ML20216G761
| ML20216G761 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Perry  |
| Issue date: | 10/23/1997 |
| From: | CENTERIOR ENERGY |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20216G751 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9804200483 | |
| Download: ML20216G761 (165) | |
Text
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l PY-CEl/NRR-2274L i
l l
PERRY NUCLEAR POWER PLANT l
SAFETY EVALUATION
SUMMARY
PURSUANT TO l
l 10 CFR 50.59(H)(2)
)
f 1996 - 1998
{
l 9904200403 980415 PDR ADOCK 05000440 PDR l
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SE No.:
96-078 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-099 l
l Description of Change:
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This USAR change request renamed the Corporate Health Physicist l
the Radiological Assessor.
The change request also changed reporting point of the Radiological Assessor from the Vice President-Nuclear to the General Manager, Perry Nuclear Power Plant Department (plant manager).
Summary:
I.
No.
The change in title from Corporate Health Physicist to Radiological Assessor and the change in reporting point are considered administrative changes. The responsibilities of the individual has not cianged.
The position of Radiological Assessor provides a health physics overview and evaluations of design and operational programs.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The change in title and reporting point are considered administrative changes.
The independent assessment of the radiological programs has not been eliminated.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The title and reporting point of the Radiological Assessor is not addressed in the Technical Specifications, Operational Requirements Manual, and the Operating License.
The change is considered an administrative change since the independent assessment functions have not been eliminated.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-084 Source Document:
DCN 5290 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises P&ID D-302-301, " Hydrogen Supply System", by reducing the operating pressure of the Hydrogen Supply system.
The l
reduction will help to preclude the inadvertent release of hydrogen from the system through the relief valves.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change reduces the operating pressure of the Hydrogen Supply i
system.
The reduction of operating pressure, decreases the probability for actuation of the Hydrogen Supply system safety reliefs.
This in turn reduces l
the probability for the release of any hydrogen from the system.
The reduced probability for lifting the reliefs will serve to decrease the probability of a fire / explosion as described in the USAR.
System operation will not be compromised.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The Hydrogen Supply system design or operation will not be compromised by this pressure reduction.
Safe shutdown will not be impacted.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a i
type different than previously evaluated has not been created.
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III.
No.
The Hydrogen Supply system design or operation will not be compromised.
No safety related systems have been affected by this change.
Plant safe shutdown will not be impacted. Therefore, no margins of safety have
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been reduced.
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l SE No.:
96-085 Source Document:
TM 1-96-017 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) jumpers the limit switch contacts on valve IN36-F0120A to allow closure of valve IN22-F0180A.
The two valves are interlocked such that valve 1N22-F0180A will be open whenever valve IN36-F0120A is closed to prevent water induction into the turbine during a plant start up.
Valve IN36-F0120A is red tag closed for feed heater 6A isolation, thus keeping IN22-F0180A open. Maintaining valve IN22-F0180A is reducing plant efficiency and contributing to erosion of the associated piping.
Summary:
I.
No.
The TM meets the existing design, material, and construction of the N22 system.
The operability of the N22 system will not be impacted by this modification.
The TM will not degrade any other plant structure, system, or I
component such that safety functicns, as described in the USAR, will not be altered. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipmant important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The TM satisfies the design, material, and construction standards of the N22 system. There are no adverse interactions with any other plant system introduced by the TM.
N22 system operability has not been impacted.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a type different than previously evaluated has not been created.
4 III.
No.
The piping and control circuitry affected by this TM are not described in the Technical Specifications.
N22 design, material, and construction standards remain satisfied.
N22 operability has not been impacted.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-088 Source Document:
DCN 5425 Description of Change:
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This drawing change revises P& ids D-302-641 and D-302-642, " Residual j
heat Removal System", by adding a clarify note as to when Spectacle l
Flanges 1E12-D0501A/ B are in the " blanked off" position.
The Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system will be isolated from the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPCC) system during normal operation with the flanges in the " blanked off" position.
l Summary:
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I.
No.
The drawing change will clarify the normal physical arrangement of l
the spectacle flanges at the interfaces between the RHR and t'CC systems. This is a non-physical, editorial drawing change. The change dnes u7t alter the L
configuration of the plant nor does it change the performance er function of the RP.A and FPCC systems. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The drawing change will clarify the normal physical arrangement of the spectacle flanges at the interfaces between the RHR and FPCC systems. This is a non-physical, editorial drawing change. The change does not alter the configuration of the plant, nor does it change the performance or function of the RHR and FPCC systems. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or o
malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated has not been I
created.
III.
No.
The change is a non-physical, editorial drawing change. The change does not affect actual plant configuration, any set points, any existing l
procedures, the Operational Requirements Manual (ORM), or any Technical l
Specifications including their bases (in particular RHR Sections 3.4.9 and 3.4.10, and Refueling Sections 3.9.1, 3. 9. 6, 3.9.8, and 3.9.9).
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-091 Source Document:
DCP 93-0182, Rev. O Description of Change:
i This design change replaces Post-Accident Monitoring Recorders 1D23-R0090A/B and 1D23-R0170A/B with two (one per division) chart l
recorders each capable of monitoring and hard copying twenty-four input channels.
l Summary:
I.
No.
The new recorders provide post-accident monitoring indication and recording only, and do not provide any control fun;tions.
Failure of a recorder itself is not an initiator to any of the accidents described l
in the USAR.
Although the new recorders employ digital hardware and software to implement the safety related functions, there are no new failure modes at the system level. The recorders are qualified for the Perry Control Room mild environment including temperature, humidity, radiation, and EMI/RFI.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The new recorders provide only indication and recording functions.
EMI/RFI emissions associated with the new recorders are below EPRI recommended emission levels and will not impact other safety-related equipment in the vicinity of the recorders.
Potential malfunctions due to software EMI failures are not of a different type than previously evaluated. The potential for a common mode failure was minimized by the cesign of the new recorder hardware and software, the Verification and Validation of the software to reduce the likelihood of errors, and the testing of the hardware to demonstrate its resistance to EMI/RFI.
Based on successful completion of all specified EQ and EMI/RFI tests, no new failure modes are created by Amplementation of the digital recorders.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a type different than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This modification does not impact the required number of channels operable, or the frequency of the channel checks or calibrations.
The new recorders' channel ranges remain the same and the recording accuracies are essentially equivalent.
The functions of post-accident indication and recording are maintained.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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r SE No.:
96-003 Source Document:
PAP-1604, Rev. 5 Description of Change:
This procedure revision incorporates various changes to the procedure.
The revision includes, but is not limited to, changes to the on-site 4
l organization, adds requirements associated with the oil / chemical release plan, and adds requirements for the Technical Specification Bases.
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Summary:
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No.
This procedure revision is considered administrative in nature.
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The design, function, and operation of the plant have not been altered.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Requirements associated with reports described within the procedure remain satisfied.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This procedure revision is considered administrative in nature.
The design, function, and operation of the plant have not been altered.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged. Requirements associated with reports described within the procedure remain satisfied.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This procedure revision is considered administrative in nature.
The design, function, and operation of the plant have not been altered.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Requirements associated with reports described within the procedure remain satisfied.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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1 SE No.:
96-094 i
Source Document: USAR Change Request 96-110 Description of Change; This USAR change request alters the operational description of the l
Condensate Demineralizer systems by permitting six demineralizers on i
line, instead of five on line with a sixth bed in standby and a seventh bed in the mix and hold tank.
The new line-up still satisfies
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the USAR requirements to assure a major condenser tube leak can be coped with.
Summary:
I.
No.
The changes to the Condensate Demineralizer system are operational and not mechanical.
The design of the system to automatically respond to changes in differential pressure across the beds has not been altered.
Plant water chemistry remains in compliance with the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.56.
USAR accident analyses has not been affected.
Therefore, the possibility of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The changes to the Condensate Demineralizer system are operational only.
The Condensate Demineralizer system design or function has not been i
altered.
Plant water chemistry remains in compliance with the recairements of Reg. Guide 1.56.
USAR accident analyses have not been affected.
Therefore, the possiollity of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The design or function of the Condensate Demineralizer system has not been changed.
Plant water chemistry remains in compliance with the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.56.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
SE No.:
96-095 Source Document:
TM l-96-020 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) installs a leak sealant device on the Reactor Recirculation Loop (B33A) piping downstream of valve 1B33-F060A.
This device will eliminate a leak identified to be originating from a mechanical joint associated with an abandoned vibration monitoring pressure transducer.
The leak sealant device to be installed is similar in concept to a pipe support clamp with a nipple. The nipple will be injected with sealant to stop the leak.
Summary:
I.
No.
The leak sealant device (clamp) will be bolted to the B33 process line.
The clamp is designed to ASME Section VIII requirements for pressure and temperature ratings a=.)ciated with the Reactor Recirculation system.
The sealant being used is app.,ved for use in reactor coolant applications.
This change does not impact the function of Reactor Recirculation system, or the design or function of any equipment important to safety.
This application, while encompassed within the reactor coolant pressure boundary, is not being relied upon to provide structural strength to the appendage or to serve as an ASME pressure boundary.
Since the critical characteristics of system design, function, and operation remain unchanged, the temporary modification has no effect upon any previously defined accidents or on equipment important to safety.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This temporary modification does not change the Reactor Recirculation system operation or function, or impact any B33 interfacing system operation or function. The temporary modification does not provide structural strength to the appendage or serve as an ASME pressure boundary.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a type different than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The temporary modification was designed to Section VIII requirements for the pressure and temperature ratings of the B33 system.
Additionally, the temporary modffication does not constitute part of the pressure boundary.
The temporary modification does not change the operation or function of the B33 system.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-096 Source Document:
DCP 94-0092, Rev. O, Rev.
1, Rev. 2 Description of Change:
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l This design change provides a safety grade source of air to the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV). The new backup air source will be used to maintain the valves leak tight in the closed position following i
a design basis accident.
The air source for this new supply is one of l
the two safety-related Instrument Air system low pressure storage tanks which also provides air for the Automatic Depressurization system safety / relief valves.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change adheres to established design criteria and codes.
The change provides for enhancements for minimizing potential post-accident main steamline penetration leakage without degrading the safety functions of the systems affected.
Reactor coolant boundary integrity remains unaffected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This design change maintains the redui.dancy and independence of the affected systems, such that susceptibility to common mode or common cause failures are not possible.
In addition, the changes meet the general design criteria for single failure of the affected equipment.
Postulated failures of the new equipment do not introduce conditions that could create new accidents or malfunctions of equipment.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new safety grade air supply is constructed and maintained in accordance with the ASME boiler and pressure vessel code.
Reactor coolant boundary integrity remains unaffected.
The change provides added assurance that the outboard MSIVs will maintain rotential penetration leakage in accordance with the Technical Specification limits. There is no impact upon the operability of the safety-related Instrument Air system or the Automatic Depressurization system.
Therefore, no margins or safety have been reduced.
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L SE No.:
96-097,97-032 t
Source Document:
PIPS 96-2198 and 96-2217 Description of Change.
These PIFs and accompanying evaluations analyze the startup and operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP) with the loss of any ITE/Gould dry-type, non-safety 13.8kV/480V transformers and their respective 480V bus.
This includes the loss of both transformers in a double-ended bus arrangement that is utilized in the non-safety related i
i 480V power distribution system.
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I Summary:
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No.
These PIFs analyze operation of PNPP with any non-safety double-ended bus in a single-ended configuration.
The design of each double-ended bus arrangement provides adequate capacity to support continued operation through a single-ended configuration based on the design parameters of the bus.
Each bus is rated at 1800 amps 1500 KVA/480V, Plant experience and visual observation of the worst case demand does not exceed the design rating of the equipment when operating under a single-ended configuration.
Switching between the configurations is permitted via a number of switching devices.
Operation with or without non-safety load centers is bounded by the USAR Loss Of Off-site Power (LOOP) event.
Furthermore, the equipment serviced by the non-safety 13.8 kV/480V AC transformers which are the subject of this evaluation have been reviewed and are not accident initiators.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of i
equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
These PIFs have not changed any plant equipment.
The design or operation of the non-safety plant electrical system has not been altered.
Hence, the failure modes associated with these transformers have not been affected. All equipment remains within the original design bases of the plant.
The worst case failure mode of these transformers is a fault condition i
which will be cleared though existing breaker coordination and protection circuitry.
Hence, the worst case failure of a non-safety transformer is loss of the associated bus.
This failure mode has not changed.
The failure of a transformer in a single-ended configuration is bounded by USAR analyses.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The design or operation of the non-safety plant electrical system has not been altered.
The single-ended bus configuration has been analyzed in the USAR.
Its failure is bound by USAR analyses. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
96-098 Source Document:
PIF 96-2159 l
Description of Change:
This PIF evaluates continued plant operation with the Emergency Service Water (ESW) Loop A flow to the Division 1 Diesel Generator (DG) at minimum flow per the system licensing and design bases.
This temporary "use-as-is" disposition will last until the end of Refueling Outage 6 (RFO6).
Summary:
I.
No.
The disposition shows that the Division 1 heat exchangers still meet the applicable component design requirements to remove the design heat loads with revised ESW Loop A flows.
Operating with revised flows to the Division 1 components will not cause a change to any system interface in a way that would increase the likelihood of any previously evaluated accident.
The operability, function, or reliability of the ESW system or the systems that it supports have not been impacted.
USAR accident analyses have not been 4
affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an acc!. dent or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The disposition does not affect the operability, function or reliability of the Division 1 heat exchangers or the ESW system.
Single failure analyses have not been impacted. Calculations confirm that the Division 1 heat exchangers still satisfy the appropriate design requirements.
Overall, the heat removal capability of the ESW system is maintained.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a
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different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The cooling capability of the Division 1 heat exchangers to remove design heat loads during normal and accidents conditions remains unaltered.
The functions and operation of the ESW system have not been affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-100 Source Document:
PIF 95-2003 Description of Change:
This PIF evaluates the existence of a pin hole leak in a weld joint on the inlet pipe of Detergent Drain Filter, OG50-DOO5B, of the Detergent Drain (DD) portion of the Liquid Radwaste system.
The DD filters are no longer required to support Liquid Radwaste system operation.
The DD filters were abandoned.
Summary:
I.
No.
The design or operation of the Liquid Radwaste system is not adversely affected by the abandonment of the DD filters.
Pressure integrity of the Detergent Drain process piping is maintained. Abandonment and isolation of the DD filters does not adversely affect radwaste processing.
Isolation of the filters cannot initiate an accident described in the USAR.
The filters are not required to mitigate accident consequences.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The Detergent Drain subsystem is not required for safe shutdown of the plant.
The abandonment of the filters has no effect on the function or performance of any system, structure, or component important to safety.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or the malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The abandonment of the DD filters has no impact upon the processing of liquid radwaste.
The pressure integrity of the Liquid Radwaste system has not been compromised.
There is no impact to any system, structure, or component required for safe shutdown or accident mitigation. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-101 Source Document:
Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 6 Description of Change:
This evaluation analyzes a change to the Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Safety Limit resulting from a non-conser"atism in the original analysis identified by the fuel vendor. A penalty is added to the original MCPR Operating Limits to compensate for the non-conservatism of the MCPR Safety Limit. The penalty is determined by subtracting the MCPR Safety Limit listed in the Technical Specifications from the cycle specific MCPR Safety Limit supplied by the vendor.
The revised MCPR Operating Limits are simply the previous MCPR Operating Limits plus the MCPR penalty. The same delta CPR values used for the original Cycle 6 i
MCPR Operating Limits are used for the revised Cycle 6 MCPR Operating Limits.
Summary:
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No.
The change in the MCPR Safety Limit and the MCPR Operating Limits does not change any plant equipment. The MCPR limit changes are more l
conservative and decrease the probability of transition boiling.
Limiting i
plant transients and accidents have been re-analyzed with no impact.
The fundamental sequences of accidents and transients have not been altered. The fuel failure mechanisms are unchanged. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The change in MCPR limits do not alter the fuel design, function j
and operation.
The accident and transient initiating sequence of events have not changed.
The revised limits are more conservative and decrease the j
probability of transition boiling.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new MCPR limits are more conservative and decrease the probability of transition boiling.
Fuel design, function, and operation have not been altered.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced, l
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SE No.:
96-102 Source Document:
Technical Specification Change Request 96-135 Description of Change:
This evalaution analyzes revising the Technical Specification Minimum i
Critical Power (MCPR) Safety Limit (TS 2.1.1.2) from 1.07 to 1.09.
The MCPR Safety Limit is the fuel cladding integrity safety limit.
No i
significant fuel damage is calculated to occur if the limit is not
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violated.
The MCPR Safety Limit provides a 95% probability at a 95%
l confidence level that following any abnormal operating occurrence, 99.9%
l of the fuel rods avoid boiling transition.
l The fuel vendor determined that the generic MCPR Safety Limit was non-conservative.
The bundle and core power distribution assumptions made l
for the generic MCPR Safety Limit were considered not bounding. A bounding analysis was performed which resulted in the fuel bundle and core designs having a more uniform power distribution. With a more uniform bundle and core power distribution, more fuel rods could be available to be at the transition boiling limit. Therefore, the MCPR Safety Limit must be set higher to satisfy the probability limits.
Summary:
I.
No.
The change in the MCPR Safety Limit does not change any plant equipment. t'le MCPR limit change is more conservative and decreases the probability of transition boiling.
Limiting plant transients and accidents have been re-analyzed with no impact.
The fundamental sequences of accidents and transients have not been altered. The fuel failure mechanisms are l
unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The change in the MCPR limit does not alter the fuel design, i
function and operation.
The accident and transient initiating sequence of events have not changed.
The revised limit is more conservative and decreases the probability of transition boiling.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new MCPR limit is more conservative and decreases the probability of transition boiling.
Fuel design, function, and operation have not been altered.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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I SE No.:
96-106 l
Source Document:
FSCRs 96-0006 through 96-0012 Description of Change:
These Fuse Size Change Requests (FSCR) replace the existing installed power fuses for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system Motor Operated Valves (MOV) 1E51-F0010, F0019, F0022, F0031, F0045, F0068 and F0510 with smaller fuses to improve the MOV motor protection under the motor locked rotor conditions.
This fuse resizing is in compliance with USAR requirements.
Summary:
I.
No.
The RCIC MOV power fuse resizing maintains the original system l
performance requirements.
This change will improve the RCIC MOV motor protection under locked rotor conditions without impacting valve operability.
l There is no impact on RCIC system capability and reliability. Accident analyses are not impacted.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
These FSCRs enhance RCIC MOV motor protection.
The changes do not adversely affect RCIC system performance, function, or operation.
Therefore, the possir.lity of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The MOV power fuse change will not impact the RCIC function to provide adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel.
The Technical Specifications associated with the RCIC system have not been affected.
The fuse resizing does not alter any RCIC system design requirement.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
96-107 l
Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-128 i
Description of Change:
l This USAR change request evaluates the transfer of responsibility for l
the review of procurement documents from the Procurement Quality Unit (PQU) to the Procurement Engineering Unit (PEU), Perry Supply Section i
I (PSS).
The Perry Supply Section will work to the Perry Quality l
Assurance Program and be subject to Perry Nuclear Assurance Department l
oversight and assessment.
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l Summary:
I.
No.
This change is a transfer of responsibility between the Perry Nuclear Assurance Department and the Perry Nuclear Services Department.
The procurement of msterials, equipment, and services at the Perry Nuclear Power plant will remain in compliance with the requirements of the Perry Quality Assurance Program and ANSI N45.2.13-1976.
This transfer of responsibility does not affect the safe operation of the plant, nor does it affect any accidents ac described in the USAR.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The transfer of procurement document review responsibility does not alter any Quality Assurance Program commitment or ANSI N45.2.13-1976 requirement.
The safe operation of the plant has not been impacted. The change does not affect USAR accident analyses.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change transfers document review responsibilities associated with the procurement of materials, equipment, and services from the Perry Nuclear Assurance Department to the Perry Nuclear Services Department.
All existing technical and quality commitments associated with this review remain intact.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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96-109 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-134 Description of Change:
This USAR change request evaluates the re-organization of the Perry Nuclear Assurance Department (PNAD) and the Perry Nuclear Services Department (PNSD).
Specific changes include: the reporting point for the Perry Training Section changes from PNSD to PNAD; the Manager, i
Quality Assurance Section (QAS) will report to the Director, PNAD except for quality issues where direct report will be to the Vice President Nuclear-Perry; and the Manager, OAS assumes responsibility of the Procurement Quality Unit (POV) from the Quality Control Section (OCS).
Summary:
I.
No.
The change request evaluates a management re-organization.
No functions / activities have been eliminated, only re-assigned.
Management background and experience requirements remain consistent with Reg. Guide 1.8 and the USAR.
The new organization structure complies with the requirements of Reg. Guide 1.33 and NUREG-0800. There is no impact on design, function, or operation of the plant. Accident and radiological analyses will not be impacted.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The change request evaluates a management re-organization.
The organizational changes do not alter the design, function or operation of the plant. Accident and radiological enalyses have not been impacted.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The change request evaluates a management re-organization.
The change is consistent with the Technical Specifications.
Plant design, function or operation will not be affected.
There are no changes to the plant accident or radiological analyses.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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96-110 Source Document:
TM 1-96-0022 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) installs a blank flange in the Potable Water (P71) system upstream of valve 1P71-F566.
This installation will permit maintenance on the 1P71-F566 valve.
Summary:
I.
No.
The installation of this blank flange permits work on IP71-F566 with the valve being removed from the system.
The blank has been manufactured and installed in accordance with the applicable piping specifications.
Since the blank is a passive device, no new equipment failure modes have been created.
The portion of the P71 system isolated by this installation is either abandoned or unused structures / facilities.
The P71 system is not required for plant safe shutdown.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the cons'quences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The installation of this blank flange permits work on IP71-F566 with the valve being removed from the system.
The blank has been manufactured and installed in accordance with the applicable piping specifications.
Since the blank is a passive device, no new equipment failure modes have been created.
The portion of the P71 system isolated by this installation is either abandoned or unused structures / facilities.
The P71 system is not required for plant safe shutdown.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The installation of this blank flange permits work on IP71-F566 with the valve being removed from the system.
The blank has been manufactured and installed in accordance with the applicable piping specifications.
Since the blank is a passive device, no new equipment failure modes have been created. The portion of the P71 system isolated by this installation is either abandoned or unused structures / facilities. The P71 system is not required for plant safe shutdown.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
SE No.:
96-112 Source Document:
DCN 5496 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises drawing D-201-146, Sheet 3,
" Electrical Fire Barrier Details - Tray and Conduit", to reflect the deletion of the requirement for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated barrier on raceways located in the Auxiliary Building 599' elevation Corridor (Fire Zone 1AB-2).
Calculations demonstrate that, in the event a fire in Fire Zone 1AB-2 a means of providing for reactor inventory control and shutdown cooling will be available to support safe shutdown. Therefore, a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire rated barrier is not needed to protect the raceways.
Summary:
)
I.
No.
This drawing change does not alter the conduits, and no physical changes to the circuits are made.
Since accidents are not assumed to occur coincidentally with a fire, removing the requirement for a one-hour rated fire barrier for these conduits does not affect the ability of the conduits or their associated circuits to function under all other design conditions (including accident conditions).
In the event of a fire, systems remain available to provide reactor inventory control and support safe shutdown.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change has not physically altered the conduit or circuitry.
No new system interactions are created by this activity.
Removing the requirement to have a rated fire barrier on these conduits can only affect whether or not these raceways could be damaged in a fire and does not affect their ability to function under other conditions. The raceways and circuits will function under current design conditions and because other events are not
{
postulated to occur concurrently with a fire.
Other means of achieving safe shutdown remain available in the case of a fire.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
L l
III.
No.
This change has not altered the conduit or circuits contained in l
the raceways. Operability of systems associated with these circuits has not been impacted.
Other means of reactor inventory and safe shutdown are available if a fire in the area should occur. Therefore, no margins of safety
- r. ave been reduced, l
SE No.:
96-113 Source Document:
DCN 5495 Dercription of Change:
This drawing change revises drawing D-201-146, Sheet 3,
" Electrical Fire Barrier Details - Tray and Conduit", to reflect the deletion of requirement for a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> rated barrier on raceways located in the Intermediate Building 620' elevation, (Fire Zone IB-3).
In the event of a fire, the spatial separation between the raceways, the low fire exposure hazard presented by the intervening combustibles, and ceiling height in excess of 30 feet, a fire in the corridor area of Fire Zone IB-3 would not be expected to involve both trains of safe shutdown
)
equipment. Additionally, the existing fire detection system, and automatic and manual fire protection features will provide adequate protection for the redundant trains of safe shutdown equipment in this area.
j Summary:
I.
