ML20215K205

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Transcript of 870506 Hearing in Hauppauge,Ny Re Plant Emergency Preparedness Exercise.Pp 4,963-5,235
ML20215K205
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Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 05/06/1987
From:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
To:
References
CON-#287-3440 OL-5, NUDOCS 8705110113
Download: ML20215K205 (274)


Text

ORIGWA! ~

O UhllEU STATES .

] NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMWLSSION IN THE MATTER OF: DOCKET NO: 5 0 -122-OL-f x

(EP E'ercise)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1)

O .

f LOCATION: HAUPPAUGE, NEW YORK PAGES: 4963 - 5235 DATE: WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 1987 AI o\\ -

ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

OfficialReporters e70S110113 e7o50s 444 North Capitol Street PDR ADocK 05000322 Washington, D.C. 20001 T pDR (202)347-3700 NATIONWIDE COVERAGE

l 71400000 4963 carysimons

,) 1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ,

3 4 BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD 5

6 ---------------X In the Matter of:  :

7 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY  : Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 (Shoreham Nuclear Power  : (EP Exercise) 8 Station, Unit 1)  :


X 9

Court of' Claims 10 State of New York State Office Building {

11 Third Floor Courtroom Veterans Memorial Highway 12 Hauppauge, New York 11788 13 Wednesday, May 6, 1987

\

(N eJ 14 The hearing in the above-entitled matter 15 reconvened, pursuant to notice, at 9:00 o' clock a.m.

16 BEFORE:

17 JOHN H. FRYE, III, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 18 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, Maryland 20555 19 OSCAR H. PARIS, Member 20 Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 21 Bethesda, Maryland 20555 22 FREDERICK J. SHON, Member Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 23 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, Maryland 20555 24 25 O

I

71400000 4964 marysimons 1 APPEARANCES:

2 On Behalf of Lona Island Lichtina Company:

3 JESSINE A. MONAGHAN, ESQ.

KATHY E. B. McCLESKEY, ESQ.

4 Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street 5 P. O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 6

On Behalf of Suffolk County:

7 MICHAEL S. MILLER, ESQ.

8 P. MATTHEW SUTKO, ESQ.

GEOFFREY R. KORS, ESQ.

9 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart South Lobby, 9th Floor to 1800 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 11 On Behalf of the State of New York:

12 RICHARD J. ZANNLEUTER, ESQ.

13 Special Counsel to the Governor Executive Chamber

' - () u Room 229 State Capitol 15 Albany, New York 12224 16 On Behalf of the NRC:

17 GEORGE E. JOHNSON, ESQ.

i U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 18 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, Maryland 20814 19 On Behalf of FEMA:

20 WILLIAM R. CUMMING, ESQ.

Federal Emergency Management Agency 21 500 C Street. S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20472 22 23 24 25

81600000 4965 cuewalsh

() 1 2 CONTENTS 3 Direct Cross Redirggt Recross Voir Dira DENNIS M. BEHR 4976/ 5197 5200 4 CHARLES A. DAVERIO 5207 MARY E. GOODKIND 5 MICHAEL K. LINDELL DENNIS S. MILETI 6 ELLIOT D. PURSELL 7 *****

8 EXHIBITS t Identified Admitted I

9 Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 57 5073 5172 Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 58 5073 5172 10 Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 59 5212 Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 60 5220

( 12 *****

13 LAY-IN TESTIMONY (None.)

A.M. RECESS Page 5029 15 LUNCHEON RECESS Page 5091 P.M. RECESS Page 5145 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O

81600101 4966 cuewalsh

- /~'N

' _)

( 1 PROCEEDINGS l

2 (9:00 a.m.)

3 JUDGE FRYE: Good morning.

l d

! MR. MILLER: Good morning.

5 MR. JOHNSON: Good morning.

6 JUDGE FRYE: After our problem yesterday with 7

the building closing, I guess we really need to reassess 8

where we stand with witnesses and who has to get away when.

9 I know Dr. Mileti was supposed to be back tomorrow; is that

'O correct?

II WITNESS MILETI: I would like to be back home 12 tomorrow, sir.

13 JUDGE FRYE: Yes, that's what I meant.

\

Id MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, Mr. Miller and I is discussed that a little bit, both yesterday while we were 16 all milling around in the lobby and this morning. We have 37 rescheduled Mr. Weismantle's appearance for Monday, since 8

you had indicated that you thought we would be held over 19 until Monday on this particular panel.

20 So, I contacted Mr. Weismantle last night and 21 Mr. Miller to tell him that Mr. Weismantle would be here 22 Monday.

23 As I understand it from Mr. Miller, he intends 24 to finish with Dr. Mileti today.

25 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. So, we will get Dr. Mileti O

81600101 4967 cuewalsh

/ 'I '

L') d back I suppose at a reasonable time.

2 MR. MILLER: Yes, sir. Let me just outline so 3

the Board knows what we are going to do now in terms of jumping around a little bit, and the reasons we are going to 5

jump around a little bit is to accommodate witnesses.

6 I am going to start this morning with Dr. Mileti 7

and also Dr. Lindell, for that matter, since they sponsor a

testimony jointly. I am going to do that rather than finishing up with Mr. Purse 11, because I realize that Dr.

'O Mileti has to get out of here today. I will finish with Dr.

Mileti today, and Dr. Lindell, barring some unforeseen 12 circumstance so that he can get out tonight.

13 I'm assuming when I'm through with Dr. Mileti

'd that there will be the redirect and other cross-examination

'S and so forth. And, then I will at that time, whether that's 16 the end of the day or first thing tomorrow, go back to Mr.

17 Purse 11 and try and finish him up.

'8 With respect to Mr. Weismantle, Ms. Monaghan did advise me that he would be available next Monday. I've also 20 requested Ms. Monaghan to simply make inquiry to Mr.

21 Weismantle as to whether he would also be available if 22 necessary all.or any part of Tuesday or Wednesday of next 23 week, because right now I'm not prepared to say we will be 24 on issues involving Mr. Weismantle on Monday. I think I 25 will know better by tomorrow or at the end of the day in J

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81600101 4968 guewalsh I

that regard.

2 But, as of now it's hard for me to predict when 3

we will really need Mr. Weismantle here, d

JUDGE FRYE: Where do we stand with Ms.

5 Goodkind?

6 MR. MILLER: We would expect to be inquiring 7

into Ms. Goodkind's testimony tomorrow acA perhaps part of 8

Monday.

9 l MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, I'm willing to i 10 inquire of Mr. Weismantle as.to his availability on Tuesday,

'I but we've already switched him a number of times and he has, 12 you know, cancelled and changed schedules and appointments 13 in order to accommodate changes in the schedule here.

O Id I'm not sure that we can keep getting him to 15 switch things around. There is only so many times he can 16 Cancel meetings with people and reschedule them.

37 MR. MILLER: I would just ask for the inquiry to 18 be made.

39 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

20 MR. MILLER: I can't do anymore than that. I'm 21 trying to give a best estimate.

22 JUDGE FRYE: Yeah.

l 23 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, is there anything else

. 24 you wanted to discuss on schedule before we get started?

25 JUDGE FRYE: Not really. I just wanted to find i '

81600101 4969 cuewalsh out where we were.

2 MR. MILLER: I just had one very limited 3

housekeeping matter. Yesterday, the Board was served with a pleading entitled " Contention EX-40, Calculation of Change 5

in Total Population Dose as a Result of Mobilization 6

Delays," dated May 4, 1987.

I And, as the Board will recall, this is an issue a

that came up through Board questioning primarily during the matters relating to Contention 40. And, I'm not sure if the

'O Board will recall, but I certainly recall, that when the matter came up -- and I'm specifically looking at the 12 transcript from March 31, 1987 -- and we were confronted 33 with this possibility of additional work and data being OJ 'd accumulated by LILCO, it was made clear on the record that is the data would be first provided to suffolk County and New 16 York State so that we could analyze the data, determine

'7 whether there needed to be discovery; and, we also, of is course, made clear to the Board that if the Board was going

" to want to hear additional evidence from LILCO regarding 20 this total population dose calculation that we, of course, 21 would reserve our rights to cross-examine any witnesses who 22 sponsored such testimony.

23 And, the Board agreed with that assessment at 24 Page 2,030 of the transcript. My only point, Judge Frye, is

.25 that contrary to what had been agreed upon, this matter e.a Q1 i

L 81600101' 4970

cuewalsh I

! now been brought to.the Board's attention without first 2

having been brought or provided to Suffolk' County and New 3

' York' State's attention.

At this point, it's too late to do_anything 5

about it but I would request that the Board simply put to 6

the side the pleading that was handed to the Board 7

yesterday.

8 I can represent to the Board that suffolk County has sent the material that was delivered yesterday to Mr.

10 Minor, who is a witness that would be looking at tuese II calculations. Mr. Minor will endeavor as expeditiously as 12 possible to review the data and the affidavits of Mr.

13 Daverio and Mr. Lieberman. He'will let us know what, if O Id any, discovery he would like to have or receive in 15 connection with the data and the calculations that have been 16 performed.

17 Once we have that listing we will, of course, 18 make requests to LILCO for such matters and such data. And, 19 at that time perhaps we could come back to the Board and 20 give the Board some idea as to when logistically we should 21 schedule this matter if the Board intends to make this 22 inquiry. If th Board decides that it does not need to hear 23 additional evidence on this matter then, of course, that 24 would moot everything I've been saying but it would also 25 moot the pleading that was filed yesterday by LILCO.

O

81600101 4971 i cuewalsh l VJ ' So, perhaps we can just put everything to the 1 2

side for the time being unless the Board wants to tell us 3

they are not going to consider this, and we will discuss the matter further with Mr. Minor and come back to the Board at 5

a later time.

6 JUDGE FRYE: Well, let us review the transcript 7

and get back to you. It sounds to me like we need to review 8

the transcript to determine whether or not we --

MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, I spoke with Mr.

10 Zeugin about it. And, both of us reviewed the transcript,

and that was not our opinion of what was said in the 12 transcript, that it required LILCO to provide the

'3 information to Suffolk County prior to providing it to the Id Board.

15 I think the issue here is whether Suffolk County 16 has been provided with the calculations and work papers it

'7 And, my would need in order to prepare cross-examination.

'8 understanding from talking with Mr. Zeugin about it is that

" those have been provided with the filing that was made 20 yesterday.

21 JUDGE FRYE: Well, I'm not talking about that, 22 but I -- let us review the transcript and get back to you-23

, all on this particular point.

24 MR. MILLER: That's fine, Judge Frye. At Page 25 2,030 is there I made a statement about how we needed the O

81600101 4972 cuewalsh 3

material to assess it prior to it being delivered to the 2

Board. And, the only comment by the Board was by you, and 3

you said, " Fine." And, there was no dispute as to what I d

wanted to do.

5 JUDGE FRYE: You are going to get a chance to 6 There is no question about that.

assess it in any event.

7 MS. MONAGHAN: Right. Judge Frye, I think that 8

the pertinent sections of the transcript are from Page 2,022 9

through 2,030.

10 With emphasis on 2,028.

MR. ZAHNLEUTER:

II 4 MR. JOHNSON: Judge Frye, could we just address 12 a little bit more the schedule for this contention and then 13 the next two contentions?

Id I was wondering about the ways in which we might 15 be able to possibly make up some of the time we lost 16 yesterday. I estimate We lost approximately five hours of 37 hearing time yesterday.

18 And, I know that you had expressed a desire to 19 finish all of the hearing testimony except for FEMA by the 20 end of the month. And, I also know that Mr. Miller told us 21 that Mr. Lanpher expects to require additional time, more 22 than was allotted on 15 and 16.

23 And, the Staff is very interested in those 24 contentions as well, and whether we can possibly meet our 25 schedule if we don't attempt to expedite things a little

O .

l 81600101 4973 f Cuewalsh Y  ;

< (V ' bit.

2 JUDGE PRYE: Well, we are certainly going to 3

expedite things, you know, to the extent that we can.

MS. MC CLESKEY: I would like to throw another 5

inquiry into the pot, since you raised it, and that is 6

whether any request for additional time on 21 will be 7

forthcoming. We haven't talked about that.

8 And, at present we've scheduled one day for LILCO's panel on 21 and one day for Suffolk County's panel

'O on 21.

It 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 f9 20 21 22 i

23 24 25 l

(1 b

81600202 4974 carysimons.

[ l JUDGE FRYE: Yes, and I have heard nothing to 2

the contrary.

3 I haven't either, but I'm

'MS. McCLESKEY:

)

d wondering whether we are going to.

5

. MR. MILLER: What's the question, Judge Frye? .

l 6

, JUDGE FRYE: Is one day'on Contention 21 going 7

to be sufficient? ,

8 MR. MILLER: From my preliminary discussions with Mr. Lanpher he has indicated to me that his rough 10 estimate of time needed to inquire into the LILCO testimony II on Contention 11 would be approximately one to two days. So 12 I don't think we are far off.

13 MS. McCLESKEY: We are running into a real j

O.- Id difficulty here.

15 JUDGE FRYE: Yes, we are, and we are also going

! 16 to waste all our time talking about this.

17 MR. MILLER: And I would like to start with Dr.

i 38

'. Mileti.

i' I9 JUDGE FRYE I think we ought to get started on i.

1 20 this. When are we going to hear from Mr. Lanpher?

l l 21 MR. MILLER: I'm not sure the Board is going to 22 hear from Mr. Lanpher. What I had indicated to the Board 23 last week was that if his estimates varied to any degree, he l

i 24 would file something with the Board, and it is my

.25 understanding from Mr. Lanpher that he has no reason to iO l

4 l

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81600202 4975 marysimons J '

believe at this time that the estimates I provided last week 2

will vary to any significant degree.

3 So I suppose at this time the Board should anticipate roughly three to four days for Mr. Lanpher on 5

Contentions 15 and 16 and one to two days for Mr. Lanpher on 6

Contention 21.

7 )

MS. McCLESKEY: Judge Frye, may I ask, not to 8

take up any more of the witnesses' and Mr. Miller's cross-examination time, that perhaps we can address scheduling

' 'U further at the end of the day on the record, but after 5 =

because I would like to respond to what Mr. Miller just 12 announced.

13 JUDGE FRYE: Let's do that. Let's proceed with 14 Cross now.

15 Whereupon, 16 DENNIS M. BEHR II CHARLES A. DAVERIO

'8 MARY E. GOODKIND MICHAEL K. LINDELL 20 DENNIS S. MILETI 21 and 22 ELLIOTT D. PURSELL 23 a panel of witnesses called on behalf of LILCO resumed their 2d seats at the witness table and, having been previously duly 25 sworn by Judge Frye, were furth.er examined and testified O.

1

_. l

81600202 4976 marysimons A

- U I further as follows:

2 CROSS-EXAMINATION (Resumed) 3 BY MR MILLER:

Q Drs. Mileti and Lindell, we are going to be 5

starting this morning with your testimony which begins at 6

the bottom of page 10, and we are going to endeavor to 7

finish with your testimony today so that Dr. Mileti can go a

home.

9 Dr. Mileti, you were not here last week, but to just to save a little time, at the bottom of page 10 in il response to Question 7 and at various other places 12 throughout the testimony there is a concept of perfect 13 performance talked about in your testimony, and for your

' O 14 benefit, Mr. Mileti, the Board has indicated that it does

15 not agree that the contentions raise the concept of perfect 1

16 performance being needed to be demonstrated by LERO. So we 17 We are not going to talk in terms of perfect performance.

8 Do you

! are going to talk in terms of adequate performance.

19 understand?

20 A (Witness Mileti) Yes, I do, quite clearly.

21 Q Would you turn to page 11 of the testimony,

22 please.

I 23 MS.* MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, this is just a little 24 procedural matter. Since Dr. Mileti wasn't here last week 25 he hasn't really formally adopted the testimony, so if we i O i

l

81600202 4977 marysimons ,

d2 I could do that.

2 JUDGE FRYE: Yes, we had best do that.

3 This is your testimony, isn't it, Dr. Mileti?

WITNESS MILETI: Yes, it is.

