ML20238F297

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Direct Testimony of EA Thomas,Ea Tanzman & Bj Swiren on New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan Presented on Behalf of Fema.* Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20238F297
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 09/11/1987
From: Flynn H
Federal Emergency Management Agency
To:
Shared Package
ML20238F286 List:
References
OL, NUDOCS 8709160064
Download: ML20238F297 (107)


Text

{{#Wiki_filter:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ UNITED STATES T AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULA'IORY COMMISSICH 4 BEFORE 'IHE A'IOMIC SAFE'IY AND LICENSING BOARD

                                                                                               )

In the Matter of )

                                                                                               )

Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, ) Docket No. 50-443-OL , et al. ) 50-444-OL

                                                                                               )           Offsite Emergency (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2)                                         )            Planning Issues     ,
                                                                                               )

DIRECT TESTI!ONY T EDWARD A. THOMAS, l EDWARD A. TANZMAN, AND BRUCE J. SWIREN CN '1HE NEW HAMPSHIRE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PIAN PRESD1TED CN BDIAIF T 'IHE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGDICY The witnesses whom the Federal Diergency Management Agency (FEMA) is sponsoring on the admitted contentions having to do with the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP) in the Event of an Accident at Seabrook Station are: Edward A. Thmas, Chief Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emergency Management Agency Region I Boston, Massachusetts Edward A. Tanzman Energy and Environmental Programs Attorney Energy and Environmental Systems Division Argonne National Laboratory Argonne, Illinois and Bruce J. Swiren Emergency Management Specialih>t Natural and Technological Hazards Division Federal Emeigency Management Agency Region I Boston, Massachusetts B709160064 070911 PDR ADOCK 05000443 T PDR

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  ,         l' ?_.l 2-Our Statements of Professional Qualifications are attached'to this Direct' s

Testimony and are~ incorporated herein by. reference. In general, the purpose of our testinony is to address the admitted

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                                  . contentions and supporting bases. As' explained below, our testinony.is
                                  - limited to certain contentions and bases. As noted in the Statement of.

Position, the Nuclear Regulathry Comnission . (NRC) .is sponsoring the - testimony of Dr. Thomas Urbanik on certain contentions having to do with the validity of Evacuation Time Estimates, and so FEMA is not sponsoring testinony on those contentions, namely: Revised Hanpton Contention III to Revision' 2

                                                               - ' Revised Hampton Contention VI to Revision 2, Basis A (Rev.1)

SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Revised Contention 31 ~I

                                                                    ' SAPL Contention 34 SAPL Contention 37
                                                           - FEMA considers its statement about the transient beach population largely.to involve matters of policy. Edward A. Thomas'is the FD% -

official in Region I who is responsible for explaining, applyirg, and carrying out FEMA's policies as they apply to the Radiological'Energency Preparedness Program. For this reason, Mr. Thomas is the single witness as to those contentions having to do with the lack of shelter for the transient beach population, namely: Revised Hanpton Contention VIII to Revision 2 SAPL Contention 16 NECNP Contention RERP-8 Durirg the period of time when Bruce Swiren was employed by HMM Associates, he worked on obtaining revised or renewed Letters of Agreement J m ..___m_____ _- _.m_._._.__.__._._m.. _ _ _ _

I' t I) 1 frm hospitals, ambulance companies, towing cmpanies, and bus companies. In-L order to avoid even the possibility of the appearance of a conflict of interests, Mr. Swiren has rerreved himself as a witness on contentions and bases having to do with these. letters of agreement and the-determination of the number of

                                                   ' Teamsters to be made available by their. employers in the event of an emergency. For this reason, Edward A.' Thomas and Edwatti A. Tanzman will testify on those contentions and bases, namely:

Revised Hanpton Contention IV South Hampton Contention 3; Bases 1, A, B, C, E, and Further Bases A.l. , A.2. , and B l Town of Kensington Contention 6 NECNP Contention NHLP-2, Basis D NECNP Contention NHLP-6, Dases d and e and HP-1-e SAPL Contention 15 SAPL Contention 25 All three of us will uddress the remaining admitted contentions and bases.

  • J The attached docunent entitled " Current FEMA Position on Admitted Con-tentions on New Hanpshire Plans for Seabrook" (hereinafter referred to as the " Statement of Position"), dated June 4,1987, has previously been made a part of the record of this case. That Statement of Position was attached as Appendix A to the Response of the Federal Emergency Management Agency to Massachusetts Attorney General James M. Shannon's Off-Site Emergency Preparedness Interrogatories and Request for Production i

of Documents to FEMA (Set No. 2) and is herein identified as Exhibit A. l l 1 The language of the contentions and their bases is set forth in that Statement of Position and so is not repeated herein. Exhibit B to this testimony, entitled " Current FEMA Position on South Hanpton Contention 8 and NECNP Contention NHLP-4", and dated June 26, 1987, is a supplement to PEMA's Statement of Position and is also a part of the recotti of this case.

    ?

c; . U Exhibit C is a copy of a letter dated August 7,1987 frun H. Joseph Flynn to Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. It reflects FEMA's position on the issues discussed therein. We individually incorporate by reference those portions of Exhibit A, B, and C which are pertinent to our respective testimony. The positions which FEMA has taken on the NHRERP, -the exercise of the

                                            ' NHRERP, ahd the contentions which this Atcanic Safety and Licensing Board has admitted were arrived at through a collegial process of review by FEMA's Regional Office in Boston, consultation with FEMA's Regional Assistance Ccanmittee (RAC) and Argonne National Laboratory, and review by FEMA's State and Local Programs and Support Directorate in Washington, D.C.

The RAC is an interagency conunittee constituted in each of the 10 standard Federal regions pursuant to 44 C.F.R. @351. The committee is camposed of representatives of FEMA, the NRC, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and Human Servi s, the Department of Transportation, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Canmerce and the Department of Interior. FEMA and the RAC have provided coments on New Hampshire draft planning for Seabrook dating back to submissions in 1982. However, the current plan, which is under litigation, dates back to 1985. In December,1985, the State of New Hanpshire submitted the NHRERP (Revision 0) to FEMA. New Hanpshire submitted extensive changes to the NHRERP (Revision 0, Supplement 1) in February,1986, which included: 1.' Volume 5 NHRERP, " Letters of Agreement in Support of the i NHRERP";

                                                   ~2. Volume 7 NHRERP, "Seabrook Station Alett and Notification System Design Report";
3. Evacuation Time Estimate (ETE) Study materials (Progress Reports Nos.1-6) frun KLD Associates;

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4. Revised procedures for the New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development;
5. Compensatory Plan outlining the means used by the State to ~

protect citizens in towns within the Seabrook EPZ when municipal govenments cannot or will not carry out tasks assigned by the local plan, and;

6. Draft public information material.

The February,1986, revisions were served on the parties on March 11, 1986. The State of New Hanpshire filed additional plan changes in April,1986, (Revision 0, Supplement 2 of the NHRERP) consisting of the following:

1. KLD Progtess Report No. 7;
2. A revision to the Department of Public Health and Safety (DPHS)-

Procedures, including replacement and new appendices'to the DPHS Procedures;

3. Rockingham County Complex procedures, including those for the Rockingham County Nursing Home,. Rockingham County Jail Facility and Rockingham County Dispatch Center; and
4. Procedures for the. decontamination of personnel at the Manchester Decontamination Center, along with Appendix F to those procedures.

A full-scale exercise of the NHRERP was conducted on February 26, 1986. During the first several ncnths of 1986, FEMA and the RAC were involved in extensive reviews of the December NHRERP (Revision 0), the February revisions (Supplements 1 and 2 to Revision 0), and the February exercise. In April, 1986, FEMA sent the following documents to the State of New Hanpshire:

1. FEMA's report of the deficiencies observed during the Febru-ary 26, 1986, exercise of the state and local plans to protect the public in the event of a radiological emergency at Seabrook; 1
2. Final Draft Report of the Exercise of the emergency plans for Seabrook held February 26, 1986;
3. Final review by the RAC of the state and local plans submitted by New Hanpshire in December,1985; and
4. Draft RAC Review of the state and local plans submitted by New l Hampshire in February,1986.
                                                    'Ihese documents have been served on the parties to this proceeding.

1 _ _ _ - _ _ _ = _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _

F i: ' On June 3,1986, the State filed another revision of the N$RERP (Re-vision 1) responding to the comnents of the PAC concerning the plan and the exercise of the plan. The ETE Study prepared by KLD Associates, whic'h had recently been teleased in a final draft, was incorporated into the NHRERP at that time.

              ,             On June 23 and 24,1986, the RAC met with representatives of the State of New Hampshire and the Applicant and explained in further detail the concerns identified in the documents described above. On September 8,1986, the State of New Hampshire subnitted another revision of the NHRERP (Revision 2, dated August, 1986) addressing the concerns identified by the RAC. FEMA submitted the FEMA /RAC Review of Revision 2 of the state and local plans to the State of New Hampshire on December 12, 1986. This document is the basis for most of the positions taken by FEMA in this licensing proceeding and has also been setved on all the parties.

On April 15 and July 2,1987, the NRC filed FEMA's positions on the parties' various Motions for Summary Disposition of Contentions. On June 4,1987, FEMA filed its Statement of losition as part of a response to Interrogatories from the parties. This reflects FEMA's current position, even though the State of New Hampshire submitted a Sumnary of Personnel Resource Assessment for the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan in late August, 1987, and additional information in early September. The review period for material which a state submits to FEMA as part of a radiological emergency response plan is normally at least 60 days. These materials are not reflected in this testinony principally because they were not received early enough to have been reviewed by FEMA and the RAC and because the State of New Hampshire has advised PEbn that the material subnitted in September is not part of the NHRERP.

c Edward A. Thomas-Chief.of the Natural and Technological Hazards. Division Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I EIXJCATICH NEW ENGLAND SCHOOL CF IAW, Boston, Massachusetts J.D. Magna Cum Laude 1986 BOSION UNIVERSITY, Boston, Massachusetts Partially completed work for MA in Urban Planning (1973-1975)- HYDROIOGIC ENGINEERING CENTER Certificate in Hydrological and Hydraulic Concepts (1975) FOREHAM LNIVERETTY, Bronx, New York Bachelor of Arts in History,1969 PIEFESSIONAL FEDERAL EMEIGNCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, Boston, Massachusetts EXPERIENCE Division Ch;ef for Natural and Technological Hazards, December 1981 - Present. Manages emergenev preparedness programs to assist State and local governments prepare for floods, earthquakes, nuclear accidents, and dam failure. Manages the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program'in FEMA's Region I (New England). Chairman of the Regional Assistance Cctnmittee. Oversees the_ review of State radiological ' emergency - response plans and the field exercises of those plans for the 6 operating nuclear power plants in New England and for Seabrook Station. Had overall responsibility < for conducting, reviewing and following up on 22. full-scale exercises and several remedial exercises. Has testified before Congressional cornmittees and served as an expert witness in administrative hearings and other legal pro-ceedings concerning the National Flood Insurance Program. Division Chief for Insurance and Mitigation, April 1979 - December 1980 Managed the National Flood Insurance Program in New England. Working with state bankers, insurance agents and government officials to prcmote the concepts of safe and proper flood plain development. Supervised staff of approximately 20. Appointed chairman of intergovernmental flood plain manage-ment task force. Established streamlined procedures for administering agency post disaster hazard reduction efforts. 1

U.S. DEPARIMENT T HOUSING AND UBBAN DEVEIDPMENT, Boston, Massachusetts Regional Director, Federal Insurance Administration, June 1974 - April 1979 Primary responsibility was the management of the flood loss reduction activities of the National Flood Insurance Program. Managed activities of between four and sixteen staff. Created new and successful means of achieving program goals with limited staff. Successfully demonstrated post-disaster hazard mitigation program that was used as national model. Housing Specialist, June 1969 - June 1974 Coordinated HUD Housing Program in several areas of  ; Massachusetts. Responsible for coordination between HUD local officials, attorneys, bankers, developers, citizens and the media. Prepared environmental impact analyses. Mediated disputes between conflicting interests. PBTESSIONAL ACTIVITIES Guest lecturer on housing, planning, emergency preparedness and environmental affairs at many institutions including Harvard University, MIT, Boston University, Hampshire College and University of Connecticut. Appeared on TV and rad!yhundreds of times. Has made professional presenta' wnn to over one thousand groups on subjects related to targency planning. SELECTED RADIOIDGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS REPORTS T i Principal author of or major contributor to:

                                       "Self-Initiated Review and Interim Finding for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Flynouth Massachusetts," dated August 4, 1987.
                                       "Analysi:s of Emergency Planning Issues at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Raised in a Petition to the Nuclear Rec'ulatory Conmission, dated July 15, 1986," dated July 29, 1987.
                                       " Current FEMA Position on Admittad Contentions on New Hampshire Plans for Seabtook," dated June 4, 1987.
                                       " Final Exercise Assessment Joint New Hampshire State and Incal Radiological Emergency Response Exercise for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant February 26,1986," dated June 2, 1986.
                                        " Analysis of Issues Related to the Evacuation Time Estimate for the Maine Yankee Nuclear PcMer Station,"

dated February 1985.

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                                                                                     ~
                                                   " Analysis of Issues Related 'to' the' Evacuation Time Estimate for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station,"

dated May, 1984.

                                                 '" Analysis of Emergency Planning Issues at Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Raised by the Massachusetts Public. Interest Research Group (MASSPIIG)," dated                                         !
                                                 - November 3,1983.

SELECTED CnHER PUBLICATIONS "The U.S.- Supreme Court and the Taking Issue" (with John Kusler, Esq.) 'in Natural Hazards Observer, September 1987

                                                   " Floodplain and Wetland Coordination" National Wetlands News-
  • letter March-April 1987
                                                   " National Flood Insurance Program" (with Alexandra Dawson, Esq.)

in Wetland, Tideland, Floodplain, and Groundwater Regulation, Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education Foundation,1986

                                                   " Legal Iending and Flood Insurance" - University of Maine Center for Real Estate Education, July 1980
                                                   " Flood Plain Management Aspects' of the National Flood Insurance .

Program" - Proceedings of the New England Rivers Conference, October 1978

                                                   " Lawyers Perspective on the National Flood Insurance Program" -

Note in Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly 1976

                                                   " Regional Policy Statement ~on Flood Plain Management in New England" - New England River Basin Commission, February 1978 (Significant Contribution to a Task Force Effort)

PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Massachusetts State Bar Massachusetts Bar Association American Bar Association Boston Bar Association I p n l

M ' ~ g BIUCE J. SWIREN Technological Hazards Program Specialist - FEDERAL D4ERGD4CY MANAGEMDJT AGDiCY REGICN I EDUCATICH M.S. Biology, University of New Hampshire 1974 B .S. ' Sciences and Humanities, Temple University, i Philadelphia, PA 1973 Professional Experience March 1987-Present Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Region I, July 1983-Dec. 1985 Boston, MA Mr. Swiren coordinated the review and evaluation of state and local emergency response planning for re-sponding to nuclear power plant accidents in New England, aid provided guidance to state and utility planners for improving their capabilities in respond-ing to a radiological emergency. Provided assistance to state and utility planners in designing exercises to test the capabilities of state and local emergency response organizations to protect the health'ard safety of the public. As the lead FENA planner for the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant, provides technical - support and has administrative responsibility for FEMA's activities on this large project. December 1985 - HMM Associates, Concord, MA - Senior Emergency Planner December 1986 Principal author of the 1986 draft Massachusetts State Plan, and associated procedutes, for responding to a nuclear power plant accide.nt at the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant. Assisted in the upgrading of the lettets of agreement in New Hanpshire's Energency Response Plan for respond-ing to an accident at the Seabrook and Vet 1tont Yankee Nuclear Power Plants 1982 - 1983  ! Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region III, Philadelphia, PA Coordinated the programmatic and field activities of the individual assistance grant program in the mid-Atlantic states under the auspices of the Federal Disaster l Relief Act, administered by FEMA. Provided guidance j and training in the application of Federal regulations to State officials. During Residentially declared disasters arranged for the deployment of disaster assistance centers in the field and supetvised the individual and family grant program.

4 Bruce J. Seiten - Page 2 1980 - 1982 Federal Emergency Management Age cy, Region III Philadelphia, PA As the lead FEMA planner for the Susquehanna and Beaver Valley Nuclear Power Plants, and the alter-nate for Three Mile Island, provided written and oral testimony to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards for the 'Ittee Mile Island and Susquehanna Plants. 1975-- 1980 United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Region III, Philadelphia, PA As Environmental Protection Specialist provided reg-ulatory and technical guidance to federal agencies, state and local governments, and the public in the areas of hazardous and solid waste disposal. As the lead program specialist to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, assisted Pennsylvania officials in the development of Pennsylvania's State Plan for the management of hazardous waste generation, storage and disposal. . Provided regulatory and technical guidance to federal agencies, state and local governments, and the public in the areas of pesticides use and disposal. Assisted state officials in the mid-Atlantic region in the development and implementation of a State level regulatory program for pesticides use and disposal. Conducted use investigations of agricultural and institutional applications of pesticides to determine the level of compliance with federal regulations. t'

l Edward A. Tanzman Energy and Environmental Programs Attorney Energy and Environmental Systems Divsion (EES) Argonne National Laboratory (N4L) Education Background j J.D. 1976, Georgetown University Law Center; special course work in legislative policymak.ing; Notes and Comments Editor of The Tax Lawyer law review i B.A. 1973, Political Science , University of Chicago, 1 with Honors in the College and in Political Science Professional Experience 1979-Present Energy and Environmental Programs Attorney Energy and Environmental Systems Division, Argonne National Laboratory 4 Provide analysis of how state and federal laws affect energy technologies, hazardous waste litigation, and possible arms control regimes. Curtent activities include: reviewing ccanpliance of state and local governments with federal nuclear power plant radiological emergency preparedness require-ments; analysis of the Soviet offsite response to the Chernobyl accident; evaluating an emergency plan to protect communities surrounding a federal facility from hypothetical toxic gas teleases fttm that facility; helping a federal agency prepare for hazardous waste litigation; and, analyzing potential legal problems created by on-site inspection to verify American ecmpliance with possible arms control treaties. Past research has included evaluating impacts of energy policies on minority groups, analysis of legal problems by the proposed Satellite Power System, studies of socioeconomic problems created by energy bcons, analysis of tegional institutional conflicts created by projected future energy growth, study of how eminent dcznain proceedings are used to acquire energy transportation corridors, analysis of federal hetardous waste regulation, and analysis of legal trends toward state regulation and taxation of the energy industry. Past experience with FEMA s radiological energency preparedness program has included participation in approximately 30 exercises of radiological energency preparedness (REP) plans. Mr. Tanzman also served as lead writer for reports of 2 of these exercises. This included consolidating all observer ccrrents for integration into the final report document. On other exercises, he served as a contributing writer. As a result of his participation in the February 1986 exercise at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, he was deposed in Docket 50-322-OL-5.

EDARD A. TANZMM ' 2 Professional Experience (Cont'd) Mr. Tanzman has also prepared regional analyses of plans and preparedness. for approval under 44 CFR 350. ' He has also served as an instructor for the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Evaluator Course at FEMA's National Emer-gency Training Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland. July 1980- Counsel, Palau National Cpngress, Republic of Palau, February 1981: U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands

                                                                           -(Leave of absence from Argonne National' Laboratory).

Served as lawyer for the legislative branch of the government of the Palau Islands (located 500 miles east of the Republic of the Philippines) during its transition from U.S. administration to constitutional republic. Responsibilities included drafting legislation, researching and writingrlegal opinions, serving as parliamentarian, providing staff nssistance to legislature officers and cmmittee chairman, and supervising a staEf of seven assistants. 1976-1979: Legislative Assistant to U.S. Senator John A. Durkin (N.H.) Responsible for Senator Durkin's Energy and Natural Resources Ccmmittee assignment. Activities included supervising a staff geologist and planner in all aspects of the Senator's Ccrnmittee work, notably debate over the President's National Energy Plan. Specific duties included hearing, markup, and floor debate preparation, legislative drafting, and constituent work. Publications: Journal Articles Tanzman, E., Constitutionality of Warrantless On-Site Arms Control Inspections in the United States, forthecming in Yale Journal of International Law (Fall 1987). Tanzman, E., Commerce Clause Limitations on State Regulation and Taxation of the Energy industry,13 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 27) (1982); also published as ANL/EES-TM-192 (July 1982) and reprinted in VII Public Utilities Law Anthology (1982-83). Tanzman E. , and B. Graham, Note, The Limits of the Section 7602 John Doe Suninons, 28 Tax Lawyer 377 (1975).

                                                                                               .)

Edwarrl Tanzman 3 Publications: Reports Tanzman, E. , .Y. Klein, E. Levine, D. Poyer, A. Teotia, D. Wernette, and R. Winter, The Impacts of the Residential Energy Tax Credit on Minorities, Department of Energy, draft report (August 18, 1983). Tanzman,' E., B. LaBrie, and K. Lerner, Overview of Hazardous Waste Management i Regulation at Federal Facilities, Argonne National Laboratory ANL/EES-TM-182 (May 1982).. Santini, D. , J. Clinch, F. Davis, L. Hill, E. Lynch, E. Tanzman, and D. Wernette, A Preliminary Evaluation of Crisis Relocation Fallout Shelter Options, Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/EES-TM-227, Volume I (March 1982) and Volune II (December 1982). Tanzman, E., and K. Lerner, An Assessment of Eminent D main as it Relates to Land Use Issues in Energy Transportation Corridors, Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/EES 'IM-194 (September 1981). Whitfield, R. , L. Habegger, E. Levine, and E. Tanzman, Environmental and Econanic Comparisons of the Satellite Power System and Six Alternative Energy Technologies, Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/EES-TM-136 (April 1981). Barisas, S., S. Ballou, P. Dauzvardis, M. Davis, M. Gabriel, J. Gasper, J. Levenson, P. Michel, W. Parker, K. Robeck, D. South, and E. Tanzman, Regional Issue Identification and Assessment, Second Annual Report - Regions V and VII, Department of Energy, review draft (January 1981). Santini, D. , E. Tanzman, and C. Hotchkiss, Education and Other Financial Problems of Areas Experiencing Energy Inducted Boom Growth, Argonne National Laboratory, ANL/AA-25 (July 1980). Wolsko, .T. , C. Brown, R. Cirillo, J. Gasper, L. Habegger, K. Hub, E. Levine, D. Newsctn, M. Samsa, E. Tanzman, J. VanKuiken, and R. Whitfield, A Preliminary Comparative Assessment of the Solar. Power Satellite (SPS) and Six Other Energy Technologies, Argonne National Laboratory, ANL-AA-20 (April 1980). Publications: Conference Papers Firgleton, D., E. Tanzman, and K. Bertram, Development of a Model Emergency Response Plan for Catastrophic Releases of Toxic Gases, presented at the 79th Annual Meeting of the Air Pollution Control Association, Minneapolis, FN, June 22-27, 1986. Tanzman, E., PURPA and Associated Federal Regulations that Impact Energy Production, presented at the University of Wisconsin - Extension professional development seminar entitled " Disposal of Municipal Refuse By Utilization As A Fuel," Madison, WI, January 16, 1985 and January 30, 1984.

Edward Tanzman 4

          .Tanzman,        E., Comunity Planning for Nuclear Power Plant Emergencies, presented                                j to the Science and Technology Ccenittee'of the Chicago Bar Association,                                           {

Chicago,IL, April 5,.1984. l g Santini, D., G. Shaw, and E. Tanzman, Fiscal Impacts of Energy Facilities on. !- County Governments: Some Implications for Revenue and Expenditure Modelling, Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Modelling and Simulation Conference, Pittsburgh, . PA,'May 1-3, 1980.