No.
This drawing change does not alter the conduits, and no physical changes to the circuits are made.
Since accidents are not assumed to occur coincidentally with a fire, removing the requirement for a one-hour rated fire barrier for these conduits does not affect the ability of the conduits or their associated circuits to function under all other design conditions (including accident conditions).
In the event of a fire, systems remain available to provide reactor inventory control and support safe shutdown.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction'of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change does not physically alter the conduit or circuitry.
No new system interactions are created by this activity.
Removing the requirement to have a rated fire barrier on these conduits can only affect l
whether or not these raceways could be damaged in a fire and does not affect j
l their ability to function under other conditions.
The raceways and circuits 1
l will function under current design conditions and because other events are not
)
l postulated to occur concurrently with a fire. Other means of achieving safe l
shutdown remain available in the case of a fire. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change has not altered the conduit or circuits contained in
(
the raceways.
Operability of systems associated with these circuits has not been impacted.
Other means of reactor inventory and safe shutdown are available if a fire in the area should occur.
Therefore, no margins oE safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-114 Source Document:
PIF 96-2641 Description of Change:
This PIF evaluates the use of an alternate backfill for missile protection purposes for buried Emergency Safety Water (ESW) piping and concrete duct banks.
This alternate backfill will only be used on a temporary basis.
In case of a tornado watch or hurricane warning any exposed ESW piping and duct banks will be backfilled with the alternate fill.
The alternate fill is equivalent protection to that of the USAR.
Summary:
I.
No.
This PIF evaluates the use of an alternate backfill for missile protection.
The increased resistance to penetration of the alternate fill (crushed rock) over that of class A fill, the crushed rcck will provide missile protection equivalent to that of compacted class A fill.
The ESW piping and duct banks will be protected from tornado generated missiles, hence, will remain functional.
There is no impact upon accident analyses.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important '.o safety have not been changed.
II.
No.
The crushed rock provides the same degree of tornado protection as that provided compacted class % fill.
Based on this, the ESW piping and duct banks will remain protected.
Hence, the design, function, and operation of j
the ESW piping and duct banks remains unaffected. Therefore, the possibility 1
of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluateu has not been created.
l III.
No.
The alternate fill provides the same degree of missile protection l
as that provided by compacted class A fill. The ESW piping and duct banks l
remain unaffected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
1 l
SE No.:
96-117 Source Document:
DCP 96-6004, Rev. 1 Description of Change:
This design change provides for termination of the Potable Water (P71) service to the Unit 2 Circulating Water Pumphouse.
The building is abandoned and P71 is no longer required.
Summary:
I.
No.
The P71 system has no direct or indirect connections to any plant system important to safety. The change being made to the P71 system will not reduce the reliability of the system.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
I II.
No.
The P71 system has no direct or indirect connections to systems important to safety.
Failures in the P71 system are bounded by existing USAR accidents and malfunctions. The reliability of the P71 system has not been affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction cf equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created, l
III.
No.
The P71 system is not directly associated with any plant systems important to safety.
The reliability of the P71 system has not been affected.
l P71 failures are bounded by existing USAR analyses.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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r SE No.:
96-118 Source Document:
DCP 96-5028, Rev. 1 Description of Change:
l This design change provides for a new lunchroom trailer to be located on the east side of Maintenance Building (MB) 100.
The trailer requires Potable Water (P71) and Sanitary Sewer (P66) service.
Summary:
I.
No.
The P66 and P71 systems have no direct or indirect connections to any plant system important to safety.
The change being made to the P66 and P71 systems will not reduce the reliability of either system.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
l II.
No.
The P66 and P71 systems have no direct or indirect connections to systems important to safety.
Failures in the P66 or the P71 systems are bounded by existing USAR accidents and malfunctions.
The reliability of the P66 or the P71 systems have not been affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
I III.
No.
The P66 or the P71 systems are not directly associated with any plant systems important to safety.
The reliability of the P66 or the P71 l
systems have not been affected.
P66 or P71 failures are bounded by existing l
USAR enalyses.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-119 Source Document:
DCN 5520 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises a note on P& ids D-302-641 and D-320-641,
" Residual Heat Removal System", by deleting reference to a specific valve position and by clarifying design flow requirements.
Summary:
I.
No.
The design, function, operation, and performance of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system will not be affected by this drawing change.
No system or equipment protection features will be modified.
Aystem redundancy and independence will not be reduced. Testing requirements will not be changed.
Equipment will not be operated differently or in an environment that could be more detrimental or more demanding.
This drawing change will not directly or indirectly affect assumptions, actions, mitigation, or consequences of an accident or of a malfunction of equipment important to safety.
The drawing change will not affect any fission product barriers.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The drawing change does not reflect any physicsl change to the plant or any process change to the way system configurativn is maintained or controlled.
The drawing change will not create any new systems, add any new l
active equipment or compromise the functioninn of any existing systems.
The drawing change will have no effect on the RHR system.
The drawing change l
cannot result in any new type of equipment failures, nor create initiators or contributors for a new type of accident.
This drawing change will not invalidate any previous accident evaluation. Therefore, the possibility of an i
accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The safety functions of the RHR system are unaffected.
Design and safety margins that existed have not been changed or compromised.
The drawing change will not degrade the capability of the RHR system to mitigate the effects of postulated transients and accidents.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-120 Source Document:
DCP 95-5071, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change modifies the Service Water and Emergency Service Water Systems Chlorine Addition (P48) system by adding a permanent fill connection for the Sodium Hypochlorite Storage Tank and disconnecting the tie between the Sodium Hypochlorite (P84) system and the P48 system.
The modification also includes converting the P48 system to permit the use of 12.5% sodium hypochlorite in place of the 0.8% sodium hypochlorite that was the initial design for the system.
This portion of the modification involved changing the flow control valves and flow indicators to permit a lower flow rate to allow the same dilution of the sodium hypochlorite to the Service Water and Emergency Service Water systems.
l Summary:
I.
No.
The design change modifies both the P48 and P84 systems.
The P48 and P84 system design criteria has been maintained. The materials used in the modification were compatible for use with the 12.5% sodium hypochlorite.
The piping supports satisfy the applicable codes and standards. 'No new equipment failure modes were identified.
Failures of the P48 and P84 systems do not initiate any accidents.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The modifications to the P48 and the P84 cystems were performed in accordance with the applicable design criteria, codes, and standards.
The modification did not identify any new failure modes.
The modification did not alter the functions of the P48 System.
The modification did not affect or alter the administrative procedures that control chemicals on site.
Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a l
different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The design change was performed in accordance with the applicable design criteria, codes, and standards.
The P48 system function of providing hypochlorite solution has not been impacted.
System piping is compatible with the 12.5% hypochlorite solution.
On-site chemical control has not been affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
96-121 Source Document:
DCN 3193 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises P&ID D-302-613, " Nuclear Closed Cooling System", to clarify the fact that there are only three Nuclear Closed Cooling (P43) system Drywell coolers (M13-B001, M13-B002, M13-B003) each having two independent coils, A and B.
The change also clarifies a note within the USAR, which implies the Drywell Cooling (M13) system has fire dampers.
The M13 system does not have fire dampers.
Summary:
I.
No.
The clarification of the Drywell cooler arrangement on a drawing and the removal of the implied M13 fire dampers from the USAR do not impact any equipment important to safety. The changes are not associated with any accident initiator or affect any system used to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
The changes do not affect the Fire Protection system.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The clarification of the Drywell cooler arrangement on a drawing and the removal of the implied M13 fire dampers from the USAR do not impact any equipment important to safety.
The changes do not add any new equipment, or create an accident initiator or new equipment failure mode. The changes do not affect the Fire Protection system.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The clarification of the Drywell cooler arrangement on a drawing and the removal of the implied M13 fire dampers from the USAR do not impact any equipment important to safety.
The maximum average Drywell air temperature requirement has not been impacted.
The changes do not affect the Fire Protection system.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-122,96-143 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-143 Description of Change:
This USAR change revises the description of the radioactive waste settling tanks to allow the tank manways to remain open to prevent possible build-up of explosive gases due to the decomposition of organic waste.
Summary:
I.
No.
Operating the radwaste tanks with the manways open does not adversely affect the integrity of the tanks or increase the potential for additional, uncontrolled leakage of liquid or releases of gaseous radioactive materials. Opening the radwaste tank manways will prevent the build-up of explosive levels of methane gas in ene radwaste tanks and thereby lower the potential for a radwaste tank failure due to methane explosion. Opening the manway covers has no affect on Radwaste Building ventilation flow rates or flow patterns.
This change has no impact on the radiological inventory within the tanks.
Radioactive releases from the open manways are bounded by the USAR radwaste tank failure event The requirements of 10CFR50 and 10CFR100, and Regulatory Guides 1.21 and 1.143 are maintained.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
Operating the radwaste tanks with the manways open does not adversely affect the integrity of the tanks or increase the potential for additional, uncontrolled leakage of liquid or releases of gaseous radioactive materials.
Opening the manway covers has no affect on Radwaste Building ventilation flow rates or flow patterns.
This change has no impact on the radiological inventory within the tanks.
Radioactive releases from the open manways are bounded by the USAR radwaste tank failure event.
The requirements of 10CFR50 and 10CFR100, and Regulatory Guides 1.21 and 1.143 are maintained.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
Operating the radwaste tanks with the manways open does not adversely affect the integrity of the tanks or increase the potential for additional, uncontrolled leakage of liquid or releases of gaseous radioactive materials. Opening the manway covers has no affect on Radwaste Building ventilation flow rates or flow patterns. This change has no impact on the radiological inventory within the tanks.
Radioactive releases from the open manways are bounded by the USAR radwaste tank failure event The requirements of 10CFR50 and 10CFR100, and Regulatory Guides 1.21 and 1.143 are maintained.
j Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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1 SE No.:
96-123,96-136, 97-027,97-069 Source Document: DCP 95-0022, Rev. O, 1,
2 DCP 95-0022B, Rev. O, 1, 2 i
Description of Change:
These design changes replace the supply side Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP) piping in the Service Water (SW) system with steel piping.
Summary:
I.
No.
The modifications replace fiberglass SW pipe with steel pipe.
The replacement SW piping is designed to meet ANSI B31.1 and does not affect the design function or operation of the Service Water system. The probability of a pipe failure / moderate energy line break remains the same as the existing service water piping.
Calculations show that the thermo-hydraulic performance of the SW system as modified is equivalent to that of the original system design. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
)
II.
No.
The modifications replace fiberglass pipe with steel pipe designed to ANSI B31.1.
The function or operation of the SW system have not been altered.
Pipe failure, as with the consequences of failure remain bounded by the original SW system design.
System thermo-hydraulic performance has not been adversely affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not
)
been created, a
III.
No.
The modifications do not affect the function or operation of the SW system.
During the performance of the SW system modifications, alternate keepfill water supply from the Fire Protection system will be used to maintain the operability of the Emergency Service Water system. The steel piping satisfies the criteria of ANSI B31.1.
Pipe failure and the consequence of failure remain bounded by the existing design.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-12$
Source Document:
DCN 5527 Description of Change:
This drawing change revised several P& ids and generated several new P& ids to reflect the actual components located on skid mounted equipment.
Summary:
I.
No.
The drawing changes do not change how the plant functions.
The design, operation, and performance of the systems involved remain unchanged.
Accident analyses are not impacted. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The drawing changes do not change how the plant functions.
There is no affect on the design, materials, or construction standards of the systems involved.
Overall plant performance remains unaffected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The drawing changes do not impact the Technical Specification l
Bases.
The design, operation, and performance for the systems in question l
{
have not been altered.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
96-126 l
Source Document:
DCN 5529 l
Description of Change:
This drawing change revises drawing D-201-146, Sheet 3,
" Electrical Fire Barrier Details - Tray and Conduit", to reflect the deletion of the requirement for a 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> rated barrier on Conduit 1R33-C5483B, located on Elevation 620' of the Control Complex in the Division 1 Switchgear Room (Fire Area 1CC-3c).
Conduit 1R33-C5483B contains Method B circuits for control power and position indication circuits for inboard MSIV main pilot air control valve solenoids. Calculations demonstrate that an alternative means of isolating the MSIV lines utilizing the outboard MSIVs will be available in the event that a fire occurs in Fire Area
(
Barrier removal is based upon the elimination of the MSIV Leakage Control system.
Summary:
I.
No.
This drawing change does not affect the conduit other than the requirement for a fire barrier. No physical changes are being made to the circuits.
Removing the requirement for a fire barrier can only affect the protection provided to the conduit during a fire, it does not affect the probability of the occurrence of any other event.
Removing the requirement for a three-hour rated
- ire barrier does not affect the ability of the associated circuits to function under all other design conditions (including 1
l accident conditions), so the MSIVs will function as designed.
USAR accident analyses have not been affected.
This activity does not increase the probability of a fire. Should a fire occur, an alternate means exists to achieve safe shutdown.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or ralfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This drawing change does not affect circuitry associated with the MSIVs.
No new system interactions have been created by this activity.
Removing the requirement to have a rated fire barrier on the conduit can only affect whether or not the conduit could be damaged in a fire and does not affect the ability of the circuits within the conduit to function under other conditions (including accident conditions).
Should a fire in Fire Area 1CC-3c occur, alternate means exist to achieve safe shutdown.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The drawing change has not altered the conduit or the contained 1
circuits.
The activity makes no changes to any MSIV component.
The prooability of a fire has not been altered by the removal of a fire barrier.
Safe shutdown capability remains should a fire occur in Fire Area 1CC-3c.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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1 SE No.:
96-127 Source Document:
DCN 5531 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises P&ID D-302-359, " Division 3 Diesel Lube Oil System", to reflect the proper configuration of pressure switches lE22-N072(, N0723, N0724, and pressure indicator lE22-R0724.
Summary:
I.
No.
This drawing change revises the configuration of several pressure switches and a pressure indicator. The plant has not been physically changed as a result of this revision.
The operation of the E22 system remains unchanged.
USAR accident analysis is unaffected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This drawing change revises the configuration of several pressure switches and a pressure indicator. The plant has not been physically changed as a result of this revision.
The operation of the E22 system remains unchanged.
No new failure mechanisms have been introduced, nor are existing 1
fa1.ure mechanisms affected. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malftnction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This drawing change revises the configuration of several pressure switches and a pressure ir.dicator. The plant has not been physically changed as a result of this revision.
The operation of the E22 system remains unchanged.
No new failure mechanisms have been introduced, nor are existing failure mechanisms affected. USAR accident analysis is unaffected.
Therefore, no margins c f safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-128 Source Document:
PIF 96-2846 Description of Change:
This PIF evaluates changes in the system leakage rates associated with j
the Emergency Closed Cooling Water (ECCW) system.
The changes in leakage rates involve reliance on the use of operator actions to align the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system as the emergency make-up source of water to the ECCW surge tanks verses reliance on a set surge tank j
inventory.
Summar,y:
I.
No.
The original design and regulatory guidance establish acceptability of using the ESW system as a emergency make-up source. This change will not impact the function or design of the ECCW system or any system it supports.
The change does not involve any accident initiators and has no affect upon any previously defined accidents. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed, l
II.
No.
The original design and regulatory guidance support the use of the ESW system as an emergency make-up source for the ECCW surge tanks.
The use
{
of operator actions have been evaluated, the results show that the ability of ESW to provide the make-up water has not been impacted. The ESW and the ECCW systems will continue function as designed. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This activity does not affect the original design or function of the ESW or the ECCW systems.
The Standard Review Plan guidance provides criteria for an acceptable ECCW design which includes the use of a seismically designed source of make-up.
The ESW system is that system. The actions required by the operator have been evaluated as being able to be completed within the required time frame.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-129 Source Document:
FCR 23472 Description of Change:
This Field Clarification Request evaluates the removal of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pumphouse roof hatch plugs.
The plugs were required to be removed to permit installation and subsequent removal of maintenance support equipment. A Structural Engineering calculation was performed to determine the credibility of a tornado missile entering the ESW Pumphouse through the open roof hatch.
The calculation concluded that a tornado missile entering the ESW Pumphouse during the short time period the roof hatches would be removed was not a credible event.
Summary:
I.
No.
The possibility of a tornado missile entering the ESW Purphouse during the short time period which the roof hatches would be open has been determined to not be a credible event.
This fact combined with the additional conservative measures to maintain a tornado watch plan, cover electrical equipment, and opening the roof hatches for no more than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> per evolution, ensures that protection equivalent to the requirements of the USAR are maintained.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
Based on the insignificant credibility of a tornado missile entering the ESW Pumphouse during the evolution described above, combined with additional conservative measures described in the above response, The requirements of the USAR remain satisfied.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The event of a tornado missile entering the ESW Pumphouse during short periods which the roof hatch plugs are removed has been determined to be not credible.
Additional conservative measures ensure the requirements of the USAR remain satisfied.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE Mo.:
96-130,97-019 Source Document: Off-site Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) l Description of Change:
This revision to the ODCM analyzes a change which eliminates the Liquid l
Radwaste (G50) system Low Flow Discharge Header Flow Monitor as an ODCM i
control activity.
Summary:
I.
No.
The G50 low flow discharge path is being abandoned in-place.
This path is one of two parallel discharge paths, hence radwaste discharges can still occur.
There are no plant modifications associated with this activity.
Overall, G50 system function and performance will not be affected.
The accident of concern, Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to Liquid-Containing Tank Failures, is not impacted by this change.
Source terms are not affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This activity does not add to or otherwise modify any plant i
equipment, including the G50 system.
The path being eliminated is a parallel discharge path, hence radwaste discharge can still occur. Accident analysis is not affected by this activity.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This activity does not modify or alter any plant equipment.
Radwaste discharge can still occur.
Source terms are not impacted.
10CFR20 and 10CFR50, Appendix I limits remain satisfied.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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i SE No.:
96-131
]
j Source Document:
WMI-0004, Rev. 2 Description of Change:
This Work Management Instruction change permits maintenance on-line by voluntarily entering into Technical SpecAfication Limiting Condition for Operation Action Statements and utilizing the associated Required j
Completion Times as controlled by the Haintenance Rule Program.
Summary:
l I.
No.
The performance of on-line maintenance is controlled by the l
Engineered safety systems have sufficient i
redundancy to provide assurance that should a safety function be required, it will occur.
USAR Chapter 15 events bound the removal of components / equipment from service.
That is, the reason for the equipment being out of service is not important (equipment failure or voluntarily taken out for maintenance).
The fact that equipment is out of service is important and USAR analyses are based upon equipment single-failure and redundancy.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of l
equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This instruction change does not physically alter the plant.
No new failure mechanisms are introduced.
USAR Chapter 15 remains bounding as stated in the sosponse above. The performance of on-line maintenance will improve equipment reliability and availability, hence overall risk to the safe operation of the plant is reduced.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The basis for Technical Specification 3.0.2 permits the use of on-line maintenance.
The Maintenance Rule Program controls the on-line maintenance process. The performance of on-line maintenance will improve i
equipment reliability and availability.
Equipment redundancy will not be adversely impacted.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-132 Source Document:
TM 2-96-001 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) justifies the operation of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Division 1 and 2 batteries (lR42-S002, 2R42-S002, 1R42-S003 and 2R42-S003) with 59 rather than 60 conne ted cells.
Summary:
I.
No.
This TM evaluated the operation of plant batteries with 59 instead of 60 cells.
Engineering calculations for battery capacity verified that the divisional batteries could adequately support ESF and Station Blackout loads with one cell bypassed.
The design, operation, and performance of supported I
equipment would not be impacted. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
Engineering calculations verified that operation with one cell bypassed would adequately support ESF and Station Blackout loads. There is no f
impact upon DC supported equipment.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident
]
or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
Operation with one cell bypassed would adequately support normal and emergency battery loads. The design, operation, and performance of supported equipment would not be affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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96-133 Source Document:
DCP 96-7073, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change disconnects Fire Suppression (P54) system, Sanitary Drain and Sewer (P66) system, and Potable Water (P71) system lines from several office-type trailers located on-site.
The design change also installs a P71 line to the Mais.tenance Test Laboratory (MTL) One.
Summary:
I I.
No.
These modifications de not adversely impact the functions or operation of the P54, P66, and P71 systems.
There is no impact upon any safety-related system or radiological release barriers.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment iraportant to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The modifications affect non-generating facilities only.
The line terminations and installation meet the original design requirements.
There is no adverse impact upon the P54, P66, or P71 systems.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created III.
No.
The modifications affect non-generating facilities only.
The line terminations and installation satisfies the original design specifications.
There is no adverse impact upon any plant system or component.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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96-137 Source Document:
Core Operating Limits Report, Cycle 6 Description of Change:
This evaluation analyzes an update to the Core Operating Limits Report l
which incorporates new operating limits for the Minimum Critical Power Ratios (MCPR) associated with Cycle 6 operation.
The new operating l
limits are based on cycle exposure.
I Summary:
l I.
No.
The reload safety analysis is performed to provided adequate l
assurance that the fuel cladding integrity (MCPR Safety Limit) is not exceeded for any moderate frequency transient.
The particular transients affected by cycle exposure are the " Load Reject Without Bypass" and the "Feedwater Controller Failure." These events have been re-analyzed with no change in the acceptance criteria that have been used in the USAR or as approved in the NRC Safety Evaluation for the GE Standard Application for Reactor Fuel (GESTAR II).
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change conforms to the analyzed envelope of USAR Chapters 4, 5, and 15.
The Core Operating Limits Report revision is in conformance with the GESTAR II analysis.
The GESTAR II analysis has been accepted by the NRC as ensuring that fuel designs will perform within acceptable bounds.
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Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a j
i different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new exposure-dependent operating limits do not alter the design or function of any plant system other than the fuel.
The potentially limitli.7 plant transients have been re-evaluated using the same acceptance criteria as previously evaluated in the USAR, i.e.,
NRC-approved methods described in the j
l GESTAR II.
The Core Operating Limits Report satisfies these acceptance l
criteria.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced, l
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96-138 Source Document: USAR Change Request 96-159 Description of Change:
This USAR change analyzes a five degree increase in the Peak Clad Temperature (PCT) during a LOCA to account for flow from the Bottom Head Drain (BHD) to the failed recirculation loop.
When the flow through the BHD was not included in the LOCA analysis, the analysis would overestimate the time to drain the vessel and underestimate the time to reflood the vessel. These effects combine to reduce the heat removal capability which underestimated the PCT.
The five degree PCT increase will compensate for these effects.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change does not affect any initiating events associated with USAR accident analysis.
The fuel still meets the clad strain and peak clad temperature requirements to prevent fuel failure.
All of the flow through the BHD has passed through the core and exits the vessel at the same point as the rest of the core flow. Hence, no flow bypasses the core.
Failure of the piping between the BHD and the recirculation loops is bounded by other LOCA analyses.
"herefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change does not impact the design or function of the fuel.
No new initiating events are created by the change in PCT.
The USAR LOCA analyses remain bounding.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change does not impact the 1% plastic strain limit of the fuel.
Conformance with the requirements of 10CFR50.46 has been maintained.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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96-139 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-160 Description of Change:
This USAR change request modifies the Fire Hazard Analysis for Fire l
Zones CC-la, CC-lb and CC-1c on the 574' elevation of the Control Complex to reflect changes in the combustible loadings of the zones.
Additionally, the change request made other minor changes to the Fire Hazards Analysis to improve its clarity.
i Summary:
I.
No.
This change request only impacts the USAR Fire Hazards Analysis.
The potential for ignition and fire development has not been affected.
The changes in the combustible loading does not exceed the limits established for the level of fire protection provided.
The potential impact of any postulated fire on equipment important to safety remains equal to that which was previously evaluated.
The equipment located in this area are not accident initiators.
Safe shutdown capability is not affected by this change.
l Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change is an evaluation of the existing combustible loading and fire hazard.
No physical changes to any systems are made by this activity.
No new system interactions are created. The fire hazard can only affect whether or not safe shutdown equipment or circuits could be damaged in I
a fire and does not affect their ability to function under other conditions, j
Since the systems will function under current design conditions and because other events are not postulated to occur concurrently with a fire, at least one train of safe shutdown equipment and circuits will remain available in the case of a fire in this area.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The separation of the circuits for redundant trains and low fire hazard maintained in this fire area provides an adequate level of protection to ensure that at least ene train of safe shutdown equipment will be available.
Hence, tnis activity does not affect the safe shutdown capability i
of the plant.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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96-140 Source Document:
Emergency Plan, Rev. 13, PIC 3 Description of Change:
This change to the Emergency Plan makes various administrative changes to the plan.
Examples of the changes are clarification of Radiation Monitoring Team assignments and elimination of duplicative figures.
Summary:
I I.
No.
