CP-202000365, Luminant, Comamche Leak Nuclear Power Plant, License Amendment Request 20-005, New Technical Specification 3.6.8, Containment Sump

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Luminant, Comamche Leak Nuclear Power Plant, License Amendment Request 20-005, New Technical Specification 3.6.8, Containment Sump
ML20244A338
Person / Time
Site: Comanche Peak  Luminant icon.png
Issue date: 08/31/2020
From: Thomas McCool
Luminant
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CP-202000365, TXX-20050
Download: ML20244A338 (32)
v • d • e


Text

m Luminant Thomas P. McCool Site Vice President Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (Vistra Operations Company LLC)

P.O. Box 1002 6322 North FM 56 Glen Rose, TX 76043 T 254.897.6042 CP-202000365 TXX-20050 August 31, 2020 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Ref 10 CFR 50.90 ATTN: Document Control Desk 10 CFR 50.91(b)(l)

Washington, DC 20555-0001 10 CFR 50.92(c)

Subject:

Coman che Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP)

Docket Nos. 50-445 and 50-446 LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST (LAR)20-005, NEW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.6.8, "CONTAINMENT SUMP"

Dear Sir or Madam:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90 and 10 CFR 50.91, Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra OpCo) hereby requests an amendment to the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Vistra OpCo requests adoption of TSTF-567-A, Revision 1, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSI-191 Issues," which is an approved change to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS),

into the CPNPP Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications (TS). The proposed changes revise TS 3.5.2, "ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) - Operating," and TS 3.5.3, "ECCS - Shutdown." The proposed changes would also add a new TS 3.6.8, "Containment Sump," to Section 3.6, "Containment Systems."

The enclosure provides a description and assessment of the proposed changes. Attachment 1 provides the existing TS pages m arked to show the proposed changes. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS Bases (TSB) pages marked to show the proposed changes (For Information Only). Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS pages.

Vistra OpCo has determined that the proposed change does not involve a significant hazards consideration pursuant to 10 CFR 50.92(c), and there are no significant environmental impacts associated with the change. The CPNPP Station Operations Review Committee (SORC) has reviewed the proposed license amendment. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91(b)(l), a copy of the proposed license amendment is being forwarded to the State of Texas.

NRC staff review and approval of the proposed license amendment is requested within one year of the NRC acceptance date. Once approved, the amendment shall be implemented w ith 120 days.

This letter contains no new regulatory commitments regarding CPNPP Units 1 and 2.

Should you have any questions, please contact Garry W Struble at (254) 897-6628 or garry.struble@luminant.com.

TXX-20050 Page 2 of 2 I state under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on August 31, 2020.

Enclosure:

DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT OF LAR 20-005, NEW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION (TS) 3.6.8, "CONTAINMENT SUMP"

Attachment:

1. PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (MARKUP)
2. PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES CHANGES (MARKUP - FOR INFORMATION ONLY)
3. PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES (CLEAN) c (email)- Scott Morris, Region IV [Scott.Morris@nrc.gov]

Dennis Galvin, NRR [Dennis.Galvin@nrc.gov]

John Ellegood, Senior Resident Inspector, CPNPP Uohn.Ellegood@nrc.gov]

Neil Day, Resident Inspector, CPNPP [Neil.Day@nrc.gov]

Mr. Robert Free [robert.free@dshs.state.tx.us]

Environmental Monitoring & Emergency Response Manager Texas Department of State Health Services Mail Code 1986 P.O. Box 149347 Austin, TX 78714-9347

Enclosure to TXX-20050 Page 1of4 COMANCHE PEAK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ENCLOSURE - DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT

1.0 DESCRIPTION

Vistra Operations Company LLC (Vistra OpCo) requests adoption of TSTF-567, "Add Containment Sump TS to Address GSl-191 Issues," which is an approved change to the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (ISTS), into the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications (TS).

The proposed amendment adds a new Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.8, "Containment Sump," and adds an Action to address the condition of the containment sump made inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The Action provides time to correct or evaluate the condition in lieu of an immediate plant shutdown. This Action is placed in a new specification on the containment sump that otherwise retains the existing Technical Specifications requirements. An existing Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.5.2.8) is moved from TS 3.5.2 to the new specification. The requirement to perform SR 3.5.2.8 in TS 3.5.3 is deleted.

The proposed amendment also revises the Safety Function Determination Program to clarify its application when a supported system is made inoperable by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system.

2.0 ASSESSMENT 2.1 Applicability of Safety Evaluation Vistra OpCo has reviewed the safety evaluation for TSTF-567 provided to the Technical Specifications Task Force in a letter dated July 3, 2018(ML18116A606).

This review included the NRC staffs evaluation, as well as the information provided in TSTF-567. As described herein, Vistra OpCo has concluded that the justifications presented in TSTF-567 and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to CPNPP Units 1 and 2 and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the CPNPP TS.

2.2 Variations Vistra OpCo is not proposing any variations from the TS changes described in the TSTF-567 or the applicable parts of the NRC staffs safety evaluation.

The CPNPP TS utilize different numbering than the Standard Technical Specifications on which TSTF-567 was based. Specifically, CPNPP will use TS number 3.6.8 for the new "Containment Sump" TS and TSTF-567 uses TS number 3.6.19 for the new "Containment Sump" TS. In the TS Bases where applicable "containment sumps" is used vice "containment sump." The TS Bases also includes that the switchover of the Containment Spray System from the RWST to the containment recirculation sump occurs at 6 percent RWST level vice at the RWST low level alarm.

These differences are considered administrative and do not affect the applicability of TSTF-567 to the CPNPP TS.

