ML20246C061

Insp Rept 70-1113/89-08 on 890530-0602.No Violations or Deviations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Nuclear Criticality Safety,Operations Review,Maint & Surveillance Testing

ML20246C061
Person / Time
Site:	07001113
Issue date:	06/27/1989
From:	Decker T, Kasnicki D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II)
To:
Shared Package
ML20246C058	List: ML20246C055 ML20246C061
References
70-1113-89-08, 70-1113-89-8, NUDOCS 8907100230
Download: ML20246C061 (8)

Text

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% N' JUN 281989 Report No..: 70-1113/89-08' Licensee: General ~ Electric Company Wi1mington, NC 28401 Docket.No.: 70-1113 License No.: SNM-1097' Facility Name: General Electric Company Inspection Conducted: May 30-June 2, 1989 Inspector: ( ._-4 uual,i b f 71 D. - Kasnicki Date Signed'

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/4 6 4[J7 59 T. Decker, Section Chief Date' Signed Radiation Safety' Projects Section Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards Branch Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

SUMMARY

Scope:

.This routine, unannounced inspection was conducted in the areas of Nuclear Criticality Safety, Operations Review, Maintenance, and Surveillance Testing.

The inspection addressed two Inspector Follow-up Items (IFI) related to the Operational Safety Assessment and followed up on two 'tmidents which recently occurred at GE.

Results: )

In.the areas inspected, violations or deviations were not identified.

Two IFIs were closed. GE's response to the two recent incidents appears to )

have. been adequate and complete. The nuclear criticality safety program continues to appear adequate.

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REPORT DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted Licensee Employees

• G. Bowman, Sen'.. Program Manager, Nuclear Safety Engineering

• R. Foleck, Sen.or Specialist, Licensing Engineering

• R. Grier for L. Divins, Manager, Chemical Manufacturing Engineering R. Keenan, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer

• G. Mallett for T. Winslow, Manager, Licensing and Nuclear Materials Management

• R. McIver, Manager, Plant Engineering and Maintenance

• S. Murray, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer

• W. Peters, Manager, FMO Maintenance

• P. Stansbury, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer

• J. Taylor, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer T. Thompson, Manufacturing Engineer

• R. Torres, Program Manager, Radiation Protection

• C. Vaughan, Manager, Regulatory Compliance

• F. Welfare, Senior Nuclear Safety Engineer i

The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees.

• Attended exit interview J

2. Incident Follow-up; Water Line Break of February 14, 1989 (88015, 88020)

In compliance with 10 CFR 20.405(a)(1)(iv) and (a)(2), GE's Nuclear Fuel and Components Manufacturing Division submitted a 30-Day Incident Report for a February 14, 1989, incident involving a potable water line rupture.

On February 14, 1989, the feed water was turned off and work begun to repair a leaking 1.5 inch potable water line that supplies the Fuel Manufacturing Operations (FMO) building restrooms. When the water to this line was turned back on, a " pop" sound was heard by the m'aintenance i personnel. Approximately two minutes later, a leak at a 3 inch valve in a nonradioactive controlled area office hallway was identified upstream to the original repair work. A valve capable of isolating the leak was located and closed, thus stopping the leak. It was estimated that between 5,000 to 15,000 gallans of potable water was discharged onto the floor.

Due to the location and time period of the leak, water flowed into limited  ;

floor spaces of both radiation controlled (contaminated) and noncontrolled {

areas. When the leak was stopped, some back flow of water occurred from I controlled to noncontrolled areas. Water also eventually leaked to i adjacent outdoor asphalted areas north of the building, which are designed to drain to the process lagoons. l

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(Radiation Protection and emergency response personnel were notified and responded. They assessed the- extent of the problem, established access n

controls, notified management and support. personnel including Nuclear Safety Engineering (radiation safety and criticality safety). They also Tinitiated valve repair and coordinated resources and approved Radiation

-6 Work Permit-(RWP) instructions for cleanup activities.

Upon determining' that back flow of water from the controlled area may have been occurring, Radiation Protection staff obtained water samples at the separation points where flow from the controlled areas were most likely.

.The highest value observed was 61 ppm uranium. taken from a carpeted noncontrolled area just outside a controlled area emergency exit. Soil and water sample ~ results obtained from outdoor areas were indistinguish-able from background. The RWP controls were maintained in effect for the cleanup operations. .The response crew obtained samples of the carpet which were dried for alpha radiation measurement. These results, in addition to direct. measurements of the floor,. smears from the floors, and surveys of potentially contaminated articles, showed that there was no 3: contamination spread above unconditional release criteria.

= Criticality safety engineering personnel responded to the site, evaluated

' the situation and determined that where the water leaked into moderation controlled areas, those areas had been demonstrated to be safe under the worst case accident condition for loss of moderation control. The actual condition of water on the floor was much less reactive than the analyzed

, accident condition in which optimum moderation by water was assumed within

, and between the uranium containers as the worst case.