5 BY MR. MILLER:

6

'Q Now,-Dr. Mileti and/or Dr. Lindell, most of 7

these answers are sponsored jointly by the two of'you, I'm.

a just curious, first of all. On page 11 there is a statement at the beginning of the page, and there is a statement where

'O you say "First, it is important to draw a distinction." Do you see that about the second line down?

12 A (Witness Mileti) Yes, I do.

13 Q And it goes on for some distance. Now I'm just curious, is there is a second or third point that you were is going to make that was not made in this testimony because it 16 just says "first" and I don't see any follow-up to that 7

first?

I8 A Let me take a look at it.

' l' (Pause while the witness reviews his testimony.)

20 One could have put a second before the word "it" 21 after the word " response" about in the middle of the 22 paragraph, but it's generally all the same thing, or perhaps 23 another way to handle it is to take the word "first" out.

24 Sorry for the confusion.

25 Q Okay. Now at the end of that paragraph you have O

81600202 4978 carysimons I

a statement "Put simply, this contention" -- and you're 2

referring to contention 50 as a whole I believe - " focuses 3

on the wrong unit of analysis. Emergency response is by 4

organizations and not by individuals."

5 Do you see that, sir?

6 A Yes, I do.

7 Q Dr. Mileti, you conducted a study that resulted 8 in NUREG CR-3524; is that correct?

9 A I was a member of a team that conducted that to study, yes.

" When you conducted it as a member of a team, Q

12 your NUREG study, Dr. Mileti, did you actually observe 13 individual behavior during a test exercise or did you simply

' () id ask people whether they knew what to do and how to do it?-

15 A Other members of the team did both.

16 " v your involvement was limited to what?

Q 17 A Helping to conceptualize the study, develop 18 i measures and questions, reviewing for different bodies of 19 organizational literature and interacting with Don Sorenson 20 as he directed the field effort.

.l -

21 Did you conduct any of the interviews of i Q i

22 emergency response personnel following the test exercise?

23 A No, I wasn't there.

24 Did you conduct any interviews of such personnel Q

25 prior to the. conduct of the test exercise?

l

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81600202 4979 rarysimons

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k.J ' A No. Other members of the team collected all 2

that field data.

3 Q And you did not actually observe the test exercise, correct?

A No, I wasn't there.

6 0 Is it fair to say, Dr. Mileti, from your understanding of what others did that individual performance 8

and actions were used to measure organizational behavior and effectiveness?

'8 A The only real unit that exists are Of course.

individuals. I mean you can't really observe an 12

. organization if you take the individuals out of it. There

(^9 Id Q But you say that the contention, Contention 50,

'S focuses on the wrong unit of analysis because the contention i

16 looks at the performance of individuals and not the performance of the LERO organization; is that your

'8 testimony?

'9 A My testimony is that it's my sense that one 20 should make conclusions about the ability of an organization 21 to accomplish its tasks, functions and goals in an 1

22 emergency, and to the extent that that necessitates looking 23 at the behavior of individuals, that's necessary in the 24 context of organizational behavior.

25 0 Do you still believe, Dr. Mileti, that the

81600202 4980 marysimons I contention focuses on the wrong unit of analysis?

2 I sure thought it did when I read it.

A 3 And you still believe that?

Q d

A I think so, yes.

5 Q Dr. Lindell?

6 A (Witness Lindell) Yes, I think so.

7 Q Dr. Lindell, do you agree that the measure of 8

organizational response and behavior must necessarily be 9

conducted through looking at individual behavior and 10 actions?

II A Yes, I do. It's the organization as a whole i 12 that is the important unit of analysis, but the observable 13 behaviors are at the individual level.

O Id Q Now there is a statement, the third sentence is from the end of the paragraph, "It is quite possible not to 16 have all individuals do their work perfectly in an emergency 17 and still have the emergency response organization achieve 18 its objective of protecting the public health and safety."

19 Would you agree with me that there could be 20 circumstances where fewer than all individuals in an 21 orgar,1zation perform perfectly or less than perfectly that 22 would result in the organizational response being 23 ineffective?

24 A Yes, that's correct. It depends upon the nature 25 of the task. .

.O l

1

81600202 4981 carysimons Q What is your opinion as to the unit of analysis 2

employed by FEMA in looking at the results of the Shoreham 3

exercise?

A (Witness Mileti) Is that my question or Dr.

5 Lindell's?

6 Q A lot of my questions, and let me just clarify, 7

if I don't specifically direct a question to you, Mr.

8 Mileti, or Dr. Lindell, then either of you can feel free to answer.

30 A (Witness Mileti) In my opinion, FEMA looked at

organizations.

12 Q Dr. Lindell, would you agree with that?

'3 A (Witness Lindell) I'm not so clear. It's clear

'd that FEMA locd at individual behavior. I'm not quite so 15 certain that FEMA in all cases carried the analysis through 16 to judging the overall performance of the organization.

Q Would you agree with me that based upon its la review of the results of the Shoreham exercise that FEMA

" concluded that LERO was not able to achieve its objective of 20 adequately protecting the public's health and safety?

21 A I would say that given their definition of a 22 deficiency that they would have been by implication 23 certainly, they'would have been forced to come to some 24 conclusion about the organizational effectiveness.

25 Dr. Lindell, the conclusion FEMA came to was Q

!- 81600202 4982 l marysimons I that LERO had been unable to demonstrate the ability to 2

adequately protect the public's health and safety, correct?

3 A Yes, I think that is what I said.

4 5

6 7 C i

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O

4

-81600303 4983 ,

joewalsh I

Q Now, I am down into Answer 8 on Page 11 of the 2

i. testimony. I'm looking at that paragraph as a whole, 3

gentlemen.

It's not your testimony, is it, that errors by 5

individuals in an organization can never reflect a training 6

problem? That's not your testimony, is it?

7 (The witnesses are looking at a document.)

e A (Witness Mileti) While we are waiting for Dr.

Lindell, I can formulate an opinion on that. One needs to

'O l

look at the behavior of individuals to make the judgment

about che behavior of an organization. And, there are 12 circumstances in which a collection of observations that led

' - '3 to a conclusion that the organization could not achieve its i d 'd goal would have to lead to that conclusion.

15 l Q Dr. Mileti, my only question though is, would 16 you agree with me that errors in performance by individual II members of an organization can be the result of an

'8 inadequate training program?

l A (Witness Lindell) I can -- it's easier for me 20 You removed the double negative, to agree with that one.

i 21 and it was easier to follow it through.

l 22 Q So, you agree with my last statement, Dr.

23

Lindell?

24 A Yes. i 25

.(Witness Mileti) And, I was going to say, of lo t

I i

81600303 4984 1

course.

2 And, for both Dr. Lindell and Dr. Mileti, your 0

3 testimony and the opinions you offer is based solely on the d

FEMA report for Shoreham with respect to your understanding 5

of LERO's performance on the day of the exercise?

6 Is that a fair statement?

7 I focused a lot of my effort on the FEMA report, A

8 but it was quite impossible to divorce what I consider to be 9

generic knowledge from doing that. But, in general, yes.

10 (Witness Lindell) I have the same answer. In

general, it's a little bit difficult to separate out exactly 12 the -- separate out the events from the significance of 13 those events as I interpret them from my knowledge of

'd organizational response to emergencies.

15 0 The last statement or sentence on Page 11 of the 16 testimony, gentlemen, you state that you believe that LERO 17 could have protected the public health and safety by is promptly notifying the public within the 10-mile EPZ by 19 making timely and appropriate decisions regarding protective 20 actions and by facilitating the implementation of evacuation

21 through effective transportation support and traffic 22 management.

j 23 Is it fair to say that your opinion in this 24 regard, which I assume is based upon the FEMA report, goes

25 further than FEMA was willing to go in its report?

O

81600303 4985 ljoewalsh

('v'

)d I A (Witness Mileti) I would have to say that in 2

judging that it would also be based on my knowledge of how 3

things worked with the warning system that day as it was simulated. And, I'm sure FEMA makes reference to it in its 5

report, but I had reviewed that in detail for another j 6 contention and I didn't exclude that knowledge.

7 Q So, Dr. Mileti, you are referring to the portion 8

of that sentence which talks about the prompt notification of the public?

IO A And as that relates to evacuation, of course. >

And, you are saying that -- do you agree with Q

12 me, first of all, that your opinion in this regard goes

'3 further than FEMA was willing, or went, in its report?

Id A That's definitely my opinion. I don't recollect

'S the precision that what exactly FEMA had to say. It 16 probably does.

'I (Witness Lindell) If the question is addressed 18 to, do I think that LERO activated the sirens and actually transmitted EBS messages and verified that people did 20 receive EBS messages and so on and so forth, the answer is 21 no. I realize that that did not happen.

22 0 Well, Dr. Lindell, let me ask you about the last 23 part of this statement. The opinion that you offer that 24 LERO could facilitate the implementation of evacuation 25 through effective transportatio.n support and traffic b

o

81600303 4986 joewalsh .

A b I management, do you believe, Dr. Lindell, from your review of 2

the FEMA report that LERO demonstrated such a capability 3

during the exercise?

d A I think -- again, it sounds like you are 5

referring to the traffic impediment, and I think that 6 because of the nature of the way that FEMA tried to simulate 7

the traffic impediment that those -- that the results that ,

a the organization behavior that was observed was quite inconclusive. The impediments were not physically present; I

there was not what I would regard as a high fidelity aimulation of the impediment.

12 And, I think that created a lot of the problems

- 13 that were observed on the day of the exercise. And, so I

'd would say that given that that's inconclusive, the thrust of 15 this is directed toward the other major aspects of 16 transportation support and traffic management, primarily the 17 ability to mobilize the field teams, send out bus drivers, 18 ambulette drivers and no forth.

39 0 Well, Dr. Lindell, I'm not sure I really have an<

20 answer to my question, but let's focus on the bus drivers, 21 then.

22 If you think the traffic impediments and the 23 demonstration r6ade by LERO was inconclusive on the day of 24 the exercise, is it your opinion that LERO demonstrated the 25 ability to facilitate the evacuation through effective O

81600303 4987 joewalsh I

' transportation support and traffic management by the 2

performance of LERO bus drivers:on the day of the exercise?

3 A Yes. I think they managed to dispatch into the

'd field-far more buses than would actually be used by the_EPZ 5

population in an emergency.

6 Q Now, Dr. Lindell, last week you -- you were here

] ,

last week, and I had a brief discussion with Mr. Daverio l

8 about the LERO bus drivers, and I believe that we p

established that of the eight general population bus drivers

'O that actually drove buses and were observed by FEMA three

demonstrated problems. And, those problems resulted in a 1 .

,( >

] [.

1 12 deficiency noted by FEMA.

i '3 Do you recall that discussion?

.O ,,

A Yes, I do.

15 Q But, notwithstanding any of that and 16 notwithstanding FEMA's finding of a deficiency with respect

'I to these bus drivers, your opinion is that LERO demonstrated 18 the capability to carry out effective transportation

'~ '9 management through the performance of bus drivers on the day 20 of the exercise?

J 7I A Yes, I do. I disagree. I think I said last 22 week that I disagree that there were any deficiencies 1 , , ..

! / TJ demonstrated in this exercise, that the bus drivers -- in 24 i the case of the one bus driver who went to the wrong bus I

, c, 25 yard, he was prepared to take out his.own credit card to ,

f 4

.c( ,,

81600303 4988 joewalsh i

rent the bus and the bus driver that went to the wrong 2

staging area, there is no indication that that would have 3

had an adverse effect.

If you have, as a matter of fact, two different 5

bus drivers both going to exactly the wrong transfer points, 6

it could be that the net effect, one would go to one 7

inappropriately and the other one would go to the other 8

inappropriately. But, if the right numbers of bus drivers 9

are there and they are capable of driving bus routes, then 10 there is no adverse effect on the performance of the j l'

organization.

12 O Now, Dr. Lindell, we don't have a situation 13 noted by FEMA in its report about two bus drivers going to O 'd wrong transfer points, but each going to the wrong bus is transfer point so that there is a balancing out. We have a 16 statement by FEMA that a bus driver went to the wrong 17 transfer point.

18 And, is it your testimony that that would have l'

no impact in the performance of the LERO organization? l 20 A I'm saying that the significance of that is not 21 something that would lead me to doubt that the public health 22 and safety would be adversely effected in an emergency, 23 because I don't think that there are going to be that many 24 l people that are going to be taking buses in an evacuation.

t 25 Q .Now, Dr. Lindell, is your opinion the same if O

I 81600303 4989

\joewalsh

\ '

t (V' three-eighths of all LERO bus drivers go to the wrong 2

transfer points?

3 A If that were based on a larger sample size, then it's conceivable that that might have an effect; that is, if 5

there were hundreds or if there were 50 bus drivers that did 6

that, then there might be a problem.

7 Q And, Dr. Mileti, wouk you agree that if three-a eights of all LERO bus drivers go to the wrong transfer points that that could have an impact on the ability of the to LERO organization to protect the public's health and safety?

A (Witness Mileti) No, Mr. Miller. In my 12 opinion, you could take all of the buses out of the LERO 33 plan and I don't think that would have an impact on public Cu;

health and safety. I don't think they are needed.

is I think it's nice that they are there, but they 16 are not going to be used.

'I Q People just aren't going to use the buses?

18 A If there is someone who needs a ride, a ride

" could be arranged on the spot with a taxi cab. It's a minor 20 phenomenon, in my opinion.

21 Q Would you look at Page 12 of the testimony, 22 gentlemen?

23 (The witnesses are complying.)

24 Dr. Mileti, have you ever offered this opinion 25 about the buses not being needed by LERO to the LERO or h

NJ' LILCO organization?

i

81600404 4990 cuewalsh O

'd 1 A I've said to many people on many occasions that 2

people, when they evacuate, tend to find their own way out.

3 Q I understand. But, have you ever told LILCO:

4 You don't need these buses, don't include them in your plan?

5 A I've told LILCO people aren't going to be using 6

the buses. I've also prepared a tape to train bus drivers 7

telling them that people weren't going to panic on the buses 8

if they were on the buses. There might be some people who might need a ride. Most people who need rides find rides 10 with friends. Most people have friends or relatives, and 11 it's their preference in an evacuation.

12 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, is it fair to say that under 13 NRC regulations and guidelines LERO is required to provide 14 transportation for those who need it?

15 A I think that's what the law requires. But, not 16 being a lawyer it's hard for me to interpret it. But, I 17 sure have that sense, yes.

18 Q Well, are you unfamiliar with NUREG 0654, Dr.

19 Mileti?

20 A No. I've seen it.

21 And, you are unable to tell me whether there is Q

22 such a statement within NUREG 0654 requiring the provision 23 of transportation assistance for evacuees?

24 I think there is, yes.

A 25 Dr. Lindell, would,you agree that there is such Q

81600404 4991 cuewalsh

.i

\ a requirement?

2 A (Witness Lindell) I don't have a copy of NUREG 3

0654 with me , but -- and, again because it's an off -site issue and when I used NUREG 0654 it was mainly in 5

conjunction with on-site evaluations, but as I recall there 6

is something to that effect.

7 (Witness Behr) I believe that the NUREG does 8

require that LERO provide assistance for transit dependent people in the EPZ.

'U Q Thank you, Mr. Behr. Now., on Page 12 of your testimony, gentlemen, it seems to me from having read Page 12 12 of your testimony that here your unit of focus is on 33 individual performance.

Id Is that a-fair statement?

15 A (Witness Lindell) No. I don't think that's 16 entirely correct, although it would help if you would point

'7 to a particular area that you are talking about.

'8 Let's just look at the Q Well, there are many.

" second sentence. " Individual performance is affected by a 20 number of factors. And, you then list factors.

21 So, it seems to me you are focusing on 22 individual perforrance.

23 Yos', that's correct.

A 24 0 Is it fair to say, Dr. Lindell, that these 25 factors that you list at the top of Page 12 of the

81600404 4992

_ cuewalsh q

b I

' testimony, in your opinion, would also have to be looked at 2

in evaluating organizational performance?