The CPNPP Technical Specifications contain a Surveillance Frequency Control

Enclosure to TXX-20050 Page 2 of 4 Program. Therefore, the Frequency for Surveillance Requirement 3.6.8.1 is "In accordance with the Surveillance Frequency Control Program."

3.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Analysis The proposed amendment adds a new Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.8, "Containment Sump," and adds an Action to address the condition of the containment sump made inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The Action provides time to correct or evaluate the condition in lieu of an immediate plant shutdown. This Action is placed in a new specification on the containment sump that otherwise retains the existing Technical Specifications requirements. An existing Surveillance Requirement (SR 3.5.2.8) is moved from TS 3.5.2 to the new specification. The requirement to perform SR 3.5.2.8 in TS 3.5.3 is deleted.

The proposed amendment also revises the Safety Function Determination Program to clarify its application when a supported system is made inoperable by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system.

Vistra OpCo has evaluated whether a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed change by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," as discussed below:

1) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump.

An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.

The containment sump is not an initiator of any accident previously evaluated. The containment sump is a passive component and the proposed change does not increase the likelihood of the malfunction. As a result, the probability of an accident is unaffected by the proposed change.

The containment sump is used to mitigate accidents previously evaluated by providing a borated water source for the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Containment Spray System (CSS). The design of the containment sump and the capability of the containment sump assumed in the accident analysis is not changed. The proposed action requires implementation of mitigating actions while the containment sump is inoperable and more frequent monitoring of reactor coolant leakage to detect any increased potential for an accident that would require the containment sump. The consequences of an accident during the proposed action are no different than the current consequences of an accident if the containment sump is inoperable.

Enclosure to TXX-20050 Page 3 of 4 The proposed change clarifies the Safety Function Determination Program when a supported system is made inoperable by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system. The Safety Function Determination Program directs the appropriate use of TS actions and the proposed change does not alter the current intent of the TS. The actions taken when a system is inoperable are not an assumption in the initiation or mitigation of any previously evaluated accident.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2) Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump.

An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.

The proposed change does not alter the design or design function of the containment sump or the plant. No new systems are installed or removed as part of the proposed change. The containment sump is a passive component and cannot initiate a malfunction or accident. No new credible accident is created that is not encompassed by the existing accident analyses that assume the function of the containment sump.

The proposed change clarifies the Safety Function Determination Program when a supported system is made inoperable by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system. The Safety Function Determination Program directs the appropriate use of TS actions and the proposed change does not alter the current intent of the TS. The proposed change to the Safety Function Determination Program will not result in any change to the design or design function of the containment sump or a method of operation of the plant.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3) Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed change adds a new specification to the TS for the containment sump.

An existing SR on the containment sump is moved to the new specification and a duplicative requirement to perform the SR in TS 3.5.3 is removed. The new specification retains the existing requirements on the containment sump and the actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable with the exception of adding new actions to be taken when the containment sump is inoperable due to containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed

Enclosure to TXX-20050 Page 4 of 4 limits. The new action provides time to evaluate and correct the condition instead of requiring an immediate plant shutdown.

The proposed change does not affect the controlling values of parameters used to avoid exceeding regulatory or licensing limits. No Safety Limits are affected by the proposed change. The proposed change does not affect any assumptions in the accident analyses that demonstrate compliance with regulatory and licensing requirements.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, Vistra OpCo concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

3.2 Conclusion In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

4.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

A review has determined that the proposed amendment would change a requirement with respect to installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. However, the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types or a significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

to TXX-20050 Page 1 of 8 Attachment 1 to TXX-20050 LAR 20-005 Technical Specification 3.6.8, Containment Sump Markup

