ML20154C165
| ML20154C165 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 07001113 |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1998 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154C152 | List: |
| References | |
| 70-1113-98-04, 70-1113-98-4, NUDOCS 9810060178 | |
| Download: ML20154C165 (21) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION II Docke't No.: 70-1113 License No.: SNM-1097 Report No 70-1113/98-04 Licensee: General Electric Company Facility: Nuclear Energy Production Location: Wilmington NC 28402 Dates: August 10-14. 1998 Inspector: Alphonsa Gooden. Radiation Specialist i
Approved By: Edward J. McAlpine. Chief Fuel Facilities Branch Division of Nuclear Materials Safety i:
Enclosure 1
9810060178 980904 l
PDR ADOCK 07001113 C PDR tM , -
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
General Electric Company NRC Inspection Report 70-1113/98-04 This routine, unannounced inspection involved an assessment of the licensee's emergency preparedness program and the state of readiness for responding to various postulated accidents. Observation of licensee activities included the annual evacuation drills conducted during August 10-12. 1998. The inspection disclosed the following aspects of the licensee's program:
e Equipment changes involving the building evacuation warning signal and radio communications were considered program enhancements l (Section 2.a.2).
L e The licensee's independent audit was adequate in assessing the readiness status of the emergency preparedness program (Section 2.a.3).
e The flow chart format for decision-making involving the emergency response organization (ERO) activation and event classification l
appeared to be an effective and user-friendly tool (Section 2.b.3).
e The administrative and physical system for ensuring appropriate staffing during off-hours was in place end properly maintained, but pager drills indicated that timely response by ERO personnel during off-hours continue to be a challenge (Section 2.c.3),
e The licensee's key ERO personnel were trained and familiar with their respective roles and responsibilities (Section 2.c.3).
e An emergency response training procedure had not been developed and/or implemented to ensure compliance with the requirements in Section 7.2 of the RC&EP (Section 2.c.3).
e The offsite interface was a program strength (Section 2.d.3).
- A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failure to notify NRC within one hour of an emergency declaration (Section 2.e.2).
e The current evacuation drill program was inadequate for providing a true assessment of accountability timeliness due to employees pre-staging (Section 2.e.3).
e- The licensee's scenario development team provided well-developed scenarios that exercised the entire ERO (Section 2.e.3).
l e The licensee's actions were appropriate and aggressive in determining l the cause of and corrective actions failed respirator cartridges.
Early indications were that a gasket on the test unit was causing an
, elevated failure rate for the cartridges (Section 2.f.2).
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e The building evacuation warning signal was changed to a more distinct and unique sound to remove confusion regarding the decision to
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i evacuate (Section 2.f.3). ,
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Attachments:
- 1. Persons Contacted and Exit Interview List of Items Opened, Closed, and Discussed List of Acronyms
- 2. General Electric Preparations For Hurricane Bonnie 1
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REPORT DETAILS
- 1. Summary of Plant Status I l
This report covered a one week period. Dperations involving Uranium Recovery and the Dry Conversion Process were shut down. There were no unusual plant operational occurrences during the inspection period A routine inspection of the licensee's material control and accountability program was conducted August 10-14, 1998, by inspectors from the Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards (ONMSS).
- 2. Emeroency Preoaredness (88050) (F3)
- a. Review of Proaram Chanaes (F3.01)
(1) Inspection Scope Changes to the licensee's Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan (RC&EP). procedures, organization, facilities, and-equipment were reviewed to assess the impact on the effectiveness of the program: and to verify that changes met commitments license conditions, and were provided to NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 70.32(1). The adequacy of the emergency preparedness independent audit program was examined.
(2) Observations and Findings Since the last inspection of this area (July 1997), two revisions were made to the RC&EP dated August 29, 1997 (Revision 4), and Revision 5 dated December 16, 1997. The changes were reviewed and determined to have no impact on the effectiveness of the RC&EP.
l Several equipment changes had resulted since the last inspection. The most significant was that involving a change to the building evacuation signal to alleviate confusion and delays to plant personnel regarding the need to evacuate. The change resulted in a very distinct and unique sound to alleviate confusion with other plant signals (e.g. emergency response team activation). Other ecuipment changes were associated with ER0 communications (racios) and notification (alphanumeric pagers). Based on observations during the evacuation drills, the inspector determined that the changes involving the building evacuation signal and radio communications were program enhancements.