3 A I think that speaks directly to the issue here d

in this contention, that the organization provides training, 5

that to the degree that it's not -- that the organization 6

doesn't select for people who already have the knowledges, 7

skills and abilities that are required on the job, the a

organization has to train people in the procedures -- the 9

plan and the procedures, train them in how to use equipment 10 if they don't already know how to use it, and that that --

I' what is provided by the organization facilitates performance 12 by the individuals, and that in turn the individuals, as 13 they perform, their performance is integrated back into the O id overall performance of the organization.

15 So, I think it's difficult to really separate 16 these things out as saying specifically that this focuses at

'7 the individual level as if we were ignoring the 18 organizational level.

39 Q Dr. Lindell, just to make sure that I have an 20 answer to my question, is it fair to say that the same 21 factors you list on Page 12 with respect to individual 22 performance,.in your opinion, have to be looked at in 23 evaluating organizational performance?

24 A No. That's not quite it, but it's pretty 25 close. What I'm trying to say is that these -- and what I O

81600404 4993 I

tried to say in the testimony was that these factors need to 2

be taken into consideration to determine whether there is a 3

training problem.

If there is a performance problem and you are 5

trying to diagnose the nature of the training problem -- and 6

that's what this contention is about, is training -- then 7

one needs to determine whether, in fact, any performance 8

problems that have been identified are training problems 9

rather than equipment problems or procedure problems.

'O Q Would you agree with me, Dr. Lindell, that in looking at, or in evaluating organizational performance, you 12 would want or need to look at all of the factors set forth 13 on Page 12 of your testimony?

A Could you repeat that again?

15 A Would you need to look at all of these factors 16 set forth on Page 12 in evaluating organizational

'I performance?

18 A No. I would need those factors that -- perhaps it's a little bit confusing. There are two different roles 20 in which, in essence, I'm responding here. One is in my 21 role as a disaster researcher; the other one is a role as an 22 organizational -- industrial organizational psychologist.

23 What I'm saying is that in interpreting the 2' performance of the individual and how that effects the 25 performance.of the organization, I am responding as a O

~- .

.81600404 4994 cuewalsh I disaster researcher; that is, somebody that looks at how 2

individual performance is aggregated into the performance of 3

the organization. That's one issue.

  • Another issue is, to take a step back, given 5

that there are any problems of individual performance what 6 caused it, what is it attributable to? Specifically, is it 7

attributable to training rather than to selection, 8

placement, classification, equipment, materials or 9

facilities? So, it's a separate issue.

10 Let me try this a little differently, Dr.

Q

'I Lindell. The factors that you set forth here on Page 12, 12 you talk about the knowledge, skills and abilities that p 13 individuals bring to the job and classification policies of U 14 the organization.

15 Training would be a second factor. Equipment is 16 a third factor. Materials, especially job performance aids, 17 And, the facilities in which the would be a fourth factor.

18 jobs are performed would be a fifth factor.

19 Is that a fair assessment of your testimony?

20 A Yes. Those are the major components that I look 21 at in trying to diagnose if there is a performance error on 22 the part of an individual and trying to determine what's the 23 cause of that error.

24 0 Now, if you wanted to make a judgment about the 25 adequacy of training of personnel within an organization, is l

81600404 4995 cuewalsh

/ si OJ I it fair to say that you would want to look at all these 2

factors in making that judgment?

3 A I would need to make some estimation of the relative importance of those factors.

5 Q Dr. Mileti, do you agree with our discussion on 6

this?

7 A (Witness Mileti) Well, part of it.

8 Q The last part about needing to look at all of the factors to make a judgment about the adequacy of

'O training?

' If I were making a judgment about the adequacy A

12 of training, I would take an organizational or sociological

- I3 point of view.

1#

Q Okay. Well, let's hold that, then. Let me is finish with Dr. Lindell.

16 Your point of view would be somewhat different;

'7 is that what you are telling me?

'8 If I were looking at the performance of an A

I9 individual, I would want to look at different things than if 20 I were looking at the performance of an organization.

21 Q Ohay. We will come back to that, Dr. Mileti.

22 Now, Dr. Lindell, I believe we discussed some of this at 23 your deposition, Dr. Lindel'., and I think in terms of 24 ranking these factors that are on Page 12 that it was your 25 opinion that you really could not rank these factors in l

l

81600404 4996 ,

,suewalsh I terms of their importance.

2 Is that a fair statement?

' 3 A (Witness Lindell) Yes, that's correct.

d And, I believe you also told me that these five Q

5 factors are all highly interrelated. Is that a fair 6

statement?

7 A No. They are not necessarily interrelated.

8 Q They are not necessarily interrelated? You 9

don't recall telling me at your deposition that these 10 factors were highly interrelated?

" A No, I don't recall having said that.

12 But, whatever, at this point you would agree Q

13 that they are not necessarily interrelated?

' Id A No. I don't necessarily believe that -- I don't 4

1 15 believe that the selection, placement and classification 16 policies of the organization necessarily influence its 17 training, that tra'ining necessarily affects materials or 18 that materials necessarily affect facilities.

19 There are -- there may be some contingencies, 20 but to say that they are highly -- there may be some 21 occasions on which you would take one action rather than 22 You might, if there is a performance error, use another.

23 one of these an'd that if you change a policy, say a >

24 selection policy, you might create a need to change the 25 training program; that if you change the procedures or the O

I

81600404 4997 cuewalsh b^ I plan or the equipment, you would probably need to train 2

people in those new procedures or in that new equipment.

3 But, you might be able to select for people who already know how to use that equipment or procedures. So, 5

there is some degree of relationship there.

6 As far as highly interrelated, I don't remember 7

if I said that. But, there is not an inevitable link given a

that you affect one that you necessarily change another one.

Q Dr. Lindell, from your knowledge of the LERO 10 organization -- let's focus specifically with LERO and Shoreham -- do you believe that there is some 12 interrelationsnip among these five factors with respect to 13 the LERO organization?

-Q ,#

A I think I just gave the examples there, that if 15 you changed procedures that you will need to train people on 16 those new procedures. If you change the equipment, you may

'7 need to train people in how to use that new equipment unless is you've already selected for people who know how to use that equipment.

20 0 So, is it fair to say, Dr. Lindell, that in 21 order to offer or make a judgment about the adequacy of the 22 training of LERO personnel you would need to look at the 23 interrelationship of these factors in the LERO 24 organizational structure?

25 A Well, I think you used the word s

81600404 4998 cuewalsh 1

" interrelationship" again. And, I would need to have 2 information about those factors either directly from LERO or 3

from my knowledge of the kinds of -- just in general, the d

kinds of things that people are being required to do.

5 I think you are asking me to say that I'm doing 6

something that's different from what I did.

7 Q Well, what I'm asking you is this, Dr. Lindell.

8 If you know nothing about any of these factors listed at 9

Page 12 except for training -- I'm talking about LERO -- do 10 you believe you can offer a judgment about the adequacy of

" training?

12 I don't think that that's necessarily the case.

A 13 Would you explain your answer in terms of what Q

Id I don't -- are you saying that you could your answer is?

15 offer a judgment about LERO's training and yet know nothing 16 about the other four factors listed on Page 12?

17 A I think it may be possible in some cases to 18 offer a judgment about training in cases where people do not 19 use any unusual kind of equipment. That is, if I were going 20 to assess some aspect of the adequacy of the training of bus 21 drivers, I would not necessarily need to know specifically 22 what kind of bus they used, because buses are very much 23 I don't think that there is a whole lot of alike.

24 difference there.

25 .I would not need to know specifically what kind O

, -- -, ,-- - . , - ,n. , , , - - c,, - - -, , . - - - - - , ,

81600404 4999 cuewalsh I

of self-reading dosimeter they used, because again the 2

equipment is fairly well standardized, and I think I can 3

make some reasonable inferences due to the nature of the equipment.

5 I don't need to have information about whatever 6

kinds of screening tests they took or the exact procedure by 7

which they were selected for their jobs.

8 So, you are asking a question that is stated as kind of a universal statement, and I can't -- I can't really

'O make a response to that, because I think that there may be some instances in which I would need very little information 12 about a specific LERO job, especially the equipment and the

'3 procedures, the facilities, the materials in order to have O 'd some reasonable opinion about the adequacy of the training.

'S Dr. Lindell, would you at least agree with me Q

16 that one should have a higher confidence level in an opinion regarding the adequacy of_ training if one knew something

'8 about all of these factors rather than nothing about any of these factors?

20 A I would say that that's a non-controversial 21 statement. I would agree with it.

22 And, can you tell me, Dr. Lindell, the extent of Q

23 your knowledge regarding each of these four factors for the 24 LERO organization, the four factors other than training?

25 Mr. Miller, LERO is a very large organization.

A b5l

-. --. ~. . ._ .-_ - .. .. . ..

i 81600404. 5000 suewalsh' I

4 There are over 1,000 people that were mobilized in many 2

different jobs.

3 In general, I would hesitate to offer blanket d

statements about those. I would say that I felt confident 5

that I had enough information to make the statements that --

6 to endorse the statements that were made in the testimony.

' 7 Q Yes, but, Dr. Lindell, I'm curious about the 8 The first factor, the knowledge, extent of your knowledge.

skills and abilities that individuals bring to their job in IO

LERO, what would you say would be your level of knowledge

'l i regarding that particular factor?

12 A I would say that the way that the selection, i

13 pla' cement and classification policies for LERO have been t

O id described to me that I know enough about how people are is assigned to jobs; that is, people are assigned to jobs in 16 accordance with the gr'eral duties that they perform which 4

17 is similar to what Dr. tileti has talked about of 18 enormativeness.

19 That is, people are assigned to the position of j

20 Radiation Protection Coordinator on the basis of some 21 training in radiation protection. Somebody is assigned as a 22 Nuclear Engineer because they have qualifications in that 23 area. People are assigned as bus drivers because they have 24 expericnce driving heavy equipment.

25 Q And, Dr. Lindell, i,f indeed it turns out that O

. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . ~ , _ . , - . _ _ _ . , _ _ , _ . . . _ , _ _ _ . . . . _ , , . _ _ . . . . _ _ . , , , . . _ _ _ . . _ . . . . _ _ _ . _ . _ , _ . _ . _ . . ~ . _ , _ _ . . . . . _ . . .

81600404 5001 cuewalsh fs I

(_) ' your understanding of selection, placement and 2

classification policies of LERO is incorrect and that 3

personnel are not necessarily assigned to LERO jobs that relate to their normal jobs, I take it that that would 5

impact the confidence level you have in your ability to draw 6

conclusions about the adequacy of LERO's training program?

7 A I'm willing to entertain that possibility, yes.

8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 I

18 19

! 20 21 1

22 23 24 25

, , - , , - - . - - - , - . , , - . , , - .. ----n,.-

e - , ,, , - . _ , _ , - ,- , , ,-- , , , - . , _ -- , , , - - --a.

81600505 5002 marysimons I

C/ 3 Q Now what is the extent of your knowledge 2

regarding the materials, including job performance aids that 3

are provided to LERO personnel?

d A To a large degree it's based on the descriptions 5

in the FEMA post-exercise assessment and my knowledge of the 6

kinds of materials that emergency workers carry with them.

7 Q And the facilities that LERO personnel personnel e

performed their jobs, Dr. Lindell, you told me last week that you have not actually seen the facilities. Have you 30 seen blueprints of the facilities?

'I A No. It turns out that I didn't really need to 12 look at blueprints of the facilities because it didn't 13 appear that facilities were implicated and there wasn't a 0"1 'd reasonable supposition based on the description in the FEMA 15 post-exercise assessment that the facilities themselves, 16 except in one specific instance there was some question I7 about noise and congestion.

18 That's the only instance I can think of in which

" a facility was implicated.

20 0 When you told at your deposition, Dr. Lindell, 21 j that you would be looking at each of these five factors in 4 22 order to render your opinions regarding the adequacy of 23 LERO's training, can you tell me now why you did not in fact 24 look at each of these five factors to render your opinion?

25 I went over the FEMA post-exercise A Yes.

C.

81600505 5003 marysimons 1

assessment and in my opinion in going through the blueprints 2

and in going through more detailed analyses of each of those 3

factors with respect to each one of the job descriptions was d

really unnecessary, that the information contained in the 5

FEMA post-exercise assessment and the additional information 6

that was provided to me in my review of the films and the 7

documentation at the training center was sufficient to 8

justify the conclusions that we are presenting in this 9

testimony.

10 Dr. Lindell, would you agree with me that Q

' another factor that should perhaps be added to your list 12 would be the motivational factor of LERO personnel?

13 MS. MONAGHAN: Objection. That's irrelevant to O id what's in this contention. There is no discussion in the 15 contention or in any of the testimony about motivation as an 16 issue here.

17 JUDGE FRYE: Where are you going with that?

18 MR. MILLER: I'm just simply trying to -- these 19 witnesses have given me a list of factors that they think 20 need to be looked at to draw conclusions about the adequacy 21 of training of LERO personnel. I simply want to know of 22 another factor you need to look at as the motivation of such 23 personnel. It's a limited inquiry, but it's just another 24 factor that I want to know if it should be added to this 25 list.

O

816 :05 5004 mai .ons I

JUDGE FRYE: All right. Should it be added?

WITNESS LINDELL: These are all factors that 3

address the ability of an individual to perform his or her required task during an emergency. Certainly in textbooks 5

on industrial organizational psychology one of the other 6

factors that is addressed is motivation.

7 Now what happens is that in most situations, 8

most organizational situations performance is motivation i limited rather than ability limited, that is to say, that in

'O a routine kind of job people usually perform at much lower levels than their maximum capability.

12 In an emergency people tend to be more ability

'3 limited than motivation limited, that is that they are very Oxu ,d highly aroused and they don't have difficulty maintaining is attention. The problem is how well can they perform is 16 limited by their ability, and that's the reason why we

'7 i addressed ability factors rather than motivational factors.

'8 JUDGE FRYE: So motivation shouldn't be in

'9 there?

20 WITNESS LINDELL: My opinion is that motivation 21 is not a relevant consideration in this case.

22 JUDGE SHON: Is a situation where you are just 23 in an exercise but you reclize there is no actual emergency 24 sufficient to make the change from motivational limited to 25

, ability limited?

j 9

. , - - , -. - , , - - - . - r-v-. .. .- .- ,, -.-------.,---.,..~,--,,r,-.------.-.r-. - -m, ,-- , , - - - - , --..-

81600505 5005 1

WITNESS LINDELL: It's clearly in my experience, t

2 it's clearly the case that people are less highly motivated 3

in emergency exercises than they are in emergencies.

d Similarly, they tend to be less highly motivated in drills 5

than they are in emergency exercises.

6 I think though that in emergency exercises 7

people have a high enough degree of motivation because there 8

are important job consequences for most of the actors. They 9

are being evaluated and their organization as a whole is 10 being assessed by FEMA or the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission. If they do not perform adequately, I think most 12 people presume there are going to be personal consequences 13 for them. So they do have a fair degree of motivation in an la emergency exercise.

15 JUDGE SHON: Thank you.'

16 BY MR. MILLER:

37 Q Now in about the middle of the page, gentlemen, 18 there is a statement about the numbers of ARCAs and 19 deficiencies that were identified by FEMA during the 20 Shoreham exercise, and you stated about half of them had 21 little or nothing to do with training, but rather concerning 22 equipment or procedures. Do you see that statement?

23 A (Witness Lindell) Yes.

24 A (Witness Mileti) I do, too.

25 Are you telling us,that about half of the ARCAs Q

O

81600505 5006 marysimons

~

' and deficiencies identified did relate to training?

i l

2 A (Witness Lindell) Yes, that's correct.

3 A (Witness Mileti) I agree.

Q Now, if FEMA identified a problem as one which, I

in your opinion, resulted from or related to equipment, is 1

6 it your opinion that that problem would not then be a f

' 7 training problem?

