12 Qlinutes Dlinutes on th ASTM E-119 time-temperature c.urve. Lurve. Th~ThE: licensee has installed a curb around
~hl:'
Lhe diesel ger.r.ra'.;or g!.'rcrator 2/3 cooling water pump to prevent prE:vent any oil spills from spreaJ.~"9 spreaJjll\! to other equipment. Thf' lice2ns~e lic~nspe has hilS installe(f installecl automatic sprinkler systems between Column/Rows 3.5 and 4.5 4,5 of this level to prevent the spread of fire from on~ side to the oth~r one !ide other and to Sepill"Clte Sepill"ate the cab .. s from each unit at opposite cabl1~~ oPPosite ends of the bui lding building illllllY the s{'uth illtlllY I J. An open head water spray system actuated by ali near sfuth wa 11. heat detection system (cable), has been installed to protect cable trdYs trdys along lIorth, east, and west walls. The licensee has installed Iid heat detector-t.h., Ilorth, tr(: actuat~c automatit open head water spray system over the diesel generator 2/3 actuat('(~ automatic cooling Wil~er wa~er pump to prevent the spread of fire to other equipment. The licEnsee lit~nsee has enclosed cable conduits from the Units 2 and 3 cable trays to the ti,e
!.iit'std
<.iiesel gerlerator generator 2/3 cooling cooliny water pump automatic transfer switch. and from the thE f.witch to tile 2/3 diesel generator cooling water pump in a l-hour
$witch I-hour rated fire b2rrier, and has installed a complei~
barrier, complete ceiling level lev!.'l early warning fire detect ~ (.10Cln sy ster;l ster;1 throughout th; til; s zone. 2.3 Evaluation ("... pT(.~cction in these zones d(;es The fire prc'\:l:'ctioll dves not comply with the technical requirem~nts of Section requirements SectiCin III.G.2 of Appendix R because intervening combustiblf:!. combustiblf:~ or -[lloe hdZdl"ds are present between the redundant trains of safe shutdown fl1'e h.lzdnls 2qU pme r. rr.* 24U 1pille nere Tl>ere was? COlicern cOI;cern that th@ thE' intervening cOlllbustib les and fire hazards may combustibles create ...1 path for the spread of fire between redundant safe shutdown systems and result in a less of safe shutdown capability. However, because of the light I ight fuel lead lC2d i"ill these zones, a fire of significant magnitude or duratioll to caus" a 10$$ caus~ 10$S of safe shutdown capab il i ty is not expected to occur. shu tdown capability II; l.h~ 1Ii t!:P upper crib housp., intervening combustible!> combustibles do not provide a path for the spread of fire between redundant safe shutdown systems because the combustib~£*s combustib~f's (ca~:cs (ca~:es and lubric~tinglubricating oil) are present only in small quantities and are contin~ous on1y cont.inlAous only above the traveling screens which wi 11 not affect the redundallt redundant systems. In the lower crib house, house. intervening combustib~es combustibles in the form of cables do provide a path between redund~nt diesel generator cooling water pumps, but cab~e cab:e quantiti(*~ quarititi(*! ttre He small, path distances betweell between redundant pumps are approxi-rloltcly rloltely 5U to 60 feet. arC: license~' has instcl1ed ar() the licenseE:' insti'J1ed fire dHcctors dHectors and auto-r.latic sprinklers to cover these cabll';s.
"liltie cablt:s. Cables for redundant service wat.er pumps of ciich cuch unit are routed in cable trays around the perinleter perimeter ofot this zone; however, cat.les cal.les for Unit 2 pumps are t'outed l"outed in cabl~
cable trays on thE' the opposite Side side of thl* .one from cab 1(, tht* lone lr~ trays for the Unit 3 pumps such that the path dis.tilnce distance between cables cab les of different units is approximatelyapprox imate ly 150 feet. feet, C~bie Cab'e quantitie~ quantities iC.. are
~re small. The licensee has instal1ed installed fire det~ctors instdl1rr sprinklers to protect these cable trays.
has instdll~c detE:ctors throughout thi~ level and 11.6-6
Revision 8 April 1992
/ \(
if a ,'(curs, it sr.0uld fir" l14,;curs. d firt: shvu 1d not no t spread from the place place of origin ori gin or endanger
.*"c;urdant pumps 1'I;(;uf1dant pump, in the upper or lower cr-ib cr"ib house because the installed curbs
- .hould conf.t:in cont.~in lubricating oil spills, sprirlkler sprinkler systems installed above cable trays alld aud in other area~ area, should extinguish or control fires to prevent their zprcad via intervening cOIT.bustibles, sIJrcad cowbustibles, and the detection systems or water flow alarms should alert the thc plant fire brigade to respondrcspond to the fire. Upon arr;v~l, arriv,', the fir~ brigade should extinguish the fire if the sprinkler syste~r.
have n~t.rout. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that a fire in these zonc~ zone:;, will not result in the loss of safe shutdown capability. The staff also finds that t~at elimination cf a11 all combustibles and fire hazards from the spaces sepan.ti~sab separoti~sab lE's les and equipJrerJt equiprrent of redundant safe shutdown trains (in all cas~~ case~ ",ore~ore th(lll than 2G feet) teet) in the upper and lower crib house would not Significantly increase the level of fire protection in these two zones. 2.4 Conclusion Based Gn Gn the above aboy ~valuation, E:valuation, the staff cOficludes concludes that the existing existjng fire protect*;,.,,, features including the completed modifications provide an protec:t-il.lTi,
~c(eptable\lcvel protect i on. Ther~fore, the exemption i; cr.eptab 1e \ 1eve 1 of protection. exempt i on should shou ld be granted.
3.0 FIRE ZO~E ZONE 1.;.2.2, 1.:.2.2, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION 517 fEET FEET 6 INCHF~ INCHf~ l.J .2.3, UNIT 2 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION 545 FEET FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.3, INCHES { -(- 1.~.1.2, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION 517 fEET f IRE ZONE 1.1.1.2, fIRE E INCHES FEET lINIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION 545 fEET ZOJ.E 1.1.1.3, l1~!lT FIRE ZOIIE FEET l II'CHES L INCHES J.1
~.1 ExemEtions Reguestt!d Exefill2tions Re9uest~d Exel"ptio~s were requ~sted Exe~ptions reqli~sted from fror., Section III.G.2.b of Appendix R to the extent tt.at it require: separltior.
t~et separltion of cables, (quipment, associ.ted nonsafety
~quipment, and associdted circl11t~
circuits of redundilnt trains by a horizontal horizont"l distance cf af more thun than 20 feet wiH-witt* r.o intervEning combust r.u intervEliing ibles or fire hazards and automatic fire combustibles
~uppre$sion syst~~~.
syst£!r.l~. 3.2 D;r,cussi0!l D;~cussi0!l 3.2.1 rlr~ rlre 1.J.2.2~ Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 517 feet 6 Inches Zone 1.1.2.2, Z"r.e 1.1.2.2 surrounds three-quarters Fire Z",r.e th.ree-quarters of the lrJerted inerted drywell (Fire (fire Zone 1.~.2) and is adjacent to Fire 1.1.1.~ on the west, Fire Zont! fire Zone 1.1.1.2 Zon~ 1.3.2 and builliing on th~ the turbine building thE: north, and Fire Zone 9.0.C on the south. The zone zol.e is separilteo separ~tlid trom adjacent adjace~t zones by reinforced concreteconcret.e barriers with ratecl duors fire rateci GlJurs and penetration seals exceptions: The south
~Eals with the following £:xceptiotls:
~IIO edst exterior wal1~
triO wall~. ar~ arE: nonrated reinforced concrete; the floor has nonrated nunrated mec~D"ical mec~"nicdl penetrations pen~trations to the reactor r~actol' building, elevation 476 feet 6 inch~~ inch£!s (Fi .. ~ Zcr.e 1.1.2.1); and the ceiiing has open hatches, stairways and mechartici:tl (Fil'l! mechanical .( penetrations to tn' pelletrgtions r~actor building, eleviltion the reactor elevation 545 feet fect 6 inches (Fire Zone 11.6-7
Revision Revi sian 8 April 1992 (- ( 1.1.2.3), 1.1.2.3). Electrical p~netraticns are sealt::d tlectrical penetrations seal~d with noncombustible materials. Fil'~ Zone 1.1.2.5.C, Firt:: dirE~tly above, is separated by a 3-hour fire rated concrete J.1.2.S.C, dirttly loor-t~ il i 119 as ff1oor-~~jJ sernr ly assell'r ly.. Redundant r~dctor rCactor pressure and reactor water level local instrumentation, adjacent to the east ~~d ~r.d west side~ of the inerted drywell drvwell
,J ...
are located ir. in th*5 th'5 1,.- fi I"f: zone. The sepa fire ration eli separation stance between the redundant instrumentat Gistance inztrumentation iun rah raCL J enc ane associated cabling is at least 10C laC feet (around the drywel1 fil'b~ drywell wall) and firb"' stops hav.: have been installE'd in these cable trays. The combustible loading is bean instal1ed apprt,)'i:r.ately 25,000 Btu per square foot. apprc.'>.ir..ately foot, which produces an equivalent severity dPp'*r.~i",ately 19 minutes on the ASTM E-1l9 time-temperature curve. of dIJpY'ClC1111ately Hose stctiUll:' iind stctiOI1. portable extir,guishers are available. dnd pGrtable 3.2.2 Flt Flle Zone 1.1.2.3, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 545 Feet 6 Inchps F i ,'(; Zone 1.1.2.3 Fil'. 1.1. 2.3 surrounds the iinerted nerted drywe 11 (F drywell ; re Zone 1. (Fire 2..2) and the 1.2.2) isol~~ion isol,,;:ion conde~~er conder.,el' pipe chase (Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.C). It is above Fire Zones 1.1.,.2 1.1.<:.2 and 1.3.2 and arod below Fire Zone 1.1.2.4. It is adjacent to thE; tht: turbine
~uil~ing
~ui1uing on the north side and a~d Unit 3 r~actor reactor buildi~g building (Fire Z~ne J.1.1.3) on Zvne 1.1.1.3) the Nest!.
"est ~*,ae.
'Ioe.
This lone zene is separted from adjacent zones by 3-hour rated barriers with the follc*willg exceptions: The-fone*willg south and east exterior building walls are nonrated ThE' sOllth nonrilted reinflJt'ced concrete; the flour has unsealed hatches. reinflJl'ced concret.e; hatches, stairwells and mechanical penetrations to r~actor t'l'actor building, elevation 517 feet 6 inches (Fire Zone 1.1.2.2); and t1it:t"~ IPiAC liVAC duct/pipe penetrijtion penetrution to FirEFire Zone 1.3.2 b~iow bt<iow does not contain a0 dar.ip~r or fire sfal. rated dar.'per Electrical penetrations are scaled with Qa nOli*combus~ nOl;-combus~ ib le lE' materia 1. Hot shutdo":,, fiot shutdo~:r equ i pment in th equipment i s zone cons this consists ns trument racks i sts of redundant ;instrument sE~arated froril sqarated from each other by at least a 75-foot horizontal distal1ce distance wi,th c~bles with cc:.bles as the prindpal principal int.ervening int.ervl'ning combustibles. Th The combustlble loading, consisting cunsisting primarily of cable insulation and ar.d switchgear. switchgear, is approximately 20,000 Btu per square foot. foot, which produces an equiu lent sevcr'ity equivcalent sever'ity of approxir..ately 15 nlinutesndnutes on the ASTM E-119 E-1l9 time-temperature cuneo curve. The 1licenseeicensee has iusta lled fire stops in the cab installed le trays cable ana installed a fire detection system throughout the zone except for the RWCU arefi~ areu~. and heat exh~ngers.exlo"ngers. 3.2.3 Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. 1.1.1.2, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Guilding, Elevation 517 Fe~t Feet 6 Inch£s Illches Fire Zor.e Zone 1.1.1.2 surrounds three-quarters of the inerted drywell drywe 1*1 (Fire Zone i.2.1) and is ad,iacent cdjacent to fire Zone 1.3.1. 1.3.1, Fire Zone 1.4.1, the turbine buil~i~y built'ir.y on-the un the north, Fire Zone !i.O.C 9.0.C on the South. South, and Unit 2 Fire Zone Zune 1.1.2.2 on the c~st. C~5t. Units 2 and 3 are of the desigll; therefore, the description of Fire Zone thE' same design; 1.1.2.2 in Sectier.Section 3.2.1 also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.2 The combustible load is approximately 27.000 27,000 Btu per square foot. foot, which produces an equivalent sev~rlty sev~r,ty of approximately 21 ~inutes minutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature curve. The 1I iCEensee in~tal'.ed a fire detectic(1 ic.~nsee has in~tal',ed detecti(;~ system throughout the zone and sealed all penetrijtio~s non-exterior walls of this zone to a 3-hour penetrations in the non*exterior fire rat'ing, rat*jng. 11.6-8
Revision 8
-~ 7 - Apri April1 1992
( 3.2.4 Fin- ZClle 1.1.1.3, Unit 3 i?('lictor fin Zelle Elevztion 545 F~et RN.ctor Building, Elevction Feet 6 Inches UI.,ts UI .. ts 2 orr- cf the Silln!: and 3 c;rr- Sinn: <i£sign; tisign; therefore, the descriptior-llescriptioP of Firefire Zont! ZOlle 1.1.~.J 1.1.<..:1 in Secticn 3.2.2 als0 alsv applies to Fil~ file Zone 1.1.1.3. The combustibl~ combustiblt: l~~c lu"C is ~~ approxin~tely approxindely 16,~OC 16,~OO Btu per squilr'e squal~ foot. 3.3 Evaluation T~e Tre fire pro~~ctioJ. pro.:ctiolo in these zones dots do~s not comp1y comply with the technical e reavin.:r;,.;uts reavircr.,':lIts of Section III .C.2 of APPE:fidix IIJ.G.2 becausE': i.t1though ApPE:ndix R becauSE'; although sdfe shutdc~!r, safe shutdclll, equi~'M;IIt. equif,n'~IIt. ;n thc~f zones in tht5.f zcnes is s(:parated by a horizontal distance (if of more than 20 feet illtfr'vellillg combustible~ ()l' ft'et illtF.t'v(:lIing fire. hazards are present betweeu cr' fire: betweell the redund.1l1~ redundJII~ tr~ins of equipmeut equipmellt (,'ec.ctor coolalOt water lE:vl ("eactor coolalit levEl and pressu}'t! pressure instr'uliocntation), instfllli,cntat ond because automatic ion), lind suppr~ssion systePls automatir. fil'e suppression systel'1s are ilre not pI ()\ pI r,\ idcd thrullgl;out the ZOf!l;S. ided thruugl;out zones. Then, ~lo.iS Then; \,.;s ilu c.oncern concern that the interveniny intervening combustibles com~ustib1es arlO aMi fire hazards lfiaylI'ay
~rru.te r.rcute n~ p~tli pot!; for the spt'~ad spread of fire J:-.ctwe~n
~etwe~n rdundant shutdown sy~tems redundant safe shlitdown and thol:
end t/,r' ~i'ck th~t '\:Ii(' ~~ck of fit', fir'e supprt!ssicn suppression systems may permit Ule ti,e fire to continue cuntinue ro;sult in a l('~~ dna rt:'suH 1C'~~ or 01' sclf~ safe shutdown capatility. Howf:vt'r, How~vE'r, because of the ligbt rnodera:c fuel load, it is not expected that iliJ. fire of significant liY/lt tc TJlodera:c d~I'atiOI' 01 magnitude dlil'otiOf, ~'c;1I1d occur. lliagnitude \>'Could combustibles in Fire ZOBes Intervening combustib1es Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.2, and 1.1.1.3 pr(.lllide provide a path for .tht thE: spread of fire l'eduncialit safe shutdown systems in the form of c.ab behip.c'; reduncidlit behip.c!; les in trays. cables Howe'/er, quantities a10r'9 HoWe'/el", cable quar;tities a101'9 these puthsp~+'hs are small, path distances are at
- t:t.~t
- ~~H 75 feet, ilne; an':; the licEllsee instai1ed fin detection ~ystell1s liCensee has instailed ~ystems in all four of these zones afi~ iire stops in cable truys in fire ar;~ tire Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.2.3 e~d 1.1.1.2. <r.d 1.1.1.3 which cross from one side of the Reactor Building tc, the other. Should tCI Sllould a fire start, it sh(.uld sh~ulci not spreed to endanger redundantredund~nt syst.ems becaus~uecaus£ the detection systems will wi 11 alert the plant fire brigade to respvnc respune to th~ the firl fin: prior to extensive spread. Upon arrival, the fire brigade will fxtin~lUisl':
l'xtin9Uisr. the fire. lhc lhe st.aff finds that since sinc" the cables and equip~fit equipmellt of n~dlmclant r'~ctunc'ant trol i tl~ are sepal't:ted tra~rl~ sepal*~ted by a horizCJrlta horizontal1 di stence of more thiin distance thiln 20 feet in Fire Zct.~s 1.1.2.2, fire Zcr,,=s 1.1.LZ, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.2, arid arId 1.1.1.3 removing the intervenir.r. intervenirf, cor,;Lustib'les cr fire h,lzards cor.iLl.Istib*les hnards wouid not significantly significar.tly increase the level of fire protect protecti(m icm in these four zones. The staff aalso 150 finds that installation of o.ll~.('rr.atic a\,t,c'rratic firE: suppressior. systems would not significally increase the l£*vel fir~ sUjJprt!ssior. lE*ve1 of pr~tecticn pr~lecticn in i~ th~5e these four zones. 3.4 Conclusion Based on the abo~~ abo~1: evaluatior:. evaluatior" the staff concludes that the existlng fire protecticn t'~atur~s protection features combined \'ith I'jtll the avai lable separation distances and light available cOlolbustib'/e leading in the above-described zone~ cowbustible zones ~rovide an acceptable 11:vel l~vel pr('~r,ction. of prC1i:r:ction. Thcrefore, th~ Therefore, the exemptions should be granted. ' 4.0 " 0 REACTOR BUILOING, BUIl.IlING, FIRE fIRE AREA R32-1 1.~.2, 1.1.2.S.A, RB2-1 (Fire Zones 1.:1.2, 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.£ 1.1.2.5.t and 1.1.2.5.C) 1.1.E.5.C) o REACTOR BUILD~NG, FIRE REAC10R BUILD!NG, fIRE AREA RB2-I1 (Fire Zones 1.1.2.1, 1.].2.2, 1.1.2.2, 1,1.2.3, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.5.0, 11.2.1 dnd and 11.2.2)
- c
.( o REt,CTOR BUILDi~G. REACTOR BUILDIIIG, FIRE I.l.1.5.B and 1.i.I.S.C) 1.1.1.5.S fIRE AREA RB3-I (Fir~ 1.1.1.5.C) (Fil'f' Zones 1.4.1, 1.(.1, 1.1.I.S.A, 1.1.1.S.A, 11.6-9
Revision 8 April 1992 ( o PFl.CTOR BUILGII:G, FIRE ARFP. RB3-11 (Fil'c PFtoCTOR BUIL[;U:G. (Fir'C Zones 1.1.1.1.1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.J, 1.1.1.4~ 1.1.1.5.0, 11.1.1, 11.1.2 and 1.3.1) 1.I.l.j, 1.1.1.4, 4.1 Exemptions Rtque5ted Excr.rpl;ons were requested Exclaptions r<!ljuested fron: Section II I.G.3 of Appendh III.G.3 th~ extent Appendix R to tht:: that tha', it requires the installation of fire detection d~tecti()n and a fixed fire suppr'cssion systelil suppl'I:ssion systenl in an area, room or zont! zon~ for which alternative a lternative !hutdown shutdown capab 1 h t~1 is prov capablht:, i ded. provided.
.2 t,fo.2 0Discussion
-; s (' U'lS ; on 4.2.1 F'r~
F;re Zones 1.2.2. 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.B1.1.2.S.B and 1.1.2.5.C, 1.1.2.S.C, Reactor Building, F~n: F~I'e Area RB2-J RB2-1 This fin! fir'~ ar'ea an:a consists of the four fire zones listed abov~. abovl<. The fire area is copt~i"ed cort&ined in th~ the Unit 2 reactor building and consist~ consists 0fDf the isolation condenser fioor, Ue iisolatiun condeliser solation condenser pipe chase aria and the shutdown cool ing cooling pump room. room, The firE: fire area is s~parated separated from other fire: fire areas by complete 3-hour bat"'~{'rs bal"'~!'rS or 3-hour barriers with unrated openings. The major unrated unrned openings are: a louvered venti "Iat;on duct and unsealed mechanical pE.Ttetrations venti'iation pEnetrations from the shutdown coe 1 ing pump room (Fire: lone cooling Zone 1.3.2) to the steam pipe chase and .