I Section 7.5 of the RC&EP required an annual independent l audit of the emergency preparedness program. According to i the Plan. "this program audit will include such items as the plan, procedures, emergency facilities, equipment and supplies, off-site interface to assure the emergency l
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preparedness l Consequently, program is being adequately maintained."this area licensee had aerformed the independent review or audit, and ,
verify that tie licensee had evaluated any significant !
l changes on the emergency preparedness program. The 1 l inspector reviewed audit documentation and discussed with I the lead auditor the Calendar Year (CY) 1997 audit. The audit was conducted during the period September 22. 1998 to October 10. 1998, by three members of the licensee's staff with no responsibility for emergency preparedness. The audit was very compliance based and consistent with the requirements for such audits as discussed in Section 7.5 of the Plan.
(3) Conclusions Based on interviews, observation of the annual evacuation drills, and associated documentation, equipment changes made since the last inspection were considered program enhancements. All Plan changes were submitted to NRC for review and approval in accordance with 10 CFR 70.32(1). The licensee's independent audit was adequate in assessing the readiness status of the site emergency preparedness program (maintenance of equipment facilities. Plan, procedures, etc.).
- b. Plan and Imolementino Procedures (F3.02)
(1) Inspection Scope Selected implementing procedures were reviewed to determine if. procedures were revised since the last inspection, and the ade RC&EP. quacy of procedures in the implementation of the (2) Observations and Findings Nine (9) procedures were designated by the licensee as Emergency Procedures (EP) for implementing the requirements of the RC&EP. The procedures were as follows: 1) Bomb Threat. 2) Environmental-Chemical / Toxic Hazards.
- 3) Communications (External). 4) Security Compromise.
- 5) Criticality 6) Fire and Explosion 7) Radiological.
- 8) Severe Weather, and 9) Transportation. According to documentation and an interview with the Manager Site Security and Emergency Preparedness (MSSEP). each of the afore-mentioned EPs were revised and updated during December l
1997. The inspector compared the superseded copy of select procedures to the December 16, 1997 version and determined
- that the changes were strictly administrative in nature.
One aspect of im)lementing procedures noted by the j inspector, was t1e absence of a formalized procedure for l
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implement the training requirements of the RC&EP regarding ERO initial training, annual refresher training and the documentation of such training. This matter is discussed in detail in Section 2.c.2 of this report.
The inspector observed an evacuation drill from the ECC and verified that controlled copies of the Plan and EPs.
selected ERO position notebooks, and the emergency telephone listing were available in the ECC and maintained current and up-to-date. During the drill. the inspector observed the use of procedures by the ERO in res)onding to the simulated emergency. Procedures appeared to ]e user-friendly for decisions involving event classification and ER0 activation.
(3) Conclusions The EPs selected for review were consistent with details contained in the Plan and appeared to adequately implement the Plan. The flow chart format for decision-making involving ERO activation and event classification appeared to be an effective and user-friendly tool.
- c. Trainina and Staffina of EmercenCY Oraanization (F3.03)
(1) Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed the emergency response training to determine if it was provided to key ERO personnel in accordance with Section 7.2 of the RC&EP. The inspector also reviewed the adequacy of the licensee's notification system for activation and staffing of the ECC during off-hours.
(2) Observations and Findings The inspector observed the licensee's annual evacuation drill (see Section 2.e.2) and noted that personnel in key ERO positions demonstrated good familiarity with their role and responsibility. The performance by the ERO during the evacuation drill in the implementation of the Plan and EPs demonstrated a trained ERO. In addition to the drill observation, the inspector requested for review documentation to show that ERO personnel assigned to the current ERO roster received training in accordance with the Plan. In response. the inspector was furnished the outline for the initial training provided to various positions.
