ML20236C400

Testimony of T Urbanik on Behalf of NRC Staff on Joint Intervenor Contentions 4 & 7A (Seabrook Plan for Commonwealth of Ma Communities).* Related Correspondence

ML20236C400
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	03/13/1989
From:	Urbanik T NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC), TEXAS A&M UNIV., COLLEGE STATION, TX
To:
References
CON-#189-8277 OL, NUDOCS 8903220129
Download: ML20236C400 (22)

Text

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Q UuCORRESPONDF.NO8 [n ra . u u sNi-c UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 89 MR 13 N0:32 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Or r .. -

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD OUGQig,'

In the Matter of k 443 OL DocketNos.5g444OL 50-PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, g al. Off-site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)

TESTIMONY OF THOMAS URBANIK II ON BEHALF 0F THE NRC STAFF ON JOINT INTERVEN0R CONTENTIONS 4 AND 7A (SPMC)

Q.1. Please state your name and occupation.

A.1, My name is Thomas Urbanik II. I am a Research Engineer associated with the Texas Transportation Institute of the Texas A&M University System, College Station, Texas.

Q.2. Have you prepared a statement of professional qualifications?

A.2. Yes. A statement of my professional qualifications is attached to my testimony. filed in the NHRERP phase of this proceeding, and is bound into the transcript following Tr. page 7372.

Q.3. In what capacity are you testifying in this proceeding?

A.3. I am testifying on behalf of the NRC Staff, for which I serve as a consultant through the Battelle Pacific Northwest Laboratories.

Battelle is responsible under contract to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission for reviewing evacuation time estimates (ETEs) for nuclear facilities and related emergency planning issues.

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Q.4. Briefly summarize your experience with emergency planning for nuclear facilities, including Seabrook Station.

A.4 I was principal author of NUREG/CR-1745, " Analysis of Techniques for Estimating Evacuation Times for Emergency Planning Zones" (November 1980), which described the limitations of several methodologies and some alternatives for determining evacuation time estimates. Also, I provided input to the development of the current guidance for evacuation time estimate studies which appears in Appendix 4 to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 1, " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants"(November 1980). In addition, I reviewed for the NRC the initial evacuation time estimate submittals of approximately 52 operating and near term nuclear facilities against the guidance of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Revision 0 (January 1980), the results of which are published in NUREG-CR-1856, "An Analysis of Evacuation Time Estimates Around 52 Nuclear Power Plant Sites" (May 1981). I am a co-author of the CLEAR computer model for estimating evacuation time which is published in NUREG/CR-2504,

" CLEAR (Calculates Logical Evacuation and Response): A Generic Transpor-tation Network Model for the Calculation of Evacuation Time Estimates" (March 1982). I also was a co-author of an indepent assessment of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station evacuation times which is published in NUREG/CR-2903, "An Independent Assessment of Evacuation Time Estimates for a Peak Population Scenario in the Emergency Planning Zone of the Seabrook Nuclear Power Station" (November 1982). I also am a co-author of two studies which evaluate certain aspects of the I-DYNEY computer code utilized in the current ETE for Seabrook Station: NUREG/CR-4873,

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l l " Benchmark Study of the I-DYNEY Evacuation Time Estimate Computer Code" (June 1988); and NUREG/CR-4874, "The Sensitivity of Evacuation Time Estimates to Changes in Input Parameters for the I-DYNEV Computer Code" (June 1988). I have appeared on behalf of the NRC Staff at a number of licensing hearings, including the 1983 and 1987 Seabrook hearings concerning evacuation time estimates.

Q.5. What is the purpose of this testimony?

A.5. The purpose of this testimony is to address the issues raised in Joint Intervenor Contentions 4 and 7A, concerning traffic management in the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Communities (SPMC), with respect to portions of the Seabrook Station EPZ lying within the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. This testimonv does not address the availability of resources necessary to implement the evacuation plan such as traffic control personnel; resource availability has been reviewed by the Federal EmergencyManagementAgency(FEMA). l Q.6. Have you reviewed the traffic management strategies and plan l contained in the SPMC?

A.6. Yes. Traffic management strategies and plans are principally I

set forth in SPMC Appendix J. I have reviewed Appendix J and other '

pertinent provisions of the SPMC against the criteria and guidance  !

contained in NUREG-0654, Appendix 4.