~nsealed mechanical pen~trations I;!,sealed mechallical penetrations i~ ir, the ceiling and floor of 1.3.2, and ventililtior ducts which do not contain fire dampers in the north wall of the ventilatior iSo~dtion is();cltion cu~denser cur.denser flJor (Fire Zon~ Zone 1.1.2.S.A) 1.1.2.5.A) leading to the fuel pool (Fire 1.1.~.b), an open 20-foot by 20-foot equiprrent lone 1.1.[.6), equiprr~nt hatch.
hatch, an open stairway and
,;vAC ri~AC ducts wj'l;ch w~ich do not have fire dampns dampErs in the floor fluor and ceilirlg ceiling of Fire:
Fire 20T1(> Zune 1.1.2.5.A, unsealed ~echanical 1.1.2.S.A, nlechanic1l1 penetratio~s penetrations in the ceiling of Fire Zone 1.1.2.S.A 1.1.2.5.1< leading leadin[: to Fire Zone ZOlie 1.1.2.6 and, ail ladder access opening and an unrnted penetr~tlOn areu unrated penetruLlon areiJ. in the floor of Fire Zone 1.1.2.S.A leading to Fire Zone 1.1.".4. 1.1.~.4. shut.down equipnlent in this fire area consists of the Hot shutdewn
;sol~tinr; cor,denser, its associated valves ant!
isoll'tior; and cabling. Tht: The alternr~te alterm~te shutdown (.apat'ility tapotility indeptndt:nt indeptnd~nt ot this tliis fire areil area is provided provideu by the HPCI/LPCJ shutaown patt.. patl,. The fire lot l ciing for thc: hl"cjing fnur fire zones tl,c: four zolles range from negligib1e negligible to 21,000 Btu
~H pH ~.quare
~quare f(\(jt, fC'ot, which produces an equivalent svt*rity sEverity ranse range ofuf approximately 0 tc 16 minutesminutEs on the ASH! ASH1 £-119 E-1l9 tini time temperature curve.
The eouipment eOllipment hatl.hes hatlhes and stairwell openings, an unrated pipe penetration area, the ladder acc(;s~* ilCC~SS opening and two HVAC ducts between Fire Zones 1.1.2.S.A, l.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.4 (below), and 1.1.2.6 ].1.2.6 (above) are protected by an automatic closed-h~ad closed-head pre*~ction water curta-in prc*i'ction curta'in ilctuated by a llnearlinear thermal detect detectionion system (simi lar (similar to that described in Generic letter t(J Letter 83-33), or by a wet pipe sprinkler system. in addit"'(in! addit';c;n, the unrU'~eCi unrU'~ea penetl'ation from Fir.: Fire lone 1.3.2 t('l Zone 1.3.l to 1.1.2.3 above is i~ [l1*ott!c1.ea b} tW(Jtt?(.1.ea on automat bj <in automatic ic sprinkler system located directly above the stf:l!l stf:el r1ate rlate whh:hwhkh surrounds the mechanical penetrations and HVAC ouct. Fire detectir*n ;hIi prov ttied throughC'ut Fire Zones 1.3.2 and 1.1.2.S.A. Nt:ither provitil'd Neither fire dl=tection d"tection rLCir nr,r 5uppressiorf suppression is provided for Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.5.C, 1.1.2.5.C~ hO\o'f!vel', thesl zones are ho~cver, ccnllectea through open grating to Fire Zone 1.1.2.S.A. al'e ccnnectea 1.1.2.5.A. ic~r,see has ;Ii5talled The 1iCE:I,see il,stalled an access ladder from the isolation condenser flour
- c U*,rt.ugh lhrt*ugh this grate for vahE~.
vahf~. 1.1.2.5.1) tJlanual fo'anual fit'e 1.1.2,5.6 dud 1.1.2.5.C an~ and Extin9ujsh~rs. Extinguishers. manUal operatior. of the outboarrl i.solation fur manual fightirlg capability is available (\utside fire fightir.g 1.1.2.S.C and ir. in Fire Fil'e Zone lo1.l.5.A 1.1.2.S.A in the: i.solatinn condenser outside Fire Zones 1.3.2. the form of fire hoses 1.3.2, 11.6-10
Revision 8 April 1992 ( 4.2.2 Fire Zones 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.5.0, 11.2.1 and 11.2.2. 11.2.2, Reactor Building, Fire Area Arra RB2-II RB2-11 This fire arEJ ana consist~ of the seven fire zo~es zOlles listed abovp. The fire arQa al'(:~ is coutdincc' ClllltdillCc' ;n in the Unit ~<: reactor building and consists cOllsists of the basemellt basen1ellt
~~j"v"tion, i~Vi\tion. the g,"ound ~jt'ound floor {()xcept few Fire Zone 1.3.2), the second fl00t" (except f(1t' flOOI" (except for Fire Zcne Zene 1.1.2.5.C) the third floor noor (except for Fire Zune Zone 1.1.2.5.[;) and dnd the fourth floor (except for Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.A). Fire ZOlles 1.2.2, 1.3.2. 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.B and 1.1.2.S.C 1.1.2.5.C comprise Fire Area RB2-1 RB2-I andalld were previrl~,lj described in Section 4.2.1.
previrl~ly Fire Area RB2-II RB2-11 is separ~tcd separatcd from othE:'" othl:l' tin~ tirt? areas t-y complete 3-hour fi,*c t>y completf.' barriers or 3-hour barriers with fil'C l-arriers cpc,nlngs. ThE nlajor unratE'd ullrated Cp(~rllngs. lJnl'atlH': unrated openings in the fire barriers are: an urlratl!d unrated doer doc'r between tbt: th~ Unit 2 and 3 reactor bui lding equipment drain tuk buiiding tarok roonl:; roon,,; in the reactor' bui1din~ basements (rire reactol' buildin9 (Fire Zones 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.1.1, loLLI, respectively). respectively), Linrated urll'ated nun-combustible: non-combustible seals from 1.1.2.1 to the turbill turbille buildilt9 bulleil'9 (fire Zur.c Zone 8.2.S.C); 8.2.5.C); H'JAC H'IAC ducts without
\/ithout fire Clampers from Fire Zonc~
firc dampers Zones 1.J.~.4 alia 1.1.2.5.0 to the turbine building; and a HVAC 1.1.Z.4 H'iAC duct without a fire uc.lIlpl'r frolT' t1e:..lI1pl'r Fir~ Zone froll' Fire ZOIl!! 11.2.1 to 11.2.3 (Unit 2 HPCI room). Openings OpEnings between b!!tweell Fire At~a Ar'c~ RB2-1 RB2-I fire zones zenes and anc FirE Area RB2-II fire zones were previou~ly previou~iy d~scribed in Sectlen Sectien 4.2.1. liM shutdowr. f:quipment equipment irl ir, t~is fire area conshts of the HPCr ,HId LPCI syst£!ms. HPCI iBid systf:ms, a!~C'~ldte£i valves and cabling and the Ilonnal their a~~(H_'dteti nonnal anc! and alternate power and cent centrol ro 1 fet:ds fetds for the iinbc~rd nboad iisolation so lat icrn condenser condensel' va lternate power 1ve~. The aalternate valve~. dnd control feeds to the inboar~ and inboar" isolation cc~densercel,denser valves are in conduit (( I'ol,t~d throuyh ro~tfd throuyt. fire Fire Zon~ 1.].2.1 The alternate shutdown l.apability 1.1.2.1 and ha~e have an approved apP"oved I-hour fire rated wrap. ilidepenClent of this fire area is provided
~apability illdepenctE:nt wrar'.
pruvided by th~ lsolaticlr, Condenser shutdown path. the lsolatio~ The fire loading f~r the seven fire zones ran£e ran~e from less than 10UO to 2~.OOO 2~,000
- itu per ~quare foot, which proGuces atu procuces an equivCilent equiv~lent sevt:rity sev~rity range of approximately r,linL te to 19 minlJtes 1 r.11nt. min~tes on the ASTM E-119 time temperature temperatllre curve.
fir~ oEtection is provlded thrcughout Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3 (ex~ept fire QEtection (except fur tur th~ the ~rpa Ct'ea above th~ thl' Rtactor R.:actol' Water Clean Up [RWCU] [KWCU] heat exchangers), cy.changers), 1.1.2.4 (e)((<:~1: (exc(:~l; for theh"igh the high radiation area associated with the RWCU system). systenr), 11.2.1
]1.'-.2. Pdrti'.l and 11.<..2. Pdrti *. l fire detection is provided in Fire Zone 1.1.2.5.0 above tLt:: tLt:
Har,cby liQuid
~tar,cby liquid control coritrol equipment and in Fil'~ Fire, Zone 1.1.2.1 by mear:s mea~s of lineallinea.
detectiol; in and under the cable trays which centain the li,ajor then.. ?l detectiori thtm rilajor combustibles in these zones. The fire barrier openings with supprc~sioll suppre~sion betllrpn Fire Area kB2-1 bet\lr,f'n kB2-I and RB2-II were described in Section 4.2.1. Finally~ Finally, mana: man<.: fire figtil:ing figko:ing capability is available in all seven fire zones zOlles in the form of (If fire hoses and extinguishers. 4.f.~ 4 **. : Fire Zon~sZones 1.4.1. 1.4.1, 1.1.1.5.A 1.1.1.5.A,9 1.1.1.S.B 1.1.1.5.C, Reactor Buil~in9. 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.S.C, BUilding, fire Area 1\83-1 RB3-J Thi! Tlii! fire firc area cD~sistscOI,sists of the four fir~ fire zones listEd listtci above. The Thc fire area is conta contaired irrd "hI iI', the Unii Unit :;::; reactor bui lding ana building and c.CJnsi sts of the isolation condensf'r cCJnsists condenspr fluor, the isolation cond~nser pipe c~ase floor, chase and the Transversr. Transverse Tn-core In-core Probe Prube (TIP) (TIl')
~quipment Y(;om.
E-quipment ruom. The fire .. red is separated froll' cttlt::r firE' "r&d ar'cas by compl~te et/,er fire are:as bdrners or 3-hC'ur barriers with unrated openings. The major unrated 3-hour bilrrlers ( i,penings are: ullsf:alecJ openings mechanical pf:netration$ unsE:aleu lIIechanical penetration:; from the TIP room (Fire Zone Z(lne '~., 1.4.1) to t(l the steam pipe chase alld and in the f100r floor of Fire Zone 1.4.1; ventilation durt~ eu rt: which wh i cr, GOClO n~t have fire d~mpers dampers in the north wel1 wa Ii of the iso1~tion i so 1. t i on condenser 11.6-11 I1.6-11
Revision 8 April 1992 (
\,
~lour
!Iour [Fire (Fire ZcneZene I.I.I.S.A) 1eadirg to the fuel pool (Fire Zone 1.1.1.6); an 1.1.1.5.A) leadirg upel1 ~O-f(,ct by upell ~O-f(,ct by 20-foot 20-fout equipment hatch.andhatch,and a HVAC H~AC duct which does not hove Iia tire> damper 11\ the floor and ceiling of Fire Zone 1.1.1.S.A; 1.1.1.5.A; urlsealed ur,scaled mechan;cai mechanical penetriltl0ns penetrutlons in the ceiling of Fire Zone 1.I.I.S.A 1.1.1.S.A leadi~9 leadiug to Fire Zone 1.1.1.6; and
".-.d ail ladder lccessacc!,ss opening in the fleer of Fire Z~ne l.I.1.S.A 1.1.1.S.A leading to Fire Zone !.1.1.4.
Hot shutdo\>;11 Hct shutdolin equipment eqUipment ill in this fire area consists of the isolation condenst>r;: condens~r ,: its associ~*.ed valves and cablinfi. associc::i.eci cabling. The alternate shutdown capability independent of TIle altenlate this fire orea ;s file i;.rea is provided by the HPCI/lPCI shutdown path. Hu;: Th", firE: lo.~ing for the f{Jur fire IOcC:ing four fire zones negligiL1e to 7.000 zoues range from negligilile 7,000 Btu per
~quarp. fcot. ~C!uare fcot, which produces an equh'alent equha1ent severity range froll! frolll approxill'lately approxil'1ately 0 io (." Ir,inutes lI:inutes on tI:t! E-119 time tempct'ature tJ:t) ASn: [-119 temperature curve.
The .:quipmE'nt lhc hatchcs, ladder access opening and the HVAC duct between Fire
.;quipment hatc/ll.:s.
CVllcS 1.1.1.5.A. Z()lies 1.1.1.5.A, 1.1.1..4 1.l.!.4 (below), and 1.1.1.6 (above) arc protected by itn an ill,tornatic clCi~ed-hei.ll!, ill*tomatic pre-action water curtain, actuateli closed-hEill!, pre-actiOl~ actuateu by a linear thermal
~ltection system (silllilar liltcction (similar to that described in Generic letter 83-33), or- or by a pipe srrinkler wet pipE: sprinklel' system. Fire detection is provided Uiroughout Hroughout Fire Zones 1.~.1 and 1.1.I.S.A.
1.4.1 1.1.1.5.A. Neith~r Neithl:r fire detection nor suppression is provided for fOl' Zon~,; 1.1.1.5.13 Fire Zont::$ 1.1.1. 5. Band 1.1.1. 5. C, however these zonc~ and 1.1.1.5.C, zonC$ ereHe connected through througtl
~pen gratirs to Fire Zone 1.1.1.S.A. Th~ T~~ license~
1icense~ has installed an acce5£ access lado~r to the isolation iso1atiar, condenser through thi~ grate for manual operdtion fOl' ~~nual operution of the outboarc isolation ccndEmser t.he condenser vai,es. I~anua! fire fightitig voi.es, t~anual fightil;g capability is available outside F;r~ Fir~ Zones 1.4.1, 1.1.1.S.B 1.1.1.5.C and in Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.S.C ( 1.!.S.A 1.!.5.A in th~ the form of fire hoses ane. ~xtinguishers. an~ e~tinguishers. 4.2.4 FirE Zones 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.3. Fire 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4. 1.1.1.4, 1.1.1.5.0, 11.1.1, 11.1.2 ar.d arId 1.3.1, Reactor Building, Fire Area RB3-1I itois firE: ihis al'l:a consists uf fire il\'l;'a ~f the eight fire zones listed above. The fire area ;s is ccntained ir the Unit 3 rt:actor ccntaine~ r~actor builcing and consists of thE" the basement ~leyation, elevation, the ground floor (except for Fir(: Fir!: Zone 1.4.1), the secoudsecolld f1(\or floor (except for F;I'~ LOlle Firc Zone 1.1.1.5.C), tt:c f1c..or (except for Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.8) and the tr.e third flc..or fourth f100r (exc~pt for flol,r (except l.I.1.5.A). Fire Zones 1,4.1, fGr Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.A). 1.4.1, 1.1.1.5.A, 1.l.I.S.A, 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.5.C (;omprise ~omprise Fire Area RB3-! RS3-i arid and have beepbeen previously des-'
<.ribt::ci tribed ir, ir. Section 4.2.3. Fire Area RB3-II is separated from other fil'e fi,'e areas complet~ 3-hour fire cCiyriers by complete barriers or 3-hour barriers with ullrated unrated openings.
unra7E:ci opening!; These unra-:eci openings in the fire barriers are: an unrated door between the Unit 2 and 3 reactor rCilctor building equipment drain tank rooms in the reactor building basem~nts (Fire Zones basements Zone~ 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.1.1 respectively), respectively). unrated non-combustible seals frColafrc,r.1 Fire Zone 1.1.1.1 to the turbine building (Fire Zone 8.2.5.C); 8.2.S.C); and HVAC ducts without fire dc.Dlpers d~Dlpers from froD! Fire Zones 1.1.1.4 and 1.1.1.5.0 to the turbil,l' buildin~. Openings between t.urb i Ill' bui1din~. b~tween Fire Area RB3-1 fire zones and Fire Area RE3-lJ RB3-JJ fire zones zon~s were previously described in Section 4.2.3. There is also alsc a louvt::red venti 1ation louv':red lation duct du~t and unsealed tsnsealed mechanica penetratlons from the mechanical1 penetratlolls shutdowrl cooling plID'P shutdvwn (fh'e Zone 1.3.1) lJlIIrp room (F'iI'e 1.3.]) to the steam pipe chase and
~r.sf'a1ed mechiillica 1 pelletrations in the ceiling lifiSf'a led mechallical ceil ing and floor of 1.3.1.J .3.1. Equipment HI ~ire Zone 1.3.1 is useQ 111 USEO for cold shutdown only.
shutdtJ\~n equipll'H,t Hot shutdm,n equiplT'Er;t in thisthi s fit'e f h'e area cop£ i sts of thEe i1rea corsists tht:: HPCI and LPCIlPCI systems, sys.tems, c( ~t;f'ir associ.ted
~t;('ir assocli:ied valvesvalv:~ "nd l'ontrol fHuS for the inboard ;sCl'cltion
,'ontrol iJnd cabling, cabling. ar.d ar:d the noma1 norraal and alternate power and conciE:ns~r valves.
is~li,tion conciEenser Tt,e alt~rllatp. power The altem.tf' 11.6-12 I1.6-12
Revision Rev;s;on 8 April 1992 (
~na c("lltrol
-lno cc,lttro 1 feeds 1;(, ~(. ':~ht:
h~ inboarc i nboa rc! ;isolation so 1at; on condenser viilves v.lves are in i r. ccnduit ccndu it routf~ rGU 1.fc' through fire Zona Zone 1.1.1.1 and have an approved I-hour fire rated wrap. wrap, The alternate shutav\/p shutaulIP capability ind~penQentindepenoent of this fire area is. i~ provided by the tile Isolation Condenser :;hutdown ~hutdown pnth. path. fin; loading for the fire zones range from The fire fro"1 less than 2,000 to 27,000 Etu 27,OOe Btu pel ~GlIare
'Guare foct, foet, which prc.duces eQuh~lent sevE!l'ity prc,duces an eau;v"lent frar.1 approxin;ilt(**~*
severity range fror,l approxin;~tr':' 2 to 2:1 r.,irutes on the A~TM E-119 time temperature curve.
- 1 r:,irutes curve, !'! l The UT,t'.I~t:d ur,I .. ,e.:i penetration frOM from fil'e Zone 1.3.1 to 1.1.1..3 1.1.1.3 (above) is ;s protected protectE-d by ill: ~d.()matic
.:domatic ~prinkler~prink1pr systE:nJ system above thE the steel plat~,
plate, which surrounds the illechcir,h:'il1 penetr~tions ana 11VAC
;lIechill,j(011 penetrt:tions IiVAC duct. Fire detection detectioJl is provided throughtJut throughlJut Fil'~ lon~s Fin' 1.1.1.~, 1.3.1, 1.1.1.3 (except lon(!s 1.1.1.2, (exc:pt for the ~rea "rea above the RWCU heat excharg~rs) r1 1.1.1.4 (except for the high exchargE:rsJ h~yh radiation r~diatior. at'f;,a ~ssocia~ed with iil:£a associated w~th ttw
~.11I!
RWev ~JsteIiIJ,.11.1.1 RWCLr ".)stefo,), .11.1.1 and 11.1.2. Part.i",l Partl&l fire detectIon is f1re detection IS provided prov1ded in In Fire FIre ZU.l' J .1.1.5.0 above the standby 1iouid liquid control eGuipment ann and in Fire ZOIil:ZonE 1.1.1.J which has lir;Ear ljJ;ear tnerr.1u.1 therr.lUl C:etection cetection if! unde\' the ill and undel' ~he cable trays which (.('r:~i..iil r.(,I:t~jll the nlaju n,ajurr combustit*les combust;!;. j~s in these zones. The fit'e fil'~ barrier cpening~ \>fitll \~i t.1c supprl!::;~1( suppres~lon . . n between Fire Areas 1\63-1 R63-1 and RB3-II RB3-11 were described in Sectioli Sectior. 4.2.3.
dnua;
,t,dnua; fire fighting cdl'ability cd~cibi1ity is available availcble in all fit'e fil'e zones in the form of flrr ~('ses and eAtlnguish.rs.
flrc e~tin9uisher5. 4.3 tv(:llJction fVi:1ui:tion The filE pro*~~(;t~('P pro',~ct;("P in the abo we-desc.l'ibed 23 fire zones does lliJt auo.e-desi:.I*lbed nut comply wit/Iwit!. ( the tech.:ical err systems allc/or Un reQuiremcnts ot' tecr.r:i.:a1 reQuirem~nts anc/or fixcc; 01 Section Il1.G,:; of Appen~ix Sect ion III.G.~ Apper"Jix R because fire dete~ fixcr; fire supprc~sion systems have not be~n instal1NI detec-instdl1ed in zone, or arr;as ar~as f()r fIJr which alte-t'IIativ.: a1tE-t"Jlative shutdown capability is provided. Ther'~ HCiS Ther.: \/;;$ a c:onc~rr, t~at a firf: cancer" ttlat fire in one of thc~E' fire zones could cause a loss J10nlla 1 safe shutdown capability. uf l10nnal Ilowever, the fire loading in all capabil ity, However, a 11 of these fire zones ranges "fire n~91igib1e to low with a I"anges from nt:gligible a fire load ranging from 20Ci0 20C/v to 27.0GC 27,O~( Ctu Utu per square foot and in no case doe5 does the equivalent fire sev~rity severity eXC!'fC: 21 minctes. Bt::cause excf:'f:C: B~cause of the low combustible loading, a fire of significant siynificant mag~itude magnitude or duratiorl duration is i~ not expected to occur. Except for Fir~Fir" Zones 1.1.2.1, 1.1.2.5.D~ 1.1.2.5.B, 1.1.2.5.C, 1.1.1.5.C, 1.1.1.5.B, 1.1.2.5.D. 1.1.1.5.8, and 1.1.1.1, fire detection i~ provider,s were requested from SE:ction III.G.3 of Appendix R to the e)'tent Section 111.G.3 extent chat it reC"l:il'~s that re(lcil'es instal1(ition instal1ation of fire detection and fixed-fil'e suppn:ssion suppY't!ssion systl!IilS systems ;1"1 :cnes for winch an alternat.ive ir, ;:cnes alternative shutdown capability is provi<led.provided. 5.2 Oisc.ussion Discussion 5.2.1 Fire Zones 8.2.S.C 8.2.5.r. and s.2.6.C, 8.2.6.r., Turbine Building, Centr~lCentral Zone GrourGrouI' This zone 9rou~ grou~ consists of fire zones in common ar~as of the ground floor (elevatitln 517 feet 6 inches) and the mezzanine (elevation 534 feet 0 inch) (elevati0n uf the turbine building. Each zone contains equlpment equIpment and cabling associ,lted associnted with Units 2 and 3. This zone group is separated from the adjacent eastern anG WE:stern western zone !lroups ~roups mainly by floor to ct:iling cdling shield walls or concrete flo~l*~. flo~l'~. Fire Zone S.2.5.C 8.2.5.C is separated from Fire Zone 8.2.4 (Unit 3 Cable Tur:r.e Tunnel) 1) by a 3-hour raterl rated floor except for one unrated locked manhole. Where walls are not present, a! as in the corridor which rUJls rurs through the zone group gl'Oup between the easterr: easten, and western zone grol.lps, groups, automatic sprinkler and fire det('ct ion syster:u: systef.1r. are insta l1ed. Separation of the centra installed. celltra 1 zone group fromfrof.1 UllltS 2 and 3 reactor buildings is by 3-hcur rated barriers with penetratiClfl!i UnH.$ pelletrati~n~; seai~t: by seait-C: b.Y nonco"lbu~tible noncoPlbu~tible materials at Units Ur.its 2 and 3 equipment drain tank rooms. Safe shutcvwll equipment and cable~ in this zone group include the 480-V ~rc shut.c~wn equiprllC:nt JolCe 39-2 and Ule the r:lechanico.' CRn cross-tie va r.;echanic,,' eRO lYing between units and SOlIE: valving SOllIE: tab ling tabling jj~socii1tt:d a~socii1ted with shutdoWh shutdowh path B29 B2, which could be used to shut down Unit 3 if a ('(curred in til is zont! fire l1ccurred rire zon" ~roup. The fi,CC Ii,CC is needed otlly ol,ly in case of i1u f ire in Unit 3 (shutdown patiJs pat"s U or F). ThE' cross-tie 'ialving valving is used as alt~rnative altl"rnative
~hutdown equipme:nt ;,hutdown equipment in cast cas~ of a fire involving th~ HPCI/LPCI shutdown path in
{>ither either ulli unit. t.