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Incident Records) which list by name and position the i
current training for personnel. When questioned regarding the annual refresher training, the licensee indicated that the refresher training was done via a self-study package sent to ERO personnel for review. The inspector noted that
4 the self-study approach did not include a proctored examination or administrative oversight to ensure ERO personnel were reviewing and understood the information. In addition the documentation was lacking regarding the subject areas covered to ensure the requirements for training as specified in the RC&EP were satisfied. Further, the inspector's review of the matrix identified individuals assigned to the ER0 as a primary or alternate that had not participated in a drill or actual event during a two year period. In response to the inspector's observations, the licensee discussed as corrective actions the formalization l of the training program (both the initial and refresher) l into a procedure to ensure the implementation of the RC&EP. 1 The inspector informed the licensee that the formalization ,
of the training program into a procedure for implementing l the RC&EP training requirements was an Inspector Followup :
Item (IFI 98-04-01).
The licensee's notification system for activating the ER0 ;
during off-hours was reviewed for adequacy in ensuring a]propriate staffing during an emergency. During off-hours.
ERO personnel are contacted by security personnel via pager and/or telephone. The inspector discussed with the licensee and reviewed pager drill documentation covering the period July 10. 1997, through June 24. 1998. During the fourth quarter CY 97 drill (December 30. 1997). poor results were obtained and were attributed to an outdated personnel listing, human errors (pagers off). and the lack of a repeat page function associated with the ERO pagers. Corrective actions included upgrades to the alphanumeric pagers to include the repeat page function, and the pager data base was revised. Additional corrective actions taken during the inspection included assigning security the responsibility for performing a quarterly review and update of the pager data base for verification that information was current.
Based on the corrective actions and results from periodic drills, the inspector determined that the licensee's system was in place and properly maintained for notifying the appropriate ERO personnel during off-hour shifts.
(3) Conclusions Based on ECC observations during the evacuation drill, the licensee's key ERO personnel were trained and familiar with
, their respective roles and responsibilities. An emergency response training procedure had not been developed and/or implemented to ensure the requirements of Section 7.2 of the RC&EP were met. The administrative and physical system for ensuring appropriate staffing during off-hours was in place and properly maintained. However, pager drills indicated
- that timely response by ERO continue to be a challenge. personnel during off-hours l
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- d. Offsite SuDoort (F3.04)
(1) Inspection Scope Licensee activity in the areas of training, agreements, and exercises, was reviewed to determine if the licensee was
- properly coordinating with offsite authorities.
(2) Observations and Findings Discussions were held with the licensee regarding meetings, trair.ing, and coordination of emergency planning with offsite support agencies. Documentation was provided to L
show an orientation tour was provided during the week of June 29. 1998. During CY 97, training was provided to the ;
offsite medical support facility on hydrofluoric acid first aid protocols. Two additional examples of the licensee's involvement with the offsite support agencies were as !
follows:
- e Site Fire Chief was involved in the coordination and formulation of an organization known as the Industrial ,
Fire Protection Alliance (IFP) which was comprised of i local government (city / county) and private sources.
- Site Emergency Preparedness Coordinator interface with l New Hanover County Emergency Management authorities !
to develop an offsite emergency reference manual l (containing plans, procedures, and protective actions) l specific to site incidents.
During the last biennial exercise, conducted July 16, 1997.
offsite personnel participated as players and/or observers.
(3) Conclusions The offsite interface continued to be a program strength in light of the frequency of contact and the involvement between the site and offsite contacts on matters of a mutual interest involving emergency preparedness.
- e. Drills and Exercises (F3.05)-
(1) Inspection Scope l- This area was reviewed to determine if the licensee was i conducting drills and exercises in accordance with Section 7.3 of the Plan: and if offsite organizations were invited
- to participate. Records vere examined from 3revious drills
- and exercises to verify that critiques were 1 eld and action items were assigned along with a corrective action L
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6 completion date. The Plan implementation file was reviewed for actual events since the last inspection.
(2) Observations and Findings .
The last full-scale NRC observed exercise was conducted on July 16. 1997. Offsite participation included volunteer fire department.. local hazardous material team, and the Region II (NRC) Base Team. State local, and industry personnel participated as exercise observers. Regarding drills, according to documentation, during CY 97 the licensee conducted 20 drills (consisting of tabletop and full scale) entailing the ERO and various res)onse teams.