Q.7. Please identify the regulatory standard or guidance criteria against which traffic management plans are to be evaluated.

A.7. 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV, requires applicants to prepare and submit an analysis of the time required to evacuate various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations. NUREG-0654, Appendix 4, provides guidance as to what is to be included in an evacuation time estimate study and how it might be presented. As a general matter, applicants are directed to make a complete review of the road network; to utilize the entire road network, carefully selecting local routes to minimize their impact on the major routes; and to avoid dependinn nnly on high-capacity routes. Id. at 4-10.

NUREG-0654 indicates that, "[a] alternatively, special traffic management plans may be developed to effectively utilize available capacity." Id.

Further, NUREG-0654 provides that "[s]pecific recommendations for actions that could be taken to significantly improve evacuation time shall be given." Id. at 4-10.

Q.8. What is the purpose of traffic management planning in conjunction with radiological emergency planning and preparedness?

A.8. As set forth above, NUREG-0654 permits applicants to develop special traffic management plans in order to effectively utilize available capacity, and directs them to provide specific recommendations for actions that could be taken to significantly improve evacuation times. In essence, then, traffic management plans provide a means to identify and plan for those actions which could be taken to significantly reduce evacuation times in the event of a radiological emergency thereby providing the lowest reasonably feasible evacuation times; in addition, the goal of traffic management is to make the most effective use of available traffic management resources.

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Q.9. Have you reached a conclusion as to whether the traffic management provisions contained in the SPMC comply with the guidance and criteria of NUREG-0654 Appendix 4?

A.9. Yes. I have concluded that, as a general matter, the SPMC traffic management plan is adequate and that it complies with the guidance and criteria of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4. I have also determined, however, that certain refinements to the traffic management plan should be made, as set forth in detail below.

1 Q.10. Has the SPMC traffic management plan been properly designed?

A.10. Yes. The traffic management plan is the result of a systematic l and thorough analysis, takinn into consideration all pertinent considerations.

Q.11. Should normal rush hour traffic and beach traffic congestion experiences be the guiding considerations in determining the deployment of traffic guides?

A.11. No. Although daily traffic conditions provide insight into the performance of individual intersections, the significant controlling intersections in an evacuation may be different from the intersections which are most congested on a daily or summer basis. For example, traffic during the summer may be very congested in the beach area, as traffic movements may be impeded by persons looking for parking spaces, accessing or leaving businesses, or " cruising". If we consider the evacuation paths as branches, limbs, and the trunk of a tree, the critical points are likely to be near the trunk of the tree where traffic is converging from

many areas. If we consider I-95 as the trunk, the neighborhoods and beach areas are the branches. Many alternatives exist for different branches to feed the limbs. It is generally not important to determine which branches feed into bottleneck intersections at any given point in time, as this sequence does not usually affect the overall ETE. It is more important that the bottlenecks which control the efficiency of the evacuation be identified; and these locations are generally likely to be nearer to the trunk than to the branches of the evacuation roadways.

Q.12. Has the SPMC appropriately considered the available road network  ;

and potential bottlenecks in developing a traffic management plan?

A.12. Yes. The SPMC has considered fully the available road network in the Seabrook EPZ. In a roadway network like Seabrook with large numbers of evacuees, the most efficient method to identify potential ,

1 bottlenecks is to use computer simulation to assess the performance of the )

roadways during an evacuation. The I-DYNEV computer simulation model was used to develop the traffic management plan contained in the SPMC.

I Q.13. How does computer simulation relate to the development of a traffic management plan?

j A.13. The computer simulation model is used to evaluate roadway performance based on expected routes to be used in leaving the EPZ.

I f However, the computer simulation model does not provide an answer directly on what to do in formulating a traffic management plan. Rather, the computer is a tool used to evaluate alternatives including specific

traffic management plans. The process is an iterative one in which alternative. strategies are evaluated until a final plan is developed. ,

Q.14. How are traffic management strategies developed?

A.14. There are several steps including the identification of congested intersections, the identification of capacity enhancement measures, and the identification of secondary traffic control points.

Q.15. How are congested intersections identified?

A.15. Congested intersections are identified as one of the direct outputs of the traffic simulation model.

Q.16. How are capacity enhancement measures determined?

A.16. There are two basic types of capacity enhancement measures that can be implemented: improved routing, and special traffic control '

measures. Potential routing and traffic control locations would be identified as a result of the initial computer simulation of the roadway system.