8 A If FEMA diagnosed it as an equipment problem and in examining not only their statement of what was wrong but

'O going back through the post-exercise assessment and looking

at the circumstances, that is looking at the context in 12 which the performance error occurred, it was clear that in 13 fact it was an equipment problem, then the conclusion, and QJ ,d consistent with what was said here, the conclusion was that is the proximal cause of the error was equipment.

16 That does not mean that if you change the

'7 equipment you wouldn't have to train people to use the new

'8 equipment, but it does mean that the proximal cause was 19 equipment.

20 Q Now, Dr. Lindell, if FEMA, for example, would 21 have said the ENC copier broke down and would have 22 identified that as a problem, that in your opinion, I 23 assume, would be a pure equipment problem?

24 A Yes, it was.

25 Q If FEMA would have said that the personnel Q

81600505 5007 marysimons (V3 I dosimeters were not read correctly by LERO personnel, I 2 assume that that would have indicated a training problem to 3

you; is that correct?

d A Yes, although it's conceivable that one could --

5 for example, one of the problem that was identified was that 6

people, that some of the LERO workers were not reading their 7

dosimeters every 15 minutes. One could, in my opinion, a unreasonably, but one could take the position that that was 9

an equipment problem as well, that is, that if LERO provided 10 its personnel with self-reading dosimeters that had a 15-i minute alarm built into it so that it would beep every 15 12 minutes, and that therefore if you provided that kind of 13 equipment that you would not have a performance problem, you 14 could say that that's an equipment problem.

15 Such equipment is not, to my knowledge, 16 aVailable on the market. So my conclusion was yes, that's a 37 training problem and it's not an equipment problem.

18 Q Did you identify any problems from your review 19 of the FEMA report that in your opinion resulted from 20 personnel not following their training in the proper use or 21 maintenance of equipment?

22 A That they did not maintain equipment correctly?

23 Q Did you identify any problems where it noted by j

24 FEMA that LERO personnel did not follow their training with 25 respect to the proper use or the proper maintenance of such O

r - -- -. - - . . _ _ . _ _ . . , _ _ _ ._ __ _ _

i-

.p -

!. ~81600505' 5008 marysimons I

equipment?

2 -

3 7 don't recall such a description.

3 Q How would you have rated that kind of problem, d

as an equipment problem or a training problem?

5 A I would have had to have seen the way that they 6

described it, they way they described their conclusion, and 7

that is in what they called a deficiency or an ARCA, and I 8

would have had to have seen what happened on the day of the exercise, the circumstances that generated the problem and

'O l~ then had to come to a specific decision on the basis of the j information available to me from the post-exercise 12

assessment and~from my knowledge of the kinds of equipment.

'3

[g as to what reasonably is the proximal or more important

'd explanation for the performance error.

is Dr. Lindell, did you look at areas recommended Q .

) 16 for improvement in deciding whether most of those comments I

'I by FEMA related to training problems?

'8 No, I didn't. As the testimony says, we A

'9 referred specifically to deficiency and ARCAs. We did not 20 look at areas recommended for improvement.

21

! Q Is there a reason why you excluded from your 22 review areas recommended for improvement?

23 A It was not specifica1]y excluded. I addressed 24 deficiencies and ARCAs because clearly those are in FEMA's 25 As an inspector for opinion issues of some significance.

t O

t

.~,-.___._s.sw.. . _ -...-,.,,. e. .-,,m w. .n, , , _ , , , , , , , , , _w#,,-mm .w~.-. ,e . . _ _ , __,.- . , ._,.--, .,r_m _ . . _ , , . . . - . , . _ _ _ . , .

81600505 5009 marysimons U 1 the NRC we have often provided suggestions to people as to 2 how they might improve their operations even though we don't 3 If we think think that there is really a serious problem.

d that there is a better way of doing things, we offer 5

suggestions, and that was my interpretation of that latter 6

category.

7 Q Now, Dr. Lindell, did you review any other post-8 exercise assessment reports to determine whether or not the 9

numbers of training related problems at Shoreham seemed to 10 be more or less than have been identified by FEMA in other il exercises?

12 A No, I didn't. I didn't make any comparative 13 assessment with other FEMA post-exercise assessments.

Id Q Did you make such an assessment, Dr. Mileti?

15 A (Witness Mileti) In reference to this part of 16 this testimony?

17 I'm talking Q In reference to this testimony.

is about a comparison of the numbers of ARCAs and deficiencies 19 that related to training to other FEMA post-exercise 20 assessment reports to draw any conclusions about the numbers 21 of training related problem at Shoreham as compared to other 22 exercises.

23 A No, I did not. Thank you for that clear 24 question.

25 From your review of the Shoreham report, Q

O

81600505 5010

- marysimons gentlemen, do you recall any problems identified by FEMA 2

that related to facilities in which individuals performed 3

4 their tasks?

A -(Witness Lindell) Any comments by. FEMA ---

5 Q Related to any problems identified by FEMA.

6 l A I think I mentioned one, that there was a 7

question about one of the staging areas having too.much 8

noise.

Q Do you recall any that went to the selection 10 placement for classification policies of the LERO organization?

12 A Only regarding the numbers of staff, and not ,

r 13 regarding their qualifications.

'd Q Now while we are on that point, Dr. Lindell, 15 could you just brief tell me what is the classification 16

, policy of LERO, or what are the classification policies?

II A My understanding of the classification policy of 18 LERO is that people should be assigned to jobs that as

" nearly as possible fit their normal job duties, that is to 20 provide them with the qualifications to perform the tasks 21 that they are called upon to exercise during an emergency or 22 during an exercise or a drill.

l 23 l Q How do you distinguish that kind of 24 classification policy from placement of personnel?

25 A Classification and. placement usually refer to --

l 0

i

_ _ , . _ - _ _ _ . - - _ . _ . , _ _ ~ . . . . _ . , _ - . _ . . _ . _ _ . _ . _ . . . _ , _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . - - . - . , _ _ _ . . - . _ - - - . . . _ . _ _

81600505 5011 marysimons

(~).

\/ 3 it's a distinction that, unfortunately, I just made 2

habitually, but it's a distinction that's made in the 3

textbooks and it isn't terribly material in this case. The d

distinction is whether you place people on a level within a 5

job or you differentia 11y place them into different jobs.

6 So classification would be the appropriate term here. It 7

wasn't a trick question.

8 Q You have a statement toward the bottom of page 9

12 that in your judgment most of FEMA's recommendations for 10 refresher training would be more appropriately corrected by Il means of job performance aids such as fact sheets and check 12 lists.

13 Earlier in the testimony, I think on page 9, 14 there was a statement that "One of the purposes of FEMA's 15 post-exercise assessment report, in your opinion, is to 16 apply FEMA's expertise to better LERO's response 17 capability." Do you recall that?

18 A Yes.

19 Judge Frye, Dr. Lindell does not MS. MONAGHAN:

20 sponsor the particular answer which Mr. Miller is referring 21 to on page 9.

l 22 MR. MILLER: You're absolutely right. Do you 23 still agree with the statement that FEMA -- one of the 24 purposes of the post-exercise assessment is to apply FEMA's 25 expertise to better LERO's response capability?

O 1

l

i i

81600505 5012 marysimons (s)' i WITNESS LINDELL: Even though I didn't sponsor 2

it, I can certainly agree with that.

3 BY MR. MILLER:

Q Dr. Mileti, do you agree with that statement?

A (Witness Mileti) It sure makes sense to me, 6

y,g, 7

Q It's fair to say, I assume, gentlemen, in 8

looking at page 12 of your testimony that at least in this instance, however, you disagree with one of the FEMA

'U recommendations, that is, for additional training?

A I think we think we have a better idea.

12 O It sounds pretty catchy, Dr. Mileti.

-- 13 A (Witness Lindell) Maybe we could go into

'd advertising.

15 Q Is it your conclusion, gentlemen, that no 16 additional training is needed for LERO personnel?

A (Witness Lindell) No.

'8 A (Witness Mileti) Absolutely not. I think training should go on and not stop.

20 Additional training.

Q 21 You mean new training?

A 21 I mean additional training as recommended by Q

23 FEMA in its Shoreham report.

24 A (Witness Lindell) I distinguish among three 25 different kinds of training here. One is in terms of i

81600505 5013 marysimons

/'X V I refresher training, that is for people who were trained to 2

do something, but apparently could not remember it over a 3

long period of time. So they need to have refresher d

training, that is to make that information more available to 5

them in memory on a chronic basis.

6

, Another area of training or another way of 7

looking at what FEMA talked about in training is the scope 8

of training, and that is enlarging the amount of material 9

that is covered in training. So for a particular job 10 description that people should get training in materials or II

.i in areas that they did not previously receive training in.

12 Then, finally, there are recommendations about 13 the availability of training, and that is that people who O id did not get training, and emergency worker training I think 15 was one example, should get it. There were some I believe 16 field job Classifications in which training was not 17 available to certain people and FEMA distinguished those 18 instances from the other instances.

19 Dr. Lindell, from your review of the Shoreham Q

1 20 report is it your opinion that FEMA utilized these same 21 concepts of refresher training, scope of training and 22 availability of training?

23 A No, they didn't use those labels. But there is 24 a difference between recognizing a distinction and being

i. 25 able to verbalize the distinction. They didn't attach those
O i

'81600505 5014 marysimons

' ' verbal labels, but they clearly differentiated those 2

different kinds of training in terms of the kinds of 3

recommendations that they made.

4 5

4- 6 7

8 I 9

i. 10 il 12 j

13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21 22 23 l 24 25
O

. . . . . _ _ _ _ . . - . .-- , _ , . . _ _ _ _ _ _ . . - - . . , _ , . ._-._._,_,m . ... - .__, _ _ . , _ - _ - _ ... _ _ . . , ,., , , _ _ _ - - - -m,-. . - , . . - , . _,

81600606 5015 joewalsh

( 1 Q Is it fair to say, Dr. Lindell, that what you.

2 did in your review of the FEMA Report for Shoreham is that 3 in every instance where FEMA stated additicnal training was

  1. needed, you attempted to determine in which of these three e

5 categories FEMA really meant to make its recommendation?

6 A Absolutely, because the idea of refresher 7 training, the distinction between refresher training and the 8 scope of training, or the availability of training, is keyed 9

tol determining whether the problem would be better solved by 10 providing job performance sids.

11 For example, one specific difference of opinion 12 we had with FEMA was over the provision of the LERO 13 identification badges in providing numbers, that is, the O' 1r dose limits and specific. steps exceeding dose e

15 authorizations, providing those on the back of a badge.

. 16 , Because my feeling is that the frequency of 17 retraining would have to be so great, that is, to remember 18 very specific numbers like that, I have had experience f

19 before myself in trying to remember administrative dose 20 >11mits, because I have.gone,frcm one plant to another, and I 21 have a hard time remembering them, even a couple of weeks 22 later.

h. i 23 So, I think that the solution, the appropriate l

24 solution in that case is not retraining, because it is just

. 25 not sensible to have people retrained every two weeks in O)

\_

81600606 5016

> 1 those numbers. {

l 2

It is better te provide on a piece of paper, or l l

3 on the back of the ID badge, in some readily accessible l 1

d location the information that they need.  !

5 Q Now, Dr. Lindell, when a bus driver or bus 6 l drivers get lost in their route, or can't find their way, do 7

you believe that there you need additional training from the 8

standpoint of expanding the scope of the training that had 9

been offered previously?

10 A 1 can't recall an incident of a bus driver 11 getting lost on his route. I can recall an instance of a 12 bus driver cutting short his route, but I don't recall i3 anybody getting lost.

Id Q Mr. Daverio, do you recall a bus driver getting is lost during the exercise?

16 A (Witness Daverio) The only thing I was trying 17 to remember -- I think it said he did not run his complete 18 route, and I don't know if they used the word, ' lost.'

19 You might interpret it that way, but I don't 20 think they used that word.

21 Well, do you distinguish, Dr. Lindell, from the Q

22 standpoint of the training that would be needed between a 23 bus driver who would not have run his complete route, and a 24 bus driver who would have gotten lost in his route?

25 A (Witness Lindell) I would say in both cases my O.

81600606 5017 joewalsh

() I assessment would be that what the bus drivers need is maps 2 that are better keyed to the locations, and to the landmarks 3 that are visible to the bus driver.

4 For example, a lot of people are not very good 5 at reading maps. They are too abstract.

6 If you have schematic kinds of maps that have 7 visible landmarks, especially things like particular stores 8 or groves of trees, or a church, or a parking lot, or a 9 service station of a particular kind, those are landmarks 10 that people can relate to, and if you have job performance II aids that have clear cut indicators of where people are 12 supposed to take actions, take a certain turn, continue 13 through the intersection, so they can keep track, then I O 14 think you have addressed the problem that you are talking 15 about.

16 Q Dr. Lindell, the bus drivers had maps at the 17 exercise. So, you are recommending or saying that the maps 18 should be improved? Is that your testimony?

19 A I would say that -- I did not go into detail on 20 that issue, but if they were given maps -- I could 21 distinguish among three different levels of maps. One is an 22 ordinary road map of the area, which might be difficult to 23 interpret.

24 One that had eliminated all the extraneous 25 streets; that is, all the ones on which the individual was O

, ~ - - - ---- -- - - .-- - - - -- < - - - - - - - - , - - - - -

- -- . , , , , , - - - - - -,.e =m-----

81600606 5018 joewalsh

/

I

() > not required to travel, or to make a turn decision.

2 And then a third level of map which would be the 3

best, that would have the previous kind of map, plus would d

have specific landmarks, identifiable landmarks.

5 JUDGE FRYE: So, you see an equipment problem 6

and not a training problem, in short?

7 WITNESS LINDELL: Well, I label them material e

problems.

9 JUDGE FRYE: Materials, but it is not training.

10 WITNESS LINDELL: As long as they are trained to -

6 Il use those maps effectively.

12 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 13 Q Now, Dr. Lindell, I assume you have never driven V 14 a bus, so I am assuming that you have no idea how difficult is it could be to read a map as you are driving a bus.

16 A (Witness Lindell) Actually, I have driven large 17 trucks when I was at the Air Force Academy. I received a I 18 military drivers license. It equipped me for driving large 19 vehicles.

20 Have you ever driven a bus?

Q 21 A I have not driven a passenger bus.

22 Would you agree with me, Dr. Lindell, that it Q

23 could be rather difficult to drive a bus, put to one side 24 whether it is full of evacuees, just drive a bus while 25 reading a map?

8 j

81600606 5019 joewalsh 1 MS. MONAGHAN: I am going to object to this.

2 This is an issue that was delved into at great length in the 3 prior proceedings on the plan litigation.

4 I don't think we need to be going back over that 5 again. The issue here is whether or not --

6 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I am simply trying to 7 establish with this witness, based upon what he just told 8 this Board, that you need training to drive a bus while 9 reading a map.

10 It is not purely an equipment or materials 4 il need. That is my only inquiry here.

12 13 JUDGE FRYE: I think we are getting into too J

14 much nitty gritty here. Let's move on.

15 MR. MILLER: If the Board believes they will 16 stop the buses and look at the map, okay.

17 JUDGE FRYE: He has already said the man needs 18 to be trained to use the map, whatever he has got.

19 MR. MILLER: Okay. Fine.

20 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 21 Q Dr. Lindell, let's look at the bottom of Page 12 22 of your testimony, continuing over to Page 13. You have a 23 statement about systeraic problems, and you talk about 24 patters of deficiencies and ARCAs.

25 Is it your testimony, gentlemen, that for there O

81600606 5020 joewalsh I

to be a pattern with respect to the LERO organization, that 2

you would think all three staging areas would have to have.

3 had experienced problems during the exercise?

d A (Witness Lindell) That would certainly bolster 5

my confidence in a hypothesis there was a training 6

deficiency if all three areas showed the same kind of 7

problems.

