ML20246E718

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Insp Rept 70-1113/89-06 on 890605-09.No Violations & Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Emergency Preparedness,Radiological Contingency & Emergency Plan.Two Drill Weaknesses Identified
ML20246E718
Person / Time
Site: 07001113
Issue date: 06/29/1989
From: Kreh J, Rankin W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246E713 List:
References
70-1113-89-06, 70-1113-89-6, NUDOCS 8907120366
Download: ML20246E718 (10)
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t UNITED STATES

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\'****/ JUN 2 91989 Report No.: 70-1113/89-06 Licensee: General Electric Company Wilmington, NC 28401 Docket No.: 70-1113 License No.: SNM-1097 Facility Name: General Electric Company Inspection Conducted: June 5-9, 1989 Inspector: MM - -

0[27[89 Date Signed Q J. L. Kreh Accompanying Personnel: W. H. Rankin Approved by: MM W. H. Rankin, Chief 6/2NI9 Date Si'gned Emergency Preparedness Section Emergency Preparedness and Radiological Protection Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope:

This routine, announced inspection was conducted in the area of emergency preparedness, and included review of: (1) the Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan (RCEP) and its implementing procedures; (2) emergency facilities and equipment; and (3) the licensee's efforts in coordination of emergency planning with offsite support agencies. In addition, the inspector observed and evaluated the annual radiological emergency response drill. Since a special inspection of the fire protection program was conducted in March 1989 (see NRC Inspection Report No. 70-1113/89-03), that program was not reviewed during the current inspection.

Results:

In the area of inspection, no violations or deviations were identified.

The licensee's emergency preparedness program appeared to be capably managed.

Review of the RCEP, implementing procedures, emergency facilities and equipment, and the training program indicated that an acceptable level of emergency preparedness was being maintained. However, the drill on June 7, 1989, was not considered a successful demonstration of the licensee's emergency response capability in that several drill objectives were not met. Drill

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8907120366 PDR 890629 I ADOCK 07001113 C PDC L___ _ ._ _ _

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2 weaknesses were identified concerning communications breakdowns and a not.

sufficiently challenging scenario.

Licensee management determined that a remedial drill was required to provide an adequate demonstration that the health and safety of plant personnel and the public could be adequately protected during an emergency.

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REPORT DETAILS l j

1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees
  • G. Bowman, Senior Program Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering
  • T. Cunningham, Representing Manager, Components Manufacturing
  • A. Dada, Manager, Chemistry Programs

' *R. Foleck, Senior . Specialist, Licensing Engineering

  • P. Godwin, Fire Safety and Property Protection Engineer
  • J. Harmon, Manager, Technology and Automation
  • R. Keenan, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety
  • R. Mciver, Manager, Plant E&M
  • G. McKenzie, Program Manager, Advanced Product Technology
  • S. Murray, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety
  • R. Pace, Representing Manager, Fuel Manufacturing
  • D. Stansbury, Senior Engineer, Nuclear Safety
  • R. Torres, Manager, Radiation Protection Other licensee employees contacted during this inspection included engineers, operators, technicians, and administrative personnel.

Other Organizations K. Schilly, Director, Emergency Services, New Hanover Memorial Hospital D. Summers, Director, Emergency Services, New Hanover County

  • Atte & d exit interview
2. Coordination With Offsite Support Agencies (88050)

The inspector held discussions with licensee representatives and reviewed applicable documentation regarding the coordination of emergency planning with offsite support agencies. Copies of current letters of agreement with these agencies were contained in Appendix A to the Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan (RCEP). The inspector determined through the referenced discussions and reviews that the licensee was annually contacting local support agencies for purposes of offering training and maintaining familiarization with emergency response rules. Confirmation of the adequacy of the interface between the licensee and support organizations was obtained through personnel interviews with representatives of two offsite agencies (see Paragraph 1). These representatives stated that the licensee's efforts with respect to training, logistical support, and other coordination were fully satisfactory.

2 No violations or deviations were identified.

-3. Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan / Procedures (88050)

This area was reviewed to determine whether changes were made in the emergency response program since the last routine inspection in September 1988, and to observe how any such changes may have affected the state of emergency preparedness at the facility.