          . Presentations:                                                  ,

Tanzman, E. (Organizer and Moderator), A. Adler, M. Anderson, C. Archambeaus F. Frank, and S. Garfinkle, National Security Classification and the Individual Researcher, synposium presented at the Annual Meeting of the 'American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago, IL, February -18, .1987. Newsom, . D. , V. Wingert, J. Keller, E. Tanzman, K. Lerner, and G. Kaszynski, j

          ' Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Evaluation, presented to the National Emergency Training Institute, Emmitsburg, MD July 27-31, 1987, January 12-16, 1987, and September 15-19, 1986.

Tansman, E. Overview of Present Policy and Technology, presented to the.. Chautatqua Workshop entitled Hazardous Waste Management: Technical and Societal Issues, Argonne, II, March 26, 1986. Tanzman, E. , U.S. Supreme Court Treatment of Econcznic Problems Posed By the Energy Industry, presented to a committee of the Young Lawyers' Section of the Chicago Bar Association,1982. Donnelly, P.F .', Evans, A.E. , Kier, P. , and Tanzman, E. , Energy and Environment, presented to Northern Illinois University School of Law, November 12 and 14, 1979. Tanzman, E., Hydro and Wind, presented at the Engineering Foundation Conference on 'Ihe Systems Approach to Energy Supply and Demand Controversies, August 15, 1979 9 Tanzman, E. , National Energy Policy, presented to the Faculty Institute On Energy Planning at Argonne National Laboratory, July 23, 1979. Professional Organizations: Bar of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois District of Columbia Bar Illinois State Bar Adjunct Faculty - National Emergency Training Center, Emmitsburg, MD.

i .. CURRD4T FEMA POSITIQ104 ADMITTED 00[mNTIO1 Q4 NEW HAMPSHIRE PIANS FOR SEABROOK ("Statenent of Position") i I

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EXHIBIT A

1

             .                                . I
                                                    )
                                                    )

AffE!!p,[3 A i e 4  :

  • y 9p -,

O O 1 CURRENT FEMA POSITION ON ADMITTED CONTENTIONS ON NEW HAMPSHIRE PLANS FOR SEABROOK l l l

!m ", 3 ' .m e p

         .n-1:                           .T A B L E'  OF      CONT   E' N'T S Page

{l Rye' Contention 2 1 Hampton Falls Contention 2 2 Hampton. Falls Contention 4 3 L South Hampton Contention 1 4 Louth Hampton Contention 2 c 5 South Hampton Contention 3 , 6 South Hampton Contention 6 8: Revised Hampton Contention.III 9 Revised Hampton Contention IV. 10-21 Revised Hampton Contention VI 22-28 Revised Hampton Contention VIII 29 Kensington Contention 1 30-31 Revised Kensington Contention , 32 Revised Kensington Contention 4 33 Revise'd Kensington Contention 6 34-35 Revised Kensington Contention 10 36 NDCNP Contention RERP-2 37 . NECNP Contention RERP-8 38-39 NDCNP Contention NHLP-2 40-43 NDCNP Contention NHLP-6 44 -57 SAPL Contention 7 58-59 SAPL Contention 8 & BA 60 SAPL Contention 15 61-69 SAPL Contention 16 70 SAPL Contention- 18 71 SAPL Contention 25 72-74 Revised SAFL Contention 31 75 SAPL Contention 33 76  : SAPL Contention 34 77 SAPL Contention 37 78

1. Rye- Contention 2 The' proposed Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Rye is unworkable because' of the lack of provisions- for any means of protecting the safety of Rye's; special needs populations. Rye has at least four (4) major special ^ needs groups, not including special needs people living at home, for which no provisions are made.in the plan; and, while the plan attempts to make ' provision for Rye's special needs facilities - (5 schools), nevertheless those provisions are' inadequate. particularly with regard to transportation and sheltering. B ASIS: No Provisions in the Rye RERP for the Rannie Webster Nursing and Elderly Home. FEMA Responser FEMA and the Regional Assistance' Committee have reviewed the special facility plans submitted by the State of New Hampshire in Rev. 2.of their RERP for Seabrook, including plans for the Rannie Webster Nursing Home. The December, 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Plans indicates at

p. 67 that this section of the State Plan is adequate.,

4 9 I ss s e .

2. HAMPTON FALLS CONTENTION 2 The plan designated as Hampton Falls fails to provide reasonable assurance since it cannot provide for continuous 24-hour operation for a protracted period, of local responsibilities, as required by NUREG-0654, A.4. B ASIS: Hampton Falls has one full-time police officer. It has no RADEF I Officer or Transportation Coordinator. It has a volunteer, non governmental Fire Department, most of whose members work out of town. The Police Chief has two back-ups who are employed at other job s. There is no demonstration that the duties assigned to local authorities in Hampton Falls by t'he plan can be met on a continuous 24-hour basis, or that other resources will be available to meet these tas,xs. FEMA RESPONSE In its Dec.1986 review of Rev. 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Seabrook, FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) reviewed all municipal (EPZ) plans for their capacity to provide for 24-hour continuous operation for a protracted period. Specif-ically Planning Standard A.4 f rom FEMA-REP-1 defines this requirement. On page 6 of the Dec.1986 RAC Review of Rev. 2 Hunicipal Plans, FEMA l f ound that some key emergency response positions do not have a back-up j listed for second shift responsibilities. In Appendix A of the Hampton i Falls Plan, there are no back-up personnel listed for the positions of I Civil Defense Director, Transportation Coordinator, RADEF Officer, Police Chief, Health Of ficer, Road Agent, and Town Clerk. For the positions of i RADEF Officer and Transportation Coordinator, there are no primary desig- -; nations either. Based on these review findings, FEMA does not have assurance that the Town of Hampton Falls can implement its plan. Since Hampton Falls has indicated that it will not actively partici-pate in the planning and response for a possible accident at Seabrook Station, it is necessary to apply Planning Standard A.4 to the State's ability to fully compensate for the Town of Hampton Falls' emergency response functions. In its June 1986 RAC Review of Rev. 1 of the NH Compensatory P1an for Seabrook  : Station, FEMA found that the plans did not adequately identify the personnel to carry out the State's Compensatory Plan. The State responded to this by I indicating that a resource allocation study was being conducted to identify ' the personnel and equipment necessary to implement local and State plans, covering all functions. Rev. 2 of the NH Plans still do not contain the results of this personnel allocation study. FEMA's findings are found on page 3 of the December 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Compensatory P1an for Seabrook. Until New Hampshire develops this information as part of its planning , base, FEMA has no basis to change its determination that the State has not demonstrated that it has adequate per sonnel resources to compensate for the non-participation of Hampton Falls personnel . [See RAC Review of the Compensatory Pl an, pages; 3(A.4); 6(H.4), 7(H.10)).

l - 3. i 1

l. HAMPTON FALLS CONTENTION 4 J The Hampton Falls RERP does not adequately meet the requirements f i of 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(a)(1), 5 50.47(b)(5), 5 50.47(b)(6) and NUREG-0654 planning standard E because there are no mutually agreeable l hasis, for notification- of response organizations - and much of the )

communications equipment referred to in the Hampton Falls RERP is ' nonexistent. \ D ASIS: ! NUREG-0654 II . E .1. states that "Each organization shall establish procedures which describe mutually agreeable bases for notification of response organizations consistent with the emergency classification level 1 and action level scheme set forth in Appendix 1." (emphasis added) I Planning Standard E in general requires that procedures and the means . for . notifying local response organizations, emergency personnel and the i public have been established. The Hampton Falls Selectmen have not agreed that the ' initial point of contact in- an emergency should be the policeman on duty' or on call, as the plan states at p. II-2. Neither have they agreed that the Fire Chief should have the primary responsibility for activation of the public alerting system, as shown in the diagram at I-18. The First Chief works out of town and would not be able to fulfill that function on a continuous 24-hour basis, as required by NURSG-0654 A.4. The Selectmen are not willing to rely on volunteer firemen as back-up. Neither do the Selectmen agree that the Chairman of the Board of Selectmen should be in direct charge of all emergency operations for the Town. This gentleman is in the New Hampshire Air. National Guard and may have conflicting responsibilities. The H.F. plan states at p. 'II-4 that the initial notification is to be made to a police officer "via pocket voice pagers". The town has no such-pagers. The town also has no means of activating the alerting system as alluded to at p. II-6. The town also is not in possession of " tone alert - radio receivers" as stated at page 11-7. No Civil Defense Radio Network nor Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Services (RACES) have been provided nor identified to the town. For all the above-stated reasons, there is no basis for reasonable assurance that the local emergency response organization, emergency personnel, or the public will receive notification of an emergency. In the absence of such reasonable assurance, it cannot be assumed that the public is adequately protected. , [ Limited as to adequacy of compensatory measures and equipment]. Board Order, April 1,1986. FEMA RESPONSE: This Contention deals primarily with the ability of the town to be notified and the adequacy of the equipment to accomplish this. As discussed i above in FEMA's responses to the Motions for Kensington Contention 2 and 10 the Rockingham County Dispatch Center can provide notification to Hampton Falls over existing equipment. Additional communications equipment and the generator already purchased would further enhance this capability. l

                                                                                                                  -4.

TOWN OF ' SOUTH HAMPTON South Hampton Contention 1 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide " reasonable assurance" because, contrary, to NUREG-0654 A.3, the plan includes no written agreements referring '.to the concept of . operations or signatures . of . local agencies. 1 B ASIS :

                                         . Although a signature page was provided in the September. 1984 draft of . the. South Hampton RERP, it has row been . eliminated.                  No agreements with ,' the town's teachers, or voluntary town workers. ' have -

H been obtained.. [ Limited . as to locs) agencies having an emergency response role within the EPZ) Board Order, 4/1/E 6. p EM,ARESPONSE: This Contention deals primarily with the deficiency noted in FEMA's June 2,1986 RAC Review of Revision 1 of New Hampshire's Seabrook planning regarding letters of agreement with towing companies. In the -December 15, i 1986 RAC Review of Revision 2, FEMA found this deficiency- to have been adequately corrected. *

 ..                                                                                                                     \

5. SOUTH HAMPTON CONTENTION 2 The RERP .for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance because contrary to NUREG-0654 A.4 the town lacks the capacity for twenty-four hours continuous operation for a protracted period. BASIS: All town personnel are volunteers, with insufficient backup to provide twenty-four hour coverage. This is true of both the police and fire departments, where even the chiefs are part-time, and many officers are not available because of other jobs. [ As modifies to provide "for twenty-four hour continuous operation for a necessary protracted period after declaration of any emergency"), Board Order 4 /1/86. FEMA RESPONSE in its Dec.1986 review of Rev. 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plans for Seabrook, FEMA and the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) reviewed all municipal (EPZ) plans for their capacity to provide for 24-hour continuous operation for a protracted period. Spee. i f-ically Planning Standard A.4 from FEMA-REP-1 defines this requirement. On 'page 6 of the Dec.1986 RAC Review of Rev. 2 Municipal Plans, FEMA f ound that some key emergency response positions do not have a back-up lis+nd for second shift responsibilities, in Appendix A of the South Hampton P1ar., there are no back-up personnel listed for the positions of Transpor-tation Coordinator, RADEF/ Health Officer, Town Clerk, and Highway Agent. Based on these review findings, FEMA does not have assurance that the Town of South Hampton can implement its plan. . Since South Hampton has indicated that it will not actively partici-pate in the planning and response for a possible accident at Seabrook Station, it is necessary to apply P1 anning Standard A.4 to the State's ability to fully compensate for the Town of South Hampton's emergency response functions. In its June 1986 RAC Review of Rev.1 of the NH Compensatory P1an for Seabrook Station, FEMA found that the plans did not adequately identify the personnel to carry out the State's Compensatory Plan. The State responded to this by indicating that a resource allocation study was being conducted to identify the personnel and equipment necessary to implement local and State plans, covering all functions. Rev. 2 of the NH Plans still do not contain the results of this personnel allocation study. FEMA's findings are found on page 3 of the December 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Compensatory P1an for Seabrook. Until New Hampshire develops this information as part of its planning base, FEMA has no basis to change its determination that the State has not demonstrated that it has personnel resources to compensate for the non-participation of South Hampton personnel . [See RAC Review of the Compensatory Pl an, pages; 3(A.4), 6(H.4), 7(H.10).

i 6. SOUTH HAMPTON CONTENTION 3 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance because, contrary to NUREG-0654 C.4, it contains no letters of agreement from voluntary police officers , voluntary firemen , other emergency workers, school teachers, transportation companies and bus drivers. It also contains no agreements from Midway Excavators and personnel at the Tweksbury Pond Campground. B ASIS: The number of available personnel at the Tweksbury Pond Campground , which has a peak population of 1,500 (about twice that of , the size of the town) is exaggerated. i [i,imited as to agreements with Transportation companies and midway excavators] board Order, 4 /1/86. FEtiA RESPONSE : FEtiA has addressed South Hampton Contention 3 and its basis that the South Hampton plan contains no letters of agreement with transportation companies or with Midway Excavators by applying P1 anning Standards A, C and J (Evaluation Criteria A.3,C.4.J.10.g, and J.10/k) in FEt1A-RE P-1. The December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans reflects FEliA's views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review comments on the New Hampshire State plan on this issue are provided on pages 74, 74-b, and 85 of Section 1, on page 1 of the letters of agreement subsection of Section IV, and on page 50 of the Compensatory Plan subsection of Section IV. F EMA's review comments on the municipal plans on this issue are provided on pages - 5 and 6 of Section 11. FEt1A relied upon the following documents in forming its conclusions on this issue: Revision 2 to the New Hampshire State plan; Revision 2 to the municipal plans. The letters of agreement with transportation companies are present in Volume 5 of the State plan, and the RAC concluded that the letters are ade-quate. The South Hampton plan does not itself contain copies of letters of agreement with transportation companies. However, they are incorporated by reference. Appendix D of the South Hampton plan is a cross-reference index to appropriate sections of the plan where descriptive material applicable to specific NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 Criteria elements are found. For those criteria elements pertaining to letters of agreement (i.e., A.3 and C.4), Volume 5 of the New Hampshire State plan is referenced (page D-1, Appendix D of South Hampton plan). The letters of agreement with transportation companies are present in Volume 5 of the State plan. The RAC has concluded that the letters of agreement are sufficient to provide enough buses and drivers (see December 15, 1986 RAC review pages 74 and 74-b of Section 1, and page 1 of Letters of Agreement subsection of l

7. SOUTH HA W TON CONTENTION 3 (conti. ) L

                                          'Section IV). However, in the case of complete' evacuation it would be

( -necessary to use' drivers provided by the Teamsters local no. 633, and it' might be necessary to use.some of the military vehicles listed in Apendix'C of Vol'. 2 of the. State plan. The total number'of buses providable under the

                                              ' letters of agreement are slightly .in excess of the number ' required.for full evacuation. The; approximate equality of buses and bus 1 requirements in the most severe emergency implies that any problems in getting buses'from. companies
                                            .to communities could exhaust bus company resources, requiring use of the National' Guard. The Teamsters.will have to provide drivers to those bus companies without' enough drivers 'for their buses. A letter of agreement with Teamsters Local 'No. 633 is provided in Volume 5 of the. State plan. In : FEMA's Aprils l5, 1987, Affidavit' in Opposition to Summary Disposition of Certain Contentions,
                                               ' item 31 of that document, FEMA noted that there 'were not any assurances that                 -i
                                             'the employers of the Teamsters drivers made available by that lctter of agree-ment will be willing to allow them to leave their jobs to respond to an emergency.

There is no letter of agreement with Midway Excavating' Company 'in either the South Hampton plan or the State plan,.even though it is listed as a con-tractor in- Appendix C'(page.C-3) of the South Hampton plan. The listing of Midway Excavating as a potential resource for the Highway Department implies that this contractor could be used for assisting in the removal of impediments to evaceation. Even though Midway Excavating Company may not be available to the town of South Hampton, it appears that there would be sufficient other resources available from the State to remove impediments to evacuation. Letters of agreement' between the State and 16 other towing companies are.present in Volume 5 of the State plan. Because of these letters of agreement, the J

                                                 ; listing of equipment provided in Appendix C of Volume.2 of the State plan, the discussion of State DOT highway maintenance equipment in section 2.6.5 of the State' plan, the RAC concluded that the plans adequately treated the issue          ,

of resources for removing impediments to evacuation (see page 85 of RAC review -! of State plan, Section I). f i 1 L L I i

8. TOWN OF; SOUTH HAMPTON' South Hampton Contention 6 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance because, contrary to NUREG-0654 H.3, the town of South Hampton does - , not .have a EOC capable for use in directing and controlling response functions. B ASIS: The plan describes the South Hampton EOC as located . in the fire station , states that it.. has ample space to accommodate all key _ town officials , and . a generator to supply backup power. The town does not have an EOC. and the location pictured (the fire station) does not have adequate accommodations, especially in the winter, and it has neither a generator not the. two-way radio communications with the school or with

                     ' State Civil Defense 'as indicated in the plan.

FEMA RESPONSE: This Contention deals with the adequacy of the town's- E0C for directing and controlling, response functions. The town's fire station should make a suitable E0C, when fitted with the generator and communications equipment l already purchased and-available according to affadviti submitted by the applicant and the State of New Hampshire, j f 3 j

                                                                                                           ]

9. REVISED HAMPION COtEEtCION III TO REVISION 2 The Evacuation Time Estimate Study (ETE) prepared by KLD Associates. Inc.. Revision 2 Volume 6, is based upon inaccurate and biased factual data and unreasonable or misleading assumptions, falls to comply with NRC regulations, and fails to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken, or that adequate facilities , equipment , or personnel will be provided to the Town of Hampton, in .the event of radiological emergency. 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1), (b)(1)(10); NUREG-0654', App.4. FEMA RESPONSE: The validity of the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associatas and incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the following Contentions: Hampton Revised Contention III SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Revised Contention 31 SAPL Contention 34 - SAPL Contention 37 At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, cifically evaluating them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. The  ! RAC found the ETEs sufficiently complied with the guidance contained in Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate - basis for protective action decision-making. FEMA concurs in that view. ,- The views of the RAC were expressed in further detail in the D3cember 15, 1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP. The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing is Dr. Thomas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed the ETEs and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards i set forh in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1 Rev. 1. The NRC statf has consulted I with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony. I l I i I

                        .                                                                                              10.

TOWN OF HAMPION REVISED COfCEICION IV 'IO REVISION ~2 Revision 2 fails to provide for adequate emergency equipment, fails to demonstrate that adequate protective responses can be implemented in the event of radiological emergency, and fails to correct deficiencies in emergency response capabilities apparent ' from the emergency exercise . 10 C.R.R. I 50.47(1)(6)(10)(14). BASIS: The bases for Contention IV set forth in CONTENTIONS OF THE TOWN OF !!AMPTON TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON NEW HAMPSHIRE NOVEMBER. 1985, anc revised Contention IV set forth in CONTENTIONS OF THE TOWN OF HAMPTON TO REVISED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN AND TO COMPENSATORY PLAN FOR THE TOhN OF HAMPTON. NEW HAMPSHIRE are herebv- realleged anc incorporated by reference herein . B ASIS: NUREG requires that each ' local RERP include written agreements with any organization serving an emergency response role within the emergency planning zone. NUREG, page 32(3). The State has entered into three agreements with transportation companies to provide buses and vans to the Town of Hampton in the event of evacuation. Under the Compensatory Plan , however, only two bus companies will provide the transportation for Hampton in the event of emergency. Compensatory Plan, page 7A-24. The transportation provided to the Town of Hampton under the Compensatory Plan and Revised RERP fail to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protective measures mandated by 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47( A)(1) for the' following reasons: . FEMA RESPONSE FEMA has addressed Hampton Revised Contention IV and its basis of inadequate evacuation transportation resources for residents, transients, and those with special needs, by applying Planning Standards A, C, J, and O (Evaluation Criteria A.3, A.4, C.4, J.9, J.10.j, and 0.4) in FEMA-REP-1. The December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans re-flect FEMA's views on this issue. Specifically, the RAC's review camients on the New Hampshire State plan on this issue are provided on pages 10, 64, 74, 7 4 -a , 74 -b , 74 -c , 12 7, 128, and 129 of Section I, and on page 1 of the Letters i of Agreement subsection of Section IV, and on pages 3 and 49 of the Canpensatory Plan subsection of Section IV. The RAC review camients on the municipal plans on this issue are provided on page 17 of Section II. y The PAC relied upon the following documents in forming its conclusions on this issue: Revision 2 to the New Hampshire State Plan; Revision 2 to the municipal plans. )

11.- n TOWN OF HAMPION' REVISED CON'IENTION IV TO REVISION 2. (Cont.)' L .Because of the need for resolution and clarification of-several

         -            items, FEMA does not yet-have complete assurance of_the adequacy of
                     , evacuation transportation' resources.and procedures.
                             'Fesponses to specific portions of Hampton Revised Contention.IV' are provided below.-

( A). Under the Compensatory Plan, the Berry Bus Company. shall provide

                     'the Ibwn of Hampton.with 40 buses. Page 7A-24. lUnder the terms of the letter of' Agreement with Berry Bus, however, see attached Berry Bus. is only obligated'to provide 31 buses in the :. vent of emergency, or.9 fewer buses than even the State acknowledges are necessary in the event of radiological emergency.

FD1A RESK)NSE: ( A) The letter of Agreement with Berry Transportation Company dated 8/7/86, located in W1ume 5 of the State Plan, indicates that it can provide approximately-62 buses and 9 drivers during an emergency. However, the buses from Berry Transportation: Company are not specifically assigned to provide transportation for the Ibwn of Hampton. As 'noted'in the RAC Review (page'1 of Letters of' Agreement subsection of Section IV), the State appears to have eliminated the. prior allotment of buses to cmmunities in its compensatory plan and in letters of agreement. : The RAC has con-cluded that, overall, the ntsnbers of buses and drivers available according to the letters of agreements are sufficient for the needs of Hampton and other cmmunities (see RAC Review pages 74, 74-a , 74-b, 74-c ' of Section 1, and page 1 of Letters of Agreement subsection of Section IV). (B) The - Compensatory Plan provides ' only one bus' to evacuate Aslan's Pride School,- Happy Apple Nursery , and the Taylor School emergency. Compensatory Plan, page 7A-7. Rather then provide a van to evacuate each of these schools in the. event of emergency, the Compensatory Plan therefore requires a single bus driver to maneuver i through heavy evacuation ' traffic '.an to proceed to each of the three schools to evacuate the children. SubstantirJ delay, if not impossibility, of requiring c single bus driver to evacuate three schools is unreasonable knd would likely result in substantial delay in removing these children from the EPZ.

                                                                                                             )

rmA RESPONSE

                        -(B)     The revised plan (see page IV-34 of Hampton Plan, Wlume 18) indicatep separate evacuation vehicles (vans) for Aslan's Pride , School, and the Taylor School. Happy Apple Nursery referenced in the contention, is not listed as one of the special f acilities in Hampton.