8 Q But with respect to my question, Dr. Lindell, if 9

two of the three staging areas experienced problems, is it 10 your opinion that you necessarily would not have a pattern?

'l A It depends upon the kinds of problems.

12 Q Well, you have read the FEMA Report.

13 A I went through the specific objectives that were OJ 14 associated with each of the staging areas, and there was not 15 what I would regard as a systematic pattern that would lead 16 me to conclude that there were training deficiencies.

17 Q Now, if you think that you would rather see 18 problems at 3 of 3 staging areas to bolster your confidence 19 l level with respect to whether there was a problem, what i

20 about problems at the EOC? What criteria do you employ to 21 determine whether problems at the EOC, or the ENC for that 22 matter, would be systemic problems?

23 A That is a little bit more difficult to call, but 24 in some cases there are specific objectives that are listed 25 in the FEMA Report that are common to not only the EOC, but

81600606 5021 joewalsh

() I to other areas as well.

2 So, in going through this I was looking at some 3 of the specific objectives. For example, under evacuation 4 management, that was met at the EOC. That was also an 5 objective that was set for the field, and in two cases it 6 'was met, and it One case it was a deficiency.

7 Dr. Lindell, what are you referring to if you Q

8 have numbers like that available to you?

9 A I am referring to some notes that I prepared.

10 Q Summary review of the FEMA Report?

11 A Yes. It is a job performance aid. I couldn't 12 possibly remember all this information without writing it 13 down on a piece of paper.

O 14 Q Now, on Page 13 of the testimony, Dr. Lindell, is you are talking about the fact that there were some 16 deficiencies and ARCAs noted for Patchogue and Riverhead 17 staging areas, and you say the Port Jefferson Staging area la did not display similar problems, do you see that?

19 A Yes, I do.

20 Q And so I suppose that goes to your statement 21 that since only two of the three staging areas had problems, 22 that you do not consider there to be a systemic problem in 23 the LERO organizational training, is that correct?

24 A That is correct.

25 Q Now, if in fact ARCAs and deficiencies had been ,

i O

81600606 5022 joewalsh

.) I identified for the Port Jefferson staging area as well, 2 would you then conclude that there was a systemic problem in 3

the training of LERO personnel?

d A Yes, I would be very likely to. I want to go 5

back a step and say that the fact that there were ARCAs and 6 deficiencies at two of the three doesn't necessarily rule 7

aut -- completely rule out the fact that there was a 8 systemic deficiency. It is possible that Port Jefferson 9

could have performed adequately not for reasons directly 10 related to the training program.

" That is, they could have improvised a response 12 during the exercise that would have produced adequate

, 13 performance, and thus avoided a deficiency, even though

'" 14 there was a problem in the training program.

15 So, I just want to clarify that one point.

16 Q Dr. Lindell, from my review of the LILCO 17 testimony in this issue, I concluded that LERO's goal is not la to train a group of free thinkers, of people who would g

I

19 implement ad hoc responses.

20 Are you disagreeing with that?

l 21 A No, I am not really disagreeing with that. I i 22 guess it would be clearer if I say that people should be 23 trained according to -- trained to respond according to the 24 plan and procedures of the organization.

25 To use the equipment that they have been given,

81600606 5023 joewalsh

() I but that doesn't preclude people from improvising during an 2 emergency.

3 As a matter of fact, people very often do.

4 JUDGE FRYE: So what you are really saying is 5 that Port Jefferson may have lucked out?

6 WITNESS LINDELL: That is conceivable, and I 7 don't want to rule out that possibility. Given this 8 particular instance, given the information that was 9 available in the post exercise assessment, I don't think 10 that that was the case.

Il But I don't want to rule out the possibility 12 that that could happen in some other exercise.

13 I am saying it is not a strict numerical O Id criterion. I am not going for two out of three, or three is out of three.

6 BY MR. MILLER
(Continuing) 17 0 Dr. Lindell, from -- you are aware of the fact, 18 Dr. Lindell, that FEMA defined a deficiency in its report on 19 Page 8, as demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would 20 cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not 21 adequate to provide reasonable assurance.

22 A (Witness Lindell) Now, you have not been with 23 us, Dr. Lindell, for all the issues, but during traffic 24 issues that were litigated before this Board, we heard from 25 LILCO witnesses, particularly Mr. Weismantle, that there

81600606- 5024 joewalsh I

were problems experienced with the dispatching of traffic 2

guides from the Port Jefferson staging area, and that in 3

fact the reason that those problems were not identified as a d

deficiency by FEMA was because FEMA did not observe the 5

inadequate response by Port Jefferson traffic guides because 6 the FEMA observers were delayed at the scene of the fuel 7

truck' impediment.

8 Now, assume that I am correct in what I told 9

you, Dr. Lindell. And there was this deficiency that should 10 have been identified at the Port Jefferson staging area. I il take it that you would agree with me that then there could 12 well be a systemic problem in the training of LERO 13 personnel, because all three staging areas would have had Id problems noted by FEMA?

15 MS. MONAGHAN: I object to the question, to the 16 extent it characterizes LILCO witnesses prior testimony as 17 agreeing that there would have been a deficiency in the 18 terms that FEMA used the word, ' deficiency' in its report.

19 JUDGE FRYE: Just remove the LILCO part of it.

20 You can connect it up if it is in the record. It is a 21 hypothetical.

l l

22 MR. MILLER: Fine. It is in the record, and I l

23 think the Board will recall the testimony, and I will just 24 make my question a pure hypothetical, Dr. Lindell.

i I

25 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) f lC f

L

81600606 5025

-joewalsh 4 [, ) 1 Q Assume with me that there would, or should have 2 been, deficiencies identified by FEMA at each of the three 3

areas. Is it then not true that those failures could have 4 demonstrated a systemic problem in the training of LERO 5 personnel?

6 A (Witness Lindell) That is an awfully long 7 question, and I think I even disagree. It is difficult for 8 me.to respond to that, because as I stated before, just 9 because FEMA thinks that something was a deficiency, does j 10 not necessarily mean that I think it was a deficiency.

Il

~That is, if there was a delay in some action 12 that was observed by FEMA, that does not necessarily mean to 13 me that there would have been -- that that would have met l

id the definition of a deficiency in my opinion.

15 Q Dr. Lindell, I am asking you to make an j 16 assumption, and I will ask you to also assume that FEMA was 17 correct in its identification of the deficiencies.

18 I am asking you to assume that there was l

i

19 deficiencies identified, deficiencies should have been f

20 identified by FEMA at each of the three staging areas.

21 Given your testimony, Dr. Lindell, is it not i

22 then true that this could have demonstrated a systemic i 23 failure of the LERO training program?

l 24 A Are you saying a delay in the dispatching of 25 which field teams, the traffic guides?

(

7

_. - _. _ - . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , _ . _ _ _ _ . _ . . _ - . ~ . . _ . - . - . _ . . _ _ _ . . _ . _ . , . _ _ _ _ _

81600606 5026

~

1 Q Dr. Lindell, my question is far broader.

2 A I understand that, and.I can't answer the far 3 broader question because I have a more differentiated idea d of what constitutes a deficiency, and if-you can't give me a 5 specific problem that I can solve, then I can't answer your 6 question.

7 Well, I have asked the question in terms of a Q

8 hypothetical. I have asked you to make assumptions, and my 9 question has contained the word, 'could', could have 10 indicated a systemic failure of LERO training program.

33 If you are unable to answer that question, i 12 fine.

13 A I think it is sufficiently vague question that I

~

Id cannot answer that question.

15 JUDGE FRYE: Ma. Miller, wasn't your original 16 hypothetical having to do with response to the fuel truck?

17 MR. MILLER: My original question, Judge Frye, 18 went to the fact that the traffic guides, although very late i

l l' in being deployed and mobilized from Port Jefferson, that 20 was not identified as a deficiency by FEMA, because the FEMA 21 observer had been delayed in waiting for LERO's response to 22 the fuel truck impediment.

1 23 JUDGE FRYE: So it was not observed.

24 MR. MILLER: So it was not observed, and 25 therefore, did not fall under the definition of FEMA as a l

i

- . - - . . . . - ~ - . ~ . - - , . . _ , - - . - . - . . . , . - , , , , . , - _ , . - - - - - , - . - - . - . , , . , - - - - - - . -

81600606 5027

. joewalsh

/

() I deficiency.

2 JUDGE FRYE: Dr. Lindell, would you regard delay 3 of traffic guides in reporting to their posts as a 4 deficiency?

l 5 WITNESS LINDELL: Not necessarily in and of 6 itself, because it depends upon if the traffic guides are 7

unnecessary, if I felt that people could get themselves out )

8 appropriately.

9 JUDGE FRYE: You don't regard that as a 10 deficiency?

33 WITNESS LINDELL: It is not necessarily a

('

~

12 deficiency.

13 MR. MILLER: I think there is a way. I think 14 the difficulty we are having Dr. Lindell is the word, is ' deficiency' then.

16 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 17 0 Would you agree with me that if FEMA identified 18 problems at each of the three LERO staging areas, that there 19 then could be a conclusion drawn that there was a systemic 20 failure of the LERO training program?

21 A (Witness Lindell) Okay, we are getting a little 22 closer. Since we are taking it one step at a time, it is a 23 little easier to addreas it.

24 The next issue is -- l 25 JUDGE FRYE: Do you agree with that?

O 4

81600606 5028 joewalsh T'

('/d N-I WITNESS LINDELL: Okay, I am sorry. I can't 2 agree with'that unless I state what I mean by systemic 3

deficiency.

d If by systemic deficiency you mean systemic with 5 respect to that issue, that is with respect to dispatching 6 of -- the timeliness of' training, training of staging area 7

personnel with respect to the timeliness of dispatching a field personnel, then if you have the same problem in all 9

three areas, yes, it is systemic with respect to that one 10 attribute of the training program.

Il JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

12 13 ja 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

81600707 5029 cuewalsh

, () 1 JUDGE FRYE: Are we at a breaking point, Mr.

2 Miller?

3 MR. MILLER: Yes, that will be fine.

4 JUDGE FRYE: Why don't we do that? Let's take a 5 15 minute break.

6 (Whereupon, a recess is taken at 10:30 a.m., to 7 reconvene at 10:45 a.m., this same day.)

8 JUDGE FRYE Let's go back on the record, 9 please.

10 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, would it be possible 11 to excuse Ms. Goodkind for the afternoon as long as Mr.

12 Miller doesn't have questions for her?

13 I've already spoken with him about that, and he O

\/ 14 has no problem with that.

. 15 JUDGE FRYE: I have no problem with it.

16 WITNESS GOODKIND: Thank you, Judge Frye.

17 JUDGE FRYE: If we are not going to be dealing 18 with any of her testimony, I see no point -- there is no 19 need for her to sit here.

20 MR. MILLER: I have no objections to that.

21 , JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

22 (Ms. Goodkind left the witness table.)

23 MS. MONAGHAN: As I told Mr. Miller, she will be 24 in this building so if there is some need to get her, we can 25 get her back in here.

(:)

81600707 5030 cuewalsh 1

JUDGE FRYE: How about Mr. Pursell? Do we need 2

to have him sit here?

3 MS. MONAGHAN: He's sitting right there.

d JUDGE FRYE: But, does he need to, is my 5 question, while we are on this topic?

6 MR. MILLER: My answer, Judge Frye, would be no, 7

we do not. We do not.

8 I'm trying to focus on Drs. Mileti and Lindell 9 There have been a couple of occasions, as today obviously.

10 you would note this morning, where I have asked Mr. Daverio

'3 a couple of questions.

12 But, I suppose if the Board wanted I'm willing

- 13 to have --

" Id JUDGE FRYE: Well, I think you probably should is have a LILCO witness or LERO witness.

16 MR. MILLER: I was going to offer that they 17 could all go except for Drs. Mileti and Lindell, but perhaps is it does make sense to keep at least one LILCO witness.

19 JUDGE FRYE: Well, if they are next door, you 20 know, we --

21 MS. MONAGHAN: Well, I think I ought to have D some say in this. It's fine with me if Mr. Pursell, you 23 know, also works with Ms. Goodkind in the other room but I 24 would prefer to have Mr. Behr and Mr. Daverio here with Drs.

25 Lindell and Mileti, please. ,

O

81600707 5031 cuewalsh

() 1 JUDGE FRYE: All right. Fine.

2 MR. MILLER: I obviously have no objections to 3 any of this.

4 (Laughter.)

5 Just leave me at least one witness.

6 (Laughter.)

7 MS. MONAGHAN: The question is, do the rest of 8 us have to stay, too?

9 (Laughter.)

to MR. MILLER: Well, the Board has to stay, but, 11 Ms. Monaghan, you and Ms. McCleskey are free to leave.

T 12 (Laughter.)

13 JUDGE FRYE: All right. Now --

O 14 MR. MILLER: We are back to Page 13 of the 15 testimony, gentlemen.

16 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 17 Q Now, Dr. Lindell, I was exploring this issue of 18 the different staging areas with you.

19 Would you agree with me, Dr. Lindell, from your i

20 knowledge of the LERO training program that the personnel 21 assigned to the three LERO staging areas each receive 22 essentially the same LERO training?

23 A (Witness Lindell) That's correct.

24 Q And, would you agree with me that, of course, 25 different FEMA evaluators observed and evaluated the O

1

i.

j 81600707-. 5032 cuewalsh l behavior of the LERO personnel at these three different 2

staging areas?

3

-A That's also-correct.

d Q And, I suppose it's possible, therefore, Dr.

j- .5 Lindell, that the difference in the problems identified at 6 the staging areas and the numbers of problems. identified by 7

FEMA could be attributable to the fact that different FEMA 8 evaluators were observing and commenting upon these LERO 9

personnel?

l 30 A Yes, it's possible. I recognize that it is j

11 possible, but I have high confidence in the ability of the i

12 FEMA personnel to observe and record the important behavior 13 or if they did not observe it to so note.

1

! . O". Id Q To make sure I understand, Dr. Lindell, you have 5

15 high confidence in FEMA's capability of observing behavior h 16 but you have little confidence in FEMA's ability to 17 j interpret the behavior they observed.

18 Is that a fair statement?

! 19 A No, that's not a fair statement.

20 Well, you have indicated to me that you disagree Q

21 with FEMA's interpretation of each of the five deficiencies l-j 22 identified in the report for Shoreham; is that correct?

23 A That is correct.

24 Q So, at least in that regard you have little

25 confidence in FEMA's ability to interpret the data they iO,

, - - ~ ~ ,,,,--,, .,,- ,__.._--_,-,...-,n _.---,,-,nn.,---,-,-n-------,,~---,--,n~--

1^

81600707 5033 cuewalsh

} 1 observed; is that correct?

2 A That's not correct.

3 Q That's not correct?

d A No. I don't -- I would not characterize my 5 regard for FEMA's ability to interpret the behavior as 6 showing little confidence.

7 I would say that I have high regard but I don't a give them a blanket endorsement. I wouldn't do that for 9 FEMA; I wouldn't do that for NRC observers; I wouldn't do it 10 if they were from EPA or any other federal agency, state, 11 local government and necessarily any other disaster 12 researcher.

13 Q Dr. Lindell, we are not talking about a blanket O 14 endorsement. You specifically disagreed with each and every 15 deficiency identified by FEMA at the Shoreham exercise; is 16 that correct?

17 A They identified what they regarded as five 18 deficiencies. I have stated that I disagree with those 19 five.

20 I don't know how to characterize my general 21 level of agreement with FEMA other than to say that I think 22 I generally agree with FEMA but I don't agree with those 23 five deficiencies.

2d I think they were problems. I don't think they 25 were deficiencies.

81600707 5034 cuewalsh I

Q Dr. Mileti, on Page 19 of the testimony, you set 2

forth several reasons for why there were differences between 3

the analysis performed for NUREG 3524 and your analysis of d

the Shoreham report; is that correct?