The inspector observed selected portions of t1e annual evacuation drills conducted August 10-12, 1998. The licensee contact indicated that the primary purpose of the announced drills were: ' familiarization of site warning system (horns and alarms): verification that card scanners were operable for personnel evacuating fuel manufacturing operations (FMO): test accountability process and evacuation routes: and evaluate the activation of the ERO in response to a criticality at the FMO building. During the FM0 building evacuation on August 11. 1998, the inspector observed a significant number of employees pre-staged and congregating at exit locatiors in preparations for the building evacuation. The inspector informed the licensee that the current evacuation drill program (announced date and time to all plant personnel) was inadequate for providing a true assessment of accountability timeliness due to pre-staging. With the exception of pre-staging, the i drills provided plant workers with the desired training associated with the site warning system and ECC staffing and activation.
The licensee's scenario development team provided well-developed scenarios that exercised the entire ERO.
Scenarios postulated accidents based on site operations and accident precursors.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's performance in conducting critiques following actual events, drills, and exercises to determine if lessons learned and/or recommendations from critiques were being incorporated into the Plan and procedures. Based on interviews and documentation.'the inspector noted that critiques were held following each drill, exercise. or event. Corrective actions to critique items resulting from the CY 97 biennial l exercise had been completed and the items were considered
! closed. As verification that the licensee was assigning l open items, the inspector observed licensee personnel 4 assigning open items from the recently conducted evacuation drill for inclusion into the automated tracking system.
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7 The inspector reviewed the licensee's actions in response to actual events during CY 97 and 98, to determine if actions were taken in accordance with the RC&EP and procedures.
With one exception, no problents were noted. The one exception was an untimely notification to NRC following an emergency classification. The incident dated March 16.
1998, involved a fire inside a dumpster. The incident was classified as an Alert at 7:52 p.m. and at 9:05 p.m. NRC was notified (73 minutes after the Alert declaration). On March 18. 1998. following a detailed review of applicable EPs associated with a fire. the licensee notified the NRC Operations Center by letter and telephone to retract the Alert declaration on the basis of a conservative interpretation of the emergency classification procedure for fires. The licensee's basis for retracting the Alert appeared to be appropriate. However. Section 4.4.2 of RC&EP and EP 6-0 entitled Fire and Explosion. required the NRC Operations Center be notified after State / local agencies and no later than one hour after an Alert or Site Area Emergency is declared. The licensee was aware of the delay and had identified two 3reas for corrective actions: 1) revise the emergency action level (EAL) procedure, and 2) additional training for personnel designated as the Emergency Director and/or Interim Emergency Director with emphasis on timely 1 notification to offsite authorities. This non-repetitive, licensee-identified and corrected violation is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VII.B.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 98-04-02).
(3) Conclusions The current evacuation drill program was inadequate for providing a true assessment of accountability timeliness due to employees pre-staging. The licensee's scenario .
development team provided well-developed scenarios that exercised the entire ERO. Following events, drills, and exercises, critiques were held and action items were assigned along with a corrective action completion date. A NCV was identified for failure to notify NRC within one hour of the emergency declaration.
- f. Emeraency Eauioment and Facilities (F3.06)
(1)- Inspection Scope The ECC. emergency response equipment. instrumentation, and supplies were inspected to determine if they were being maintained in a state of operational readiness.
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(2) Observations and Findings j l
The inspector conducted an inventory and operability check of survey instruments, dosimeters, full face respirators, and self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) equipment located inside the ECC emergency cabinet. Survey instruments had current calibration stickers and responded properly to a radioactive source check. The inspector I
observed the operability of the meteorological system and ;
communications equipment during the evacuation drills and no (
problems were noted. According to documentation periodic j testing and surveillance was performed at the required 4 intervals for criticality warning system. ECC equipment, and the meteorological system. As stated above in Section 2.a. 1 the most significant equipment change since the July 1997 i inspection was the building evacuation warning signal ,
l changed to a more distinct and unique sound to alleviate i confusion.
