ML20236L865
| ML20236L865 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 11/05/1987 |
| From: | Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY) |
| To: | |
| References | |
| CON-#487-4769 ALAB-832, OL-3, NUDOCS 8711110092 | |
| Download: ML20236L865 (23) | |
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},i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION .p g g g J l
COMMI$SIONERS:. OFRCt ; . , , . .
I 00CKUy,.!, . 4 .. ,o q l
Lando W Zech, Jr. , Chairman Thomas M. Roberts
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Frederick M. Bernthal l
Kenneth H. Carr 3 g gi g ,6 g . j
- Kenneth C. Rogers.
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In the Matter of ) ,
1 1 l LONG ISLA'ND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322 OL-3 l
) (Emergency Planning) l (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) l Unit 1) ) 1
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L MEMORANDUM AND ORDER.
In ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135 (1986), the Shoreham Appeal Board reversed and remanded three issues, among others, to the Licensing Board: the Licensing
. Board's refusal te permit an evidentiary hearing on whether the Shoreham Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) should be expanded by a few miles to provide an adequate base foi ad hoc emergency response efforts beyond-the EPZ in very severe accidents (Contention 22.B.); the Board's refusal to' l
permit an evidentiary hearing on whether the EPZ should be expanded by a few l
miles to minimize the occurrence and effects of spontaneous evacuation from outside the EPZ (Contention 22.C.); and the Board's. approval of the appli-cant's provisions for hospital evacuation. In an Order dated September 19, 1986, the Commissi,on took review of these three issues and requested briefs l from the parties.
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On review Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO)'and thEstaff. support the ,
Licensing Board's decisions on these issues and oppose the.AppeairBoard ,
- decision. The interveners take the opposite view. -
We conclude on the'EPZ. issues that while the decision of'the' Appeal Board" ;
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is a reasonable one in light of-the' available, but limited, adjudicatory l
L precedent, additiona1'Comission guidance,is needed. ' Afterlcarefu1l review of .
the history of our regulations,.w'e conclude that. contentions 22.B.fand 22.C.
constitute challenges to these regulations. Since int'ervenors'have declined.
to cast their contentions in the alternative as challenges _ to the regulatiotis i under 10 CFR 2.758, litigation-of the.se issues must be disallowed; . As 'forf
. hospital evacuation, we agree with;the Appeal' Board that LILCO's plans'do not <
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fully satisfy NRC's emergency planning regulations.
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I. EPZ Size , ,
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A. Background . ,
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' / ._a 10 CFR $ 50.47(c)(2). provides.that, generally, the EPZbr power reactors '
shall be "about ten miles" in radius, with the' exact boundacies'to be deter-i mined "in ralation to emergency response needs and capabilities as they are ;
J affected by such . conditions as demography, ~ topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." LILCO's plume EPZ is about ten miles in radius.
In Contention 22., a four-part, te.n-page (double-spaced)' contention, -
intervenorsarguedthattheproposedLILC0plumeEPZwasnotlarge~Nough,foh
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4 eight'al1eged"distinguishinghharacteristics." To the extentL that
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this contention asserts that ad hoc emergency response would be
. impossible,. it must be rejected as~a challenge to 5 50.47(c)(2). To the extent'.that 1.t challenges the LILCO plan.in specific matters,.
viz.' transient population,. inadequate roads, adverse weather, etc.,.
these concerns.have already been asserted in other contentions which we have admitted.
Order Ruling on Objections!to Spe'cial Prehearing Conference' Order, Sept. 30L 1983, at 4. . The' Licensing. Board . rejected Contention 22.C. 'for much' the 'same.
reasons.
In ALAB-832, the Appeal Board reversed the Board's' disallowance of these contentions, reasoning that "... these contentions do not appear to seek anything more than t' hat to which section 50.47(c)(2) entitles interveners:
a determination of the ' exact size and' configuration of the EPZ based upon, inter alia, local conditions.'"3 - On the ground that one set of fa, cts might support more than one contention,.the Appeal Board als'o rejected the' Licensing Board's reasoning that because interveners were being.' permitted to challenge
. th'e overall adequacy of the plan to ' deal with spontaneous evacuation, the disallowance of Contention 22.B. had no effect. on interveners' ability to litigate the safety matters at issue. ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 148.