Q.17. Please describe how improved routing may serve as a capacity enhancement measure.

A.17. Many evacuees will tend to use the most familiar or shortest l,

route to freeways such as I-95. If everyone used this approach, however.

l some roadways would be underutilized. Traffic management plans are implemented to route some evacuees to routes which would otherwise be underutilized. For example, traffic from Plum Island may tend to access f

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I-95 from Route 110; the SPMC traffic management plan routes this traffic to Route 1 South, to make better use of available capacity.

Q.18. Please describe the special traffic control measure which could serve to enhance road capacity.

A.18. A special traffic control measure would utilize two lanes of traffic where only one is normally available. For example, in the SPMC, two lanes of traffic are taken through Salisbury Center from Route 1A to l

Route 110, as shown in traffic control point (TCP) No. B-SA-06.

Q.19. Is it appropriate to use a large number of special traffic control measures?

A.19. No. Only where there is a potentially significant impact on ETEs are special traffic control measures appropriate. One must also look at the impact on emergency vehicle traffic before implementing a special traffic control measure.

Q.20. In a traffic management plan, how should one determine which locations require traffic control personnel?

A.20. First priority is given to locations with capacity enhancement measures and locations that are bottlenecks. Lower priority locations are those having significant congestion. The lowest priority locations are l those locations where additional personnel may help to handle unexpected contingencies, but are not otherwise needed.

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l Q.21. How are the required number of traffic control personnel detemined? , l A.21. The number of traffic control personnel is detemined by the required. functions at each location. One person per intersection is generally adequate for routing purposes. Locations with special traffic i

, 1 control measures could require addition personnel, based on the specific measure to be implemented.

Q.22. Does the SPMC specify the use of an adequate number of traffic control personnel?

A.22. Yes. The SPMC provides an adequate number of traffic control personnel in its traffic management plan. The number of traffic control positions (TCPs) is adequate, and was' developed using an appropriate methodology.

Q.23. Are there any locations in the EPZ which require additional l consideration for the placement of traffic control personnel beyond that which is provided in the SPMC7 j A.23. No. The SPMC traffic management plan establishes appropriate and sufficient locations for traffic control.

i Q.24 How are the number of traffic control devices determined?

A.24. The type of traffic control determines the number of cones and other devices used. Two cones are generally enough to discourage traffic in a single 12-foot lane. More cones may be required at locations with wider pavement, such as skewed intersections or roadways with shoulders.

. I Q.25. Is an adequate number of cones provided for in the SPMC?

A.25. In general, the number of. cones is adequate, but some locations appear to have an inadequate number of cones based on the criteria stated in A.24. Also, it may be appropriate to provide at least three cones per location to handle any contingencies that may arise.

Q.26. Is the SPMC's preference for the use of cones, rather than other devices such as barricades, inappropriate?

A.26. No. The use of traffic cones is censistent with the need for j rapid deployment and flexibility in planning, and is also consistent with I the SPMC's objective of discouraging (but not prohibiting) vehicular passage.

Q.27. Are the traffic control diagrams contained in the SPMC sufficiently clear and adequate?

A.27. The traffic control diagrams are generally adequate for their 1 t

intended purpose. However, some of the diagrams lack adequate detail, or are out of date.

Q.28. Please explain your comment with respect to these problems in the diagrams.

A.28. During a recent visit to the EPZ, I observed that while some diagrams reflect traffic signals, other diagrams do not; the diagrams l

should be revised to reflect existing traffic. In addition, the diagrams l

l at many interchanges do not accurately reflect the size of traffic islands l

l at the ramp terminals, producing an inaccurate depiction of where cones

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i should be placed and where traffic guides should be stationed. Finally,  ;

one diagram (TCP No. E-NP-01) is out of date, and should be revised to reflect recent road reconstruction.

Q.29. Are these diagram revisions likely to affect evacuation times?

i A.29. No. Revisions made to reflect traffic signals and island size would assist traffic control personnel in their duties, and are unlikely to affect evacuation times. With respect to the instance of road reconstruction, the only practica1' impact is to reduce the number of personnel required, inasmuch as the reconstruction implemented some of the traffic control measures contemplated by the SPMC.

Q.30. Does the fact that a TCP diagram may be out of date constitute a deficiency in the plan?