__ _ - - 1

a 12. 10%N OF HAMPIDN REVISED CDtEDCION IV 70 REVISION 2 (Cont.) (C) The . Compensatory Plan and the Revised Hampton RERP acknowledge that 23 emergency and special neede vchicles will be recuired to evacuate the Town in the event of emergency. Compensatory Plan, , page 7A-7: Revised Hampton RERP, page !!-3.0. The letter agreements  ! for Hampton's transportation needs, however, fail to ellocate a single emergency or special needs vehicle for the Hampton population. l FEKA RESPCGrE: (C) The revised State and Hampton local plans indicate the estimated need for two (2) special needs buses, six (6) bus conversion kits, f our (4 ) vans, and tw: (2) reclining seat coaches for the Tcwn of Hampton- (see Appendix I, page I-3 of Valume 2 of State Plan, and

                                . pace IV-34 of Town of Hampton Plan), in addition to 77 regular school buses. These vehicles will be provided for Hampton from the resource pool of bJses and EMS vehicles documented by letters of agreement in \blume 5 of the State Plan. The provision of these
                                . vehicles will be coordinated by the Bnergency Medical Services (EMS)

Coordinator located in the State EOC. (See EMS Coordinator Proce-dures in vblume 4B of State Plan). The RAC has concluded that there are adequate letters of agreement to account for the estimated needs of buses and ambulances (see page 10 of RAC Review, Section I). . (D) The Revised Hampton RERP does not p; ovide transportation fo.- any vacationers, transients or other non-resident individuals who may lack their own transportation and may be present in the Town at the timt of emergency. In view of the substantial number of tourists and -i transients coming to Hampton throughout the year, and particularly during the summer months, it is only reasonable to assume that a sfrnificant number of additional public transportation vehicles will be required to promptly carry out an evacuation. FEMA PESPCGSE (D) As noted on pages 11-28 and 11-29 of the Hampton Plan, transients l without access to shelters or vehicles in which they may evacuate when sheltering has been recmmended will be provided for by the i Public Works Director who will provide transportation for those transients to a suitable sheltering location. If evaccation has been recommended, the plan also states that each municipality has provisions for evacuating residents, including transients. In add-ition-, the State is prepared to provide emergency transportation resources to those communities that have exhausted the local response capability. ibwever, the RAC has concluded that the issue of the l adequacy of transportation for transients will remain open pending infomation to be supplied by the State on the number of transients needin; transprrtati - (see FM Review cf element J.9 On page 64

4 13.

       'IOW OF HAMPION REVISED CON'rENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont.)

of State plan ' review, Section I; and page 17 of local plan review, Section II).  ! (E) Under the Compensatory Plan, the Timberlane Bus Company of Salem , New Hampshire shall provide the Town of Hampton with 35 buses in the event of emergency. Salem is located approximately 40 miles from the Town of . Hampton. Since under the Revised Hampton RERP, individuals evacuated from Hsmpton will be taken to Nashua, immediately adjacent to . Salem, Revised RERP, page II-17, the Timberlane buses

 .       attempting to reach Hampton for evacuation purposes will be required to                              9 maneuver through evacuation traffic leaving Hampton. The likelihood of                               l substantial delay, if not impossibility , of evacuation vehicles reaching Hampton therefore raises significant questions on the feasibility of the evacuation transportation provided to the Town under its Revised RERP. .

The Revised Hampton RERP therefore fails to provide . reasonable assurance of prompt access for emergency vehicles to the EPZ and fails to ' consider the potential impediments of evacuation traffic in promptly providing evacuation vehicles to the Town. NUREG-0654, page 63. FEMA RESPONSE (E) The August 1986 Letter of Agreement between, the State and the Timberlane Transportation Ccrnpany of Salem, which is located in Volume 5 of the State Plan, indicates that approximately 40 buses and 40 drivers will be available during an~ emergency. These buses are not specifically assigned to provide transpor-tation for the 'Ibwn of Hampton. As noted in the RAC Paview (page 1 of Letters of Agreement subsection of Section IV), the State appears to have eliminated the prior allotment of buses to ccmnunities in the Compensatory Plan and in letters of ~ agreement. 'Ihe RAC has concluded that, overall, the numbers of buses and drivers available according to the letters of agreement are sufficient ~for the needs of Hampton and other communities (see RAC Review pages 74, 74-a , 74-b, 74-c of Section I, and page 1 of Letters of Agreement subsection of Section IV). However, further clarification is still needed regarding the availability of teamsters from their employers during work hours. It should also be noted that Nashua is no longer a host ccmnunity for Hampton, as referenced in the con-tention. Individuals evacuated from Hampton will be taken to the Reception Center in Ebver. By way of further basis: (A) Onergency Fesources and Equipment. l L

14. TOW OF HAMP' ION REVISED COtEENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont. ) Revision 2 fails to allocate adequate buses or EMS vehicles to the Town of Hampton to reasonably support an evacuation on grounds including:

1. The State indicates that the bus companies under Letter Agreement will provide 553 buses and 490 drives to support an evacuation in the event of radiological emergency. Vol. 4 App. I-1 and 2. These figures arc inaccurate and misleading. Many of the buses to be provided by a particular bus company lack Eufficient drives T.nd, conversely, other bus companies are prepared to provide drivers, but have no buses for them to drive. Id. FEMA correctly notes that only " bus-an d-driver pair s" under agreement should be counted to determine the maximum number of emergency vehicles available to support. an evacuation. FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/66, at p. 39. The state , however, can  !

only demonstrate 541 bus-and-driver pairs, Vol. 4 App.1-1 and 2, or 13 , bus / driver pairs less than the 444 necesscry minimum rcquired to carry out an e vacu ation , Vol. 4, App. I-5, even using the State's own unreasonably low EPZ population figures. FDiA RESPONSE:

1. The RAC has concluded that, although there are numerous inconsis- ,

tencies in bus needs estimates, overall the numbers of buses and drivers available according to the Letters of Igreement in Volume 5 of the State Plan are sufficient (see pages 74, 74-a, 74-b, 74-c of RAC Peview of State Plan Section I, and page 1 of Letters of Agreement subsection of Section IV). . As indicated on page 74 of the RAC Review (Section I), the Air National Guard, National Gaard and DOT vehicles are listed in volume 2, App. C. School buses are listed in Volume 2, App. I which lists capability of 574 buses but only 446 bus and driver pairs available at bus ccrnpanies to affect evacuation. The 574 buses listed plus the private vehicles of the persons in the EPZ plus the reserve resources of the Air National Guard, Army, and Highway Eepartment totalling 851 vehicles offer a large reduncancy of resources. As further described on page 74-b of the RAC Review (Section I), the " Transportation Pesources Requirements" totals from Vbl. 2, Rev. 2 - 8/86, page 1-3, indicate that the bus requirements are well in excess of the number of bus ccrupany drivers that have agreed to drive, but somewhat less than the number of buses avail-able according to the letters of Agreement. The Plan properly allows for the f act that not all bus ccznpanies have as many drivers willing to serve as they have buses that would be made available. A letter of Igreement with Teamsters

15. TOW OF IWFION P1 VISED COtEEtEION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont.) Incal tb. 633 of New Hampshire provides for the Incal to provide as many as 1,500 personnel, a value well in excess of any foresee-able needs.

2. The bus-and-driver pairs under Letter Agreement with the State represent an " absolute maximum," FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, S/2/86, at p. 39, and do not provide reliable figures to measure available . j evacuation buses or personnel. FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment.

6/2/86, App. I at p. 233. Both common sense and conversations between FEMA and the bus companies indicate that in fact the actual bus-and-driver availability would be substantially less than as specified in the. Letter Agreements, id, . which could reasonably be expected to be reduced by reason of bus breakdown, driver unavailability, drivers who may get lost enroute to the EPZ, or who may become imbedded in outgoing evacuation traffic thereby substantially delaying or prohibiting a driver from timely reaching the EPZ. RAC Review , August, 1986, Section VI, p.12. FEMA RES10NSE

2. See response to Item #1 above.
3. In an apparent effort to address FEMA's concerns on the inadequacy of available personnel and transportation resources, the State -

has entered into an agreement with the Teamsters Union, apparently for the purpose of providing additional bus drivers for evacuation. Vol. 4 App . 1-11. Revision 2, however, fails to demonstrate that the Teamsters under. agreement are in fact adequately trained to drive the school buses and emergency vehicles for the mobility impaired to properly effectuate an ( evacuation , fails to specify how these backup drivers promptly will be { notified and coordinated with available buses, and fails to support the j purported agreement with the Teamsters with Letter Agreements executed 4 by the individual members of this union. FEMA RESPONSE:

3. The Istter of Nreement with Teamsters Iocal No. 633 is present in Wlume 5 of the State Plan and documents the Union's agreement to provide approximately 1,500 personnel to drive transportation vehicles as needed during emergencies. In regard to training, the 6/2/86 agreement between the State and the Teamsters indicates that "the thw Hampshire Civil Defense Nency will provide training to the I.ocal 633 l

o . 16. TOW OF HAMPTON REVISED COtEEtEION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont.) membership regarding potential emergencies in New Hampshire." The State training program is described in Section 3.2 of the State Plan. As' indicated on page 3.2-6 of the State Plan, NHCDA will provide annual instruction to the' drivers of bus and ambulance transportation resources. The training will consist of "an overview of the RERP and emergency response organization, notification, emergency classification. levels, protective actions, location of staging areas, basic radiation concepts, and radiological exposure control, including the use of dosimeters" (pages 3.2-7 and 3.2-9 of State Plan). Although the RAC had no specific coments on the training program for bus drivers, Planning Standard O (Radiological Ehergency Response Training) was rated as adequate by the RAC (pages 127,128, and 129 of Section 1. of State Plan review). No details were found in the plan as to how Teamsters' bus drivers will be notified and coordinated with available buses. However, there is a contact person for 71eamsters local No.633 and telephone nmber listed on page 1-11 of Appendix 1 of NHCDA Procedures in

                                                                                         \blume 4 of the State Plan. Although the procedure for the EOC A3 sources Coordinator- (Wlume 4 State Plan) and the Director of Pupil Transportation Safety (Voltrne 4B State Plan) intlicate that they will request bus empanies to conduct a fleet inventory and driver avail-ability poll, no other procedures could be found which describe how individual Teamrters drivers are contacted and matched with available buses which require drivers. Although the RAC did not coment on this in its review, this information should be provided in the plan        ,

to ensure that Teamsters' drivers can be contacted, mobilized and matched with available buses in a timely manner. (B) Emergency Exercise. The February 26 exercise only confirmed the consistent position of the Town of Hampton and other interveners that evacuation of the EPZ around Seabrook Station is not feasible and that the personnel and equipment allocated to support an emergency response are inadequate. For example , the State could not satisfy even the limited demand for buses of communities participating in the exercise, FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, p. 40, could not provide adequate EMS or ambulance service, FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, pp. 42, 44, no buses were allocated for summertime employees, RAC Review, August 1986 Section VI at p. 9, the State failed to demonstrate that adequate backup buses were available to support an evacuation, FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/86, p. 4 2, and the State did not allocate transportation for those individuals who may have a vehicle in the household, yet the vehicle may be unavailable i

I l 17. I I TOW 4 OF HAMPION REVISED CDNTDCION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont.) l at the time of an emergency. RAC Review, August 1986, Section I,

p. 71. Revision 2 fails to correct these anc related deficiencies.

Additionally, if the State was unable to reasonably carry out e limited and' preplanned evacuation exercise, with no requirement for coordination with Massachusetts, and in the dead of winter, an actual evacuation of the summertime beach population is wholly unrealistic and unworkable. FD4A RESPONSE: (B) The Final Exercise Assessment of the Februa:y 26, 1986 Exercise

                              . documented many deficiencies in the State's ability to provide evacuation trarisportation resources in a prompt and coordinated manner. Remedial actions to correct these deficiencies will have to be successfully demonstrated in a future exercise.

(C) Special Needs Population. Revision 2 calculates the special needs population for the Town of Hampton based upon an " annual survey." Vol. 18, p. 11-30. This

                      " annual survey" is in fact a mere " postage paid mail back card" sent out by the State purportedly to all persons residing within Hampton.             Id.

Less than 2 percent of the Town responded. Vol . 18, p. IV-34. The survey is a grossly inadequate vehicle to compute the special needs and transit dependent populations of the Town of Hampton and unreasonably places the burden upon handicapped, mobility-impaired, and other transit dependent or special needs individuals: to affirmatively request transportation or be ignored under the State's emergency plan. The State itself recognized the inadequacy of its own survey since it increased by 50 percent the transportation allocation for the special needs populations for all towns, in view of the "small sample sizes" received  ! from each community. RAC Review. August.1986, Section VI, p. 6. As l the RAC pointed out, however, no statistical justification has been  ! provided by the State for this 50 percent increase. Id at p. 5. The special needs populations for the Town of Hampton, and for other EPZ towns, therefore represent an unknown quantity for evacuation planning. (C) The RAC Review indicates that there needs to be clarification in the Plan on the basis for determining the number of people in the EZP ccr.1munities requiring transportation during an evacuation. The i RAC Review also indicates that numerous inconsistencies need to be resolved. The RAC Review (page 74-a of Section I) noted that the special needs survey of transit dependent residents is different frcrn the telephone survey which was used for ccraputation in the _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ l

18. I: TOW OF HAMPTON REVISED COtTTENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont.) Evacuation Time Estimates (ETE) Study. The special needs survey gives the' lowest ntsnber of residents requiring transportation. There are some very large' differences in special needs survey estimates of requirements by community (see. W 1. 4, Rev. 2 - 8/86, pages 18B-2 through 18B-27) and the ETE telephone survey estimates (see Table 11-7, W1. 2) . The Plan should state the basis of its use of~a particular set of numbers, give date when the estimates were developed, and explain whether and why those numbers take precedence over any'other set of numbers which were constructed for essentially the same purpose. The plan reviewers do not now have enough information to judge the accuracy or priority of a given set of numbers. Specific caninents on Volume 6 (ETE Study) will be provided by an expert witness to be sponsored by.the NRC. (D) Compensatory Plan. FEMA has recommended that the State Compensatory Plan be revised "to anticipat_e. the non-participation of any of the local jurisdictions in the Seabrook plume EPZ." FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment,- 6/2/86, p. 44. Based upon the FEMA- . recommendation , and from the avowed non-participation of the Town of Hampton and numerous other towns within the EPZ to impicment the NHRERP, the State has promulgated a compensatory plan consisting of only five pages. Vol. 2, App. G. As presently drafted, the Compensatory Plan wholly fails to allocate adequate personnel, equipment , or resources to implement an evacuation on - grounds including:

1. The plan erroneously assumes the- cooperation and participation of Hampton school officials, although no letter agreements-confirming this participation have been obtained . Vol . 2, App. G-2.

LEMA RESPONSE: (D) Appendix G of Wlume 2 of the State Plan does not represent the total State Canpensatory Plan, but only represents and outline of the concept of operations. The details of how the Canpensatory Plan operates have been incorporated into the plan procedures (Volumes 4, 4A, and 4B) .

b .. 19. 3 TOW OF HAMPTON REVISED CONTENTION IV y REVISION 2 ~ (Cont.)

1. -It is' correct that' the Compensatory Plan assumes the cooperation
                      .of.Hampton School officials in implementing their response plans and in providing information on school attendance (page G-2 of Appendix G to volume 2 of ' State Plan). .It is also correct that the plan contains no letters of agreement with Hampton School officials confirming this cooperation. Ibwever, FEMA REP-1 does-not name letters of agreement with school officials since schools.

are considered public agencies.

2. ' A' side from ' vague reference to the coordination of " law enforcer:ient setivities and traffic control," Vol. 2,. . App. G-3, the compensatory plan whol!y fails to specify where. this additional . 7 law enforcement personnel will be obtained .to make up for those ' local police who will not~ participate in the implementation of the NHRERP, including the Hampton Police Department. Either the plan erroneously assumes local participation 'in the face of the express vote of the Town of' Hampton not to so participate, or the plan relies upon the inadequate number of personnel in. State Police Troop A to carry out local law enforcement duties. With its 35 troopers, however, Troop A does not even have sufficient ' personnel to staff access control points for the EPZ, as
             . required under Revision 2, let klone take over the traffic mcnagement and security duties presently assigned to Hampton and other local police departments.        FEMA , Fins) Exercice Assessment , 6/2/86 Et p. 4f.

FEMA RESPONSE:

2. The New Hampshire State Police Troop A procet'ures include prcy-visions to nobilize additional personnel to compensate for municipalities that may be unable to respond to the emergency.

As noted in the procedures for the Troop A IED Representative (page 6, step #6, Troop A Procedures in Voltane 4B of State Plan),

                        "If additional personnel and equipment are required, contact the State Iblice EOC Liaison to initiate state police alerting -

procedures to call in troopers from other parts of the State." The procedures also indicate that if still further assistance is required, the State EOC representative is to.be contacted to request support from other State resources. The RAC Review-indicated that this revised procedure was adequate (see page 49 of Compensatory Plan subsection of Section IV). The procedure for mobilizing additional support, therefore, appears to be adequate, although the adequacy of overall resources still requires resolution. For example, the State indcated (page 3 of Compensatory Plan subsection of Section IV of RAC Review) that "A resource allocation study is currently being conducted. This study will (1) identify the personnel and equignent  ! j required to implement the local and State plans and procedures 1

. ')

20. 1

          'IO9N OF HAMP' ION REVISED COtTTENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont.)

4 and (2) assure. that adequate. resources are available to cover L all emergency functions. Once this study is complet:1, rosters j j and equipment lists in the plans and procedures will be reviewed ' and updated according.to the results of this analysis." i The'RAC concluded that the adequacy of~ resources depends on the. l outccrae of the cited study. (E) Transit Dependent Individuals. Revision 2 adopts a " concept of pre-designated bus routes" to evacuate - transit dependent residents and transients Section I, without private p. 73. transportation . RAC Review. August.1966_. Apparently this procedure has been adopted to purportedly increase the speed of evacuation, by eliminating the need for door to door pick ups of-l transit dependent individuals as provide din the prior NHRERP. These pre-designated . bus routes, however, will require individuals, including the " mobility-impaired ' " to leave their homes during a radiological emergency, to locate the pre-designated bus routes, and to remain outdoors subject to increased radiological exposure, awaiting evacuation buses which FEMA has already indicated may reasonably be expected not to . arrive. FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/16, at p. 40. ThTs procedure unreasonably compromises the public health and will not radiation injury. adequately protect the Hampton population- from Additionally, the transportation allocated for the Town- of Hampton under Revision 2. Vol. 18 .p. 34, does not include buses for the substantial number of transients, including the beach population. Vol. 4 App. I-8. , FEMA RESPONSE (E) The concept of pre-designated bus routes for the evacuation of residents and transients without transportation does not eliminate the need for door-to-door pickups for " mobility-impaired" indi-viduals with special needs. As indicated on page II-31 of the Hampton Plan, the Public Works Director is responsible for main-taining a current listing of the residents that require evacuation by special. vehicle or that require physical help to evacuate.

                   'Ihe Public Works Director is responsible for ensuring transpor-tation is provided for these people. As indicated in the Hampton Plan (page II-31), the transportation requirements are transmitted to the town IFO local liaison for assignment and dispatch of the.

appropriate transportation resources. As noted in the Public Works Directors' procedures (page IV-32 Hampton Plan), town emergency workers will be assigned to report to the homes or other locations of people with special needs to assist them in

21. M OF_ M N REVISED COtEENTION IV TO REVISION 2 (Cont. ) .. boccding vehicles. Directions will also be provided for EMS vehicles reporting to homes of people requiring ambulance transport. Should tom officials not participate, these activities would be performed by the State under the Compensatory Plan. In regard to the adequacy of transportation for transients in Hampton, see the previous FEMA response to Item "(D)" of the original

                       -                      basis of Hampton Contention #4.

9 O

22. REVISED HAMPION CONTENTION VI E REVISION 2 Revision 2' fails to demonstrate that adequate personnel are available to respond. or to augment their initial response on a continuous basis, in ,_ the event of radiological emergency. 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(1)(10). BASIS: The bases for Contention VI set forth in CONTENTIONS OF THE TOWN OF HAMPTON TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGEMCY RESPONSE PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON. NEW HAMPSHIRE. NOVEMBER, 1985, and Ievisec Contention VI set forth in CONTENTIONS OF THE TOWN OF-HAMPTON TO REVISED RADIOLOGICAL' EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN AND TO COMPENSATORY PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON. NEW HAMPSHIRE, are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference herein (see p. 3). FEMA RESPONSE This contention, taken overall, concerns the capacity for the Town of Hampton and the State to provide sufficient personnel resources to support an initial and on-going emergency response. The requirement is defined in Planning Standard A.4 of FEMA-REP-1. In the December 1986 RAC review of the REY. 2 Municipal plans, on page' 6, FEMA found that some key emergency response ~ positions do not have ~ any back-up for second shift response. Apendix A of the Hampton Plan does not show any alternates for the positions of Civil Defense Director, RADEF Of ficer, and Health Of ficer. In addition, the Town Manager is listed as the incumbent official for three emergency response positions, those being Town fianager, Civil Defense Director, and Health Officer. Based on these review findings, FEMA does not have assurance ~ that the Town of Hampton can implement its plan. Since Hampton has indicated that it will not actively participate in the planning and response for a possible accident at Seabrook Station, it is necessary to apply Planning Standard A 4 to the State's ability to fully compensate for the Town, of Hampton's emergency response functions. The same comments apply here as for the Contentions South Hampton 2 Kensington 1, and Hampton Halls 2. FEMA's responses to the specific basis contained in this Contention are as follows: i 1 l 1 l J l

hWPION VI - (Cont. ) . _ . (A) Revision 2 provides that 28 local traffic guards are required for the Town of Hampton and Hampton Beach, Vol. 6, p, 8-11, although the  ; Hampton Police Department only has a total of 24 full time officers in the entire force. Vol. 18, p. IV-41. Even adopting the State's implicit, and unreasonable, assumption that the entire Hampton police force would be immediately available to respond' to a radiological emergency, the force simply does not have adequate personnel to man the traffic control points, j Vol. 6, p. 8-11, Vol. 18, p. IV-43, to provide EOC security, Vol. 18,

p. IV-42, to provide security patrols throughout the Town, Vol. 18,
p. IV-43, to provide those people within Hampton at the time of emer-gency with backup public alerting, Vol.18, IV-41, or to close and patrol I the town beaches. Vol. 18A App. G-3.  ;

l FEMA RESPONSE f Basis A (Rev. 2) - This basis asserts that the town's 24 full-time police officers are rot sufffcient to perform all the duties assigned to them. Since the town has indicateo that it will not commit its full or part-time police officert (which together are sufficient to perform all assigned emergency response functions), and the State has committed to compensate for local emergency response responsibilities (Volume 2, Appendix G of State Plan), this basis is without merit. r

                     ,          (B) In an effort to compensate for the lack 'of local personnel to adequately respond to a radiological emergency, Revision 2 provides that tM New Hampahlre Stste Police will provide " assistance to local police departments for litw enforecroeat and traffic control." Vol. 1, p . 1,3-20, c

State Police Trcop A is the only Stafo Police force in reasonable proximity . f to the EPL Shtec ' Troop A , however, has only 35 troopers, and 44 - p" officers are required to staff the eccess contral points for the EPZ, FEMA has propshly couctuded that Troop ' A does not even have sufficient personncd for eccess control, FEMA, Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/86,

p. 46. ~ Necessarily, Troop A has no additic.nal personnel to assist local aunicipshties, such as Hampton, Vol. 1, p., 1.3-20, lacks resources to provide anyi trtffic control beyond access ccntrol within the EPZ, will be unable to respond to requests from DOT to provide road barriers, signs, or ronC (.unwance during - evacuation, or otherwise to perform the excessh e number of duties,assirrned to the State Police utsr Revicion 2.