Attachment 1 to TXX-20050 Page 2 of 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) ...... .... ........ ... .. 3.4-22 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (LTOP) System .. ..... .. .. 3.4-26 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ......... ............. .... ... ............ .. ...... ......... .. 3.4-31 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage .. .. ...... .................. ..... . 3.4-33 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ...... .. .. ..... ... .. .............. .. .. .. . 3.4-37 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity ........ .............. ............ ....... ............ .. ........ ... .. ... . 3.4-41 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity ........ .... .. ...... .... .. .. ............ .. .. .. 3.4-44 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) .............. ...... .. .. .. . 3.5-1 3.5.1 Accumulators .. ........... .... .... ... ..... ... .. .. ...... ... .. .......... .... ..... .. ... ... ..... .. .. . 3.5-1 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating ..... .. ..... .. .. ....... ... ... ......... ........ ... ... ...... .. ... ..... .. ..... . 3.5-4 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown .... ..... .. ..... ....... .......... ..... .... .. .... ..... .... ...... .. ... .... ... . 3.5-7 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) .... .. .. .... .. .... .. ..... .. .. ....... .. ... .. 3.5-9 3.5.5 Seal Injection Flow ....... ........ .. ... .. .. .. ................. .. ........... .. .. ..... ...... ... . 3.5-11 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .. ... ..... ..... .. ..... ..... .... ... .......... ... ................ .. . . 3.6-1 3.6.1 Containment. ....... ........ ...... ... ... ..... .. .. ............ ... ...... .. .. .. ........ ..... ... .. .. . 3.6-1 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks .... .. .. .. ....... .... ... ......... .. .. .......... .. ..... ...... ...... . .. 3.6-2 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves ... ..... .... .. .... ..... .... ... ........ ........ .... ........ . 3.6-7 3.6.4 Containment Pressure .. .. .... ... ........ .. ... ... ...... .......... .... .......... ... ..... ... .. 3.6-14 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature ... ..... ... .. ........... .. .. ..... .......... .. ........ .... . 3.6-15 3.6.6 Containment Spray System .... ...... .. ........................ ..... .... .. ... .. .... ... .. . 3.6-16 3.6.7 Spray Additive System ..... ... .............. ... .. ..... ..... ............ ... .... .. ..... .. ... . 3.6-18 3.6.8 Containment Sump .. .. ........ ........ ...... .... ........... .... ....... ... ........... .... .... . 3.6.19 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ........ .... ... ... .. ...... .... ....... .. ...... ....... .. ... .. ... ............... ... . 3.7-1 3.7 .1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ..... .. ....... ... .. .... ....... .. ..... ........ .. . 3.7-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MS IVs) .. ......... .... ... .. .. .... .. ....... .. ..... .. .. 3.7-6 3.7.3 Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs) and Feedwater Control Valves (FCVs) and Associated Bypass Valves ...... .. ... .. .. ....... ........... .... . 3.7-8 3.7.4 Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) ...... ........ ...... .. 3.7-10 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System ............ .. ................ ... ....... ........ . 3.7-12 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) ....... ....... .. .. .... .... ....... .. .. .... ... ........ . 3.7-16 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System .. .... ..... .. ......... .... .. .. .. .... .. 3.7-18 3.7.8 Station Service Water System (SSWS) .... ... ..... ...... ........ .. .. .... .... ... .. . 3.7-20 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) .... ........ ..... .. ................. .... .... .. .... ... ..... .. .... . 3.7-23 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration/Pressurization System (CREFS) 3.7-25 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS) .. .... .... ..... ... ...... .. .. 3.7-28 3.7.12 Primary Plant Ventilation System (PPVS) - ESF Filtration Trains .. .. 3.7-31 3.7.13 Fuel Building Air Cleanup System (FBACS) .. ..... .. ... ... .. ... .... ..... ..... .. 3.7-33 3.7.14 Penetration Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS) - Not Used 3.7-34 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Area Water Level .. .. ....... ................. .. ........ ....... ...... ... .. 3.7-35 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration .. ............ ... ............ ... .. ... .... .. 3.7-36 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage .. .................. ... ........ ............ ...... ...... ... 3.7-37 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity ... ...... .... ........... ......... ....... .... ...... .. ...... .. . . 3.7-44 3.7.19 Safety Chilled Water ..... .... .... .. .. .. ........ ... ... ....... ... .. ............ ..... ...... ... .. 3.7-45 3.7.20 UPS HVAC System ...... ........ ...... .. ....... ... ......... .............. ................ .. . 3.7-47 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .. .. .... ... .... ... ...... .. ........... .......... .... .. ... 3.8-1 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating .... ..... .... .. ... .. .......... ....... .. ..... ...... ............... .. 3.8-1 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown ........ ..... ....... ............ .. ............ .. ... ..... ...... .. .. . 3.8-17 COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1AND2 ii Amendment No. ~

Attachment 1 to TXX-20050 Page 3 of 8 ECCS -- Operating 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.5.2.2 Verify each ECCS manual , power operated, and automatic In accordance with valve in the flow path , that is not locked, sealed, or the Surveillance otherwise secured in position , is in the correct position. Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.3 Verify ECCS piping is full of water. Prior to entry into MOOE3 SR 3.5.2.4 Verify each ECCS pump's developed head at the test flow In accordance with

+

point is greater than or equal to the required developed the INSERVICE head. TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.5.2.5 Verify each ECCS automatic valve in the flow path that is In accordance with not locked , sealed , or otherwise secured in position, the Surveillance actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated Frequency Control actuation signal. Program.

SR 3.5.2.6 Verify each ECCS pump starts automatically on an actual In accordance with or simulated actuation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2 .7 Verify, for each ECCS throttle valve listed below, each In accordance with mechanical position stop is in the correct position. the Surveillance Frequency Control Valve Number Program.

8810A 8816A 8822A 88108 88168 88228 8810C 8816C 8822C 88100 88160 88220 COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.5-6 Amendment No.-456-, 4 Attachment 1 to TXX-20050 Page 4 of 8 EGGS -- Shutdown 3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 The following SRs are applicable for all equipment required In accordance with to be OPERABLE: applicable SRs SR 3.5.2.1 SR 3.5.2.4 SR 3.5.2.7 SR 3.5.2.8 COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.5-8 Amendment No. 40.Q, +ee-to TXX-20050 Page 5 of 8 Containment Sump 3.6.8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.8 Containment Sump LCO 3.6.8 Two containment sumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Initiate action to mitigate Immediately containment sumps containment accident inoperable due to generated and transported containment accident debris.

generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. A.2 Perform SR 3.4.13.1. Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> A.3 Restore the containment 90 days sumps to OPERABLE status.

COMANCHE PEAK UNITS 1AND2 3.6-19 Amendment No.

Attachment 1 to TXX-20050 Page 6 of 8 Containment Sump 3.6.8 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more B.1 --------------N 0 TES-------------

containment sumps 1. Enter applicable inoperable for reasons Conditions and other than Condition A. Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS -

Operating," and LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS -

Shutdown," for emergency core cooling 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> trains made inoperable by the containment sumps .

2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray System," for containment spray trains made inoperable by the containment sumps.

Restore the containment sumps to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> COMANCHE PEAK UNITS 1 AND 2 3.6-20 Amendment No.

Attachment 1 to TXX-20050 Page 7 of 8 Containment Sump 3.6.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.8.1 Verify, by visual inspection , the containment sumps In accordance with do not show structural damage, abnormal the Surveillance corrosion , or debris blockage. Frequency Control Program COMANCHE PEAK UNITS 1 AND 2 3.6-21 Amendment No.