During the period since September 1988, one revision (Revision 7, dated December 1,1988), was made to the RCEP. All nine of the emergency procedures were revised as well (all at Revision 1, dated December 1, 1988). Selective review of the RCEP and emergency procedures disclosed several minor discrepancies for which satisfactory procedural revisions were issued prior to the end of the inspection period. This review also indicated that there had been no decrease in the licensee's emergency response capability as a result of the December 1988 revisions.

The licensee's emergency preparedness program did not include periodic testing of the capability to notify key Jesignated emergency response personnel during non-regular hours. Licensee representatives agreed to review this matter and formulate appropriate corrective action.

Inspector Follow-up Item (IFI) 70-1113/89-06-01: Periodically demonstrate the capability to contact designated personnel to staff the Emergency ,

Control Center (ECC) during off hours.  !

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Emergency Facilities and Equipment (88050)

The licensee's primary emergency response facility is the ECC, located at the primary personnel entrance to the Controlled Access Area (CAA).

Although occasionally used as a training room, the ECC is essentially a dedicated facility. An annex to the management area of the ECC housed portable radiation-detection equipment and miscellaneous emergency response supplies. The inspector reviewed records of the weekly surveillance of ECC equipment for the period September 13, 1988 to May 26, 1989. Inspection of selected equipment at the ECC indicated a fully adequate level of readiness was being maintained.

The licensee's Emergency Vehicle was inspected. This dedicated vehicle was designed for rescue and fire fighting. Records of weekly inventories for the period September 1, 1988 to June 2, 1988, were reviewed.

Communications equipment available for emergency use was delineated in RCEP Section 6.2 and included at least five standard telephones at the ECC, six cellular telephones, fixed and portable VHF radio transceivers, and amateur radio equipment owned by a number of plant personnel active in that field. All of this equipment was used or tested regularly.

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-3 No violatio' ns or deviations were identified.

5. Emergency Response Drill (88050)

The RCEP required that periodic tests and drills be performed.to maintain proficiency in emergency response, to include an annual drill integrating the onsite and offsite components of the emergency response organization.

The drill conducted on June 7,1989, was intended by .the licensee to fulfill the latter requirement.

The drill scenario involved the accidental dropping of a heated uranium

, hexafluoride cylinder in the . Vaporization Area, with' attendant serious injury and contamination of an operator (all coordination simulated).

Included among the' drill objectives were the prompt activation of the emergency organization and the provision of ambulance service by the. New Hanover County Department of Emergency Medical Services (EMS). The licensee's drill goal and purposes are listed in detail in the attachment to this report.

The inspector observed various aspects of the drill: (1) activation of the emergency organization; (2) rescue and treatment 'of the simulated casualty by licensee responders (medical, radiation-protection, and security personnel) and treatment of the " victim" by the medical staff at New Hanover Memorial Hospital; (3) management and control of the " accident" response by the Emergency Director and staff at the ECC; (4) notifications and communications; and (5) radiation-protection practices.

Serious performance deficiencies occurred d ' uring the drill, all . in the area of communications, which is one of the most critical aspects of any emergency response. Several communications breakdowns, caused variously by inadequate performance of hardware and people, seriously compromised the effectiveness of the licensee's response to the scenario. The problems in this category were as follows:

Untimely activation (delayed by about 20 minutes) of the ECC due to a security guard's failed effort to manually actuate the Autocall System (the plant alarm which summons the emergency organization to the ECC).

Failure to call-the offsite ambulance service (EMS) due to confusion over terminology (a call to a security guard from the incident scene inquired about notification of EMS; he confused that term with EMT, or the onsite Emergency Medical Team, which, he informed the caller, was already en route).

Inability of the licensee's ambulance to communicate with either the hospital or the ECC (except within a fraction of a mile) so as to provide information on the patient's condition prior to arrival at the hospital (apparently the antenna on the vehicle provided insufficient gain, according to a licensee representative).