.11.6-14 11.6-14
Revision 8 April 1992 ( II: rr~l'e
~l'e lo~e Zo~e 8.2.S.C.
8.2.5.C, fired fire dett<ction det~ct;on and sprinkler sy~tcms sy~tems protect all fectlOf;s fectlOf;s ct the zOlle south of Columr,/Row E 011 elevation 517 feet 6 inches. The f~llor ThE' f!llor area i~ about 15,900 I5,9Ge square feet with a ceiling height of 17 feet. t~tal fire lOur:! The tlital loa!! (t>xclusive (t'xclusive of Electrohydraulic Corltro1 Cor,trol (EIiC) (ElK) fluid) is Jpproxirr",tely 20.00u low, .lpproxim('tE:!ly 20,00(: htu litu per square foot, and is in the form of electric.c.l electric.~ 1 cabie. The EHC flui~ fluio fire hazard was not added to the total fire load because i1. is contained in a rt!servoir. if. reservoir, has a high flash point. point, and is protected by a
~;ater \iater spray system. The r.~jority r..ajority of thi thiss fire zone is covered b) by fire detection and suppression sy~tems.
8.~.5.C does not corltain Fire Lvr.e S.t!.S.C cor,tain any of the alternative shutdown equipment ilssociut~d \/ith Qssociiltt:d Ilith iSC\ l l,tion condt::nser, is(lllition cond"nser, but it does have cables associated with it. These cab l~s are provided with a l-hour rablt:s I-hour fit"e fit'e rated wrap, ant:am: fire detection autrr... t-ic sprillkler protection in accordance wiU Section 1II.G.2 and autrr.",t"ic III.G.2 of Apper,l.lix Apper,~ix R. fir~ fire 70ne 8.?G.C, located en elevations 534 feet 0 inches and 517 feet 6 inch~s. inches, has a floor drea of 11,400 11 ,400 square feet and ~l: ceiling cei 1ing heis~t heigH ofClf 27 feet. WhileWhi le it dOE:s does contll contd-in cables "in ceb les and equ; pment as!;(lciated equipment ils~(lciated with safe shutdown for both UllitS '-~ ar,c Ullits ar.!! 3, it does nc..t nClt contain any cab les or equipment associated \lith cables a lter-llith alter-not've nat;ve safe shuLdown shuldown capability. The alternative alternative. safe shutdo~n capability for Central Zone Group is this Centra1 i5 provided by the isolation condenser conden~Er with the assoc-iated cables and equipment located in the eastl:rn east!::rn and western zone groups of the bl';l11ing anc th~ Unit 2 and Unit 3 Reactor Buildings. turbine bldlt.ling { The fuel louding square fl)ot) squCirc loading in FirE: f,)ot) excll.tcdll9 Fir!:: Zone 8.2.6.C is low (approximately 18,000 Btu per exclr..oill9 the turbinetllrhine lubricating oil which ;s is not included in pel' the tGtal fuel 10cid lo~d becduse it i~ is contained in a closed reservoir, has a high flasl; point, and is protected by autolTiatic fllSI: autolnatic fire detection and open head wat.er water spray suwres;>"iurl spr.1y suwres:;iull systems. The r"ajority of this fire zone (8.2.6.C) is prot~cted by Q ceiling level sprinkier prott!cted sprinkler system, but has automatic fire detect. 1el, only detectic~ on 1y along a long the north wall. We 11.
!lanual figlli:in9 capability tl.ar:ual fire figll1:ing cdpability in the form of hose hClse stations and fire extin~u;~hers extinsuishers is avaiiable avajiable to these fire zones.
5.~.2 5.~,2 Z~I:es S.2.1.A, Fire ZLI:es fire 8.2.1.A, 8.2.2.A, S.2.5.A, B.2.S.A, 8.2.5.B, 8.2.6.A, 8.2.6.8,8.2.6.B, 8.2.7,) 7.0.A, 8.1, and 9.0.A, Turbine Bunding, BUilding, Eastern Zone Group The eas te,"ntet'n zone group consists of 10 fi re ZClies cl~ove. z()r;es 1ii steo above. Thi Ss zCllie zOlie group cCln~ists only of con!ists Clf the Unit ~ associated sections s~ttions of the turbine building: the basemert, station buttery rooms, the mezzanine mezzaliine level of the turbine building,
~Ilt, IJnit -!:ht: Unit 2 diesel diesFl generatur generator rooAl, roorn, the clean/dirty tlil oi 1 tank room and the ground floor ieve level. s'paratedfrom
- 1. It is $'parated" from the centra lOlle group by unrated, but sub-central1 zone 5tantial, st.antial, reiliforced concrete shield walls whose cable penetrations arc sealed noncontustible matErials. The tastern by noncontu!atible tiistern zor,e group 9roup is separated from the l:untrol cuntrol roorr'/auxiliary electric f:quipment I::quipment roolll room (AEER) fin firt areas by 3-hour fire fir~
rilted r,1ted barrit!I'S. barriet*s. The eastern zone grllup group is separated from thE: th~ Unit 2 reactor buildillg by barriet's lluildiJl9 barrier's ".-itl1 I'.-ith an equ iva lent 3-hour fire rating and from the turbine equivalent LlIilding Luilding mai" mai~ operating 'floor iloor by a 5ubstautial substalltia 1 (bllt unrated) ccncrete floor flClor
$uppor~p.d ~uppor~p.d on unprotected unpru.ected steel st~el with several openings to the area abGve. ab~ve. The eastelTI zone grc..up easteni 9r~up is separtited separated from the Unit 3 western zone group grClup cable tunnel by a 3-hc.ur rated reirforced rc:irforced conc:rete conc.rete floor ccnta ining one unratcC:
containing unratet: pelietrdtion (a locked access pendrcltion dccess manhole). 1I.6-15 11.6-15
Revision 8 April 1992 ( shutdowli systems ;n
~.ilfe shutdowrl
- ,ilfe in this zone group include sections ot of the HPCI/LPCI shutdowr, path for U11~t
~hutdown UIlH 2. The isolation isol~tion condenser condcnser path is the thE alternative shutdo~1ti cd~ability for this 2(;ne shutdown t.djjability zene group arid locat~d in the western and alld it is locat£!u c~ntrdl CPl1trd I zone zonc group of the turbine building bui lding and the reactor builaing, indepen-dent of this zone g-oup, except for certai~
g'*cup, extept certain Unit 3 control cables which are rou'c(;(; nlU'CU: if' ir cable cab Ie risers adjacent adjacer.t to Fire Area TS-V. TB-V. However, these cablescab les are prr.tc'cted by a I-hour fire rated wrap, automatic fire detectors, and an auto~e auto~" matic fire supprcs~;on system hi fil'e suppresr.ion in accordance with Section 1I1.G.2 c.f Appendix'R. lII.G.2 Clf Appendix'R, 101' The firefife icading for the 10 fire zones range::. range:; from 2,OOC to 4,640,000 Btu per square f~ot. squarf: frot. Howey~,', Howevtr', the zones having high fire loads are due to either ciE:sel ciesel or Uf lut.ricatir.£ luLricatir.£ ei1s ens which are contained in steel ta'lks. tanks. These specific haz.-rd. are also cc;vered fire haZ,T(h c~vered by automatic fir£: fire suppression systems. systems, The hc:lallce halance Of OT the fire loae!; loac$ He furln of cable insulation and have an
<.re in the furm equivaler;t equivalcr;t fire seve::rity approxlmately 1 hour.
sev~rity of appro;omately 1111 10 firr.: firr, ::ones
- ones ar:are provided with automatic fire detection systems and/or ir'e suppres~ion system!;.
t i\"{~ system~. All major fire loadings/hazards are covered by auto-math; mati(; 1"it' systems. Manual fire fighting capability is available f'it'" suppression sy!>tems. to all 1(; ft ire zones in the form of fire extinguishers and hose stations. statiCJr.s.
~.2.3 Fire Zor.~s 5.2.1.5, S.Z.I.6, 8.2.2.B, 8.2.4, 8.2.5.0, 8.2.6.0, B.2.5.E, 8.2.5.E, 8.2.6.E, b.l. 7.0.0, and 9.0.B, Turbine Builcing, Builc'ing, Western Zone Group T~r TrC' ~c~t~r~
\le~t,"rr, Z~le Zl'ne group consists of 10 tire zones listed abovc. above. This zone group consists only of the Unit 3 associated section of th turbine building
'C mezzanine, ground 1loor, bilttery rOCli:,
b"l,t.ery lloor, basement, cable tunnel, DC panel room, station rocr.:, and diesel 9H1erator ge,nerator rco",. roorl'. It is separated froln frO~1 the centra 1 I and eastern zone group~ groupf. as described in Sectier,s 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. Safe shutdown ir. Secticr.s
~)~tms ~j~terns in this zo~e zoroe group include sections sect'ions of HPCI/LPCI shutQ~wn path for HPCI/LPC1 shutQuwn Unit Unit:. 2. iht!ih" isolcl'L"ion isolation condenser path is thc the alternative shutdown shutdowll capabil capabilityity for this zone gt'our gt'OUr and all equipment and cables are ill<lependl:Iltimlependerlt of the fire zone~ i~ in the ~este~n Itester'n z~nez~lle group.
grc.up. The fire loading for the 10 fire zones rang~s from 1,000 to 162,000 Btu per squar~ square foot. loot. However, the higher loads are in tht:: th" forTII form of diesel fuel "'hich\'Ihich
~rotected by an automtltic i~ .rotected 1!:. autom"tic fire suppressiun system. The balclOce balance of the fire loadi~gs loading$ ale ute in the fllt'mtll!'m of cable insulation and the associated fire severity ;iss uneaer IJroeaer 454G rllir:l.'tes.
r'lir.~tes. . All 10 fire zones are provided with autcm~tic auton~tic fire det:ction detection and/or suppression systems. All An ~~jor t.azilrds and fire loadings are covered by autom~tic ar.ajor fire hazards autom~t.ic fire
$uppressi~r $uppres~ior systems. Manual fire fighting capability is available to all 10 zor;~:; in the forr.1 (:f fire hose stations and extinguishers.
fire ZOT;t;:; 5* .? fva.luation The fire prctectioll protection in He t~e above-d~scribed above-d,;scribed 22 fire zones dOE:s do~s not comply with th~ ih~ technical req~irement$ req~irements of Section 111.G.3 III.G.3 of Appendix R because fixed fixeu fire supP""r;ssion suppyession systcnlSsystcnl5 and/or firf detection detectior. systems have not been installed in zones for which an altC:l'nativ~altHnativ~ safe shutdown capability is provided. !( ThE principal concern was los~ 10s~ of norlIlal WiJ$ that a fire in one of thcsf' Silj" shutdown capability. Although nor*mal Salt' thes!' fire zones could cause a some of these fire zones r,lthough soml:! 1I.6-16
Revision 8 April 1992 have a high fire load, the fire loading is due to diesel fuel or lubricating ( oils in steel tanks. These steel tanks have been reviewed to the provisions of "Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code" the -Flammable Coden (NFPA-30) published by the National Fire Protection Association. While the tanks do not conform in all details to this code, they do satisfy the major provisions of the code and are considered to provide an equivalent level of protection. In addition, these fire loads are protected by automatic fire suppression systems. ~;thWith these exceptions, however, the fire loads range from negligible to moderate and, in no case, do they exceed a I-hour equivalent fire severity. Because of these low to moderate fire loadings, and given that the diesel fuel and lubricating oil fire hazards are contained and protected by fire suppression systems, a fire of significant magnitude or duration is not expected to occur. All fire zones are protected by fire detection or fire suppression systems or both. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that a fire in any of the subject fire zones will be detected in its early stages and extinguished by the automatic fire suppression systems or by the fire brigade before adjacent safety-related locations are threatened. If a fire should damage any normal shutdown components in anyone of these zones before it is extinguished, the alternative shutdown capability, which is independent of these zones per Section III.L of Appendix R, is available to be used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The staff has determined that there ;sis reasonable assurance that a fire in any of these fire zones will not result in the loss of safe shutdown capability. The staff has also determined that the installation of additional fire detection and/or fixed fire suppression systems would not significantly increase the level of fire protection in these I fire zones. .
~ ..
5.4 Conclusion Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire protection features combined with the independent alternative shutdown capa-equivalent level of protection. Therefore, the exemptions bility provide an eqUivalent should be granted. 6.0 0 REACTOR BUILDING, ELEVATION 613 FEET 0 INCH FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.6, UNIT 2 REAC~OR o FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.6, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING, EVEVATION 613 FEET 0 INCH 6.1 Exemptions Reguested Requested Exemptions were requested from Section III.G.3 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the installation of fire detection and/or a fixed fire suppression system in a zone for which alternative shutdown capability is provided. 6.2 Discussion Fire Zones 1.1.1.6 and 1.1.2.6 adjoin each other at the topmost elevation of the reactor buildings and constitute the refueling floor. They are adjacent ( to the turbine building on the north side. Only the north wall is 3-hour rated. Other walls are nonrated and are exterior walls of the reactor buildings. The 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.2.5.D, floors of these zones are the ceilings of Fire Zones 1.1.2.5.A. 11.6-17
Revision 8 April 1992 .( ( l.I.I.S.A, and 1.1.1.5.0 de~cribed 1.I.l.5.A, de5cribed in Sections 4.2.1~ 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, and 4.2.( rF~rfctively. rp'roctively. Up~nings Upenings to flre F1re Zones 1.1.2.5.0 and 1.1.1.S.U l.l.l.5.D ccnsist of ai stdil"".) dUO stdit"'c..j dno uns~jll£*C! uns~i,]f*~ Irechanical pen~tl*"ti(\ns. penl!tl"ilti(lnS. Hose Stotioos stotions and portable ext ir.~ui shers are prvvid~d. t!xtir'!:juishers combust it> le loadirl~, prllv ided. The combustible loadir,~, which consists con~ ists of eh:ct.- e leet.- ric.: 1 cabling, i!. ric(:l i~ le~s less thon than 1.000 Btu per "4uare ~4uare foot, which prudutes pruduces clllan equ'l-eGul-spv~rity of ic~~ than 1 miriute valent. sPvt.rity mir;ute on the ASTM [-119 tilTl(:-tempenture tilTlf:-tetnperiture CUfVf>. curvp. [l~lt;ction ar,r; [1(:lection ar,t; 5uppressiuJ. suppressiuJ' systellis systenls o.re-arE" not installed. The licer-see lieersee has instal-1,:<.1 dd prt;ac..t;(ln 11:ti sprin~1H system at the hatch~s prt:aLtion sprin"-1H hatches arid stairway openings to Fire and stalrwiiY Z(\n~s Zc>nes 1.J.~.5.A dlld alld l.!.1.S.A. 1.1.1.5.1.. Ther t:t: is no sdfe Tht'r sdfr: ~.hutdown
~,hutdown Cd!: ed~ i log ing or equipment in Fin 1.1.2.6 and Fire Zones 1.'1.2.6 1.1.1.6. ita! i ieensEt: requested An i hi! iicensl:t exemptlof, because th£:~e an exempt1or. the~e zunes arc art: IIOt 1I0t sl~ar sl~ard*(.ed b) ~*hour
*.r.:.ed b,: ~-hour fire Lc1rri~rs froll' Fire Zon~s Larriers frolf' Zones 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.1.5.1.,
1.1.2.5.0, "rod ~nd 1.1.I.S.C, 1.1.1.5.C, which (£kcept (ncept for Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.0 and anci
- .1.Z.5.D)
- .1.2.5.D) contain safe saf" shutdown equipment aUG allci have alternative safe shutauwn S}
- LCr.iS providf.-o.
Sj'~lCr.iS prov i df.-(j * . 6.3 Ev~luation tVilluatioJl The fire protet:tHwprottlctHJfI in tht:s(: lc>nes doe~ not comply wit.h the techlilcal theSE: lones techli1cal rt:~uirenl~nts l".quiren,~nts of Secti(I,: Sectic,r: IlI.G.3 of 07 Appendix R because Fire Zones 1.1.1.6 and 1.1.2.6 de r.vt r,.,t h<lV~ hav" a fit'(!firc, detectioJ! fir.ecl-fire suppr~ssiorl detectior: and/or i1a fi>:E.d-fire su~pressior. system t~f:Y 7urm and t"'f:Y furm part pan (Jf of a plant areil areu tor whi which lternat ive shutdown oil aalternative th cHI ~ystem shutdowJl !.ystem ha~ has be~nb<~n providrd. ,( The primprinL. q.iG ,~a 1 C(Jtlc{~rn rr'l.lc deve}0J.i fire C'C"l,lnul..l~c snutlie..... n cap~bi1ity capability has been provided) ard damage nOl1lra1 syst~n, nOrJllal safe shutdown systE::nc compOl'lt:nto; contaired T.h~rein. compol'~l1t~ contilir.ed Therein. Hese T~ese two fire zones have fire loaris loarls that Clreore 1It'~lipible-rl\:"~l;pible and, ill no cas!:, r.(les theequhalent f'ire caSl:, c!('les f"ire ~everity severity exceed 2 minut.es. millut.es.
~e'~tse c.E:t.L'se of thp thE' nfgligibl~
nfgl igibh: fire loads. loads, fta fire of si9~ificant sigldficant magnitude or auration is not nut ~xrected expected to occur. Should a fire occm', ocelli', 1t It should oevelop slowly, remoll. remdir. sma 11, iHIC smal1, dissipaU' ltS ollC dis.sipatc 1tS heat to tht! the surroulJding surroullding env;ronment without spread;r~ environment with(,iut spreadi!", t(l iH.iJacer.1. to dliJacer,. f'in f*if"(. zones. ThE: fire detection systems irl ill the adjaCEnt fire zOI!es zor,es wou k (ilotect wOllle; (iLtect thE' the firE:: firl-: oud alld th~ fil'e brigade ~(luld the fi,'£: would be sUII1II.cncd sUmiloened to extir;gulsh extir'\!U1Sh the tin: firf: r,anua l',anually.11.)'.
~HIC.~
~H,tt! 'Cht:t't th"l*t (',re~.re no safe shutdown call1ponents conlponents irl in these two fire zones, thelf~
firE: Z('Ines, thetE: 1Sis "u 'I,mc~nl
!iU conCt<rll for any il1'fr.f-di ate fi ilrlr.f*diate finrt; damage poter.ti poter,tial. a 1. Tht! staff has deterlili The stiiff deterJilined ned *.t.~tt therp.
fJ*.iI there i:, i~ redsondb reasondble: h: assurance that a fire in either of tht;:~e tht;~e two fir<.: fire 7r.r'I*~* wi n not rt:wlt 7r.r1(*~, rHult in th.' s<i1ety shutdown capability in adjacent th, loss of soJety areas. Furth~r, Further, the ~t.aff finds that the insta l1ation of fire detection and/ur installation and/ot* fixeG~fire-fixeG-fire supprp!,SiOhsuppre!.sioh Systf:AIS ,"ould not. sig'lificantly SYStE:A.S ",ould significantly increase the level uf t 11"[ rrotectio~ 11f£ rrotectior, in the5~ these firp fir!' zones.