Attachment 1 to TXX-20050 Programs and Manuals Page 8 of 8 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

b. A loss of safety function exists when , assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed . For the purpose of this program , a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:
1. A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
2. A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
3. A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
c. The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program , the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.

5.5.16 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

a. A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(0) and 10 CFR 50 , Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in NEI 94-01 , "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J,"

Revision 3-A , dated July 2012 , and the conditions and limitations specified in NEI 94-01 , Revision 2A, dated October 2008, as modified by the following exceptions:

1. The visual examination of containment concrete surfaces intended to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B testing , will be performed in accordance with the requirements of and frequency specified by the ASM E Section XI Code, Subsection IWL, except where relief has been authorized by the NRC.
2. The visual examination of the steel liner plate inside containment intended to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, will be performed in accordance with the requirements of and frequency specified by the ASM E Section XI Code, Subsection IWE, except where relief has been authorized by the NRC.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 5.5-14 Amendment No. 48, 4-73-,

to TXX-20050 Page 1of10 Attachment 2 to TXX-20050 LAR 20-005 Technical Specification Bases

[For Information Only]

B 3.6.8, Containment Sump Markup

Attachment 2 to TXX-20050 Page 2 of 10 TABLE OF CONTENTS B 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage.. .... ...... ..... ... ... .. ..... .... ......... B 3.4-69 B 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation. .... .. .. ..... ..... ........ ... .......... .......... B 3.4-75 B 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity. .... .... .... .. .... .. ...... ..... ... ..... .. ..... ........... .. ... .. .... .. ... ... .... B 3.4-81 B 3.4.17 SG Tube Integrity .. ...... ... ... ..... ........ ... .... .. ........... .. ............. ... ........ ..... .... .. .. B 3.4-87 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) ... .. .. ...... .. .. ........ ........... B 3.5-1 B 3.5.1 Accumulators.. ... ..... ... .. .. ... .. .. .... .... .... .. ... ... .... .. ....... ........... .. .. .. ... .. ... .. ... ...... B 3.5-1 B 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating . .... .. .... .. ... ... ....... ..... .... . ...... .......... .. ... .. .. .. . ..... ... . .. .... .. .... B 3.5-9 B 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown .... .. ....... ... .. .... .... ...... .... .... ......... .... .. ...... .. .... ..... ........ .. ... B 3.5-19 B 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) ... .... ....... .. ....... ..... .. .... .................. B 3.5-22 B 3.5.5 Seal Injection Flow. .. ....... .... .. .. ....... .... ... ... .... ..... .. ...... .... ... .... .. .. ..... .. ... .. .... . B 3.5-28 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ....... .... .. ..... ...... ... .... .... .. .. ...... .......... ... .... .. .... ........ B 3.6-1 B 3.6.1 Containment. ........ ... .... .. ............. ... ...... ... ...... ... ....... ... ...... ... ...... ........... .. ...... B 3.6-1 B 3.6 .2 Containment Air Locks .......... ..... .. .... .... ..... ..... ..... .... .... .......... .......... ..... .. ..... B 3.6-5 B 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves ........ ... .... ......... ............ ....... ... ... .... ... ... ...... .... . B 3.6- 11 B 3.6.4 Containment Pressure .. ..... ... .......... ........ .. ... .......... ......... .......... ......... ......... . B 3.6-26 B 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature ........ ... ..... .. ..... .. .... ..... ...... .... .... ..... .... ........ ... . B 3.6-29 B 3.6.6 Containment Spray System .. ............ .. ......... ..... .... ...... .. .. ...... ... .... .... .... ... .. ... B 3.6-32 B 3.6.7 Spray Additive System ........ ... ........ ....... .. .. ....... ..... .. ............... ..... .... ......... .. B 3.6-39 B 3.6.8 Containment Sump ... .... ........ ..... ...... ... ........ .. ..... .... ..... ....... ...... ...... ............ .. B 3.6-42 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ...... ... .. .... ....... ..... ..... .............. ....... ........... .. ............. ....... .... B 3.7- 1 B 3.7 .1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ... ... .. ... .. .. ....... ....... ....... ...... .... ........ .. . B 3.7-1 B 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) .... ......... ........... ...... .... ........ ............. B 3.7-8 B 3.7.3 Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs) and Feedwater Control Valves (FCVs) and Associated Bypass Valves .... ....... ...... ..... ......... ........ ..... .... .......... .. B 3.7-13 B 3.7.4 Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) ....... ....... ... ...... .... .... B 3.7-20 B 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System. .... ........ ......... ... .... ....... ........ .. .... ...... .. B 3.7-24 B 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) .. .. .. .. .. .... .. ... .. ..... ............ ......... ..... ... ....... B 3.7-32 B 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System.. .. .................... ...... ...... .... ....... B 3.7-35 B 3.7.8 Station Service Water System (SSWS) .... ... .... ........ ..... ...... .......... .. .. ..... .... B 3.7-39 B 3.7 .9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) .............. ... ....... .... ....... .... ... ... ... .. .. .......... ..... .. .... . B 3.7-44 B 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration/Pressurization System (CREFS). .. ... B 3.7-4 7 B3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRAGS).. ....... .... .. ..... ... ...... .... .... B 3.7-56 B 3.7.12 Primary Plant Ventilation System (PPVS) - ESF Filtration Trains.. ....... .... B 3.7-60 B 3.7.13 FUEL BUILDING AIR CLEANUP SYSTEM (FBACS) ....... ..... ......... .. .... ... . B 3.7-67 B 3.7.14 PENETRATION ROOM EXHAUST AIR CLEANUP SYSTEM (PREACS) B 3.7-68 B3.7.15 Fuel Storage Area Water Level.. .. ......... .... ..... ......... .. .. .. ........ ............. ...... . B 3.7-69 B 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration. ....... ....... .. ......... ... .......... .. .. ......... B 3.7-72 B 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage .. ... ..... ......... ... ... .......... ... .... ... ........ .... ......... . B 3.7-77 B3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity. .. .......... ... .......... ......... .. .......... ... ................... .. B 3.7-80 B3.7.19 Safety Chilled Water System... .. ... .. ............ ... ...... ................. ....... .. .... .. .. .... B 3.7-83 B 3.7.20 UPS HVAC System - Operating. .... ..... .... ..... ........... .. ....... ....... ... .... .... ..... .. B 3.7-87 B 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS .. ... ... .... .... ........... .. .... ........ .... ... .... ..... ..... ... B 3.8-1 B 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating... .. .... ...... ....... ...... ............... .. .. ........ ...... .. ... ... ....... B 3.8- 1 B 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown .... ......... ... ... ..... ...... .... ........ ..... ....... .. ... ........ .... ..... B 3.8-30 B 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil , Lube Oil , and Starting Air. ....... .... ...... .... ............... .... ... .. ... B 3.8-37 B 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating ...... ... ........ .. ........ ... ..... ... .. ... ... ........ .. .. .... .. ............ B 3.8-45 COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B ii Revision .6f-