In taking review of the rulings on Contention 22.B., the Commission asked:
(1).whether ... the admission of Contention 22.B. impermissible challenges the generic rulemaking finding that a 10-mile EPZ will provide an adequate basis .for satisfactory ad hoc emergency response 3
Id., 23 NRC at 148. However, the Appeal. Board rejected interveners' argumenii that the only . legitimate limits on the size of the.EPZ 'are those limits dictated by local: conditions. Instead .noted the Appeal Board, the ~
regulations permit consideration only of " minor adjustments (such as a mile or
, two)...." Id., 23 NRC at 149, n.41. Cf. id., 23 NRC at 148, n.37.
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capabilities} (is 'they are affected by .such conditlons as demography, topog-- ,
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- w. o raphy, ladd charcc$$ristics, acr_ese rcutes, andl jurisdictional boundaries."
t Interveners # offer two main'argurend) on 3he interpretation of this v 3 regulation. 'First they argue that while spontaneous evacuation and lack of local gover ment cooperation '
aren't listed in the regulations as local 'condi-t % ,
tions, the conqitions listed are exerrolary rather than exclusive. .Second, interveners emphasize that "the determination of the exact size and configura-tion of the EPZ m/s,t be made 'in.' relation to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by ...'" local conditions. Brief at 13 (emphasisintBrief). The concept.of " local emergency response needs and
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l capabilities," they, continue, encompasses LILCO's alleged failure'to plan for j spontaneous evacuation, an, evacuation that will result directly from listed n 1 ;
conditions such as the 1&o'd characteristics of Long Island.7
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I In their seply Brie'f, interveners charge that LILCO -l and the,d_.,
staff23 NRC offer at 145. to the Commission on EPZ size that largely arguments address xestions other than those which the Contnission chose to review. ,
Reply BriiAat 3. Interveners claim th 4 they don't respond'to these s
improperly offered arguments, and thah.the Commission should not consider them. However, they continue, if the tomrrission intends to consider these improper drguments, then it should offer interveners an opportunity to respond. )In fact, however, interveners devote nearly two pages of their fourteen page response to these LILC0/ staff. arguments. See Reply BHef at 6-7.
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1ntervenors add that the'legitimady of Contention 22.C. is confirmed by the Brenner Licensing Board's daternent that it would consider the effect of local conditions on EPZ size. ' the'Brenner Board stated; that whether or not contentions were submitted on thclissue, it would investigate whether, "because of the geography of Lkg Island, evacuation planning within an approximate 10411e EPZ may. not be adequate because of the impacts of persons 1 outside and to the east of the EPZ choosing to evacuate and having to do.so by J coming through the EPZ." ' 15 NRC g 618-19. LILC0 claims ,that this issue was litigated in the fom of Conterths 23.D. (evicuatiqn is am ineffective
' protective action because LILCd hasn'.t considered the exterd of spontaneous evacuation that will; occur) ,,.s 23 and'a..H.'(LILC0 has failed to1 provide for i
[ Footnote Continued] i4 -
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8 Licensing Board are correct that-only minor adjustments are permitted, interveners add, they were precluded from litigating for these adjustments.
Reply Brief at 6.-
Finally, while claiming that the Commission did not take review of the Appeal'~ Board holding 'in ALAB-832 that a ut'ility-only emergency response is a " local condition" to be considered in detemining EPZ size, interveners assert in response to a LILCO argument that the Appeal Board correctly decided l this question.
- 2. Staff and LILC0 Arguments ,
The staff and LILCO oppose the admission of Contentinr.s 22.B. and C.. t 1
mainly on the ground that the Contentions challenge the generic findings !
underlying the Commission's determination that a ten-mile EPZ 'for power reactors is adequate to protect the'public. The staff and LILCO contest'the Appeal Board's conclusion that Contention 22.B. was aimed at determining the exact size and shape of the EPZ based on local conditions. Rather, they claim, it is a direct challenge to the Commission's determination that a ten-mile EPZ in all cases would provide a substantial base for ad hoc expan-sion of any emergency response. Staff Brief at 12; LILCO Brief at 3-4. As to Contention'22.C., the staff and LILC0 make three main points: first, that the contention challenges the generic determinations in section 50.47; second, that the local conditions cited by interveners are not the type contemplated
[FootnoteContinued]
the only way to comply with the NRC's requirements is to expand the EPZ. I Thus, Limerick does not directly support interveners' position.
l 10 ~l will know clearly where the boundary is, and ... to avoid bisecting a _ discrete '
population." LILC0_ Reply Brief at 2.