5 A (Witness Mileti) Yes, it is.

6 Q And, one of those differences at the bottom of 7

Page 19 was because the person's who evaluated the exercise e

did not seek to measure your social science factors as they conducted their exercise evaluation and different exercise 10 evaluators looked for different things depending on what 13 part of LERO and what FEMA objective they were evaluating.

12 Do you see that statement?

13 A Yes, I see it.

~

Id Q So, I assume, Dr. Mileti, that you would agree is with me that it is possible that the differences that were 16 noted in the FEMA report with respect to the adequacy of 17 performance of LERO personnel at the three staging areas 18 could be attributed to the fact that different FEMA l'

evaluators were making observations of performance by LERO 20 personnel?

21 A It's a possibility. The issue is whether it's 22 probable or not. And, I would presume, given what we've 23 heard about how FEMA observers are prepped to go and do 24 their work that it's probably not probable.

25 But, certainly there were different observers

t 81600707 5035 cuewalsh .

I

() I and different people.

2 Q Now, back to the top of Page 13 of the 3 testimony, the second full sentence, in fact, the second and d third sentences, "What performance errors were observed 5 tended not to be systemic. T'. sat is, when one LERO subunit 6 did not meet, or only partially met an objective, there was 7 at least one other subunit that did meet the objective."

8 Do you see those statements, gentlemer.!

9 A (Witness Lindell) Yes, I do.

10 0 Is it not true that in some instances problems, il even under your definition, were systemic problems?

12 A I don't think there is any indication of that.

13 Q Well, let me ask you about at least two examples 14 that come to my mind, Dr. Lindell. Are you familiar with 15 the fact that route alert drivers, one from each staging 16 area, were sent out and observed during the Shoreham 17 exercise?

18 A I recall that route alert drivers were sent out.

19 Q Do you recall that in each case FEMA concluded E that the route alert drivers should have completed their 21 routes in a more timely fashion?

22 A I think that is correct. Yes, I think that's 23 correct.

24 0 Do you recall, Dr. Lindell, that there were two 25 simulated traffic impediments at the exercise?

O

81600707 5036 cueaalsh i

A It would be hard to forget the traffic 2

impediments.

3 Q Do you recall, Dr. Lindell, that in each of d

these two impediments FEMA identified problems?

5 g yes, 6

Q Now, using these two examples, Dr. Lindell, are 7

they not examples of systemic problems identified by FEMA at 8 the Shoreham exercise?

9 A I would have to go back and -- if you could cite la the specific deficiency or ARCA that would help me to go 11 back into my notes, because that's the way that I've 12 recorded it.

13 My recollection is -- and I will state that as a 4

DJ V 14 recollection, without a specific reference. My recollection 15 is that for the route alert drivers, it was not clear to me 16 that -- it's not clear to me at this point that that was a 17 And, I think it had to -- I think it was training problem.

18 l what I would regard as a procedure problem; that is, that 19 there wasn't sufficient -- there wasn't an adequate 20 provision prior to the exercise of either enough personnel 21 for route alert driving so that they could accomplish the 22 routes, you know, to shorten the routes so that they could 23 be accomplished within the given time.

24 Like I say, that's my recollection.

25 JUDGE FRYE Now, the traffic impediments, was f

I

'l L- .)

81600707 5037~

cuewalsh O i ehae trainine?

2 WITNESS LINDELL:~ In the traffic impediments?.

'3 That was true for the route alert drivers. Now, for the 4 traffic impediments, as I've said before, I have difficulty 5 drawing any conclusions from the traffic impediments because 6 you_Can't see an invisible overturned gravel truck.

7 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

8 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 9 Dr. Lindell, is it your opinion, based upon your Q

10 review of the Shoreham report, that nothing ascociated with Il either of the traffic impediments indicated a training 12 problem among LERO personnel?

13 A What I've said is that it's inconclusive. It --

0 14 there simply is -- there's enough confusion about what took 15 place in the way-that the impediments were simulated that to it's -- at the time that I read it, I had not talked to 17 anybody in LILCO about it. They just sent me a copy of the 18 FEMA post-exercise assessment report.

19 I read that, and it looked to me at the time 20 that I saw -- I read about it in the post-exercise 21 assessment that there was some kind of a problem with the 22 simulation itself. And, it's impossible for me, at this 23 point, to separate out what was a problem with LERO from 24 what was a problem with the way that FEMA --

25 JUDGE FRYE: So, you can't draw a conclusion?

O

81600707 5038 cuewalsh I

WITNESS LINDELL: I said -- that's why I 2 I just can't draw a described it as inconclusive.

3 conclusion on that.

4 BY MR. MILLER: (Cotttinuing) 5 Q Would you look at Answer 9 of the testimony, 6

gentlemen?

7 Dr. Mileti, I'm not -- I don't mean to exclude a you from any of this. As long as you don't jump in, I'm 9

going to just keep going ahead.

30 A (Witness Mileti) All right. Then, I will feel II free to.

12 Q Okay. Now, Answer 9 of the testimony, there is

-, 13 a statement about why individual mistakes, in your opinion, b 14 would not lead to the failure of the entire organizational is response in an actual emergency.

16 Now, I take it -- let me ask you, Dr. Mileti, I 17 take it that it is not your opinion that there must be a is failure of the entire LERO organization before one could 19 reach the conclusion that the training for that organization 20 had been inadequate?

21 A (Witness Mileti) I would reach a conclusion 22 that the training were inadequate if the organization 23 couldn't achieve one of its fundamental goals.

24 Q Do you believe that there must be a failure of 25 the entire organization before you can reach the conclusion i

O

81600707 5039 cuewalsh

( 1 that a fundanental goal of that organization could not be 2 achieved?

3 A Not the entire organization, no.

4 And, in this next statement that LL'O previously Q

5 analyzed the demands of the emergency situation, to what are 6 you referring when you make that statement?

7 A (Witness Lindell) Well, the demands of the a emergency situation include the characteristics of the 9 hazard agent, the characteristics of the community and the 10 characteristics of the situation.

Il The characteristics of the hazard agent include 12 the -- basically are addressed by NUREG 0396 and the 13 implications of that in terms of source term and 14 meteorological conditions for defining the risk area.

15 Then, the next is characteristics of the 16 community, things like the nature of the road net, the 17 location of various segments of the population, the location is of special facilities like schools, hospitals, nursing homes 19 and so forth.

20 And, so those are the demands of the emergency, j

21 how to -- what are the characteristics of the hazard agent, 22 what are its potential impacts on the population and who is 23 affected and how can they respond.

2d Q Now, when you state that LERO has previously 25 made such an analysis or conducted such an analysis, Dr.

(

4 81600707 5040 cuewalsh I

(>_) '1 Lindell, to what are you referring?

2 Are you referring to the LILCO plan itself?

3 A The analysis is reflected in the plan and the d

procedures and inclusive of it.

5 g rim sorry. What was that last part?

6 A And inclusive of it.

7 Q Is there anything else that you are aware of 8

where this analysis you are discussing is demonstrated or 9

documented by LERO?

10 A In the training program.

33 0 And, is that last opinion, Dr. Lindell, based 12 upon your review of the FEMA report?

13 A No, that's more based upon my review of the

( lj

%- 14 videotapes and the workbooks, the materials that were 15 provided to LERO personnel.

16 0 Which you have characterized as a rather cursory 17 review; is that correct?

18 A Four and a half hours.of reviewing training 19 videotapes is not what I would regard as a cursory review.

20 As far as this question of anticipating the emergency 21 demands, as far as looking at all the things that people 22 did; that is, if I were going to do an inspection of their 23 training program, that is if I were some kind of an 24 inspector, then in that sense I would characterize it as a 25 cursory review.

Qi

81600707 5041

=uewalsh

() I' But, with respect to this particular question 2 that you are asking, I wouldn't describe it as cursory.

3 Q Now, later on the page, at the beginning of the d

last paragraph, you have a statement regarding LERO's 5 maintenance of information and control systems. Could you 6 tell me what systems you are referring to? ,

7 A Yes. It's -- when you are talking about 8 organizational information and control systems, it's not a 9 physical -- not necessarily a physical system that you can 10 point to. It refers very often to a policy or a procedure.

13 So, to that extent you can see it in the 12 procedures, in written procedures, but it's reflected in the 13 practices of the organization.

14 What I'm referring to here as far as information 15 and control systems is systems by which they can obtain 16 information about the status of the hazard and the status of 17 the response. So, the information and control -- the 18 information systems for the hazard have to do with obtaining 19 information about the magnitude of the release, about 20 meteorological conditions.

21 Those are used to define what the risk area is.

22 Then, the information control systems for monitoring the 23 status of the response include factors such as the feedback 2d of information to the EOC from the staging areas as to when 25 field teams are dispatched in response to an order from the O

81600707 5042 cuewalsh f- I l

(_ J EOC that those teams be dispatched.

2 It's reflected in feedback to the staging areas 3

from the -- for example, the traffic guides in saying we are 4

on station.

5 JUDGE FRYE: Does any of this have to do with 6 This is what the sentence you were individual performance?

7 referred to talks about.

8 WITNESS LINDELL: Yes, it has to do with 9

detection of errors, any possible errors or delays, in the i 10 performance of individuals within LERO. I wanted to make

the distinction first about the information systems related 4

12 to the hazard versus information systems related to the 13 response to the hazard.

() . i4 15 16 17 4 18 19 20 i

l 21 l

22 <

23 24 4

25 0

l

81600808 5043 marysimons

/~3 MR. MILLER: Dr. Lindell, I appreciate your

(/ 1 2 wanting to make all these distinctions clear for us, but if 3 there is a way to do it in a shorter fashion, I would d

appreciate it only because my time is limited today with Dr.

5 Mileti's schedule.

~

6 WITNESS LINDELL: Certainly.

7 BY MR. MILLER:

8 Q My question was could you just tell me what 9

systems are referred to, and I think you gave me a generic 10 answer. So let me ask you in a particular sense. With il respect to bus drivers arriving late or getting lost or 12 missing segments of their routes, could you tell me what 13 system is in place within LERO to prevent that from O'- 14 happening?

15 A (Witness Lindell) Well, there are two different 16 ideas here. One is preventing it from happening, which is 37 the idea of providing adequate training materials and job 18 performance aids. The other one is detecting and monitoring 19 the performance of personnel as they are accomplishing their 20 duties. That is, that as the bus drivers are dispatched 21 from the staging areas to the bus yards and then to the 22 transfer points that if there is information transmitted or 23 at a certain time there is supposed to be a certain number 24 of bus drivers at a particular transfer point, that if there 25 is a deviation from that expectation or that expected level I

81600808 5044 marysimons

/9

(/ > 1 of staffing, that that information is transmitted back to 2 the staging area or back to the EOC so that the EOC and the 3

staging area can verify that the staffing of the transfer 4

points has been completed. That is a specific example.

5 Q Okay. Let's take it in the context of my 6

example. LERO bus drivers, and let's take the example from 7

the FEMA report of the bus driver who missed a segment of 8 his route.

9 Now tell me what system is in place within LERO 10 to detect and correct that mistake?

II A Running multiple bus drivers on any particular 12 route. That is, if one bus driver misses it, that it can be 13 corrected by the next bus driver coming through if it's a 14 random error.

15 Q And is it your understanding, Dr. Lindell, that 16 each and every bus route within the LERO organization for 17 those routes there are multiple bus drivers that drive those la routes?

19 A I didn't pursue that point in great detail 20 because it's my understanding that in general that's the 21 case, but that gets back to the previous statement that was 22 made about is it necessary to have lots of bus drivers and 23 there is going to be anybody on the bus, basically the 24 question that Dr. Mileti raised.

25 perhaps Mr. Daverio can answer that question Q

81600808 5045 marysimons O >

more direce correce1v.

2 A (Witness Daverio) My rememberance of the plan 3 is that we do have multiple bus runs per route. I don't d think there is any route that has only one bus run on it.

5 0 Now, Dr. Lindell, what is the system that would 6 detect and correct performance errors by bus drivers if you 7 assume that 3/8ths of the LERO bus drivers perform i a inadequately by doing such things as missing segments of 9

their routes?

10 A (Witness Lindell) If one were to assume that il 3/8ths of the bus drivers missed portions of their routes, 12 it's not an inevitable conclusion that the portion of a 13 route that was missed by the first bus driver through would 14 be missed by the second bus driver through.

15 Even if the route were missed by the second 16 driver through, which I think is a very improbable even 17 given the quality of the improvements or given the 18 recommended improvements in the maps, even assuming that 19 that did happen, people within the EPZ are given a telephone 20 number to call if they need transportation assistance. So 21 they can determine for themselves, phone that message in and 22 get transportation assistance assuming that they did not 23 have friends, relatives, neighbors or anybody else who could 24 give them transportation assistance.

25 0 So your answer implies that the people who would

81600808 5046 marysimons i not be picked up because buses did not show co'ld u just 2

simply get on the telephones and start calling LERO? Is 3

that your testimony?

d A Yes.

5 Do you think that is a logical conclusion about Q

6 what people would do in an emergency?

7 A Mr. Miller, I don't think there is going to be a anybody left there to call LERO on the telephone. I think 9

they are going to have other ways out. I think people are 10 going to get out other ways.

" So you agree with Dr. Mileti that buses are not Q

12 needed in any event?

13 A They are desirable. They are not essential.

Id A (Witness Mileti) And if they are needed, the j 15 person could just get on the next bus as it comes through.

I 16 Q If it not one of the missing 3/8ths.

17 Now let me ask you, Dr. Lindell, and I don't 18 want to spend much time on this, but the traffic guides that 19 were noted by FEMA to have arrived substantially late at 20 their post in the field and that was in fact identified as a 21 deficiency as well, what particular system within LERO would 22 detect and correct that pcrformance error?

23 A (Witness Lindell) The route spotters for one 24 and other traffic guides if they were at the appropriate 25 locations, but certainly the route spotters would be able to l

0

81600808 5047 marysimons D)

(_ 1 detect if there were any traffic backups along the routes.

2 Q Now, Mr. Behr, if you want to add something, you 3 can add it.

4 A (Witness Behr) The traffic guides are also 5 required to report back into the staging area when they 6 arrive at their traffic control point.

7 Q Now I assume, Mr. Behr, from that answer that at a some point in time someone within LERO if they had not heard 9 from particular traffic guides would reach a conclusion that 10 traffic guides had not reported to their post; is that what Il you're saying?

12 A Yes, I think that is a fair conclusion.

13 Q How long would have to go by before someone

' I4 within LERO would make this sort of conclusion?

15 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, it seems to me that i

16 we are going into a lot of detail that doesn't really have a 17 whole lot to do with whether or not there are systems i

18 designed to detect and correct performance errors.

19 JUDGE FRYE: And, moreover, it seems to me that

. 20 the systems that are being identified don't have much to do 21 with training.

22 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I'm keeping this 23 limited and I'm focusing just on the traffic guides, and I'm 24 focusing on the traffic guides because FEMA identified that 25 as a deficiency.

O

~

81600808 5048 carysimons

) I But the testimony here says that even if you 2

have performance mistakes, not to worry, we have systems 3

that will detect and correct those mistakes.

d j JUDGE FRYE: Right.

5 MR. MILLER: So I.would like to find ou; from 1.

j 6 these gentlemen what those systems are because I don't 7

, believe there are any such systems, and I would limit that 8 just to this traffic guide inquiry.

j

)i JUDGE FRYE: All right. Let's get the traffic 10 guides out of the way and move on.

II WITNESS BEHR: I think the answer to your i

12 question is that there is no specific time limit spelled out ,

1 -- 13 in the procedures. However, there have been cases and it i

( 14 has happened in a number of cases where when a traffic guide

15 has not reported back into a staging area that the lead t

16 traffic guide has radioed to someone else in the field, be j.

17 l- it a route spotter or another traffic guide, to please see 18 if he could ascertain whether that traffic guide has arrived l,

l 19 so that they determine whether the need to dispatch another i <

20 one.  ;

i l 21 BY MR. MILLER:

3 i

22 O And my question is can you recall, Mr. Behr, how 23 much time had to go by before anyone was prompted to take 24 such action?

l 25 A (Witness Behr) No, I don't recall. '

4 4 I

i


e-, , _ . _ ,m,.._,m, , - - . , , . , , _ . . . , - . , . , , - __-m,,....,,,,..r_._w-_-mr,._-.