Attachment 2 to TXX-20050 Page 3of10 ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES BACKGROUND (background)

The ECCS subsystems are actuated upon receipt of an SI signal. The actuation of safeguard loads is accomplished in a programmed time sequence. If offsite power is available, the safeguard loads start after a one second sequencer delay in the programmed time sequence. If offsite power is not available, the Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) buses shed normal operating loads and are connected to the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). Safeguard loads are then actuated in the programmed time sequence. The time delay associated with diesel starting , sequenced loading, and pump starting determines the time required before pumped flow is available to the core following a LOCA.

Each ECCS pump is provided with normally open miniflow lines for pump protection. The RHR miniflow isolation valves close on flow to the RCS and have a time delay to prevent them from closing until the RHR pumps are up to speed and capable of delivering fluid to the RCS . The SI pump minflow isolation valves are closed manually from the control room prior to transfer from injection to recirculation . The Charging Pump miniflow isolation valves close on receipt of a safety injection signal and alternate minflow isolation valves open.

The active ECCS components, along with the passive accumulators, the RWST, and the containment sump, are covered in LCO 3.5.1, "Accumulators," and LCO 3.5.4, "Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) ,"

and LCO 3.6.8, "Containment Sump," and provide the cooling water necessary to meet GDC 35 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The LCO helps to ensure that the following acceptance criteria for the ECCS, SAFETY ANALYSES established by 10 CFR 50.46 (Ref. 2), will be met following a LOCA:

a. Maximum fuel element cladding temperature is ::; 2200°F;
b. Maximum cladding oxidation is ::; 0.17 times the total cladding thickness before oxidation ;
c. Maximum hydrogen generation from a zirconium water reaction is
0.01 times the hypothetical amount generated if all of the metal in the cladding cylinders surrounding the fuel , excluding the cladding surrounding the plenum volume, were to react;
d. Core is maintained in a coolable geometry; and
e. Adequate long term core cooling capability is maintained.

(continued)

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.5-11 Revision Attachment 2 to TXX-20050 Page 4of10 ECCS - Operating B 3.5.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.5 .2.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS following flow balancing and have mechanical locks to ensure flow balancing and to limit SI pump runout. The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.8 Periodic iAspeetiOAS of the COAtaiAA'leAt SUA'lp suetioA iAlet eASUFC that it is uArestrieted aAd stays iA proper opcratiAg eoAditioA . The SurvcillaAee F1 equeney is co11trolled U1ider ti 1e Surveilla1 ice Frequency 6011t1 ol Progran 1.

REFERENCES 1. 10 CFR 50 , Appendix A , GDC 35 .

2. 10 CFR 50.46.
3. FSAR, Sections 6.3 and 7.6.
4. FSAR, Chapter 15, "Accident Analysis."
5. NRC Memorandum to V. Stello, Jr. , from R.L. Baer, "Recommended Interim Revisions to LCOs for ECCS Components," December 1, 1975.
6. IE Information Notice No. 87-01 .
7. BTP EICSB-18, Application of the Single Failure Criteria to Manually-Controlled Electrically-Operated Valves.

COMANCH E PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.5-18 Revision Attachment 2 to TXX-20050 Page 5of10 ECCS - Shutdown B 3.5.3 B 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS)

B 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown BASES BACKGROUND The Background section for Bases 3.5.2, "ECCS - Operating ," is applicable to these Bases, with the following modifications.

In MODE 4, the required ECCS train consists of two separate subsystems:

centrifugal charging (high head) and residual heat removal (RHR) (low head).

The ECCS flow paths consist of piping, valves, heat exchangers, and pumps such that water from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) and the containment sump can be injected into the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) following the accidents described in Bases 3.5.2.

APPLICABLE The Applicable Safety Analyses section of Bases 3.5.2 also applies to this SAFETY ANALYSES Bases section.