The plan revision implements various administrative changes to the j
Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or f
components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The revision implements various administrative changes to the i
Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The revision implements various administrative changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event. The plan changes have not reduced the effectiveness of the plan in accordance with 10CFR50.54 (q).
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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96-141 Source Document:
DCP 9C-6043, Rev.0 Description of Change:
This design change replaces the motor pinion and worm shaft gear for the actuators of Motor Operated Valves (MOV) 1G33-F0039 and 1G33-F0040.
This gear change will increase the torque / thrust capability of the MOV actuators.
The increased capability provides assurance of proper valve j
function.
The modification will also increase the stroke time of the valves. The new calculated stroke time will be 27 seconds.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change will increase MOV capability.
The change maintains the original system performance requirements, such that the accident analysis is not affected.
The probability of a Reactor Water Clean Up system pipe break or containment isolation malfunction has not been altered.
The increased MOV capability does not exceed the valve or the actuator maximum ratings.
Code requirements for pressure boundary integrity have been maintained.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This design change does not affect containment integrity or plant accident analysis.
Equipment reliability and qualification are maintained.
The change creates no new equipment failure modes.
System design bases remain satisfied.
Therefore, ?.he possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
There is no change to the valve control circuit logic created by this design change.
The MOVs will continue to maintain the containment isolation function. Compliance to the piping code requirements is not compromised. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-142 Source Document:
PIP 96-2568 Description of Change:
This PIP analyzes using spare contacts from the Leak Detection system NUMAC power monitor relays (lE31-N0702A/B-K15) with the contacts from the NUMAC Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system isolation relays (lE31-N0702A/B-K7) to prevent RCIC from isolating in the event that power is lost to the NUMAC power monitor.
Summary:
I.
No.
This PIF analyzes placing the spare K15 contact in series with the j
M7 contact to prevent a RCIC isolation.
This configuration is consistent with the requirements of the RCIC and Leak Detection design bases.
This change does not adversely impact the function or operation of the Leak Detection or RCIC systems.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The material and installation of the new configuration is consistent with the requirements of the Leak Detection system.
No new failure modes are created.
The design of the RCIC system has not been impacted.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This PIF analyzes placing the spare K15 contact in series with the K7 contact to prevent a RCIC isolation.
This configuration is consistent with the requirements of the RCIC and Leak Detection design bases. This change does not adversely impact the function or operation of the Leak Detection or RCIC systems.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-144 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-168 Description of Change:
This USAR change eliminates the requirements for the on-site review committee (Plant Operations Review Committee) to review various procedures,'the Emergency Plan, and the Physical Security Plan, l
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change eliminates some administrative review requirements from the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC).
The functions of PORC remain in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.33, Generic Letter 93-07, and 10CFR50.54. These review functions cannot modify or alter any plant system or component.
Hence, USAR accident analysis has not been affected.
Therefore, j
the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or j
malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed, l
l II.
No.
This USAR change eliminates some administrative review requirements from the PORC.
The functions of PORC remain in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.33,_ Generic Letter 93-07, and 10CFR50.54.
These review functions cannot modify or alter any plant system or component.
Hence, USAR accident analysis has not been affected. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
Though this USAR change eliminates some administrative review requirements, the functions of PORC remain in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.33, Generic Letter 93-07, and 10CFR50.54.
The elimination of these review functions cannot alter the design, function, or operation of plant system or j
component.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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I SE No.:
96-145 Source Document:
INTT Change Request 96-169 Description of Change:
This USAR change request analyzes a revision to the time sequences for the Division 2 loads OM24-C001B and OP41-C001B.
OM24-C001B was changed from a 17-second to a 15-second start time.
OP41-C001B was changed from a 10-second to a 17-second start time.
Summary:
I.
No. This change request revises component sequence times for the loading of the Division 2 Diesel Generator (DG).
The sequence time change does not affect the component or the load it places on the DG.
The revised sequence times do not adversely affect the loading of the DG.
The DG loading remains in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.9.
USAR accident analysis is not impacted.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No. Thic change request revises component sequence tiices for the loading of the Division 2 Diesel Generator (DG).
The sequence time change does not affect the component or the load it places on the DG.
The revised sequence times do not adversely affect the loading of the DG.
The DG loading remains in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.9.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not changed.
III. No. This change request revises component sequence time,9 for the loading of the Division 2 Diesel Generator (DG).
The sequence time change does not affect the component or the load it places on the DG.
The revised sequence times do not adversely affect the loading of the DG.
The DG loading remains in compliance with Reg. Gaide 1.9.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been
- reduced, s
SE No.:
96-146 Source Document:
TM l-96-028 TM l-96-029 Description of Change:
These Temporary Modifications (TM) install freeze seals on the Residual Heat Removal (RHR - E12) system.
The freeze seals permit removal of several E12 valves for leak testing.
Summary:
I.
No.
The installation of the freeze seals permits removal of several valves for leak testing.
The RHR system loop associated with the TM will be declared inoperable prior to installation of the TM.
However, compliance with the ECCS Technical Specifications is maintained. Administrative controls are in place to ensure the integrity of the piping, on which the freeze seal is placed, will not be adversely affected by the freeze seal.
Should the freeze seal fail, potenti.al flooding is bound by existing analyses.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The installation of the freeze seals permits removal of several valves for leak testing.
The RHR system loop associated with the TM will be declared inoperable prior to installation of the TM.
However, compliance with the ECCS Technical Specifications is maintained. Administrative controls are in place to ensure the integrity of the piping, on which the freeze seal is placed, will not be adversely affected by the freeze seal.
Should the freeze seal fail, potential flooding is bound by existing analyses. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The RHR system loop associated with the TM will be declared inoperable prior to installation of the TM.
However, compliance with the ECCS Technical Specifications is maintained. Administrative controls are in place to ensure the integrity of the piping, on which the freeze seal is placed, will not be adversely affected by the freeze seal. Should the freeze seal fail, potential flooding is bound by existing analyses.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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96-148,97-059, 97-093 Source Document:
DCP 96-0042, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change replaces the existing individual Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) suction strainers with a single large passive strainer that rests on the floor of the suppression pool and encircles the suppression pool.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change replaces the existing ECCS and RCIC suction strainers with a single large passive strainer.
The materials (ASME Section II), design (ASME Section III, subsection NF), and construct'on requirements (ASME Section III, V, IX and AWS Dl.1) used for fabrication of the new strainer have been chosen to assure the strainer will remain intact (i.e.,
will not collapse or break up) even with the postulated post-LOCA hydrodynamic loading, postulated debris loading, and under postulated degraded suppression pool water quality conditions (high pH).
The new strainer design is not susceptible to debris bed compaction and does not significantly affect the pool mixing phenomenon.
The new strainer will not degrade the performance of the ECCS or the Containment Heat Removal system. The analysis of accidents that require the operation of the ECCS remain unchanged since the new strainer will perform the same functions as original strainers. The new strainer has been designed to survive combinations of seismic loading, suppression pool hydrodynamic loads due to a LOCA and the actuation of the S/RVs, and other applicable loads consistent with the requirements of the current licensing bases. The new strainer will not cause the loss of the ECCS or RCIC pumps' required NPSH since it has been designed to maximize NPSH available greater than the required NPSH for the pumps under postulated accident conditions.
The new large passive ECCS suction strainer has been designed and its location optimized in the suppression pool to minimize the effects of hydrodynamic loads on the strainer. The effect of the new strainer on the heat capacity of the suppression pool, and the analyzed level / volume of the suppression pool have been shown not to negatively affect the existing USAR analyses.
The analysis of a LOCA occurring in combination with an ECCS pipe break coincident with a loss of offsite power remains unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change does not adversely affect the overall ECCS or RCIC system performance or reliability. This change does not cause the ECCS or RCIC system to be operated outside of their design bases limits.
Since the new strainer is passive, no operator actions are required.
Therefore, no increase in the possibility of operator error due to added complexity or other human factors conditions has been introduced.
The new strainer has been designed to withstand the design basis seismic loading in combination with other hydrodynamic loads in accordance with the current licensing bases.
Protection from gravitational missiles has been provided by ensuring that any large object that could become a gravitational missile does not remain in the vicinity of the strainer unless it is seismically restrained.
The new strainer has been designe~ such that the water chemistry (i.e.,
high alkalinity) of the suppreusion pool will not adversely impact the strainer.
The new strainer is capable of handling LOCA-generated debris and pre-existing debris without a reduction of NPSH to the served pumps.
The new strainer was designed and constructed to applicable codes and standards appropriate for this type component and which maintains the original design bases of the
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replaced strainers. Therefore, the possibility of an accident o malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This modification has not reduced the margins inherent in the acceptance criteria of 10CFR50.46, since the design of the new strainer allows and enhances the ability of the ECCS to satisfy these requirements by maintaining the NPSH for the ECCS pumps within their design requirements. This change has not modified the response or reduce the effectiveness of the RCIC
{
system for the same reasons.
Since the strainer is located at the bottom of the suppression pool, the volume of water above the top of the strainer, and thus the top row of 1.OCA vents, remains unaffected by the change.
- Hence, minimum post-accident drawdown level of the suppression pool and minimum vent submergence required by the analyses has been unaffected. The effect of the new strainer on the heat capacity of the suppression pool, and the analyzed level / volume of the suppression have been shown not to negatively affect the existing USAR analyses.
The new strainer has been designed to survive combinations of seismic loading, suppression pool hydrodynamic loads due to a LOCA and the actuation of the S/RVs, and other applicable loads consistent with the requirements of the current licensing bases. This change does not adversely affect the overall ECCS or RCIC system performance or reliability.
This change does not cause the ECCS or RCIC system to be operated outside of their design bases limits.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-149 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-164 Description of Change:
This USAR change request analyzes the use of any on-shift Control Room supervisor to release work inst of only the on-shift Unit 4
Supervisor (US).
The Control Room personnel involved in the change include the Shift Supervisor (SS), the US, the Shift Technical Advisor (STA) if in possession of a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) license, or any other member of the on-shift crew who maintains a SRO license.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change to the USAR is an adjustment of the shared administrative duties of the Control Room personnel.
The change of responsibility wills not impact plant safety since the SRO licensed individual will be working closely with the Control Room US in the work release process.
Since the Unit Supervisor will still be kept informed of all changes to plant equipment, he will still be maintaining the overall configuration control of the plant. Accident analysis remains unaffected. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
All the individuals who have the ability to release work under this change are required to possess a SRO license.
Since the Unit Supervisor will still be kept informed of all changes to plant equipment, he will still be maintaining the overall configuration control of the plant.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type j
than previously evaluated has not been created.
l III.
No.
This change is an administrative change in order to redefine who can release work on plant equipment and systems.
Since the Unit Supervisor will still be kept informed of all changes to plant equipment, he will still be maintaining the overall configuration control of the plant.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
SE No.:
96-150 Source Document:
DCN 5423 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises P&ID D-302-212, " Service Water System", to properly depict the location of a keepfill crosstie line bet'<een the Service Water (P41) system and the Emergency Service Wcter (P45) system.
Summary:
I.
No.
The function and operation of the Service Water and the Emergency Service Water systems are not affected by this drawing change.
The function of P45 keepfill has not been impacted by this change.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The function and operation of the Service Water and the Emergency Service Water systems are not affected by this drawing change.
The failure of the Service Water and the Emergency Service Water systems are not initiators of any USAR accident. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not l
been created.
III.
No.
The function and operation of the Service Water and the Emergency Service Water systems are not affected by this drawing change.
Technical Specifications associated with the Emergency Service Water system have not been affected.
The P45 keepfill function has been maintained.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced, i
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96-151 Source Document:
DCN 5585 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises P& ids D-302-121 and D-320-605, " Main, Reheat, Extraction, and Miscellaneous Drains", to indicate the Outboard MSIV Drain Valves, 1B21-F0067A/B/C/D, are manual locked closed valves, which permits the valves to be reclassified as manual (passive) containment isolation valves.
i Summary:
I.
No.
The design, operation, function, and performance of the Main Steam and the Main Steam Line Drain systems, including the Outboard MSIV Drain Valves, will not be affected by this drawing change.
The change will not degrade the reliability of the systems.
No additional loads will be placed on the systems.
No system or equipment protection features will be modified.
System redundancy and independence will not be reduced.
Equipment will not be operated in an environment that could be more detrimental or more demanding.
This change will not affect assumptions, actions, mitigation, or consequences of an accident or of a malfunction of equipment important to safety. The change will not adversely affect any fission product barriers.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of i
equipment important to safety have not changed.
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II.
No.
The drawing change does not reflect any physical changes to the I
plant or to any plant system. The change will not create any new systems, add any new active equipment, or compromise the functioning of any existing system.
The change will have no adverse affect on the Main Steam Line Drain l
system.
The change will not result in any new type of equipment failures.
l Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The safety functions of the Main Seam Line Drain system, including the Outboard MSIV Drain Valves, are unaffected.
No system or equipment protection features will be modified.
System redundancy and independence will not be reduced.
Equipment will not be operated in an environment that could be more detrimental or more demanding.
System design margins have not been l
compromised.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
SE No.:
96-152 Source Document:
DCP 96-5082, Rev. O DCP 96-5085, Rev. O Description of Change:
These design changes modify the control logic circuits for Motor Operated Valves (MOV) 1E12-F0048A and 1E12-F0024A, respectively, to reconfigure the torque switch and the open and closed position limit switches.
This will preclude the limit or torque switches from being bypassed by external fire-induced cable faults.
In so doing, this will eliminate the potential for valve travel beyond acceptable limits in the event of a fire in the Control Room which may induce circuit faults that initiate spurious valve operation.
Summary:
I I.
No.
The control logic wiring changes do not impact the post-fire safe-shutdown capability of the plant.
New cables added by these modifications do not introduce any additional vulnerabilities to fire events, as the new cables are routed within existing raceways.
The systems will continue to operate as previously analyzed.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The control wiring changes do not affect component or system operating modes and functions.
Safe shutdown of the plant has not been impacted.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of I
equipment of a different type than any previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The control logic wiring changes.do not impact the post-fire safe-shutdown capability of the plant.
New cables added by these modifications do l
not introduce any additional vulnerabilities to fire events, as the new cables are routed within existing raceways. The systems will continue to operate as previously analyzed.
Technical Specifications are not affected by these modifications.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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1 SE No.:
96-154 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-171 Description of Change:
This USAR change revises the Off-gas system hold-up pipe failure design j
bases and provides recalculated offsite radiological doses for the j
- event, l
l Summary:
I.
No.
The USAR change did not make any physical changes to the plant nor did it revise how the plant is operated.
The revised radiological doses I
resulted in consequences less than the limits of the original values stated in j
the USAR.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The USAR change did not make any physical changes to the plant nor did it revise how the plant is operated.
The revised radiological doses resulted in consequences less than the limits of the original values stated in I
the USAR.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
j III.
No.
The revised dose analyses have resulted in the radiological consequences at the site boundary and the Low Population Zone being maintained i
within the licensing limits.
Plant operation has not been affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
96-155 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-160 Description of Change:
i This USAR change modifies the Fire Hazards Analysis for various fire zones and areas to reflect the change in the combustible loading as documented in a fire loading calculation.
In addition, changes are l
being made to simplify and clarify the fire zone and fire area descriptions.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change only impacts the Fire Hazards Analysis in the USAR. The i
potential for ignition and fire development is equal to that presently l
evaluated. The overall increase in the calculated combustible loading does not exceed the limits established for the level of fire protection provided.
The potential impact of any postulated fire on equipment important to safety remains the same.
Equipment important to safety will still function to i
mitigate the consequence of any postulated accident as previously evaluated.
I Safe shutdown capability has not been impacted.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change does not physically alter any plant systems.
No new system interactions are created.
Systems will still function under current design conditions and because other events are not postulated to occur concurrently with a fire, at least one train of safe shutdown equipment and l
circuits will remain available. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or j
l malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not l
been created.
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l III.
No.
This activity does not alter any plant equipment.
The separation of the circuits for redundant trains and the low fire hazard maintained in l
these fire areas provides adequate protection to ensure that at least one train of safe shutdown equipment will always remain available.
Hence, the
)
safe shutdown capability of the plant has not been affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
96-156,97-040, 97-071 Source Document:
DCP 96-0022, Rev. O, Rev.
1, Rev. 2 Description of Change:
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This design change installed a Cured-In-Place-Pipe (CIPP) liner to refurbish the return side Service Water (SW) system Fiberglass i
Reinforced Plastic (FRP) piping.
The design change also installed new l
FRP piping in locations where existing FRP pipe was removed.
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l Summary:
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No.
The installation of the CIPP liner or the replacement FRP piping does not adversely impact the design or operation of the Service Water (P41) system.
No credit is taken in the design of the liner for the host pipe.
The performance of the P41 system, as modified, is maintained.
The installation i
of the CIPP liner and the new FRP piping as a replacement is in no way a causal or direct factor in the initiation of.USAR transients or accidents.
This modification does not adversely impact safety-related valves OP41-F420 l
and F430.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an l
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
Implementation of this modification results in a system that meets the original system performance requirements.
The liner and replacement FRP l
are designed to the latest industry codes and standards.
The modification i
does not affect the design function or operation of the SW system.
Therefore, i
the possibility of an accident or malfuention of equipment of a different type than previously evalauted has not been created.
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III.
No.
The installation of the CIPP liner or the replacement FRP piping does not adversely impact the design or operation of the Service Water (P41) system.
The performance of the P41 system, as modified, is maintained.
The installation of the CIPP liner and the new FRP piping as a replacement is in no way a causal or direct factor in the initiation of USAR transients or l
l accidents.
The liner and replacement piping are designed to the appropriate l
industry codes and standards.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been l
reduced.
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1 SE No.:
96-157 Source Document:
DCN 5220 l
Description of Change:
This drawing change revises P&ID D-302-713, " Mixed Bed Demineralizer and Distribution System", incorporates the safety class for valve 1P22-F06318.
The valve is an ASME Safety Class 2 valve.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change incorporates the safety classification of 1P22-F0631B.
No changes have been made to the plant.
The design and operation of the Demineralized Water system have not been affected. Accident analysis is unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change incorporates the safety classification of 1P22-F0631B.
No changes have been made to the plant.
The design and operation of the Demineralized Water system have not been affected. Accident analysis is unchanged.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of l
equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change incorporates the safety classification of 1P22-FO631B.
i No changes have been made to the plant.
The design and operation of the 1
Demineralized Water system have not been affected. Accident analysis is unchanged.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-158 l
Source Document:
DCP 95-0079, Rev. O l
DCP 95-0079A, Rev. O I
DCP 95-0079B, Rev. O Description of Change:
1 These design changes replace three divisional Class lE TOPAZ inverter -
l SOLA power supply combinations with three Class lE VICOR DC-DC power j
supplies.
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Summarv:
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I.
No.
These design changes replace the divisional power supplies with an improved design.
The new units are equivalent in classification and environmental qualification to the existing units.
There is no adverse impact upon the divisional battery sizing or upon the DC busses supplied.
The new components are sized to satisfy.the full demand of the associated DC busses.
q 4
The new power supplies are installed and operated in accordance with the applicable electrical codes.
USAR accident analyses are unaffected.
)
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
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i II.
No.
These design changes replace the divisional power supplies with an l
improved design.
The new units are equivalent in classification and environmental qualification to the existing units.
There is no adverse impact upon the divisional battery sizing or upon the DC busses supplied.
The new components are sized to satisfy the full demand of the associated DC busses.
The new power supplies are installed and operated in accordance with the applicable electrical codes.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created, j
l III.
No.
These design changes replace the divisional power supplies with an i
improved design.
The new units are equivalent in classification and environmental qualification to the existing units.
There is no adverse impact upon the divisioral battery sizing or upon the DC busses supplied.
The new I
components are sized to satisfy the full demand of the associated DC busses.
I The new power supplies are installed.and operated in accordance with the l
applicable electrical codes.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-159 Source Document:
DCP 96-5033, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change strengthens the Drywell shield door supports to ensure the door is adequately supported for the required loads, such as seismic and pool swell, when the door is open.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change modified the Drywell shield door supports to ensure the adequacy of the structures for all required loadings.
As modified, the shield doors will not adversely impact any equipment important to safety.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This design change modified the Drywell shield door supports to ensure the adequacy of the structures for all required loadings. As modified, the (a.' eld doors will not adversely impact any equipment important to safety.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This design change modified the Drywell shield door supports to ensure the adequacy of the structures for all required loadings.
As modified, the shield doors will not adversely impact any equipment important to safety.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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i SE No.:
96-160 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-172 Description of Change:
This USAR change evaluates a site re-organization.
The changes include,
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but are not limited to the creation of the Perry Nuclear Maintenance Department, transfer of the Quality Services Section to the Nuclear Services Department, and transfer of the Security Section to the Services Department.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change is administrative only. No functions or i
responsibilities have been deleted, only re-assigned.
The design and operation of the plant are unchanged. Accident analysis is unaffected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or l
malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change is administrative only. No functions or responsibilities have been deleted, only re-assigned. The design and operation of the plant are unchanged. Accident analysis is unaffected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a j
l different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change is administrative only. No functions or responsibilities have been deleted, only re-assigned.
The design and operation of the plant are unchanged. Accident analysis is unaffected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-001 Source Document:
DCP 94-0027, Rev. O, Rev.
4, and Rev. 6 Description of Change:
This design change installs a bypass line around each of the. Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) heat exchangers and utilizes an electro-hydraulic Temperature Control Valve (TCV) to control the flow between the heat exchanger and the bypass line based on the ECC water temperature downstream of the heat exchanger.
1 Summary:
I.
No.
The modifications meet the design, material, and construction j
standards of the ECC system.
The TCV has a fully qualified actuator which is l
powered from a safety-related 1E power supply. The actuators are powered from the same Engineered Safety Function (ESP) division as the components being served by the ECC system to ensure redundancy is maintained.
The installation of the bypass line and TCV does not introduce adverse system interactions, and is designed to ensure that ECC temperatures remain within acceptable limits.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This modification meets the design, material, and construction standards of the ECC system.
The changes associated with this modification do not change the design function or operation of any plant equipment.
The modification will not affect the function or degrade the performance of any plant system or component.
The TCVs are installed in the two redundant loops of ECC, and are powered by separate 1E power supplies.
The response of the ECC system to an accident condition is not degraded or changed in any manner.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type has not been created.
III.
No.
Implementation of this change enhances the performance of the ECC system.
The modification satisfies the design, material, and construction standards of the ECC system.
ECC redundancy has been maintained. The response of the ECC system to an accident condition is not degraded or changed in any manner. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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i SE No.:
97-002 Source Document:
DCP 96-044, Rev. 0 I
Description of Change, f
This design change eliminates the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV)
Leakage Control System (LCS) based upon the granting of a license amendment to adopt the Revised Accident Source Term Methodology.
The MSIV LCS and the outboard MSIV drain lines are being eliminated with physical separation (cut and cap) from any operating system and abandoned in place.
Summary:
I.
No.
The current operation, function, performance and expected response of the Main Steam system, the Main Steam Line Drain system, the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff system, the Plant Standby Electrical Power system, and the systems, structures and components interfacing with or in the vicinity of these systems will not be adversely affected by this modification.
The design change eliminates a large amount of high energy piping and reactor coolant pressure boundary piping.
The replacement of manual and automatic containment isolation valves with pipe caps and test valve appendages will reduce the amount of post-accident leakage.
Interface systems are not adversely impacted.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The change does not create any new systems or add any equipment that can affect the functioning of any systems, structures or components.
No new equipment failures, event initiators or event contributors are created.
Interfacing systems are not adversely impacted.
The reactor pressure boundary and primary containment are not affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The current operation, function, performance and expected response of the interface systems, and the systems, structures and components in the vicinity of these systems will not be adversely affected by this modification.
Design margins that existed have not been compromised.
There is no adverse impact on the ability of any system to mitigate the effects of postulated transients and accidents.
The reactor pressure boundary and primary containment are not affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been j
reduced.
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SE No.:
97-003 f
Source Document:
DCP 96-044A, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change converts Containment isolation valves 1821-F067A, B,
C, and D from electrically operated to manually operated valves. The l
modification also disables valves 1B21-F068 and 1B21-F069.
These modifications are being made to support the elimination of the Main
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Steamline Isolation valve Leakage Control system.
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Summary:
i I.
No.
The current operation, fonction, performance and expected response l
of the Main Steam system, the Main Steam Line Drain system, the Nuclear Steam Supply Shutoff system, the Plant Standby Electrical Power system, and the systems, structures and components interfacing with or in the vicinity of l
these systems will not be adversely affected by this modification.