A.30. No. Emergency planning is an evolving process, and revisions should be expected to be ongoing. Further, there will always be some discrepancies that will have to be addressed at the time of an actual emergency. 1 Q.31. Are there any other recommendations you wish to make with j respect to improving the current traffic management plans? ,

A.31. Yes. The closing of an interstate highway is a major undertaking  !

and should be considered carefully in a traffic management plan. In this regard, .ertain access control diagrams and summaries should be revised to reflect a more gradual phase-in of control measures and advance warnings as traffic approaches Georgetown Access Control Post GT-2 (p. J. 122) and

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Haverhill ACP No. HA-4 (p. J-134). Implementation of this recommendation )

will require additional traffic control devices beyond those identified in i

these portions of the SPMC.

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1 Q.32. What effect are such revisions likely to have on evacuation f times?

A.32. Improvement of these diagrams will facilitate the realization of evacuation times which have been estimated in the SPMC ETE. t Q.33. Do you agree with the assertion that an uncontrolled evacuation would be faster than a controlled evacuation under the SPMC?

A.33. No. The SPMC allocates ' personnel and resources in an effective manner at locations necessary to assure that there will be an efficient evacuation. Such an evacuation will undoubtedly be faster than an i

evacuation conducted without a traffic management plan. Further, even if l l

the number of traffic control personnel and resources provided in the SPMC  !

were to be doubled, there would be no significant effect on the ETE, since they would be deployed at non-critical locations.

Q.34. Does the SPMC traffic management plan provide appropriate consideration to the Gillis Bridge?

A.34. Yes. Route 1 is not a bottleneck location in this part of the roadway system. Intermittent operation of the bridge should cause no

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significant problems.

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-Q.35. Would making Route 1A one-way from Salisbury Beach improve the evacuation time? ,

l A.35. No. Some cars would be able to exit the Salisbury Beach parking j area somewhat faster until the additional on-street space is filled. I However, this would have no effect on the ETE, as downstream locations closer to I-95 control the ETE.

Q.36. Are there adequate traffic management plans for Plum Island?

A.36. Yes. . The primary evacuation route -- via Plum Island Turnpike, 1

Ocean Avenue, Rolph Lane, and Hanover St. to Route 1A south -- has four TCPs at appropriate locations. An alternative route via Route 1A also exists. These provisions are sufficient.

Q.37. Is the intersection of Merrimac Street, Mosely Street and Spoffard Street a critical location relative to the need for a TCP?

A.37. No. This intersection largely handles local traffic.

Q.38. Is there a need for a TCP at State and High Streets?

A.38. No. This is not a major evacuation route.

Q.39. Is there a need for a TCP at low Street, Route 1, and Pond Street?

A.39. No. Route 1 is the only major evacuation route at this point.

A traffic actuated signal will accommodate any of the local traffic entering the evacuation stream at this location.

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l Q.40. Is there a need for additional traffic control beyond that provided in the SPMC, at the City of Newburyport High School, Anna Jacques Hospital, or other locations within the City of Newburyport?

A.40. No. The points specified are local access points at non-critical locations. No bottleneck locations appear to have been omitted from consideration in the SPMC.

Q.41. Do the TCPs adequately address impedance, traffic volume, breakdowns, driver response, speed of approaching vehicles, and topography.

l A.41. Yes. The TCPs were developed taking these factors into consideration. As set forth above, however, further refinements should be made at two access control points along I-95.

Q.42. Are more traffic control guides required to be provided in the ,

I Town of Amesbury than are specified in the SPMC? .

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A.42. No. Numerous locations have been suggested for designation as l TCP locations by the Town of Amesbury, including the intersections of Friend and Sparhawk, Route 110 and Rocky Hill, Friend and Main, Friend and School, Whitehall and Friend, Friend and Highland, Pond and Friend, Pond and High, Greenleaf and Friend, High and Whitehall, Congress and Elm, Monroe and Elm, and Highland and Route 110. However, these intersections l reflect locations that are not critical in terms of controlling evacuation times, and need not be designated for traffic control.

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I Q.43. Is it necessary that traffic guides be familiar with local areas l in order for the traffic management. plan to be effective? l A.43. No. The TCP diagrams provide the information necessary to  !

implement the evacuation strategy. It should be remembered that  ;

evacuation traffic is not typical of normal traffic patterns, and normal experience is therefore not a controlling consideration.