Due to the stable conditions associated with operation in MODE 4 and the reduced probability of occurrence of a Design Basis Accident (DBA) , the ECCS operational requirements are reduced . It is understood in these reductions that certain automatic safety injection (SI) actuation is not available. In this MODE, sufficient time exists for manual actuation of the required ECCS to mitigate the consequences of a DBA.

Only one train of ECCS is required for MODE 4. This requirement dictates that single failures are not considered during this MODE of operation. The ECCS trains satisfy Criterion 3 of 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO In MODE 4 , one of the two independent (and redundant) ECCS trains is required to be OPERABLE to ensure that sufficient ECCS flow is available to the core following a DBA.

In MODE 4, an ECCS train consists of a centrifugal charging subsystem and an RHR subsystem . Each train includes the piping , instruments, and controls to ensure an OPERABLE flow path capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump.

During an event requiring ECCS actuation, a flow path is required to provide an abundant supply of water from the RWST to the RCS via the ECCS pumps and their respective supply headers to each of the four cold leg (continued)

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B3.5-19 Revision 69 to TXX-20050 Page6of10 Containment Sump B 3.6.8 B 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS B 3.6.8 Containment Sump BASES BACKGROUND The containment sumps provide a borated water source to support recirculation of coolant from the containment sumps for residual heat removal, emergency core cooling, containment cooling, and containment atmosphere cleanup during accident conditions.

The containment sumps supply both trains of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and the Containment Spray System during any accident that requires recirculation of coolant from the containment sumps. The recirculation mode is initiated when the pump suction is transferred to the containment sump on low Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) level for ECCS, and at 6% RWST level for the Containment Spray System which ensures the containment sumps have enough water to supply net positive suction head to the ECCS and Containment Spray System pumps. The Containment Spray System consists of two separate trains of equal capacity, each capable of meeting the design bases. Each train includes two containment spray pumps, heat exchangers, spray headers, nozzles, valves, and piping.

Each train is powered from a separate ESF bus. The refueling water storage tank (RWST) supplies borated water to the Containment Spray System during the injection phase of operation. In the recirculation mode of operation, containment spray pump suction is transferred manually from the RWST to the containment sumps.

The containment sumps contain strainers to limit the quantity of the debris materials from entering the sump suction piping. Debris accumulation on the strainers can lead to undesirable hydraulic effects including air ingestion through vortexing or deaeration, and reduced net positive suction head (NPSH) at pump suction piping.

While the majority of debris accumulates on the strainers, some fraction penetrates the strainers and is transported to downstream components in the ECCS, Containment Spray System, and the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) . Debris that penetrates the strainer can result in wear to the downstream components, blockages, or reduced heat transfer across the fuel cladding. Excessive debris in the containment sumps water source could result in insufficient recirculation of coolant during the accident, or insufficient heat removal from the core during the accident.

COMANCHE PEAK- UNITS 1AND2 B 3.6-42 Revision to TXX-20050 Page 7of10 Containment Sump B 3.6.8 BASES APPLICABLE During all accidents that require recirculation, the containment sumps SAFETY provide a source of borated water to the ECCS and Containment Spray ANALYSIS System pumps. As such, it supports residual heat removal , emergency core cooling, containment cooling , and containment atmosphere cleanup during an accident. It also provides a source of negative reactivity (Ref. 1). The design basis transients and applicable safety analyses concerning each of these systems are discussed in the Applicable Safety Analyses section of B 3.5.2, "ECCS - Operating ," B 3.5.3, "ECCS - Shutdown," and B 3.6.6 , "Containment Spray System."

ER-ESP-001, Revision 3 (Ref. 2) describes evaluations that confirm long-term core cooling is assured fol lowing any accident that requires recirculation from the containment sumps.

The containment sumps satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50 .36(c)(2)(ii).

LCO Two containment sumps are required to ensure a source of borated water to support ECCS and Containment Spray System OPERABILITY.

A containment sump consists of the containment drainage flow paths, design features upstream of the containment sump that are credited in the containment debris analysis, the containment sump strainers, the pump suction trash racks, and the inlet to the ECCS and Containment Spray System piping . An OPERABLE containment sump has no structural damage or abnormal corrosion that could prevent recirculation of coolant and will not be restricted by containment accident generated and transported debris.

Containment accident generated and transported debris consists of the following:

a. Accident generated debris sources - Insulation, coatings, and other materials which are damaged by the high-energy line break (HELB) and transported to the containment sumps. This includes materials within the HELB zone of influence and other materials (e.g.,

unqualified coatings) that fail due to the post-accident containment environment following the accident;

b. Latent debris sources - Pre-existing dirt, dust, paint chips, fines or shards of insulation , and other materials inside containment that do not have to be damaged by the HELB to be transported to the containment sumps; and
c. Chemical product debris sources - Aluminum, zinc, carbon steel ,

copper, and non-metallic materials such as paints, thermal insulation, and concrete that are susceptible to chemical reactions within the post-accident containment environment leading to corrosion products that are generated within the containment sump pool or are generated within containment and transported to the containment sumps.

Containment debris limits are defined in ER-ESP-001, Revision 3 (Ref. 2) .

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.6-43 Revision to TXX-20050 Page 8of10 Containment Sump B 3.6.8 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, containment sump OPERABILITY requirements are dictated by the ECCS and Containment Spray System OPERABILITY requirements. Since both the ECCS and the Containment Spray System must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, the containment sumps must also be OPERABLE to support their operation .

In MODES 5 and 6, the probability and consequences of these events are reduced due to the pressure and temperature limitations of these MODES. Thus, the containment sumps are not required to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 or 6.

ACTIONS A.1. A.2. and A.3 Condition A is applicable when there is a condition which results in containment accident generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed limits. Containment debris limits are defined in ER-ESP-001 ,

Revision 3 (Ref. 2).