81600808 5049 carysimons

(~)%

g_ 1 Q Okay, let's move on then.

2 Can you tell me, Dr. Lindell or Dr. Mileti --

3 first of all, you seem to be using as a test for whether or d not individual performance errors have any impact this 5 concept of severe and irreversible consequences. Is that a 6 fair statement, that there has to be severe and irreversible 7 consequences before individual performance errors have any 8 significance, in your opinion?

9 A (Witness Lindell) Yes. That relates'to the 10 issue of protection of the public health and safety. That 11 is, once somebody receives an exposure, you can't reverse 12 the fact that they received an exposure to radioactive 13 material.

14 Q So hypothetically at least, Dr. Lindell, if a 15 bus driver fails to show up his route and as a result people 16 are delayed getting out of the EPZ and receive some 17 exposure, under your definition that would constitute a 18 severe and irreversible consequence; is that correct?

19 A Only assuming all of the above, yes.

20 Q So in my example, we have an example of an 21 individual performance error that would result in severe 22 Irreversible consequences?

! 23 A No. What you said was in the first case if the 2d bus driver failed to show up and that resulted in people not 25 being able to get out in a timely manner and that further

)

.. _ . - _ _ _ , - . _ - ~ . . . _ . . _ . . . , _ _ ..___ - _ _ . _ _ . _ _ , _ _ . _ , _ . . _ _ _ ,

81600808 5050 marysimons

/mi I V' resulted in exposure to radioactive material, then that 2

would be a problem.

3 Then in your second statement you changed it and d

you're talking about assuming thati there was a problem, and 5

that's not the case.

6 Because you assume that people would get out by Q

7 some other means such as with friends or neighbors?

8 A That's right.

9 Q Now you also refer on page 14 and also on page 10 13 at the bottom to backup mechanisms for accomplishing Il critical tasks. Are these backup mechanisms really 12 different from the systems you've described to me?

---, 13 A (Witness Mileti) I think those backup O:d 14 mechanisms are duplications in the ability to perform is certain functions.

16 A (Witness Lindell) That's different from 17 Information systems are information and control systems.

18 designed to diagnose the state of pomething, whereas backup 19 mechanisms for controlling or performing have to do with 20 implementing some action.

21 So that, for example, if a siren fails that a 22 route alert driver can go out and alert the people in that 23 particular area that was supposed to have been covered by 24 the siren.

, 25 0 So, Dr. Lindell, the dispatching of route alert

81600808 5051 marysimons

() 1 drivers to the exercise is an example of a backup mechanism 2 in the LERO organization, correct?

3 A That's correct.

4 Q Can you think of any other examples? Just give 5 me another one, if you would.

6 A (Witness Mileti) To help with evacuation there 7 are a whole lot of other examples. For example, the traffic 8 guides, the buses and mainly the EBS stations to get people 9 moving on their own, the ambulance and ambulettes and how to they might help.

Il Q Let's just take the first one, Dr. Mileti. Let 12 me, if you could briefly, how the traffic guides are a 13 backup mechanism.

O 14 A To facilitate evacuation, the primary mechanism 15 is people getting in the car and going on their own.

16 0 Oh, I see. So under your definition the entire 17 LERO organization is really a backup mechanism; is that is correct?

19 A (Witness Lindell) No, that is not correct.

20 With respect to traffic management and transportation 21 support, I would say that that generally is the case, but as 22 far as prompt notification of the public and dissemination 23 of warning mechanisms one cannot reasonably presume that the 24 public will intuit for themselves when is the appropriate 25 time to take protective action,.

O

81600808 5052 marysimons

,% i q_)s 1 Q I gather, Dr. Lindell, from your answer though 2

that to a large extent you would believe the entire LERO 3

organization is a backup mechanism?

4 A In terms of numbers of personnel that are 5

assigned to functions, to perform specific kinds of tasks, I 6

would say most of the LERO personnel in terms of numbers are 7

assigned to backup mechanisms for accomplishing evacuation, a yes, 9

0 Under your theory, Dr. Lindell and Dr. Mileti, 10 and this ties back to a question that Judge Frye asked you, il Dr. Lindell last week I think regarding the necessity of the 12 LERO organization, is it your opinion that the LERO

-- 13 organization is really not necessary, with the exception

(~l!

\>" Id perhaps of notification of the public functions?

15 A (Witness Lindell) I would say that it is 16 desirable to have the LERO organization, that is that in 17 order to provide reasonable assurance that the public health 18 and safety can be protected.

19 Is it necessary, not desirable, but is the LERO Q

20 organization necessary, in your opinion?

2i A Under certain circumstances it could be 22 necessary. Under many other kinds of circumstances it would 23 probably not be absolutely necessary.

24 0 Under the circumstances that were simulated 25 during the exercise, including the timing of the release, do b

\/

~81600808 5053 marysimons

() 1 you believe the LERO organization is necessary?

2 A (Witness Mileti) Mr. Miller, emergency planning 3 is a good idea generically and in that the LERO organization d

involves emergency planning for nuclear power plants, yes, 5 it's necessary and its useful. Can we and have we seen 6 evacuations that have been successful by luck without 7 emergency planning, yes, but we shouldn't count on that.

8 Emergency planning is useful.

i 9 So you, Dr. Mileti, at least believe that the Q

IO LERO organization is necessary?

II A I think emergency planning generically, which 12 would subsume LERO and others, yes, absolutely.

13 Q And you would agree, Dr. Mileti, that LERO is 14 also required by NRC regulations and guidelines; is that 15 correct?

16 A Yes, I have that distinct impression.

17 Q Now, Dr. Lindell, do you disagree with Dr.

M Milet17 19 A (Witness Lindell) No, I don't disagree with Dr.

20 Mileti.

21 A (Witness Mileti) I think what Dr. Lindell may 22 have been saying is that there are certain things in 23 emergency planning that are more important than other things 24 and the, in my opinion, prime important thing is any 25 emergency plan is getting warnings to the public. I call O

81600808 5054 carysimons I

that a warning system.

2 Q And, Dr. Lindell, let's wrap this up. With 3

respect to the specific scenario that was exercised at d

Shoreham on February 13, 1986, under those circumstances you 5

believe that the LERO organization is a necessary 6

organization?

7 A (Witness Lindell) It's difficult for me to 8 answer that in terms of saying it's a necessary organization because under those circumstances I would say that the

'O circumstances involved in the scenario involve what I would Il regard as a rapid onset of an emergency situation. If there 12 was a rapid escalation of the emergency, I think under those 13 cases it is reasonable to believe that LERO may have been NJ V 14 necessary.

15 Social scientific prediction is not sufficiently 16 precise that we could say with exact precision that it would

'7 have been necessary or to say with precision that it would 18 not have been necessary. It's in the ball park. That is, I9 it's quite possible that LERO would have been necessary in 20 that kind of emergency.

2: There is some possibility that an evacuation 22 could have been accomplished without LERO providing 23 transportation support and traffic management.

24 Q Is it your opinion, gentlemen, that all critical 25 tasks to be performed by the LERO organization have backup 5

r 81600808 5055

! carysimons

() I mechanisms associated with them?

2 A (Witness Mileti) Yes.

1 3

Q Now the last paragraph of Answer 9, and I'm not d page 14 of the testimony, states that "LERO has multiple 5 methods for detecting and interpreting unexpected situations 6 during an emergency and for monitoring the quality and 4 i 7 timeliness of each subunit's performance of its emergency l 8 response assignments."

i 9 Are these methods any different from the systems j

10 and the mechanisms that we've previously discussed?  !

.i i 11 A (Witness Mileti) Mr. Miller, I apologize.

12 Where is that again?

j 13 Q The first full paragraph on page 14.

14 A I see it. Thank you.

i i 15 Could repeat the question again, please.

l 16 Q The methods that you mentioned on page 14, are i

17 they any different from the systems and the backup 18 mechanisms that we have previously discussed?

i 19 A (Witness Lindell) Maybe I could clarify. The  !

20 point of this paragraph is really directed toward unexpected  ;

l t

21 situations, whereas in the previous paragraph we were 22 talking about routine demands; that is, that once you 23 dispatch, once you give an order to the staging areas to 24 dispatch field teams, it's a routine event that you expect  ;

i

! 25 that the field teams will be dispatched. The only question i i

l (:)

I

81600808 5g$g  ;

I is now long it will take and then when it is that the field i

2 teams have arrived on station. -

3 In this paragraph beginning with the word a

j d " Finally," we are talking about unexpected events.

5 i (

6 I

l 7 8 ,

i 9

! L l, 10 .

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12 i

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i

81600909 5057 joewalsh O i mieness meen vor exame1e, in reference to 2 the road impediments, if that truck had really been turned 3 over, there were multiple ways that that could have been 4 detected in a real emergency. There are route spotters 5 driving around in a real emergency, evacuation is being 6 monitored by bus drivers -- the ones that are in their buses 7 driving them -- traffic guides. The public can certainly l 8 notice an overturned gravel truck, they call in. The news 9 media might have covered that.

10 It's important to have that kind of redundancy. ,

il Q I would like to ask you just to focus on the I

12 timeliness part of this statement on Page 14. If you could, 13 tell me what specific methods, if any, LERO has in place to O 14 ensure that unexpected situations are detected in a timely is fashion?

16 A The more redundancy you have, the quicker one of 17 them is going to pick it up.

18 Q Give me an example other than the road 10 impediments, if you could, Dr. Mileti?

l 20 A Can I pick the unexpected event?

21 Q Well, I would like to have one from the exercise 22 if you could do that.

23 (The witnesses are conferring.)

24 Dr. Lindell, maybe I could help speed this up.

25 There are a number of free-play events that were used by O

81600909 .

5058 i joewalsh 1

. FEMA. I think it's somewhere in,the neighborhood of 15 or 2 so during the exercise.

3

, I'm just asking you to pick any one of those.

4 A (Witness Lindell) Yeah, I'm sorry. I'm just 5

drawing a blank right now. I can't think of a specific 6

example. I 7

i Q Mr. Daverio, can you think of one?

e A (Witness Daverio) Let me give you an example, and it may not be precisely to your question. It's in our l 10 testimony on the Ridge school bus.

'l Q Okay. That's a free-play incident. I will take 12 that one.

j 13 A Okay. And, let me tell you how that would be --

I l

hmj 18 if you remember how it went that day, they dispatched a 15 school bus. They called the Superintendent a couple of i 16 times, made sure the bus was there, and at the end if they 17 would have got to the Coliseum they would have known it was <

' '8 a school bus rather than no bus. Remember, there was c j

M controversy over whether you could find -- whether the bus '

j 20 ever got there or not.

21 So, I think that sort of is in the same type of 3

22 ball game of what Dr. Lindell was talking about.

23 Q Okay. My only question is to (jive me, or  ;

24 describe to me, the method that LERO employs to ensure that 25 in a timely fashion you can detect that there are problems

!a J  !

81600909 5059 1 joewalsh

~

() I with, for example, the school bus being dispatched to the 2 school?

3 A By the -- and I can't remember the title of who 4

4 called, but -- and I could look it up for you, but he called

5 the school Superintendent and said
Did the bus get there?

6 So, he would have got a timely feedback if the I 1 bus wasn't there and then could have taken the appropriate f

8 action.  ;

9 Now, once the bus left the school and proceeded l Q  ;

! 10 to the reception center, if a bus would be delayed in H reaching the reception center what mechanism within LERO 12 would get that information in a timely fashion to the LERO  !

13 organization? i 4

i

() 14 A At that point, I'm not sure that I would be j 15 concerned about timeliness because they are already moving i '

16 out of the zone. You are doing what you can for them.  !

l

! 11 I don't know that a timely notification by the 18 procedure on the day of the event would be required at that ,

19 point. So, I wouldn't worry about it at that point, Mr.

20 Miller.

l l 2' Q Mr. Daverio, the timeliness could be a concern j i

l 22 unless you are aware of whether or not that bus loaded with j 23 school children hade in fact, exited out of the zone. And,  ;

i r 24 you would not know that until information was received by l .

25 LERO from the destination point that the bus had arrived; is [

4

81600909 5060 i that not correct?

2 A That's correct. And, I'm assuming they are 3 trying to move out as expeditiously as possible. So, I 4

don't know why a feedback that they couldn't get out or that 5

they were in traffic someplace is a critical knowledge 6 that's required at that point in time.

7 (Witness Lindell) I would just amplify on that.

8 JUDGE FRYE: Let's move on to a new subject. I

  • It's background information, but I think this is all fine.

10 don't see any relation to training.

MR. MILLER: Well, I don't dispute that, Judge 12 Frye. In fact, I have basic problems with this entire 13 testimony of Dr. Lindell and Dr. Mileti as to how it relates

~} 14 to training.

15 And, to be blunt with the Board, I'm not sure 16 that much, if any, of this relates to training. But, it's 11 here in the testimony.

18 JUDGE FRYE Yeah, it is. You are quite right.

17 WITNESS LINDELL: Would you like an explanation 20 of that? It will take two sentences.

21 JUDGE FRYE llow does it relate to training?

22 WITNESS LINDELL: It relates to training in that 23 the existence of backup mechanisms defines the training 24 criterion. That is, that if you have no backup mechanisms 25 in order to have adequate reliability of performance then

81600909 5061 joewalsh 1 training has to be 100 percent effective.

2 If you have backup mechanisms, then it is not (

i 3 necessarily the case that individual training has to be 100 4 I 4 percent effective. That is, you can -- ,

i

) 5 JUDGE FRYE: It gets back to perfect 6 performance?

7 WITNESS LINDELL: Even if -- okay. Even if you  !

8 don't require perfect performance on behalf of the '

s  :

J 9 organization, if you select any criterion other than perfect j 10 performance, if you state as your performance objective -- r

!' II if you develop an index of, say, 90 percent -- if you could i .

12 define what constitutes 90 percent effective and say, okay,  !

that's our criterion for the organisation, then in order to i lO 13 14 relate individual training criteria to the performance of l 15 the organization you have to understand how various backup l '

i 16 mechanisms, divergent or redundant mechanisms -- if you have 1

i I? no divergent or redundant mechanisms, you need a higher is training criterion.  ;

! 19 If you have more, then a lower performance l 20 criterion is acceptable on the basis of individuals.  ;

21 JUDGE FRYE Oh, that's great. But, the  !

I 22 contention talks in terms of certain specific failures that  ;

i 23 occurred during the exercise that demonstrate that the ,

{

24 training was inadequate. j i

i 25 Now, is it your position that the failures [

l i f

l

81600909 5062 joewalsh I occurred but don't demonstrate that the training was 2 inadequate?

3 WITNESS LINDELL: That's exactly it. That's d

exactly it.

5 It's our way of saying how we define inaderluate.

6 JUDGE FRYE Okay.

7 MR. CUMMING: Judge Frye, I would like to point e out for the record that in the contention language, it repeatedly uses the word " deficiency," although, in fact, 10 that was not how the FEMA post-exercise assessment describes il some of the training inadequacies.

12 so, I think it should be clear that the 13 Intervenors have, in fact, described in the contention by O,'r ld their frequent use of the term " deficiency" language which 15 doesn't directly correlate to the FEMA post-exercise to assessment.

11 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I don't have the I8 contention in front of me. But, I think we were rather M careful -- or at least tried to be -- when we referred to 20 particular deficiencies in capitalizing the word 2' ' deficiency."

22 JUDGE FRYE: All right.

23 MR'. MILLER: And, sometimes I suppose the word 24 " deficiency" was used to indicate problem.

25 JUDGE FRYE We can certainly sort those out.

81600909 5063 joewalsh O I MR. MittER: Jedee erve, I am more than haver to 2 try to look for a way to shortcut all of this testimony 3 sponsored by Drs. Lindell and Mileti. Maybe I can try this d

one.