Vol. 2, p. J..Y-20 and 21. f EMA has therefore properly noted that "even wi d A elp from other t roops , the State Police force could be seriously derseted and law enforcement possibly irrpsired." FF,MA , Final Exercise Assessment, 6/2/86 at p. 46. FEMA RESPONSE Basis B (Rev. 2) The problem of obtaintro afficient State Police resources, in a timely raanner, to cerform sssigned Nties plus any ne'.'essary capensa.- tory ace f ais, remains. The logistics would seem to require a full acbilirsu6s v State Police Troops at the ALERT level to allow for extra . trave N to the Seabrook area. l

      \

i I ,, C____1 h __ !

L HAMPKN VI (Cont.) BASIS: (A) Population estimates. In establishing adequate levels of local personnel to respond in the event of a radiological emergency, the , Hampton RERP relies upon a. " peak seasonable population" of 110,000 for the Town of Hampton. This population estimate is purportedly "the -, j maximum population which may be expected in the Hampton area at any time during the peak cummer months," Hampton RERP pg.1-11, and was computed utilizing second hand information prepared by non-local sources. The Hampton RERP thereby violates FEMA regulations since " estimates of transient population shall be developed using local data such as " peak , f tourist volumes." NUREG. Appendix 4 - 3. i By letter of October 29. 1985, the Town of Hampton specifically . advised the State that the Hampton RERP peak population estimate of l 110,000 was substantially below traffic counts and local business figures. l As set forth on the attached Affidavit of Glen French, President of the Town of Hampton Chamber of Commerce, the local Chamber of Commerce routinely relies upon population estimates of between 150,000 to 200,000 l people per day for the Town of Hampton during the summer season. As 1 i many as 250,000 people can be expected within the town on each day over l the Fourth of July weekend. The State therefore relles upon a peak population estimate less than  : one-half of actual figures , as determined by local officials uniquely qualified to make these computations based upon parking, both legal and illegal, business receipts, and seasonal shifts in the demand for municipal services. At a minimum, NUREG, - Appendix 4 - 3 requires the State to fully explore with local officials the basis for the disparity in State and local population figures. The State, however, terminated all discussion on this issue. Necessarily , the State's reliance upon unreasonably low population estimates raises substantial questions on the adequacy of local personnel allocated to the Town under the RERP to respond to a radiological f emergency. FEMA RESPONSE Basis A (Rev.1) See FENA response to Contention SAPL 34 (B) Police Departments. The Hampton RERP provides that a total of 80 police officers and personnel will be available to respond to a radiological emergency. Hampton RERP, Appendi:t C-1. These figures are misleading and fail to account for the fact that 50 of the 60 police personnel are "special officers" hired by the department on a part time or seasonal basis. These special officers therefore lack the experience, skill, and training necessary to promptly implement adequate protective responses in the event of radiological emergency. , FEMA RESPONSE l Basis B (Rev.1) l With proper training, the 50 special officers should be able to I function adequately in their emergency response duties. However, this basis is now without merit, since the Town of Hampton does not plan to participate in the emergency planning process.

P , hWIP'ItB VI (Cont.) 25. (C) Department of Public Works. The Hampton REFP provides that a total of 60 personnel are available from the Hampton Public Works Department to implement protective responses in the event offigurce radiological- 'are Hampton RERP. Appendix C-3. These emergency. misleading. Of the 60 department personnel, 24 of these individuals constitute " temporary" employees, who, by reason of inadequate training and experience, cannot reasonably be expected to promptly and appropriately implement necessary evacuation procedures. Similarly, an additional 19 members of the Public Works Department are routinely. employed in waste water treatment and sewer maintenance. Accordingly, these individuals cannot reasonably be expected to implement the traffic control, evacuation transportation, or maintenance of evacuation routes which represent the ' primary responsibilities of the llampton Public Works Department in the event of evacuation. Hampton RERP IV 29. The remaining department personnel consist 'of the director and 16 highway personnel upon which would fall primary responsibility for initiating and ireptementing protective responses in the early stages of a radiological emergency. See NUREG. pg. 20. These duties include:

1. Responsibility for evacuation of all individuals without automobiles, families without the use of the vehicle, and people with special transportation needs. NUREG, Appendix IV - 27(7). Plainly the limited staff of 17 in the Public Works Department who are familiar with highway and transportation problems are wholly inadeounte to insure the transportation of the thousands of individuals who may be located on the beach at the time evacuation is implemented, even assuming this was the sole function to be performed by the department in the event of a radiological emergency. The additional and substantial duties of the  :

department to canvas the town and direct evacuation of special needs individuals, families, vacationers, and other non-auto owning individuals, merely underscores the gross inadequacy of local public works personnel to meet their responsibilities under the RERP. 10 C.F.R., Section 50.47(b)(1).

2. Under the Hampton RERP, the Public Works Department is responsible for ensuring that "all evacuation routes are serviceable throughout the course of an evacuation. " Hampton RERP II - 31.

Clearly the available Public Works Department personnel are inacequate even to carry out this single function mandated by the Hampton RERP. More significantly, the Hampton RERP unreasonably assumes that maintaining accessibility of evacuation routes will " entail normal adverse weather route maintenance only . " RERP pg. II - 31. The RERP therefore unreasonably fails to account for accidents , breakdowns, driver disobedience, panic, and gas shortages which must be reasonably anticipated in the event of mass evacuation. The Hampton RERP therefore fails to provide reasonable assurance that the town has adequate staff to estry out its evacuation responsibilities, NUREG. pg. 31. Assignment of Responsibility, and the RERP relies upon an unreasonable and unrealistic model in determining staff capability to implement the plan. NUREG pg. 61. Protective Response. _ _ _ _ __ - - - - - . I

T

                             . HAtMm 7: (Cont. )                                                                               26.

FEMA RESPONSE __ Basis C (Rev . '2) , 4

                                    -With proper training, Department of Public Works personnel (both full time and part time) should be able to function adequately in their emergency response duties. However, this basis is now without merit, since the Town of'
                                                                                                               ~

Hampton does not plan to participate in the emergency planningL process. (D) Selectmen. The Board of Selectmen for the Town of Hampton are provided ultimate authority to direct radiological emergency operations for the Town. Hampton RERP 1 - 16. The RERP igncres the feet, however, that . Selectmen are only part-time officials who may have full-time jobs even outside the' Town of Hampton. It is reasonable to assume that at least certain members of the Board of Selectmen would be unavailable to promptly respond, implement, and direct an appropriate Protective response. Additionally the Hampton Selectmen are annually elected which may thereby seriously compromise effective RERP education and training for newly elected officials. . FEMA RESPONSE i Basis D (Rev. l)

                                                                                                                                     ~

Same response as for basis B and C above. - i m________ _ . - . - . _ _ _

i HAMP2m VI1(Cont.) 27. d BASIS:

(E) The Revised Hampton RERP relies. upon the cooperation' and .

participation ' of Town. of, Hampton employees and officials, ; including  ! Selectmen, . - RERP ' IV-2,- police , - ' IV-41, ,and fire officials, IV-16. to implement protective ' actions in the event of emergency. By vote of the  ! Hampton Town Meeting on March 8, 1986, and by Resolution adopted - by -  !

                  > the Doard of. Selectmen on March 24, 1986, however, the Town of Hampton                                ;
                   ~has ~ declined and refused to participate in the preparation 'or                                       .

implementation of. the Hampton RERP prepared . by the . State. . Necessarily 1

the State cannot rely upon Hampton personnel to carry out the State plan  !

for -. the Town . - Accordingly, the Hampton RERP fails - to provide i ti reasonable assurance that Hampton personnel will-implement or carry out j protective actions 'during an emergency. (F) Under the Revised Hampton RERP, the duties and responsibili- ] ties of the1 Town Manager and the Town Civil Defense Director have been expanded. Revised Hampton .RERP IV, pages 7-16. The Revised Hampton - RERP, ' however, fails to account fore the fact that, within the Town of Hampton, the Town Manager is presently serving as acting Civil Director. Defense Accordingly, the emergency administrative responsibilities placed upon this single individual for the Town of Hampton . are wholly unreasonable and far < exceed. the abilities of one

                  . person ; however, capable.                For example, among other duties, the Town Civil' Defense. Director is required - to assess and monitor the Town transportation needs in the event of emergency and acquire additional'                                i vehicles. should allocated transportation prove inadequate. Compensatory Plan IV-13. ' 14               At.. the same time, the Town Manager is responsible to insure. that all - Town Departments are adequately ctaffed and that appropriate and adequate staffing is provided throughout~ the emergency.

Compensatory - Plan IV-9. Since these responsibilities may continue on a 24 hours basis , it is unreasonable to assume that the Civil Defense Director / Town Manager' can continue to provide adequate transportation + and personnel for the duration of an emergency as required by 10 C.F.R. ~ 5 50.47(b)(1). Additionally, even assuming that separate individuals are designated as Town Manager and Civil Defense Director for the Town, the Town believes that the numerous duties imposed on - each of these individuals under the ' Revised Hampton RERP place an unreasonable and unrealistic burden on Town personnel in violation of 10 C.F.R 5 50.47(b)(1). For example, the Town's Civil Defense Director is not only required to insure adequate transportation for evacuees, but must further monitor all manpower and equipment requirements for the entire Town during an evacuation of tens of thousands of people and determine "if these needs can be augmented with State resources." ~ Revised Hampton RERP IV-14. No provision is made in the Revised RERP in the event auch State resources prove unavailable and by default, these responsibilities for acquiring additional vehicles or personnel would fall upon the Town Civil Defense Director. FEMA RESPONSE Basos E and F (Rev. 2) See FEMA response at beginning of Contention.

28. Hmm VI- (Cont.) (G) The State Compensatory Plan relies upon local school officials, y under direction- of a. single local Unison, to evacuate the Hampton school ! students . , In violation of ' NUREG - 06564, page 32, . no letters of agreement have been filed indicating any willingness on the pert of these individuals to participate in, or accept responsibility for, 'these mandated responsibilities under the Compensatory Plan , Compensatory Plan, page l 13A-14. Additionally, it is unreasonable to ar officials responsible for' evacuating the schools are of suff!cient number: , have adequate training, or will otherwise be available to evacuate the more than 2,600 Hampton school children in the event of radiological emergency. See Compensatory Plan,' page 7A-7. FEMA RESPONSE Basis G (Rev. 2) FEMA REP-1 does not require letters of agreement with government agencies, and thus FEMA does not require letters of agreement with schools, or their staff. While schools are in session, it is the normal responsibility of the staff to provide for the safety of the student population. (H) The Compensatory Plan provides that only a single Sate Police vehicle will be provided to the Town of Hampton to " maintain security and to report on local road and traffic condition." Compensatory Plan, Troop. A. New Hampshire State Police Emergency Response Procedures, page 2. Since even the State acknowledges that Hampton may have an " upper peak seasonal population of 110,000" Revised Hampton Plan I-11, it is wholly unreasonable to expect that a single police cruiser can maintain security and remain adequately apprised of road conditions throughout the Town in  ; the event tens of thousands of individuals are attemptfng to evacuate Hampton. , The Compensatory Plan further provides that troopers should not

          " expedite the flow of traffic leaving the EPZ...at the expense of access control functions." Compensatory Plan, Troop A Emergency Response Procedure, page A-1. Accordingly, since vehicle breakdowns, accidents, stalled cars, and other impediments to evacuation must reasonable be anticipated given the number of vehicles and evacuees, the Compensatory Plan makes no provision for State Police or other adequate personnel to maintain the accessibility of the evacuation roads.

Finally , the 28 troops assigned to access control for Hampton are inadequate to insure reasonably prompt evacuation of the tens of thousands of vehicles leaving Hampton, as well as additional vehicles pascing through the Town from surrounding communities at There the time of emergency, Compensatory Plan. Appendix C. page C-7 0. is no showing that State Police Troop A has sufficient personnel to meet its responsibilities for access control, security and other duties for the Town of Hampton and other communities within the EPZ, or to augment this response on a 24 hours basis. 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(1). FEMA RESPONSE Basis H (Rev. 2) See FEMA response at beginning of Contention.

  • 29. i REVISED RWPION CONTENTION VIII 'IO REVISION 2  ;

t

                                                      ~
                             - ~    . Revision 2 fails - to.. provide adequate emergency eauipment,' facilities,                          ,

or personnel to support an emergency response and fails to demonstrate that adequate protective responses can be . implemented in the - event . of. l radiological emergency. 10 C.F.R. 550.47(1)(8)(10). .! J BASIS:  ! The ' bases ' for Contention VIII . set forth in CONTENTIONS OF'TH3 ~ TOWN OF HAMPTON TO RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN ., d FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON. NEW HAMPSHIRE, NOVEMBER,1985, . anc Revised Contention VIII set forth in CONTENTIONS OF THE TOWN OF HAMPTON TO REVISED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONdE PLAN AND TO COMPENSATORY PLAN FOR THE TOWN OF HAMPTON, NEW HAMPSHIRE, are hereby realleged and incorporated by . reference herein.-

    ?

PEMA RESPONSE: . See FEMA Response t ,; NECNP-RERP-8, e l l

30. KENSINGTON CONTENTION 1 The December,1985 draft radiological emergency response plan for the Town of Kensington does not assure that each principal response organization has staff to respond and to augment its initial response on a continuous basis, as required by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(1), because there are not alternates in several of the key emergency response positions and other departments are inadequately staf fed to respond to an emergency as outlined in the plan. I l BASIS: There are currently no alternates for the positions of Civil Defense Director, Fire Chief, and RADEF Of ficer. With many of these individuals vorking out of the area on frequent occasions, continuous protection cannot be provided without alternate individuals to act in their place. Addi ti on-ally, there is no transportation coordinator, FEMA RESPONSE i in its Dec.1986 review of Rev. 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological l Emergency Response Plans for Seabrook, FEMA and the Regional Assistance l Committee (RAC) reviewed all municipal (EPZ) plans for their capacity to provide for 24-hour continuous operation for a protracted period. Speci f-ically Planning Standard A.4 f rom FEMA-REP-1 defines this requirement. On page 6 of the Dec.1986 RAC Review of Rev. 2- Municipal Plans, FEMA f ound that some key emergency response positions do not have a back-up listed for second shift responsibilities. In Appendix A of the Kensington P1an, there are no back-up personnel listed for the positions of Civil Defense

'                                          Director, Transportation Coordinator, RADEF Of ficer, Police Chief, Health Of ficer, Road Agent, or Town Clerk. Based on these review findings, FEMA
  • does not have assurance that the Town of Kensington can implement its plan.

Since Kensington has indicated that it will not actively participate in the planning and response for a possible accident at Seabrook Station, it is necessary to apply Planning Standard A.4 to the State's ability to fully compensate for the Town of Kensington's emergency response functions. in its June 1986 RAC Review of Rev.1 of the NH Compensatory P1an for Seabrook Station, FEMA found that the plans did not adequately identify the personnel to carry out the State's Compensatory P1an. The State responded to this by indicating that a resource allocation study was being conducted to identify the personnel and equipment necessary to implement local and State plans, covering all functions. Rev. 2 of the NH Plans still do not contain the results of this personnel allocation study. FEMA's findings are found on page 3 of the December 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Compensatory P1an for Seabrook. Until New Hampsnire develops this information as part of its planning base, FEMA has no basis to change its determination that the State has not demonstrated that it has adequate personnel resources to compensate for the non-participation of Kensington personnel. [See RAC . Review of the Compensatory Plan, pages; 3(A.,4); 6(H.4), 7(H.10)].

i 31. KENSikGTON CONTENTION 1, (Cont. )

                                                  ' BASIS:
                                                         . The-Kensington Volunteer Fire Department is served by individuals who            i work out of town. There is no assurance that fire department personnel will be reachable'or capable of responding in a timely manner in the event of- a
                                                   . radiological" emergency.

The Police Chief in Kensington does not reside within the town and there is no assurance that he will be reachable or capable of responding

                                                   ' promptly in the event of a radiological emergency during his of f-duty hours.

FEMA RESPONSE The availability of emergency response personnel to resp ad to an emergency does not necessarily depend on their working or living in the affected community, in this case Kensington. As long as designated emergency response personnel can be reached by . telephone or radio at their place of work and home and be able to staff their posts in time to carry out their assigned duties, there is no reason to presume these personnel will not be reachable or able to respond. Since local community E0C's are activated at the Alert classification level, there should be enough time.to mobilize and deploy emergency response staff to their respective

                                                    - posts. As discussed earlier in the response to this Contention, FEMA's concern is primarily with the number of local emergency responders.

In a fast breaking situation, the capacity exists to implement protec-tive actions such as sheltering without the local response organization being fully staffed. BASIS: , The Kensington Road Agent is responsible for assuring a successful, smooth evacuation by clearing roads of snow, stalled cars, accidents, and otherwise assuring that the roadways remain open for evacuation. Kensington's Highway Department does not have sufficient personnel or resources to fulfill these responsibilities, and the common arrangements for aj! hoc assistance by private contractors are insufficient to assure that these responsibilities will be met. Kensington has only one Road Agent, and relies on local con-tractors to assist as needed during winter storms. The Road Agent is also a volunteer fireman and medic and may be needed to perform other duties . during an evacuation. [ i FEMA RESPONSE , FEMA's position concerning the availability of one road agent, with L no back-up, is that this is not sufficient to ensure adequate coverage i I for this EOC position. The response to the first basis of this contention explains FEMA's position in greater detail. 1 __m___________m_______-

32.. a , e REVISED- KENSINGTON CONTENTION 2 The NHRERP, Revision 2 for "TOK" does not provide for adequate

          " notification, by the licensee of State-and local response organizations, and for notification ~of emergency response personnel by organizations, as.

required.by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(b)(5). Provision for notification of the town emergency response organization is inadequate in that it depends 4 upon notification through the Rockingham County Dispatch. E:lOS.i "T0K" will: no longer be using Rockingham County Dispatch'as of the end of 1986. FEMA RESPONSE: This Contention deals with' the means' byl which the Town of Kensington will: receive notification of an emergency at Seabrook. In its review of Rev._2 of New Hampshire-Plans for Seabrook dated Dec. ember 15,1986, FEMA and the RAC found that.the Rockingham County Disptach Center had both adequate ' equipment and personnel. coverage for providing notification.to the towns._ Thus, although the Town of Kensington may not. use the Rocking-

         . ham County Dispatch Center on a routine basis, there is no reason that it-
                                              ~

could not notify Kensington personnel in 'the event of an emergency at. Seabrook.

33, i

                                                                                                                                              -l
                                                                                                                                             ~f
               - REVISED KENSING' ION COtTTENTION 4 -                                                                                       ,

The NHRERP, Revision 2 for "TOK" does not provide reasonable assuranc> that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the eent of a radiolrxjical emergency at Seabrook Station, as required by 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (a)(1), because the.Kensington Elementary School provides inadequate radio-

               - logical protection.

BASIS: The Kensington Elementary School is currently proposed as a shelter for elenentary school students in the event that sheltering is recommended. The elementary school in the Town of Kensington is inadequate for sheltering

                ^ children,- the highest risk population, due to the fact that there are no interior roans, no basement, and all classrooans have a wall of windowsn.
                - FENA RESPONSE:

This Contention deals with the suitability of the Kensington Elementary School- as a shelter, with' a Dose Reduction Factor at least .9. In that the

                                                                                                                                   ~
                - New Hampshire Plan does not differentiate between stude,nts and the general public regarding the suitability of sheltering as a protective' action, and the Dose Reduction Factor inherent in virtually any winterized building is at least .9,       FEMA has no reason to believe that the Kensington Elementary School is unsuitable as'a shelter.
  ' I

- _ _ _ _ _ _ _ =

34. REVISED KEN 5INGTON CONTENTION 6 The NHRERP, Revision 2, for "TOK" does not provide adequate arrangements for effectively using assistance and resources as required by 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(3) because there are not appropriate letters of agreement to identify support organizations and other facilities which are to provide assistance. B ASIS : NUREG-0654 II C.4. requires that each organization shall identify nuclear and other facilities , organizations or individuals which can be relied on in an emergency to provide assistance. Such assistance shall be identified and supported by appropriate letters of agreement. "TOK" is not aware of a letter of agreement with Midway Excavators. "TOK" has been informed by Midway Excavators (not by NH State Civil Defense) that as of November 21, 1966 it will not be servicing any towns. Midway Excavators left "TOK" unplowed during the snow storm of November 19, 1986 and, in fact "never showed up" or called "TOK" to inform "TOK" that it would not be coming, Midway Excavators is servicing only State roads as of November 21, 1986. In AFFIDAVIT OF RICHARD H. STROME (CONTENTION KENSINGTON *6 AND CONTENTIONS SOUTH HAMPTON-1 AND 3) MAY 19,1986 in support of APPLICANTS' MOTION FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF KENSINGTON CONTENTION NO. 6 AND SOUTH HAMPTON CONTENTIONS NOS.1 AND 3 MAY 20, 1986, Richard H. Strome states: at 3. "As to local tow or snow removal companies such as Midway Excavators, the state has adequate back-up resources should local contractors be unavailable to two or to plow the snow in the Town of South Hampton." In light of Midway Excavators action of November 21, . 1986 in which it effectively transferred the resources of "TOK" to the State, "TOK" has serious questione as to the existence of the State's back-up resources and the adequacy of any resources the State purports to have. "TOK" no longer has a Snow Removal Agreement with Midway Excavators.

                                                                          " TOE" does not accept as appropriate letters of agreement the letters of agreement with transportation companies.                                                            Many of these letters list more buses cnd other vehicles than there are drivers. There                                                                          are no letters of agreement for the already inadequate number of drivers.

FEMA RESPONSE: FEMA has addressed Town of Kensington Rev.ised Contentian 6 and its basis that there are not appropriate letters of agreement with Midway Excavators or with transportation companies by applying Planning Standards A, C, and J. (Evaluation Criteria A.3, C.4, J.10.g, and J.10.k) in FEMA-REP-1. 1 The December 15, 1986 RAC Review of the State and municipal plans reflect FE"Ns views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review comments

f" 35.

                                             . REVISED KENSINGTON CONTENTION 6 . (Oont.):

on the New. Hampshire State Plan. on this issue are provided on pages'74,; 74-b,t and-85 of Section .I,' on page 1 of the Letters of-_- Agreenent subsection

                                                                                                                      ~

' ' of Section IV,: and on page 50 of the Compensatory. Plan subsection _ of Section IV.; FEMA's review consents.on the municipal plans on this issue are pro-; vided~on pages 5-and 6 of Section II. 7 c

                                                  .. . FEMA relied uponithe foll'owing documents _ in forming its conclusions on

_ this issue: Revision 2 of' the New Hampshire . State Plan; Revision 2 to the muni cipal i pl ans. For a . response .to' this issue, see the . FEMA response to South. Hampton Contention'3. Asinoted in the response, thereLis no Letter of Agreement with Hidway Excavating Company. However, it' appears- that .there .would. be , ~ suf ficient other' resources available from the State ~to ; remove -impediments to evacuation. 'It is noted, however, that Midway' Excavating Company:was not' identified in theLKensington Plan 'as a provider of contracted services. (see page' C-3 of . Appendix aC of Kensington Pl an). - As also noted in the.

                                               ' FEMA response to South Hampton Contention 3 .which is applicable,to the!

response _ to Kensington Revised Contention 6, the letters of agreement with l

                                               . transportation' companies are considered by the RAC to be adequate.

O e y' j l

                                                                             .                      .      36.