The . incident was identified as a Class I incident and investigated in accordance with GE's internal procedures. Findings from this investiga-

. tion determined that the leak occurred in the threaded collar area of a 3 inch PVC ball valve. The manufacturer's rating for this valve indicates that water hammer effects' from maintenance work- should not have caused damage to the valve integrity. Previous failures of this type valve have not been experienced at NF&CM. It was the consensus of the investigating

. team, based on the history and physical inspection of the valve, that the PVC valve had a pre-existing crack defect in the threaded collar. Over time, small water hammer effects continued the cracking process until failure occurred. The valve was replaced with a similar type from a  ;

different manufacturer on February 15, 1989, and the areas were returned l to normal service on the following day.

The inspector discussed this incident with cognizant GE representatives, toured the entire area whic, had been affected by the incident, and reviewed GE's entire file containing related documentation.

The file contained a Radiological Protection Shift Activity Report, Security Incident Report, a company internal " news release" describing the progressive status of the incident, radiological survey maps, a copy of applicable pages from 10 CFR 20, Radiological Work Permits (RWP), a Radiological Protection Unusual Incident Report, and a final Investigation Report.

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. Attachments'to the final Investigation Report were a memo from-the nuclear safety manager to the affected Area Manager regarding incident classifica-tion, dated February 15, 1989; an FMO building map showing affected areas; RWPs for' cleanup activities; Radiation Protection Unusual Incident Report, dated February 14, 1989; contamination surveys and sample results; NRC notification and follow-up telephone documentation of February 15 and February 16,1989; NRC 30-Day Incident Report, dated March 16, 1980; and manufacturer's information on the failed PVC ball valve. This final

. Investigation Report was signed by the nuclear safety' engineering manager, the nuclear safety engineering team leader, FM0 maintenance manager, FM0 maintenance supervisor, Radiation Protection manager, affected Area Manager, Environmental and Industrial Safety Manager, and the Licensing and . Nuclear Materials Management manager. Their signatures were designated 13 indicate their concurrence that all recovery actions, as specified by the report, were completed. GE's corrective actions identified in the final Investigation Report were to physically identify and label those FM0 water lines which could cause flooding of controlled areas upon' failure, and to review key cut-off valve locations with

. emergency response personnel.

The inspector- toured the entire area which had been' affected by the flooding with a cognizant GE representative. The potable water line involved in the incident had been labeled as such.and direction of flow indicated by arrows. The only-fuel processing area which had been flooded was a. powder blending area. It was water from this blending area that had back flowed through an office area and exited to the outside through a north exit doorway. GE theorizes that contamination was found only on the leading edge of carpeting in the affected ' office area,. as indicated by survey maps in the incident file, due to the extremely low flow rate of the back flow together with the tendency for heavy particles to settle and become trapped quickly in the carpet; similarly, contamination spread to the outside of the controlled areas, in general, was minimal, presumably due to the extremely low flow rate of water on the floors.

The review of the incident file, discussions with GE representatives, and the inspector's tour of the affected area indicated that GE responded very well. to this incident. The review of the nuclear criticality safety aspects of this incident are discussed in Paragraph 4 below.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Incident Follow-up; Dropped Fuel Bundle of January 31, 1989 (88020) i' In compliance with 10 CFR 20.405(a)(1)(iv), GE Nuclear Fuel and Components

. Manufacturing Division submitted a 30-Day Incident Report for a January 31, 1989, incident involving damage to a completed fuel assembly.

On January 31, 1989, a fuel assembly was being raised in a fuel bundle .

final inspection stand. As the fuel assembly reached the top of its travel, the roller chain snapped and the inspection stand lift fixture containing the bundle fell unrestrained to the bottom of the 15-foot deep inspection area equipment pit. The inspection pit does not cortain water I

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4 Land no personnel were in the pit. Radiation Protection personnel were contacted to secure the area and survey for possible uncontained

, radioactive . material. . All fuel rods were found to have broken loose from the lower tie plate with the end plug broken out of four fuel rods. A few

. fragments of. pellet chips were cleaned from the area with no resulting exposure to personnel. The fuel assembly was disassembled and remaved from the pit to the. fuel rod controlled area using the instructions cf a Radiation Work Permit (RWP). Radiation Protection personnel monitored the RWP activities, cleanup, and performed the . final release surveys on the afternoon of January 31, 1989. Pending determination of the cause of the inspection stand failure,. the inspection stand, as well as . five other

-similar stands, were removed from service.

The incident was identified as a Class II incident and was investigated in accordance with GE's internal procedures. Based upon this investigation, the cause was found to be a defective limit switch. This limit switch serves to limit the upper travel of the inspection stand lift fixture.

Failure of the limit switch allowed the lift fixture to reach its maximum travel position which overstressed the lift chain beyond its capacity.

Maintenance personnel performed inspections and checks on all inspection stands including key parts, i .e. , limit switches, chains, and sprockets.

This was completed prior to return to operation for each inspection stand.

Preventive action planned to reduce the probability of a recurrence includes the installation of redundant limit switches to pretent overtravel in both the up - and down directions. Design, procurement, scheduling, and installation will be completed for all inspection stands by the~.end of 1989. As an interim measure, a visual indicator has been installed at each inspection stand to alert the operator that the lift fixture.is approaching the maximum elevation. The visual indicator is an interim measure, until the redundant limit switches are installed, to reduce reliance upon the current single limit switch as the primary control mechanism.