The inspector noted that two of the four full-face respirators examined, had cartridges installed that exhibited signs of physical or cosmetic damage to the cartridges. Consequently, the inspector requested that the respirators be removed from service for testing the adequacy of equipment to perform the intended function. Three of four cartridges were tested and resulted in one failure. In response to failure, the licensee was proactive in testing additional cartridges and determined a higher than normal failure rate resulted. In light of the test results, several actions ensued:
e All cartridge respirators were removed from service pending further evaluations into cause of failures.
e Respirator testing equipment operability and calibration status was reviewed.
e Respirator testing equipment operator (s) observed and evaluated for verification that testing was performed in accordance with procedures.
e Bioassay results for respirator users were reviewed to verify no uptake or unusual results.
Although the licensee's investigation and resolution was incomplete at the time of the inspection, the licensee's l actions were appropriate and aggressive in resolving the t
cause and corrective actions. Early findings during the investigation disclosed that a gasket on the test unit was causing an elevated failure rate for the cartridges. The inspector informed the licensee that the investigation and i
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corrective actions associated with the respiratory protection testing program was an IFI (98-04-03).
(3) Conclusions ,
Testing and surveillance was performed at the required !
intervals for criticality warning system. ECC equipment, and l the meteorological system. The building evacuation warning l signal was changed to a more distinct and unique sound to l remove confusion regarding the decision to evacuate.
Although the licensee's investigation and resolution to cartridge failures was incomplete, the licensee's actions were appropriate and aggressive in resolving the cause and corrective actions with early indications that a gasket on the test unit was causing an elevated failure rate for the cartridges.
- g. Followuo On Previously Identified Issues (F3.07)
(1) Inspection Scope The inspector reviewed actions taken by the licensee to correct previous issues to verify that the corrective actions were adequate and had been completed.
(2) Observations and Findings e (Closed) IFI 97-07-08: Review the adequacy of corrective actions taken to resolve items from the exercise critique.
The inspector reviewed documentation and interviewed i the licensee contact on this matter and found that all items identified during the CY 97 exercise as i requiring corrective actions were completed. l e (Closed) IFI 97-07-09: Verify the implementation of a formalized tracking system for ensuring timely closure ,
, of action items identified during drills / exercises. l The inspector noted that items identified during the CY 98 evacuation drill as requiring corrective actions were provided to the MSSEP for inclusion into a computer tracking data base for tracking to i completion. Further, the MSSEP provided hard copy '
documentation to demonstrate that prior to computer tracking, the licensee was manually tracking issues i for corrective actions.
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l (3) Conclusions l
Based on the licensee's actions, both items were considered closed. .
- h. Information Notices (ins)
(1) Inspection Scope i
The inspector reviewed the following ins to determine if the information had been received by the licensee and what if any actions taken:
IN 96-70: Year 2000 Effect On Computer System Software IN 98-08: Information Likely To Be Requested If An Emergency Is Declared (2) Observations and Findings l
Based on interviews and a review of select documentation, the inspector determined that both ins were received and actions were taken in response to ins. The licensee developed a priority listing of items according to safety significance in response to year 2000 readiness. According to the licensee, all high priority items were scileduled for completion by December 31. 1998. Regarding IN 98-08, the licensee reviewed Section 3.3 of the RC&EP regarding information to be conraunicated during an event, and '
determined that the details from the IN were properly addressed.
(3) Conclusions The licensee's actions were appropriate.
- 3. Exit Interview The inspection scope and results were summarized on August 14.
1998, with those persons indicated in the Attachment. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed the status of the licensee's root cause into respirator cartridge failures.
On September 1,1998, the inspector contacted the Manager. Site Security and Emergency Preparedness telephonically to discuss the NCV for failure to notify NRC within one hour of an emergency declaration. Although proprietary documents and processes were
- occasionally reviewed during this inspection, the proprietary j nature of these documents or processes has been deleted from this report. No dissenting comments were received from the licensee.
l Subsequent to the inspection. Region II and General Electric began tracking Hurricane Bonnie. As the storm approached the
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11 Wilmington. NC area. Region II and General Electric initiated discussions to keep NRC informed of the status of General Electric's preparations, weather conditions onsite, and both onsite and near site damage. The information collected was provided to senior agency management to keep them informed on General Electric's status. The type and frequency of information provided by General Electric was excellent and is presented in Attachment 2.