REVISED KENSINGTON CONTENTION 10 , The NHRERP. Revision 2 for "TOK" does not provide for communi-cations with contiguous State / local governments within the plume exposure pathway EPZ, as required by 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47 App. E,E.(9)(a), because provisions for communications with the State government are inadequate. BASIS; , i NUREG 0054 F.1.b. requires provisions for communications with l contiguous State / local governments within the EPZ. The Kensington , Emergency Operations Center (EOC) currently has only one telephone i (red phone) for communications with State / local. governments, located on-the ground floor of the EOC, while the command post is located on the second floor of the EOC. This system is not adequhte to allow necessary emergency communications. "TOK" asserts that there is no showing that the equipment exists. The NHRERP. Revision 2 for "TOK" et page 11-8 states: "This description is of the new communications system planned for the Town of Kensington. All of this equipment has been purchased, however the town has elected to accept only a portion of this equipment at this time." "TOK" hks not made such an " election". In AFFIDAVIT OF GARY J. CATAPANO RE KENSINGTON CONTENTIONS NOS. 2 AND 10 MAY 16,1986 in support cf APPLICANTS'

SUMMARY

DISPCSTION OF 1 KENSINGTON CONTENTIONS NOS. 2 AND 10. MA Y 20,1986, Gary J. j Catapano states at 5: " Additional radio equipment was purchased for the - Kensington Police Department as part of a complete reconfiguration of the existing communications net work and installation was begun. (Installation was halted, insofar as I am aware at the direction of some  ; official of the Town." No official gave such direction. "TOK" has never refused equipment. .j FEMA RESPONSE: This Contention deals with the adequacy of communications equipment to contact contiguous State and local governments. Equipment already in place would allow Kensington to communicate with State / local governments. The availability of additional radio equipment, already purchased and ready for installation, would certainly enhance the town's communications abilities. (See FEMA /RAC Review of New Hampshire Municipal Plans, , December 15,1986, pp 9-10). ] l l l i l l , I I  : l i

37.

                                 ' NECNP Contention - RERP-2
                                         . L The : 'New Hampshire - RERP violates '10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(3) as implemented by - NUREG-0654 at 5. II. C.1.b in that the state _ has not                                                       -

specifically' identified all areas in which itirequires : federal assistance or-the extent of -its needs; nor has it made arrangements to obtain that assistance nor has it stated the expected time of arrival of Federal assistance at the Seabrook site.or EPZ.

                                 - BASIS:

NRC regulations - at 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(3) require that:

                                    " arrangement . for' requesting and effectively using. assistance resources have been made: before offsite plans may be approved.                                                                       NUREG-0654 further .provides that each state "must make provisions for incorporating -

the Federal response capability into its operation- plan," including.

,                                   " specific Federal Resources expected", and their " expected time of arrival The New Hampshire RERP ~

at specific nuclear facility sites." III . C.1. b . does not . comply with these requirements in several respects. First, the RERP does not specifically identify all of the state' needs for assistance from the federal government. Section 1.4.5 identifies a need for support from the- Boast Guard and Federal Aviation Administration for restriction of the coastal . waters and the airport. The plan also identifies a need for

                                    " shellfish contamination screening" but does not describe the agency that-
                                 ' it expects help- from.              Section 1.4.4 also vaguely describes the state's need for~ nontechnical and technical support , including " radiological monitoring. "            The exact ' nature and extent of these needs is not-described.                                                                                                              .

This generalized ' identification of need does not give the Federal government: sufficient notice of the state's expectations for assistance, nor does it give sufficient assurance that the necessary steps will be taken to - protect the public health and safety. The plan' must instead identify the particular functions that the State cannot carry out, and the equipment and number and que,lifications of Federal personnel needed to carry them out. Second, the plan speaks of requests for aid as a future task. RERP 55 1.4.4, 1.4.5. There is no indication of the time at which Federal aid is to be arranged for--whether it is sometime in the near future, or after an emergency has occurred. In order to assure that Federal aid will be made available promptly upon request, specific types of Federal assistance mu st be prearranged by written contract with the Federal government. The arrangements for Federal aid must include an indication of when the aid is expected to arrive in the EPZ, as required by NUREG-0654 f il . C .1. b . Without these measures, there can be no reasonable assurance that the state plan can and will be implemented. Limited as to required federal assistance, Board Order. 4/1/86. FEMA RESPONSE: This Contention deals with the areas in which the State requires federal assistance, especially from the U.S. Coast Guard and for shellfish exam . ination. In the FEttA/R AC Review of December 15, 1986, it was found that the deficiencies notec in Rev. 1 of the New Hampshire Plans with respect to this matter had been corrected (see page 14 of the State P1an Review).

38. NECNP CONTENTION R,ERP-8  ! The New IIampshire RERP does not provide a " reasonable assurance ' that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a 50.47(a)(1), in that radiological emergency ," as required by 10 C.F.R. the plan does not provide reasonable assurance that sheltering Nor does is an the plan provide  ;

           " adequate protective measure" for Seabrook.                s                               )

adequate criteria for the choice between protective mea.ures as required l by 6 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654, 5 II.J.10.m. 1 I 1 1 FEMA RESNNSE to Revised Town of Harroton Contention VIII to Revision 2 (of ( the New Hampshire RERP for Seabrook) , SAPL Contention 16, and NECNP Contention l RERP-8 These three contentions all deal with what is fundamentally the same issue: protection from a radiological release for beach-going population at Seabrook who do not have ready access to any effective form of sheltering. Wis group includes both " day-trippers to the beach and those persons who only have access to unwinterized or other types of construction which will offer a lesser degree of protection than that offered by standard residential or comnercial buildings. Backcround - This issue has been of great concer.n t;o FEMA fran our , earliest Cetailed involvement with the preparation of plans and the achieve-ment of a level of emergency preparedness which would achieve our regulatory standard set for tha;. 44 CFR 350.5 of adequately protecting the public health and safety by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be t.aken offsite in the event of a radiological - emergency at the Se9 brock t,'aclear Power Plant. In December 1985 the State of New Hampshire submitted plans for protecting the public in the event of an accident at Seabrook to FEMA for review pur-suant to 44 CFR 350. Rose plans were forwarded for review by the Pagional Assistance Committee (RAC), # interagency group established pursuant to 44 CFR 350 to both assist state and local government in the development of radiological emergency response plans and to evaluate the adequacy of such plans. On Encember 31, 1985, FEMA, as chair of the RAC, requested that the members of the RAC (as well as the other FEMA staff who were reviewing the New Hampshire Plans) immediately focus on the issue of the protection of beach population and the occupants of unwinterized acccmnodations. This menorandum is attached as Appendix C to this response to interrogatories. FEMA Position - Since the time of our December 31, 1985, mettorandum on the subject of the protection of the public on and near the beaches around Seabrook, the State of thw Hampshire has refined and improved its emergency plans and subnitted a detailed Evacuation Time Estimate which sheds a considerable amount of light on this issue. The facts relevant to understanding this issue are that:

l 39. tiECT CGTf!NI' ION Fflo-8 (Cont.) p

                                                            ~
                                               .~( 1 ) We primary guidance document used by FEMA and the RAC in reviewing-off-s ite emergency plans is NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Fev.1, a document jointly developed by FEMA and the NRC. hat guidance document indicates on p.13 that "(t)he range of times between
                                                                             ~

the onset of accident conditions and the start of a major release is of the order of one-half hour to several hours". This statement is further clarified on p.17, Table 2 to indicate that (a) the major portion of a. release may occur in a time period ranging

                                                     - frm as .little as one-half hour to one day af ter the release begins and (b) that the travel time of the release to exposure point can range frm one-half hour to two hours at five miles, and one hour to four hours at ten miles.
                                                                        ~

(2) On peak sumer days there are thousands of beachgoers in the

                                                     'Seabrook EPZ in areas beginning approximately 1.7 miles from the plant. We current New Hampshire plans contemplate evacuating the many thousands of beachgoers who have access to no adequate shelter as a protective action in the event of an accident at Seabrook.

We understand that the plans contain no consideration of sheltering the " day trippers" because on sumer days when there are a large number of these people, it is not possible to find reasonably-

                                                      . accessible shelter for them. W ere are an additional number of persons who would be in or have access only to shelter in unwinter-ized cottages and motel rooms. The protection afforded by sheltering in these structures will definitely be less than that afforded by a normal wood frame house.            .-

(3) The Evacuation Time Estimate for the Seabrook EPZ subnitted by the State of. New Hampshire indicates at pp.10-1 et. seq. that in good weather when the beaches are at 160 to 100 percent of capacity it - , will take three and one-half hours to clear the beaches, and a , total of from four hours and fifty minutes to five hours and - fifty minutes to evacuate all the population on the beaches from the EPZ. In sme situations such as sudden bad weather following a peak sumer day, the total evacuation time for portions of the EPZ 7 range up to seven hours and fifty minutes. Werefore, using the standard guidance for the initiation and duration f of radiological releases, and the current New Hampshire RERP including ETE, it appears that thousands of people could be unable to leave during an > accident at Seabrook involving a major release of radioactivity without i f adequate shelter for as much as the entire duration of that release.  ! Therefore, until these issues are resolved even if all the other inadequacies and deficiencies cited in the RAC Peviews of the New Hampshire Plans, and the Review of the Exercise of these plans were to be corrected, FEMA would

                                         .not be able to conclude that the New Hampshire State and local plans to protect the public in the event of an accident at the Seabrook Nuclear Ibwer Plant are adequate to meet our regulatory standard that such plans
                                          " adequately protect the public health and safety by providing reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken offsite in the event of a radiological emergency." (See, 44 CFR 350.5(b)).                                         j i

40. NE.CNP ' CONTENTION NHLP 6 The local emergency response plans.for New Hampshire communities within the plume' exposure emergency planning zone do not assure that "each principal' response organization has staff to respond and to augment.its' initial response on a continuous basis ," 10 C.F.R. 50.47. 50.47(b)(1), in the following-respects: a :. The police. forces for the towns surrounding Seabrook do not have sufficient personnel or resources to carry out their responsibilities'under the plan.

d. The plans contain no demonstration that priya.te companies or individuals who will be depended on to assist in an emergency will actually-be able, committed and willing to perform those functions.

9 Under the plans, the local fire departments are -responsible for. such tasks as assisting in monitoring the evacuation, for decontamination of of affected individuals,. operating and maintaining the E0C or the public alert system.(PAS), and assessing emergency transportation needs. The local fire departments do not have sufficient personnel or resources to fulfill these responsibilities.-

h. There is no assurance that local emergency response personnel will
   ,                          be reachable ~or that they will be able to -respond soon enough to' assure protection'of the public health and safety.                      .      ,
1. The.. local plans 1do not provide for adequate backups or alternates for important positions in' the event that assigned personnel are not available..
j. . Many of the posts crucial to an effective emergency response have .not' yet' been filled. ,

FEMA RESPONSE: FEMA's position on this Contention, overall, is the same as that for. the other personnel resources contentions (Kensington 1, Hampton Falls 2, South Hampton 2, Hampton 6, and SAPL 8) which is, FEMA does not have assurance. that there exists the capability to staff local emergency response positions for an initial response, and to augment that response on a continuing basis, since'there are numerous positions in the local emergency response organiza-tions which do not have alternates (P1 anning Standard A.4, page 6.of RAC Comments for Municipal Plans). Similarly, the State has not adequately demonstrated in its planning that it has the capability to fully compensate for ~ non-participating localities and localities needing supplemental State assistance (see RAC comments on page 3 of Compensatory Plan review, Planning ] Standard A.4). FEMA's responses to the six basis of this Contention are as follows: E Basis A - L This basis concerns the adequacy of the staffing of local police forces to carry out their responsibilities as identified in the local plans. i

    $,     g mg                                                                                          41..

NEC' NP- CONTENTION NHLP-2 (Cont.) 9 ItL is not clear to FEMA what' procedure (s) the local police are.to fol-

                                                   ~

low to assist with public alerting and notification. The . system of public notification;is'primarily a State responsibility, with activation of the system to occur at the Rockingham County Complex. Each local community has back-up. activation capability, which physically' involves no more than the

           -pushing of:several buttons. This is not resource-intensive at the local level. However, if-there are siren failures, then is the police chief-responsible for implementing route alerting (which could be resource                                i intensive)? See RAC comments for item J.10.c. on page 18 of the Municipal Pl an : Review. -

The following' tabulation shows the total number of' local police, as identified in Appendix C of the respective local plans, versus the number -of

           -personnel necessary to staff local traffic control posts for each respective community, as found in Table 8-6 of Volume 6 of the New Hampshire State Plan EOC Police                      -   TCP       Secur-l Full l Part l Total             -  Staff       ity   Totall Greenland                 3                    3    -    3          1      4 l          1                           '1 Kingston           '

4 1 3 l 7 - 5.. ' 1 6 l E. Kingston 4 4 - 3- l 1 4 1 Kensington . 6 j 6 - 3 l 1 4 l S. Hampton 5 l 5 - 2 1 3 -! Rye 7-10 17 29-27 3 1 4 Newfields 1 J 6 l 7 - 4 1 5 . l l New Castle 3 7 10 - 2 ' 1 3 l Hampton Falls l 1 ) 3 l 4 - 1 l 1 2 l Stratham l 5 3 l 8 - 4 1 5

                                          \                   l Exeter               l   19         13   l    32     -

10 1 11 1 Brentwood l 10 l 10 - 3 1 4 l Hampton l 24 1 50 l 74 - 15 1 16 l As can be seen, local police resources (both full-time and part-time) range from marginal to more than adequate for traffic control. l l f l . .

42. K ED % RESPONSE

      ,            NECNP ' CONTENTION NHLP-2 (Cont.)

When you; factor in the1 responsibility of providing s.ecurity at the local. E0C'and normal police duties, all of which require 24-hr staffing, it is! apparent that the Town of Greenland will need outside assistance and the Towns :of Kingston, E. Kingston, Newfields,' and' Stratham may need limited assistance due to the. fact there are not' alternates for all necessary

                ~'p olice personnel . The Towns of- Kensington, So. Hampton, Rye, Hampton Falls, andHampton.have indicated their intentions not to participate in
                ' the emergency. response organization, thus. shifting the responsibility for emergency. response onto the. State. See comments at beginning of'this
                 , Contention.

Basis D

                          . Letters of-' agreement for towing companies and bus transportation com-panies are now found in Volume 5 of the State Plan, and.are' referenced as such in each local plan. This is appropriate, since the State now controls the distribution of these' resources. FEMA and the RAC found the State's resources for removing impediments to evacuation were adequate (see page 85 of the RAC Review of State Plan, item J.10.K). Additionally, the RAC found that. the letters of. agreement with transportation companies were generally
                                           ~

adequate (see RAC Review of State Plan, pages 74 and 74-b, item J.10.g; ^ pg.1 of RAC Review of Letters of Agreement, items A.3 and C.4). Basis G

The designation of volunteer firefighters as local emergency workers is not uncommon or inappropriate. As long as designated emergency workers
                  .can be . reached at home and work, and can travel to their assigned posts                             '

in time to fulfill their emergency responsibilities, there is no reason to conclude that the use of volunteers is inadequate. FEMA has not determined whether the number of fire department person-nel, both full-time and volunteer, is sufficient to cover assigned duties in all municipalities, since the State's Resource Allocation Survey is not yet completed and submitted to FEMA (see RAC Review of Municipal Plans, page 6, Planning Standard A.4). Basis H As stated above for Basis G, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with designating part-time personnel as local emergency workers, so long as they can be reached at work and home and arrive at their assigned posts in time to fulfill. their responsibilities. Since emergency workers should be mobilized at the ALERT stage, this should allow sufficient time to travel to emergency

                   ' response posts. In a more rapidly developing emergency the plan provides for alerting the public to take protective actions without fully staffing the State or local E0Cs.

43. FD% RESPONSE NECNP CONTENTION NHLP-2 (Cont.) The ability to alert and mobilize emergency workers, whether full-time or part-time, is something that is frequently tested in exercises. FEMA'a 1 judgment about this matter will be made at the next Seabrook Exercise.

                              . Basis I See FEMA response at beginning of Contention.

Basis J With the exception of Hampton Falls, all-key emergency response positions have been filled. However, many do not have alternates. See response at beginning of Contention.

                                                                                                                   .I l

l I l i l

 ; i               , .
                                                                                                                                           )

NECNP Contenti:n NHLP-6

                                                 . The local emergency plans Ldo not provide for an adequate range of protective . actions, 10 C.F.R. -I 50.47(b)(10), because they contain                               j inadequate . means of relocation or. other protection for those with special                         .

l, needs, those without private . transportation. ' school children, or persons  ! confined to- institutions or elsewhere for health or other reasons. i Moreover. .the resources available to the towns for these purposes are ) j inadequate to provide a reasonable assurance that the public will be protected in the event'of an accident. FEMA RESPONSE j FEMA has addressed Amended NECNP Contention NHLP-6 and its' basis of in-adequate means of relocation, and inadequate resources in host communities, by applying Planning Standards A.C.E,H,J, and L (Evaluation Criteria A.3,C.4,  ! E .7,H.ll ,J .10.h ,J .10.g,J .12,L.1, L .3, and L.4 ) i n FEMA-REP-1. The December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans re-flect FEMA's. views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review comments on the New Hampshire State plan on this issue are provided on pages 12, 34, 74, 74-a, 74-b, 74-c,113, and 114 of Section I, and on page 1.of the Letters of Agreement subsection of Section IV. . FEMA's review' comments on the Host communities municipal plans on this issue are provided on pages 10, 12, 15, and 16 of Section III. FEMA relied upon the followins documents in forming its conclusions on this issue: Revision 2 to the New Hampshire State Plan; Revision 2 to the municipal plans. . FEMA' does not yet have assurance of the adequacy of. plan provisions for means of relocation and resources at host communities. Responses to specific portions of Amended NECNP Contention NHLP-6 are provided below.

                                            !!!. Amendments to ' Contention NHLP-6 A. The following basis is . substituted entirely for the basiy supplied in NECNP's contention NIILP-6.- dated February 24, 1986: 1                            j
a. In many cases there is a telephone number to call for those without private transportation who need relocation assistance. Such a provision is inadequate not only because of the vulnerability of telephone systems in the vent of an emergency, but because even if the telephone works ,- there is no assurance that the assistance will be available to all who need it. Moreover, the telephone system in the EOC may be overloaded. Fo there are 1,798 people in Exeter who have no transportation. g example,  ;

1 FEMA RESPONSE ( a) The revised municipal plans no longer require telephone calls to the E0C at the time of the emergancy to request relocation assistance. Pre-designated bus routes or pickup points are now used to provide transportation for residents and transients requiring transportation. These bus routes are shown on public information material distributed annually to residents. EBS messages will also direct residents to these routes or pickup points (e.g., Exeter plan pages 11-32 and 33). Identification of those people with special l needs is done by return of a special postage-paia survey card which is included

i i ND3D EP-6 (Cont. ) - 45. in the public information material (e.g., Exeter plan page 11-33). The listings;of those people with special transportation needs is. held by local officials in the communities for purposes of transportation resource planning. It'is, therefore, not necessary for people to call in to the local EOC to ob-tain transportation assistance, except for those people who have not previously' notified. officials of their special needs, and are unable to get to a pickup point on a bus route. As noted in th_e local plans (e.g., Exeter plan page j 11-33), these requests will be handled on an ad hoc basis as the people call 1 in to the EOC or State number provided in the compensatory plan to request assistance. 1 The contention refers to 1798 people in Exeter who have no transportation.

              ~The means of obtaining that information is not described and differs signifi-cantly from the figure used by the State for planning purposes in Vol. 6 of the State Plan. At this time, FEMA has no reason to believe the State's figures are incorrect.
b. Residents requiring transportation will have to report to
            .the nearest bus route location for pick-up.                 During a radiological emergency, making an estimate of the arrival time of these buses at any given       point - - will . be nearly    impossible. Thus,   people   without transportation may find themselves standing outside during an emergency for an undetermined amount of time, waiting for a bus to come along the route.      Evacuees may be exposed to unacceptable levels of radiation while waiting outside for a bus. Discouraged evacuees might also further risk exposure by returning to their homes and giving ,'up on evacuating.
             " Latchkey" children who are at home while their parents are at work may also fail to call for help or to understand directions regarding bus pick-up.

FEMA RESPONSE (b) The plan anticipates that evacuation buses for residents requir- i ing transportation will make multiple runs along the pre-designated bus routes (see ETE, State plan Volume 6, page 11-11; Hampton plan, Public Works Director procedures, pages IV-31 and IV-32). Therefore, it will not be necessary for residents to arrive at pickup points at an exact time. The length of time people will be waiting outside for buses will also be mini-mized by this method. The times required to mobilize buses and evacuate the people have been estimated in the ETE. These estimated times will be used as one of the variables in protective action decision-making described

               .in State plan Section 2.6.7.        In other words, the possibility of evacuees being exposed to radiation while waiting outside for buses will be taken into account in the decision to evacuate or shelter.
     .a 46.

NECMP NWE-6 (Cont. ) . I

                                                                                                              )
c. The RERP .does ' not provide a reasonable assu$ance of -

safety ' for school children who may be evacuated in a radiological emergency. ) For example, the Hampton . plan notes that "[iln the event of an evacuation, the State Resource Coordinator will direct the dispatch 'of buses they . willfrome the State Staging Area to.the Local Staging Area (EOC) where provided maps and directions to the schools." Vol.18 at 11-29.- The State RERP instructs ' the Director of Pupil Transportation Safety to "have the available drivers and buses (which normally service - the schools) report'to their appropriate schools with adequate fuel in the buses." ' Vol. 4B, Pupil' Transportation Safety Procedures at 2. Thus, it is not clear directions. where buses will go and from whom they will receive

             ' FEMA RESPONSE (c) Although not specifically commented on in the RAC review, there is some discrepancy in the plan and procedures as to where the buses that evacu-ate schools report to. For example, the Hampton local plan (Volume- 18, page 11-29) states that, "the State Resources Coordinator will direct the dispatch of buses' from the State Staging Area to the Local Staging Area (E0C) where they will be provided maps and directions to the schools." A,similar de-
        .      scription is provided in the Exeter plan (Volume 26,,'page 11-31). Conversely, the State plan procedures for the Director of Pupil Transportation Safety (Volume 48, p. 2) state, "have the available drivers and buses report to-their appropriate scnoo n ." The LOC Resource Coordinator procedures in Volume 4 of the State plan also state, "have the Director or rupii Tr an s-portation Safety instruct available drivers and buses to report to their                .

appropriate schools" (page 7-3). The logistics for mobilizing evacuation - buses to the schools need to be clarified and made consistent.in the State and local plans. 1 l-( l l t I

NEC:@ ELP-6 (Cont.) - 47-1

d. According to Revision 2, the State of New Hampshire now I intends to coordinate the dispatch of buses to schools in the EPZ.

However, the- State has not demonstrated that this can be done in an j efficient and timely manner. The cumbersome process of dispatching I school buses invites confusion and delay. The bus companies will need to  ! contact their' buses and drivers, and be in continuous contact with the I State staging area to update resource availability. If the regular drivers are not available, the Teatrsters union or other drivers who may act as , substitutes win have to be contacted, get to where their designated bus j is stored, and acquaint' themselves with tasks such as learning a route i and familiarizing themselves with an unfamiliar bus. The State staging 1 i

 . area will need to determine how many buses .have gone directly to schools, and therefore how many are needed to go to local staging areas.