& . .t Conclusio!!
f,.~ tids~d tiilst::d or.Oli thf' ~bove eVi thE" i1bove l 1l.ootlora, eVi'lL.at lon, concluaes that the £xisting st.aff conc1uaes the staff Existing fire proi.ett prOi.ect luI! iol' feature~ features prt.v pn.v ide an ad~quate levf.l lev£.l ~f protect ion. Therefor~,
"f protec.:l Therefor!!, the t,y.l'motion~ st.c-u t,y.flmot;on~ Id be granted.
st.c*u ld II.6-18 11.6-18
Revision 8 April 1992 ( ii.u
. (J ( FIRE AREA ARt~, RB2-JI RB2-11 FIRE ZONE 1.1.2.], 1.1.2.1. UNIT UNIT?? ~[AC10R BUILUING ELEVATION REACTOR BUILUIIlG
~76 J'6 FEEf FEET b I~CRES l~thES o
FIRE A~[P RR2-I FIRE ZUHE A~[f. PR2-I 1.3.~. ~~IT I.UNE 1.3.£. lJl:IT 2 REACTUR BUILDING BlJILDING SHUTDOWN COOliNG cooliNG PUMP POMP ROOP. RooM ELEVATIoN ELEVAtION 517 51' FEEt FEET 6 INcHtstNCHES 'I"'.
~e,
°1-1-
rH:[ rrr:[ ',PEA "PEA RB3-1: FiRE ZONE 1.1.1.1. uF-In FlRE ZOf~E U~IT 3 REAC10k WILDING ELEV~llUt kEAC10f< £;UILDING ELEVAlIU. 476 F££1 FEET 6 INcHtStNcHES H:f. !,PEA f-f-IF:f. I.PEA RB3-J RB3-1 flkErlkE ZONE 1.4.1, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING BUiLDING TIP ROO~i. ROO~i, FLEvAf!OIi 5 FltVATtbli iJ FEEl Sl! b IINCHES NeHES
- 7. ii L),elOpt ilJIIs l),elopt ilillS PeguestH,!
Peguest,,() E~i:lllflttUJl~ E:'f:I,,~tlUII~ \-'['re ~!['re reqllf-!~l.E:a reqlle~H'Q from Sec..tion Settion III.G.2 01 Apptwdix App~lIrJix F. to the eXtl*nt ex",l'It that rio Ii. fI~c;uires Hc;uires the ir,sta"ilation ir,su"ilatilln of an autc'lildtic autc'r.Jatic flrl;. f1r~ :)uppress;on
~uppression systt:t:l.
systlofn. 7.2 Ciscussion° Ciscussi()11 7.2.1 Fil'" Z,me Fir't:; Z..,ne 1.1.2.1, Unit 2 R(oo~t()r RN~tur Buildir;q Buildir;~ Elevation 4j'6 Feet {j (j Irlches
!rIches this This i~
;~ th~
tht- b~S~ffiEnt bi1s~lT,ellt floor th'or of thf th£* U"i~ Uni. 2 reactcr building. The north, south. 50uth. anQ an.:; east~dSt walls wai"is cf this zone form th~ ~xtcrior t.his lonE f:xtcrior of th~ the plant plalit except that the LPCl pum~' pUIf'~' n;urns (Fire Zcnt:s 11.2.1 dnd (FirE' ZOrlt:s and 11.2.2) 11.2.?) "re ore ill the ~lIuthwest southE:!as~ suuthwest and southeaS't c corIIU*~. cor"u'~. respect.'w'ely, fr"I:1 fr"!:1 fire ZerlE; roncr(!tc With roncrete (.\"lIr respect;\e1y, of this floor 1ev,,1. ZCIl~ 1.1.1.1 of Vrllt WI ih all (."lJr which cr,rnects a 11 p~~ctrations CONI~Ct5 thb Vn1t 3. The we~t. wa pler,~tra ti ons sEal~d thh wne levt:l. The: SEa led to a J-hour wile to the The west wall separai:.es wall11 is 3*hour 3-hour rating Separdi.eS this rat i n9 EXt~pt thE' Unit :33 reactor building EXCE:pt fur fOI' Ln buildinq fquipment orgin thi5 zore t'~inforcecf 3-hour rated l'einforcecf un unrated zlire or.ill
'lClli~ *tean k rliOr.~.
roor.,. The wa 11~. tt~ wall!. i.i the lPC LPCII pUr.IP rooms cOn\.o; cOr:t.oillfa unst:tllf>d unso:a1f'd penetrilt -.or,s. penetrat"ollrls. Tht: c..t:i'l Thl: i ng of thi tl"i"ling ZOIIU is c.c.I.:.;tructed thisS ZOlla etl,$tructed (\f "clnt 1'1!1l1l0rced concretf ~with arced concretp itt: all elEctrical penetra1.10nS electrical penetril1.10llS sealE"d; seillfd; mechall1cal mechalllcal per.etrations pelletrations to Fin: Fire Zon~s Zones 1.1.2.2
.;;.,;c ~I;d 8.2.5B.2.5.A * .4 art rdtloG. The cormustible Ilot rdU:Q.
ar(i 'IUt lOcidwg (electrical cables 1n corilustible 10.;d"'9 10 trays) is 1000lUOO Stu Btu r.eor squar~ foet. r.£'r squan: foot, wh whichich Jiroduces roroduces all t;qu i va 1ent severi equivalent severity 1e~s theW ty of' le50s thali
! r,li 1 r,:illute IIU te 011 thE:: tht ASTM ASTH E-l1E-1J99 l.ule-teJl',pt:rcl1;ure curvE'.
1.11:1e-terr,pt:r~ture curv£'. shutc(;~;" ~quipment Pot shutc(;\';I. r.onsist~ of LPCI vah~~ equipment consist!: valvle~ i\"d
~nd the alttirnativE:
a1t"rnativE: ir/beard iI/beard HO la t10n C('mdl:llst:r Holatlon Cl)ndllllSer vahl.:s va lv", power and ~nd control contro I ft-eus ftE:uS (in condui t). ThE: 11 (i n co"cuit). llCtmSee ctmsee prlJvicif'd a 1inE'aT has prlJvidE>d thermal1 detection lint*en tht:rUlil detc,ction systt.msystLm in and under cab cable trd.l'~, le tra} 50
- and a I-h(,ur fire
!-h(lur fin: feted r"ted wrap Oll tt,\! ai~ernatE or tt.t! aiternatE power and cCllitrol fe~c.is to the intloaYd c"litrol TetUS in~oard iso1aticII conden~H isolaticfl condell:i!:r \:(llves."~lves. Portilble Portable fire firo: Er.tinguishus and hose: ~tations arc host! :..tations I,H:ilab1e c,Hlildb lp. illitl ttd tloiss zone.
Then~ There in:!: al:" ~.\ir. tlir. ~hutdowr. shutdown pOl..hsptnhs 1" reactor buil(l1n~, 1n the rp.actor bui1(J1nlj, viz., the ;solatior, iso1atior, (.cl,Ct:nser tCI.Ct:nser path B1, and Clnd thetho: UrCt/LPCI IIPCI/LPCI Pilth p"th C. Given d T j ire in a,ny any fil'e fhe zone, zune, olie of ttlf: one thr, Shutdown pc;i.'ths pliths could bE be used to shutoown tilt! th~ ,'ct-.ctor. I*c~,ctor. ThesE:. Thest. two shutdo"",; shutdo"" 'fifths 'J.'i1ths are inCIl:!penCl~nt inal:!pencsl!nt t:xcept for thf.! the redundant inboard ;solcst;oJi iso1dtioll c(}fo('E'nser vc11\o'~s C(lN'enSer vu1\'tS powl!r MIt! control fet:ds. powllr cHIt! fl!t:CSs. That h, shutdo~1ri lJc1l.t. i~. shutdown Pdtt. C (HPCl/l.FCl) (HPCl/I.FCI) does nrt "t~ly I"t:ly upor. (,jjt:ration
,:,pfration of t.he the isolat iso1atlOnlOn condense" 'lit valves lves bUlbUl path Bl. Bl re '",H re! HS upontht!1'1 upOnthl!1"' tieing open.
or he motur
'rhe ..... perated 1ntcard mutu\"""perated i IIlcard ilS!Jl"tion condeJl~t:r valves sol" t ion condenst;r va lves iJrE: nonna 11y open dud HE nonnally dnd
~rt! °loccu,t!
;;rc *loeo\.l::d ;n in the dry"'~l1, drY"'t:l1, whitt; whict. 1S lS inerted. Tht: lIorllldl nurllldl pvw{~r pC\lI~r and cortrtd
'fPrlS are rOUlt:C1
'f:f'ris rOULO:CI sucr. th"t they are vUIr,t::rdble suer, t"e,t vull,t:rdule ttr t<J fire dama~w damage ir. aOjdcelit Zone iI, adjact!IIt 11.6-19
Revision 8 Apr; April1 1992 ( 1.1.2.2. Flo\ol Flll~1 to the isoli:t.l(.jn isoli:tiun condenser could be tut-off wt-off ulld ul,d equipment ecuipment (llid ulld
".llt illy as::>l:c1ated
("ld as,cciated "titt ~,;U tt,l;! tt.e alterllutive alten,utiYe HPCI/LP('IHPC1/LPCI path could also be dill,iiJged dal.;ijged by (';: f; Th('l'~ tore, re . Th£'l'd fire. Hrrnatt;iYe ore. a Hrrna ve pOwer and cuntro 1 feeds for the sootor-operated IIlOtor-operated inboan1t iiso1"ti"" inboarc s(llQt ior, clIndensel' ~il1yes havI cvndensl!l' 'vulves b~(:n insta hay' IH:t:1I ~ led. insta;led. fteds are rOLLted These feeds routed frol., [1C,-?/3 to Unit 3 MeC frol.. [J(',-?/3 MCC 38-:. From the Mee the cable$ MCC,, t.he cables are routed tt.r'ough tt.r*ough th" Unit ~ I'l~actor tht: I'l,actor bui 1ding and 1I1to building I-hour fire rate<l il.to a l-hour ratecl wr apped condL!it wlapped conddt in r i rp lont! riff Zon.! 1.1.2.1. Tht!..e Tht~e c~bles ci:b les then pa!.s pass into Fire- Fire Zone 1. 1.3.~.
- 3. ~. fireFire ZOlle 1.1.;:.1 contain! cablin9 Equipmem; fur the HPCl/LPCI shutdown path(C).
rablinp ar,d t!quipmen\; U, U. Ther~'i'ore, Therefore, a fit'E: fil'l in Fire Zone 1.1.2.1 dictates the use tlf IIf alterMtive alternative safe
~hut~(\wn
~hutc(l\ln !lilthpr.th P.l (is()lat,ul~ condenser) oud H (isolat,o.1 alld the condenser valvf's will be it'd i!:d by the Iid l~.f*rni!tive. l-I'lJur ratl:G l'.(*rn~tive, l-t.(.Iur rated l-Irapped coneJuit power and control fet:ds.
~Irapped concJuit 7.2.2 FH~
FlI Zone 1.1.1.1, Unit 3 Reactor R!:actor Building Elevation 476 Feet 6 Inches n.~~ zone is tt:t=tI;~ basement floor of the Uuit Ullit 3 reactor building. The north,
~(1lj-;'h, ~ol,~/i, dnd west Wells walls of t~1St~is zone foni fOrlJi the extericr (If CJ~ the plant except that. thet.
the LPCr p~llIP rOOlol;i LPCI Plillip (F;re Zones 1:.1.1 rOOI." {F"ire 1~.1.1 alld and 11.]11.1.2)
.2) are in the southwest ilnd ~nd Jl,;utheast cerlle,'s, respectively. of thi J~utheast CCrIlCl'S, tlliss floor flool' level. The east (ast wa wall11 sepclrates sep .. rates this zu~e Zor.(, from Fire Zone lone 1.1.2.1 of Unit 2. The south so~th wall wan al£c separatc~
ai~.c separatn tt.i:. tt.i; zone tror.1 tror.. rire Zone 11.1.3 (on~ (one of two HPCI pump rooms). The cDmhu~tlble cr,mhli~tlble lCJ;;ding is 2000 Bt~ lOJding Btu per sqU~l~ squal'( foot, f(lot, which produces un iln t~~ iiva u:;lI valent ~('vt:,'i ty OT dpproximatel,Y lent H-Vl:l'ity dpproximate 1)' 2 minutes ~iI the ASTM F**1l9 lIli nutes 1;11 F.. 1l9 time-ter.1peraturf. t ime-tct:lperaturr. (.urve. c.urve. Ur:it! 2 and 3 ar't: Ur:its design; therefore, the de!;cription an: the same dt;sign; de~cription of the previoli~.lyprevilJu~.ly
,jiscusse~ File Zone 1.1.2.1 in Section 7.2.1.
,!iscusseci 7.2.1, from which this zone is separated lj a 3-hour l,)" 3-/iuur ril.ted rilted concrete concrc;;e Irfall wall (extpt (extept as noted in Section 7.2.1), alsCs also applies to Fin: ZQIiC 1.1.1.1. Alternative shutdu\/n Fire Z(;IIC shu1.do~m capability is provicl~d provided indeper.c!cflt indeper.ccl,t of t.hiS zo;;e by t:<.jliipment tins lOi,e t:<;liipment loci.oteci loc(.ted in Fir'(;: Fil'~ !.rea r,rea RB3-1 (Fire Iones lones 1.] 1.1.1.S.A,
.1.S.A.
1.1.1.~.B, 1.1.1.5.C and 1.4.1). Witt. Wi 1.1. rl:'spec: rpsper. t tl:t(: safe shutdo~m, the iSSllt: Safe shutcJo,,!J'I, i SoUl! of altenative a 1terr;a t ive power dhti ul,ti control contru 1 fet'c; ferc; fot" for the lJll.:t'ard iso1<.tion conderiscr ihu(*ard isolc,tion condefiscr valves is the same for Ulllt- Ullit'33 as WL~. lolL!. describea for Fir~ Znne describeo Znr.e 1.1.2.1 i~ in ~nit Lnit 2 (s~e (se' Section 7.2.1). 7.3 Evaluution Evaludtion The fire fir~ protection in Fire Zones lones 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.1.1 describea above does dues not com~\lj' com~'lJ' ~nth \nth the:the technical requirements of Section III.G.2 I1I.G.2 of App<:.r.dix Apptndix R beCdli~t beCd~St: all ai' autor,~utic autor.'~tic fire suppr'ession suppr-ession s),stem ~Jstem has not ber:n beE:n instiil1ed. installed. Then: \/il5 \#0:; conCI;:rr. concen. that a fiTf: one 01 these fire zone~ could cau!>>e if; cme firE.- ill cau~e a loss of normal safe ~afe shutdown capability. However, the fire loading i.1 in these fire zones is r.tgl lor.es igibh:. (!ecausp r.t:gligiblt:. Cecausp (If t.he low combustible loading, a.a fire of ('f t.ht: si!jri,ficant I,,'ignitude stgrilticant I"'ignitude or duration is nrt net expected to OCCUl*. OCCUI*. Fire detectitlfl cetectilll, is h pnN fur these fire' zcncs. P,'IIV idee 1'l,.or zcnes. The,'efore, The"efore, there thfrt is reascnob reascnable le aSSUl"ar,ce assurar,ce that
~ fire ill in "nJ' dny 01 subject fire zones ~i of the subjl"ct 11 be detected in its E:ilrly
\iill early ,stagH
.stagH
,'r.~ i::xt
'.'r.1l "xtihs~j~hed ihSlt i:.:hed by the brigad<! before 1"I?dundant t~e firt! brigaci~ redundant sa1 salety-relatE'd et},-relatfd r.(l",ponell*_~ crt: th"t:!atf:rl~d.
('(lJr.ponen',!: th,'e"tf:npd. pro,loion of ai, l-hour fire r~ted The proilsiun wrapped conduit th~t rated wrappnd t.hot contains the JJ~ernativ[
~I:ernativt isolation isoiation c~ndenser cvndenser v~lves power ~hd and control f~6ds fHds route:d routed through thes~ 1:l' jil1(:
thest:: (: zC'nes zrnes aalsc 1SCi cr,sures Cf.sures thutth .. t Ue aalternative lterllat lve saf.:: ~hutdown path t'~lllains saf" !>hutdown I't!n,ains I 1..6-20 II 6-20
Revision 8 April 1992 available with respect to the isolation condenser valve flow path because of the ( low fire severity potential and lack of fire hazards in these four fire zones. The staff has determined that there is reasonable assurance that a fire in any of these fire zones will not result in the loss of safe shutdown capability. The staff finds that the installation of an automatic fire suppression system would not significantly increase the level of fire protection in these fire zones. 7.4 Conclusion Based on the above evaluation evaluation,t the staff concludes that the existing fire protection features combined with the alternative shutdown capability independent of the above-described zones provide an adequate level of protection. Therefore, the exemptions should be granted. B.O 8.0 c C FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.2, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING ELEVATION 517 FEET 6 INCHES o FIRE ZONE 1.1.1.3, UNIT 3 REACTOR BUILDING ELEVATION 545 FEET 6 INCHES 8.1 Exemptions Requested Exemptions were requested from Section 111.G.2 III.G.2 of Appendix R to the extent that it requires the installation of an automatic fire suppression system. 8.2 Discussion 8.2.1 Fire Zone 1.1.1.2, Unit 3 Reactor Building Elevation 517 Feet 6 Inches This zone surrounds three-quart~rs three-quarters of the inerted drywell (Fire Zone 1.2.1) and is adjacent to Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 on the east, Fire Zones 1.3.1 and 1.4.1 and the turbine building on the north, and Fire Zone 9.0.C o~ on the south. Units 2 and 3 are of the same design; therefore, the description of previously discussed Fire Zone 1.1.2.2 in Section 4.0 also applies to Fire Zone 1.1.1.2. This zone is separated from adjacent zones by 3-hour rated fire barriers, rated doors, and penetration seals with the following exceptions: the south and west walls are nonrated; the floor has nonrated mechanical penetration to Fire Zone 1.1.1.1; the ceiling has open hatches, a stairway and mechanical penetration to 1.1.1.1. Fire Zone 1.1.1.3. The electrical penetrations pe~etrations are sealed with noncombustible material. Fire Zone 1.1.1.S.C, 1.1.1.5.C, above, is separated by a 3-hour fire rated ceiling/floor assembly. Combustible loading is approximately 27,000 Btu per square foot, which produces an equivalent severity of approximately 21 Minutes
~inutes on the ASTM E-119 time-temperature time-te~perature curve. DG-2/3 bus In the vicinity of the D6-2/3 duct and cables, the fire load is negligible (2,000 Btu per square foot).
The Th~ licensee has installed a fire detection system throughout the zone, sealed openings to the Unit 2 reactor building to a 3-hour fire rating, and rerouted or wrapped in a 1-hour I-hour fire rated enclosure the Unit 2 power, excitation and control cables for the 2/3 diesel generator and auxiliaries. The 2/3 diesel generator (DG-2/3) is used to provide power for safe shutdown in the event of a fire in most Unit 2 and 3 fire zones. Unit 2 cables to the 2/3 diesel ( I-hour fire rated wrap per the requirements generator are provided with a l-hour require~ents of Appendix R. Thi Thiss wr,lp WNP was also provided for the Unit 2 4KV bus duct. 11.6-21 II .6-21
Revision 8 ( April 1992 8.2.~ 8.2.~* rire Zone 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.3 t Unit 3 Reactor Building Elevation 545 Fr:et F~et 6 lnch~s Inch~$ Thi~ zenp surround~ ~ire zen' surround. tire Zone 1.2.1 and Fire Zone 1.1.1.5.C. l.l.I.S.C. It is above Fire 7.ont' ] .l.l.~ described previously and below Fire Zone 1.1.1.4 described in I.onr* 1.1.1.<: In Section 4.0. It i~ ad,iacentad~iacent to the turbine building on the north Ilorth and tv rire Fire Zone Zor.e 1. 1.2.3
- 1. 2.3 on thr:
th~ east. Uni ts 2 and 3 are of the same des ign; therefore, ! Un; the description of previously discussed Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 in Section 4.0 also app 1i es to Fi re Zone 1. 1.1. 3 except as notea. Fire noteo. Th~ cOiubustih Thl- approxitlately 18,000 Btu per square foot, whic.h cOilibusTih 1 e loading is approxltlately which produce*s producC's a" a~~ equivalent fire severity of 14 minutes on the ASTM E-119 t'im~-tcm~erature curve. curv~. There lhere are no nC' conmustibles corilustibles in the vicinity viCinity of the I-hour flr~ flre wrapped cables. The licensee has installed fire detection through-Gut most of tht:: tht: zone, and sealed all penetrations to Fire Zone 1.1.I.S.C lol.1.S.C and to Fir<, Fir(; Zone 1.1.2.3 1.1.2,3 to 3-hClur rating. Unit 2 cables are wrapped in a I-hour fire rated barrier ard are rout~d firE' routed approxinately one foot off the floor. 8.3 Evaluation The r,re pro!er.tion in the above-described two fire zones do~s flre pro!ection does not comply with tht tecbnical req~irement~ of Section III.G.2.C thE: technical llI.G.2.C of Appendix R because an dutuli:atic dutur.:atic fire suppres5illll system has not been installed. su~pres5iull !:.ystem The fire p,'otecticn pt'otecticn concern for fer these two fire zones was that a fire could stcll't damage: redundant 06-2/3 cables or its bus ducts. 06-2/3 stijrt anci damagc' OG-2/3 suppl ;es supplies power to both uni powe'- ts and 11~~ requi units red for £r.lf:!,-yency required Er.teryency power ;inn thE' thl' event of a fire ill ffiost i~ n,ost fire zones. FOt, both of these fire zon~$, For zones, the fire 10ad load is low and does not exceed, on the 5.vel-age, a\'el'age, a 21 r.:illute fir~ severity. minute firt! In the vicinity of the 1-hourI-hour wrapped UG-2/3 combustibl~s or only a negligible amount. eccles, there are either no combustiblE:s uG-2/3 caelE's, Iheref~re, it is expected that a fire would develop slowly and remain small.