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ATTACHMENT 1 INSPECTION PROCEDURES USED IP 88050 Emergency Preparedness i
LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED '
Licensee-
- D, Barbour. Team Leader, Radiation Protection
- D, Brown. Team Leader. Environmental Project'
- R. Crate, Team Leader, Industrial Safety
- S. Dale Lead Auditor, Compliance Auditing
- D. Dowker, Manager, Chemical Product Line
- T. Flaherty Manager. Dry Conversion Project
- P. Godwin, Coordinator Fire Safety and Emergency Response
- R._Keenan, Manager, Site Security and Emergency Preparedness
- A Mabry Program Manager, Radiation Safety-G. Martin, Principal Engineer-
- C, Monetta,' Manager . Environmental Health and Safety
- S. Murray, Manager Facility Licensing-
- L Paulson, Manager, Nuclear Safety
- C, Vaughan, Manager, Regulatory Planning B. Witte, Manager, Wilmington Information Technology Other licensee employees contacted included engineers, technicians, production '
staff, security, and office personnel.
- Attended exit meeting l LIST OF ITEMS OPENED AND CLOSED Item Number Status Descriotion 70-1113/97-07-08 Closed IFI - Review the adequacy of corrective actions taken to resolve items from the exercise critique.
70-1113/97-07-09 Closed IFI - Verify the implementation of a formalized tracking system for ensuring timely closure of action items identified during drills / exercises, i
70-1113/98-04-01 Open IFI - Formalize the training program into a 3rocedure for implementation of the RC&EP training requirements.
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l' 70-1113/98-04-02 Open/ Closed NCV - Failure to notify NRC within I one hour of an emergency, i 70-1113/98-04-03 Open IFI - Review root caura for !
respir'atory cartridge failure and l verify adequate corrective actions.
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List Of Acronyms Used l CFR . Code of Federal Regulation
-CP&L Carolina Power and Light CY Calendar Year l EAL Emergency Action Level '
ECC Emergency Control Center EP ' Emergency Procedures ERO Emergency Response Organization l FM0 Fuel Manufacturing Operations
'GEAE General Electric Aircraft Engines GENE General Electric Nuclear Energy IFl Inspector Followup Item MPH Miles Per Hour MSSEP -Manager. Site Security and Emergency Prepuedness NCV Non-Cited Violation NHCE0C New Hanover County. Emergency Operations Center L
RC&EP Radiological Contingency and Emergency Plan SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus I'
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l ATTACHMENT 2 GENERAL ELECTRIC PREPARATIONS FOR HURRICANE BONNIE CHRON0 LOGY 8/24/98, 0730: They are not under a Hurricane Watch yet. Current weather is very good. They have begun inventorying supplies and will be ordering what they need -- probably today. They have begun coordination with local emergency management personnel. They are watching the storm progression and know that at this point they have 16 percent char.ce of getting the eye. They are expecting at least 40 miles per hour ;
(mph) winds on site by Wednesday morning and are expecting 10 inches of rain. They have maintenance crews on site and plan to begin to pick u) Jotential missiles and perform 1 other storm related tasc 3eginning today. They also will be l deciding what fuel they have on site that can be shipped.
GE will keep us posted. ;
8/24/98, 1410: The General Electric Nuclear Energy (GENE) and General Electric Aircraft Engines (GEAE) emergency organization and
' building management met at 1000 to plan the preparation for the eventual impact of Hurricane Bonnie. Cleanup and removal of loose material have started. Volunteer teams to man the site during the storm are being prepared. Also recovery teams who will respond to the site after the storm has passed, are being developed. Communications to employees on the plant status will be distributed today.