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Failure to provide adequate notice (via telephone) to the hospital to allow enough time to prepare for handling the " contaminated" patient.

It should be noted that none of the communications problems cited above resulted from the " artificiality" sometimes associated with drill conditions. All of the problems were real response inadequacies which potentially could have occurred during an actual emergency. The

, communications breakdowns were evaluated in the aggregate as a Drill Weakness requiring corrective action.

Drill Weakness 70-1113/89-06-02: Failure of the licensee's personnel and equipment to convey necessary information in an accurate and timely manner.

Although it was anticipated that an alert would be declared, the simulated accident was classified only at Unusual Event, at least in part because the cylinder problem (a slight leak) was resolved by on-the-scene responders before the ECC was activated. Moreover, several of the players commented after the drill that they would not expect the ECC to be ordered into action for an actual event of the type portrayed in this scenario.

The inspector determined that the scenario was insufficiently challenging to effectively test the overall capability of the emergency response organization. This was also categorized as a Drill Weakness requiring corrective action.

Drill Weakness 70-1113/89-06-03: Failure of the scenario to effectively test the overall capability of the emergency response organization.

During a meeting of the inspector and licensee staff on June 8, 1989, the Manager, Technology and Automation (who was the designated primary for the position of Emergency Director), announced the intent to conduct a repeat drill to address the deficiencies cited above.

This drill was tentatively scheduled for October 1989, and will be observed by the NRC. Although it was acknowledged by the inspector that considerable training benefit was derived from the June 7, 1989 drill, the NRC's position is that the annual drill, in order to be considered acceptable, must convincingly demonstrate the licensee's capability to respond to an emergency situation as delineated in the Emergency Plan and implementing procedures.

The inspector attended the licensee's critique held on June 8, 1989. The critique was thorough, with licensee evaluators identifying numerous logistical problems, including all of the communications breakdowns discussed above.

No violations or deviations were identified.

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6. Action on Previous Inspection Findings (92701)
a. (Closed) IFI 70-1113/86-22-49: Addition to the RCEP of a detailed description of radiological monitoring equipment provided to New Hanover Memorial Hospital.

Section 5.5.4 of the RCEP was revised to include a reference to Table 2.2, which listed the specified equipment.

b. (0 pen)IFI 70-1113/89-22-50: Specifying in the RCEP that the program for training offsite support organizations is to be performed on an annual basis. The licensee agreed to revise Section 7 of the RCEP to specifically address this item.
c. (0 pen) IFI 70-1113/88-09-01: Revision of emergency procedures to clarify authority for directing activation of the Autocall System.

The licensee agreed to address this item in the next revision of the RCEP.

d. (Closed) IFI 70-1113/89-09-02: Conducting periodic ECC briefings on incident status. This item was addressed in the Emergency Director Instructions (contained in the emergency procedures). Due to the brevity of the drill on June 7,1989, no ECC briefings were conducted by the Emergency Director. However, the inspector observed open discussions being held continuously among ECC principals.
e. (Closed) IFI 70-1113/88-09-03: Ensuring that emergency procedures are followed by emergency response personnel. An inspector observed that ECC personnel were using their position procedures and appropriate message forms.
f. (Closed) IFI-70-1113/88-09-05: Revision of procedures to specify that the NRC will be notified within one hour of an emergency declaration. Revisions to the emergency procedures appropriately addressed this item. The requirement for a one-hour notification to the NRC Operations Center was also added to Section 4.4.4 of the RCEP.
g. (Closed) IFI 70-1113/88-09-06: Delineating (in the RCEP) the backup means for communicating with offsite support groups.

RCEP Section 6.2 was revised to indicate the availability of cellular telephones and amateur radio equipment for communicating with the various offsite support groups in the event the standard telephone system is lost.

7. Exit Interview l The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 9,1989, with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas L- - __ _ _ _ -_. _ _ __ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

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inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed below.

Licensee management confirmed the commitment to repeat the annual evaluated drill for 1989, tentatively in October,1989. Proprietary information is not contained in this report. Dissenting comments regarding these findings were not received from the licensee.