Immediate action must be initiated to mitigate the condition. Examples of mitigating actions are:

  • Removing the debris source from containment or preventing the debris from being transported to the containment sumps;
  • Evaluating the debris source against the assumptions in the analysis;
  • Deferring maintenance that would affect availability of the affected systems and other LOCA mitigating equipment;
  • Deferring maintenance that would affect availability of primary defense-in-depth systems, such as containment coolers;
  • Briefing operators on LOCA debris management actions; or
  • Applying an alternative method to establish new limits.

While in this condition, the RCS water inventory balance, SR 3.4.13.1, must be performed at an increased Frequency of once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. An unexpected increase in RCS leakage could be indicative of an increased potential for an RCS pipe break, which could result in debris being generated and transported to the containment sumps. The more frequent monitoring allows operators to act in a timely fashion to minimize the potential for an RCS pipe break while the containment sumps are inoperable.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.6-44 Revision to TXX-20050 Page 9of10 Containment Sump B 3.6.8 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

For the purposes of applying LCO 3.0.6 and the Safety Function Determination Program while in Condition A, the two containment sumps are considered a single support system for all ECCS and Containment Spray System trains because containment accident generated and transported debris issues that would render one sump inoperable would render all of the sumps inoperable.

The inoperable containment sumps must be restored to OPERABLE status in 90 days. A 90-day Completion Time is reasonable for emergent conditions that involve debris in excess of the analyzed limits that could be generated and transported to the containment sumps under accident conditions. The likelihood of an initiating event in the 90-day Completion Time is very small and there is margin in the associated analyses. The mitigating actions of Required Action A.1 provide additional assurance that the effects of debris in excess of the analyzed limits will be mitigated during the Completion Time.

When the containment sumps are inoperable for reasons other than Condition A, such as blockage, structural damage, or abnormal corrosion that could prevent recirculation of coolant, it must be restored to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Completion Time takes into account the reasonable time for repairs, and low probability of an accident that requires the containment sumps occurring during this period.

Required Action B.1 is modified by two Notes. The first Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS

- Operating," and LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS - Shutdown," should be entered if inoperable containment sumps result in an inoperable ECCS train . The second Note indicates that the applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray System," should be entered if inoperable containment sumps result in an inoperable Containment Spray System train. This is an exception to LCO 3.0.6 and ensures the proper actions are taken for these components.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 B 3.6-45 Revision to TXX-20050 Page10of10 Containment Sump B 3.6.8 BASES ACTIONS (continued)

C.1 and C.2 If the containment sumps cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the associated Completion Time, the plant must be brought to a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the plant must be brought to at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and to MODE 5 within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required plant conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging plant systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.6.8.1 REQUIREMENTS Periodic inspections are performed to verify the containment sumps do not show current or potential debris blockage, structural damage, or abnormal corrosion to ensure the operability and structural integrity of the containment sumps (Ref. 1).

The Surveillance Frequency is controlled under the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

REFERENCES 1. FSAR, Chapter 6 and Chapter 15.

2. ER-ESP-001 , Revision 3 Generic Letter 2004-02 Supplemental Response.

COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1AND 2 B 3.6-46 Revision to TXX-20050 Page 1of8 Attachment 3 to TXX-20050 LAR 20-005 Technical Specification 3.6.8, Containment Sump Clean

Attachment 3 to TXX-20050 Page 2 of 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) (continued) 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) ...................... . 3.4-22 3.4.12 Low Temperature Overpressure Protection (L TOP) System .......... . 3.4-26 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ........................................................... . 3.4-31 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ................................. . 3.4-33 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ........................................ . 3.4-37 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity ....................................................................... . 3.4-41 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity ............................................. . 3.4-44 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) .......................... . 3.5-1 3.5.1 Accumulators ................................................................................... . 3.5-1 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating ........................................................................... . 3.5-4 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown ........................................................................... . 3.5-7 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) .......................................... . 3.5-9 3.5.5 Seal Injection Flow .......................................................................... . 3.5-11 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS .................................................................. . 3.6-1 3.6.1 Containment. ................................................................................... . 3.6-1 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks .................................................................... . 3.6-2 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves .......................................................... . 3.6-7 3.6.4 Containment Pressure ..................................................................... . 3.6-14 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature ......................................................... . 3.6-15 3.6.6 Containment Spray System ............................................................. . 3.6-16 3.6.7 Spray Additive System .................................................................... . 3.6-18 3.6.8 Containment Sump .......................................................................... . 3.6.19 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ................................................................................ . 3.7-1 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ............................................... . 3.7-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MS IVs) ............................................. . 3.7-6 3.7.3 Feedwater Isolation Valves (FIVs) and Feedwater Control Valves (FCVs) and Associated Bypass Valves ..................................... . 3.7-8 3.7.4 Steam Generator Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) ..................... . 3.7-10 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System ................................................ . 3.7-12 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) .................................................... . 3.7-16 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System ..................................... . 3.7-18 3.7.8 Station Service Water System (SSWS) ........................................... . 3.7-20 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ................................................................ . 3.7-23 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Filtration/Pressurization System (CREFS) 3.7-25 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS) ........................... . 3.7-28 3.7.12 Primary Plant Ventilation System (PPVS) - ESF Filtration Trains ... . 3.7-31 3.7.13 Fuel Building Air Cleanup System (FBACS) ................................... . 3.7-33 3.7.14 Penetration Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS) - Not Used 3.7-34 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Area Water Level ....................................................... . 3.7-35 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration .......................................... . 3.7-36 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage ......................................................... . 3.7-37 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity ............................................................. . 3.7-44 3.7.19 Safety Chilled Water ........................................................................ . 3.7-45 3.7.20 UPS HVAC System ......................................................................... . 3.7-47 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ....................................................... . 3.8-1 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating .................................................................. . 3.8-1 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown .................................................................. . 3.8-17 COMANCHE PEAK- UNITS 1 AND 2 ii Amendment No. ~