The local staging areas will have to make their needs known to the State agency,- and will therefore need to be continuously updated on the number of buses headed directly to the schools. The schools and the local staging area will need to be in constant contact as well, so that the school can inform the local staging area of the arrival of normal buses and make its needs known to the local staging ares, which will transfer that information to the State staging area, who will be in direct contact with the needed resources. The amount of time involved in gathering all of the necessary information and coordinating a response from the State Staging area will be enormous: the task is far too cumbersome to assure adequate protection to the evacuees who rely on buses. i FEMA RESPONSE j (d) Procedures in the State and local plans need to be clarified to ensure that the State can efficiently coordinate the dispatch of buses to ,". the schools for evacuation. As noted in the preceding response for item

        "(c)," there are inconsistencies which need to be resolved in where the buses report to. Also, as noted in the response to further basis item A.3 in the response to revised Hampton Contention IV, there are no details in the plans as to how the supplementary Teamsters' Local No. 633 bus drivers will be notified and coordinated with available buses, or, for that matter ow many Teamsters will be released by their employers for emergency respofise 1

I 4

          '                                                                                                                                                      48' LimmP' NHLP-6 (Cont. ) .

f c. . The RERP' indicates that the normal drivers 'and buses will . I be Tcountedi an substantially, regardless 1of the ' time of day, schedule of f  ! idrivers. ; and availability of buses, to perform the functions that l they j perform , at : the n beginning and end of - a . school day. Vol. 4 B , Pupil transportation . Safety : Procedures at 2. - This assumes that . the regular ' drivers are the same drivers that have been guaranteed in the letters of agreement. Nothing in ' the letters of agreement with the bus ' companies-demonstrates. that the same drivers. -. familiar with the route, will be j-  : available. . .. For example, . a ; driver with Timberline in' Portsmouth told us that many drives havc-second jobs.flive far. from the bus company, or are Lunreachable . in between runs. She- also told' us that the regular school-buses were not sitting in the lot all day in' between the. start and the 'end of the school' day, .but are on the road for special runs and field trips as

y -

much of the time as possible. In addition, many of these buses . do not , have . radios, 'so even if they. were close to 'the EPZ, they may not be  ! L reachable. . Thus, there may be a large number -of . the normal : school j buses : andJ ' drivers who' will not be available during a radiological j emergency. j i l I t

                                                                                                                                                                      'J FEMA ~ RESPONSE-                                                                                                          d' i r iM T q".y (e) Although the use of drivers 'and buses whicinormally trnsport                                                                   I school children will be used for evacuation transportation to.the greatest extent:possible, the. plan provides for supplementary resources as needed.

As.noted in the response to' item A.1 in the further basis to revised Hampton f] ,j Contention IV, the RAC has concluded-that, although.there.are numerous in- fd consistencies in bus needs estimates, overall'the numbers of buses and ~ L drivers available according to the Letters of Agreement in Volume 5 of the / State plan are sufficient. (See pages 74, 74-a, 74-b, 74-c of December 15, 1986 RAC review of State plan Section I, and.page 1 of Letters of. Agreement . I subsection of Section V.)- However, as mentioned previously, FEMA does l' have a concern about the provisions in. place with the Teamsters' employers. to release them when needed. y - 7 I

                                                                                         "                      i I
                                                                                    ;   o                                    /                                        ,

f ;) .b. ' t i i  ; , o I s

             +

1 _ = _ - _ _ _ _ = , _ - _ . _ . - _ _  :.

NEM NHLP-6 (Cont.) - 49 . B. C:nt:ntion HP-1: The host plans for Manchester, Dover, Salem, and Rochester, do not meet the requirements of 10 C.F.R. Sections 50.47(a), 50.47(8), (10), (11), and (13), or NUREG-0695, Sections J.12 and K.5.b. B ASIS :

a. NUREG-0695 requires that the personnel and equipment at relo-cation centers should be capable of monitoring within about a 12 hour period all residents and transients in the plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation centers. Section J.12.

MANCHESTER:  !

1. The Manchester relocation center does not contain enough equipment to assure that all individuals can be administered the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration (the check would take over 40 hours if all the available monitoring equipment were used only for this checkpoint), nor enough to do a more thorough check on those evacuees who are contaminated to find out where the contamination i.s. Only 3,060 of the 20,000 expected evacuees could be scanned in 12 hours in the decontamination facility if all of the available monitoring equipment were used only at this checkpoint. This is only for the first scan in each case. However the lans call for several scans in the decontamination facility per person.

9 y< ,, . Moreover, it is absurd to assume that evacuecs 'would stand in line f [' I for this long before being able to register and begin ' rendezvous process. V' ,, it is very likely that the host facilities will be abandoned by most f ,, /evacueps when the inefficiency becomes apparent, leaving people without l,, access" to the organized method of finding one another within' the

                             @ception area. Those discouraged individuals may seek shelter in other darts of the State or outside the State, thus spreading radioactive                                            -

contaminat)on as they travel.

2. After twelve hours, the Manchester facility is  !

scheduled to become the only facility that will handle the decontamination of emegency workers. Vol. 36 at B-2 Obviously , monitoring and decontamination of the general public will still be underway at that time. Thus, there is no reasonable assurance that the Manchester relocation center can meet the needs of emergency workers. ROCHESTRR:

  • 0. . Theh will not be enough equipment in the Rochester relocation center to aswee that everyone can be administered even the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration. The plans do not clearly state how many CDV-700 surveying instruments will be available for use in Rochester, j,/ 7 However, there wilbbe far radiological monitoring kits, and therefore no more than four CDV 700's c:an be counted on. Vol. 35 at 11-11.

I f It is possible that 35,000 evacuees wiu go to the Rochester host cility for decontamination. Vol. 35 at I-10. If there are four i CDV-700's f the initial scanning, it will take the last evacuee to 143 hours adenuate p otect on to the vacuees ty. This clearly will not provide l l l

I: WEXW ?HP-6 (Cont.) . 50. DOVER: 4. There will not be enough equipment at the Dover host facility to assure that everyone can be administered even the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facilities for registration. There will be 43 CDV-700's available for use in. Dover during a radiologierJ emergency. Vol. 33 at 11-11. There could be 57,000 evacuees coming to Dover for decontamination. Vol. 33 at 1-10. Just to get everyone into the reception facility after one scan will take 23 hours. SALEM:

5. There will not be enough equipment in the Dover host facility to assure that everyone can be administered even the quick one minute check for contamination before entering the reception facility for registration. There will be 3 CDV-700's available for use in Salem during a radiological emergency. Vol. 38 at Il-11. There could be as many ss 29,000 evacuees coming to Salem for decontamination. Vol. 38 at I-8.

Just to get everyone into the reception area after one scan will take 161 hours. FEMA RESPONSE (B) Host Plans (HP-1 ) (a) Manchester (items 1 and 2); Rochester (item 3); Dover (item 4); and Salem (item 5). The RAC, in its December 15, 1986 review, has concluded that the host plans are inadequate to determine if there are adequate resources (equip-ment and personnel) to support the monitoring and decontamination operations for the anticipated number of evacuee arrivals in a 12-hour period. As indicated by the RAC in its review of the host community plans (Section III, pages 10 and 15), the descriptions of the number of staff members required for monitoring and decontamination activities is provided in Appendix B3 - of each host community plan. However, it is impossible to assess from the - plans if the number of staff positions are adequate to support the operations for the anticipated number of evacuee arriv61s in a 12-hour period, and if there are enough trained personnel available locally to fill the required number of staff positions. Call list rosters for local personnel (see Appendix B9) are not yet available. In addition, it is also not known if the number of monitoring instruments available (see Section II.E.4', is sufficient to support the operations. Section II.E.4 of each of the host community plans refers to CDV-700 survey meters. Although the meters are also listed on the inentory sheets provided in Appendix B8, there is no indication on the inventory as to the quantity of survey meters (and dosimeters) on hand (see p. B8-1). It is recommended that the total number of each item on hand be indicated on the inventory sheets. The RAC recommended that in order to clarify the capabilities and ade-quacy of resources to perform the monitoring and decontamination operations, the plans should clearly specify the assumptions used in preaaring the staffing lists indicated in Appendix B3 and the equipment resources indi-cated in 3ection ll.E.4 (i.e., what are the total number of evaruees ex-pected to arrive at the monitoring and decontamination f acilities of the reception center, and what percent of the evacuated population does this number represent?)

n. I 1P" ";p, (
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                                                                                                                                                          .?                                51.

terNP NHLP-6 (Cont.)r f' t

                                                                                      's            b. ,Jtu i !: Qm)an inmurces availabla accordfr:g to the pier,s                         are inadeouata to protect, tid pt?blic healtl2 anki idfety. All of the host plans t                                                                   - regardless 6 oSthe size of the populations they are exp
      }                                ,,                               provide forfG4 staff members to perform the many divers ~oected                                         to serve -

with the facility. Vols. 33, 35, 26 3d at D 9-1, '-3. ;Not, tasks astociated only are these 3 ntymben?inadequetCori , t their face, bt.ithe ; State cicarlyfnas applied a r,an5M.ind for,auV Mihout making any atterypt to determise what are the

     @                                                                  hidffv4 needs of i:ai.h separite faciD.y.

O etm sesecase ' s. (b) (seereshnsetopreviousitem"(a)"ontheneedforadditional 3 supporting info mation on the staffing resources.) x :, t '. s

                                                                          .l               '

i-9 - s ' x ,-

                                                 \
                                          )                             ' '
                                                                                             .,     c. " TN jlan does not assure that everyone evactated' fecm the g,i '                'e     ',

172 will go to a ressprion. area. Vols. 33, 35, 36, 38 at 1-11. Without i  ;' an asemince that eve.ry evacuated person and every evacuation vehicle is

 ~*j                                                                     scanned futC:adiolordcal- ontamiziejfon and decontar.dnated'tf'nrecuary, a y;                                public h..(.mtd in the>fcrm of f radiologically contaminated people and 1;                             Gticles nlll' go unchecked thrwghout the state, into other states and to

(/ Canada. In addition , there is no assurance that people who das decontamination services at the host cotomunity will be able to obtsin the.m ,

                       ~
                                      .y                                 anywhere ele,e in a ' ressonable amount of time,* since few hospitals hava-extenrive decontamination capabilities. Vol.' I at 2. 5-5.

P

                            ,         y              y
                          =
                                                                          . FENA RESP 0Ks                                                    i
              . h ,,,;                                 .

(c) The"samph prest.Moted EBI messages contained in the state plan

                                /                                                 state that monitoring and 'Jecontamir,ation services are available to evacuees g                                                      "

at the reception rJnters (BHCDA Procedures, Volume 4, 7ppendix G, pages G-31 and G-37). Howmac, as noted by the RAC comments ,(Mction 1, page 34), the RAC rscomnended that in tne case of ( contaminating.Eccident in paich people may actually hws become contaminated the :mssages jtculd speciNcally i 91rus:t evacuees to go to reception centers for monitoring.

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t kl .

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                                                                                                                                    \            t

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                                                                                                                                                                    -s                ,

NDCNP IELP-6 (Cont.) 52. l

d. The plan does not adequatelv accommodate the decontamination needs of evacuated hospital patien'ts and nursing home residents. Since the decontamination of these individuals will oce ' at their host health care facilities, they will need to wait for the arrivr["of a CDV-700 which will already be in peat demand at the reception center ,

Likewise, the monitoring team trained to perform decontamination to be I dispatched to these facilities will have more than enough to do at the reception center. In addition, there are no procedures for how to deco taminate these individuals in the plans. Further, the hest medical ' es may risk exposing regular residents to radiological contaminated materials. Vols. 33, 35, 36, 38 at B-3. FEMA RESPONSE (d) Based on the description on page B-3 of Appendix B of the host I community plans, monitoring and possible decontamination of evacuated hospital patients or health care facility residents will not be performed by staff at the health care host facilities, but by personnel from the same resource pool supplying staff for monitoring at the reception centers. Since the adequacy of staffing and equipment for monitoring and decontami-nation at the reception centers is in question, the availability of staff and equipment to be dispatched to the health care host facilities is also in question. (See response to previous item "(a)" on the need for additional supporting information on the staffing resources.) O O

NEMP MEP-6. (Cont.) 53.

e. It is ' not ' clear that injured contaminated evacuees or internally . contaminated evacuees wiu be accommodated by the plans. Both sets of people are to be referred to the DPils Supervisor. Vol. 33, 35,
36, 38 at B-4.. However, there is no indication of what s/he wiu do udth them beyond the vague activity of ' referring them to medical authorities, how s/he. will base decisions,'and-what facilities win be available for these pecple. For example , the two Manchester hospitals that are listed in .

Volume - 1 of the RERP ' are Catholic Medical Center, which has ~ no dec6ntamination capability, and Elliot Hospital,. which can handle one contaminated patient per hour. There is no reasonable assurance from l this that medical care - will be' available for injured and contaminated or internally contaminated individuals. FEMA RESPONSE (e) The December 15,1986 RAC review concluded that the plans have adequate provisions for medical services for contaminated injured individ-uals.- As noted. in the RAC review (pages 113 and 114 of Section 1), hospital capabilities are-listed on Table 2.8-1 of the State plan (pages 2.8-5, -5A, and -5b). ' Letters of agreement from these hospitals are included in Appendix H of Volume 2 of the State plan.

              ' The handling of injured contaminated individuals who arrive at the reception centers .is described in procedures for the DPHS Supervisor, the E0C RHTA, and OPHS Director in Volume 4A of the State plan. Based on the individual case, the individual may then be transported to one of the hospitals listed in Table 2.8-1 of the State plan. As noted inn the RAC review of the host community plans, this will be handled by coordinating with the State on a case-by-case basis (page 16 of Section III).

e i 1 l l i

I i

, S4 NBCNP IHILP-6 (Cont.) -
f. The. host facilities coordinator is charged with the task of identifying personnel who may provide emergency medical treatment -

on-site. No explanation; of how this will be done or where- the host k coordinator will find these people is . demonstrated in the plans. Vols . ' 3 5 , . 36 at III-76, Vols. 33, 38 at III-E. 4 FEMA RESPONSE (f) The method or means by which the Host Facilities Coordinator identifies " personnel who may provide emergency medical treatment on-site" is not clear in the plans. For example the Dover Host plan (Volume 33)L indicates on page I-17 that the City of. Dover Health Officer will " Assist

                          -the DHS, DPHS, and ARC in identifying and treating health problems of evacuees." The Dover plar also states on page 11-10 that, " Medical support will be supplied by..the R6scue Section Chief of-the Fire Department.. Went-worth Douglas Hospital will provide shelter for evacuated patients who need skilled nursing .:are.'.' On Page 11-;14, the Dover plan also incicates that.

the DHS will provide " medical services references" at the reception center. The State plan procedures (Volume 4B, Division of Human Services, Appendix B, page B-7) also indicate that several state agencies are available to support' the Reception Center activities, and that the Division of Public. Health, Emergency Medical Services can provide ambulance service support and - medical facility references. Thus, while it appears that sufficient medical resources would be available, it is not clear in the plan how the Host Facili-ties Coordinator coordinates these resources, and which source is most appro-priate. The plans should be revised to clarify this issue. O l

55. NECNP NHM (Cont.) k I g., Although. there is a letter of understanding with the Red-Cross that it will take responsibility for feeding, clothing, and sheltering all evacuees who have those. needs, there -is no demonstration of a Red - ' Cross capability to provide these services to the huge number of people who may need them. Vol. 5, Statement of Understanding between the l

                  . State' of New Hampshire and the American Red Cross.                                                   q FEMA RESPONSE (g) :The RAC review of the host community plans (page 12 of. Section III) indicated that the mass care facilities appaar'to have adquate capacity. The Statement of Understanding with the Red Crcss in Volume 5 of the State plan-documents its ' intent and capability- to provide feeding, clothing, and shelter-ing services to' evacuees in a radiological emergency. The American Red Crosas has proven ability to provide these disaster relief services to large numbers of people and there is.no compelling reason to question'its capabilities in this specific instance.         In its Statement of Understanding, the Red Cross states that "American Red Cross disaster responsibilities are nationwide.

Therefore, when the local chapters in the affected arias are unable to meet

                                                                                        ~

the needs of disaster victims,-the resources of the total organization are made. avcilable." O I

WECNP NHLP-6 .(Cont.') 56.

h. 'Although the plana report that ther s is a day's - food regularly on hand at local schools, it is not clear whether that is - a day's food for ; the 1,000 regular students at the school. - or a day's- food to serve 20.000. . In addition, the State claims that within that one' day period . Red Cross will be able to gather its resources to provide for further. food needs. However, no evidence is given to support .that projection. Volt. 33, 35, 36, 38 at II-10.- The Red Cross will also be I responsible for providing any clothing that is needed. Vols 33,. 35, ; 36,
        . 38 at 11-10.~ Since fresh . clothing is an integral part of the decontamin-ation facility, it is not adequate to rely on receiving clothes on an ad l:         ' hoc basia.

1 FEMA RESPONSE (h) The statement in the. host community plans that "public schools

              - generally have enough food on hand to last for a day" should be clarifird, p                It probably refers tL either the normal student population or to the evacuee capacity of each facility.      However, th's requires confirmatica and l-clarification in the host plans.

l- In regard to the ability of the Red Cross to assemble its resources. to supply food after one day, the Me'ican Red Cross has proven ability to provide disaster relief services in atiirrdy manner to large numbers of people, 'and there is no compelling reason to quest.on 'ts capabilities in this specific instance. It is also noted in each of the host plans that the host communities will pro-

vide interim supplies, including food and clothing to the reception centers, L decontamination centers, and mass care shelters as needed to assist State agencies or the Merican Red Cross (page 11-11 of Volumes 33, 35, 35; pages 11-10 and 11-11 of Volume 38).

The Red Cross is primarily responsible for providing clothing to evacuees. However, supplementary resources are also- available. The plans indicate that . the Salvation Army may assist the Red Cross in providing supplies (food and . clothing) for evacuees at the mass care shelters (pages 1-20,11-13, and 11-17 in Volume 33; pages I-20,11-13,11-16 in Volume 35; pages 1-19, and 11-17 in Volume 36; pages I-19 and 11-16 in Volume 38). In addition, the procedures for the Host Facilities Coordinator indicate that he/she will coordinate with the local E0C in obtaining additional replacement clothing if initial Oe-contamination Center supplies appear insufficient (pasge III-7 of Volumes 35 and 36; page III-8 of Volumes 33 and 38). Although the host community plans indicated that a letter of agreement with the Salvation Army is present in Volume 5 of the State plan, the RAC review (page 12 of Section I) of the State plan indicated that this letter wqas not present. If the State and host communities intend to rely on the Salvation Army to assist the Red Cross in providing supplies, the appropriate letter of agreement should be added to volume 5 of the State plans.

57. IECNP ten-6 (Cont.)

1. The host plans contain no system to communicate lists of registered evacuees with other host facilities. Vols. 33, 35, 36 38 at
   !!-12. If the host facility does not keep track of the location of evacuees, order among evacuees will not be kept. For families who are split up because children go to school in a different area than their parents live or work, or spouses who work in different areas. a more comprehensive system of logging the whereabouts of evacuees will be necessary to maintain order.

FEMA RESPONSE (1) Although there appears to be adequate capabilities at the reception centers and mass care facilities to track and communicate the lists and loca-tions of evacuees who use the host community facilities, the host community plans do not specifically describe how this will be done. Addition of this activity description to the host community plans and procedures would clarify who is responsible for performing this activity. The capability is presently described in detail' only in the State plan procedures,for the Division of Human Services, which is responsible fo.r operation of,the reception centers. Appendix B of the Division of Human Services indicates that all persons entering the reception center are registered on ,a special form (Appendix B, page B-1). A copy of this form is sent to the Message Exchange and Locating Service. As indicated in the procedures, a phone line for incoming telephone calls will be installed at the Message Center for receiving inquiries from . outside friends and relatives (page B-2). Persons inquiring about the location - of relatives / friends will be directed to this station to find out if the individual they seek has registered, and/or to determine if any messages have been left for the inquirer (page B-2). I

r , 58. S APL Contention 7 The New Ilampshire State and local plans fail to meet the require-ments of 10 C.F.R. I 50.47(b)(11) and NUREG-0654 E.5.b. because there has been no showing that. the means of radiological decontamination of-emergency personnel . wounds, supplies and equipment have. been established. Further, there has not been a clear showing that adcquate means for waste disposal exist. By' way of amendment of the basis and additional basis. SAPL states as follows: The N!!RERP Rev. O now assumes that all monitoring and decontamination of evacuees will be handled by host community personnel under the supervision of D PIIS. There are no letters of agreement , committing the host community personnel to perform these functions (save that for the. American Red Cross) and there are no letters of agreement securing the reception center facilities contemplated for use under the plans. Therefore , the adequacy of personnel and eculpment is not assured. Further , there are now two less host community primary reception centers due to the deletion of Nashua and Durham, which will increase the burden on the municipal resources (personnel and equipment) for those communities still participating. According ,to Rev. 2, the peak summer ' midweek population is 142,929. A high percentage of the evacuating population could require monitoring and decontamination under plausible accident scenarios. Even lesser percentages would overwhelm the facilities and personnel available to perform monitoring and decontamination services. The decontamination centers' procedures and facilities are now more adequately described than heretofore, though how contaminated areas of the decontamination centers are to be vacuumed or otherwise decontaminated to prevent individuals from becoming contaminated at the facility is not well described. There is still no storage capability for waste water that will result from the washing of evacuees and their vehicles. The State of New- Hampshire still contemplates dilution as the solution to this hazardous . pollution problem. That is not a satisfactory answer and could lead to a public risk for the residents of the host communities . The Decontamiantion Supervisor Pool at Vol. 4 A , p. A-2 lists an "R. Letellier" as a possible supervisor for three centers, "E. Thompson" for two centers and "C. Albano" for two centers. If these are actually the same people listed ' more than once, as it appears, this creates the .4 i false impression that there is a larger pool of potential supervisors than actually are available. l l

59. FEMA RESPCNSE 'IO SADL 7 In the December 1986 review of the New Hampshire State and Host Community Planning, FEMA and the PAC examined the provisions for the registration and mnitoring of evacuees at reception centers. Plannirg Standard J.12 of FEMA REP-1 defines the requirements which must be met. The RAC concluded that the State Plan contained adequate provisions for the registration and nonitoring of evacuees, (page 98 of State Plan RAC Review) but the host plans do not adequately describe the resources (equipment and personnel to support the nonitoring and decontamination operatiors for the anticipated number of evacuee arrivals in about a 12-hour period (page 15 of Host Plans FAC Beview). As indicated by the RAC in its review of the host ccmmunity plans (Section III, pages 10 and 15), the descriptions of the number of staf f members required for nonitoring and decontamination activities is provided in Appendix B3 of each host conmunity plan. However, it is impossible to assess from the plans if the number of staff positions are adequate to support the operations for the anticipated number of evacuee arrivals in a 12-hour period, and if there are enough. trained personnel available locally to fill the required number of staff positions. Call list resters for local personnel (see Appendix B9) are not yet available. In addition, it is also not knoan if the number of monitoring instruments available (see Section II. E.4) is sufficient to support the operations. Section II.E.4 of each of the host coumunity plans refers to CDV-700 survey mters. Although the meters are also listed on the inventory sheets provided in Apendix B8, there is no indication on the inventory as to the quantity of survey meters (ard dosimeters)'on hand (see . Bi-1). It is rectmnended that the total number of each item on hand be indicated on the , inentory sheets. The RAC recommended that in order to clarify the capabilities and adequacy of resources to perform the nonitoring and decontamination op3ra- ~ tions, the plans should clarly specify the assumptions used in preparing the staffirg lists indicated in Appendix B3 and the equipnent resources indicated in Section II.E.4. , (i.e. , what are the total number of evacuees expected to arrive at the nonitoring and decontamination facilities of the reception center, and what percent cf the evacuated population does this number represent?) It is FEMA's position, as articulated in the memrandum frun J Richard Krimm to all FEMA regions, dated Decenber 24, 1985, that provisions for nonitoring evacuees must address at least 20% of the total EPZ population (see Appendix B for a copy of this menorandum). The RAC found that Appendix F of the DPHS procedures specifies appropriate criteria for decontamination and that the facilities for conducting decon-tamination are acceptable (pg. 109 and pgs. 110-112 of RAC Review of State Plan, elenents K.5a and K.5b). Letters of agreement with host coumunity personnel and fucilities are not necessary, since they constitute local governnent organizations.