Hurricane tracking maps and family planning brochures have been distributed to employees. A decision to close the facility will be made Tuesday, dependent on the movement of the Hurricane. At the present time. North Carolina is not under a hurricane watch or warning (1400- 8/24/98). GE is maintaining close communication with the local Emergency ,
Management organization. I 8/25/98, 0714: Wilmington, NC area is under a Hurricane Warning as of 0500. !
8/25/98. The forecast for the storm says that Wilmington will be affected by the Hurricane, with at least 50 mph winds by Wednesday afternoon. GE will meet this morning to decide on when to shutdown the facility. Preparation for the storm started yesterday and will continue today.
8/25/98, 0830: GE needs about two shifts (12 to 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br />) to bring the plant down. With that amount of time. they can do the small cleanup that will eliminate problems on restart. GE expects gale force winds (34 mph) at sunrise tomorrow. They have multiple communication links. These include: normal 2 Edited to remove privacy information in the form of personnel names I and telephone numbers.
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I telephone, cellular telephone 800 MHZ radio and ham radio.
With both types of radio and the telephone lines they can contact the New Hanover County Emergency Operations Center (NHCEOC). They will have staff in the NHCEOC as well as at the plant. GE is expected to'have experienced staff in the NHCEOC and as the onsite Emergency Director.
8/25/98, 1300: Current projections are for gale force winds on site by l midnight and hurricane force winds on site around dawn. GE has stopped UFs input to conversion, has stopped adding pellets to the furnaces, and has started shutting down the plant processes with a target of having them shutdown by 2300 today with the exception of continuing to moving pellets through the furnaces that were previously added.
They expect to staff the ECC at 2100 and dismiss other workers at 2300. A small crew will be kept on site but the next shift of workers has been told not to report for work.
8/26/98, 0715: Plant is shutdown and waiting for the storm. Expectations are for the eye to make landfall at Ball Head Island near the mouth of the Cape Fear River which is near Brunswick Nuclear Power Station and about 30 - 40 miles south of the GE site. Current weather is 20 mph wind with gusts to 29 m3h. GE is expecting hurricane force gusts around 0800 and t1e eye to make landfall between 1100 and noon. No power problems have been experienced.
8/26/98, 0815: The site is ex)eriencing wind gusts in excess of 40 mph.
They believe taat declaration of an Alert based on wind speed on site will be coming soon.
8/26/98, 0945: Wilmington is beginning to see wind gust up to 75 mph at a location referred to as Frying Pan Shoals. Airport is seeing winds at 55 mph. The plant has lost the Secondary Electrical Feeder from Carolina Power and Light (CP&L) which supplies power to process water wells, waste treatment plant, and some warehouses. They are in the process of monitorir.g and conserving water, but have available the 300.000 gallon water tower and huge fire ponds (based on memory this is another million gallons). Diesel fire pumps have been tested and are available. Not much water is being used currently with the plant shutdown.
8/26/98, 1215: Plant reported that the hurricane has slowed to 10 mph and is 45 miles south of Ball Head Island. At this rate they do not expect to see the eye of the storm until 1700 to 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br /> today. Latest wind speed from the airport is 46 mph sustained and gusting to 56 mph. They will use the airport wind speed to make emergency declarations since their wind gage is somewhat sheltered by building and trees. Staff has l gotten some sleep in shifts. Water supply is not a problein.
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l Checking of the double roof on the Dry Conversion Process 1
building has shown that it is performing its design function.
8/26/98, 1445: The eye wall has been observed between Ball Head Island and l Wilmington. The wind s)eed at the Wilmington airport which l 1s about 5 miles from tie plant are 52 mph sustained and I gusting to 74 mph. The Secondary Feeder is still out of service but has flickered on and off several times. No other damage has been reported. The plant reports that due to the storm's slow speed of 3rogression, some of the energy has wrapped around to the bacc side of the storm which may ;
mean that the back side will be about the same intensity as l the leading side. At the time of loss of the secondary l feeder, the licensee was treating a batch of waste water at the waste treatment plant By procedure the licensee is 1
using air s)arging since they had not completed precipitate removal. T1e content of the tank is about 21 grams U-235 which is of no safety significance. The only other i
situation being managed by the licensee is water supply.