Q.44. Are TCPs required at Route 286 where it intersects with South Main, Adams, and Washington, or at the intersection of Seabrook Road and Forest Road?

A.44. No. These three intersections of Route 286 are intersections with local streets. Alternative local routes exist which can be used to evacuate the area, and are likely to be used by local residents. Access to Route 286 is possible in any event, due to the slow moving traffic which may be anticipated to be present. The intersection of Seabrook Road and Forest Road involves two local roads with limited traffic volumes, and similarly does not require a TCP.

Q.45. Is there a need for TCPs at Page School driveways and Route 113, Stewart Street and Route 113, Childrens Castle driveways and Route 113, Bridge Street and Route 113, Coffin Street and Route 113, Garden Street f and Route 113, Crane Neck Road and 113, or any other locations in the Town i

of West Newbury? l A.45. No. These West Newbury locations are not major evacuation routes requiring traffic control positions, and many local evacuation route alternatives exist.

Q.46. Is parking for traffic guides a problem?

A.46. No. Traffic guides are instructed to park out of the traffic flow. Many alternatives exist depending on the location, including side streets and off-street parking areas.

Q.47. Are you familiar with the Manual of Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD)?

A.47. Yes. The MUTCD is the standard reference for traffic engineers with respect to the design and installation of traffic signs, signals and markings.

Q.48. Is the traffic management plan contained in the SPMC consistent with the MUTCD?

A.48. The SPMC traffic management plan is generally consistent with the MUTCD, except to the extent discussed above concerning two access control points on I-95.

Q.49. What is the significance of the concept, " fulfill a need," as used in the MUTCD? l A.49. This concept provides that traffic control devices should only be installed if necessary; the overuse of traffic control devices is j l

considered to be counterproductive.

Q.50. Is the SPMC traffic management plan consistent with this l concept? l A.50. Yes.

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Q.bl. Does the SPMC traffic management plan comply with the need to

" command attention," as indicated in the MUTCD?

A.51. Yes. The traffic guides will be wearing safety vests and will be equipped with flashlights. No further special designation of traffic guides is required. l l

l Q.52. As used in the MUTCD, please explain the statement that devices 1

should " convey a simple meanina". )

A.52. The MUTCD indicates that traffic control devices should convey a simple meaning. Traffic control devices use standard shapes, colors and words (or symbols) to convey messages. Traffic cones are devices that  ;

convey a simple meaning.

Q.53. Does the SPMC traffic management plan designate traffic control devices consistent with this philsophy?

A.53. Yes.

Q.54. How do traffic engineers attempt to convey respect for traffic control devices and personnel, consistent with the MUTCD? j A.54. The most important concept is to comply with the basic principles of traffic engineering. This has certianly been done in the ,

1 SPMC development of the traffic management plan. In addition, the deployment of standard traffic control devices and the wearing of special safety vests by traffic guides, assists in commanding the respect of motorists.

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... 7, Q.55. Are the number of traffic control points designated in the portion of the EPZ Massachusetts adequate to make effective use of available roadways?

A.55. Yes. Traffic control points are provided at critical locations where capacity enhancement can provide significant benefits. There are only a limited number of points where such activities are appropriate. In addition, many additional traffic control points are provided to handle contingencies such as accidents. In other words, the SPMC provides more trafic control points than are actually required, based on capacity enhancement needs and the desire to handle contingencies.

Q.56. Does the SPMC traffic management plan take advantage of available opportunities to reduce evacuation times to as great an extent as is reasonably feasible?

A.56. Yes. l Q.57. Does the SPMC utilize appropriate and sufficient capacity enhancing measures and other traffic control strategies? [

A.57. Yes. The SPMC has identified those actions that could significantly improve evacuation times, consistent with NUREG-0654, Appendix 4.

Q.58. What is your conclusion regarding the SPMC traffic management plan?

A.58. The SPMC traffic management plan was developed in a systematic manner using sound traffic engineering principles, and is generally

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• t i consistent with the guidance of NUREG-0654, Appendix 4. Some additional refinement of the plan is necessary, as set forthin A.28 and A.31 above, but the required changes can easily be made.