'Theref(Jre, deter-tion is provided for thes£ Fire deter-Uon theSE two fire zones so that there is'- is'.
reascr,aL le assurancC' that the fi reasar:aL firere brigade would be sum.oned sunwr.oned in a tintely tinlely lliar-rer. Because of the low fire load, the lliaM'er. extingui5~ thE fire brigade can quickly extinguistl thE fire. l~ th~ Ir. the interi~. the Unit 2 caLles and bus duct which are I-hour interim, th~ rat~cl wrapped can successfully withstand the effect.s fire rilt.rl effects of a small fire asso~iated with these two fire zones. st~ff has determined that there is reasonable aSSlJrance Thl! sti'lff assIJrance that a fire in
~ither these two fire zones w111 <!ither of t.hese will not result in the loss of safe shutdown l;"r~bility and, also, that the installation of ian l;ilrilbility an automatic fire suppression suppres~ion sy~tem thr~ughout th~
system the fire zones would not significantly upgrade the level of fire fi re protHtion. protHt ion. 8.4 Conc'iusion Conc"iusion Baseti Basec.i on tht! evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing and th" above evaluation.
~Irvp(jsed ~ropvsed protection features pr(\\'id~
fire prctectiorl prC'vide an adequate level of protection. iheH;fcre, lhcl*~f(;re, the exel;lptions exel.'ptions should be granted. 11.6-22
Revision 8 April 1992 ( 9.C ~:P,H:
~:,m: (,ONTROl rONTROL P.OOM AN!) AN:'> AUX~I.IARY AUX,I.IARY ELECTRiC EQUIPI*IEt!T EQUIPI*IEtlT ROOI~
ROOl~ (FIRE AREA TB-V; TS-V; C
** ", !OAeli.pt
" I vi' Reques~_ td f.r e)(empt.i\~
f.r' rcqu~sted from S(o(.tion exempti,'"... was rcquE:sted S[,~tion II LG.3 of Appendix 1'[(\ to the extent lILG.3 extEnt that it reC'ldn~~ rerL:htdrew I.-;*:rdrew thF': t~p. requested exemption e~elllption ar.ti a~ti used the original justification to fulfill the i111\Jly~i~
ijll<llysi~ requir:I.1t:nts requircl.lt:nts of uf Generic lettet' Lettet* 86-10. Although the staff is not reCjuH'~d requll'cd to rev;eh' revie,,' the ('L bl 86-10 ar.alysis, WI? have revif;ued revicllCd the orisinal original
$Ubr.'i~sion su~r.*;~sion and concur with the licensel:'s license~'s conclusion: i.e.,t HE::
i.e' the structural 5up~urtin!;i the steel supjJurtin!;l ihe Control Rc.cr,l ceilins will not be sl.it~ect RecM ceilin9 sul;,ect to tempm'ature!= tempet"ature~*' hi~i; hisi; enough ~o calIse conC(~l'li
~() CClllse COnC!'!"1i by any credible fire ilt ill the Control P.oom. I'oom. In
~,dition,
~(.dit.ion. t~c t'cinfuru,rl concrete ceiling/floor slab it~~lf nc rcinfurLerl it5E:lf exceeds the
( n;qu
!~dst i r~m(:nts for a 3-hc,lIr
,.~quir~m(,nts iedst 3-hcvr reristance r~ting.
3-t:cur fire rFfistance b~r-rier and a 3-h"~r rated bra'rier rHing. Therefore, 11 ",enetrat all ~enetraticr-s Thereforc, the C~lltrol icr-s are sea l[:~ to at sealed CCJntrol Room c£iling c.£11ing . i riC 1ud i 119 iit~ ((ir:cluding t~ urlpru'~E!ctE'd unpru'wctE'tI struct.l!re structure. 1 ssteel ~t:pports) is c('r.S tee 1 supports) idered to prov c['r.sidered provideide
~.tC;.l*ctior E'quivalent
~tctectior equivalent tG te. ,i: 3-hour fire rated l"ijted barrier. The fire load is 45,000 Ut .. pel' Utl.l ~'1I'are foot for pCt* !.('ware ",ontl'ol room and 13~,O(jO fut* the -tont,"ol 13~,O(j0 Btu per ~,quare ~.quare fOl;t foct fortor Lite AEER. The fire lcac i~
Lile t(jt~l1y comprised of cable insulatior.. [;oth aimost t(Jtt.lly is ainlOst I!oth (~re fire 10ild load villues transif.te into a fire severity (f less than 1-3/4 Hours itS vulues trallsiE.te ilS
~~\J,.esent"c by the ASn: r -119 fire tt:st curve.
~C:present~c .
Fire F ire prot(~ct protect lor. thi~ fire area lor, for thir- areij cClnsists cc.r,sists of a completecemplete fin* detectic;r, fhE' detectiur* system ir, lc;',:h fire zonE:S. ir. lVI:h zonf,S. Fire Zone 6.2 has an automatic haion haicn fire suppression sy~~cm sys:cm al,d ita tlanua iUld l:1anual1 CO,. CO, total tfloodingloading fire suppre~sion systen. systlm. Both firt:: we.es have firt: 20(.es firE' extincu~~h~rs extinsu~shi!rs alld hcse stations aVC1ilat:le:. availa~lE:. The main ccr.trol roen:rocn: ;sis c(Mtinu(iu~ C(;IIT. inuuu~ ~~1:;1 lI1anne~ d~ring plant operation. manned dlJring Since the cl.rl,trol cont"in main control boards, switdsears, rc.or.:s and AEER contain cvt,trol r(jOr.:s switch.eurs, and l-ill9 for most cf cabl'ill9 cab Gf th~ t.llt! safety.relatec1 safety-relateci and safe shutdoh'n equiplOCnt compolI~nts shutdown equipmtfit compolIl<:nts fot" tt.(. fUl' i/oe. tlant, sigllificant fire in Fir~ rlant, a significant Fir" Zones 2.0 and 6.2 could affect the norna~ norna; ~lal1t ~lant sah saff shutdown systems. tt.i$ Tt';$ necessitates the USE< ust: "'.f tI.f an un independ(:lIt independC:llt ltetr.at lye safe shutdown systelil{ aaltelroiitive s). Twc systeAI(s). Twe G'ifferent 1ternat iv(~ safe shutduwn different aalternative: shutdown pat"~ patt.;, (lme for U.nit lillit ::~ and und on~ one fur Unit 3) are avai lablt:' lablt: to these fire ze"rles Zc.lles dnodnli at"e p~y5ical1y arc p~y~ i ca 11y alit: e Jectri cr.lly indept!lici~nt al,e: electricr.lly independent of Fire Fi t"C ',rea
~,rea TB-V.
9.3 9.::' Fvaluation
,lhe fire: protect he fi)'(; protectior, ior, inill fire AreuAre .. TR-TR-VV does not comp comply ly wi t~e techn th the with tp.chnko ko I
- l~ulfemer.ts of Secti(J1I Sect;eJl' ]III.G.3 lI.G.3 of uf Appendix R b~cause fiXed-fire suppressior.
b(cause i1a tixl:d-fire suppression 'C :J] :'t;ljU)temeT,ts
~ystem h.:.::,
capar': capat'l"ity h~o I.Ot bet.;ll l'ity is pro\ in$t.?lled in a fh'\':: bet;n in$t.?l1ed prc.\ided. ided. fit'I;: area fo\"fu\' \/hich Ilhich an aaltcn.ative sh~t.cown ltcrllative shllt.cown 11.6-23
Rev; Revi sian sion 8 April 1992 ( The primary concern for this fire area was that a fire in the main control
" ./ room could cause the loss of normal shutdown capability. However, should a fire occur within the main control room, it is expected to be promptly detected by either the automatic fire detection system or by one of the station personnel manning the area. The fire is expected to develop slowly and be extinguished promptly by the control room personnel or the fire brigade.
Should fire damage be extensive, requiring evacuation, then an alternative safe shutdown system can be used. Because Fire Area TB-V has complete 3-hour fire rated barriers (except for the unprotected structural steel supporting the Control Room ceiling as described above in the Discussion), it is expected that a fire would not spread beyond the barriers because of the low fire load (severity of 1.75 hours). The staff finds that the installation of a fixed fire suppression system in the main control room (Fire Zone 2.0) would not signif-icantly increase the level of fire protection in this area. The AEER (Fire Zone 6.2) is already equipped with an automatic fire supression system which exceeds the requirements of Appendix R. 9.4 Conclusion Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the existing fire protection features in this area, combined with the alternative shutdown capability, provide a level of protection equivalent to the technical III.G.3 of Appendix R. Therefore, the exemption requirements of Section 111.6.3 should be granted.
- 10.
SUMMARY
Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the level of fire safety in the areas/zones listed below is equivalent to that achieved by compliance with the technical requirements of Section 111.6.2 of Appendix R, and therefore, the request for exemptions in the following areas/zones should be granted:
- 1. Crib House (Upper and lower Lower Levels), Fire Area 11.3 to the extent that 20 feet separation free of intervening combustibles or fire hazards is not provided between the redundant trains of safe shutdown cables, eqUipment equipment and associated nonsafety non safety circuits. See Secti"on 2.0 for lIore more information.
- 2. Units 2 and 3 Reactor Building, Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 to the extent that 20 feet separation free of intervening combustibles or fire hazards ;sis not provided between the redundant trains of safe shutdown cables eqUipment equipment and associated nonsafety circuits. See Section 3.0 for more information.
- 3. Units 2 and 3 Reactor Building, Fire Zones 1.1.2.1 and 1.1.1.1 to the extent that an automatic fire suppression system is not installed. See Section 7.0 for more information.
- 4. Unit 3 Reactor Building, Fire Zones 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 to the extent that an automatic fire suppression system is not installed. See Section 8.0 for more information.
( Based on the above evaluation, the staff finds that the level of fire safety in the areas/zones listed below is equivalent to that achieved by compliance II .6-24
Revision 8 April 1992 ( witt; witt thl.!the *':'t:chnica~
~echnica' nyuil'emellts r~yuir~mellt5 of Sectiorl Sectio~ III.G.3 of Appendix P i?T1d, therefcr~,
~nd, therefcrs, th~ rrnuest for c~emptiull~
the' ,',r,uest. e~.er.lptiuli:' in the fo11owir'9fol1owi~9 areas/zones areas/;:ones should be granted.
- 1. Fire Z(~~5 Z~~~5 1.1.~.1, 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.5.0, 11.~.1> 11.~.1, 11.2.2, 1.1.l.5.B, 1.!.l.5.B, 1.1.2.5.C, 1.1.2.5.A, 1.1.1.5.A, 1.J.J.5.A, 1.1.1.5.C, 1.1.1.5.B, ] ,1.1.1.
1.1.1.5.8, 1.1.1.1, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.1.2,1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4, 1.1.1.~.D, 1.1.l.~.D, 11.1.1. 11.1.2, ",.d .. ~11 locate:d,,~11 ll.1.2, al.d 1.3.1 locatc:d the Unit 2:: ami Cloildings to the ext~flt Reactul' Buildings allli 3 Reactor extent that fire detection ant.f, an~f. fixrcJ-f it'~ fi)(rcJ-f supprt'ssion sYEtel.l~ iI'" supprt'ssiofl Sy~t~l.l~ are not provided throughout the area/zonf*. SHticr, 4.0 for rnnre See SHticcl more inforliKl.tion. inforlolation. 2. (. F~r( Zlines2unes b.~.5.C, 8.2.6.C, 8.2.l.A, B.2.l.A, S.2.2.A, B.2.S.A, 8.2.5.A, 8.2.5.8, 8.2.6.A, S.2.6.A, 8.2.6.C, 8.2.7, 7.0.A, 8.1, B.1, 9.G.A, 9.O.A, 8.2.1.C, 8.2.1.e, S.2.2.B, 8.2.2.B, 8.2.4, 8.2.5.0, 8.2.5.D, 8.2.6.D, B.2.5.l, 8.2.5.l, 8.2.6.E, 6.1, 7.0.B, and 9.0.B, lecated lccat~d in the turbine buii I~hr.~, bu I,lir.~, to th~ extent tu the: Extent that fire detect detectioniCFI and fixed-fire suppression systerlls syste~'s are ar" notnut prCi\"~ded throu~hout the zur,es. zlJr.es. See Section 5.0 for I(J()re IIiOre nf (,rlio~ t ion. iinf~rmation. 3.
~. Fire zones 1.1.2.6 n~d and 1.1.1.6, lQcated lucated in the Unit 2 and 3 reactor builo ir:~s, to the f'Yt{!nt builcir'l;5, Ht~nt that f'it'e f'in' detect1(1fi detecticn {,lid,.lld fixea-fire sUpprS510n supprf.SS1Un systems are nut providt!d provid~d U,rr.ughout U,rcughout thE:: the zone. Sec See Section 6.0 for RlOre R1Or~
inforr.:at;e;n. i nf orma t icJn.
- t. r)re ZOl1l!S 2.0 and 6.2 Ccr.trol rlre ZOIl(!S Roum and Auxiliery eel.trol RO(Jhi Auxiliary Electri(;
Electri~ Equipment Room Ruom (AEERj fer Units 2 1:1,cj (AE.ER; t:r,c.i J~ to the extent that a fixed-fire suppressioll syst~"' is . suppression sY:itenl twt rlT"cvided 1\(lt r,r'cvided throughout th£: the ZC"lnes. ZC1nes. See $el.t $eLtion ion 9.9.0G for more information. ResE::o f\oS!:O Ull 011 thE: evaluation, the ~taff finds that exemptions the: above evaluation. exemptiolis from Sectic.r. Sectic.rl I1I.G.2 III.G.2 for fur iackjack of an ali i!utomatic automatic suppress*ior suppres,*ior system in Fire Zones 1.3.2 and
- 1. 4.1 He 1.4.1 Ct'e nut nec~s $Cl ry .
lleC~S$ary.
;;tluse fin: :i.Mles Fot ;;hvse :..c,fles that are arc conllllon tu r.lcre COOilllOIl to requested l'}:Elllption, r.lore than one I't:!quested e):Emption, tr.et~e icens .., bas assured 'lhc.t 1licens~t tli"t therE:
there is 110 overlap vi no overl~p cd the exemptions requc5"ted. requcsLed. that 1:(;~lC! C(;I; 1t! 1lead ur."ceptabi£. ead to ur.'Cc.eptollJ 1£. fi fire protection re protect ion conditions. The fir£: f; t"E: zones so inoived thin. tha'. ilre commor. to il\"~ COImlOr. r.KJr" than lll"rP. t.o r.llIrt: linp. of the above requested exemptior.5exemptior.~ are: 1J .1.1.,
.1.1.~ alld alid 1.1.1.3 III.G.'
IlI.G.C: - 20 feet s{!paration s~paration fr<:e fre:e of intencrling intencning combustibles. IIIl.G.2 II. G.2 - Lac"- Lac~ of automatic:
~utomatic fi,'e suppression systems.
fil'e suppre~5ion I II .G.3 - Lack of III.G.3 oi f~rr Lrr* detecticn f ix~d-fire suppres~ion. detecticl: and fixed-fire 1.1.2.2 and 1.1.2.3
!lI.G.~ - 20 feet sep(;ration lll.G.; sep.ration fr(:c fre:e cf intervening combu:>tihles.
combu,tibles. IlI._G.:; llI.G.3 - lack Lack of firt:, Q!:tection <;'lId firE' cif:tection fixed-fire suppressic.n.
~nd fixed-fir~
1.1.2.1 and 1.1.1.1 1.1.1.l 111.t.2 111.£.2 - Lack of ~utumatic ~uiumatil: fire supprcssi~n. supprcssic.n. III.G.! - lack IIJ.G.3 Lack of ot f-il'e fil'e detectiNi ~I,d fixeo-fire suppression. detecti(1~ 0111.1 11.6-25 II.6-25
Revision 8
-~ 24 24 ..- April 1992
( This Safety Evaluatlon Thls EvaluatIon was prepared based on a Technical Evaluation Report (TER-C5506-581) (TER-C5506-58l) dgted doted November 7. 7, 1986. 1986, prepared by Franklin Research Center (FRC) under a cOhtract with the U.S. Nuclear Regult.tory (onnission (NRC). Reguli.tory Connission Principal contributors: John Stang, revised by David Notley Pr1ncipdl Dated: January 5, 1989 c 11.6-26
7
***. _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ ....0-- .... _ ***
~4.' _ _ *""'~_-*- - ............ ..:...-..~..... ., *
- UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555 c
co. July 6, 1989 Revision 8 April 1992 50-237 Docket Nos. 50~237 and 50-249 Mr. Thomas J. Kovach Nuclear Licensing Manager Commonwealth Edison Company Post Office Box 767 Chicago, IL 60690
Dear Mr. Kovach:
SUBJECT:
SAFETY EVALUATION REGARDING COMPLIANCE WITH 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX R, ITEMS III.G.3 AND III.L AND EXEMPTION REQUEST FOR HOT SHUTDOWN REPAIRS FOR DRESDEN UNITS 2 AND 3 (TAC NOS. 59853 AND 59854) By submittals dated September 10 and November 17, 1987, and March 15, April 19 July 13, and September 16, 1988, you further revised your Appendix R co.pliance program at Dresden regarding Items III.G.3 and III.L (alternative/dedicated 0 shutdown capability) which was previously approved by the staff in a Safety Evaluation issued July 17, 1987. As discussed in the enclosed Safety Evaluation, we haye have determined that the \\.
'I revised alternative shutdown capabjlity capabjljty for Dresden Units 2 and 3 meets the requirements of Appendix R. Item 111.6.3 III.G.3 and the performance goals of Item III.L and is.
III.l is, therefgre orreptabJr. ocreptablr. In addition, our re uest for exem tions from the A endix R Item III. I. r . .
~tdown repairs is js a1s9 also granted In this context, we note that a few of the proposed manual actions requi"re completion within a very short time after scram (e.g., replacement of blown control power fuses for the swing diesel generator starting controls, removal of 20 control power fuses for reactor relief valves, and engaging the automatic switch prior to evacuating the control room for a fire in the blowdown inhibit SWitch control room). We will re~uest reeuest that the Region verify your ability to perform the identified short-term ot shutdown repairs in a timely manner.
ft.~~6{joct ..Ml..,,, 1t,~~f:t{j"t Project Directorate 111-2 nagor Division of Reactor Projects III, Special Projects IV, V, and SpeCial
Enclosure:
As stated
- (
< ( cc w/enclosure: See next page 11.7-1
Revision B April 1992 Mr. Thomas J. Kovach Dresden Nuclear Power Station c Commonwealth Edison Company Units 2 and 3 cc: Michael I. Miller, Esq. Sidley and Austin One First National Plaza Chicago, I111nois Illinois 60603 Mr. J. Eenigenburg Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station Rural Route #1
#l Morris, Illinois 60450 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspectors Office Dresden Station Rural Route #1 MorriS, Morris, Illinois 60450 Chainnan*
Chainnan Board of Supervisors of Grundy County Grundy County Courthouse Morris, Illinois 60450 ( Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road, Bldg. #4 Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137 Mr. Michael E. Parker, Chief Division of Engineering Illinois Department of Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704
- c
- (.