They do not want to run out of water and have to turn off l air compressors for lack of cooling water. This would cause plant valves to go to their fail safe configuration and should not present a safety concern. The licensee's '
preference is to keep the status quo.
8/27/98, 0715: The eye has )assed and winds are down to 20 mph with a few gusts from t1e backside of the hurricane. They expect to be out of the rain bands in 3 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Estimates are that they received 10 - 12 inches of rain. Lagoons were lowered in preparation for the hurricane and did not overflow.
During the night they ran out of process water (down to fire protection reserve) and had to shut down pumps and compressors. A backup compressor is still being used at waste treatment for tank s)arging. Preliminary estimates are that there was not muc1 damage on site. Damage of the following types were noted: lost or loose building siding and flashing, water leaks in some non-nuclear building roofs, water in air conditioning systems, and failure of some portions of security alarm system. The CP&L Secondary Feeder is still out of service with no estimate of when it will be restored. This is the major item necessary for restart in that it is needed to restore arocess water.
Damage from the storm was not as bad as iurricane Fran in 1996. Roads in the area are passable with reports from employees ranging from trees on houses to a few lost shingles. Building captains will meet this morning at 0730 l to form teams for a more detailed damage estimate and to l
i initiate the site recovery plan.
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4 8/27/98, 1100: Hurricane Bonnie was down-graded by the National Weather Service to a Tropical Storm.
8/27/98, 1600: Damage assessment has found no more damage than previously reported. GE has a commitment from CP&L to restore the l j
Secondary Feeder by 1700 today. At that point they will 1 start bring up compressors and aumps. They will staff l evening shift and graveyard wit 1 a fire watch type of staff I as the plant comes up. Employees will be notified to come l to work tomorrow beginning at 0700 when they will continue :
to check out the process for eventual restart. They will call again tomorrow morning with a status.
4 8/28/98, 0715.: The secondary electrical feeder was restored at 1715 hours0.0198 days <br />0.476 hours <br />0.00284 weeks <br />6.525575e-4 months <br /> on 8/27. Water tanks have been filled, lines tested, and all utilities have been restored and stabilized. Computer l systems are back on line. The licensee will meet at 0730 to -
determine when to restart the processes. The licensee will compile the lessons learned from the experience. Based on the above status it appears that the licensee is in a ;
position to safely restart processes. The Regional 1 Administrator was briefed on the facility status and had no !
objection to the licensee restarting plant processes when they were ready. This was communicated to the licensee with a request to brief Region II around noon today on the startup status.
j 8/28/98, 1015: Final update on the status of GE. The sun is shining but l they are leaving the boards on the windows in preparation i for Danielle. They have already sent out an inquiry relative to volunteers to man the plant in the event that hurricane comes their way. Plant staffing is 50-60 percent i so they are going slow with restart activities. They j recognize that they will need additional staff when {
processes are ready to operate. Improvement in staff levels !
is expected on future shifts.
Dry Conversion: No major problems. The two roll up doors on the north side of the building had about 4 inch diameter l; puddles of water on the inside of the building. Utilities l are back and stable. They are beginning to fire up the HF i facility. Within the next few hours they will begin firing i up two of the kilns. Line 2 will remain down. Heat up will !
take about 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Best estimate is vaporization to begin l on Sunday morning. I Chemical Area: No major problems. Return of the secondary electrical feeder permitted process water cooling to be ;
restored and permitted restart of plant air systems. Normal ;
air sparging in the waste treatment facility has been resumed. With the loss of plant air, the system involving i
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5 pipe detectors and double block and bleed valves failed in a safe manner as designed. This stopped all discharges of liquid waste from the Uranium Recovery Unit. The licensee is currently managing the waste streams to assure they are performing in a stable manner." No damage on storage pads.
May start processing as early as tonight with priorities .
being scrap dissolution, solvent extraction and operation of '
line 5.
Fabrication Area: No major problems. One furnace is completely cold. It was shut down when cooling water was lost. The other furnaces are coming u) in temperature from a reduced temperature status. May wort some in the Gadolina shop area tonight. Computers systems are back on line.
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