To bolster the position that only geographical conditions were to be considered, and then lead to minor adjustments, if any, LILC0 cites the NRC staff'sspresentation'to_the Commission in 1980, where the staff explained that the factors to be considered were "' narrowed to a relatively small range,'" .j e.g., a "' major population center' crossing the 10-mile boundary and ' abnormal -
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topographical situations, a very peculiar river valley.'" LILC0 Brief at 5, j s
Even in these " abnormal" situations, staff's intent was to adjust EPZ
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note 6.
] l boundaries "'by small amounts.'" M. )
The staff adds that "the cure for any EPZ-related problem arising from 1
events taking place outside the EPZ is not to expand the zone, but to factor those matters into the planning for the protective actions to be~taken for- q 1
those within the 10-mile zone." M. LILC0 agrees, stating that the record I shows that providing accurate, consistent information to the public will minimize spontaneous evacuation, and that this is the remedy contemplated by the regulations. LILC0 Brief at 10, citing Diablo Canyon, LBP-82-70, 16 NRC l 756,779(1982).
Further, even if spontaneous evacuation is to be considered a local condition, they submit, it isn't the type of local condition that can cause .,
adjustments in EPZ size, because the conditions contemplated in the regulation ai*e those unique conditions existing'around each plant, as opposed to those-which might arise at the time of an accident at any plant. Staff Brief at 15-16; LILC0 Brief at 12.
Continuing, they argue that Contention 22.C. challenges the regulations in two ways. First, it posits non-geographic conditions, e.g. , spontaneous evacuation and the utility-only nature of the response organization. Staff O
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Finally, LILC0 and the staff note that the. Licensing Board: specifically
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considered potential problems associated with spontaneous evacuation by those -
outside the EPZ, rejecting ~several intervenor assertions:
-o that spontaneous evacuation would Einside-the EPZ. (Contentions: 23.A .C);ygrevent the evacu'ation of those o ' that spontaneoiJs evacuation ~of those outside the EPZ'woul'd!
significantly and adversely affect egcuation' times from within the?
EPZ (Contentions 65, 23.D.and 23.H);-
o .that spontaneous evacuees from'outside the EPZ might: harm themselves by'~ entering contaminated areas,- and mi ,
a evacuationfromwithinthe'EPZ(Contention'23.H.)ggimpede l , and.
o that LILC0 had. drawn the' EPZ, boundary improperly such_'.that' it ' . .
bisected discrete populations'and-jurisdictions (Contention 22.D.)'.-
LILC0 Brief at.14..
H
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[ Footnote Continued] !
and how far away)'.there will be'in an~ emergency of unknown naturel ,
sometime-in the future. This task is' impossible. :(Interveners l
would use public opinion polls for this purpose, but the: record
-l shows that opinion polls cannot predict actual emergency behavior.)- 'l
... Even assuming the planner can predict'the extent'of. spontaneous evacuation, he then has to have a' criterion for where ~ to draw the' ,
1- line. (0 pinion polls, for example, will show fewer spontaneous ' i evacuations as distance from the plant increases; at what point on this decreasing function does one end the EPZ?) There is no such l criterion in NRC regulations or guidance....
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- g. at 11, 14 See LILC0 Answer at 3-4, citing PID I, 21 NRC' at 804, 806-09 ("i.ILC0 has given reasonable consideration to the possible. impacts of shadow evacuation on evacuation traffic arising from within the EPZ;" " excess - :
evacuation poses no barrier to evacuation of all ~or part of the EPZ.") '
15 Staff Brief at 14, citing 21' NRC at 801-09. Cf. LILC0 Brief at 12 :!
(citingContention65). j 16 The Board found that "those wh'o evacuate unnecessarily because of fear
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i of radiation would also'have strong motivation not to enter the EPZ,"'and'that LILC0's plans for EPZ perimeter control were reasonable. PID, 21 NRC at 804.- u q
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14 action guides generally would not be exceeded beyond ten miles unless the containment failed catastrophically and there was a very large release of radioactive material. The Report further concluded that even for very large releases, emergency actions such as sheltering or evacuation within ten miles would result in significant reductions in deaths and early injuries. Id.
at 6-7. From a probability standpoint, the Report concluded that the I probability of large doses from core-melt accidents drops off substantially at about ten miles from the reactor. _Id. at 37.
i Based on these considerations, the Report concluded that: )
... emergency response plans should be useful for responding to any accident that would produce offsite doses in excess of the PAGs.