Item No. Description and Reference 70-1113/89-06-01 ' I FI : Periodically demonstrate the capability to contact designated personnel to staff the ECC during off-hours (Paragraph 3).

70-1113/89-06-02 Drill Weakness: Failure of the licensee's personnel and equipment to convey necessary information in an accurate and timely manner (Paragraph 5).

70-1113/89-06-03 Drill Weakness: Failure of the scenario to effectively test the overall capability of the emergency response organization (Paragraph 5).

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e RADIOLOGICAL DRILL JUfE 7, 1989 GOALS PROVIDE AN EXERCISE THAT WILL PRACTICE THE PROCEDURES, SKILLS, AND INTERACTION OF THE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION, RESPONSE TEAMS AND OFFSITE AGENCIES.

PURPOSE OF DRILLS o PROVIDE RADIATION PROTECTION WITH 1 RAINING EXPERIENCE FOR HANDLING AN INJUR( IN THE CONTROLLED AREA, CONTAMINATION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS).

o PROVIDE EMERGENCY ORGANIZATION WITH TRAINING PROBLEMS

-INVOLVING POTENTIAL RELEASE, CYL,1NDER CONTROL, ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS, INJURY, TRANSPORT, AND FAMILY NOTIFICATION.

o PROVIDE TRAINING FOR OFF SITE EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATIONS (e. p. RESCUE SQURDS).

o PROVIDE THE LOCAL HOSPITAL PERSONNEL WITH SOME HANDS ON TRAINING EXPERIENCE DEALING WITH CONTAMINATED PATIENTS.

o PROVIDE FOR MEDIA NOTIFICATION, AND RESPONSE TRAINING.

o PRACTICE COMMUNICATIONS IN THE EMERGENCY CONTROL CENTER (ECC) DURING INCIDENT (INFORMATION FLOW).

1 JHB APRIL 1969 t

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'1 RADIOLOGICAL DRILL JUNE 7, 1989 SCENARIO: AN EMPLOYEE-IN THE VAPORIZATION HHEH HMS BEEN INJURED..A UF6 CYLINDER IS UBSERVED WIfH IHE VHLVE END ON THE FLOOR'HND.THE B4CK END ON H CHbLE LEHNING 4GHINST H CHAMBER. THERE HPPEHRS 1U BE 60ME UF6 6Ab LEHKING..

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT:

'10:00 AT LINE 2B VHPOHIZATION CHAMBER THE CON 1ROL ROOM NOTED LOW PRESSURE OF 30 INCH UF6 CYLINDER DURING HYDOLYSIS.

CYLINDER WAS CONSIDERED HALF FULL AT'lHE TIME.

10:00 VAPORIZATION OPERATOR INVESTIGATED AND'FOUND CO2 VALVE NOT CLOSED COMPLETELY RESULTING IN COOLING AND PLUGGING OF PIGTAIL. OPERATOR UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO MANUALLY

'CLOSE CYLINDER VALVE. SUSPECTED PLUG IN VALVE STEM.

10:06 HEAT CUT OFF ON 2B CHAMBER.

10:45 VAPORIZATION OPERATOR,- WEARING A FULL FACE MASK. PULLS THE CYLINDER OUT OF 2B CHAMBER. CYLINDEH IS HOT buT OPERATOR IS WORKING INTO THE NEXT SHIFT HND WHNIS TO FINISH BEFORE LEAVING.

10:46 WHILE MOVING CYLINDER WITH OVERHEAD LRANE OVEH UTHEN UFb CYLINDERS STORED ON FLOOR, 'l HE :

1. CRANE JAMS SUDDENLY
2. CYLINDER SWINGS OUT HND CHbLE BHEAKb
3. CYLINDER BOUNCES OFF FLOUR CYLINDER HND HITb OPERATOR.

11:00 A SECOND' OPERATOR ENTERS VAPORIZATION HND SEES THE UNCONSCIOUS INJUNED OPERATOR, NEXT TO CYLINDER ON FLOOR.

UF6 CYLINDER APPEARS TO BE "SL?.GHTLY" LEAKING GAS.

JHB APRIL 1989

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