The inspector reviewed the entire GE file on this incident. Records, photographs, and discussions with cognizant GE personnel indicated that the investigation of this incident was comprehensive and complete and that it had been controlled adequately. CE's Incident Report was performed in accordance with their procedure, " Nuclear and Environmental Incident Investigation," P/P 40-12, Rev 6, dated December 4, 1987.

No violations or deviations were identifiec.

4. Nuclear Criticality Safety Analyses (88015)

. . The inspector reviewed the documented nuclear criticality safety analysis for the fuel processing area which was affected by the flood discussed in Paragiaph 2 above with two GE Senior Nuclear Safety Engineers. The analysis had considered optimum moderation and therefore is conservative relative to the moderation accident which occurred. The analysis had

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received an independent review as required by Paragraph 2.5.2.1 of the license application. Both analyses were performed so as to determine fuel processing limits and any further nuclear safety requirements for fuel processing and handling operations so as to comply with the Double Contingency Principle as is required by Paragraph 4.1.1 of the license appli cati on..

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Nuclear Safety Internal Audits (88015)

The inspector reviewed quarterly nuclear safety audit reports which are required. by Paragraph 2.8.1 of the license application for the first quarter of 1989. The findings noted in the reports were not violations of NRC requirements and it appeared that they were being addressed and resolved in a timely manner. The audit report had been distributed to required management personnel. Inspection items for these audits come from a random selection of Nuclear Safety Requirements which have been defined for fuel processing operations.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Daily Checks of Criticality Monitoring System (88015, 88025)

The inspector determined that daily operability verification of control terminal and panel indicator lights and the current status of all detectors was being performed as is required by GE procedure, " Nuclear Safety Instrumentation," NSI No. 0-4.0, Revision 253, September 2,1988; Appendix C, " Instructions for Inspection of the Criticality Warning System.*

No violations or deviations were identified.

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7. Maintenance and Surveillance of Active / Passive Interlocks (88025) i I

Discussions with cognizant GE representatives indicated that they have i I

been involved in a large project dealing with the maintenance and surveillance of active / passive interlocks. They have performed "Hazop" analyses on equipment systems in the 6.reas of criticality, radiation, and chemical safety so as to determine active / passive interlock safety systems. They have then performed fault tree analyses and are proposing modifications, where required, to have two contingencies. Other related analytical work is ongoing to further categorize systems and define the magnitude and scope of this project. At this time it appears that the tracking of active / passive interlocks will be done on a system other than GE's main computer maintenance tracking system, MPAC.

GE indicated that this is quite a long term and complex project with portions of it becoming implemented while development of other aspects of it are continuing. The inspector stated that while the development of i

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this project is still ongoing, efforts to initate the project appear i complete arid therefore this item would be closed for record purposes. I Further implementation will be reviewed during subsequent routine l inspections. IFI 87-15-06 is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified. )!

8. Status of Computer Tracking of Maintenance and Surveillance (MPAC) (88025) I During NRC Inspection No. 70-1113/89-02, conducted during the week of January 23, 1989, the inspector had noted that MPAC appears to be developing into a acceptable tracking system, but also noted that there were some awkward peculiarities associated.with using the system and with understanding some of the displayed data that are related to the inflexibility of the purchased software. While MPAC has been fully implemented, it is still in development and GE representatives indicated that such issues are being addressed. Discussions with GE representatives during this inspection indicated that, through use of the system, anomalies are still being discovered, described and recorded. At this point in the development of the project, as an interim measure, GE representatives indicated that they feel they are about ready to accumulate the descriptions of the anomalies into an appendix to the MPAC user's manual to better assist users of the system. Later, they plan to acquire more software or make modifications to the existing software to i negate the anomalies. GE indicated that negating these anomalies and '

further refinement of the MPAC system is a long term project and will likely never be 100% complete in that modifications will always be introduced as needed or desired. The inspector stated that while the '

development of this project is still ongoing, efforts to initiate the project appear complete and therefore this item would be closed for record purposes. Further implementation will be reviewed during subsequent routine inspections. IFI 87-15-04 is closed.

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No violations or deviations were identified. .

9. Exit Interview l

The inspection scope and results were summarized on June 2,1989, with 1 those persons indicated in paragraph 1. The inspector described the areas inspected and discussed in detail the inspection results listed above.  ;

i Although reviewed during this inspection, proprietary information is not contained in thi.s report. Dissenting comments were not received from the licensee.

Two IFIs were closed. GE's response to the two recent incidents appears to have been adequate and complete. The nuclear criticality safety program continues to appear adequate.

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Item Number Description and Reference (Closed) IFI-87-15-04 Improved calibration records via centralization of maintenance function and MPAC computer tracking system (paragraph 8)

(Closed) IFI-87-15-06 Tracking of testing of active / passive interlocks on MPAC computer system (paragraph 7) l

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