The design change eliminates a large amount of high energy piping and reactor coolant i
pressure boundary piping. The replacement of manual and aucomatic containment l
isolation valves with pipe caps and test valve appendages will reduce the l
amount of post-accident leakage.
Interface systems are not adversely impacted. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The change does not create any new systems or add any equipment that can affect the functioning of any systems, structures or components.
No j
new equipment failures, event initiators or event contributors are created.
1 Interfacing systems are not adversely impacted.
The reactor pressure boundary and primary containment are not affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or ma] function of equipment of a different type than previously l
evaluated has not been created.
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l III.
No.
The current operation, function, performance and expected response l
of the interface systems, and the systems, structures and components in the I
vicinity of these systems will not be adversely affected by this modification.
l Design margins that existed have not been compromised. There is no adverse j
impact on the ability of any system to mitigate the effects of postulated L
transients and accidents.
The reactor pressure boundary and primary containment are not affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-004 Source Document:
DCP 96-5046, Rev. 0 Description of Change:
This design change replaces the non-regulating 25 kVA Class lE l
distribution transformer,lR25-S0033, with a 15 kVA regulating transformer.
The new 15 kVA regulating transformer will provide voltage regulation to accommodate variations in loads or upstream voltage
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fluctuations.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change maintains the original system performance requirements such that the original accident analyses are not affected.
Implementation of this change improves bus voltage regulation.
There is no impact on system capability and reliability.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This modification replaces the non-regulating 25 kVA transformer
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with a 15 kVA regulating transformer to improve bus voltage regulation. The j
system function and operation remain unchanged.
The difference in failures l
rates between the old transformer (25 kVA non-regulating) and the new l
transformer (15 kVA regulating) is essentially negligible.
In addition, the new transformer will enhance system operability due to improved voltage stability.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
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III.
No.
This modification replaces the non-regulating 25 kVA transformer with a 15 kVA regulating transformer to improve bus voltage regulation.
The system function and operation remain unchanged.
The difference in failures l
l rates between the old transformer (25 kVA non-regulating) and the new l
transformer (15 kVA regulating) is essentially negligible.
In addition, the l
new transformer will enhance system operability due to improved voltage j
stability. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-005 Source Document:
DCP 95-0102, Rev. 3 Description of Change; l
This design change installs dual filter trains "in-line" within the Control Rod Drive (CRD) Recirculation Pump Seal Purge Water supply piping.
The modification permits one filter train to be operational while the second train remains in standby.
To further improve filtration capabilities of the CRD system, this design change also provides alternate replacement filter elements for the CRD Pump Suction Filters. These new filter elements are designed to capture additional corrosion and wear products.
i Summary:
l I.
No.
The new filters being added to the CRD system are passive devices.
The alternate replacement filter elements are direct replacements for the current elements and are of a similar design and construction.
The new i
filters are compatible with primary systems..
The new and replacement filters l
do not introduce any new failure mechanisms to the CRD system.
Purge water I
will still be provided to the recirculation pump seals but of a higher quality l
than before.
Cleaner purge water to these seals should extend seal life, thereby improving seal reliability.
The CRD system will continue to function as originally designed.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The design of the Control Rod Drive Purge Water system has not been affected. All safety-related aspects of the CRD system and supporting l
subsystems are unchanged. The new filters will be installed in the nonsafety-related portion of the system. A complete failure of the filters will not l
prevent the recirculation pumps or seals from performing their intended safety function.
No new failure modes have been introduced.
Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This design change will improve CRD system filtering capabilities, which will assist in increasing the life of the recirculation pump seals.
This modification does not adversely impact any safety-related system or function.
Technical Specifications are not affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-006 Source Document:
DCP 96-5047, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change replaces the non-regulating 25 kVA Class lE distribution transformer, 1R25-S0029, with a 15 kVA regulating transformer.
The new 15 kVA regulating transformer will provide voltage regulation to accommodate variations in loads or upstream voltage fluctuations.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change maintains the original system performance l
requirements such that the original accident analyses are not affected.
I Implementation of this change improves bus voltage regulation.
There is no impact on system capability and reliability.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
l II.
No.
This modification replaces the non-regulating 25 kVA transformer with a 15 kVA regulating transformer to improve bus voltage regulation.
The system function and operation remain unchanged.
The difference in failures rates between the old transformer (25 kVA non-regulating) and the new transformer (15 kVA regulating) is essentially negligible.
In addition, the new transformer will enhance system operability due to improved voltage stability.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This modification replaces the non-regulating 25 kVA transformer with a 15 kVA regulating transformer to improve bus voltage regulation.
The system function and operation remain unchanged.
The difference in failures rates between the old transformer (25 kVA non-regulating) and the new transformer (15 kVA regulating) is essentially negligible.
In addition, the new transformer will enhance system operability due to improved voltage stability.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-008 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-006 Description of Change:
This USAR change analyzes an increase in the Auxiliary Building (AB) floor elevation 568'-4" flood water level resulting from a through wall crack in a 16" Emergency Service Water (P45) pipe from 16" to 18.8".
This USAR change also increases the AB floor elevation 568'-4" flood water level resulting from a through wall crack in a 24" P45 pipe at floor elevation 620'-6" from 9" to 11".
Both of the resulting flood water levels are less than the previously defined maximum allowable flood water level of 20".
Summary:
I.
No.
The revised AB flood levels are less than the 20" design maximum flood water levels.
At the AB elevation 560'-4" hallway on the north side of the building, above a 20" depth, water would begin to come into contact with electrical conduits entering the bottom of rack mounted Rosemount transmitters associated with the Emergency Closed Cooling (P42) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (E51) systems.
Due to the construction and orientation of these transmitters, failure is not expected until a flood water level somewhat greater than 20" is attained. Wetting of the Rosemount transmitters due to any ripples or wave action that may occur at the new flood levels will have no more effect on the transmitters then wetting from everhead spray from a postulated pipe crack.
Operability of the P42 and E51 systems has not been compromised.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The revised AB flood levels are less than the 20" design maximum flood water levels. At the AB elevation 568'-4",
above a 20" depth, water would begin to come into contact with electrical conduits entering the bottom of rack mounted Rosemount transmitters associated with the Emergency Closed Cooling (P42) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (E51) systems.
Due to the construction and orientation of these transmitters, failure is not expected until a flood water level somewhat greater than 20" is attained. Operability of the P42 and E51 systems has not been compromised.
Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
In the AB elevation 560'-4" hallway, floor flood water is detected by two redundant, nonsafety grade, seismically qualified level sensing devices.
Both of these devices actuate a Control Room annunciator alarm when water level reaches 2" above floor level.
The design basis assumes an operator isolates the leak 30 minutes after receipt of the high water level alarm. This produces the design maximum level of 20".
The revised AB flood levels are less than the 20" design maximum flood water levels.
This USAR change does not impact the sensing devices, the alarm functions or the operator actionr. As stated above, operability of the P42 and E51 systems has not been compromised.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-009 l
Source Document: Technical Specification Change Request 97-005 l
l Description of Change:
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This Technical Specification change evaluates implementation of the i
optional performance-based requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix J, Option B.
Summary:
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No.
This change evaluates implementation of performance-based testing.
The Appendix J testing is in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.163.
Allowable leakage rates have not been affected.
Plant equipment has not been modified, or otherwise altered by this change.
Hence, the primary Containment remains l
capable of maintaining radioactive effluent releases within the limits of 10CFR100.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
l II.
No.
This change evaluates implementation of performance-based testing.
The Appendix J testing is in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.163.
Allowable leakage rates have not been affected.
Plant equipment has not been modified, or otherwise altered by this change.
Hence, the primary Containment remains capable of maintaining radioactive effluent releases within the limits of 10CFR100.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
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III.
No.
This change evaluates implementation of performance-based testing.
The Appendix J testing is in compliance with Reg. Guide 1.163.
Allowable leakage rates have not been affected.
Plant equipment has not been modified, or otherwise altered by this change.
Hence, the primary Containment remains capable of maintaining radioactive effluent releases within the limits of 10CFR100.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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f SE No.:
97-010 Source Document:
Technical Specification Change Request 97-007 1
l Description of Change:
I j
This Technical Specification change extends the surveillance frequency l
for the refueling equipment interlocks and the one-rod-out interlock l
channel functional tests, f
Summary:
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No.
This Technical Specification change extends the surveillance frequency of several refueling channel functional tests.
Refueling equipment i
interlocks exist which prevent criticality and prompt reactivity excursion l
events. The change in testing frequency does not modify or otherwise alter these interlocks.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety I
have not changed.
II.
No.
This Technical Specification change extends the surveillance r
l frequency of several refueling channel functional tests.
Refueling equipment l
interlocks exist which prevent criticality and prompt reactivity excursion
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events. The change in testing frequency does not modify or otherwise alter these interlocks.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of I
equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This Technical Specification change extends the surveillance f
frequency of several refueling channel functional tests.
Refueling equipment j
interlocks exist which prevent criticality and prompt reactivity excursion events. The change in testing frequency does not modify or otherwise alter these interlocks.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-011 Source Document:
Technical Specification Change Request 97-008 l
Description of Change:
l This Technical Specification change incorporates two new surveillance requirements to the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) specifications to provide additional assurance of ECCS operability.
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Summary:
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No.
This Technical Specification change incorporates surveillance requirements for ECCS strainer integrity and suppression pool cleanliness to provide additional assurance of ECCS operability.
Implementation of these j
surveillance requirements do not alter the design, function, or operation of the ECCS.
Pool cleanliness stendards/ limits have not been affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or l
malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This Technical Specification change incorporates surveillance requirements for ECCS strainer integrity and suppression pool cleanliness to provide additional assurance of ECCS operability.
Implementation of these surveillance requirements do not alter the design, function, or operation of the ECCS.
Pool cleanliness standards / limits have not been affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This Technical Specification change incorporates surveillance requirements for ECCS strainer integrity and suppression pool cleanliness to provide additional assurance of ECCS operability.
Implementation of these surveillance roquirements do not alter the design, function, or operation of the ECCS.
Pool cleanliness standards / limits have not been affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-012 Source Document:
Emergency Plan, Rev. 13, PIC 5 Description of Change:
This change to the Emergency Plan implements NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, Supplement 3, Revision 1, entitled " Criteria for Protective Action Recommendations for Severe Accidents." The changes include replacing default Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) based on primary containment radiation monitor readings, as an indicator of fuel clad damage, and elimination of the minimum shelter default PAR for a General Emergency.
Summary:
I.
No. The plan revision implements various changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not been changed.
II.
No. The revision implements various.:hanges to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event. 'Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III. No. The revision implements various changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components. The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event.
The plan changes have not reduced the effectiveness of the plan in accordance with 10CFR50. 54 (q).
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-013 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-009 Description of Change:
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This USAR change permits the use of substitute data generated from the i
Process Computer for up to ten Local Power Range Monitor (LPRM) strings.
The change also permits the practice of single Traversing In-core Probe (TIP) set LPRM calibrations.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change permits the use of substitute data for LPRMs and the single TIP set calibration practice.
These practices are consistent with the design of the Process Computer and its software.
The accuracy limits associated with the LPRMs remain in compliance with the applicable fuel vendor specifications.
Limits associated with the design and operation of the fuel have not been affected.
This change does not impact any plant system or component.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change permits the'use of substitute data for LPRMs and the single TIP set calibration practice. These practices are consistent with the design of the Process Computer and its software.
The accuracy limits associated with the LPRMs remain in compliance with the applicable fuel vendor specifications.
Limits associated with the design and operation of the fuel have not been affected. This change does not impact any plant system or component.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This USAR change permits the use of substitute data for LPRMs and the single TIP set calibration practice.
These practices are consistent with the design of the Process Computer and its software.
The accuracy limits associated with the LPRMs remain in compliance with the applicable fuel vendor specifications.
Limits associated with the design and operation of the fuel have not been affected.
This change does not impact any plant system or component.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-014 l
Source Document:
DCP 96-5059, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change renovates the Women's Locker Room at the 599' elevation of the Control Complex. This renovation will expand the I
locker room into the adjoining clothing storage / office area.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change does not involve any systems associated with the initiation'of any postulated accident.
The design change does modify the Controlled Access and Miscellaneous Equipment Areas HVAC and the fire suppression systems, however the function and operation of these systems has not been adversely impacted.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The women's locker room renovation includes modification of the Controlled Access and Miscellaneous Equipment Areas HVAC and the fire j
suppression systems.
However, the modification does not create any new system j
interfaces, change system operation, or place any new loads on these two systems. Changes to the other plant systems and structures involved with this l
modification, do not adversely impact the operation of the plant.
Therefore, i
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the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different I
type than previously evaluated has not been created.
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III.
No.
The women's locker room renovation includes modification of the l
Controlled Access and Miscellaneous Equipment Areas HVAC and the fire l
suppression systems.
However, the modification does not create any new system interfaces, change system operation, or place any new loads on these two systems.
The remaining changes resulting from this modification have no adverse impact upon the operation of the plant. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-015 Source Document:
DCP 96-5040, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change adds a new atmospheric drain line to eliminate the condensate from the three Turbine Building Supply Plenums (M35) plenum drains and route it to the Storm Drain (P67) system. The new piping run will have a means of directing the flow to the Equipment and Floor Drains system via a three-way ball valve.
The new pipe line is projected to have a flow rate of ten gallons per minute (gpm).
Summary:
I.
No.
The piping is non-safety related and non-seismic. These changes adhere to esteblished design criteria and established codes. The modification provides for minimizing the production of liquid radwaste.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The new drain line does not interface with any plant equipment or system that is important to safety.
The changes adhere to established design criteria and established codes. The new drain line is at atmospheric pressure, hence, pipe rupture, jet loading, and missiles are not credible.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new drain line does not interface with any plant equipment that is important to safety.
The new drain line is at atmospheric pressure, hence, pipe rupture, jet loading, and missiles are not credible.
This drain line does not perform any safety-related function.
There are no Technical Specifications applicable to the systems being modified.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-017 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 96-095 Description of Change:
This USAR change removes valve OP42-F0551 as a target for Lighting Unit l
1R71-50205 and adds it as a target for Lighting Unit OR71-LO206A.
l Summary:
l I.
No.
The USAR change re-assigns OP42-F0551 to its actual emergency l
lighting unit.
There is no field work involved with this change. The Emergency Lighting (R71) system has not been affected by this change.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or j
malfunction of equipment important for safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change is limited to the description of emergency lighting l
required for access or illumination of safe shutdown / safety-related equipment I
in various plant areas.
None of the R71 lighting components has been affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of l
equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
I III.
No.
This change ensures that a correct listing of emergency lighting l
and the associated safety equipment that is illuminated from the lighting is maintained.
No physical work is involved.
This change does not affect the l
operation of any safety-related equipment.
R71 components have not been l
affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-018 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-014 Description of Change:
This USAR change revises the plant water chemistry limits to reflect the limits associated with Regulatory Guide 1.56 and the fuel vendor l
warranty values.
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Summary:
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I.
No.
This USAR change does not alter the design or operation of any plant system, only water chemistry values have been modified.
The revised l
values are a function of improved plant performance.
USAR accident analysis l
remains unaffected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the l
consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
have not changed.
II.
No.
This change does not impact the design or operation of any plant l
component.
Plant component failure analyses are not affected. Accident l
analysis remains unchanged. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change does not impact the design or operation of any plant system or component.
Effluent concentrations remain within 10CFR20 and 10CFR50, Appendix I limits.
Chemistry limits desc ibed within Regulatory Guide 1.56 remain satisfied.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-020 Source Document:
Physical Security Plan, Rev. 23 Description of Change:
This Physical Security Plan (PSP) change has been evaluated to ensure that the effectiveness of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant PSP has not been reduced, and to ensure that the requirements of 10CFR73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials", remain satisfied.
Site Protection must be contacted for further details since this is considered
" SAFEGUARDS" information.
l Summary:
I.
No.
The PSP describes the comprehensive Physical Security Program, and does not affect the design, function, or operation of plant systems or l
equipment. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The PSP does not affect the design, function, or operation of plant systems or equipment. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not i
l been created.
III.
No.
The PSP does not affect the design, function, or operation of plant systems or equipment.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-021 Source Document:
Emergency Plan, Rev. 13, PIC 4 Description of Change:
This change to the Emergency Plan revises the Emergency Action Level (EAL) methodology used in Section 4.0 of the Emergency Plan to address implementation of NUMARC/NESP-007, Revision 2, entitled " Methodology for Development of Emergency Action Levels", in lieu of the existing NUREG-
)
0654 Appendix I based logic.
l Summary:
1 I.
No.
The plan revision is limited t-changing the methodology used to classify an abnormal event under the 10CFR60.47 (a) (4) planning standards. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The revision is limited to changing the methodology used to classify an abnormal event under the 10CFR50.47 (a) (4) planning standards.
As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The revision is limited to changing the methodology used to classify an abnormal event under the 10CFR50.47 (a) (4) planning standards. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event.
The plan changes have not reduced the effectiveness of the plan in accordance with 10CFR50. 54 (q).
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-023 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-020 Description of Change:
This USAR change eliminates the description of the sizes of heat trace insulation and motor sizes associated with Solid Radioactive Waste (SRW) system components.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change does not physically change the plant.
The control, processing, and packaging of the solid radioactive waste remains
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unchanged. The ALARA design features of the SRW system are unaffected y the change.
The operation of the SRW system remains in compliance with all applicable regulatory guidance, limits and restrictions.
The SRW system will still be able to preclude the accidental release of radioactive waste into the solid waste packaging aris resulting from component failure or system malfunctions. This USAR change is bounded by the existing USAR accident analysis.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an 1
accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change does not physically change the plant. The control, processing, and packaging of the solid radioactive waste remains
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unchanged. The ALARA design features of the SRW system are unaffected by the change.
The operation of the SRW system remains in compliance with all applicable regulatory guidance, limits and restrictions.
The SRW system will still be able to preclude the accidental release of radioactive waste into the solid waste packaging area resulting from component failure or system malfunctions.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This USAR change does not physically change the plant. The control, processing, and packaging of the solid radioactive waste remains unchanged. The ALARA design features of the SRW system are unaffected by the change.
The operation of the SRW system remains in compliance with all applicable regulatory guidance, limits and restrictions.
The SRW system will still be able to preclude the accidental release of radioactive waste into the solid waste packaging area resulting from component failure or system malfunctions.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-024 Source Document:
DCN 5622 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises drawings D-412-04 and D-512-029 to remove the references to the radiant energy heat shield located in the Auxiliary Building 568' elevation (Fire Area 1AB-1g) at the west side of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system instrument panel.
This radiant energy panel is no longer required for protection since the safe shutdown analysis was revised to utilize the Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) system as an alternative to RCIC.
The equipment supporting LPCS is located in another panel and has adequate separation from the redundant train of safe shutdown equipment and circuits.
Therefore the equipment located on the RCIC instrument panel is no longer required to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire in Fire Area 1AB-1g.
Summary:
I.
No.
This drawing change does not alter the conduits or the circuits contained therein.
Since accidents are not assumed to occur coincidentally with a fire, removing the requirement for a radiant energy heat shield does not affect the ability of the equipment or circuits to function under all other design conditions (including accident conditions). The LPCS and RCIC systems will function as designed.
The additional fire loading presented does not increase the potential for a fire or the possible impact of a fire on equipment credited for safe shutdown.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
No physical changes to the equipment or circuits associated with the LPCS or RCIC systems are made by this activity.
No new system interactions have been created. Removing the requirement to have a radiant energy heat shield does not affect ability of these systems to function under required operational conditions.
Since other events are not postulated to occur concurrently with a fire, and a means of reactor inventory control remains available in the case c fire in Fire Zone 1AB-Ig, the safe shutdown capability of the plant has not been affected. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a dif ferent type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This activity makes no changes to the LPCS or RCIC systems, hence system operability has not been impacted.
Since accidents are not assumed to occur coincidentally with a fire, removing the requirement for a radiant energy heat shield does not affect the ability of the equipment or circuits to function under all other design conditions (including accident conditions).
The additional fire loading presented does not increase the potential for a fire or the possible impact of a fire on equipment credited for safe shutdown.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-025 Source Document:
DCN 5590 Description of Change:
This drawing change lowers the temperatures depicted on the B-022 series drawings for environmental zones FB-2 and FB-3. Additionally, the change
)
divides zone FB-3 into three (3) separate zones based on temperature and l
location within the plant.
Summary:
i I.
No.
This drawing change does not alter the physical condition of the plant but only how it is represented on the referenced drawings.
The changes l
in temperature are based on data acquired via the Plant Monitoring Program and l
a design calculation.
Since the temperatures are lower than was what originally anticipated, the lower temperatures serve to reduce the possibility I
of a common mode failure with respect to thermal degradation.
Since the actual temperatures in the plant are not being changed, this drawing change has no affect on the ability of the safety-related equipment to perform its j
safety function.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The drawing change deals with temperatures as represented on the environmental condition drawings.
The teraperatures as depicted on the drawings are used to determine the qualified life of equipment located within those environmental zones.
The effect of the changes on the equipment is a
)
longer qualified life.
Since the temperatures are lower than those originally i
l anticipated, the lower temperatures serve to reduce the possibility of a common mode failure with respect to thermal degradation.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The drawing change deals with temperatures as represented on the I
environmental condition drawings.
The temperatures as depicted on the l
drawings are used to determine the qualified life of equipment located within those environmental zones.
The effect of the changes on the equipment is a longer qualified life.
Since the temperatures are lower than was what originally anticipated, the lower temperatures serve to reduce the possibility i
of a common mode failure with respect to thermal degradation.
Therefore, no I
margins of safety have been reduced, i
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SE No.:
97-028 i
Source Document:
DCP 97-5035, Rev. 0 l
Description of Change This design change removes a portion of a knockout wall between the i
Turbine Building (TB) and the Turbine Power Complex (TPC) to allow for i
replacing the condenser expansion joints. The removed portion of the wall will be replaced with similar material after replacement of the I
condenser expansion joints.
Summary:
I.
No.
The wall being removed is a nonsafety-related, non-seismic Category I knockout wall and calculations demonstrate that the removal of a small portion of the wall does not affect the structural integrity of the wall. The TB and TPC do not house equipment essential to plant safe shutdown.
Since the wall is a fire barrier, during the time in which the fire barrier is affected, compensatory measures will be in place.
The cutout is above the flood level elevation, hence it does not create a flooding concerns.
This activity does not change the dose rate indicated for the TB and has only temporary impact on the indicated dose rate for the TPC.
The TB/TPC wall is not included as a missile barrier for the postulated internally generated missile nor is credited as a tornado missile shield / barrier or turbine missile shield.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This activity does not alter, modify or affect any equipment or function of any equipment important to safety. The activity does not create any new system interactions.
No new components have been added.
Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The wall being removed is a nonsafety-related, non-seismic Category I knockout wall and calculations demonstrate that the removal of a small portion of the wall does not affect the structural integrity of the wall.
The TB and TPC do not house equipment essential to plant safe shutdown.
Since the wall is a fire barrier, during the time in which the fire barrier is affected, compensatory measures will be in place.
The cutout is above the flood level elevation, hence it does not create a flooding concerns.
No missile barriers are affected by this activity, and no barriers for high or moderate energy line breaks are adversely impacted. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
96-029 Source Document:
DCP 96-0049, Rev. 0 Description of Change:
This design change installs a one hour rated fire barrier to protect the circuits associated with the Division 2 Diesel Generator (DG) routed in cable trays 285, 1358 and 1837 in the Diesel Generator Euilding Corridor 3
(Fire Area DG-1d) in lieu of protecting the Division 1 raceways.
Summary:
I.
No.
Replacing the raceway fire barriers with a different material having a one hour fire rating provides an equal level of protection for the circuits in these raceways.
The overall fire hazard present in the fire areas is unchanged, and the potential for ignition of the combustibles and development of a fire in the area remains the same. Providing raceway fire barriers for Division 2 safe shutdown circuits and eliminating the requirement for raceway fire barriers for Division 1 circuits in Fire Area DG-1d will maintain the capability of the circuits for one train of safe shutdown equipment to withstand the effects of a pontulated fire.
The raceway fire barriers have been evaluated with respect to the effect on circuit ampacity and it has been determined that the circuits remain capable of handling the electrical loads imposed by the equipment being served.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
Changing the type of material that provides the 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> fire rated barrier does not impact the required level of protection. Components and circuits important to safety are not physically changed by this activity.
Installation of the barriers does not create any new system interactions.
This activity will not compromise the safe shutdown functions to be performed i
by the equipment associated with the circuits being protected.
The potential l
for damage to one train of safe shutdown circuits due to a fire has already been analyzed and since one division of safe shutdown equipment remains free of fire damage, the impact of the fire on equipment important to safety remains the same.