11.7-2
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGWLATORY REG!JLATORY COMMISSION WA.SHINGTON, o. C. 20555 WASHINGTON, D. Revision 8
/ April 1992 I
\ SA~ETY EVALUATION SY.TWE.OfFtCE*Of.NUClEAR BY.T~E.O~FICE*OF.NUClEAR REACTOR.REGULATION REACTOR. REGULATION COHPlIANCE.WITW APPE~DIX COMPlIANCE.WIT~ APPENDIX R.TO.I0.CFR PART 50,.ITEMS.III.S.3.ANO.III.l.AHD R.TO.lo.erR 50,.ITEMS.III.G.3.AND.III.l.AND EXEMPTION.REgUEST.fOR.IIOT.SJiUTDOWN.REPAIRS EXEMPTION*REQUEST.~OR.JjOT*SJjUTDOWN.REI1AIRS DRESDEN.STATION,.UNITS.2.AND.3 DOCKET.NOS *. 50.2311249 DOCKET.NOS.*50.2311249
- 1. INTRODUCTION By letter dated July 17, 1987, a safety evaluation (5E) (SE) was issued regarding Ap~nd1x Ap~ndix R to 10 eFR CFR Part 50, Items III.G.3 and III.l IteMS III.S.3 III.L (i1ternative (alternative and/or dedicated shutdown capability for a fire event in the plant) for Dresden Units 2 and 3. The above SE addressed deviations from an earlier safety evaluation (ESE) dated January 19. 19, 1983 on the above subject. The SE was necessitated by the licensee licensee's' s reverification effort and associated findings relating to
(( with Appendix R requirements. compliance wfth requireMents. These findings were identified in a number of subsequent sub~itta1s sub~ittals by the licensee (August 9, September 18, and October 16, 1985; January 9 and May 30. 30, 1986). In the reverification submittals, the 1fcensee licensee cons1dered considered zonal interaction ana revised the originally identified alternative hot shutdown paths, proposed hot shutdown repairs, i.e ** pulling out fuses and replacing b10wn repairs. 1.e., blown fuses, and requested exemptions froM the Appendix R, R. Item III.G.1 III.G.l requirement for performing .such repairs. Subs~quentlYt sub~fttals dated September 10, and Hovelber Subs~quently, by sub~ittals NoveMber 17. 17, 1987, and March 15, April 19. 19, July 13 and Septenber 16, 1988, the lfcensee licensee further revhed revi~ed the Appendix R cOlllpl1ance prograll'l progralll at Dresden.'" These submittals Dresden *. 'These identified a few changes (e.g ** handling fire induced (e.g., Induced spurious operations, operations. high/low pressure interfaces, Interfaces, handlfng hanoling electrical fsolationIsolation concerns, hot shutdown repairs and eXelptton exeaptlon requests) from the earlier submittals on which the July 17, 1987 SE WIS was based. This SE is based on the subsequent sub.itta1s sub.lttals ..ntioned ntloned above, above. and Fire Inspection Reports 50-237/88-10 and 50-249/88-12 dated Januar,y January 3.3, 1989 for Dresden Untts Units 2 and 3. This SE addresses deviations froM froll the January 19, 1983 ESE and it supersedes the July 17, 17. 1987 SEe SE. It further fUrther evaluates the licensee's request for exemptfons exemptions fro. from the Appendix R, Item III.G.l III.G.1 requfrement requirement with regard to the proposed hot shutdown repairs. The SE addreSSing the. . licensee's other eXelptlon exemption requests fro. applicable Appendix R requtrements requirements with regard to the fire protection features for Dresden Units 2 and 3 has been proYided provided separately. II..7-3 II 7-3
Revision 8 April 1992 2.0 POST.fIRE SAtE.SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY
~OST.nRE SAfE.SHUTDOWN Systems.Required.for.Sife Shutdown 2.1 Systems.Re9uired.for-Sife In addition to the systems and components identified in the.ESE for achieving equivalent fire lreas safe shutdown for a fire in certain fire areas or their equ;valent areas (see Section 2.2 of this SE for a definition of equivalent fire areas), the licensee identified the use of the high pressure coolant injection/low pressure coolant injection (HPCI/LPCI) systems. This approach would achieve hot shutdown in lieu of the isolation condenser (IC) shutdown method identified in the ESE.
Additionally, for a fire in certain plant areas/zones (RB2-I: Zone 1.3.2, RB2-II: Zone 1.1.2.3, RB3-II: Zones 1.3.1 and 1.1.1.3 - see Section 2.2 of this description), the licensee identified the use of the LPCI/ SE for a fire area description). containment cooling service water (CCSW) system for decay heat removal to achieve and maintain cold shutdown in lieu of the normal shutdown cooling system and its dnd associated supporting systems identified in the ESE. The safe shutdown systems identified above are expected to be used during a severe fire event when other means of shutdown identified in the plant procedures are determined to be un-avallab Ie. available. Alternite.Safe.SAutdowR.Is.Required 2.2 Areas Where Alternate.Safe-ShutdowR.ls-Required As part of their reverification effort, the licensee examined the need for providing alternate safe shutdown capability for Units 2 and 3 for a fire in any fire area or its equivalent fire area. The licensee defined an equivalent ( fire area as one or more fire zones which border other fire areas, and is either separated by a 3-hour rated fire barrier or by equivalent fire protection. The licensee also considered zonal interaction; i.e., fire spreading from zone to zone in their reverification analysis. (The licensee's earlier submittals assumed that fires would not spread from zone to zone). When the analYSis indicated that the requirements of Appendix R were not explicitly met. met, the shutdown' path and the same licensee verified that the same alternate hot shutdown/path same' cold shutdown path (i.e., the normal shutdown cooling system path) were available for all the zones within a fire area or its equivalent with a few exceptions. 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.3 and The cold shutdown exceptions are for Fire Zones 1.3.2, 1.1.2.3. 1.3.1 as discussed in Section 2.1 above. The hot shutdown exceptions are for 1.1.2.6, as discussed below. Fire Zones 1.1.1.5.0, 1.1.1.6, 1.1.2.5.0 and 1.1.2.6. The licensee also proposed modifications to provide either a 3-hour rated fire barrier, or equivalent fire protection features, for the affected zones to barrier. ensure safe shutdown capability. Based on their zonal interaction analYSis, requfred for 11 the licensee concluded that alternate shutdown capability was required areas (total 13 areas) as the reqUirements of Section III.G.2 were' not met for these areas. T~ese are: (1) (I) RB2.I Uait RB2*I Unit 2 Relctor-Bu11ding.E9uivilent-Ffre.Arei-1 Relctor.Buflding.Equfvllent.Fire.Arel.I Thfs area contains the Unit This Unft 2 IC and its pipe pfpe chase zones. Elevations 589'-0", 570'-0" and 546'-6" (Zones 1.I.2.S.A, 1.1.2.S.A, 1.1.2.S.B and 1.1.2.S.C) I.I.2.S.C) ( II.7-4 11.7-4
,1
Revision 8 April 1992 ( (2) RB2.I.Unft RBl-I.Unit 2 Reactor Building.Equivalent Fire.Area.I This area is the the Unit 2 shutdown cooling pump room. Elevation 517 517'-6" 1
-6" (Zone 1.3.2)
E9uivaleRt.~ire Area*II (3) RB2-IIUnit 2 Reactor Building EquivaleRt.fire This area contains Unit 2 HPCI and LPCI valves, LPCI pumps, 480V motor control centers (MCCs), local reactor level and pressure instrumentation, 4 kV switchgear, 125V dc reactor building distribution panel, 250V dc MCCs, 480V switchgear and the Unit 2 part of the common refueling floor. Elevation 476'-6" (Zones 1.1.2.1, 11.2.1 and 11.2.2), elevations 517 -6", 517'-6", 1 545'-6", 570'-0", 589'-0" and 613 613'-0" 1
-0" (Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.2.4, 1.1.2.5.0 and 1.1.2.6)
(4) RB3-I Unit 3.Reictor.Building.Eguivalent.fire 3.Reactor.Building.Equivalent.fire Area.I This area contains the Unit 3 IC and its pipe chase zones. Elevations 589 -0 11 , 570'-0" and 545'-6" (Zones 1.1.1.5.A, 1.1.1.5.B and 1.1.1.5.C) 589'-0", 1 (5) RBl~I ggJ.I .. Unit 3-Reactor.Buildfng.E9ufvalent.flre.Ar~i 3.Reactor.Building.Equivalent.ffre.Area I This area is the traversing incore probe (TIP) room. Elevation 517'-6" (Zone 1.4.1)
- ~
- ( (6) RB3-II Unit 3.Reactor.Bul1ding 3.ReactorBuflding Equivalent.fire Area.II This area contains Unit 3 HPCI and LPCI valves, LPCI pumps, 480V MCCs, local reactor level and pressure instrumentation, shutdown cooling pump, 4 kV switchgear, 125V dc reactor building distribution panel, 250V dc MCCs, 480V 4BOV switchgear and the Unit 3 portion of the common refueling floor. Elevation 476'-6" (Zones 1.1.1.1, 11.1.1, 11.1.2), elevation 517'-6" (Zones 1.1.1.2.
1.1.1.2, 1.3.1), elevations 545'-6", 570'-0", 589'-0" and 613'-0" (Zones 1.1.1.3, 1.1.1.4, 1.1.1.5.0 and 1.1.1.6) (7) TB-I Turbine.Building Turbine.BuildiRg Eastern.Zone.Group.Fire.Arei EasterR.Zone.Group.ffre.Arei This area contains essentially Unit 2 cabling and equipment. Elevations 469'-6",495'-0" 469'-6", 8.2.1.A, 8.2.2.A), elevation 517'-6" (Zones S.2.S.A, 495 1 -0" (Zones 8.2.l.A, 8.2.5.A, 8.2.5.B, Unit 2 diesel generator (DG) 8.2.S.B, (OG) room 9.O.A, 9.0.A, dirty oil tank room 8.1), B.l), elevations 534 -0", 538'-0" 534'-0", 1 53B'-0" (Zones 8.2.6.B, B.2.6.B, 8.2.6.A) and elevation 549'-0" (Zones 8.2.7, 8.2.7. station battery rooms 7.0.A) (8) TB-II .. Turbfne*BuildlRs*Central.Zone (B) TS-II TurbiRe.BuildiRg.Central.Zone Group.fire.Area This area is common for both units and contains the mechanical control rod drive (eRD) (CRO) cross-tie valve and a 480V MCC. Elevations 517'-6" and 534'-0" (Zones 8.2.S.C B.2.5.C and 8.2.6.C) 11.7-5
Revision 8 April 1992 ( \ (9) TB~III .. Turbi~e Building Western.Zone Group.Fire Area This area contains Unit 3 cabling ana eqUipment. equipment. Elevations 469'-6,N 469'-6," 495'-0" (Zones 8.2.1.B, 8.2.2.B), elevation 502'-6" (Unit 3 cable tunnel 517 1-6 11 (Zones 8.2.5.0, 8.2.5.E. Zone 8.2.4), elevation 517'-6" 8.2.5.E, Unit 3 OG Room 9.0.B), elevation 534'-0" (Zone 8.2.6.0), elevation 538'-0" (Zones 8.2.6.E, DC panel Room 6.1) and elevation 5511-0" 551'-0" (Station Battery 8attery Room 7.0.B) (IO) (10) TS.V TB.V Turbine Building Equivalent.fire,Area Equiva1ent.fire.Area This area contains the Units 2 and 3 control1 room and auxiliary electric equipment room. Elevations 534'-0" and 517 517'-6"
-6" (Zones 2.0 and 6.2)
(11) RB-2/3 .Reictor,Bul1di~g.t/3,fire.AreA RB-2;3 .Reactor.Buflding*Z/3.fire.Area This area contains the Unit 2 HPCI room (Zone 11.2.3), Unit 3 HPCI room (Zone 11.1.3) and the swing OG g.O.C) DG 2/3 Room (Zone 9.0.C) The licensee has provided an alternate hot shutdown capability for a fire in any specific area listed above independent of the area as required by Appendix R, Section III.G.3. Additionally, the licensee has identified fire zones listed above that lack fire detection and/or fixed fire suppression systems both of which are required by Section III.G.3. The licensee has requested exemptions from the III.G.3 requirements for the above zones and has provided justification c( based on their fire hazards analysis. The licensee listed eight alternate hot shutdown paths; six use the respective unit IC and two use the respective unH unit HPCI/LPCI system for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown of either Unit 2 or Unit 3, or both, depending on where fire occurs. Two of the IC alternate hot shutdown paths (B1 (Bl for Unit 2 shutdown for a fire in areas T8-1TB-l or RS2-II, RB2-II, except for Zones 1.1.2.6 and 1.1.2.5.0; Al for Unit 3 shutdown for a fire in areas TB-III or RB3-II except for Zones 1.1.1.6 and 1.1.1.5.0) use the unit IC, OG 2/3. 2/3, the other unit's power train, and local manual operation of the IC valves. Two other IC alternate hot shutdown paths (A2 and B2 for shutdown of Units 2 and 3. 3, respectively. respectively, for fire either in area TB-II or TS-V) a fir~ TB-V) use DG OG 2/3, the respective unit IC and power train, and local manual operation of the IC valves. The remaining two IC alternate hot shutdown paths use the respective unit IC, power train and OG and do not require Manual manual operation of the Ie IC valves for a fire in the RB-2/3 fire area (E for Zone 11.2.3;'F 11.2.3;*F for Zone 11.1.3; E and F for Zone g.O.C). The HPCI/LPCI alternate hot shutdown paths (C for Unit 2 shutdown for a fire in RS RB 2-1 area; 0 for Unit 3 shutdown for a fire in RB3-1 RB3-! area) use the respective unit HPCI/LPCI syst~m. power train and OG. For a fire 1n in the Unit '2/3 reactor Unit*2/3 refue~ing floor (RB2-II:Zone 1.1.2.6/RB3-II:Zone 1.1.1.6), building common refue11ng 1.1.1.6). or . TS-IV TB-IV (turbine building operating floor and vent floors),floors). the two normal hot shutdown paths A and S B are generally used for Units 2 and 3 shutdown, respectively, respectively. since the refueling floor and TB-IV area do not contain any safe shutdown equipment or cables. These normal hot shutdown paths use OG 2/3 and the eqUipment respective unit Ie IC and power train. The pathSpaths do not require manual operation of the th~ IC valves. These normal paths are also used for a fire in either Zone 1.1.2.5.0 (RB2-II) or 1.1.1.5.0 (RB3-II) for the same reason mentioned above, i( ie" provided the fire does not spread into another zone. In such a case, the alternate hot shutdown path 81 Bl or Al described above is used. II. 7-6
Revision 8 April 1992
- 5
~ 5 ~-
(~ The staff has reviewed the above mentioned alternate hot shutdown paths for Dresden Units 2 and 3, and finds them acceptable. 2.3 Section.III.G.2.of Appe~dix"R Appendix,R The licensee indicated that the crib house (Zone 11.3) which contains the service water and diesel generator cooling water pumps, complies with the requirements of III.G.2 with a few e~ceptions dealing with barrier design and cable separation for which the licensee has requested exemptions. The licensee provided justification for these exemptions based on their fire hazards analysis. These exemptions have been evaluated separately. For a fire in the above area, Th~se either normal hot shutdown paths A eith~r A and BB or redundant hot shutdown paths E and F may be used for Units 2 and 3, depending upon where the fire occurs. The licensee also indicated that for some of the fire zones 1n in areas RB2-II RB2-I1 and RB3-II RB3-I1 listed in Section 2.2 of this SE, some of the safe shutdown functions will be protected in accordance with the requirements of III.G.2. The licensee has requested exemptions from the applicable requirements of III.G.2, which have haye been evaluated separately. 2.4 Modifications for.Safe.Shutdown System Besides completing the modifications identified in the earlier SEt SE, the licensee has completed the following modifications: (1) Relocation of the local control station for MCC 38-1" 38-1 main feed (( which power the DG 2/3 auxiliaries, from its previous location in the turbine building mezzanine floor (Zone 8.2.6.C) to the DG 2/3 room in the RB-2/3 area. This ensures the availability of one of the two redundant sources of power to the DG 2/3 auxiliaries out-side the turbine building. The control station for the redundant source, MCC 28-1, ;s is located in the turbine building ground floor (Zone S.2.5.C). B.2.S.C). (2) Installation of an automatic transfer switch on the power feeds for the DG 2/3 cooling water pump in the cribhouse. This modification ensures availability of at least one of the two redundant sources of power for the pump. (3) Installatfon of ladders to provide access to alternate hot shutdown and cold shutdown equfpment. shutd~n equipment. In addition" to the above modifications, addition'to modffications, the licensee committed' to pro-lfcensee has committed'to vide a number of other fire ffre protection features. The adequacy of these features with regard to ensuring ensurfng separatiQn separation of alternate shutdown paths has been con- ," sidered infn the evaluation of the exemption requests. The staff findsffnds the above modifications modffications acceptable. 3.0 EVALUATION The safe shutdown systems, equipment and components identified 1n in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of this SE are expected to be used during a severe fire event when other ( means of shutdown identified 1nin the plant procedures are determined to be 11.7-7
Revision 8 April 1992 ( unavailable. Sections 3.1.1 through 3.5 identify how the performance goals Section III.L of Appendix R to 10 CFR 50 are met when alternate outlined in Sect"lon shutdown paths are used: 3.1.1 Reactivity. Control Reactivity control is achieved by following the procedures described in the ESE. 3.1.2 Reactor.Coolant.Inventory Reactor coolant inventory is controlled by following the procedures described in the ESE except for the following: (1) Based on their analysis of fire-induced spurious operation of the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), the licensee determined that no single fire can prevent both the inboard and outboard MSIVs on any steam line from closing on an isolation signal. Therefore, excessive loss of reactor coolant inventory from the reactor vessel via the main steam lines during a fire event is prevented by automatic closure of at least one MSIV on each main steam line. The safe shutdown procedures will also specify closure of the MSIVs from the control room for appropriate fire areas. (2) For a fire 1n in either RB2-1 RB2-I or RB3-1 RB3-I area, the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path is used to achieve hot shutdown. The control room operator places the HPCI into operation to maintain proper reactor water level. Reactor coolant { inventory control is accomplished by manually operating the flow-controller to regulate water supply to the reactor vessel by the HPCI pump, which takes its suction from either the condensate storage tank (CST) or the torus. During this mode of operation, the operator will place the HPCI room cooler in operation. operation, supplying it with cooling water from the service water system or the DG cooling water pump. 3.1.3 Reactor.Coolant Pressure Control The "Target Rock" valve (mechanical mode) and the mechanical safety valves on the steam lines will be used for reactor coolant pressure control. 3.1.4 Relctor.Decly.Helt.Removal Reactor. Decay.Weat. Removal For a fire 1n in any plant area other than RB2-J RB2-I or RB3-I, decay heat removal during hot shutdown is accomplished through the use of the IC, associated supporting' equipment and procedures ISas described in the ESE. For a fire in RB2-1 RB2-I or RB3-J RB3-I areas, the HPCI system will be used in conjunction with the LPCI system 1n in the torus cooling mode to accomplish decay heat removal during hot shutdown. operation, the operator will start one or two LPCI pumps In this mode of, LPCI operation. (Division II) and open valves in either the torus test return line or the torus spray line to return water to the torus after it is cooled by the containment cooling heat eXChanger. exchan~er. The operator will also start two con-tainment cooling service water (CCSW) pumps (Division II) to provide cooling water flow to the tube side of the heat exchanger and, additionally, open the discharge valve for the cooling water discharge header. The operator will throttle flow as appropriate to obtain the desired cooling and will verify that the LPCI and CCSW room coolers are in service. I1.7-8 II.7-8
Revision 8 April 1992 c*c For a fire in any plant area/zone other than RB2-I/l.3.2, RB2-lI/1.1.2.3, RB2-1I/l.l.2.3. . RB3-II/l.l.1 RB3-II/l.3.1 and 1.1.1.3. 1.1.1.3, decay heat r~val renoval during cold shutdown Is ts Iccampltshed aCCGIPltshed by using the no~l normal shutdown cooling systel, systen, reactor building closed cooling water (RBCCW) system, the service water system, and the procedures outlfned outlined tnin the ESE. For a ffre fire in the zones identffied identified above. above, the lPCI/CCSW LPCI/CCSW (Division (Divfsion II) method will be used to remove decay heat during cold shutdown. In this ..thod. thod, the vessel is filled using lPCI.LPCI, with hot water overflowing to the torus through the relief valves. This method continuously cycles ~cle$ water though the core, through the relief valves to the torus and back again after cooling via contdir~nt cooling heat exchanger. Water to the LPCI room the oontd1r~nt r~ cooler 15 is provided usfng using the unit OG's DG's cooling water pu~s or service water pumps. pu~s. Water to the CCSW room cooler fs is provided from the CCSW pump d1scharge discharge and is 1s routed through the cooler to the pump suction. 3.1.5 3.1.S Process-MoAftorlns Process-Monitorin9 Dfrect Direct indication of process variables such as reactor vessel water level. level, reactor coolant system pressure and condensate storage tank water level Ire are provided locally. _~lso, indication of Ie IC water level for the IC hot shutdown paths, and suppression pool water level for the HPCI/lPCI HPCI/LPCI hot shutdown paths. paths, are available locally. Suppression pool temperature indicat10n indication for the HPCII HPCI/ LPCI shutdown path is provided locally. D1agnostfcDiagnostic monitoring includes local indications for service water system pressure and condensate transfer pump discharge d1scharge pressure for the IC path and HPCI and LPCI pumps discharge pressure for the HPCI/LPCI shutdown path. Diagnostic monitoring available for cold .( shutdown systems syste~s includes indicat10ns shutdown cooling coo11ng and the CCSW systems. syste~s. of_~ressures for the RBCCW. fndications of~~ressures RBCCW, no~l normal 3.1.6 Support-Functions Support-Fu~ttfons In addft10n addition to the systems needed to support the IC hot shutdown paths and tht! the nonnal shutdown coo11ng cool1ng sys'tetn sys"tt!l1 cold shutdown path identified 1n in the ESE. ESE, the HPCI. HPCI, lPCI LPCI and CCSW room coolers are available to provide necessary support for the alternate shutdown systems. Control and monitoring for these systems
. are provided loca locally.