This would include the more severe design basis accidents and the 1 accident spectrum analyzed in the RSS. After reviewing the potential consequences associated with these types of accidents, it ;
I was the concensus [ sic] of the Task Force that emergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out to which predetermined actions would provide dose savings for any such accidents. Beyond this generic distance it was concluded that actions could be taken on an ad hoc basis using the same considerations that went into the initial action determinations.
The Task Force judgment on the extent of the Emergency Planning Zone is derived from the characteristics of design basis and Class 9 accident consequences. Based on the information provided in Appendix I and the applicable PAGs a radiys of about 10 miles was {
J selected for the plume exposure pathway and a radius of about j 50 miles was selected for the ingestion exposure pathway, as shown in table 1. Although the radius for the EPZ implies a circular area, the actual shape would depend upon the characteristics of a particular site. The circular or other defined area would be for planning whereas initial response would likely involve only )
a portion of the total area.
Report at 16.
l A reading of the Report indicates clearly that the margins of safety provided by the recommended ten-mile radius were not calculated in any precise fashion but were qualitatively found adequate as a matter of judgment. Given the uncertainties in estimations of Class 9 accident probabilities and con.se-quences', there was no other feasible choice in this regard. The EPZ's shape
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every conceivable accident, the possibility of serious harm to the public. If this were actually the criterion, it would be difficult if not impossible to set any a_ priori limits to the size of the EPZ or to the scope of required emergency planning. Emergency planning can, however, be expected to reduce
- any.public harm in the event of a serious but highly unlikely accident. 4 But the rule clearly was intended to set such limits. Even under the Appeal Board's analysis, the rule amounts to a Commission finding that adequate protection can be provided by an EPZ of limited size, ten miles in l l
radius give or take a few miles, but certainly much less than twenty. '
Given these circumstances, we think it is entirely reasonable and appropriate for the Commission to hold that arguments for " adjusting" a ten-mile EPZ to improve safety, especially arguments that entail complex analysis and lengthy litigation, are an impermissible challenge to the rule.
The Appeal Board has in effect also treated the rule as imposing a cut-off, i
which the Appeal Board places at somewhere more than ten miles but certainly less than twenty. The Appeal Board's approach is not.much different from l l simply reading 50.47(b)(2) as requiring an EPZ "about twenty miles in radius" ;
and then taking the, position we adopt, i.e. refusing to accept contentions !
that would enlarge an EPZ that meets the criteri,on. But the rule says ten, l not twenty. The " outward creep" the Appeal Board would allow seems in the end I i to have no logical limits, as LILC0 and the staff argue, j l i 1 Accordingly, we think the better interpretation is that the rule l I
precludes adje ' .nts on safety grounds to the size of an EPZ that is "about l ten mila radius" and that Contentions 22.B. and 22.C. should on this l i !
I ground be deemed impermissible challenges to the rule. In our view, the proper interpretation of the rule would call for adjustment to the exact size ;
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l of the EPZ only on the basis of such straightforward administrative !
18 evacuation of EPZ hospital patients until individuals in other "special facilities"(e.g.,nursinghomesandnurseryschools)wereavacuated,hadnot calculated evacuation times for two of the three EPZ hospitals, and had not predetermined the circumstances under which EPZ hospital patients would be .
evacuated.
Nevertheless, the Licensing Board concluded that the LILC0 plan was adequate. In the Board's view, arrangements for the relocation of patients to hospitals outside the EPZ could be made while the emergency was in progress.
This was considered adequate because the hospitals are close to the outer edge of the EPZ, where the likelihood of receiving doses requiring evacuation is small, sheltering is the preferred emergency response in any event because of the risks attendant upon the movement of patients, and the EPZ hospitals were constructed so as to'be particularly suitable for sheltering. .