Circuits are capable of carrying the imposed electrical j
loads for the equipment being served.
Damage to the raceway fire barriers due to seismic loads will not affect the ability of the protected circuits to perform required functions. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not i
been created.
III.
No.
This activity makes no circuit changes.
The ability of the circuits to carry the electrical loads imposed by the equipment associated with the circuits under accident conditions is maintained.
Protecting either l
Division 1 or Division 2 circuits satisfies the condition of maintaining one j
train of equipment and circuits to achieve and maintain safe shutdown free of I
fire damage.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-030 Source Documents DCN 4326 Description of Change:
This drawing change adds a note to drawing B-022-030, " Environmental Conditions for Drywell Area", indicating that higher local area temperatures may be found in Drywell Zone DW-1, and references temperature data recorded between 1989 and 1994.
This data was taken from varioas temperature monitore including seventeen interim temperature monitors.
The drawing change also revises drawing B-022-032 to reflect the maximum normal temperature as 145'F.
Summary:
I.
No.
This activity does not affect the original design intent of any system located in the Drywell or affect any equipment important to safety.
The operability of the equipment in the upper Drywell region is not degraded by this activity. Numerous modifications have been implemented such as Drywell cable replacement with higher design temperatures to resolve high temperatures in the upper Drywell and to protect the integrity of cable.
There will be no impact to any safety related systems or equipment, or any component associated with the mitigation of radiological releases.
The revisions addressed by this drawing change do not degrade or prevent actions 1
described or assumed in the USAR accident analysis.
Hence this activity does not impact the radiological consequences of an accident evaluated in USAR.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
There are no physical modifications made to any plant system as a result of this activity.
The design of the various systems located in the Drywell remains unchanged.
Since the equipment located in the affected zones will continue to meet their original design intent, no new failure mechanisms have been created.
This activity does not degrade the design safety function or pressure retaining capability of any equipment important to safety or introduce any new interfaces.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The design of the various systems located in the affected Drywell zones are unchanged by this activity.
This drawing change does not degrade the design safety function or pressure retaining capability of any equipment important to safety.
The basis for Technical Specification Section 3.6.5.5, Drywell Average Air Temperature, has not been impacted.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-031 Source Document:
DCP 91-0135, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change replaces 16 shroud head bolts with GE Shroud Head Stud Assembly Modification (SHSAM) lock assemblies.
The modification also removes the 19 remaining original installation shroud head stud bolts including a portion of the retainer assemblies and removes 16 shroud head stud nuts and lifters where no bolt / lock assembly will be reinstalled.
Summary:
I.
No.
The shroud head and steam separator assembly is not a safety class component, and is not part of the core support structure.
The Shroud Head Stud (SHS) and bolt assembly (including the locking device) is a passive, nonsafety-related component.
Removal of the SHSs from 16 of the 32 SHS locations will result in a small leakage bypass flow from the inside to the outside of the shroud through the shroud flange insert drain hole. This has been evaluated and shown not to be a safety concern.
The calculated fuel peck clad temperature remains below 2200'F.
The possibility of loose parts is reduced as a result of implementation of this design change, since the new design SHS locks are not susceptible to flow induced vibration and wear.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The new GE SHSAM locking device has been analyzed to be functionally equivalent to the existing SHS bolt design.
The new locking device does not introduce any increased potential for loose parts since it is not subject to flow induced vibration wear phenomenon.
The modification does not create any new component / system interactions.
The change has no impact on core reflood capability. The design function and safety features of other vessel internal equipment, i.e.,
the core shroud, core support structure, shroud, and core spray spargers, are not affected by this change.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The shroud head and steam separator assembly is not a safety class component, and is not part of the core support structure.
The Shroud Head Stud (SHS) and bolt assembly (including the locking device) is a passive, nonsafety-related component.
Removal of the SHSs from 16 of the 32 SHS locations will result in a small leakage bypass flow from the inside to the outside of the shroud through the shroud flange insert drain hole. This has been evaluated and shown not to be a safety concern.
The calculated fuel peak clad temperature remains below 2200'F.
The possibility of loose parts is reduced as a result of implementation of this design change, since the new design SHS locks are not susceptible to flow induced vibration and wear.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-033 Source Document:
DCP 96-7104, Rev. O Description of Charige:
This design change renovates an area on the second floor of the Service Building. The renovated area will be renamed " General Office Area."
Summary:
I I.
No.
The design change renovates an office area of the plant.
The architectural design of the area will not alter the structural integrity of the Service Building.
There is no safety-related equipment located in the Service Building.
Therefore, the robability of occurrence or the l
consequences of an accident or malranction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The design change renovates an office area of the plant.
The l
architectural design of the area will not alter the structural integrity of the Service Building.
There is no safety-related equipment located in the Service Building.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The design change renovates an office area of the plant.
The architectural design of the area will not alter the structural integrity of the Service Building.
There is no safety-related equipment located in the Service Building.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-034 Source Document:
PAP-0511, Rev.
6, PIC 2
)
Cepcription of Change:
l This procedure change eliminates the use of step-off pads between I
contaminated areas and clean areas.
This change is considered an administrative change, j
Summary:
l I.
No.
The elimination of step-off pad use between contaminated areas and clean areas is an operational consideration.
Step-off pad use does not l
involve plant equipment or equipment important to safety.
Plant radiological j
controls are not adversely impacted.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The elimination of step-off pad use between contamirated areas and clean areas is an operational consideration and considered
't, administrative change.
Step-off pad use does not involve plant equipment or equipment l
important to safety.
Plant radiological controls'are not adversely impacted.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The elimination of step-off pad use between contaminated areas and clean areas is an operational consideration and considered an administrative change.
Plant radiological controls are not adversely impacted.
The use of step-off pads is not addressed in the Technical Specifications or the Operating License.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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I SE No.:
97-035 l
Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-030 l
Description of Change:
This USAR change evaluates a site reorganization that transfers Procurement Engineering and the Test Lab from the Perry Supply Section to the Design Engineering Section. This results in a transfer of responsibility for developing, reviewing, and approving procurement documents.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change.lters the reporting point of Procurement Engineering and the Test Lab.
The functions and activities of Procurenent Engineering and the Test Lab have not changed.
The requirements for the procurement of services and the procurement, storage, and issuance of material and equipment have not been altered or eliminated. The design or operation of plant systems and equipment have not be affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This organizational change does not add, delete, or change any l
plant system or component.
There is no introduction of any new failure mechanisms, nor does this change compound existing failure mechanisms.
The j
functions and activities of the affected personnel have not changed and the requirements related to the purchase, storage, and issue of material and equipment have not been altered or eliminated.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change is an administrative reorganization that transfers responsibilities from the Perry Supply Section to the Design Engineering Section.
The functions and activities of the affected personnel have not changed.
The requirements related to the purchase, storage, and issue of material and equipment have not been altered or eliminated.
The design or l
operation of plant systems and equipment have not be affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-036 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-032 Description of Change:
This USAR change alters the reporting point of the ALARA Coordinator j
from the Superintendent, Health Physics to the Superintendent, ALARA/ Radiological Engineering.
No change in job functions, duties, or responsibilities have occurred.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change is an administrative reorganization.
No job functions or activities have been eliminated.
There is no impact to Reg. Guide 1.8 or ANSI N18.1-1971.
The design or operation of the plant has not been affected.
Hence, the accident analysis as described in the USAR has not been impacted.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequence of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important te safety have not changed.
j II.
No.
This change is an administrative reorganization.
No job functions or activities have been eliminated.
The plant remains in compliance with Reg.
Guide 1.8 and ANSI N18.1-1971, and the level of commitment of these two documents as detailed in the USAR.
The design or operation of the plant has not been affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
1 III.
No.
This change is an administrative reorganization.
No job functions or activities have been eliminated.
The plant remains in compliance with Reg.
I Guide 1.8 and ANSI N18.1-1971, and the level of commitment of these two documents as detailed in the USAR. The design or operations of the plant has not been affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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97-037 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-034 Description of Change:
This USAR change makes various editorial revisions to the USAR.
The changes include, but are not limited to correction of typographical errors, correction of grammar, and clarification / consistency between redundant sections. None of the changes alter the design or operation of any plant system or component.
Summary:
l I.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision, None of the changes alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the t
l probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of l
equipment important to safety have not changed.
l II.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes l
alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not l
impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Tharefore, the l
possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created, j
III.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes I
alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-038 Source Document:
Technical Specification Change Request 97-031 Description of Change:
This Technical Specification change will make the change approved in l
Amendment 83, which was approved for only one operating cycle, a
l permanent change. The change approved by Amendment 83 is associated with the leakage limits associated with the Main Steam Lines.
Summary:
I.
No.
This Technical Specification change eliminates the one cycle time allowance for the leakage limits associated with the Main Steam Lines.
The change in leakage limits was approved in Amendment 83.
The one cycle l
restriction was an administrative requirement and was not due to a design or safety concern.
The limit for total leakage from the four Main Steam Lines l
has not been altered.
The requirements of Reg. Guide 1.3 remain satisfied.
This change does not alter the design or operation of any plant system or component Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
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II.
No.
This Technical Specification change eliminates the one cycle time allowance for the leakage limits associated with the Main Steam Lines.
The change in leakage limits was approved in Amendment 83.
The one cycle restriction was an administrative requirement and was not due to a design or safety concern.
The limit for total leakage from the four Main Steam Lines has not been altered.
The requirements of Reg. Guide 1.3 remain satisfied.
This change does not alter the design or operation of any plant system or i
component.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
l III.
No.
This Technical Specification change eliminates the one cycle time allowance for the leakage limits associated with the Main Steam Lines.
The change in leakage limits was approved in Amendment 83.
The limit for total l
leakage from the four Main Steam Lines has not been altered.
The requirements of Reg. Guide 1.3 remain satisfied.
This change does not alter the design or operation of any plant system or component.
Therefore, no margins of safety l
have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-039 Source Document: Technical Specification Change Request 97-033 pescription of Change:
This Technical Specification (TS) revises the existing exception to Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 as it applies to LCO 3.6.1.9 for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS).
The exception, added by Amendment 71, expires upon completion of the sixth cycle of plant operation. This revision will make the change, previously approved in Amendments 63 and 71, a permanent change and will revise the existing exception to clarify that it applies only to the Inboard MSIV LCS subsystem.
The MSIV drains remain in their current configuration, which seals off secondary containment bypass leakage.
The sealed drain path caused by the collection of condensate from the steam generated during heatup and power ascension, results in temporary inoperability of the Inboard MSIV LCS subsystem when the plant is below 50% rated thermal power.
The requested 3.0.4 exception permits use of the existing Action statement (Condition A of LCO 3.6.1.9) during mode changes.
Summary:
I.
No.
This Technical Specification (TS) revises the existing exception to Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 as it applies to LCO 3.6.1.9 for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS).
There are no changes to the plant or in the manner the plant is operated.
Potential concerns of pooled condensate in the drain lines have been evaluated and the configuration found to be acceptable.
Leakage past the MSIVs will still be able to be routed for filtration as in the design bases radiological analyses.
No new equipment or systems are added.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The inboard MSIV LCS subsystem is only credited during a large break LOCA with Reactor Coolant system depressurization.
The temporary unavailability of the Inboard MSIV LCS subsystem can be mitigated by operation of the Outboard MSIV LCS subsystem.
No new equipment or systems have been added and plant operation has not been changed.
No new failure mechanisms have been introduced.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This Technical Specification (TS) revises the existing exception to Limiting Condition of Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 as it applies to LCO 3.6.1.9 for the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) Leakage Control System (LCS).
There are no changes to the plant or in the manner the plant is operated.
Potential concerns of pooled condensate in the drain lines have been evaluated and the configuration found to be acceptable.
Leakage past the MSIVs will still be able to be routed for filtration as in the design bases radiological analyses.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
I SE No.:
97-041 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-036 Description of Change:
This USAR change evaluates a site re-organization in which the responsibility for the Control Room Simulator changes from the Manager, Perry Training to the Manager, Information Technology.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change is administrative in nature.
No functions have been eliminated, only re-assigned.
The design and operation of plant systems have not been impacted. Accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change is administrative in nature.
No functions have been eliminated, only re-assigned.
The design and operation of plant systems have not been impacted. Accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This USAR change is administrative in nature.
No functions have been eliminated, only re-assigned. The design and operation of plant systems have not been impacted. Accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
SE No.:
97-043 i
Source Document:
PDB-R001, Rev. O, PIC 4 Description of Change:
l This Plant Data Book (PDB) revision provides alternative monitoring for the Control Rod Drive (CRD) System Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) l instrumentation.
The Rod Control and Information System (RCIS) normally continuously monitors the HCUs and provides alarms if HCU nitrogen pressure decreases below 1575 psig or if water is detected on the nitrogen side of the HCU internal piston.
1 Summary:
I I.
No.
The HCU instrumentation performs a passive monitoring function of HCU status and does not affect the safety SCRAM function of the HCU and associated control rod.
The alternative monitoring is non-intrusive and does not affect the SCRAM function. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the i
i consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
have not changed.
l l
II.
No.
The use of an alternate methodology for monitoring the status of the HCU is non-intrusive and does not affect the HCU components necessary to j
perform the control rod SCRAM function. The HCU instrumentation and interface
)
with RCIS does not directly impact control red operability.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created, t
l III.
No.
The use of an alternate methodology for monitoring the status of j
the HCU is non-intrusive and does not affect the HCU components necessary to i
perform the control rod SCRAM function. The HCU instrumentation and interface with RCIS does not directly impact control rod operability.
The operability of the HCU SCRAM accumulator is maintained if the nitrogen pressure is maintained above 1520 psig and minimal water is on the gas side of the accumulator.
The alternative monitoring methodology ensures the above l
requirements remain satisfied.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been j
- reduced, i
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1 SE No.:
97-044 Source Document:
DCN 5301 Description of Change:
This drawing change will eliminate the demineralized wet lay-up requirements of the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system portion of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system heat exchangers. Additionally, this change provideo the basis for deleting ESW valves 1P45F0014A/B and IP45F0068A/B from GL 89-10, " Safety Related Motor Operated Valve Testing and Surveillance Program", since the valves will no longer be required to perform an active safety function.
Summary:
l d
I.
No.
Based on the frequency that the ESW system is chemically treated, stagnant water will not cause degradation beyond design allowables of the RHR heat exchangers.
Testing (performance testing and eddy current examination) and water box / tube inspections will confirm that the RHR heat exchangers will still meet the design requirement to remove heat for all modes of operation.
The elimination of wet lay-up cannot cause a loss of shutdown cooling capability and cannot cause a LOCA event to occur. Overall system performance of the ESW and RHR systems is maintained.
The RHR and ESW system will not be operated any differently than the way the systems have been operated in the past.
The drawing change does not impact the USAR accident analyses.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
I II.
No.
The drawing change does not involve any new accident initiators or equipment failure modes.
No hardware is being added or modified by this change.
Demineralized wet lay-up is no longer necessary to maintain the RHR/ESW systems functional. Motor operated valves 1P45F0014A/B and 1P45F0068A/B are required to be open for system operability and are not needed to satisfy the GL 09-10 program.
The motor operated valves will be maintained in the required position for accident conditions (open) for safety-related i
non-active. component. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been l
created.
III.
No.
The RHR heat exchangers remain capable of performing their design functions.
Testing programs ensure that corrosion will not cause degradation of the heat exchangers beyond code allowabics. Cooling capacity (ESW) for safety related equipment has not been reduced.
The GL 89-10 program has not been adversely impacted by this change. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
SE No.:
97-045 Source Document:
TM 1-97-003 Description of Change:
This temporary modification installs a freeze seal on a 3/4" Two-Bed Demineralized Water (P21) service drop to facilitate the repair of valve IP21-F080.
Use of the freeze seal permitted the balance of the P21 system to remain in service during the repair.
Summary:
I.
No.
The P21 system is not relied upon for the safe shutdown of the plant.
Any leakage from a possible freeze seal failure would not create any flooding concerns since the anticipated flow rate from the P21 line can be accommodated for and is bounded by USAR analyses.
There is no safety significant equipment in the location of the freeze seal.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed II.
No.
There is no connection between the P21 system and systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant.
Flooding from a postulated freeze seal failure will be limited, can be accommodated by plant features, and is bounded by more severe flooding evaluations in the USAR.
No safety-related components are located in the area. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
There is no connection between the P21 system and systems required for the safe shutdown of the plant.
Flooding from a postulated freeze seal failure will be limited, can be accommodated by plant features, and is bounded by more severe flooding evaluations in the USAR.
No safety-related components are located in the area. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-046 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-040 DCN 5666 Description of Change:
These changes revise the Materials Surveillance Program by indicating new material specimen capsule locations, the number and type of surveillance specimens at those locations, the removal of the 3* capsule in Refueling Outage 5, and the reinstallation of the reconstituted specimen capsule in Refueling Outage 6 (RFO6). The reconstituted capsule installed in RF06 was of a slightly different design than that of the original capsule, i
Summary:
i I.
No.
The new capsule for the reconstituted specimens is essentially a like for like replacement of a reactor vessel appurtenance that has no interface with other systems or components.
The new capsule is of essentially the same physical design as the original capsule and is made of materials that are more resistant to stress corrosion cracking. As such, the reconstituted specimen capsule is more resistant to failure than the original specimen capsules.
The revised surveillance program remains consistent with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix H.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The new capsule for the reconstituted specimens is essentially a like for like replacement of a reactor vessel appurtenance that has no interface with other systems or components.
The new capsule is of essentially the same physical design as the original capsule and is made of materials that are more resistant to stress corrosion cracking. As such, the reconstituted specimen capsule is more resistant to failure than the original specimen capsules.
The revised surveillance program remains consistent with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix H.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
Reconstitution of the 3* material surveillance specimens and reinstallation of the reconstituted specimen capsule into the RPV does not have any effect on vessel material properties or meeting the requirements of Appendix H.
It simply provides additional opportunity to evaluate the material properties after future cycles. The new capsule for the reconstituted specimens is essentially a like for like replacement of a reactor vessel appurtenance that has no interface with other systems or components.
The new capsule is of essentially the same physical design as the original capsule and is made of materials that are more resistant to stress corrosion cracking.
As such, the reconstituted specimen capsule is more resistant to failure than the original specimen capsules.
The revised surveillance program remains consistent with the requirements of 10CFR50, Appendix H.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-047 Source Document:
DCP 96-0107, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change replaces the Meteorological Monitoring System instrumentation with new instrumentation. The software which processes the instrument data is being revised to accommodate the new components.
l The modification also reconfigures the system from a multiple channel system to a two channel system.
Pummary:
I.
No.
This modification replaces the Meteorological Monitoring System (MMS) instrumentation with new components, upgrades the data processing software and reconfigures the system to a two channel system.
The MMS does not directly impact or control any other plant system.
There is no impact upon any of the fission product barriers. The Emergency Plan will continue to satisfy the applicable regulations.
USAR accident analysis is not altered or otherwise affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment to safety have not l
changed.
II.
No.
This design change does not adversely affect any plant systems and will not degrade any safety-related equipment.
The modification does not i
introduce any new equipment failures or accident initiators / contributors.
Fission product barriers are unaffected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This modification does not adversely impact any plant equipment.
The Emergency Plan remains in compliance with the applicable regulations.
Technical Specifications are unaffected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
i SE No.:
97-048 Source Document:
DCP 94-0027, Rev. O through Rev. 6
\\
\\
Description of Change:
This design change installs a bypass line around each of the Emergency Closed Cooling (ECC) heat exchangers and utilizes an electro-hydraulic Temperature Control Valve (TCV) to control the flow between the heat exchanger and the bypass line based on the ECC water temperature l
downstream of the heat exchanger. This evaluation resulted in a determination that NRC review is necessary. A request for NRC review l
has been submitted under separate cover.
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SE No.:
97-049 Source Document:
DCP 97-4023, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change replaces obsolete flow instrumentation; flow totalizers/ indicators, OP21-K0100A/B, and flow indicator, OP21-K0464; in the Two Bed Demineralizer and Distribution (P21) system.
The design change replaces these instruments with one device that will perform the same functions as the existing three instruments.
Summary:
I.
No.
This modification replaces obsolete flow instrumentation with new components.
This system is not required for safe operation of the plant.
The replacement components meet or exceed the existing P21 design requirements.
The design meets the applicable codes and standards for nonsafety installations.
The failure effects of the P21 system upon other plant systems have not been changed.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The modification was performed in accordance with the appropriate design criteria, codes, and standards.
No new failure modes or effects have been created. The modification does not alter the function or performance of i
the P21 system.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The modification does not alter the performance or function of the P21 system.
The design meets the applicable codes and standards for nonsafety installations.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-050 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-042 Description of Change:
This USAR change revises the leakage rates associated with the Emergency Closed Cooling Water (ECCW) system by returning the leakage rates back l
to the original licensing and design bases values.
Summary I.
No.
This USAR change re-establishes the original design bases of the ECCW system with respect to system leakage rates.
This change does not adversely impact the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system or the ECCW system.
l As evaluated in the USAR, the action to align the ESW system to the ECCW system seven days post-LOCA remains unaffected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment
)
important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change re-establishes the original design bases of the i
i ECCW system with respect to system leakage rates.
This change does not
=
adversely impact the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system or the ECCW system.
As evaluated in the USAR, the action to align the ESW system to the ECCW system seven days post-LOCA remains unaffected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
)
III.
No.
This USAR change re-establishes the original design bases of the ECCW system with respect to system leakage rates.
This change does not adversely impact the Emergency Service Water (ESW) system or the ECCW system.
As evaluated in the USAR, the action to align the ESW system to the ECCW system seven days post-LOCA remains unaffected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-051 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-041 Description of Change:
This USAR change clarifies the intent of the USAR Radiation Zone Maps.
The clarification states the maps will provide design guidance with respect to appropriate locations of equipment in accordance with ALARA principles.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change clarifies the intent and use of the USAR Radiation Zone Maps.
The zone maps are intended for use as a design tool.
As such, the maps will provide the basis for decision making for shielding and equipment location with respect to ALARA considerations.
This change does not impact the design or operation of any plant component or system.
The change does not alter any source term or dose / dose rate within the plant.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or n.alfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The USAR Radiation Zone Maps show normal operating and shutdown design basis radiation levels only and are intended for use as a design tool.
These maps are not used for equipment qualification decisions.
This change does not impact the design or cperation of any plant component or system.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change clarifies the intent and use of the USAR Radiation Zone Maps. The zone maps are intended for use as a design tool. As such, the maps will provide the basis for decision making for shielding and equipment location with respect to ALARA considerations.
This change does not impact the design or operation of any plant component or system.
The change does not alter any source term or dose / dose rate within the plant.
The radiation zones are not addressed in any portion of the Technical Specifications.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
{
l SE No.:
97-052 Source Document:
TM 1-97-0004 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) electrically and mechanically disables Emergency Closed Cooling Water (ECCW) Temperature Control Valves (TCV)
IP42-F0665A/B.
The valves will be positioned to the full flow through the ECCW heat exchanger position.
Summary:
I.
No.
This TM negates a potential active failure of TCVs 42-F0665A/B by placing each valve in a passive mode.
Implementation of this L. essentially duplicates the functional configuration of the ECCW system prior to the installation of the TCVs.
No new failure mechanism that would impact the function of the ECCW system or any other system, structure, or component has l
been introduced.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences
(
of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This TM negates a potential active failure of TCVs IP42-F0665A/B by placing each valve in a passive mode.
The valves will conduct flow through the ECCW system in the same manner as the adjoining piping.
The TM does not involve any accident initiators or failures not previously considered in the USAR.
The change creates no additional system interactions.
The originally evaluated system functions are maintained. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
Installation of this TM will not impact the capability of the ECCW system to provide cooling to supported systems and components. The ECCW system and all interfacing systems will continue to meet design, procurement and installation requirements in accordance with applicable codes, standards and installation specifications.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been l
reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-053 Source Document:
DCP 97-5070, Rev. O l
Description of Change:
l l
This design change installs spacer blanks in the Emergency Closed Cooling (P42) system piping in place of manual valve P42-F580 and Motor Operated Valve (MOV) P42-F551.
The blanks will be installed in order to eliminate the potential for leakage out of either P42 loop through the l
piping installed for the C Control Complex Chiller. The motor operator l
for P42-F551 will be disabled by determinating the wiring to the motor l
operator, removing the fuses and opening the fusible disconnect switch.
Summary:
J I.
No.
The removal of MOV P42-F551 reduces the potential cf failure of the l
P42 system by removal of an active component.
The removal of Loth the l
P42-F551 and P42-F580 will reduce the possibility of human error with valve manipulations and valve maintenance.