Attachment 3 to TXX-20050 Page 3 of 8 ECCS -- Operating 3.5.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SR 3.5.2.2 Verify each ECCS manual, power operated, and automatic In accordance with valve in the flow path, that is not locked, sealed, or the Surveillance otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position. Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.3 Verify ECCS piping is full of water. Prior to entry into MODE3 SR 3.5.2.4 Verify each ECCS pump's developed head at the test flow In accordance with point is greater than or equal to the required developed the INSERVICE head. TESTING PROGRAM SR 3.5.2.5 Verify each ECCS automatic valve in the flow path that is In accordance with not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, the Surveillance actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated Frequency Control actuation signal. Program.

SR 3.5.2.6 Verify each ECCS pump starts automatically on an actual In accordance with or simulated actuation signal. the Surveillance Frequency Control Program.

SR 3.5.2.7 Verify, for each ECCS throttle valve listed below, each In accordance with mechanical position stop is in the correct position. the Surveillance Frequency Control Valve Number Program.

8810A 8816A 8822A 88108 88168 88228 8810C 8816C 8822C 88100 88160 88220 COMANCHE PEAK - UNITS 1 AND 2 3.5-6 Amendment No.-466-, 468-

Attachment 3 to TXX-20050 Page 4 of 8 ECCS -- Shutdown 3.5.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.5.3.1 The following SRs are applicable for all equipment required In accordance with to be OPERABLE: applicable SRs SR 3.5.2.1 SR 3.5.2.4 SR 3.5.2.7 COMANCHE PEAK- UNITS 1 AND 2 3.5-8 Amendment No. 4W, 4-e&

to TXX-20050 Page 5 of 8 Containment Sump 3.6.8 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS 3.6.8 Containment Sump LCO 3.6.8 Two containment sumps shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more A.1 Initiate action to mitigate Immediately containment sumps containment accident inoperable due to generated and transported containment accident debris.

generated and transported debris exceeding the analyzed!

imits. A.2 Perform SR 3.4.13.1. Once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> A.3 Restore the containment 90 days sumps to OPERABLE status.

COMANCHE PEAK UNITS 1 AND 2 3.6-19 Amendment No.

Attachment 3 to TXX-20050 Page 6 of 8 Containment Sump 3.6.8 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. One or more B.1 --------------N 0 TES-------------

containment sumps 1. Enter applicable inoperable for reasons Conditions and other than Condition A. Required Actions of LCO 3.5.2, "ECCS -

Operating," and LCO 3.5.3, "ECCS -

Shutdown," for emergency core cooling 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> trains made inoperable by the containment sumps.

2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.6.6, "Containment Spray System," for containment spray trains made inoperable by the containment sumps.

Restore the containment sumps to OPERABLE status.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> COMANCHE PEAK UNITS 1 AND 2 3.6-20 Amendment No.

Attachment 3 to TXX-20050 Page 7 of 8 Containment Sump 3.6.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.6.8.1 Verify, by visual inspection, the containment sumps In accordance with do not show structural damage, abnormal the Surveillance corrosion, or debris blockage. Frequency Control Program COMANCHE PEAK UNITS 1 AND 2 3.6-21 Amendment No.

Attachment 3 to TXX-20050 Programs and Manuals Page 8 of 8 5.5 5.5 Programs and Manuals 5.5.15 Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) (continued)

b. A loss of safety function exists when, assuming no concurrent single failure, a safety function assumed in the accident analysis cannot be performed. For the purpose of this program, a loss of safety function may exist when a support system is inoperable, and:
1. A required system redundant to the system(s) supported by the inoperable support system is also inoperable; or
2. A required system redundant to the system(s) in turn supported by the inoperable supported system is also inoperable; or
3. A required system redundant to the support system(s) for the supported systems (a) and (b) above is also inoperable.
c. The SFDP identifies where a loss of safety function exists. If a loss of safety function is determined to exist by this program, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions of the LCO in which the loss of safety function exists are required to be entered. When a loss of safety function is caused by the inoperability of a single Technical Specification support system, the appropriate Conditions and Required Actions to enter are those of the support system.

5.5.16 Containment Leakage Rate Testing Program

a. A program shall be established to implement the leakage rate testing of the containment as required by 10 CFR 50.54(0) and 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, as modified by approved exemptions. This program shall be in accordance with the guidelines contained in NEI 94-01, "Industry Guideline for Implementing Performance-Based Option of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J,"

Revision 3-A, dated July 2012, and the conditions and limitations specified in NEI 94-01, Revision 2A, dated October 2008, as modified by the following exceptions:

1. The visual examination of containment concrete surfaces intended to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B testing, will be performed in accordance with the requirements of and frequency specified by the ASME Section XI Code, Subsection IWL, except where relief has been authorized by the NRG.
2. The visual examination of the steel liner plate inside containment intended to fulfill the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option B, will be performed in accordance with the requirements of and frequency specified by the ASME Section XI Code, Subsection IWE, except where relief has been authorized by the NRG.

COMANCHE PEAK- UNITS 1 AND 2 5.5-14 Amendment No. 4-6-8, 4-73-,

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