The Appeal Board reversed. It characterized the LILC0 arrangements as ad hoc, and found that contrary to the regulations' requirement for EPZ evacuation time estimate',s LILC0 had hot provided time estimates for each EPZ hospital. The Appeal Board also noted the Licensing Board's contrasting treatment of hospitals and nursing homes. While the Licensing Board found no deficiency in LILCO's failure to obtain agreements with hospitals for relocation of hospital patients, it found deficient LILC0's failure to sufficiently identify and to include letters of agreement with facilities outside the EPZ for accommodating EPZ nursing home residents. The Appeal Board was puzzled by the Licensing Board's contrasting treatment of these two areas.
In taking review, the Commission asked whether the regulations, including l
l section 50.47(c)(1), " require evacuation plans for hospitals in the EPZ even though sheltering would be the preferred option in most circumstances."
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l 20 guidance ' explicitly.' allow different treatment for different groups such as hospital patients."
LILC0's next' argument on the hospital evacuation issue, and the only argument offered by the Staff on this issue, is that even if.the regulations
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generally require evacuation plans, the Shoreham plan is not significant1y'-
. deficient in this regard, and thus, under 9 50.47(c)(1), the Comission is not 1 i
compelled'to deny the issuance of a license. Both LILC0 and the's_taff. support I
. I this argument by pointing to the Licensing Board's findings on the distance of the hospitals from the plant (over. nine miles),.on the' heavy masonry-construc-tion of the hospital buildings leading to .2 shielding factors (i.e., the dose inside the buildings would be 20% of the-dose outside), on the danger of evacuation for patients, on.the low probability of accidents that would require evacuation for those more than nine miles from the plant,'and on the l
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existing arrangements for eventual evacuation of the hospitals. I Finally, LILC0 argues, it has developed reasonable evacuation plans for '
i the hospitais. Evacuation vehicles first would' complete their nursing / adult home runs, and then report to hospitals on an "as needed" basis, as determined by hospital administrators upo'n balancing.information including that on -
weather, projected doses, and the risk of transporting patients. Moreover, ,
LILC0 argues, the Appeal Board was mistaken that LILCO had not adequately calculated evacuation times for hospitals, since .the Licensing Board specif-ically found that the hospitals could be. evacuated within nine hou'rs.20 20 The Licensing Board found that:
[A]mbular.ces would not completely evacuate the Suffolk County Infinnary until some 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, 50 minutes after the initial ;
[FootnoteContinued]
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- 22 allegedly." complete failure" to plan for hospitals can.never been viewed, a using550.47(c)(1),asinsignificant.21 C. Comission Decision 1
We agree with the-Appeal Board's reasoning on this issue.- Even though
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q sheltering will'quite likely be the preferred protective action for EPZ j q
hospitals in the event of a serious accident, evacuation should not be I prejudiced by the failure to plan in advance. Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50 )
requires evacuation time estimates for the EPZ without exceptions for~ special facilities such as hospitals. Clearly, evacuation plans for hospitals must at least be developed in sufficient detail to provide'a basis for these {
-j estimates. Moreover, hospitals, as a kind of "special facility, are
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specifically mentioned in the principal guidance document in 1!his field, NUREG-0654, and there is'no suggestion:in this guidance that hospitals'are to.
be treated specially as exempt from the evacuation planning requirement. that ;
1 applies to other segments of the population within the EPZ.
- We therefore conclude, in agreement with the Appeal Board, that the j regulations require the applicant to fulfill the same planning obligations with regard to hospital evacuation as the Licensing Board imposed in .
I connection with other like segmentis of the EPZ, such as nursing /5dult homes. '
This conclusion does not necessarily end the inquiry as to whether LILCO's 21 In response to.LILC0's Brief, interveners claim that the Comission should disregard many of LILC0's arguments because they are outside the' scope of the Comission's review questions, particularly insofar as LILC0 attempts' to show that-there is adequate planning and preparedness,for hospital evacuation.
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- It is so'0RDERED.
4 For the' Comission *\
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- t gp;f\_ w SAMUEL J. CHILK
. Secretary'of the Comission d
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.j Dated at Washington, D.C. .
~"i thisA day of November,198'7..
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Commissioners.Bernthal and Rogers were'not present?for '
the affirmation of this order,'if they had been.present.-
they would~have approved it. ,
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