By decreasing the possibility of human error and equipment failure, the P42 system is made more reliable and more likely to be available to support the ECCSs and the Control Complex Chilled l
Water system following an accident.
By using space. blanks of approximately i
(
the same w(ight as the valves replaced, made of compatible materials, and l
sealed into the piping using the same bolting and gaskets, no new loads or forces are created in the piping.
The ASME stress analysis for the piping remains unchanged.
Since the spacer blanks are completely made of metal, no environmental qualification concerns exist. The spacer blanks are made of material compatible to the existing piping; no dissimilar metal corrosion concern has been created. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The use of passive spacer blanks in place of valves will perform a more positive isolation function than the valves originally installed.
I Removal of active components such as valve P42-F551 and its associated l
electrical components reduces the possibility of a failure of the P42 system to perform its intended design function. Since the spacer blanks are materially and physically compatible to the valves they are replacing, the i
blanks will perform the isolation function better than the valves they are replacing.
Therefore, the possibility of ar sccident or malfunction of i
l equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
l III.
No.
The removal of MOV P42-F551 reduces the potential of failure of the P42 system by removal of an active component.
The removal of both the P42-F551 and P42-F580 will reduce the possibility of human error with valve manipulations and valve maintenance.
By decreasing the possibility of human error and equipment failure, the P42 system is made more reliable and more likely to be available to support the ECCSs and the Control Complex Chilled Water system following an accident.
By using spacer blanks of approximately the same weight as the valves replaced, made of compatible materials, and sealed into the piping using the same bolting and gaskets, no new loads or forces are created in the piping.
The ASME stress analysis for the piping remains unchanged.
Since the spacer blanks are completely made of metal, no environmental qualification concerns exist.
The spacer blanks are made of material compatible to the existing piping; no dissimilar metal corrosion concern has been created.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-054 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-075 Description of Change:
This USAR change revises the description of the communications systems available for Emergency Plan implementation.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR revision implements various administrative changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The USAR revision implements various administrative changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The USAR revision implements various administrative changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event.
The plan changes have not reduced the effectiveness of the plant in accordance with 10CFR50.54 (q).
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-056 Source Document:
PAP-1313, Rev. O Description of Change:
This procedure revision provides guidance for the ese of the containment polar crane auxiliary hoist for handling light loads (loads up to 1048 lbs) over fuel, to lift / move the Inclined Fuel Transfer System (IFTS) gate (1700 lbs maximum) near fuel, and to allow the polar crane empty load blocks to travel over fuel.
Summary:
I.
No.
This procedure revisien provides guidance for a number of lifting activities within containment.
The heavy loads program has not been affected.
This procedure revision does not alter or modify any plant system or equipment. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or the malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This activity does not alter, modify or affect any plant equipment.
There is no impact upon fuel handling activities. This procedure revision enhances the necessary defense-in-depth methodology of the existing heavy loads program by imposing double rigging hardware and more stringent inspection and maintenance requirements.
No new failure modes of the crane or other lifting devices have been introduced.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This activity does not alter, modify or affect any plant equipment.
There is no impact upon fuel handling activities. This procedure revision enhances the necessary defense-in-depth methodology of the existing heavy loads program by imposing double rigging hardware and more stringent inspection and maintenance requirements.
No new failure modes of the crane or other lifting devices have been introduced.
Therefore, no margins of safety i
have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-057 Source Document:
OAI-1702, Rev. 1 Description of Change:
This Operations Administrative Instruction provides guidance for taking plant rounds electronically.
Summary:
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I.
No.
The plant rounds provide direction for performing routine j
monitoring of plant equipment and recording of related data. Non-intrusive l
monitoring of equipment does not affect the design or operation of that equipment.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
Tasks performed by the plant rounds are limited to non-intrusive monitoring. These tasks do not adversely affect the capability of the equipment to operate in accordance with its design.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a different type l
than previously evaluated has not been created.
l III.
No.
Plant rounds are used to monitor equipment.
None of the tasks which are performed by plant rounds adversely affect the capability of any equipment to operate in accordance with its design. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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i SE No.:
97-058 Source Document:
DCP 97-5066, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change installs permanent connections to the 24" Service Water (P41) system discharge header to facilitate future installation of an Alternate Decay Heat Removal (ADHR) system.
The modification includes the addition of two 12" side stream connections with manual isolation valves and caps on each line, the addition of one manual inline 24" butterfly valve to the 24" P41 header, and the relocation of restriction orifice.
Summary:
I.
No.
This modification has negligible hydraulic effects on the performance of the P41 system.
The affected P41 piping and supports are designed in accordance with ASME/ ANSI B31.1.
The modifications are seismically designed such that the maximum stress range is less than that specified in Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1, Section B.2.c.
The l
modification meets or exceeds the design, material and construction standards applicable to the P41 system. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or raalfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
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i II.
No.
The affected P41 piping and supports are designed in accordance with ASME/ ANSI B31.1.
The new piping design meets the requirements of Branch l
Technical Position MEB 3-1.
The modification will have a negligible affect on P41 system temperatures and pressures.
The new valves are seismically qualified.
The two 12" lines will be permanently capped down stream of the isolation valves such that flooding due to mis-positioning of the valves is not possible. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The modification does not affect the ability of the P41 system to provide keepfill to the Emergency Service Water system.
The affected P41 piping and supports are designed in accordance with ASME/ ANSI B31.1.
The new piping design meets the requirements of Branch Technical Position MEB 3-1.
The modification will have a negligible affect on P41 system temperatures and l
pressures.
The pipe caps downstream of the isolation valves minimizes the potential of flooding.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-060 Source Document:
DCP 91-0155, Rev.0, Rev. 1, Rev. 2 Description of Change:
This design change deletes the low trip / alarm function associated with the Solid Radioactive Waste (SRW) Waste Feed and Dewatering Pump pressure switches OC ' ' -035A/B and OG51-N0055A/B.
The change from an installed cement soliu."ication system to a vendor operated dewatering / solidification system has reduced the normal operating pressure to a negligible level.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design modification deletes the low trip / alarm function for the SRW Feed and Dewatering Pump pressure switches. The change from an installed cement solidification system to a vendor operated solidification i
system has reduced the normal operating pressure to a negligible level.
The modification does not adversely impact the plant's ability to process and ship solid radioactive waste. There is no affect upon any plant system or component.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This design modification deletes the low trip / alarm function for l
the SRW' Feed and Dewatering Pump pressure switches. The change from an l
installed cement solidification system to a vendor operated solidification system has reduced the normal operating pressure to a negligible level.
The i
modification does not adversely impact the plant's ability to process and ship l
solid radioactive waste. There is no affect upon any plant system or component.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of l
equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This design modification deletes the low trip / alarm function for the SRW Feed and Dewatering Pump pressure switches. The change from an installed cement solidification system to a vendor operated solidification system has reduced the normal operating pressure to a negligible level.
The l
modification does not adversely impact the plant's ability to process and ship solid radioactive waste.
There is no affect upon any plant system or l
component. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-061 Source Document:
PAP-1914, Rev. 5, PIC 7 i
Description of Change:
t l
This procedure revision modifies the surveillance requirements for fire l
suppression water supply (motor / diesel pumps) by eliminating the four l
year "In Frame Inspection" requirement. The change to the surveillance t
requirements is consistent with the requirements of NFPA 20, " Standard I
for the Installation of Centrifugal Fire Pumps."
Summarv:
I.
No.
This procedure change to the surveillance frequencies for the diesel fire pump is in accordance with current manufacturer's recomrc.endations and satisfies the requirements of NFPA 20.
Hence, in the event of a fire, the ability of the Fire Protection (P54) system to control fire damage to systems t
important to safety is maintained.
This procedure change does not affect the Safe Shutdown Capability Report or the basis for any Appendix R exemption requast.
Since availability of the fire protection system to perform its function to protect equipment important to safety is not adversely affected, i
this change does not increase the severity or nature of potential fire related damage to equipment important to safety.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or concequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment I
important to safety have not changed.
l II.
No.
The procedure change only impacts the fire protection system and is l
not functionally related to any known accident mode or failure mechanism for i
plant features important to safety.
The operation of the diesel fire pump has I
not been adversely impacted, and the fire protection system will maintain its current design capabilities. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This procedure change to the surveillance frequencies for the diesel fire pump is in accordance with current manufacturer's recommendations and satisfies the requirements of NFPA 20.
Hence, in the event of a fire, the ability of the Fire Protection (P54) system to control fire damage to systems i
l important to safety is maintained.
The fire pump will continue to meet the applicable codes and standards and quality assurance requirements as originally specified.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-062,97-075 Source Document: Technical Specification Change Request 97-048 l
Description of Change:
This Technical Specification change removes the reference to the NRC policy statement on overtime from the Technical Specifications, i
Summary:
l I.
No.
This Technical Specification change eliminates the reference to the l
NRC policy statement on overtime from the Technical Specifications.
The administrative controls associated with overtime remain in compliance with the NRC policy.
The controls have been relocated to a plant procedure. This is consistent with current NRC practices. Changes to the procedure are controlled under the 10CFR50.59 program. This change does not affect the design, function, or operation of any plant system or component.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The administrative controls associated with overtime remain in compliance with the NRC policy. The controls have been relocated to a plant procedure.
This is consistent with current NRC practices. Changes to the procedure are controlled under the 10CFR50.59 program.
This change does not affect the design, function, or operation of any plant system or component.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The administrative controls associated with overtime remain in compliance with the NRC policy. The controls have been relocated to a plant i
procedure.
This is consistent with current NRC practices. Changes to the 1
l procedure a re controlled under the 10CFR50.59 program.
This change does not I
affect the design, function, or operation of any plant system or component.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-063 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-049 Description of Change:
This evaluation analyzes a change to the USAR which clarifies the l
description of water sample points and establishes acceptance criteria j
for several water chemistry parameters.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change does not alter any plant system or component.
Water chemistry parameters are not affected. Water chemistry and its associated monitoring equipment remain in compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.56 and General Design Criteria 13, 14, 15, and 31.
USAR accident analysis has not been affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
have not changed.
t II.
No.
This change does not impact the operation of the plant.
Water chemistry and its associated monitoring equipment remain in compliance with the applicable regulatory guidelines. Accident analysis is not affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a l
different type than previously analyzed has not been created.
III.
No.
This USAR change does not impact plant operation.
Chemistry parameters and monitoring instrumentation remain in compliance with the applicable guidelines.
Chemistry accuracy requirements have not been adversely affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-064 Source Document:
TM 1~97-0009 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) installs a temporary water supply as an alternate Service Water system supply source to provide cooling to the Nuclear Closed Cooling (NCC) system during a time when the Service Water system is out of service during Refueling Outage 6.
The Temporary Service Water (TSW) uses two temporary pumps in the Emergency Service Water (ESW) Pump House to provide water to a single NCC heat exchanger.
The system will primarily use abandoned Unit 2 piping.
Summary:
I.
No.
The Temporary Service Water is a substitute for a nonsafety system which is not required for the safe operation or shutdown of the plant.
Potential flooding, water spray, or seismic fall down of the temporary equipment which could impact equipment important to safety is bound by analyses for permanent plant components.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The Temporary Service Water is a substitute for a nonsafety system which is not required for the safe operation or shutdown of the plant.
Potential flooding, water spray, or seismic fall down of the temporary equipment which could impact equipment important to safety is bound by analyses for permanent plant components.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The Temporary Service Water is a substitute for a nonsafety system which is not required for the safe operation or shutdown'of the plant.
Potential flooding, water spray, or seismic fall down of the temporary j
equipment which could impact equipment important to safety is bound by i
analyses for permanent plant components.
Therefore, no margins of safety have
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been reduced.
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i SE No.:
97-065 f
Source Document:
DCN 5712 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises several P& ids associated with the Emergency l
Closed Cooling Water (ECCW) system. The revisions include adding component operating flow rate information, adding component design flow rate information, and making editorial changes.
Summary:
I.
No.
The drawing changes do not alter or modify the function of the ECCW system.
The changes will not cause the ECCW System to operate outside of its design or testing limits.
The chan7es do not affect any physical piping configurations, mechanical or electracal equipment, or electrical control logic. The changes can not be accident initiators.
The changes cannot prevent, degrade, or change actions described or assumed in USAR accident analyses.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
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II.
No.
The drawing changes do not change how the ECCW system functions.
The changes have no affect on the design, materials, or construction standards of the plant or of the ECCW system. Overall system performance remains unchanged.
There is no relationship between the changes and accident initiators or failure mechanisms described in the USAR.
Therefore, the l
possibility of an' accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The drawing changes do not affect the design or function of the ECCW system.
The Technical Specifications associated with the ECCW system 3re not impacted by these changes.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-066
- Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-051
)
Description of Change:
)
l This USAR change incorporate new Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)
Pressure / Temperature (P/T) curves.
The new P/T curves are valid through 9 Effective Full Power Years (EFPY), and through 18 EFPY.
l Summary:
l l
I.
No.
The revised P/T curves are based on irradiated RPV specimens l
analyzed in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendices G and H.
The lowest upper i
shelf energy through 32 EFPY is predicted to be 75 ft-lb, which is greater j
l than the required minimum of 50 ft-lb.
The adjusted reference temperature for 1
the limiting material is 83.8"F, which is lower than the 200 F limit of Reg.
Guide 1.99.
As such, the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary has been maintained. There are no hardware changes associated with this change and no new or revised system interfaces.
USAR accident analyses are i
not impacted by this change. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety I
have not changed.
II.
No.
No new modes of operation or hardware changes were made by this change.
The testing of the RPV specimens was performed per 10CFR50, Appendices G and H, with the results incorporated into the revised P/T curves.
1 The integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary has been maintained.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a j
different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The revised P/T curves are based on irradiated RPV specimens analyzed in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendices G and H.
The lowest upper shelf energy through 32 EFPY is predicted to be 75 ft-lb, which is greater t
I than the required minimum of 50 ft-lb.
The adjusted reference temperature for the limiting material is 83.8 F, which is lower than the 200*F limit of Reg, i
Guide 1.99.
As such, the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary has been maintained.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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i SE No.:
97-067 l
Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-052 l
Description of Change:
This USAR change adds a commitment to USAR Appendix 1B that requires at least once per operating cycle, a qualitative assessment of Drywell bypass leak tightness will be performed, unless the Technical l
Specification Drywell Bypass Leak Rate Test is performed in its place.
I This commitment was added in response to NRC concerns associated with submittal PY-CEI/NRR-2007L requesting approval to perform Drywell bypass l
leak tests using a performance based approach.
l Summary:
l I.
No.
The USAR change places a previously made commitment to the NRC into the USAR.
This incorporation of a commitment is considered an administrative I
change. As such, there is no impact upon the design or operation of the plant.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The USAR change places a previously made commitment to the NRC into the USAR.
This incorporation of a commitment is considered an administrative change. As such, there is no impact upon the design or operation of the plant.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
l III.
No.
The USAR change places a previously made commitment to the NRC into I
the USAR.
This incorporation of a commitment is considered an administrative change. As such, there is no impact upon the design or operation of the plant.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-068
[
Source Document:
TM 1-97-00012 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) installs a nonsafety-related temporary line for Service Water (SW) strainer backwash.
The permanent line was inadvertently broken at an elbow located in front of the SW Pump House (SWPH) during an excavation. This TM will attach a 6" flange and install a 6" fire hose which will be routed to a catch basin.
Summary:
I.
No.
The implementation of this TM does not adversely impact'the design or operation of the SW system.
The installation of a new 6" flange and a 6" fire hose routed to a catch basin provides the same design function as the original piping configuration.
Operation of the SW strainer backwash function will continue to be r.aintained.
A hydraulic evaluation performed to account for the altered configuration has determined that the installed components will have an insignificant effect on the backwash flow.
The fire hose being t
utilized is rated or pressures greater than the SW system design pressure.
The failure of the temporary components have been evaluated and found to not i
adversely impact any safety-related structures, systems, or components either directly or indirectly.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the l
consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
have not changed.
II.
No.
The installation of the TM meets the original SW system performance requirements.
The temporary components will not affect the design function or operation of the SW system. Operation of the SW strainer backwash function will continue to be maintained. A hydraulic evaluation performed to account for the altered configuration has determined that the installed components will have an insignificant effect on the backwash flow. The fire hose being i
utilized is rated for pressures greater than the SW system design pressure.
l The failure of the temporary components have been evaluated and found to not adversely impact any safety-related structures, systems, or components either directly or indirectly.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a j
malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The implementation of this TM does not adversely impact the design l
or operation of the SW system.
The installation of a new 6" flange and a 6" j
fire hose routed to a catch basin provides the same design function as the original piping configuration.
Operation of the SW strainer backwash function will continue to be maintained. A hydraulic evaluation performed to account for the altered configuration has determined that the installed components will have an insignificant effect on the backwash flow.
The fire hose being utilized is rated for pressures greater than the SW system design pressure.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-070 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-054 l
l Description of Change:
)
(
l This USAR change revises the licensing basis to include the use of the l
" TOP. MIS" analysis for determining the probability of a tornado generated I
missile striking an important system or component.
This change identifies that only "important" systems and components require either l
l unique tornado missile protection or that the cumulative probabilities of the unprotected targets being struck by a missile be less than 10.
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This evaluation resulted in a determination that NRC review is
]
necessary.
A request for NRC review has been submitted under separate Cover.
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SE No.:
97-072 Source Document:
TXI-0265, Rev. O l
Description of Change:
I This temporary test instruction evaluates the use of one loop of F.mergency Service Water (ESW) to cool both Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPCC) system heat exchangers. The use of this ESW alignment is limited l
to alternate decay heat removal purposes during Mode 5 throughout Refueling Outage (RFO) 6.
The instruction aligns either ESW loop A or B i
to the FPCC heat exchangers.
Summary:
I.
No.
The alternate decay heat removal line up specified in this instruction supplies an additional Decay Heat Removal (DHR) source to the fuel pools. This DHR lineup would not be used unless the normal DHR source is lost.
The consequence of the USAR Mode 5 accidents are not impacted by this alternate DHR source.
The DHR source in its self is independent of the USAR analyzed fuel pool accidents, with the exception of the loss of DHR event.
The alternate DHR source line up specified in this instruction uses existing plant safety-related components with diesel backed power.
The lineup meets all the requirements of a DHR system.
This lineup does not change any l
structure, system, or component. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or l
the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The scope of this instruction is limited to operation of an alternate alignment of the Emergency Service Water system during refueling.
Calculations show that no new hydraulic transients or component failures are created through the implementation of the instruction. The consequence of the USAR Mode 5 accidents are not impacted by this alternate DHR source.
The alternate DHR source lineup specified in this instruction uses existing plant safety-related components with diesel backed power. The lineup meets all the requirements of a DHR system.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The scope of this instruction is limited to operation of an alternate alignmsnt of the Emergency Service Water system during refueling.
Calculations show that no new hydraulic transients or component failures are i
created through the implementation of the instruction. The alternate DHR source lineup specified in this instruction uses existing plant safety-related I
components with diesel backed power. The requirements of Technical l
Specification 3.9.8 remain satisfied. Therefore, no margins of safety have l
been reduced, l
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SE No.:
97-073 Source Document:
DCN 5596 Description of Change:
This drawing change assigns individual Master Parts List (MPL) numbers to the existing 24" manway covers on the cross-over piping for the Moisture Separator Reheaters. This change also adds gasket material and torque value information to the vendor drawing associated with these manway covers.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change editorial in nature and does not alter the physical configuration of any equipment or structures.
The change does not alter previous or current maintenance, inspection, or testing practices.
There is no physical change to the plant configuration, operation, or hardware. As such, there is no impact upon the design or function of the Main and Reheat Steam (Nil) system.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety j
have not changed.
II.
No.
This change is editorial in nature and does not alter the physical configuration of any equipment or structures.
The change does not alter previous or current maintenance, inspection, or testing practices.
There are no physical changes made to plant equipment.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change is editorial in nature and does not alter the physical configuration of any equipment or structures.
The affected Nil system piping does not perform a safety function. There is no physical change to the plant configuration, operation, or hardware. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-074 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-055 l
Description of Change' This USAR change provides guidance for the handling of light loads other than fuel (e.g.,
refueling tools) over the reactor core without the primary or secondary containment being operable.
l Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change provides guidance that for certain lifts of non-fuel components over the core can be performed without operability of the primary or secondary containment. The lifts are administratively controlled such that the radiological consequences associated with accidental dropping remain bounded by that of a dropped fuel bundle. The change does not alter I
any refueling equipment or refueling processes. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change does not create any new systems, or add any new equipment that can compromise the functioning of any existing system, structure, or component.
The change does not alter existing refueling processes and load handling procedures.
This change will not result in any
]
new equipment failures.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or l
malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The administrative controls for light load lifts over fuel in the open reactor vessel ensures that the radiological consequences associated with a dropped item does not exceed the previously calculated results of a Fuel Handling Accident. This change will not degrade the capability of the Fuel Handling system or the plant to mitigate the effects of postulated transients and accidents.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-076 Source Document:
DCP 97-5075, Rev. O Description of Change:
.This des 3gn change installs pipe taps for future use by a Hydrogen j
Injection system.
The design of the pipe taps meets the requirements of l
ANSI B31.1, Power Piping Code.
The material and construction standards l
for the taps satisfies the applicable requirements associated with the l
piping being modified.
Pipe appendages are adequately supported to i
preclude vibration fatigue failures.
Summary:
I.
No.
The purpose of the design change is to provide connection points for future use.
The modification is installed in nonsafety, non-seismic systems.
The taps consist of pipe, isolation valves, and welded caps designed j
in accordance with existing line specifications.
The components added to the systems are passive manual valves and inactive control signals which will have no affect upon system operation. There is no impact upon system redundancy or independence. The systems to which the taps are attached are not relied upon l
to mitigate any accident.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the l
consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety l
have not changed.
II.
No.
The components added to the affected systems are passive and inactive.
Materials of construction are consistent with the current system design.
There are no additional failure modes introduced by the proposed modification.
System and plant operation remain completely unaffected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
l III.
No.
The modification is installed in nonsafety, non-seismic systems.
The taps consist of pipe, isolation valves, and welded caps designed in i
accordance with existing line specifications. The components added to the systems are passive manual valves and inactive control signals which will have no affect upon system operation. There is no impact upon system redundancy or independence.
The systems to which the taps are attached are not relied upon to mitigate any accident.
Therefore, no.nargins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-080 Source Document:
TM l-97-0015 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) installs a freeze seal in the Control Rod Drive Hydraulic (Cll) system line associated with the Hydraulic j
Control Unit (HCU) 10-15 manual isolation valve ICll-EP101 to isolate i
the valve from the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) to perform maintenance.
Summary:
I.
No.
The freeze seal installation will not degrade any equipment or permanently alter any safety-related structures, systems or components.
The precautions taken in conjunction with the freeze seal installation do not increase the probability of a line break of the affected portions of piping.
Potential failure of the freeze seal and the associated leakage is bound by the loss-of-coolant accident, as described in USAR Sections 0.3 and 15.6.5.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The freeze seal installation will not degrade any equipment or permanently alter any safety-related structures, systems or components.
The possibility of a system, structure or component being impacted is not I
considered credible because of the precautions that are taken in the installation of a freeze seal to prevent loss of the seal and to prevent loss of piping integrity.
Failure of the C11 line is bound by the design bases LOCA. Any water leakage due to a potentially failed freeze seal would be l
directed to the Suppression Pool.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident l
or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has l
not been created, i
III.
No.
The freeze seal installation will not degrade any equipment or J
permanently alter any safety-related structures, systems or components.
The possibility of a system, structure or component being impacted is not
)
considered credible because of the precautions that are taken in the installation of a freeze seal to prevent loss of the seal and to prevent loss i
of piping integrity.
Failure of the Cll line is bound by the design bases LOCA.
Use of an industry proven method of isolating the line, non-destructive examination of the line before and after the freeze seal, and measures taken l
to prevent pipe failure and freeze seal failure, combine to provide adequate assurance of piping integrity.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-081 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-059 Description of Change:
l This USAR change clarifies the terminology used to describe the Fuel Handling Building (FHB) monorail assembly and that lifting light loads and specific heavy loads over and/or near spent fuel racks is acceptable.
1 Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change does not alter the refueling process.
No equipment used in refueling operations is physically affected.
Loads lifts 1
remain in compliance with the Heavy Load Handling Program and NUREG-0612.
Potential load lift failures are bound by existing analyses.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change does not alter the refueling process.
No equipment used in refueling operations is physically affected.
Loads lifts l
remain in compliance with the Heavy Load Handling Program and NUREG-0612.
I Potential load lift failures are bound by existing analyses.
Therefore, the l
possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This USAR change does not alter the refueling process.