11,y. 3.2 72-Hour Requirement The lfcensee licensee has reaff1r.ed reaffir.ed that Dresden Units 2 and 3 have the capability to achieve cold shutdown w1thin 72 hours after a fire event in tn a~ any plant area. area, assuming a loss of offs1te offsite power. 3.3 Repafrs Repairs sesides several-c~ld shutdown repairs which are permitted by Appendix R and Besides several-t~ld Which are identified in the l1censee's licensee's September 10. 10, 1987 submittal. submittal, the lfcensee has identified fdentffied a few hot shutdown repairs repafrs infn thefr their sub.fttals. submittals. These are discussed below: (I) (1) IC hot shutdown paths A2 and 82, B2, wh1ch whfch are used for achieving hot shutdown of Units 2 and 3 for a fire in TS-II TB-II or TB-V area require two condensate (c. transfer pumps (located in TB~I.TB-I, Zone 8.2.5.A. B.2.S.A. and T8-III, TB-III. Zone 8.2.5.E) 8.2.S.E) II. 7-9
Revision 8 April 1992 ( to be placed under local control. This, in turn, requires electrical isolation of these pumps. The licensee proposed to achieve isolation by pulling out one fuse per pump at the applicable MCC on the floor above the pumps. The licensee further stated that the pumps are not needed to provide makeup water to the Ies rcs until at least 20 minutes after the initiation of the Ies, ICs, and that this provided ample time to remove the fuses. The staff concludes that the licensee's exemption request from the III.G.I III.G.l requirement for the above hot shutdown repairs is acceptable since it only involves pulling out two fuses and there is reasonable assurance that this can be done 1n in a timely manner. (2) Additional hot shutdown repairs to correct common power source, spurious operation and electrical isolation concerns are discussed in Subsections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 of this SEeSE. 3.4 Associated.Circuits.and Associated.Circuits.aRd Isolition Iso1itioR As part of their reverification effort, the licensee examined associated circuits concerns, including common power source, common enclosure, fire-induced spurious operations including possible high/low pressure interfaces, and an electrical isolation deficiency. The licensee has addressed these concerns in their submittals as discussed below. 3.4.1 Common Power. Source COmmoR c ( Regarding protection against fire-induced spurious operation and high impe-dance faults associated with common power sources (i.e., faults in non-safe shutdown circuits which compromise the power supply to safe shutdown loads powered from the same source), the Dresden units rely on manual operations specified in the shutdown procedures for a fire in the plant. These procedures include tripping circuit breakers, operating disconnect switches, and removing fuses. Specifically, the licensee stated that the plant safe shutdown procedures
- require the operator to shed all the non-safe shutdown loads from 4kV and 480V (associated with the hot shutdown paths that use the fire common power buses (aSSOCiated affected unit's own power train) by tripping the associated breakers in a timely manner. Additionally, these procedures instruct the operator to remove the 125V dc control power fuses for the electrically operated breakers for the non-safe shutdown loads, if required. Fuses will be removed as necessary prior to tripping the applicable breakers, to preclude subsequent spurious closure. The licensee further stated that the applicable control power fuses are easy to identify and remove, readily accessible, and under periodic surveillance, and that their removal would not cause anY any undue hazard. Based handlin9 'common on the above, the staff finds the licensee's approach for handling *common power source concerns including the proposed hot shutdown repair (i.e., fuse remova Is) to be' removals) acceptab le. The staff f~~:he~
be* acceptable. br';her. recommends that the 11 censee' s licensee's request for exemption from the Appendix R, Item III.G.l reqUirement, to allow the above hot shutdown repair be granted. 3.4.2 Common Enclosure
/( The common enclosure concern arises when redundant safe shutdown circuits are
- ~-
\ ..
routed together in a raceway or enclosure and they are not electrically protected, or a fire can destroy both circuits due to inadequate fire protection means. 11.7-10
Revision 8 April 1992 ( Regarding the above concern, the licensee stated that redundant safe shutdown cables are not routed in common enclosures and that though some non safety-related cables m~ may be routed in common enclosures with safety-related cables, the nonsafety-related cables are not routed between redundant safety-related divisions or trains. The licensee stated that all electrical circuits have been designed with appropriate protection from overcurrent conditions. The licensee stated that applicable fire protection features (e.g., substantial fire barriers for areas or zone groups, wrapping of select cable trays and automatic suppression systems) provided for an area or a zone group will assure that a fire will not propagate out of the area or zone group. The staff finds the licensee's handling of common enclosure concerns acceptable. 3.4.3 Spurious SpuriOUS Operatio~s Operations Fire in some areas can impair safe shutdown due to fire-induced spurious operation of safe shutdown equipment. Therefore, isolated local control stations for safe shutdown equipment such as IC valves, shared (swing) DG 2/3 and its support eqUipment, and service water pumps have been provided. Loss of reactor coolant (RC) inventory resulting from fire induced spurious openfng opening of motor operated HPCI steam supply valves (when the HPCI is not supplying reactor vessel makeup) and spurious operation of RWCU valves, is prevented by tripping applicable breakers. These valve breakers are located in a 250V dc MCC located in Unit 2 or 3 reactor building (E1. (El. 570 -0"). Alternatively, 570'-0"). 1 the feed to the MCC at the 250V dedc MCC in the turbine building bul1ding could be tripped. The above procedure will close the HPCI steam supply valve and isolate the ( RWCU system. Spurious opening of the solenoid operated reactor head vent valves (resulting in RC inventory loss) will be prevented by a pre-fire action; i.e., ensuring closure by removing power from these valves. Steam venting of the main steam lines nnes via spurious operation of the air operated IC valves va lves 1sis prevented by manually closing the applicable upstream valve. To prevent fire-induced spurious closure of the motor operated IC valves that are required to be open during Ie IC operation, power to these valves is removed by tripping the applicable breakers located at the 250V dc MCC 2A or 2B, or by tripping the feed to the applicable MCC at the 250V de dc MCC in the turbine building. These valves ma~ be subsequently opened manually. Spurious closure of the control rod drive (CRD) valves in the cooling water line will not disrupt the supply of makeup water to the reactor vessel during Ie IC operation. This is because flow will be available through the charging water line and the scram injection valves, and also by ensuring that the scram signal is not reset. rev1~.ltd the above procedures for handling f1re~1nduced The staff has revie.l£d fire-induced spurious operations and concluJ~s that th~ they are acceptable. ", 3.4.3.1 Spurious 0per.tton.of 0peritfon.of Relctor.Relief Reactor.Relief Valves Fire-induced spurious actuation of a reactor relief valve (RRV-any one of four electromatic valves or one target rock valve for each unit) warrents special consideration and is, therefore, addressed separately in this subsection. A fire event in Fire Area RB2-I, RB2-II, RB3-I, RB3-II, TB-I, TB-III or TB-V ( Cdn result in spurious operation of a Unit 2 and/or Unit 3 RRV(s). To 11.7-11
Revision 8 April 1992
-~ 10 -
( eliminate such a potential, the licensee proposed to remove power from all relief valve circuits of Unit 2 and/or Unit 3 following a fire which Specif1cally, for a fire 1n affects Unit 2 and/or Unit 3. Specifically, in anyone of the above fire areas except TB~I TB-I or TB-III, TB~III, the licensee proposed to remove power by opening the respective breakers at the 125V dc distribution panel(s) locdted in Fire Area(s) TB-I and/or TB-III. For a fire in Fire Area TB-I or located TB-III, the licensee proposed to remove powee TB-III. power by ~ulling vulling out the affected contajned in an electrical panel in a different unit's RRV control power fuses cont~jned fire area (TB-I: Unit 2 RRV control power fuse panel is 1n in Fire Area TB-V, TB~V, Fire TB-III: Unit 3 RRV control power fuse panel 1s Zone 6.2; lB-III: is in Fire Area RB3-II. RB3-II, Fire Zone 1.1.1.3). The licensee stated that at anyone time, only 20 fuses unites) will require removal within 10 minutes for the 5 RRVs for the affected unit(s) after scram, that the fuses are easily identifiable and removable, and that the1r removal will not involve any Significant operator hazard. Additionally, their for a fire in any one of the seven fire areas, the newly installed automatic blowdown inhibit switch will be engaged from the main control panel (Fire Area TB-V) to prevent automatic/spurious actuation of the automatic blowdown system. The licensee stated that the plant shutdown procedures for a control room fire will require engaging the inhibit switch prior to evacuating the control room. The licensee stated that the applicable panel for a fire in Fire Area TB~III will be readily accessible; but that access to the panel in Fire Zone 6.2 in Fire Area TB-V, for a fire in Fire Area TB-I, will require transit through the affected fire area itself and entry through one of the two 3-hour fire rated doors to Fire Zone 6.2. The licensee justified the above approach stating that the doors are widely separated (about 100 feet) and that partial ( ' .. automatic fire suppression systems have been provided in Fire Area TB-I that protect the area between the doors from fire damage. The licensee also described other fire protection features (e.g., a 3-hour fire rated masonry wall separating access doors north of column row E). The licensee claimed that these the two access. TB-I, at least one design features will ensure that for a fire in Fire Area TB~I, door entrance to Fire Zone 6.2 will be accessible. Based on the above design features, the staff concludes that the proposed manual action for a fire in Fire Area TB-l fir~ TB-I is feaSible. feasible. During a fire inspection conducted during April 18-22, 1988, the inspectors found that at Dresden Unit 3, the potential exists for fire-induced multi-conductor cable fault in two control cables associated with Unit 3 RRVs. Such spur10usly opening, thereby compromising a fault can result in two or more RRVs spuriously safe shutdown capability. It was further noted that fire-induced failures of in bypassing and defeating the function of the automatic these cables can result 1n blowdown inhibit switch. The licensee outlined modifications (e.g., installing two new control cables 1n in a separate tray) to rectify the RRV spurious actuation in a submittal dated September 16, 1988. *The staff concerns mentioned above 1n has reviewed th~se modificatio~s an~ finds them acceptable. modifications and Based on the above, the staff concludes that the proposed procedures including hot shutdown repairs (i.e., fuse removal) for handling fire-induced spurious operation of the RRVs are acceptable. The staff further recommends that the licensee's request for exemption from the Appendix R,R. Item III.G.I III.G.1 requirement, to allow performing the above hot shutdown repair, be granted. The staff concludes that the proposed modifications to rectify concerns relating to ( multi-conductor cables are acceptable. 11.7-12
Revision 8 April 1992 ( 3.4.3.2 High/lew. Pressure IRterfaces High/Lcw.Pressure I~terfaces One special category of spurious operation involves high/low pressure inter-faces. The concern stems from the possibility that components on the low pressure side of the interface may not be designed for operation at the normal operating pressure of the reactor. Thus, if normally closed motor-operated interface valves were to open spuriously due to a fire event when the reactor was at pressure, the low pressure piping could rupture. The isolation valves unisolable LOCA outside may not be able to close. The result would be an unisolab1e containment. In the ESE, it was stated that Dresden Units 2 and 3 had no high/low pressure interfaces that relied solely on motor-operated valves for isolation. The shutdown cooling system (SCS), which usua11~ contains such interfaces, is designed to full reactor pressure (1250 psig) at a temperature of 350°F. This is lower than the ReS RCS design temperature of 575°F. The staff has concluded, as stated in the ESE, that the ses SCS can withstand RCS temperature on a one-time basis; therefore, no protection against the possibility of fire-induced spurious opening of the high pressure-high temperature/high pressure-low temperature interface between the ReS RCS and the ses SCS is needed on a bas is. one-time basis. Subsequent to the issuance of the ESE, connections have been made between the low pressure designed fuel pool cooling system (FPCS) and the SCS which, in turn, is connected to the RCS. As a result, high/low pressure interfaces (normally closed motor-operated valves) currently exist between the SCS and the FPCS. Regarding the above, the licensee stated that the power supply ( to four valves would be removed during normal power operation to preclude spurious opening. The licensee stated that the power to these valves will be restored only when necessary during outage activities (i.e., when the reactor is depressurized). The staff finds the above approach acceptable for preventing fire-induced spurious opening of the currently existing high/low pressure interface valves between the SCS and FPCS. 3.4.4 Electrical.I501atioR Electrical. IsolatioR DeficieQc~ DeficieQcy The electrical isolation deficiency concerned a fault on a remote circuit blowing a fuse needed for local control prior to isolation, consequently impairing the capability for local control of the needed safe shutdown equip-ment. The licensee stated that quite a few hot shutdown circuits are singly fused and so are vulnerable to this problem. A majority of these circuits are control Circuits A circuits for the 4kV 4kY circuit breakers. These breakers are equipped with local mechanical "TRIP" "CLOSE"N buttons IITRIP" and "CLOSE that are good for one close and one trfptrip operation without electrical control power. Additionally. Additionally, the licensee stated that some of the remaining control power circuits are for 480V 480Y breakers associated with two condensate transfer pumps. The applicable pump breaker can be jacked closed within 20 minutes after Ie IC initiation (permissible time for supply of makeup water to the IC) Ie) in the event the control circuit becomes inoperable.
,(
II.7-13 11.7-13
Revision 8 April 1992 ( The balance of the singly fused circuits involve local controls for four inboard Ie IC valves for both units and controls for starting the swing OG 2/3 engine. A fire in certain plant areas ( RB2-II; RB2-1I; RB3-II; OG 2/3 room in RB 2/3) may require local control for some of the hot shutdown components or equipment mentioned above. The need for local control will depend upon the hot shutdown path specified for the fire area in Section 2.2 of this SE (a fire in RB2-II RB2-I1 or RB3-II RB3-I1 will require local controls both for starting the swing OG engine, and the other unit's IeIC inboard valves; a fire in OG 2/3 room will require local controls for both units IeIC inboard valves). For such fire events, the licensee proposed hot shutdown repairs to replace blown control power fuses for the isolation switches for the applicable components or equipment. The licensee stated that the above operation will be performed in fire areas other than the affected fire areai aff~cted area; the replacement fuses which are of the cartridge type will be readily accessible. The licensee has committed to maintain the applicable replacement fuses and the fuse pullers under periodic surveillance 1n in the proximity of the fuse replacement locations, and to specify the needed manual operations, i.e., fuse replacement and operation of isolation switches as necessary, in the plant shutdown procedures. The licensee further stated that aa Single fire at tn~ tb~ most would require six fuses to be replaced. The replacement fuses will be easy to identify and install in a timely manner (10 minutes after scram for the swing DG OG engine starting controls; 30 minutes for Ie IC inboard valves). The licensee claimed that since the circuits involved in the above procedures are low-voltage control circuits and the fuses though rated at 15 amperes will actually carry much less current, the above task will not pose any undue operator hazard. c:( Based on the above, the staff has determined that the licensee's proposed manual actions including the hot shutdown repair, i.e., fuse replacement, meet the intent and purpose of IE Information Notice Nos. 85-09, IIIsolation "Isolation Post-Fi re Shutdown Capability" Transfer switches and Post-Fire Capabi 1ity" dated January 31, 1985, licensee's and ar~, therefore, acceptable. The staff further recommends that the l~censee's toe*Appendix R, Item III.G.1 requirement,to allow request for exemption from toe-Appendix the above repair for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown, be granted. 3.5 Saf~ Shutdow~ Procedure$.and.MiRpower Shutdowa Procedures.and-MiRpower In the submittals, the licensee stated that safe shutdown procedures have been developed to incorporate the above-described alternate shutdown paths, including procedures for handling possible fire-induced spurious operation of equipment needed for accomplishing safe shutdown. The licensee further stated that these procedures would ensure that the necessary shutdown functions are performed at all times by available manpower. The staff finds the above positl~n position acceptable.
4.0 CONCLUSION
The safe shutdown systems identified in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of this SE are expected to be available during a severe fire event when other means of shut-down identified in the plant procedures are determined to be unavailable. 11.7-14
8 Revision 8 UNITED STATES April 1992 Apri1 ~~~J
~~~I NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, WASH'NGTON. D.o. C,20555 C. 20555 eo. Il~~11ft.
CLJ. 12)11601< /",. D/~
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't.&'* L. ~
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c Docket Nos. 50-237 and 249 August 15, 1989 tf ;UIlIII jt(. IJ~I
~*tlill1 /1(, 4~f Mr. Thomas J. Kovach , .
Nuclear Licensing Manager . ; AUG 2
'j; Commonwealth Edtson Edison Company Post Office Box 767 J'~L...-I J'~L--I_ --_--.J10
_ _--.Ji0 Chicago, IL 60690 --------.-
Dear Mr. Kovach:
SUBJECT:
EXEMPTIONS FROM THE TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS OF APPENDIX R TO 10 CFR PART 50 ~- DRESDEN NUCLEAR POWER STATION, UNIT NOS. 2 AND 3
, (TAC NOS. 59851 AND 59852) .,
By letter dated August 10,la, 1984 as supplemented by letters dated September 18,
~larch 12 and March 20, 1986, Commonwealth Edison Company (CECo) requested 1985, ~1arch exemptions from Section III.G of Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50. By letter dated October 16, 1985, CECo submitted additional fire protection exemption requests and by letter dated May 30,3D, 1986, CECo's exemption request SUbmittals submittals were further revised based on a meeting held with the NRC staff on April 8. 8, 1986.
This information was further supplemented in a letter dated April 14, 1987. We completed our review of your submittals and by letters dated January 5, c 1989, and July 6, 1989 YOij YOij were provided u~ copy of the staff's Safety Evaluations. Based on our evaluation of the CECo submittals, we concluded that CECo's proposed fire protection configuration provides an equivalent level of safety to that achieved by compliance with Appendix R. Therefore, the exemption requests as described in the enclosed exemption are granted. The "EnVironmental "Environmental Assessment and finding Finding of No Significant Impact" was published in the Federal Re~ister on August 7, 1989 (54 FR 32399). A copy of the exemption is being flled fl1ed with the Office of the Federal Register. Sincerely, Paul C. Shemanski, Acting Director Project Directorate 111-2 ' Division of Reactor Projects III. III, IV, V, and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/enclosure: c See next page I1.8-1 11.8-1
Revision 8 15. 1989 August 15, April 1992 Mr. Thomas J. Kovach Dresden Nuclear Power Station ( Commonw~alth Edison Company Units 2 and 3 cc: Michael I. Miller, Esq. Sidley and Austin One First National Plaza Chicago, Illinois 60603 Mr. J. Een1genburg Eenigenburg Plant Superintendent Dresden Nuclear Power Station Rural Route n Morris, I11in01s Illinois 60450 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory COl!1llission Commission Residerlt Inspectors Offi ce Office Dresden Station Rura 1 Route .1 Rural ,1 Morris, Illinois 60450 Chainnan Chairman Board of Supervisors of Grundy County Grundy County Courthouse Morris, Il1ino;s Illinois 60450 Regional Administrator Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III 799 Roosevelt Road, Bldg. 14 #4 Glen Ellyn, I11inois Illinois 60137 Mr. Michael E. Parker, Chief Division of Engilleering Engineering Illinois III i noi s Department of Nuclear Safety 1035 Outer Park Drive, 5th Floor Springfield, Illinois 62704 ,e(~. i I 1.8-2 11.8-2
Revision 8 April 1992 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION In the 'Matter of COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY Docket Nc. 50*237 50-237 and 50-249 (Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 2 and 3) EXEMPTION I. 1. Cormlorl~/ealth COlllliorMea lth Edison Company (CECo, the licensee) is the holder of Prov;sional Operating License No. DPR-19 and Facility Operating License No. Provisional (, ~_ OPR*25 which authorizes the operation of Dresden Nuclear Power Station, Unit DPR-25 wliich Nos. 2 and 3 (the facilities) at a s.teady steady state power level not in excess of 25.:7 25~7 megawatts ther~al. therlilal. This license provides, among other things, t~ings, that th~ the facilities are subject to ail rules, regulations, and Orders of thE Nucl~ar P.egulatory Conmission Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the staff) no...,now or ur hereafter in effect. The facilities are boiling water reactors (BWR's) located at the licensee's site in Grundy County, I1Hno15 Illinois.*. II. Section 50.54 of TitlE 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 eFR CFR 50.48, "Fire Protection") and Appendix R to 10 eFR CFR Part 50. 50, "Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Facilities Operating Prior to January 1. I, 1979," set forth certain fire protection features required to satisfy the GenHCil GenH,,1 Design Criterion related to fire protect1~n protecti0~ (Criterion 3, Appendix A to 10 GFR CFR Part 50). ( (.
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II .8-3 11.8-3
Revision 8 April 1992 ( Section 1II.G III.G of Appendix R reouir~s reouires fire protection for equipment important to post-fire shutdown. Such fire protection is achieved by various combinations of fire barriers, fire suppression systems, fire detectors, and separatiorl separation of safety trains (II I.G.2) or alternate post-fire shutdown (II1.G.2) equipment free of the fire area*(III.G.3). The objectives of this protection is to assure that one train of equipment needed for hot shutdown would be undamaged by fire, and that systems needed for cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours (III.G.1). III. By l~tter ietter dated August la, 10, 1984 as supple~ented by letters dated September 18, 1985, ~~arch
~\arch arid 12 alld ~arch 20, 1986, CECo requested exelnptions exemptions
.C C- from Section III.G IILG of App~ndix R to 10 CFR Part 50. By 1etter letter dated ciated October 16, submitted additional fiTe 1985, CECo submitt~d fire protecticn protection exemption requests and by letter l~tter Nay 30, dated ~'ay 3D, 1So8E, 1~8E, CECo further revised exemption request submittals based on a meeting he1dheld with the NRC staff on April 8~ 8, 1986. This information WdS
>IdS supplemented by CECo in further supp1emented Q Q letter dated April 14, 1987. A description of the exemptions requested and a summary of the Comrnissicnls d~scriptivn Commission's evaluation follow.
Exemption Requested The licensee requested exemptions from the requirements of Se-etion Section III.G.l of 10 CFR Part* SO Appendix R whiCh, eFR Part-50 which, in part, requires that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown be free of fire damage. In ,( 11.8-4
Revision 8 April 1992 c their submittals, the licensee identified several shutdown circuits and associated equipment that could be compromised due to failure of fuses associated with thes~ circuits, or due to fir~ induced spurious operation of certain shutdown equipment. The licensee requested exemptions 1n in regard to the following equipment eqUipment and failure modes: (1) Condensate transfer pumps 2A and 3A; control circuits for 4KV and 480V safe shutdown circuit breakers; inboard isolation condenser (Ie) (IC) valves; dnd circuits affected by postulated fuse failure's Swing DG 2/3 control c"ircuits due to indd~quate electrical isolation from circuits compromised by the fire. (2) so.fe shutdown buses affected by failures of non-safety load 4KV and 480V Safe circuits to a firE.