               .                                                                                                 60.

SAPL Cont:ntion 8 f The New . Hampshire State and local plans fail to meet the requirements that there be adequate manpower and 24-hour per day emergency response. including 24-hour per day manning of communications links , as required by 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(a)(1), 5 50.47(b)(1), 5 50.47(b)(2), and NUREG-0654 II. A. l .e , II. A.4. and II . F .1. a . Contention 8 A: The New !!ampshire Compensatory Plan fails to meet the requirements that there be adequate manpower and 24 hour per day emergency response, including 24 hour per day manning of communications links, as NUREG-0654 I 50.47(a)(1), 5 50.47(b)(1), required by 10 C.F.R. II . A . l . c. , II . A . 4. , and II. F.1. a. FEMA RESPONSE: In its Dec.1986 review of Rev. 2 of the New Hampshire Radiological Duergency Pasponse Plans for Seabrook, FEMA and the Pegional Assistance Committee (RAC) reviewed all municipal (EPZ) plans for their capacity to provide for 24-hour continuous operation for a protracted period. Specif-ically Planning Standard A.4 fran FEMA-REP-1 defines this requirement. On page 6 of the Dec.1986 RAC Review of Rev. 2 Municipal Plans, FEMA found that many key emergency response positions do not have a back-up listed for second shift responsibilities. Based on these review findings, ' FEMA does not have assurance that the EPZ municipalities can fully implement their plans. In Volume 2, Appendix G of the State Plan (Compensatory Plan), the State has clearly canitted its personnel and equipnent resources to providing support to municipalities where the required emergency response exceeds ' the capabilities of the municipalities. Since many of the municipal plans, in their respective Appendix A, indicate an insufficient second shift capability, it is quite conceivable that the State may have to canmit sane of its limited personnel resources to assisting one or more local connunity in implementing its emergency response due to the unavailability of the primary local responder. In addition, there are currently six connunities who have indicated they will not participate in the planning prcx:ess. The State will have to fully compensate for those communities. In its June 1986 RAC Review of Rev.1 of the NH Compensatory Plan for Seabrook Station, FEMA found that the plans did not adequately identify the personnel to carry out the State's Cbnpensatory Plan. The State responded to this by indicating that a resource allocation study was being conducted to identify the personnel and equignent necessary to implement local and state plans, coverina all functions. Rev. 2 of the NH olans 1 still does not contain the results of this personnel allocation study. FEMA's findings are found on page 3 of the December 1986 RAC Review of the New Hampshire Canpensatory Plan for Seabrook. Until New Hampshire develops this information as part of its planning base, FEMA has no basis to change its determination that the State has not demonstrated that it has adequate personnel resources to canpensate for the non-participation or supplemental needs of the EPZ communities. (See RAC Review of the Compensatory Plan, pages; 3(A.4), 6(H.4), 7(H.10)]. ~ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

SAPL Contention' No.15 . .61. SAPL razsserts - Rsdraftsd SAPL Contsntion No.15 and- the basis for that contention in SAPL's filing of April 8,1986. Redrafted SAPL Contention No.15 The letters of agreement that have been submitted by the N.H. Civil Defense Agency 'in Volume 5 of the State plan fail to meet the' require-ments' of 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1),150.47(b)(1), $50.47(b)(3), 559.47(b)(12), Appendix E.II.B. and NUEEG-0654 II. A.3. , II.C.4. , and II.P.4. because

                                                            - they do not demonstrate that . adequate arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been reade , - that 'the ernergency responsibilities of the various supporting organizations have been specifically _ established.. that each principal response organization has staff to respond or to augment its initial response on a continuous basis, or that agreements are being reviewed and certified to be current on an annual basis as is required.

FEMA RESPONSES ( AMENDMENTS AND FURTHER DASIS) FEMA has addressed the redraf ted ard amended Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL) Contention No.15 and its basis of inadequate letters of agree-ment by applying Planning Standards A, C, and J (Evaluation Criteria A.3, C.4, and J.10g) in FEMA-REP-1. On December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans reflect FENA's views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review comments on the New Hampshire State plan on this issue are provided on pages 10, 12, 19 and 74-b of Section' I, and on pages 1 and 2 of the Istters of Agreement subsection of . - Section IV. FEMA's review ccmments on the meicipal plans on this issue are provided on page 3 of Section III. FEMA relied upon the following document in forming its conclusions on-this issue: Revision 2 to the New Hasnpshire State plan, Revision 2 to the municipal plans. FEMA does not yet have assurance of the adequacy of the written agree-ments. As noted in the December 15, 1986 RAC review, evaluation criteria element A.3 is considered inadequate due to the fact that the State plan does not contain all letters of agreement which have been referenced in the host emnunity plans (see pages 10 and 12 of Section I RAC review). Other aspects of resource assistance and letters of agreenent are generally considered adequate by the RAC. Responses to specific contention issues are provided below. i

                                                                                                                                                        '1 i

I m______ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . - _ _

SADL 15 (Cont.) 62. By way of amendment and statement of further basis, SAPL holds as follows:

1) Though the Coast Guard and Hew Hampshire Towing Association agreements are now signed, the USAF agreement has wholly disappeared.

There is thus no assurance that Pease AFB will make its hospital and runway facilities available, which are key in the emergency response effort for Seabrook Station. Civil Air Patrol flights must be able to fly into Pease for transport of- officials and radiological samples. The agreement with the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has also disappeared. FEMA RESPCNSE

1) The written agreements with the U.S. Air Force (Pease AFB) and Portsmouth Naval Shipyard have been deleted from the plan. Inclusion of these letters is not required since assistance by these federal f acilities could be provided under the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FRERP). A copy of the FRERP is now provided in Volume 5 of the State plan. In a separate letter included in Appendix H of State plan Volume 2, the U.S. Air Force Hospital at Pease Air Force Base has indicated its willingness to make its hospital facilities available during a radiological emergency to the extent that such care to civilian casualties does not interfere with its primary responsibility to active duty military personnel.
                                                                    ~
2) There are no letters of agreement with the reception centers and mass care facilities in the local communities and letter agreements are missing for certain of the host care facilities for special facilities in the EPZ (egs. Goodwin's of Exeter, Eventide Home, Seacoast Ilealth Center).

The RAC specifically asked these agreements (Reply to RAC, P.10 of - 134). FENA RESPONSE i l

2) The American Red Cross ( ARC) is responsible for providing mass care to individuals evacuated from the plune exposure EPZ (see State Plan, page 1.3-17). A written agreement between the ARC and the State of New Hampshire is included in Volume 5 of the State plan. As noted on page 10 of the Decanber 1986 BAC review of the State plan (Section I), the RAC found that the Red Cross letter of agreenent adequately denenstrates an ability to open and staff planned mass care facilities. However, as noted on page 12 of the RAC review (Section I), other letters of agreement are referenced in the host ccnmunity plans as being available in Volume 5 of the State plan (see page I-19 of Manchester and Salem plans, and page I-20 of Dover and Rochester plans). The RAC found this item to be inadequate because no letters of agreement related to mass care are present in Volume l 5 of the State Plan for the following private organizations:

a r SAPL 15 (Cont.) 63.

  • Salvation Anny l
  • New Hamoshire College
  • Notre Dame College and Parochial Schcol 1
  • District Nursing Association
  • Salem Boys Club
  • Pochester Catholic School
            ' Rochester Day Care Center
                                                                                                  ]

4 Although not specifically noted in the RAC review, it is correct that there are also no letters of agreenent in the plans from the host facilities for residents of the following special facilities: Goodwin's of Exeter (Volume l 26A), Eventide Hane (Volune 26A), and the Seacoast Health Center (Volume 18A). Page A-2 of Attachment A of each of the preceeding special facilities have been received, written confirmations are " currently under review." These . written agreements should be provided in the plans.  ;

3) Though the N.!!. Towing Association letter is now signed, there is still no letter of agreement with Rockingham County to assure that the Dis,satch Center can be used. This facility i's key in the emergency notification scheme.

FEMA RESPONSE

3) A letter of agreement with the Rockingham County Sheriff's Depart:nent is present in Volume 5 of the State plan. Notification procedures for the Rockingham County Dispatch Center are also fully described in the Procedures section of the State plan (Volume 4B).
4) Though a letter of agreement has been secured with the Federal Aviation A administration , there is still no letter of agreement with New England Telephone. The November 1965 draft of the NHRERP stated that it was "on file. " It has not yet surfaced in the plans.

FEMA RESPONSE

4) Volume 5 of the State plan does not contain a letter of agreement with New England Telephone. However, the need for such a letter is not aoparent.

SaPL 15 (Cont.) 64. ! 5) The letter of agreement with Teamsters Local No. 633 does not provide the requisite reasonable assurance that sufficient drivers will be uvallable to make up the shortfall of drivers indicated by the letters cf agreement with the specific bus companies.* Many of the drivers would have prior commitments to be coing other jobs, the individual members cf the union have in no way demonstrated their willingness to perform these functions or and are where they there is no indication relative of how to the location the buses. of the drivers would be notified

   .         FD4A RESPONSE
5) The PAC has concluded (see page 74-b of Section I of PAC review of State plan, and page 1 of Section IV PAC review of letters of agreenent) that the State plan properly allows for the fact that not all bus canpanies have as many drivers willing to serve as they hae buses that would be made available. The letter of agreenent with Teamsters Local No. 633 of New Hampshire (Volume 5 of State Plan) provides for the Local to provide as many as 1,500 j.

parsonnel, a number well in excess of any foreseeable needs, to drive trans-portation vehicles as needed during major emergencies. However, FD% does not yet have assurances that there are procedures in place for nobilizing the Teamsters from their places of employnent.

6) The letter signed by OMNE Partners II on July 31,1986 may or may not remain current for a reasonable period of time since OMNE is in a bankruptcy proceeding. Therefore , there is no assurance that this transportation staging area will indeed be available, j FEMA RESPONSE 1

i

6) The letter of agreement with CMNE Partners II provides for the  !

availability of the OMNE Mall parking areas as a transportation staging ' l area. Theletter of agreement also clearly states that, "this agreement is subject to renegotiation at such time as ownership of the property is conveyed fran CNNE Partners II to another party." l 1 l l l

SAPL 15 (Cont.) BASIS: 65. NUREG-)654 II. A .3. requires that each plan include written letters of agreement referring to the concept of operations between Federal, State and local agencies and other support organizations having an emer-gency response role within the EPZ. The agreements are supposed to identify the emergency measures to be provided and the mutually accept-able criterie for their implementation and specify the arrangements for the exchange of information. NUREG-0654 II. C. 4 states that each organi-zation shall identify nuclear and other facilitics . organizations or individuals which can be relied upon in an emergency to provide assistance and that such assistance "shall be identified and supported by appropriate letters of agreement." NUREG-0654 II.P.4 states that each organization shall update its plan and agreements as needed, review and certify it to be current on an annual basis. The letters of agreement in Volume 5 of the State plan do not suffice to satisfy these requirements for the following reasons: a) Some of the letters of agreement bear no signature. The New England Interstate Radiological Assistance Compact has no signature page to validate it. The letter of agreement between New Ilampshire Ycnkec and the State of New Hampshire and Massachusetts is neither completed, nor signed. The Memorandum of Understanding with the Coast Guard has i a typed in name, but no sign at ure . The agreement with the New liampshire Towing Association is not signed . (A prospective date of j 11/27/86 appears on the agreement.) The Memorandum of Understanding ' Between the USAF and the State of New Hampshire is nct signed nor dated. FEMA RESPONSE (BASIS) (a) Many of the letters of agreement have been updated for Revision 2 to the plan. With only a few exceptions, the letters and agreenents have been signed. Letters of agreements which are unsigned include: "

  • Agreenent between New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Canpany of New Hampshire and the states of New Hampshire and Massachusetts (unsigned by Massachusetts representative, as noted on page 2, Section IV RAC review of Letters of Agreement).
  • New England Interstate Radiation Assistance Plan (no signature page included).
  • Agreements between radio stations WCYT/MNH, WUNH and the New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency (unsigned by either party) .
  • Memorandum of Understanding with U.S. Coast Guard (includes typed-in name for no signature of Coast Guard representative).

All other agreements have been signed, including the one with the New Hampshire Towina Association. 'Ihe menorandum of understanding with the U.S. Air Force has been deleted fran the plan (as noted above in item #1 of amended basis).

SAPL 15 ' (Cont. ) - 66. . b) There . are . no letters of agreement with many of the key response organizations and governments. For example , there are no letters of agreement with . the 17 N.II. -local communities nor are there ' letters of agreement with the host communifics. Thus, the requirements of NUREG-0654 II. A.3 are not met. FENA RESPONSE { (b) There are' no letters of agreement with the 17 New Hampshire EPZ ccumunities or with the four hest communities. The concept'of operations for

                . emergency response by the local communities is provided.in the radiological               !
    ~

energency response plans for these communities. If specific communities are unable to implement their plans, the State of New Hampshire.would assume responsibility for implementation of the plans under provisions of the State compensatory plan. c) Some of the agreements date back a number of years. For example, the New England State Police Compset is dated 6/69. Clearly , the specifics of any. emergency response for the area surroundin'g Seabrook Station were not contemplated when this compact was signed. This is contrary to the requirements of NUREG-0654 II.P.4. FENA RESPONSE (c) Although the fact that an agreement is old does not necessarily negate its applicability, it would appear prudent for the state during its annual . review and update of the plan to confirm that old agreements, such as the New England State Policy Compact, are applicable to a radiological emergency response at Seabrook. d) There are not letters of agreement with School Administrative Units , schools , teachers, owners of towing companies (other than the unsigned postdated agreement with the New England Towing Association mentioned above), day care centers, . nursing homes. Rockingham County Dispatch, but drivers or other organizations or individuals to - be relied upon to provide assistance in an emergency as reouired by NUREG-0654 II . C . 4. FENA RESPCNSE (d) Letters of agreement with individual teachers and bus drivers are not included in the plan. However, letters of agreement with those organiza-tions supplying bus drivers (e.g. , bus canpanies and Teamsters Local No. 633) are present in Volume 5 of the State Plan. Iatters of agreenent with towing coupanies are also now present in Revision 2 of the plan (Volume 5). Also see FENA response to items #2 and #3 of the amanded basis given above for - letters of agreement which are present or absent fran Rev. 2 to the plan. . l

6 SAPL 15' (Cont.) 67. e) ~ There is no showing thst ths FAA Concord Flight Ssrvics Agreement or the agreement. with New England Telephone are sufficient to establish the ~ responsibilities of those organizations as required by 10 C.F.R. 150.47(b)(1) because those letters are not provided in Volume 5 - but are said to- be "on file." FEMA RESPONSE (e) Revision 2 of the Stataplan (Volume 5) now contains a letter of agreenent with the FAA. As noted in the above FEMA response to item #4 of the amended basis, there is still no letter of agreement with New England Telephone. However, the need for such a letter is not apparent. f) The letters of agreement with hospitals include a number of letters from hospitals which are not listed in the New Hampshire State Plan (see p.2.8-5 for the list. ) It is very clear to SAPL why these letters even appear in Volume 5. For example, the October 0,1985 letter from Alice Park Day Memorial Hospital in Lebanon, New Hampshire states

                               "...because APD is a small hospital with extremely limited resources, it is unable to handle radiation victims. " The October 7, 1985 letter from Valley Regional Hospital similarly states, " . .the pflysical design of our facility , and in particular. cur emergency receiving area, would make appropriate isolation of. the contaminated . patient impossible. "       SAPL believes that all extraneous letters from entities not to be counted upon in an emergency response should be removed from Volume 5. It seems SAPL that it would only add to the difficulty emergency responders face              .

in making appropriate referrals to have non-applicable information' to sift through. The letters from hospitals that are listed in the State plan do not demonstrate that the requirements of 10 C.F.R. 550.47(b)(12) have been met. There is no letter for Newport IIospital, which is listed in the state p lan . Pease Air Force Base Hospital states, "We are willing to cooperate fully with civilian hospitals and disaster authorities is assisting with care of civilian causalities to the extent that such care does not interfere with our primary responsibilities to active duty military personnel." (emphasis added) There is, therefore7 no assurance that this hospital's resources will be available to civilians. Further, as was stated previously in SAPL Contention A4, Please is just a short distance beyond the EPZ boundary and could under certain circumstances need to be evacuated. The letter provided for iluggins Hospital is illegible. The letter for Lakes Regional General Hospital in Laconia dated 10/15/85 states ". . .we recognize our responsibilities to treat such cases that occur in our service area and to y help neighboring hospitals that may be faced with more casualties thit they can treat as a result of a disaster situation." (emphasis added) Seabrook Station and its EPZ are not in the Lakes Region General Hospital servict area nor are the hospitals in the Seabrook EPZ neighboring hospitals. The letter from Catholic Medical Center dated 10!!7/65 states l I 1

5 SRPL :15 (Cont. ) 68. that a letter written by Dr. Windler on 1/6/84 still holds. No copy of the 1/6/84 letter is provided. For these and other reasons, the letters of -l agreement . from hospitals included in Volume 5 of the State ;ilan do not E provide support for a finding that adequate arrangements for me' dical services for contaminated injured individuals have been made. FEMA RESPONSE - (f) The. letters of agreement with hospitals having radiological emer-gency capability are' presented in Appendix H of the State plan (Volume 2,

             'Rev. 2). H e letters are now consistent with the listing presented on                                          !
     ,        Table .2.8-1 of the State plan (pages 2.8-5, -Sa, and -5b). A letter from Newport Hospital is also included in the revised plan.

De letter frcm Pease Air Force Base Hospital indicates that this military hospital is willing to cooperate and assist in the care of civilian casualties to the extent that such care does not interfere with the h pital's

              " primary responsibility-to active duty military personnel." Although there is no assurance that this hospital's resources will be available to civilians, its inclusion with the other hospitals is appropriate in the plan since it represents a resource which potentially might be available in a radiological emergency.
                   . The letter frcm Lakes Regional General Hospital reflects the hospital's responsibility to " treat such cases that occur in our service area and to help neighboring hospitals that may be faced with more casualties than they can treat as a result of a disaster situation." ne fact that Seabrook Station and its EPZ may not literally be "in the Lakes. Region General Hospital service area," and the hospitals in the Seabrook EPZ may not literally be
              " neighboring hospitals" probably does not negate lhe hospitals' willingness to provide the specialized medical services in a radiological energency.
                                                                                                                          ~

Both the 10-17-85 and the earlier 1-6-84 letters from the Catholic Medical Center are now included in Appendix H of the revised State plan (Volume 2). g) Many of the letters are too non-specific and do not demonstrate that adequate arrangements for requesting and effectively using assistance resources have been made. The concept of operations is not clearly defined. For example, the R.S. Landauer, Jr. & Co. letter of 12/30/83 does not tell how fast the . company can provide film badges. (The letter also needs to be updated as required by NUREG-0654 II.P.4.) The Memorandum of Understanding between the USAF and the State of New Hampshire makes no reference to an accident at Seabrook, and, as was mentioned above, it is unsigned and undated. FEMA RESPONSE (g) An updated letter frcm R. S. Landauer, Jr. , & Col, dated 3-3-86 is now included in Revision 2 of the State plan (Volune 5). The letter provides information on the required logistics and time frame for providing readouts of badges which are being supplied. De Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Air Force has been deleted from the State plan. (Also see FEMA response to above item #1 in the amended basis.)

STtPL 15 (Cont.) 69. h) The letters of agreement with bus companies provide no assurance that bus drivers will be available to drive buses into the EPZ. In some cases their [ sic] are too few drivers for the number of buses to be provided by a company under the plans. JanCar Leasing Corporation. for example, is to provide 197 buses, but only lists 150 drivers. SAPL l also is concerned that some of the buses that are alleged to be available  ! during emergencies might be chartered out or otherwise not available. FEMA RESPCNSE (h) In regard to the availability of bus drivers to drive evacuation buses, see the FEMA response to above item #5 in the anended basis. i) The letters of agreement with ambulance companies do not , support a finding of reasonable assurance that adequete protective I measures can and will be taken. Most, if not all, of the companics listed are a minimum of 1 hour's drive from the EPZ. None of the companies except Berlin Emergency Medical Services . Inc . state how many ambulances and what personnel are available. That company's letter notes that "If the patient is in a hazardous area, we usually have to wait on the outskirts until the patient is brought to us. This might be signifi-cant in the event of a disaster involving the nuclear plans." For all of the above cites reasons, the letteres of agreement fail to support the requisite 10 C.F.R 950.47(a)(1) finding of reasoncble assurance that adeouate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Scabrook Station. FEMA RESPONSE (i) Ambulance providers are located both within and outside of the EP2. As noted in State Plan Section 2.8.3 (page 2.8-2), ambulance provichrs frcm outside the EPZ will provide nonemergency medical transportation (i.e. , evacuation) of nobility-impaired persons. Emergency medical services from within the EPZ will maintain emergency medical transportation. Iatter of agreement with ambulance providers are included in Volume 5 of the State plan. All letters in the revised plan (Rev. 2) now state the number and type of medical transport vehicles available as well as the number of EMrs. We August 1986 letter of agreement with Berlin Emergency Medical Serices no longer states that "if the patient is in a hazardous area, wa usually have to wait on the outskirts until the patient is brought to us." he RAC review indicated (pacx3 10 of Section I) that accordir.g to estimates of ambulance needs, an adequate number of letters of agreement with ambulance companies have been signed. In addition, names and addresses l of numerous ambulance ccxnpanies for which there are no letters of agreenent are provided as an additional resource. l_ - - - - -

1

    - ,                                                                                                                          , 70.

p ~ p ' SAPL' Contention 16 - l . L .The New ~ Ilampshire .. ~ State and local plans -do not make i adequate L Provisions for. the sheltering of.various segments of the populace in the- [ = EPZ and: therefore the plans fail to meet e the requirements of 10 C.F.R. ? $50.47(a)(1),-. 550.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.10.a, and m. Li n .. . FD% RESPONSEg See FEMA Response to NECNP-RERP-8

  /

O 4 e .2

e

c. .
                                                                                                       .q 71.

1

              -SAPL CONTErfrION 18 The NHRERP. . Rev'. 2 significantly miscalculates the numbers of non-huto owning population for the 17 New. Hampshire. local communities.                 I 1 No .: buses are , proviced in the plans for the individuals who are not.

accounted .for due' to these ' miscalculations. Therefore,- these plans fails to- meet the 2 requirements of 10 CTR 530.47(a)(1), 550.47(b)(8), NUREG-0654 II.J.10.g. and NUREG-0654 Appencdx 4, p. 4-3.