No equipment used in refueling operations is physically affected.
Loads lifts remain in compliance with the Heavy Load Handling Program and NUREG-0612.
Potential load lift failures are bound by existing analyses.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-082 Source Document:
DCN 5736 Description of Changa:
This drawing change adds two branch connections and isolation valves to P&ID D-302-382, " Potable Water System." The two branch connections supplied water to two toilet trailer complexes located at site different locations.
Summary:
l I.
No.
This drawing change adds two connections to the Potable Water (P71) l system.
Both branch connections were constructed in a safe, reliable manner.
[
There will be no impact on the operation of the P71 system. Therefore, the I
probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This drawing change adds two connections to the Potable Water (P71) system.
Both branch connections were constructed in a safe, reliable manner, i
i There will be no impact on the operation of the P71 system.
The P71 system does not have any connections to plant systems important to nuclear safety.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a l
different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
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III.
No.
This drawing change adds two connections to the Potable Water (P71) l system.
Both branch connections were constructed in a safe, reliable manner.
There will be no impact on the operation of the P71 system.
The P71 system does not have any connections to plant systems important to nuclear safety.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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i SE No.:
97-083 Source Document:
TM l-97-0014 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) utilizes the Fire Protection system to l
provide an alternate Service Water system supply source to provide cooling to the Nuclear Closed Cooling (NCC) system during a time when the Service Water system is out of service during Refueling Outage 6.
l Summary:
I.
No.
The Temporary Service Water is a substitute for a nonsafety system l
which is not required for the safe operation or shutdown of the plant.
l Potential flooding, water spray, or seismic fall down of the temporary l
equipment which could impact equipment important to safety is bound by l
analyses for permanent plant components.
Therefore, the probability of l
occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment l
important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The Temporary Service Water is a substitute for a nonsafety system which is not required for the safe operation or shutdown of the plant.
l Potential flooding, water spray, or seismic fall down of the temporary equipment which could impact equipment important to safety is bound by analyses for permanent plant components.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The Temporary Service Water is a substitute for a nonsafety system i
which is not required for the safe operation or shutdown of the plant.
l Potential flooding, water spray, or seismic fall down of-the temporary l
equipment which could impact equipment important to safety is bound by analyses for permanent plant components.
Therefore, no margins of safety have I
been reduced.
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I SE No.:
97-085 l
Source Document:
PSTG, Rev.
4, PIC 2 I
Description of Change:
This Perry Specific Technical Guidelines (PSTG) revision incorporates updated values for various parameters.
The revision also changes the Hydrogen Control Guideline to be consistent with EPC Issue 9311.
Summary:
I.
No.
Operation of systems and components as directed by th Plant Emergency Instructions (PEI) occurs after the accident or transi
- has begun, hence does not affect the possible initiators of any accident or transient.
The hydrogen control equipment is operated consistent with its design.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
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II.
No.
The PEIs provide actions to take in response to an accident or l
transient to shutdown the reactor, restore and maintain adequate core cooling, and maintain containment integrity. Operation of the systems and components as directed by the PEIs occurs after the accident or transient has begun, hence does not affect the possible initiators of any accident or transient.
j All hydrogen control equipment is operated in a manner consistent with its design.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The actions taken by the PEIs in response to an accident or transient is to shutdown the reactor, restore and maintain adequate core cooling, and maintain containment integrity are intended to restore Technical Specification related parameters to within the Technical Specification limits.
Operation.of the systems and components as directed by the PEIs occurs after the accident or transient has begun, hence does not affect the possible initiators of any accident or transient.
All hydrogen control equipment is operated in a manner consistent with its design.
Therefore, no margins of I
safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-086 Source Document:
USAR Change Requcat 97-067 Description of Change:
This USAR change makes various editorial revisions to the USAR.
The changes include, but are not limited to correction of typographical errors, correction of grammar, and clarification / consistency between redundant sections.
None of the changes alter the design or operation of any plant system or component.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted. 'USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes l
alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not
)
impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the l
possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
f l
III.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
l I
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l SE No.:
97-087 Source Document:
DCP 97-5084, Rev. O Description of Change:
design change installs two safety-related check valves into the C.
.ainment Liquid Radwaste Sump Equipment Drain (G61) system piping.
Onv check valve was added to the piping immediately upstream of the Containment inboard isolation valve, 1G61-F075, and the other check valve was added between the inboard Containment isolation valve, 1G61-F075, and the outboard valve 1G61-F080 of penetration P417.
Both check valves are physically located inside of Containment.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change installed two check valves into the G61 system for the purpose of thermal overpressure protection of the piping the valves are installed in.
The potential failure of the check valve would be considered a single active failure and should it occur, the normal G61 system Containment isolation valves would be capable of isolating Containment atmosphere from the environment in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
Both check valves are environmentally and seismically qualified for this application.
Both valves relieve into the Containment, hence the Containment would not be bypassed if the valve either leaked or opened as a result of performing its design function.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This design change installed two check valves into the G61 system for the purpose of thermal overpressure protection of the piping the valves are installed in.
The potential failure of the check valve would be considered a single active failure and should it occur, the normal G61 system Containment isolation valves would be capable of isolating Containment atmosphere from the environment in the event of a LOCA.
Both check valves are environmentally and seismically qualified for this application.
Both valves t
relieve into the Containment, hence the Containment would not be bypassed if the valve either leaked or opened as a result of performing its design function.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This design change installed two check valves for the purpose of l
thermal overpressure protection. The two valves were designed and installed l
in accordance with the applicable ASME code requirements.
Both valves are l
environmentally and seismically qualified for this application.
The l
potential failure of the check valve would be considered a single active l
failure and should it occur, the normal G61 system Containment isolation
(
valves would be capable of isolating Containment atmosphere from the l
environment in the event of a LOCA.
Both valves relieve into the Containment, hence the Containment would not be bypassed if the valve either leaked or opened as a result of performing its design function.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-088 Source Document:
DCP 97-5074, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change installs two safety-related relief valver into piping l
of the Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) system.
One relief valve was added to the piping immediately upstream of the Containment inboard isolation valve, 1G33-F028, and the other relief valve was added between the inboard Containment isolation valve, 1G33-F028, and the outboard valve 1G33-F034 of penetration P424.
Both relief valves are physically l
located inside of Containment.
l Summary:
I.
No.
This design change installed two check valves into the RWCU system for the purpose of thermal overpressure protection of the piping the valves are installed in.
The potential failure of the check valve would be considered a single active failure and should it occur, the normal RWCU system Containment isolation valves would be capable of isolating the Containment from the environment in the event of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA).
Both i
check valves are environmentally and seismically qualified for this application.
Both valves relieve into the Containment, hence the Containment I
would not be bypassed if the valve either leaked or opened es a result of performing its design function.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
l l
II.
No.
This design change installed two check valves into the RWCU system l
for the purpose of thermal overpressure protection of the piping the valves l
are installed in.
The potential failure of the check valve would be l
considered a single active failure and should it occur, the normal RWCU system Containment isolation valves would be capable of isolating Containment from I
the environment in the event of a LOCA.
Both check valves are environmentally I
and seismically qualified for this application.
Both valves relieve into the l
Containment, hence the Containment would not be bypassed if the valve either leaked or opened as a result of performing its design function.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
l III.
No.
This design change installed two check valves for the purpose of thermal overpressure protection.
The two valves were designed and installed in accordance with the applicable ASME code requirements.
Both valves are environmentally and seismically qualified for this application.
The l
potential failure of the check valve would be consideree a single active failure and should it occur, the normal RWCU system Containment isolation I
valves would be capable of isolating Containment from the environment in the l-event of a LOCA.
Both valves relieve into the Containment, hence the l
Containment would not be bypassed if the valve either leaked or opened as a result of performing its design function.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-089 Source Document:
TM l-97-0018 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) provides for the temporary installation of blanks on Feedwater (FW) system check valves 1N27-F0559A/B.
The temporary installation of blanks on 1N27-F0559A/B in conjunction with the inboard maintenance valves 1N27-F0560A/B and associated piping interconnections will form the Containment boundary for FW penetrations P121 and P414.
While the blanks are installed, the affected penetrations will be isolated and out of service such that there will be no internal pressure in the piping.
The blanks will be sealed using a gasket and approved sealant. The blanks will be restrained in place to maintain the blanks in position during a postulated seismic event.
Summary:
I.
No.
The temporary modification will be installed during Mode 5, and with no internal pressure in the piping.
Providing a blank on the valve body will not affect the containment penetration isolation capabilities.
The integrity of the piping system will be maintained with the blank to prevent the transfer of air out of Containment.
The blanks are designed consistent with ASME code requirements.
The temporary modification will not degrade the i
reliability of Containment integrity provided by the FW system piping and containment structure.
The temporary modification will not place additional loads on any System, Structure, or Component (SSC), and will not impede the functioning of any SSC.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The temporary modification will not degrade the function of any SSC, and cannot be an initiator or contributor to any malfunction of equipment installed in the plant.
No new active equipment is added, and no new type of equipment failures are created.
The blank is designed and fabricated consistent with the same design codes that were used on the FW system and Containment.
The barrier provided by the blank will be equivalent to that of the original check valves.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.-
III.
No.
Technical Specification 3.6.1.10 specifically permits use of one closed valve or blank as an acceptable means of establishing Containment integrity for a penetration.
For the temporary modification, the blank on valve IN27-F0559A/B with valve IN27-F0560A/B administratively controlled closed is consistent with this Technical Specification requirement for the Feedwater penetrations.
Design margins have not been changed or compromised.
The blank is designed and fabricated consistent with the same requirements as those imposed on the Containment.
The temporary modification will not degrade the capability of Containment integrity to mitigate the effects of postulated abnormal events and accidents.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
t SE No.:
97-090 Source Document:
SOI-Cll, Rev. 1 Description of Change:
This system operating instruction revision changed the method of precharging the control rod Hydraulic Control Units (HCU) with nitrogen and broadened the allowable nitrogen pressure band for HCU operability.
Summa r,y :
I.
No.
This change does nc
'lter the operating characteristics of the equipment involved.
The broade nitrogen pressure band remains bound by the USAR accident analysis.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change does not alter the operating characteristics of the equipment involved. The broader nitrogen pressure band remains bound by the USAR accident analysis.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change does not alter the operating characteristics of the equipment involved. The broader nitrogen pressure band remains bound by the USAR accident analysis.
The Technical Specifications (TS) associated with this equipment, TS 3.1.3, TS 3.1.4, and TS 3.1.5, remain unchanged.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
E
SE No.:
97-091 Source Document:
PDB-F0001, Rev. 5 Description of Change:
This Plant Data Book (PDB) change revises the Core Operating Limits Report and incorporates Cycle 7 fuel operating parameters inclusive of the Cycle 7 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Limit.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change introduces a new fuel design and a new core configuration.
No other plant system or component has been altered.
The fundamental sequences of the accidents and transients have not been affected.
The fuel system design bases are provided in General Electric Standard Application for Reactor Fuel (GESTAR II).
The new fuel design, the previous fuel designs, and the core design satisfy or exceed the requirements of GESTAR II.
This change has no impact on the events described in GESTAR II.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The new fuel and core configuration were designed in accordance with GESTAR II.
The essential components of the fuel are the same as previously analyzed.
The function and operation of the fuel remains the same.
The initiating sequence of the events have not changes.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new fuel and core configuration were designed in accordance with GESTAR II.
The essential components of the fuel are the same as previously analyzed.
The function and operation of the fuel remains the same.
The design satisfies the acceptance criteria of the fuel-related Technical Specifications.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
[
SE No.:
97-092 l
Source Document:
SP-2155, Rev. 2 l
l Description of Change:
1 This Installation Standard Specification revision provides guidance for the use of Controlled Low Strength Material (CLSM) as a replacement for i
Class B and Class C backfill.
The CLSM can also be used to replace l
Class A fill when the Class A fill was used as bedding and backfill for I
buried piping and ductbanks.
1
(
Summary:
I.
No.
This specification revision provides guidance for the use of Controlled Low Strength Material (CLSM) as a replacement for Class B and Class C backfill.
The CLSM has a coefficient of permeability oi less than 1.8 x 10 ~' cm./sec. which is at least as impermeable as Class B backfill.
The l
use of CLSM will not increase the groundwater inflow rate.
The CLSM has sufficient strength to support buried piping and ductbanks.
The placement method for the CLSM will assure adequate support for these components, hence there is no affect upon the seismic support of the buried piping and ductbanks.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This specification revision provides guidance for the use of Controlled Low Strength Material (CLSM) as a replacement for Class B and Class C backfill.
The CLSM is at least as impermeable as Class B backfill.
The use l
of CLSM will not increase the groundwater inflow rate.
The CLSM has sufficient strength to support buried piping and ductbanks. The placement method for the CLSM will assure adequate support for these components, hence there is no affect upon the seismic support of the buried piping and ductbanks.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The CLSM provides an equivalent or better foundation than Class B or C fill.
The CLSM is at least as impermeable as Class B backfill.
The use of CLSM will not increase the groundwater inflow rate.
CLSM will not be used to replace Class A fill for the Plant Underdrain system or as a foundation for l
safety-related buildings.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-094 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-078 Description of Change:
This USAR change updates the Emergency Service Water (ESW - P45) system pump performance parameters consistent with the current system design.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change updates the USAR to reflect the appropriate pump parameters consistent with the P45 pump "A" and "B" design. The change does not identify or cause any degradation of plant systems, structu es or components.
The design and operation of the ESW system has not been affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change does not impact the design or operation of the ESW system.
The change does not create any new systems, structures, or components, nor add any new active equipment. The change will not result in any new type of equipment failures. Therefore, the possibility for an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The P45. system design has not been compromised through the update of pump capacity information in the USAR.
The change does not create any new systems, structures, or components, nor add any new active equipment.
The' change will not result in any new type of equipment failures. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-096 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-080 Description of Change:
This USAR change provides a more complete description of how vibratory f
loading and the resulting stress levels are evaluated.
The change l
describes the correlation between component stress levels and fatigue l
usage factors.
The change is programmatic and does not result in any physical changes to the plant.
This USAR change is applicable to the stress and usage factors associated with jet pump set screw gaps.
l Summary:
I.
No.
The change describes the correlation between component stress l
levels and fatigue usage factors.
The integrity of the jet pumps is assured l
due to a fatigue usage factor value less than or equal to 1.0, and continued l
ASME code compliance.
Since the fatigue usage factor value is less than or i
ettal to 1.0, the jet pumps will not fail due to fatigue.
The jet pumps will l
st.11 be able to provide a floodable volume to cover two-thirds of the core in i
event of a recirculation line break or LOCA.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or a malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
l II.
No.
The change describes the correlation between component stress i
levels and fatigue usage factors.
The integrity of the jet pumps is assured due to a fatigue usage factor value of less than one, and ASME code compliance. The jet pumps will be able to provide a floodable volume to cover two-thirds of the core in event of a recirculation line break or LOCA.
The l
design function and structural integrity of the jet pumps are maintained.
l Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a l
different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
1 III.
No.
Tne change describes the correlation between component stress levels and fatigue usage factors.
The margin of safety for this activity is associated with the ASME code and USAR cumulative fatigue usage factor of 1.0.
For reactor internal components peak vibratory stress intensity can exceed 10,000 psi, but the fatigue usage factor for that component is limited to 1.0 for normal and upset conditions.
The jet pump set screw gaps will be reinspected in each refueling outage and the fatigue usage factor will be reevaluated to demonstrate continued conformance to design / licensing basis fatigue limits for the jet pump assemblies.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-097 Source Document:
RWI-G50(FBRS), Rev. 2, PIC 12 Description of Change:
This Radwaste Instruction change provides guidance for the chemical cleaning of the Portable Filtration System (PFS).
Summary:
l I.
No.
This instruction change provides guidance for the chemical cleaning of the PFS.
The PFS contains a non-precoat backflushable filter unit that is non-permanent plant equipment. The Service Air and Two Bed Demineralizer systems supply services to the PFS.
The connections have backflow preventers I
that would stop the migration of the cleaning chemicals into the systems should a PFS failure occur.
The cleaning chemicals are compatible to the PFS.
Furthermore, the chemicals will not adversely impact the Radwaste system which is the discharge point for the cleaning fluids. No new source term would be created by the clean-up of the PFS.
USAR accident analysis remains unaffected by this change.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The EFS contains a non-precoat backflushable filter unit that is non-permanent plant equipment.
The Service Air and Two Bed Demineralizer systems supply services to the PFS.
The connections have backflow preventers
{
that would stop the migration of the cleaning chemicals into the systems should a PFS failure occur.
The cleaning chemicals are compatible to the PFS.
]
Furthermore, the chemicals will not adversely impact the Radwaste system which l
is the discharge point for the cleaning fluids.
No new source term would be created by the clean-up of the PFS.
Administrative controls provide assurance that if the PFS leaks during the cleaning process there will be no impact to any surrounding plant equipment.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The PFS contains a non-precoat backflushable filter unit that is non-permanent plant equipment. The Service Air and Two Bed Demineralizer systems supply services to the PFS.
The connections have backflow preventers that would stop the migration of the cleaning chemicals into the systems should a PFS failure occur.
The cleaning chemicals are compatible to the PFS.
Furthermore, the chemicals will not adversely impact the Radwaste system which is the discharge point for the cleaning fluids.
No new source term would be created by the clean-up of the PFS.
Administrative controls provide assurance that if the PFS leaks during the cleaning process there will be no impact to any surrounding plant equipment.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-098 Source Document:
RWI-G50(MISC), Rev. O Description of Change:
This Radwaste Instruction change provides guidance for the Drum Dryer Unit (DDU).
Summary:
I.
No.
This instruction provides guidance for the DDU.
The DDU is a small, self-contained evaporator which is used to evaporate waste water containing impurities which may have an impact upon the Liquid Radwaste (LRW) system. The maximum capacity of the unit is less than 200 gallons, hence flooding is of no concern should the unit fail.
The unit is portable, hence I
there is no impact upon the design or operation of any installed plant systems I
or components.
Potential radiological releases from a postulated DDU failure remain bound by existing USAR analyses.
USAR accident analysis remains unaffected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This instruction provides guidance for the DDU.
The DDU is a small, self-contained evaporator which is used to evaporate waste water containing impurities which may have an impact upon the Liquid Radwaste (LRW) system.
The maximum capacity of the unit is less than 200 gallons, hence flooding is of no concern should the unit fail.
The unit is portable, hence there is no impact upon the design or operation of any installed plant systems i
or components.
Potential radiological releases from a postulated DDU failure remain bound by existing USAR analyses.
USAR accident analysis remains unaffected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
l III.
No.
The DDU is a small, self-contained evaporator which is used to evaporate waste water containing impurities which may have an impact upon the Liquid Radwaste (LRW) system.
The maximum capacity of the unit is less than 200 gallons, hence flooding is of no concern should the unit fail.
The unit is portable, hence there is no impact upon the design or operation of any installed plant systems or components.
Potential radiological releases from a i
postulated DDU f'ilure remain bound by existing USAR analyses.
Therefore, no margins of safo have been reduced.
i t
SE No.:
97-099 Source Document: TM 1-97-0022 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) electrically and mechanically disables Emergency Closed Cooling Water (ECCW) Temperature Control Valves (TCV) 1P42-F0665A/B.
The valves will be positioned to the full flow through the ECCW heat exchanger position.
Summary:
I.
No.
This TM negates a potential active failure of TCVs 1P42-F0665A/B by placing each valve in a passive mode.
Implementation of this TM essentially duplicates the functional configuration of the ECCW system prior tc the
-installation of the TCVs.
No new failure mechanism that would impact the function of the ECCW system or any other system, structure, or component has been introduced.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This TM negates a potential active failure of TCVs IP42-F0665A/B by placing each valve in a passive mode. The valves will conduct flow through the ECCW system in the same manner as the adjoining piping.
The TM does not involve any accident initiators or failures not previously considered in the USAR.
The change creates no additional system interactions.
The originally evaluated system functions are maintained.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a dif ferent type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
Installation of this TM will not impact the capability of the ECCW system to provide cooling to supported systems and components.
The ECCW system and all interfacing systems will continue to meet desic', procurement and installation requirements in accordance with applicable ce t es, standards and installation specifications. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
t SE No.:
97-104 Source Document:
DCP 97-5081, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change increases the orifice diameter of warm-up orifices 1N27-D003A through 3D for the Reactor Feedwater Booster Pumps (RFBP).
This will allow an increase in the pre-heating flow rates.
Without proper pre-heating, the pump in standby could be damaged if it is placed in service.
Summary:
I.
No.
The existing sizing of the warming orifices has shown that the RFBP are not receiving sufficient heating to assure that the pumps can start on demand with consistency.
The change will increase the long term reliability of the pumps and reduce the possibility of these pumps acting as an initiator of a Loss of Feedwater transient.
This change will not cause the Feedwater system to be operated outside of the Feedwater design limits.
This modification does not change, degrade, or prevent actions described or assuiced in the USAR accident analyses.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have net changed.
II.
No.
The new orifices are passive, nonsafety-related components.
The change does not add any new components.
Since the source of water for heating is the pumped fluid, there is no possibility of excess heating of the pump.
Replacing these passive components with the same passive components with a slightly larger opening, will not create any new system or component interactions.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This design change does not alter any Feedwater system function, operating parameters, or system interaction.
Replacing these passive components with the same passive components with a slightly larger opening, will not create any new system or component interactions.
Since the source of water for heating is the pumped fluid, there is no possibility of excess heating of the pump.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
l
SE No.:
97-101 Source Document:
PAP-1914, Rev. 5, PIC 6 Description of Change:
This procedure revision modifies the surveillance requirements for fire pumps by incorporating the design and initial pump acceptance test data as the test acceptance criteria.
Summary:
I.
No.
This procedure change to the surveillance requirements for the fire pumps is in accordance with the design bases of the pumps.
Use of the design l
bases as test acceptance criteria does not impact the operability of any of the fire pumps.
Hence, in the event of a fire, the ability of the Fire Protection (P54) system to control fire damage to systems important to safety is maintained.
Safe shutdown systems and components have not been affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or_ consequences of an accident or a i
malfunctica of equipment important to safety have not changed.
l II.
No.
This procedure change to the surveillance requirements for the fire
]
pumps is in accordrnce with the design bases of the pumps.
Use of the design j
bases as test acceptance criteria does not impact the operability of any of 1
the fire pumps.
Hence, in the event of a fire, the ability of the Fire Protection (P54) system to control fire damage to systems important to safety l
is maintained.
Safe shutdown systems and components have not been affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This procedure change to the surveillance requirements for the fire pumps is in accordance with the design bases of the pumps.
Use of the design bases as test acceptance criteria does not impact the operability of any of the fire pumps.
Hence, in the event of a fire, the ability of the Fire Protection (P54) system to control fire damage to systems important to safety is maintained.
Safe shutdown systems and components have not been affected.
l Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
J 1
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SE No.:
97-106 2
Source Document:
DCN 5768 Description of Change:
This drawing change updates several water system P& ids to reflect operating data flow changes determined during the performance of a l
temporary test.
The test was performed to verify the acceptability of Service Water (SW) system flow through various plant components due to i
l the modifications made to the SW system during Refueling Outage 6.
l Summary:
1 l
I.
No.
This drawing change updates the flow rates on several water system j
P& ids.
The affected systems are nonsafety.
The revised flows do not i
adversely impact the function or operation of the affected systems. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This drawing change updates the flow rates on several water system P& ids.
The affected systems are nonsafety.
The revised flows do not adversely impact the function or operation of the affected systems, i
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or a malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This drawing change updates the flow rates on several water system P& ids.
The affected systems are nonsafety.
The revised flows do not adversely impact the function or operation of the affected systems.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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I SE No.:
97-102 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-072 l
Description of Change:
This USAR change revises the Core Operating Limits Report and l
incorporates Cycle 7 fuel operating parameters inclusive of the Cycle 7 Minimum Critical Power Ratio (MCPR) Limit.
l Summary:
\\
l I.
No.
This change introduces a new fuel design and a new core h
l configuration.
No other plant system or component has been altered.
The l
fundamental sequences of the accidents and transients have not been affected.
l The fuel system design bases are provided in General Electric Standard i
Application for Reactor Fuel (GESTAR II).
The new fuel design, the previous fuel designs, and the core design satisfy or exceed the requirements of GESTAR I
l II.
This change has no impact on the events described in GESTAR II.
l Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or j
malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The new fuel and core configuration were designed in accordance with GESTAR II.
The essential components of the fuel are the same as previously analyzed.
The function and operation of the fuel remains the same.
i The initiating sequence of events have not changed.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new fuel and core configuration were designed in accordance with GESTAR II.