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"(, relief valves affected (3) Reactor reli:f affectEd by fire induced faiiures failures of associated circuits causing
~ausing their spurious operation.
The licensee proposed hot shutdown repairs to justify their request for exer.Jption from Section 111.G.1. exemption III.G.!. Fire induced postulated failures of fuses protectin~ safe shutdown circuits, prior to th~ protectirlS the isolation of these circuits for local control, was justified by evidence of redundant manual controls including fuses, and pulling out of appropriate fuses. ~nd by controls for fuse replacement. The accessibility, staff determined that the licensee controls for the location, accessibility. surveillance, and operator safety in regard to replacement of fuses surveillance. fuse~ and other proposed manual rnanua~ controls are acceptable. Repairs for fuse failures caused by high impedance faults associated with common power pow~r sources sourc~s and fire induced spuri~us operation of equipment were justified by evidence of established plant shutdown procedures and controls
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11.8-5
Revision 8 April 1992 ( requiring tripping of circuit breakers, operating disconnect switches, and removing fuses. These procedures also require shedding of non-safety loads from appropriate 4KV and 480V safety buses, and the removal of 125Y 125V DC control power fuses from appropriate non-safety load circuit breakers. The staff determined these procedures and controls to be acceptable. The staff has also determined that there is reasonable assurance that the licensee's proposed manual actions including the hot shutdown repairs (fuse replacement) meet the intent an'd an-d purpose 'ofof IE Information Notice No. 85~09. 85~09, "Isolation "Iso Post-Fire lation Transfer Switches and Post-Fi Capability,* re Shutdown C~pabil ity," dated Janua ry 31, 1985, and are therefol4~ January therefo"e acceptablE'. acceptab IE'. The special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12 apply in that application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the Ie i( under 1y ing purposE: underlying purpose of the; ru le. the:rule. In th ; s case, the hot shutdown repa this i rs repairs
,- involving fuse removal and replacement preclude the possibility of postulated fire induced fuse failures f~ilures and high impedance faults from impairing the operability of required safe shutdown systems from performing their safety function. Thus, the underlying purpose of the rule would be satisfied without requiring redundant fUSing and electrical isolation.
Exemption Requested The licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of Seef10n Section III.G.2 of Appendix R because intervening combustibles or fire hazards are'present are-present between the redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment in the upper and lower crib houses (Fire Zone 11.3 Crib House).
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11.8-6 I1.8-6
Revision 8 April 1992 ( that th~ The staff's principal concern was that* the intervening combustibles and fire hazards may create a path for the spread of fire between redundant safe shutdown systems and result in a loss of safe shutdown capability. However, because of the light fuel load in these zones.zones, a fire of significant ~agnitud~ magnitud~ duratiun to cause a loss of safe shutdown capability 1s or duration is not expected to occur. occur, it should not spread from the place of origin or If a fire should occur. endangt!r endang~r redundant pumps in the upper or lower crib house because the installea curbs should contain lubricating cil instal1eo oil spills, sprinkler systems installed above cable trays and in other areas should extir,guish or control fires to prevent their spread via i~tervenin9 i~tervening combustibles, and the detection shoula al~rt systems or water flow alarms shoulo alert the plant fire brigade to respond to the fire. Upon arrival, the fir~ fire brigade should extinguish the firt fire if the (/ ('
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\. sprinkler systems have not. en Cn th this is the staff concludes that the basiS, i s bas t ccr,figuration provides en licensee's alternative fire protectioll ccnfiguration an equivalent
-level of fire safety to that achieved by cCimplianc~
-lev£l compliance with Section III .G.2.
II1.G.2. application'of the The special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12 apply in that applicatioo*of rEgulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the r£gulation underlyin~ purpose of the rule. In this case, the light fuel load in these zones 1nin combination with the existing fire protection features and completed modifications minimize the possibility of a fire in one train spreading and causing damage te the redundant train. Thus the underlying purpose of the rule would be satisfied without requiring the 20 foot minimum separation distance free of intervening combustible material. 11.8-7 I I. 8-7
Revision 8 B April 1992 ( Reguested Exemption R~guested The licenset license~ requested an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.2III.S.2 of Appendix R in the following fire zones: Fire Zone 1.1.2.2, Unit 2 Reactor Building, Elevation 517 feet, 6 inches; Fire Zone 1.1.2.3 Unit 2 Reactor Building. Building, Elevation 545 feet, 6 inches; Fire Zone 1.1.1.2, Unit 3 Reactor Building, Elevation 517 feet, 6 inches; and Fire Zone 1.1.1.3, Unit 3 Reactor 8uildi~g Buildillg 517 feet, 6*6 inches. These exemptions were submitted because: although
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distan'cf: of safe shutdown equipment in these zones is separated by a horizontal distan'c£: oore than 20 feet, intervening combustibles or fire hazards are present between the redundant trains of equipment (reactor coolant water level and pressure instrumentation) and automatic fire suppression systems are not provided throughuut throughout the zones. ,(
' .... The stC1ff st"ff' ~ principa) cor/cern l
cor,cern was that the intervening combustibles combustib les and redur,dant saf~ tire hazards may create a path for the spread of fire between redundant saft. shutdown systems and ana that the lack of fire suppression systems may permit the fire to continue and result in a loss of safe shutdown shutdo~m capability. However, because of the light to moderate foel f~el load, it is not expected that a fire of significar.t dut'ation d~I'ation or magnitude would occur. Intervening combustibles in Fire Zones 1.1.2.2, 1.1.2.3, 1.1.1.2, and 1.1.1.3 provide a path for the between redundant safe shutdown systems in the form of cables spread of fire betwe~n trays. in tr~s. cable Howev~r, cabl~ quantities along these paths are small, path distances are ~t at least 75 feet, and the licensee has installed fire detection systems in all four of these zones and fire stops in cable trays in Fire Zones 1.1.2.2. Zenes 1.1.2.2, 1.1.1.2, 1.1.2.3 and 1.1.1.3 which cross from one side of the Reactor Building to the other. Should should not spread to Sho~ld a fire start, it shou16
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II.8-8 11.8-8
Revision 8 Apri 1 1992 April c endanger redundant systems because the detection systems will alert the plant fire brigade to respond to the fire prior to extensive spread. On this basis, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed fire protection configuration provides an equivalent level of fire safety to that achieved by compliance with Section III.S.2. II1.G.2. The special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12 apply in that application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. In this case, the li"ght fu~l"load light to moderate fuel load in combination with the fire detection systems installed by the licensee in all four of these zon~s a11 zones and fire stops in cable trays in all four zones which cross from one side of the reactor building to the other minimize the possibility of a fire in one train spreading and causing damage to the ,( ,[ redundant train. Thus th~ underlying purpose of the rule would be satisfied without requiring the 20 foot minimum separation distallce distdllce free of intervening combustible material. Exemption Requested The licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R in 23 fire zones located in Reactor Building Fire Areas RB2-1 and RB2-11 for Unit 2 and Reactor Building Fire Areas RB3-II for Unit 3 because fire detection systems and/or fixed fire suppression systems have not been installed in zones or areas for which alternative shutdown capability is provided. The staff's prinCipal principal concern was that a fire in one of these fire zones could cause a loss of normal safe shutdown capability. However, the fire loading in all of these fire fir~ zones ranges from negligible to low and in no fir~ severity exceed 21 minutes. case does the equivalent fire ~f the low Because of
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I 1. 8-9 11.8-9
Revision 8 April 1992 ( combustible loading, a fire of significant magnitude or duration is not expected to occur. Except for seven fire zones, area-wide fire detection is " pr~vided. For the seven fire zones not having area-wide fire detection, there is either linear cable fire detection or spot fire detection, or the fire zones are open to an adjacent fire zone having fire detection installed throughout. Adequate means (extinguishers and/or hose lines) for manual fire" fighting is available in a11 of the fire zones as required. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that a fire in any of the 23 subject fire zCJnes would b~ detected in its early stages and extinguished by the fire brigade before adjacent safety-related locations are threatened. Should a fire damage any safe shutdown components in any of these locations before the fire brigad~ ~xtinguishes it, an independent alternative
- ( shutdown capability is av~ilab*le to be used to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. The ~lternat;ve safe shutdown path is separated from all fire zones where it is intended to be used by 3-hour fire rated barriers and any unsealed openings in a rated barrier are protected by an automatic suppression system in accordance with Gen~ric Letter 86-10 for unsealed penetrations. On this basis, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed alternative fire protection configuration provides an equivalent level of fire safety to that achieved by compliance with Section III.S.3.
The specia~circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12 apply 1n that application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the un~erlying purpose of the rule. In this case. the low fire loadings and th~ area-wide or linear cable or spot fire detection in combination with adequate means for manual fire righting in all 23 fire zones and independer.t , (
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,. \ alternative shutdown capability eliminate the possibility of not achievinQ achie'ling or I1.8-10 1I.8-10
Revision 8 April 1992 ( maintaining safe shutdown. Thus the underlying purpose of the rule would be satisfied without requiring fire detection systems and/or fixed fire suppression systems in each of the zones. Exwption Reguested Ex£mption The licensee requested an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R in 22 fire zones located in Central, Eastern, and Western Zone Groups of the Turbine Building because fixed-fire suppression systems and/or. fire detection systems have not been installed in zones for which aTI an alternative safe shutdown capability is provided. The staff's principal concern was thot a fire in ene one of these fire zones could cause a loss of normal safe shutdown capability. Although some of these fire zones have a high fire load, th~ the fire leading loading is due to diesel fuel or lubricatiToS steel' tanks. These steel lubricatir.s oils in steel'tanks. ste~l tanks have beer. reviewed to the provisions of the "Flal11Tlable provlsions "Flammi:ble and Combustible liquids Liquids Code Code"ll (NFPA-30) pubHshed b) the "ational bj thE' liational Fire Protection Assoc.iation. While the tanks do not conform in all details to this code, they do satisfy the major provisions of the code and are considered to provide an equivalent level of protection. In adaition, these fire loads are protected by automatic fire suppression systems. With fir~ 1~ads these exceptions, however, the fire loads range from negligible to moderate and, in no case, do they exceed a I-hour equivalent
~quivalent fire severity. Because of these low to mocerate fire loadings, and given that the diesel fuel and lubricating 011oil fire hazard~
hazards are contained and protected by fire suppression Significant magnitude or duration is not expected to occur. systems, a fire of significant All fire zones are protected by fire detection or fire suppression systems or i{ i(
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Revision 8
-- 10 10 -- April 1992 c
Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that a fire in any of the both. Therefore. subject fire zones will be detected in its early stages and extinguished by the automatic fire suppression systems syst~ms or by the fire brigade before adjacent safety-related locations are threatened. If a fire should damage any normal shutdown compon~nts in anyone of these zones before it is extinguished, the alternative shutdown capability, whith zonES per Section III.l of Appendix R, is which is independent of these zones to achieve" and maintain safe shutdown. available to be used to'achieve On this basis, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed alternative fire protection configuration provides an equivalent level of fire safety to that achieved by compliance with Section III.G.3. applicatior. of The special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12 apply in that application
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- (. the regulation in the pa~ticular par.ticular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. case, most of the fire Zones In this case. zones have negligible to moderate fire loadings and the high fire loading zones, which have the diesel fuel and lubricating oil. oil, are contained in tanks which satisfy the major provisions of the fire protection codes. Since all fire zones are arE protected by the fire detection or suppression equipment or both and independent capability 1s alternative shutdown c~pability is available.
available, the possibility of not achieving or maintaining safe shutdown is eliminated. Thus the underlying purpose of the rule would be sa~isfied without requiring fire detection systems and/or fixed fire suppression systems in each of the zones zones.*
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11.8-12
Revision 8 April 1992 ( Exe~ption Requested Reguested The licensee requested an exemption from the requfre~nts require~nts of Section 111.6.3 III.G.3 of Appendix R in Fire Zon~s 1.1.2.6 and 1.1.1.6 of the Unit 2 and 3 Reactor Building, respectively, because fire detection and/or fixed-fire suppression systems have nct been installed since they form a part of the plant area for which an alternative shutdown system has been provided. The staff's principal concern for a fire in one of these two fire zones is that a fir~ cculd develop and spread to adjacent fire zones (for which aalternative copa~i1ity lternative shutdown capc.t; lity has been provided) and damage normal safe shutdown system components conta.ined contained therein. These two fire zones have fire loads that are negligible and, in no cese,case, does the equivalent fire severity exceed 2 minutes. negligible fire loads, a fire of significant Because of the negligibl~ C. magnitude or duration is ~ot ~ot expected to'occur. Should a fire occur, it shoulci develop remain small, and dissipate: cievelop slowly, remairl dissipate its heat to the surrounding envir~nment without spreading to adjacent fire zones. The fire detection syste~s in the adjacent fir~ zones systeMs brlgad~ zenes would detect the fire and the fire brlgade woulc weuld be summorled summor,ed to extinguish the fire manually. Since there are no safe shutdown components in these blo b/o fire zones, there is no concern for any inmediate in~ediate fire damage potential. On this basis, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed alternative fire protection configuration pr~vides an equivalent level of fire safety to that achieved by with Section III.G.3! compliance w1t~ l1I.G.3, The special circumstances of 10 eFR CFR 50.12 apply in that application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlyin~ purpose
~urpose of the rule. In this case, th~ negligible fire loadings in
( II1.8-13 I.8-13
Revision 8 April 1992 c( combination with the fire detection systems and alternate shutdown capability in adjacent zones eliminates the possibility of not achieving or maintaining safe shutdown. Thus the underlying purpose of the rule would be satisfied without requiring fire detection systems and/or fixed fire suppression systems 1n in both of these zones. Exemption Requested Reguested The licensee requested an exemption from the requirement of. Section III.G.2 . . of Appendix R in Fire ZorlEs Zor,Es 1.1.2.1 and 1.3.2 of the Unit 2 Reactor Building Buildir,g and Fire Zones 1.1.1.1 and 1.4.1 of the Unit 3 Reactor Building because an automatic fire supyr~ssion sup~r~ssion system has not been installed. The staff's cencern was that t~at a fire in on~ one of these fire zones could cause a loss of normal safe shutdown capability. However, the fire loading in ( these fire zones is ne91;~ible. negli~ible. Because of the lO~1 10\,1 combustible loading, IIa fire of significant magr.itude or duration is not expected to occur. Fire detection is provided for these fire zones. Therefore, tr.fre tr.ere is reasonable assurance that a fire in any of the subject fire zones will be detected in its eariy stages and extinguished by the fire brigade before redundant safety-related component.s are threatened. The provision of a l-hour I-hour fire rated wrapped conduit that contains the alternative isolation condenser valves power and control feeds routed through these fire zones-also ensures that the alternative safe shutdown path remains available with respect to the isolation condenser valve flow path because of the low fire severity potential a~d and lack of fire hazards in these four fire zones. On thi~ basis, the staff conclud6s concludes that the licensee's proposed II. 8-14 11.8-14
Revision 8 April 1992 alternative fire protection configuration provides an equivalent level of fire safety to that achieved by compliance with Section III.G.2. The special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12 apply in that application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. In this case, the negligible fire loadings in combination with existing fire protection features and alternative shutdown capability eliminate the possibility of not achieving or maintaining safe shutdown. Thus the under1ying underlying purpose of the rule would be satisfied without requiring an automatic fire suppression system to be installed. Exemption Requested The lieensl:!e r"quested an exemption from the requirE:ments licensee r~quested SEction III.G.l requir"ments of Sf:etion III.G.2 ( of ApPEndix Appendix R in Fire Zo~s 1.1.1.2 and 1.1.1.3 of the Unit 3 Reactor Building because an automatic fire suppression system has not been installed. corCErn for these two fire zones was that a fire could start The staff's corc~rn and damage redundant Diesel Generator (DG)-2/3 cables or its bus duits.ducts. OG-2/3 DG-2/3 suppl ies power to both units and is required supplies requirEd for emer'gency power in the lones. event of a fire in most fire zones. For both of these ffre fire zones, the fire load is low and does not exceed. exceed, on the average, a 21-minute fire severity. In the vfcini~ vicinity of the I-hour wrapped OG-2/3 DG-2/3 tables, cables, there are either no combustibles or only a negligible Therefore, it is expected that a fire would develop slowly and remain amount. There~ore, small. Fire detection is provided for these two fire zones so that there is reasor.ab1e assurance that the fire brigade would be sunvnoned reasonable summoned in a timely n~nner. n2nner. Because of the low fire load, the fire brigade can quickly extinguish 11.8-15
Revision 8 April 1992 ( the fire. In the interim, the Unit 2 cables and bus duct which are I-hour fire rated wrapped can successfully withstand the effects of a small fire associated with these two fire zones. The staff has determined that there is reasonable assurance that a fire in either of these two fire zones will not result 1n in th~ loss of safe shutdown capability. On this basis, the staff concludes that the licensee's proposed alternative fire protection configuration provides an equivalent level of fire safety to that achieved by compliance with Section III.G.2. The special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12 apply in that application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is ~ot not necessary to achieve the ur,derlying purpose of th~ underlying thE rule. In this case, the low fire loadings in combination with fire detection and protection features provided. provided, eliminate the {.( possibility of not aehiev,ing achiev.ing or maintain,ing maintaining safe shutdown. Thus the underlying purpose of the rule would be satisfied without requiring an automatic fire suppression system to be installed. Rt:guested Exemption R~9uested The licens~~ requested an exemption from the requirements of Section III.G.3 of Appendix R in Fire Area TB-V located in the Main Control Room and Auxiliary Electric Equipment Room because a fixed-fire suppression system has not been installed in a fire area for which an alternative shutdown capability 1s is provided. The staff's prf"~ry prirr~ry concern for this fire in the main control room could cause the loss of normal shutdown capability. However, should a fire occur within the main control room, it is expected Expected to be promptly cetected by either the automatic fire detection system or by one of the station's personnel manning Th~ fire is expected to develop slowly and be extinguished promptly the area. The ( II.8-l6 11.8-16
ReVision 8 April 1992 c by the control room personnel or the fire brigade. Should fire damage be extensive, requiring evacuation, then an alternative safe shutdown system can extensive. be used. Because Fire Area TB-V has complete 3-hour fire rated barriers (except, as described above, for the unprotected structural steel supporting (except. the Control Room ceiling which will not be subjected to temperatures high concernJ, it is expected that a fire would not spread beyond enough to cause concern}, the th~ basis, the staff concludes barriers because of the low fire load. On this basis. alternative fire protection configuration that the licensee's proposed alternativ~ config~ration provides eGuivalent leve1 an equivalent levEl of firE fire safety to that achieved by compliance with Section 111.6.3. III.G.3. Th~ special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12 apply in thdt application of regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the the reg~lation {i(~ underlying purpose of the. rule. existirg fire detection In this case the existir.Q system systenl promptly detect the or station personnel manning the area should pr'omptly fire fir~ and once detected promptly, extinguish it. In the unlikely event that requiring control room evacuation should occur, the extensive damage, reqlliring extensiVE alternative safe shutdown system can be used. The above ccmbination eliminates possibi lity of not achieving or maintaining safe shutdown. the possibility Thu~ tt,! the underlyirlg purpose of the rule wouid be satisfied without requiring a underlyirlQ fixed-fire suppression system to be installed *
. IV.
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that pursuant to 10 eFR CFR 50.12, this exemption is authorized by law, will not present ar. undue risk to the consistent with the common defense and public health ana safety, and is consist~nt C:.. (r~" Corrrnission has further determined that special circumstances, security. The Corrmission 11.8-17
Revision 8 April 1992 c 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present justifying the exemption. as set forth in 10 CFR 50.12(o}{2}(ii), exemption, nan~ly that the application of the regulation 1n In the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. Specifics are discussed in each exemption request, but in general the underlying purpose of the rule 1s is to accomplish safe shutdown in the event of a single fire and maintain the plant in a safe condition. This is accomplished by assuring that sufficient unda~~ged equipment eqUipment .is available to support safe shutdown. shutdown, assuming conceru *. In thE areas for which an exemption is
. a fire within the area of concerrf requested, being requested. pa~sive as well as active fire protection features assure that any single fire wi11 r,Cit result in the loss of safe shutdown capability.
will ~ut These Thes~ detection systems, separation distance, fire features include fire d~tection barriers, water spray systems to preclude propdgation, and manual actions. 'C The fire protection features, in conjunction with low combustible loadings and p~ysica1 location and configurations, provide a high degree of in some cases phYSical assur~nce that a singie fire will not result in loss of post-fire shutdown capabi 1ity. capability. Accordingly, the Commission hereby grants the exemptions from the requirements of 10 eFR CFR Part 50, Appendix R as described in Section III above. 11.8-18
Revision 8 April 1992 Commission has determined that the granting Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commissi?n grantfng of this exemption will have no significant impact on the environment (54 FR 32399) August 7, 1989. This exemption is effective upon issuance. FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
>4-,
~~ 1>' 1Y/~J.-,
jrfJ-M. Holahan, Acting Director Gary H. Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V, and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation ROcKville, Maryland Dated at Rockv;lle, this 15th day of August 1989. ,e
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11.8-19}}