   .            FEMA RESPONSE:

The validity of the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates and incorporated into the tERERP was. challenged by~ the i following Contentions:

                                       .Hampton Revised Contention III SAPL Cbntention 18
                                         .SAPL Revised Contention 31 SAPL Contention 34         -

SAPL Contention 37 At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, si;iecifically evaluating them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. 'Ihe  : RAC found the ETEs sufficiently ccmplied with the guidance contained in l Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate -! basis for protective action decision-making. FEMA concurs in that view. The views of the RAC were expressed in further detail in the December 15, .. 1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP. - The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing is Dr. "Ihanas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed the ETEs and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards set forh in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1 Rev.1. 'Ihe NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony.  ! l l l

                                                                                                       )
                                                  .c                                                              .

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72. c . AMENDED SAPL CONIDTfION No. 25 The .New Hampshire State and local radiological' emergency ' response - plans do not; reasonably assure that the public health and;. safety will adequately be . protected; because; the ' provisions for : protecting those persons whose mobility 'may be impaired due to such . factors as institu-tional or. othericonfinement are patently lacking. Therefore, the plans. do not meet? the ' requirements of - 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1) . : 550.~47(b)(8) and . I

                                             ' NUREG-0654 II.J 10.d. .
      -                                                             By: way of amendment- and additional basis                   SAPL states as follows:

The Exeter Hospital Radiological Emergency Response Plan contained in Volume :26A' of. the . NHRERP Rev. 2 does not support a finding that

                                             ;     there will.be' adequate care provided for those pstients classified as Cate-gory. IE (Advanced Care Required; or Category IV. (School. Dus) because the -letters , of agreement .with ~ the host hospitals for Exeter. Hospital do not
indicate that any of . these ' facilities have the willingn'ess or facilities to take - these patients. Catholic Medical Center and . Concord Hospital: only assert 'a willingness to accept ' Class II anc Class III. patients. . Hampstead
                                               - Hospital's letter: is non-specific' in regard to how: many or what category of patients it will accept and does not support a finding that these                                           i patients' will be ' cared for.                           There is, therefore, no reasonable assurance that these Individuals will be adequately provided for.,

Further, at page 15 of the Exeter Hospital Ra'diological Emergency Responso Plan, it states: Patients- aged 55 years old or considered too critical for ~ transport should be consiciered . candidates for sheltering rather than evacuation. - Coordinate with DPHS. FEMA RESPONSE: FEMA has addressed the amended Seacoast Anti-Pollution Imague (SAPL) Contention tb. 25 and 'its basis of inadequate provisions for protecting institutionalized mobility-impaired persons by applying-Planning Standards A, C, and J (Evaluation Criteria A.3, 'C.4, J.10.d and J.10m) in FEMA REP-1. The December 15, 1986 RAC Review of the State and municipal plans L reflect FEMA's views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review conments on the New Hampshire State Plan on this issue are provided on pages 10, 12,. 87 and' 88 of Section I . FEMA's review ccuments on the municipal plans on this issue are provided on page 19 of Section II. l

M 1A RESPONSE 73. l AMENDED SAPL CON'I'ENTION NO. 25 (Cont.) FEMA relied upon the following documents in forming its conclusions on this issue: Revision 2 to the thw Hampshire State Plan; Revision 2 to the municipal plans. FEMA does not yet have assurance, based on the available letters of agreement, that there are adequate provisions for protecting instituion-alized persons. The December 15, 1986 RAC Review of the State and local plans for evaluation criteria element J.10.d indicated that plan revisions adequately treated protection of the mobility impaired (see page 67 of Section I, State Plan review; and page 19 of Section II, local plan review). However, the RAC Peview did not ecmrent on the fact that letters of agreement with the host hospitals for evacuated patients from Exeter Hospital do not include provisione for acceptance and care of Category I-and Category IV patients. 'Ihe letters frca Concord Ibspital and Catholic Medical Center only indicate their agreement to accept Class II and Class III patients (see Attachment A to Exeter Ebspital Radiological anergency Response Pian in Volume 26A of plans). The letter frcm Hampstead Hospital is non-specific. Mditional information needs to be provided in the agreements and plans to clarify how ' Category I and Category IV patients from Exeter tbspital will be protected in the event of a radiological emergency. In regard to the shelterirg of Exeter tbspital patients " aged 55 years old or considered too critical for transport,".rather than evacuate them, State Plan Section 2.6.5 indicates that New Hampshire relies on two protective actions for limiting the direct exposure of the general publaic within the Plume Exposure EPZ. These two protective actions are sheltering and evacuation (State Plan, page 2.6-4) . 'Ihe decision whether to shelter or evacuate is based on several variables, including dose reduction factors due to sheltering (State Plan, page 2.6-29). State Plan Section 2.6.5 - (page 2.6-6) indicates that New Hampshire employs the " Shelter-in-Place" concept if sheltering is the chosen protective action. In regard to sheltering residents of special facilities such as Exeter Ibspital the State indicates that sheltering is the preferred protective action (State Plan, page 2.6-7). FEMA concludes that the plans have been adequately revised to take into account the sheltering protec-tion f actors for special facilities (RAC Review, Section I, page 67). A special tabulation of specific protection factors for each of the facilities (including Exeter tbspital) is present in Table 2.6-3 of the State Plan (RAC Review, Section I, page 67) . 'Ihe RAC Review (Section I, page 88) indicates that the flow diagram in the State Plan (Fig. 2.6-7) now properly reflects the decision-making process for the election between sheltering and evacuation, and that the treatment of institutionalized is now adequately detailed. Relative to the lack of written agreements with the host facilities for residents of certain special facilities (Seacoast thalth Center in

i 74. j FD1A RESIGSES AMENDED SAPL' CONTENTION NO. 25 (Cont.) i Hampton, Goodwin's of Exeter, and Eventide Ibme of Exeter), and the lack of written agreements for reception and mass care facilities, see the FEMA response to Item #2 in the amended and redraf ted SAPL Contention tb.15. The basis for the contention statement that "O'Brien Ambulance of Beverly, Massachusetts, has stated thata the campany will not be able to participate in any type of reeponse in the Seabrook area" is unknown. The Letter of Agreement with O'Briedn Anbulance, Inc. (January 1986) provided

                .in W1ume 5 of the State Plan makes no such statement.

e l L ____ _ _ . _ _

J 75.' Revised SAPL Contention No. 31: The evacuation time estimate report, as described in Volume 6 of

                    - NHRERP Rev. 2 does not meet the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1),

550.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 II.J.2 II . J .10, i, 10 h and 10 1, r.nd Appendix 4 because it fails to account properly for the number of vehicles that would be evacuating the EPZ: relies in part upon unsupported ' assumptions; relies in. part upon potentially biased input data: does not rely upon an extensive enough empirical base; relies upon traffic control personnel not shown 'to be available doe snot appropriately j account for travel . impediments such. as flooding, snow, fog and icing of roadways; does not account ' ' for the effect of driver disobedience on evacuation time estimates ( ET E's ) ; . doe snot appropriately deal with , topographical features; does not deal realistically with the transport of 1 transit dependent ' persons; in some instances overestimates . roadway { I capacity and. .for all of these reasons, underestimates the amount of time

                    'it would take to evacuate the EPZ and it subparts (" Regions") under the various scenarios analyzed.

FEMA RESPONSE: The validity of the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates and incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the following Contentions: , Hampton Revised Contention III SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Revisad Contention 31 SAPL Cbntention 34 - SAPL Contention 37 , At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, specifically evaluating l them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. The RAC found the ETEs sufficiently ccrnplied with the guidance contained in - Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate basis for protective action decision-inaking. FEMA concurs in that view. The views of the RAC were expressed in further detail in the December 15, 1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP. The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing is Dr. Thomas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed the ETEs and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards set forh in NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1 Rev.1. The NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony. 1 i I l l

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x J' ji , l l 1  ; SAPL Contention No. 33 - - 7 l -! Contrary)to' the requirements of 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1), ISO.47(b)(8), 550.4 7(b)(D), ' 550.4 7(b)(10) and NUREG-0054 II.J.12, there is no showing . that NHRERP . Rev. 2 provides adegnately for th6 registration and_.meni-  !

                             . toring of evacuees at 'receptfora centers within about a 12-hour "heriod.                                                            -{

B ASIS :' ( , The NhRERP' Rev. 2 ' has reduced the number of host communities

        .                       from six communities down to four communities in eliminating Nashua and -                                                               ,

Durham., This has, had .the resultant effect of lessening the ~ base of ' municipal . resources that can be drawn upon to . assist the evacuating

                             - population ' and has reduced the likelihood, ,.which was not great before ,                                                           ..

that all evacuees seeking assistance . would infaed be ar.sisted within the - / time frame set?forth in NUREG-0654 as reasori'able, i.e. , about a 12-hour "'4 period. The ' ratei at which evacuees can .2 be processed through the remaining Soception :ind decontamination facilities ~ has not in any fashion

                             - been estabilched in the planc. . Therefore, reasonable - assurance has not                                                                i been demonstrated- that any significant fraction of the summer midweek population of . 142,929 estimated in the~se plans for the New Hampshire
                             - portion of the. EPZ could be assured the requGMs assistance in the speci-fled time frame. p                                            /

FEMA RESPCMSE: . f

                                                                                                                                   /

Refer to ItEMA Response for SAPL Contantion '7f f .. . Y l e

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             .;                                  The New Hampshire State and local plans do not meet the reouire-
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                                ,      ment that there be maps showing the population distribution around the                                  j j                                       facility as required at NUP.EG-0654 J.10.b. and Appendix 4. Therefore .                                J l                                     y there is no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can                                  !

j' and will be taken purnuant 10 CFF 550.47(a)(1) and $50.47(b)(10). l ! r,,, FEMA RESP 0tiSE: i

                                                                                                                                               )

The validitysoti the Evacuation' Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates rnd incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the f allwitxj Cont (ntions: l 7 / \ Hampton Revi, sed Contention III SAPL, Contsution 18

e SAPL RMised Contention 31 i

(- SAPLContfatior14 - { SAPL Contention 27 At FEMNs request, the fM reviewed the ETEs, specifically evaluating them against the guidance set ilmth, in NtTREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.l. The RAC found the ETEs suff>iciently ecmplied with the guidance contained in - Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate basis for protective action decision-making. FEMA concurs in that view. The views of the RAC were, expressed in further detail in the December 15, 1986, RAC Paview of Revidion 2 of the NHRERP. The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing

                            ;'          ici Dr. Thcznau Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed                       ~
                  "                     the CEES and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards
                            '          set forh in NUREG-0654, FE;4A REP-1 Rev. 1.                    The NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony.

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( . 78. E SAPL Contention No. 37

      }

The . NHRERP ~ Rev. 2' fails to provide reasonable assurance of adequate public protection because an adequate number of emergency vehicles are not pmvided for in the plans and further there is no

                                                  - assurance that effective use of these vehicles will be possible in view of a potentiki -outgoing ' flow of evacusting traffic and a significant lack of i                                                  . drivers .      Therefore. these_ plans do not ceet the requirements of ~ 10 CFR
                                                  ~ 550.47(a)(1),- 150.47(b)(3).150.47(b)(10) and NUREG-0654 11.J.10.g. and II . J .10. k .

FEMA RESPONSE: The validity of the Evacuation Time Estimates (ETEs) prepared by KLD Associates and incorporated into the NHRERP was challenged by the following Contentions: Hampton Revised Contention III SAPL Contention 18 SAPL Bevised Contention 31 SAPL Contention 34 - SAPL Contention 37 At FEMA's request, the RAC reviewed the ETEs, specifically evaluating them against the guidance set forth in NUREG-0654, FEKA REP-1, Rev.l. The RAC found the ETEs sufficiently cmplied with the guidance contained in Appendix III of NUREG-0654, FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 so as to serve as an adequate

  • basis for protective action decisiormaking. FEMA concurs in that view.

The views of the RAC were expressed in.further detail.in the December 15, 1986, RAC Review of Revision 2 of the NHRERP. . The witness who will address these issues at the licensing hearing is Dr. Thomas Urbanik, a recognized expert in the field. He has reviewed the ETEs and has also concluded that they are adequate under the standards set forh in NUREG-0654, FDiA REP-1 Rev.1. The NRC staff has consulted with Dr. Urbanik on other evacuation time estimate studies and will sponsor his testimony. i r u__m_.__m._____

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NECNP Contention NHLP-4 Procedures to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway EPZ,10 CFR 50.47(b)(5), are inadequate. Limited t'o notification of persons with special notification needs. FEMA Re<iponse: FEMA has addressed NECNP Contention NHLP-4 and its basis that the' local pi, ins do not make adequate provision for notification of people with' special 10tification needs oy applying Planning Standard E (Evaluation Criteria E.5) in FEMA-REP-1. I The December 15, 1986 RAC review of the State and municipal plans reflects FEMA's views on this issue. Specifically, FEMA's review comments on the New Hampshire State Plan on this issue are provided on pages 24 and 25 of Section I and on page 8 of Section II (local plans). b FEMA found that the local and State plans do not indicate procedures for identifying and distributing tooe-alert radios to new businesses and residents. Also, Section II B of the local plans do not specify by what means instructions are previded to the hearing impaired to enable them to understand what they are to do after receiving a visual signal on the visual-alerting radio receivers.

SOUTH HAMPTON CONTENTION 8 The RERP for South Hampton fails to provide reasonable assurance because. contrary to NUREG-0654 J.10.d. it fails to provide for adequate transpor-tation arrangements for the evacuation of mobility-impaired individuals (subject to institutional or other confinement) and that adequate arrange-ments have not been made to identify and transport persons who do not own an automobile. Limited to mobility-impaired individuals and transport dependent persons. FEMA Response: 1 FEMA has addressed Town of South Hampton Contention-8 and its basis that the South Hampton local plan does not provide for adequate transpor-tation arrangements for mobility-impaired and transport dependent persons by applying Planning Standard J (Evaluation Criteria J.10.d) in FEMA-REP-1. i The December 15. 1986 RAC review of State, municipal, and Compensatory Plans reflects FEMA's reviews on this issue. Specifically. FEMA's review comments on this issue are provided on pages 66.and 67 of Section 1, (State Plan). page 19 of Section II (Municipal Plans), and page 10 of Section IV (Compensatory Plan subsection). FEMA found that the procedures in the State and local plans were generally adequite to deal with transportation for mobility-impaired or otherwise dependent persons. However. FEMA at this time is still reserving its judgment regarding the ability of the State to implement compensatory measures for local communities in this area. See RAC consents on pg.10 - of Compensatory Plan review, and FEMA's April 15, 1987 position on the Motion for Summary Disposition of this contention. _ h-____-_______

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                                                                           ')

i i ( , I i LEITER IRTED AUGUST 7,1987 FROM H. JOSEPH FLYNN

                                              'IO 'IHOMAS G. DIGNAN, JR.

1 EXHIBIT C l l \ _ - _ - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _

i d' s %v f'* < ' t i gFederal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 [

                      '4,       ,

WP August 7, 1987 Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esquire Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, Massachusetts 02110 Re: FEMA Statement of Position on Off-site Contentions (Seabrook Station)

Dear Mr. Dignan:

On June 19, 1987, your office filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission the Applicants' Answer to Joint Motion for Leave to File a Supplement to Motions for Stay of the Partial Initial Decision Filed by Seacoast Anti-Pollution League, Attorney General James M. Shannon and Town of Hampton. The litigation involved pertains to the application of Public  ! Service Company of New Hampshire and the other owners of Seabrook Station for a low-power license, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is not directly involved in those proceedings. Nevertheless, we feel that we need to clarify our Statement of Position filed in connection with the off-site litigation on June 4, 1987, since your pleading refers to our Statement of Position and interprets it in a way that does not represent our views. Please understand that I am not challenging the legal argumentation which you assert in the low-power license matter; that would be inappropriate, since FEMA is not a party. However, it is in the interest of all the parties to the off-site litigation to understand more fully what FEMA intended by its Statement of Position on the ber2ch population issue, j 1 On page 3 of your pleading, you state: 1 In essence, it is the position of FEMA Region I that it ) must be demonstrated for every nuclear power plant site { that in the event of an extremely unlikely major j fast-breaking accident which results in a major release ir. (' one-half hour, it must be demonstrated that the emergency plan will essentially guarantee zero risk to the general . public.  ; ll There are two aspects of this statement on which FEMA wishes to comment. First, in the quote above and at several other places in your pleading, you i refer to the FEMA position filed with the off-site ASLB on June 4, 1987, as l l l t__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

I' l i l' I; representing the views of FEMA Region I. The' Answers to Interrogatories and Statement of Position represent the views of the agency, not those of a single, office within the agency. Our second point, as our Statement of Position points out at pages 38 and-39, is that FEMA's evaluation of radiological emergency response plans assumes that the range of. accidents to which the plans are intended to respond includes those with a major release in one half hour. This view is supported by the guidance provided by the NRC in NUREG-0396 and by the NRC and FEMA jointly in NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1. . It is the NRC's role, not FEMN s, to determine the nature or likelihood of the accidents to be addressed in off-site emergency planning. Our concern with evacuation time estimates has traditionally been with their accuracy because of their importance in the , making of an informed choice between sheltering or evacuation of the population potentially affected by a release from a nuclear power plant. However, the summer beach population at Seabrook is a special case since the planning effort itself reflects a lack of reliance on sheltering as a protective action. Since the only available protective action'in this case is evacuation, FEMA has also.taken into account the: time necessary for evacuation in making a judgment.about the safety of the beach population. FEMA does not hold the position that emergency plans must guarantee zero risk. Indeed,.we acknowledge that applicable guidance does not specify rigid or mechanical limits'to the injuries which a plan may unavoidably open the door for under certain accident scenarios. However, plans must address the full accident spectrum which includes the possibility of significant releases in as early as one-half hour, as the NRC has determined. FEMA has made a qualitative decision about the safety of the population of the Emergency Planning Zone in the first several hours where, under the existing plan, no sheltering option is contemplated for large numbers of people at the beach. FEMA does not hold that any level of risk is acceptable just because the dose savings are the best that can be conveniently achieved. In FEMA's view, its ultimate responsibility is to determine whether the protection afforded by a radiological emergency response plan is reasonable. Sincerely, H. Jose Flynn,

                                                                                                                           /

Assistant General Counsel j l 1 __m___.-____ - _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ . _ _ _ _ _

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                                                                                                                                                                    '87 SEP 14: P3 M0 w ci                                                                                                                  UNITED STATES OF. AMERICA h..h
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-  ; i .,; m,

                                                                                                                                     ,                                    o    a-
                                                                                                                . BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD'
                                                                                                                                                                                             . p.

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                                                                                                                                          )
                                                           ,    In the Matter of.                                                         )
                                                                                                                                          )

Public Service Co. of New Hampshire, ). . Docket No. 50-443-OL et al. ) '50-444-OL-

                                                                                                                                          )            Offsite Emergency:
                                                             -' (Seabrook Station, Units 1 & 2)                                          -)               Planning Issues.
                                                                                                                                          )
1. )-

l.. j CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

                    ,                                            _ . I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing Direct Testimony of Edward A.' Thomas,: Edward A..Tanzman, and Bruce J. Swiren on the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan.have been served on the following'by
                                                             . Express Mail service through the United States Postal Service on this J0fh day.

of September,'1987' 'l l' l.

                                                             - Helen Hoyt, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety.and Licensing Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission East West Towers Building-4350 East West' Highway-                                                                                                         ,

Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Dr. Jerry Harbour Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

                                                              -Nuclear Regulatory Commission                                                            ,

Bethesda, Maryland 20555 L I 1: Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke l .; ' Administrative Judge

  • Atomic Safety and Licensing Board L Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, Naryland 20555 l.
         ' -         --.a-.---_a-x_        --w-_ . - . _     -4.iaam._m.         _ _ _ - _ _ _ . . _   ..._u_

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                                                                 -4 4
                      .Beverly Hollingworth 209 Winnacunnet Road                      q Hampton,' . NH '. 03842                   1 L>                      Sandra Gavutis,' Chairman                    ,

Board of Selectmen  ! 1 RFD 1 Box 1154 j Route 107 Kensington,'NH 03827' Carol.S. Snieder

                     . Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General      ,

One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor

                     ' Boston, MA 02108 Stephen E. Herrill Attorney General' George Dana Bisbee.                       
. ' Office of the Attorney General 25 Capito1' Street Concord NH 03301-6397 Richard A. Hampe, Esq.
                      ,New Hampshire Civil' Defense Agency 35 Pleasant Street Concord, NH 03301-Calvin'A. Canney, City Manager City Hall 126 Daniel Street Portsmouth,'NH 03801 Roberta C. Pevear-State Representative-Town of Hampton Falls Drinkwater Road
                      .Hampton Falls., NH 03844 Robert A..Backus, Esq.
Backus,'Meyer & Solomon 116 Lowell Street Manchester, NH 03106 i Paul McEachern, Esq.

Mathew T. Brock, Esq. Shaines & McEachern Post Office Box 360  ! Portsmouth, NH 03801 i

                                                                    )

Edward A. Thomas' Federal. Emergency Management Agency 442 J.W. McCormack (POCH) Boston, MA 02109 Jane Doughty Seacoast Anti-Pollution League 5 Market Street i Portsmouth, NH 03801 Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal I Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory j Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 i Allen Lampert l Civil Defense Director  ! Town of Brentwood 20 Franklin Streat Exeter, NH 03833 1 Angie Machiros, Chairman q Board of Selectmen 25 High Road Newbury, MA 01950 Jerard A. Croteau, Constable . 82 Beach Road P.O. Box 5501 Salisbury, MA 01950 Diane Curran, Esq. Harmon & Weiss 2001 S Street, N.W. Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 Philip Ahrens, Esq. Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General State House Station, #6 Augusta, ME 04333 Thomas G. Dignan, Jr., Esq. Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board l U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ( Washington, D.C. 20555 l

Docket and Service Section Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

  ' Washington, D.C. 20555 J.P. Nadeau, Esq.-
  • Selectmen's Representative Board of Selectmen 10 Central Road Rye, NH03870 Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Board of Selectmen South Hampton, NH 01913 Mr. Robert Carrigg, Chairman Board of Selectmen Town Office Atlantic Avenue North Hampton, NH 03862 William Armstrong Civil Defense Director Town of Exeter 10 Front Street Exeter, NH 03833 -

Peter J. Matthews, Ma;>or City Hall Newburyport, MA 01950 William S. Lord Board of Selectmen Town Hall - Friend Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairman Board of Selectmen 13-15 Newmarket Road Durh:m, NH 03824 Gary W. Holmes, Esq. Holmes & Ellis 47 Winnacunnet Road , Hampton, NH 03842 1.

s. .g (

            ,.7 'Sherwin E.' Turk,.Esq.
                'OfficeLof the Executive Legal. Director' U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tenth Floor.
                  '7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814=
                ,Oreste Russ"Pirfo,: Esq.

b-

                < Office of-the: Executive Legal Director.

U.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington,.DC:20555 .

                . Senator Gordon J. Humphrey
                .U.S.= Senate Washington, D.C. 20510
                  ;(Attn: Herb Boynton)
                 ' Senator Gordon'J..Humphrey, 1 Pillsbury. Street Concord, NH'03301.

(Attn: Herb Boynton) Thomas F.. Powers, III Town Manager 3 Town'of Exeter.

10 ! Front Street -
                 ,Exeter, NH 03833 Brentwood Board of Selectmen RFD Dalton Road Brentwood, NH 03833 Dated: September)(,1987
                                                                          ,1l                                       ~ ve H. JOSEPif/FLYNN , f Assistanf. General' Counsel
                                                            ' Federal-Emergency Management Agency i

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