The essential components of the fuel are the same as l
previously analyzed.
The function and operation of the fuel remains the same.
l The design satisfies the acceptance criteria of the fuel-related Technical Specifications.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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i SE No.:
97-107 Source Document:
Emergency Plan, Rev. 14 EPI-Al, Rev.
6, PIC 1 Description of Change:
This revision to the Emergency Plan and implementing instruction makes various changes to the plan.
Examples of the changes are incorporation of organizational changes, use of a Public Information Brochure and telephone directory listing for emergency response information in lieu of an annual calendar, and consolidation of the site first aid and medical responses into a single section in the plan.
Summary:
I.
No.
The plan and instruction revision implements various changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not been changed.
II.
No.
The revision implements various changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program.
As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changea do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The revision implements various changes to the Emergency Preparedness Program. As such, the changes do not implement any modifications to or impact the operation of plant systems, structures, or components.
The changes do not alter plant operator responses to an accident or abnormal event.
The plan changes have not reduced the effectiveness of the plan in accordance with 10CFR50.54 (q).
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-108 Source Document:
DCP 97-5094, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change adds landscaping material to the area above the buried Unit 1 and 2 Fuel Oil Storage Tank (FOST) area.
The landscaping design consists of an area with walkways, raised garden beds, trees, and i
arbors.
The raised garden beds are being made by surrounding the park area as well as the interior beds with a low garden wall.
l Summary:
I.
No.
The addition of this garden area only interfaces directly with the FOSTs.
The FOSTs will remain within the previously established design limits.
The landscaped area does not change the operation of any system or create any I
I new system interfaces.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the l
consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
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II.
No.
The addition of this garden area only interfaces directly with the l
The POSTS will remain within the previously established design limits.
I The landscaped area does not change the operation of any system or create any i
new system interfaces.
The landscaped area does not adversely impact the l
flooding analysis for this yard area, or add tornado missiles in sufficient l
quantity to exceed the TORMIS evaluation value. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously j-evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The addition of this garden area only interfaces directly with the FOSTs.
The FOSTs will remain within the previously established design limits.
The landscaped area does not change the operation of any system or create any l
new system interfaces. The landscaped area does not adversely impact the J
flooding analysis for this yard area, or add tornado missiles in sufficient i
l quantity to exceed the TORMIS evaluation value.
Therefore, no margins of j
l safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-109 l
Source Document:
Physical Security Plan, Rev. 24 Description of Change:
This Physical Security Plan (PSP) change has been evaluated to ensure that the effectiveness of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant PSP has not been reduced, and to ensure that the requirements of 10CFR73, " Physical Protection of Plants and Materials", remain satisfied.
Site Protection must be contacted for further details since this is considered
" SAFEGUARDS" information.
Summary:
I.
No.
The PSP describes the comprehensive Physical Security Program, and does not affect the design, function, or operation of plant systems or equipment.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The PSP does not affect the design, function, or operation of plant systems or equipment.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The PSP does not affect the design, function, or operation of plant systems or equipment.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-110 l
Source Document: USAR Change Request 97-098 l
Description of Change:
This USAR change clarifies the design requirements of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) discharge line keep-fill jockey (waterleg) pumps.
l The change addresses the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system, Low Pressure Core Spray (LPCS) system, and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system jockey pumps.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change updates the pump design information to alleviate confusion with the minimum pump performance data for the ECCS waterleg pumps as related to the keep-fill function and the Feedwater Leakage Control system.
This change does not alter the design or operation of any plant system or component. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change updates the pump design information to alleviate confusion with the minimum pump performance data for the ECCS waterleg pumps as related to the keep-fill function and the Feedwater Leakage Control (FWLC) system.
Operation of the ECCS waterleg pumps and the FWLC system will remain unchanged.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type tha: previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This USAR change updates the pump design information to alleviate l
confusion with the minimum pump performance data for the ECCS waterleg pumps as related to the keep-fill function and the Feedwater Leakage Control system.
This change does not alter the design or operation of any plant system or component.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-111 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-105 l
Description of Change:
i This USAR change clarifies the description of the Condensate Filtration system and the N24 Condensate Demineralizer (N24) system.
Summary:
I.
No.
The clarifications do not impact the N23/N24 systems.
None of the clarifications compromise compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.56.
Water quality compliance with industry guidelines is maintained.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not i
changed.
II.
No.
The clarifications do not affect the function / operation of the
)
N23/N24 system. Water quality compliance with industry guidelines is maintained.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The clarifications do not affect the function / operation of the N23/N24 system.
None of the clarifications compromise compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.56.
Water quality compliance with industry
. guidelines is maintained.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-112 Source Document:
Technical Specification Change Request 97-106 Description of Change:
This Technical Specification change eliminates the surveillance requirements for accelerated Diesel Generator (DG) testing as allowed by Generic Letter 94-01.
Summary:
I.
No.
This Technical Specification change eliminates the requirement for accelerated DG testing. Administrative controls (via the Maintenance Rule)
.which provide for the monitoring and testing of the DG provide assurance that the reliability of the DGs has been maintained.
This change does not alter the design, material, or operation of the DGs.
Divisional redundancy has been maintained.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This Technical Specification change eliminates the requirement for accelerated DG testing. Administrative controls (via the Maintenance Rule) which provide for the monitoring and testing of the DG provide assurance that the reliability of the DGs has been maintained.
This change does not alter the design, material, or operation of the DGs.
Divisional redundancy has been maintained.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This Technical Specification change eliminates the requirement for accelerated DG testing.
Administrative controls (via the Maintenance Rule) which provide for the monitoring and testing of the DG provide assurance that the reliability of the DGs has been maintained. The use of the Maintenance Rule program is consistent with the guidelines of Generic Letter 94-01.
This change does not alter the design, material, or operation of the DGs.
Divisional redundancy has been maintained.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-113 1
Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-107 Description of Change:
This USAR change incorporates the revised tornado missile probability analysis approved in License Amendment 90.
Summary:
I.
No.
License Amendment 90 a analysis and establishes the 10pproves the use of the "TORMIS" probability cumulative acceptance criteria for the total probability of tornado missiles striking "important" systems and components.
Incorporating the TORMIS analysis and its associated administrative controls into the USAR will not adversely impact the function or operation of any plant system or component.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
)
II.
No.
License Amendment 90 approves the use of the "TORMIS" probability analysis and establishes the 10 cumulative acceptance criteria for the total probability of tornado missiles striking "important" systems and components.
Incorporating the TORMIS analysis and its associated administrative controls into the USAR will not adversely impact the function or operation of any plant system or component.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
License Amendment 90 a analysis and establishes the 10-'pproves the use of the "TORMIS" probability cumulative acceptance criteria for the total probability of tornado missiles striking "important" systems and components.
Incorporating the TORMIS analysis and its associated administrative controls into the USAR will not adversely impact the function or operation of any plant system or component.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-114 Source Document:
EDCR 87-0273 Description of Change:
This Engineering Design Change Request (EDCR) constructed a two story Maintenance Building annex, which houses office and shop areas.
The building is located in the northwest corner of the Protected Area.
Summary:
I.
No.
The new building is located remote from any safety significant plant buildings.
The building is designed to the Ohio Basic Building Code requirements.
The minor grade changes around the building will not impact the site ability to protect plant buildings from a flooding event.
The new building has been included in the tornado missile probability analysis.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The new building is located in a remote corner of the Protected Area, away from safety-related buildings.
The building meets the requirements of the building code.
The minor grading changes will not affect the sites' ability to accommodate a flooding event.
The building is included in the tornado missile probability analysis.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new building is located in a remote corner of the Protected Area, away from safety-related buildings.
The building meets the requirements of the building code.
The minor grading changes will not affect the sites' ability to accommodate a flooding event.
The building is included in the tornado missile probability analysis.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
SE No.:
97-117 Source Document: DCP 97-5057, Rev. O Description of Change:
This design change replaces the obsolete Drywell Cooling Temperature Recorder, 1M13-R0110, with an available equivalent in order to regain proper functionality of the recorder.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change replaces an obsolete recorder with an equivalent device.
The device provides for recording purposes only.
The recorder does not provide any control function.
Failure of the recorder itself is not an initiator of any accidents described in the USAR.
The recorder is designed to be compatible with the installed environment (e.g.,
temperature, humidity, EMI/RFI, human factors, and seismic) such that system performance will not be degraded, and it will not impact other systems that could initiate the accidents described in the USAR.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The new recorders provide a large digital readout display, statt:
indicators which show the operator the channels currently in alarm and recorder failure status, improved chart recording, and capability to print out a current status of any process channel on demand or as preset intervals.
Mathematical functions can create new averaging channels which are beneficial during implementation of the Plant Emergency Instructions.
The recorder has keylocked protection for operating in the recorder setting parameters mode.
This prevents the operator from inadvertently changing recorder parameters.
The recorder reduces the overall operator burden during accident conditions.
The new recorders specifications for response time, print interval, chart speed, power consumption, and accuracy meet or exceed the existing recorder specifications.
The modification does not degrade or prevent operator actions during an accident, does not alter assumptions made in evaluating radiological consequences during an accident, and does not impact fission product barriers.
The recorder is designed to be compatible with the installed environment (e.g., temperature, humidity, EMI/RFI, human factors, and seismic) such that system performance will not be degraded and it will not impact other systems that could initiate the accidents described in the USAR.
Therefore, the possibility of en accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The new recorder meets the original recorder design specifications for seismic, electrical and physical separation, equipment environmental qualification.
The electrical loading on the bus has been reduced, and panel heat load has decreased.
The improved recorder operator interface does not introduce new failure modes. The recorder has keylocked password protection for operating in the recorder setting parameters mode.
This prevents the operator from inadvertently changing recorder parameters.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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I SE No.:
97-118 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-113 Description of Change:
This USAR change eliminates the requirement to the have TLDs analyzed at least quarterly.
Summary:
I.
No.
The maximum length of time of a TLD monitoring period is considered l
an administrative requirement.
The length of a monitoring period does not affect the ability of a TLD to accurately report and monitor personal doses.
j The personal dosimetry devices are supplied, processed, and evaluated by a dosimetry processor holding a current National Voluntary Laboratory t
Accreditation Program (NVLAP) certification in accordance with
{
The ability to monitor personal doses during any phase of plant operation including accident conditions has not been affected.
No plant i
Structures, Systems, or Components (SSC) are affected by the changing the length of time of a TLD monitoring period.
Therefore, the probability of j
occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment i
important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The maximum length of time of a TLD monitoring period is considered l
an administrative requirement and does not affect plant SSCs.
Additionally, l
the length of a monitoring period does not affect the ability of a TLD to
}
accurately report and monitor personal doses. Therefore, the possibility of l
an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously l
evaluated has not been created.
1 III.
No.
The maximum length of time of a TLD monitoring period is considered an administrative requirement.
The length of a monitoring period does not affect the ability of a TLD to accurately report and monitor personal doses.
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The personal dosimetry devices are supplied, processed, and evaluated by a dosimetry processor holding a current National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) certification in accordance with 10CFR20.1501(c).
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-119 Source Document:
DCP 87-0725, Rev. 1 Description of Change:
I I
This design change replaces components in the Leak Detection system with digital NUMAC monitors.
Summary:
I.
No.
This design change replaces components in the Leak Detection system. Although the NUMAC monitors employ digital hardware and software to implement the safety-related functions (leak detection), there are no new failure modes of any significance at the system level.
The NUMAC i
l design was developed in accordance with the Digital Upgrade Rule Guidelines.
The monitors are qualified for the Control Room mild environment including temperature, humidity, radiation, and EMI/RFI.
The l
potential for a common mode failure was minimized by the design of the NUMAC hardware and software, the verification and validation of the software to reduce the likelihood of errors, and the testing of the hardware to demonstrate its resistance to EMI/RFI.
The results or consequences of a common mode failure, whether due to a component failure, software failure, or EMI/RFI failure has not changed with the NUMAC design. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This design change replaces components in the Leak Detection system.
A single failure analysis concluded there are no new single failure modes of significance at the system level.
Common mode failure
)
protection provisions were addressed in the NUMAC design.
The NUMAC i
EMI/RFI emissions are minimized by design and will not impact other safety-related equipment in the vicinity of the monitors.
Potential malfunctions due to software EMI failures existed in the original design.
Therefore, the possibild.ty of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The NUMAC monitors will not affect any design conditions or impact the various Leak Detection system monitored parameters in the I
Technical Specifications.
This modification does not impact the required number of channels operable, minimum channels operable, Action Statements, or the frequency of the channel checks. Although the NUMAC monitors employ digital hardware and software to implement the safety-related functions (leak detection), there are no new failure modes of any significance at the system level.
The NUMAC design was developed in accordance with the Digital Upgrade Rule Guidelines.
The monitors are qualified for the Control Room mild environment including temperature, humidity, radiation, and EMI/RFI.
The potential for a common mode failure was minimized by the design of the NUMAC hardware and software, the verification and validation
(.
of the software to reduce the likelihood of errors, and the testing of the l
hardware to demonstrate its resistance to EMI/RFI.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-120 Source Document:
DCN 5697 Description of Change:
This drawing change revises P&ID D-302-242, " Service Air Distribution",
by adding the valves 1P51-F0604, 1P51-F0607, 1P51-F0647, and 1P51-F0649 l
which supply air to the four Fuel Preparation Machines 1F11-E0001A, i
1F11-E0001B, 0F11-E0001C, and 0F11-E0001D.
l Summary:
I.
No.
The chaiages involve showing the Service Air valves which supply air i
to the four Fuel Preparation Machines.
There is no impact upon the Service l
Air system or the refueling equipment.
Refueling processes have not been affected.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
l II.
No.
The changes involve showing the Service Air valves which supply air l
to the four Fuel Preparation Machines.
There is no impact upon the Service Air system or the refueling equipment.
Refueling procest.es have not been l
affected.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of
(
equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The changes involve showing the Service Air valves which supply air to the four Fuel Preparation Machines.
There is no impact upon the Service I
Air system or the refueling equipment.
Refueling processes have not been l
affected.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-122 Source Document: Memorandum Serial RAS-97-0226 Description of Change:
This memorandum alters the site organization by changing the reporting point of the Radiation Protection Section from the Plant Department to the Services Department.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change is administrative only. No functions or responsibilities have been deleted, only re-assigned.
The Manager, Radiation Protection Section remains the Radiation Protection Manager as described in Reg. Guide 1.8.
The design and operation of the plant are unchanged.
Accident analysis is unaffected. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change is administrative only. No functions or responsibilities have been deleted, only re-assigned.
The Manager, Radiation Protection Section remains the Radiation Protection Manager as described in Reg. Guide 1.8.
The design and operation of the plant are unchanged.
Accident analysis is unaffected. Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This change is administrative only. No functions or responsibilities have been deleted, only re-assigned.
The Manager, Radiation Protection Section remains the Radiation Protection Manager as described in Reg. Guide 1.8.
The design and operation of the plant are unchanged.
Accident analysis is unaffected. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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l SE No.:
97-123 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-119 l
Description of Change:
This USAR change revises the testing requirements for activated carbon adsorbents installed in Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) and non-ESF ventilation systems.
The testing will be performed in accordance with ASTM D3803, 1979.
Summary:
I.
No.
This change incorporates ASTM D3803, or its approved successor, as the basis for testing activated carbon in both ESF and non-ESF ventilation systems.
This change does not decrease the capability of the filters to perform its intended function, since the testing requirements referenced meet or exceed the originally stated requirements.
No accident consequences are increased, because the change still ensures that the activated carbon will remove radiciodines in accordance with the performance specifications stated in the USAR. Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
j II.
No.
The USAR change provides for testing of the gas phase adsorbent in accordance with the approved edition of ASTM Standard D3803 or its successor.
This does not change the intended design function of the adsorbent nor the ventilation system in which it is installed.
The adsorbent media is not associated with the systems whose failure can initiate an accident.
The configuration of the adsorbent media is not affected by the testing.
The charcoal absorbent testing is performed in accordance with approved standards that ensure that the adsorbent media will remove radioiodine in accordance with USAR accident analyses.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The activated carbon is a passive component in ESP and non-ESF systems.
The minimum removal efficiencies for elemental and organic radiciodines remain unchanged.
Testing performed in accordance with the currently approved edition of the ASTM standard is consistent with the Technical Specifications.
Test acceptance values have not been changed.
1 Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
97-124 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 97-120 Description of Change:
This USAR change makes various editorial revisions to the USAR.
The l
changes include, but are not limited to correction of typographical errors, correction of grammar, and clarification / consistency between redundant sections.
None of the changes alter the design or operation of any plant system or component.
Summary:
I.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchenged.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
SE No.:
98-002 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 98-001 Description of Change:
This USAR change eliminates the description of the System Operation Center (SOC) and replaces it with the System Switching Authority.
The name and location of the System Switching Authority are of no consequence to the operation of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.
Summary:
I.
No.
The change described above is administrative and does not physically change the plant, the plant transmission yard, or the transmission system.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change does not alter the physical plant, change the method of operation of the plant, or change any operational or design parameters.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The change described above is administrative and does not physically change the plant, the plant transmission yard, or the transmission l
rystem.
Technical Specifications have not been affected.
Therefore, no i
margins of safety have been reduced.
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I SE No.:
98-004 source Document:
TM l-98-0002 Description of Change:
This Temporary Modification (TM) installs a blind pipe fitting upstream of valve 1E12-F0528.
The blind pipe fitting will prevent steam leakage past the seat of valve IE12-F052B from influencing downstream Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system temperature and pressure.
The blind pipe fitting is a non-welded, carbon steel, machined, forging compatible with the piping system to which it will be installed.
The design, material, fabrication, and installation of the blind pipe fitting will be in accordance with appropriate codes and specification for the RHR system.
Summary:
l I.
No.
This TM involves a normally isolated section of RHR system piping that would have been used with the Steam Condensing Mode (SCM) of RHR.
The SCM has been previously rendered inoperable and unavailable.
The SCM and this
'section of RHR piping is not an initiator of or contributor to any accidents or equipment malfunctions, nor will the change cause a condition where the SCM or this section of RHR piping would become an accident initiator or contributor. This change is a passive design with no active components.
This change has been designed, procured, fabricated, and installed in accordance with the design requirements and specifications associated with the RHR system. The SCM is not an Engineered Safety Feature (ESP) and is not utilized in the safe shutdown of the plant.
The SCM has no radiological mitigation function.
This TM will not affect the operation of the RHR or the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
This change is passive in nature and does not involve any active components.
The change has been designed to not involve any new failure mode potentials related to pipe rupture or missile generation.
No new accident initiators have been identified.
This change has been designed, procured, fabricated, and installed to the same design requirements and specifications as those established for the RHR system.
This change does not affect the design, function, or operation of the RHR or RCIC systems.
The change doer not introduce any mechanisms which could impact the mitigation functions c any equipment important to safety.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The RHR SCM is currently maintained inoperable and unavailable for operation.
The RHR SCM is not contained within the Technical Specifications.
Design and safety margins that existed have not been changed or compromised.
The implementation of this TM will not degrade the capability of these systems to mitigate the effects of postulated transients and accidents.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
98-005 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 98-005 Description of Change:
This USAR change adds a post-LOCA vital area (as defined by NUREG 0737, item II.B.2) for the location of the manual supply of safety-related air to the outboard Main Steamline Isolation Valve (MSIV) accumulators.
Summary:
I.
No.
Adding the identification of a vital access area to the USAR to capture the location of the manual isolation valve for supplying safety-related air to the outboard MSIV accumulators post-LOCA does not affect any previously installed equipment.
The dose to the operator during the performance of this action is not considered to increase the consequences of the LOCA.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
Adding the identification of a vital access area to the USAR to capture the location of the manual isolation valve for supplying safety-related air to the outboard MSIV accumulators post-LOCA does not affect any previously installed equipment. The dose to the operator during the performance of this action is not considered to increase the consequences of the LOCA.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously has not been created.
III.
No.
Technical Specifications requires that at least two (2) non-licensed operators be maintained on shift in Operational Conditions 1, 2
and 3 (the Modes of concern for this event). No other non-licensed operator actions are specifically taken credit for within the first hour of the design I
basis LOCA.
Hence, one of the two non-licensed operators will be available to I
perform the specified valve opening and the action is well within the l
capability of the Technical Specification staffing requirements.
The dose to the operator during the performance of this action is not considered to increase the consequences of the LOCA.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
98-006 Source Document:
USAR Channe Request 97-111 Description of Change:
This USAR change clarifies the description of the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system suction source such that the source may be from either the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) or the Suppression Pool during normal operation.
The change also clarifies the operation of the I
Suppression Pool Cleanup (SPCU) system.
Summary:
I.
No.
The change clarifies the description of two plant systems.
The clarification will not cause a change to any system interface in a manner that would increase the likelihood of an accident.
The change will not adversely affect the operability of either system.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The USAR change will not create any new systems, or add any new equipment that can compromise the functioning of any systems, structures, or components.
This change will not result in any new equipment failures.
The changes will not degrade or adversely alter any nonsafety-related or safety-related equipment. The redundancy and independence within the systems will not be reduced.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The USAR change will not create any new systems, or add any new equipment that can compromise the functioning of any systems, structures, or components.
This change will not result in any new equipment failures.
The changes will not degrade or adversely alter any nonsafety-related or safety-related equipment.
The change will not affect the operability of either system.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.:
98-013 Source Document:
USAR Change Request 98-010 Description of Change:
This USAR change revises USAR Figure 9.2-15 (Sheet 3), " Turbine Building Clored Cooling System", to show that test connections / vents, IP44-F0612 and 1P44-F0613, are capped, and that the normal position for 1P44-F0646A/B/C/D are open.
Summary:
I.
No.
The design, construction, and operation of the Turbine Building Closed Cooling (TBCC) system has not been changed.
The TDCC system is not required to respond to any anticipated operational occurrence, transient, or accident described in the USAR.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The design, construction, and operation of the TBCC systen have not been changed.
The TBCC system is not required to respond t v
anticipated operational occurrence, transient, or accident described in the USAR.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction or equipment of a different type than prevfously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The design, construction, and operation of the TBCC system have not been changed.
The TBCC system is not required to respond to any anticipated operational occurrence, transient, or accident described in the USAR.
Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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i SE No.:
98-019 Source Document:
USAR Chango Request 98-017 i
Description of Change:
l This USAR change makes various editorial revisions to the USAR.
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changes include, but are not limited to correction of typographical errors, correction of grammar, and clarification / consistency between redundant sections.
None of the changes alter the design or operation of any plant system or component.
Summary:
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No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes l
alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR accident analysis l
remains unchanged.
Therefore, the probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.-
No.
This US?.R change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
This USAR change is an editorial revision.
None of the changes alter the design, function, or operation of the plant.
USAR analyses are not impacted.
USAR accident analysis remains unchanged. Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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SE No.: 98-020 Source Document: USAR Change Request 97-079 Description of Change:
This USAR change incorporates two new Storm Drain Catch Basins resulting from design changes implemented to replace the supply side Fiberglass Reinforced Plastic (FRP) piping in the Service Water (SW) system with steel piping.
Summary:
I.
No.
The modifications replace fiberglass SW pipe with steel pipe.
The I
replacement SW piping is designed to meet ANSI B31.1 and does not affect the l
design function or operation of the Service Water system.
The new catch basins are tied into the existing Storm Drain system.
The new catch basins do not impact the function of the Storm Drain system.
The changes in topography resulting form the SW system modifications ensures that precipitation run-off drains away from plant structures even assuming the maximum probable precipitation.
If the Storm Drain system becomes blocked, the changes in topography ensure that plant buildings will not be flooded. Therefore, the I
probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety have not changed.
II.
No.
The modifications replace fiberglass pipe with steel pipe designed l
to ANSI B31.1.
The function or operation of the SW system has not been I
altered.
The new catch basins are tied into the existing Storm Drain system.
I The new catch basins do not impact the function of the Storm Drain system.
l The changes in topography resulting form the SW system modifications ensures that precipitation run-off drains away from plant structures even assuming the i
maximum probable precipitation.
If the Storm Drain system becomes blocked, the changes in topography ensure that plant buildings will not be flooded.
Therefore, the possibility of an accident or malfunction of equipment of a different type than previously evaluated has not been created.
III.
No.
The modifications do not affect the function or operation of the SW l
system.
The new catch basins are tied into the existing Storm Drain system.
j The new catch basins do not impact the function of the Storm Drain system.
The changes in topography resulting form the SW system modifications ensures that precipitation run-off drains away from plant structures even assuming the maximum probable precipitation.
If the Storm Drain system becomes blocked, l
the changes in topography ensure that plant buildings will not be flooded.
l Therefore, no margins of safety have been reduced.
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