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es L 1"Gir UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U*r NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 'l9 HAR 13 AH):32 In the Matter of ) crr _

Docket Nos. 50-443COLKE % s -

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, el al . Off-site Emergency Planning Issues (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) s CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF'S PRE-TRIAL BRIEF ON CONTENTIONS CONCERNING THE SEABROOK PLAN FOR MASSACHUSETTS COMMUNITIES (SPMC)" and

" TESTIMONY OF THOMAS URBANIX IT ON BEHALF 0F THE NRC STAFF ON JOINT INTERVENOR CONTENTIONS 4 AND 7A (SPMC)" in the above captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system, or as indicated by double asterisks, by express mail, this 7th day of March 1989:

Ivan W. Smith, Chairman (2)* Philip Ahrens, Esq.

Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission State House Station Washington, DC 20555 Augusta ME 04333 Richard F. Cole

• John Traficonte, Esq.**

Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Washington, DC 20555 Boston, MA 02108 Kenneth A. McCollom** Geoffrey Huntington, Esq.

Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General 1107 West Knapp Street Office of the Attorney General Stillwater, OK 74075 25 Capitol Street Concord, NH 03301 ~

James H. Carpenter, Alternate

• Administrative Judge Diane Curran, Esq.**

Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Harmon, Curran & Tousley U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2001 S Street, NW Washington, DC 20555 Suite 430 Washington, DC 20009 Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. , Esq.**

Robert K. Gad, III, Esq. Robert A. Backus, Esq.**

Ropes & Grey Backus, Meyer & Solomon One International Place 116 Lowell Street Boston, MA 02110-2624 Manchester, NH 03106

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H. J. Flynn, Esq. Judith H. Mizner, Esq.**

Assistant General Counsel 79 State Street i Federal Emergency Management Agency Newburyport, MA 01950 500 C Street, S.W. .

. Washington, DC 20472 Robert Carrigg, Chairman  ;

Board of Selectmen l Paul McEachern, Esq.** Town Office Shaines & McEachern Atlantic Avenue i 25 Maplewood Avenue North Hampton, NH 03862 P.O. Box 360 i Portsmouth, NH 03801 William S. Lord Board of Selectmen Charles P. Graham, Esq.

. Town Hall - Friend Street-McKay, Murphy & Graham .Amesbury, MA 01913  ;

100 Main Street  :

Amesbury, MA 01913 Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chaiman Board of Selectmen i Sandra Gavutis, Chairman 13-15 Newmarket Road Board of Selectmen Durham, NH 03824 RFD.#1, Box 1154 Kensington, NH 03827 Kensington, NH 03827 Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey l Calvin A. Canney United States Senate l City Hall 531 Hart Senate Office Building 126 Daniel Street Washington, DC 20510 Portsmouth, NH 03801 Richard R. Donovan R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq.** Federal Emergency Management Lagoulis, Clark, Hill-Whilton Agency

& McGuire Federal Regional Center 79 State Street 130 228th Street, S.W. ,

Newburyport, MA 01950 Bothell, Washington 98021-9796  !

Allen Lampert Peter J. Matthews, Mayor Civil Defense Director City Hall Town of Brentwood Newburyport, MA 01950

. 20 Franklin Exeter, NH 03833 Michael Santosuosso, Chairman Board of Selectmen  ;

William Armstrong South Hampten, NH 03827 - (

Civil Defense Director Town of Exeter Ashod N. Amirian, Esq.**

10 Front Street Town Counsel for Merrimac Exeter, NH 03833 145 South Main Street P.O. Box 38 Gary W. Holmes, Esq. Bradford, MA 01835 Holmes & Ellis 47 Winnacunnet Road Barbara J. Saint Andre, Esq.**

Hampton, NH 03842 Kopelman and Paige, P.C. t 77 Franklin Street i l

Boston, MA 02110 l

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I Ms. Suzanne Breiseth J. P. Nadeau Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen Town of Hampton Falls 10 Central Street Drinkwater Road Rye, NH 03870 1 Hampton Falls, NH 03844 +

3 Atomic Safety and Licensing Robert R. Pierce, Esq.* Board Panel (1)* i Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Board Panel Washington, DC 20555 ]i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Ms. Elizabeth Weinhold 3 Godfrey Avenue Atomic Safety and Licensing Hampton,-NH 03842 Appeal Panel (5)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Docketing and Service Section*

Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Connission Washington, DC 20555 oI - -

Sherwin E. Turk Counsel for NRC Staff l

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