5 JUDGE PARIS: Can I inquire of comething of Mr.

6 Cumming?

1 MR. MILLER: Sure.

a JUDGE PARIS: In two out of the four i

deficiencies, FEMA called for additional training, Mr.

'O Cumming. Go ahead.

Il MR. MILLER: Thank you, Judge Parin.

12 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing)

1) Q Dr. Lindell and Dr. Mileti, is it your basic O 14 annertion in this testimony which goen approximately from 15 Pagen 10 to 20 that for the LERO organization, training in 16 comehow not necennary?

11 A (Witneon Mileti) Absolutely not. j 18 (Witneon Lindell) No.

11 MR. MILLER: Okay. I'm not sure, Judge Frye, 20 how to not go through this tentimony. I don't understand il that answer in light of some of thin tentimony, but I don't i

22 think I have a choice but to try to go through the tontimony n that's before the Board unlenn the Donrd in willing to tell 24 mo that the Doard in not going to attribute any weight to 25 thin tentimony.

O  !

l 81600909 5064 l

(?'joewalsh ' MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye --

l L' 2 JUDGE FRYE: Well, I'm not sure the Board is 3

willing to take that position.

d MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, Mr. Miller could have 5 moved to strike the testimony --

6 JUDGE FRYE I think he did.

1 MS. MONAGHAN: -- on grounds that it was 8 relevant -- not this particular portion of it, he did not.

9 And, to now take the position that it ought to i

What I would

'O be stricken, it's too late for that right now.

33 like to say here though in that what the Intervenors'

'? position in with renpoct to this contention in that one 13 needs to look at all of these individual performance errorn

(-s,!)

v" 18 and by aggregating them one comen up with a problem with the 15 LERO training program.

16 The ponition that we are taking here, and that U all of those analysen goes to, is that that's not the way l

M that you ought to be looking at it; that the way in which to

'$ examine the innue here in to look at overall performance of 20 an organization and to try to annean that an opposed to bean il counting the number of errorn that occurred the day of the l 22 exercine, because it doesn't give you -- by doing that, you l

l 23 don't rate in any way how important or how significant the 1

24 error wan. You place no weight on that.

25 And, by looking at the three analysen that have Q

81600909 5065 joewalsh I  !

been provided here which look at it each from a different 2 perspective, the purpose was to give the Board a different I

3 way of looking at it and looking at the whole organization 4 and really to be able to come to the conclusion as to 5 whether the organization could function and, therefore, 6 whether the training program was effective in permitting 7 that organization to carry out its role.

8 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I don't want to argue

' And, I will try to keep this as

with counsel for LILCO.

10 short as I can.

[

II JUDGE FRYE: Let me just explore something. I 12 don't know whether this will be helpful or not.

! 13 We spent a good deal of the morning now talking

.O j I4 about various backup mechanisms and redundancies and things 15 of that nature. In your opinion, are these essential if one 16 is to conclude that the training program now in place is I? adequate?

i is WITNESS LINDELL: Yes, I think so. ,

j 19 MR. MILLER: I guess I will continue, Judge 20 Frye.

21 JUDGE FRYE I guess you will.

! 22 MR. MILLER: I will try t.o do this in as short a t

23 fashion as possible. I want it understood though on the l l 24 record -- I think it is clear on the record, but I wasn't i

~

[

25 moving to strike this testimony. I was responding to Board

O

81600909 5066 joewalsh

,r-}

b'd I concerns about the pertinent --

2 JUDGE FRYE: The materiality, right.

3 MR. MILLER: -- testimony.

d JUDGE FRYE: Yes.

5 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 6 Let's look at Answer 10 on Page 14, gentlemen.

Q 7

Dr. Mileti, would you give me a brief definition of the e terms " coordination" and " cohesion" which are used 9

frequently throughout the remainder of your testimony?

10 A (Witness Mileti) It's hard to translate il sociology into English, but I'm pretty good at it so I will 12 But, forgive me if I'm sloppy at it.

try.

j ,-

13 Those who have sought to study whether 14 organizations can achieve their goals, which is for all 15 practical purposes the definition of organizational 16 effectiveness, have concluded that the key factor in 31 determining whether an organization can achieve its goals or 18 be effective is cohesion of the organization and 19 coordination of the organization.

20 And, those factors are determined largely by 21 those that I sought to examine when I did my analysis.

22 JUDGE PARIS: What is cohesion?

23 MR. MILLER: That was the question.

24 WITNESS MILETI: llaving it together.

25 JUDGE PARIS: llaving it together?

(C~~

C/ '

4 81600909 5067 joewalsh I WITNESS MILETI: In a --

2 JUDGE PARIS: Like in, they got it together?

3 JUDGE SHON: What's the difference between that 4 and coordination? Coordination seems awfully close to 5 having it together, too.

6 WITNESS MILETI: Those two concepts overlap a 7 great deal, and different scholars call them by different 8 names.

9 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 10 Q But, there is a lot of overlap between those two 11 terms, then? That is, coordination and cohesion?

12 A (Witness Mileti) There is a lot of overlap I 13 between most sociological terms and those, too, yes.

Now, in your NUREG study, Dr. Mileti, you 14 Q

! 15 focused primarily on the cohesion and the comprehensiveness 16 between organizations and within organizations; is that 17 correct?

18 A We focused on the factors we thought affected or l 19 determined whether or not emergency response would be 20 effective. And, in reference to your word " comprehensive,"

21 we focused in reference to what we thought were the tasks 22 that needed to be accomplished or the goals.

23 Q The focus in the NUREG study on 4

24 comprehensiveness, was that a different focus than your use i

25 of the term " coordination" in this testimony?

I i

I

81600909 5068 joewalsh 3

A Coordination would be how well the organization 2

did. Comprehensiveness would define at what.

3 JUDGE FRYE: At what?

d WITNESS MILETI: Yes.

5 JUDGE FRYE: Coordination is how well they did, i 6 and comprehensiveness is --

7 WITNESS MILETI: What they were trying to 8

~ achieve.

9 j_ JUDGE FRYE: --

what they were trying to j 10 achieve?

II WITNESS MILETI: Yes, whether they addressed all 12 the emergency demands or not.

13 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing)

. U()J . Id Now, I take it, Dr. Mileti, that in your opinion Q

i 15 the three factors on Page 14; the first factor, a clear 16 understanding about what to do; the second factor, 17 flexibility in approach; and, the third factor, a good idea la about the overall inter-organizational emergency response, 19 that in your opinion those three factors can be found within 20 the LERO organization?

21 A (Witness Mileti) Yes.

22 Q Do you believe that any of those three factors l

23 does not exist within LERO?

24 A No, although on the basis of my assessment I 25 have less information about flexibility in the FEMA

'D 4

, - . . , . . . . _ - . , - - , - . . _ - _ _ - _ _ . . _ - - - - . . . _ , . - - ..-.-...m._,_ . . _ _ _ . . . _ - . _ _ . _ . . . . , , _ . . .. _ _ . _ - , , , , , _ , . ,

81600909 5069 joewalsh fm

(_) I assessment than I do about the other two.

2 Q Do you have sufficient information about 3 flexibility to have drawn any conclusions?

4 A Yes. I feel there is a basis for it in the LERO 5 organization. I recollect helping put it there, and I 6 observed some indicators of it when I did my assessment of 7 the FEMA assessment.

t 8 Q Is it fair to say that with respect to these 9 three factors you have less confidence in sufficient 10 flexibility in approach existing within LERO than the other 11 two factors?

12 A Absolutely not, no.

3 13 0 When you told me you had less information then, 14 what was the point?

15 A Because there was less information recorded by 16 the FEMA observers when they recorded what it is they 17 recorded. And, therefore, there was less evidence of it.

18 But, there was some evidence of it.

19 And, additionally, I wouldn't expect to find as 20 much flexibility demonstrated in an exercise as I would in a 21 real emergency.

22 0 Does flexibility in approach, Dr. Mileti, 23 include the ability to, when necessary, carry out measures 24 in an ad hoc fashion?

25 A I would define flexibility as the ability to not O

81600909 5070 joewalsh ,

7. ,

1

'v/ > take the implementing procedures so seriously that when a )

2 situation pops up that they don't cover, that someone can't  ;

3 innovate and try to cover them.

d  !

Q So, you are telling me, Dr. Mileti, that 5

flexibility would require that personnel not adhere 6

religiously to procedures but know when to deviate from such 7

procedures?

8 A Sometimes procedures have flexibility built into 9

them as well. But, you can't take an emergency plan too 10 seriously.

Il If the plan could cover every contingency that 12 could occur, you probably could avoid the emergency to begin 13 with because you would know about everything that was

(,"'d 14 occurring.

15 JUDGE FRYE: But, in short, you are saying at 16 some point you have got to throw your procedures in the 17 wastebasket and innovate?

18 WITNESS MILETI: At some point, you have to be 19 able to think, too.

20 JUDGE FRYE: All right.

21 WITNESS MILETI: And, training and planning --

22 one of the -- I think Dwight Eisenhower said it first, the 23 most important part of planning is the experience at being 24 engaged in planning and thinking things through as they 25 might occur in an emergency.

You can't go by the book all the time.

~

I l

81601010 5071 cuewalsh

() 1 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, toward the bottom of Page 14 2 there is a statement that the factors we have been 3 discussing have been empirically illustrated as relevant to 4 exercise assessments at nuclear power plants.

5 Do you see that statement?

6 A (Witness Mileti) Yes, I do.

7 Q And, can you tell me the basis for your 8 statement that these factors have been empirically 9 illustrated?

10 A The NUREG report I reference in the testimony.

11 Q Is that the one example where, to your 12 knowledge, these factors have been empirically illustrated?

i 13 A Yes, I think that's what I just said.

14 Q I mean, are you aware of any other studies or 15 reports?

16 A No, I'm not.

17 Q The test exercise in the NUREG -- I keep 18 referring to the NUREG, Dr. Mileti. You will assume with me 19 that I'm referring to NUREG/CR-3524, okay?

20 A I do that automatically, yes.

21 Q Now, the test exercise that was involved in your 22 NUREG study, was that a FEMA-graded exercise such as the 23 FEMA exercise at the Shoreham plant?

24 A It was a FEMA-graded exercise, yes.

25 Q Of a commercial nuclear power plant just like l

l

-.v.

81601010 5072 cuewalsh

(. 1

(,/ 2 the Shoreham plant?

2 A Owned by a utility, yes.

3 Q So, you would draw no real distinctions between d

the different exercises, the one in your NUREG study and the 5

one at Shoreham?

6 I would not, no.

A 7

JUDGE PARIS: So, NUREG/CR-3524 was an analysis e of an actual exercise?

9 WITNESS MILETI: Part of it was, yes.

10 JUDGE PARIS: Okay. That's what you meant when

" you said it had been empirically illustrated?

12 WITNESS MILETI: That's correct.

13 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I think we are up to

( 14 Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 57. I'm not sure.

15 JUDGE FRYE: 56 was the FEMA report on Indian 16 Point. Does that sound right?

17 MR. MILLER: Yes. I think that's right. 55 was is the Shoreham report and 56 was the Indian Point.

19 JUDGE FRYE: 56 was the report on Indian Point 20 and was the last one, as I recall.

j 21 MR. MILLER: Okay. Let me mark as Suffolk 22 County Exercise Exhibit 57 a copy of the NUREG/CR-3524 which 23 Dr. Mileti and I have been discussing.

24 The first page of this simply has the title of 25 the NUREG, and it's dated -- the date of issue, May 1984.

f i

l l

81601010 5073 suewalsh

( 1 It's a multi-page document.

2 (The document referred to is marked 3 as Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 4 Number 57 for identification.)

5 MR. MILLER: I would also like to hand out at 6 this time and have marked as Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 7 58 a copy of another multi-page document which -- the first 8 page of which has at the top in handwriting "EOC." And then 9 four columns, Objective and then FEMA Assessment and then 10 FEMA Evaluation and then Cohesiveness Rating and then 11 finally the column entitled " Comments."

12 (The document referred to is marked

~

13 as Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit O 14 Number 58 for identification.)

15 JUDGE FRYE: Do you have any clips?

16 MR. MILLER: We will get some.

17 JUDGE FRYE: I think we should, because this has 18 so many parts to it.

19 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 20 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, the document we have identified 21 as Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit Number 57, does this 22 appear to be a copy of the NUREG/CR-3524 report?

23 A Yes, it sure does.

24 Q And, what we have identified as Suffolk County 1

25 Exercise Exhibit 58, could you describe that to me?

  • C)

81601010 5074 cuewalsh 1

A This is an overview of how I tried to view the 2 FEMA post-exercise assessment in terms of the concepts I 3 would want to put on and eyeglass as a sociologist as d

illustrated in the NUREG report.

5 Let ne ask you first about Exhibit 58, Dr.

Q 6 The handwriting in the margins and in the columns I Mileti.

7 assume is your handwriting?

8 A' No, it's not.

9 Q Is it an assistant of some sort?

10 A Absolutely, yes.

4 " And, I gather that the typed text are various Q

12 portions and sections of the FEMA report for Shoreham?

13 A That have been photo-reduced I believe.

l

" 14 Q Now, does Exhibit 58 contain the entire FEMA' 15 report?

16 A I believe it leaves out the conclusions of the 17 FEMA report.

18 Q When you tell me the conclusions were omitted, 19 what conclusions are you referring to?

20 A What they concluded was a deficiency and their l

1 21 general overall conclusions and the title page land that sort 22 of thing.

23 Q The sections that discuss the actual 24 deficiencies and ARCAs, that has been omitted? Is that what

[

25 you are telling me?

{~ --

81601010 5075 cuewalsh O

k/ 1 A Yes. I think that was excluded. And, I believe 2 we also included in our analysis data on -- or, there may 3 have been reference in the FEMA report that for my purposes 4 served no purpose.

5 0 Can you just give me an example?

6 A The congregate care centers we excluded from our 7 analysis, because they weren't really exercised. There was 8 no data, so to speak.

9 Q Now, Dr. Miletic I assume that Exhibit 58 was to the basis for Attachment F to the LILCO testimony; is that 13 correct?

12 A Yes, it was. It had a whole lot to do with it.

13 Q Well, am I correct that the data that is noted 14 in the right-hand written column under " Cohesiveness Rating" 15 was what's gathered and compiled on Exhibit 58 and then 16 basically transferred to the format on Attachment F?

17 A Yes.

18 Q So, there should be a direct correlation between 19 your cohesiveness ratings and Exhibit 58 and those 20 identified in Attachment F?

21 A Except for the mistakes that were made that we 22 tried to correct I believe before I was here as part of a 23 package that was submitted to everybody.

24 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, what I would like for you to 25 do, if you could do this, is to, explain to me briefly how

81601010 5076 cuewalsh

/

( la 1 you identified your cohesiveness ratings. And, I would be 2 glad for you to demonstrate that with the very first example 3 on Page 1 of Exhibit 58.

d Let me just explain, my problem is that I see a 5 bunch of underlining under the text of the FEMA report but I 6

see no correlation between that underlined -- those 7

underlined passages and the ratings that you identify in a your column.

9 Is there a way that I can obtain that 10 information or would it require you to go through each and 33 everyone of these sentences and tell me?

12 A I could tell you how we did it for each and

-, 13 every one.

( )"! 14 Q That's going to take far too long, I suspect.

15 A If you want a copy of what I brought with me 16 today, you are more than welcome to it. But, in order for 17 me to answer your question, I need to look at how I make the 18 links.

19 Q Maybe you could just do it for the first one.

20 A I'm happy to.

l, l

21 Q The very first EOC-1 objective.

l 22 A What I tried to do -- and I need to give a short l

23 background -- was read the FEMA report from the point of 24 view of what I, as a sociologist, thought would make a 25 difference in terms of judging whether or not LERO could l

l

81601010 5077 cuewalsh I

( 1 accomplish its emergency response objectives. In order to 2 do that -- thank God FEMA doecn't employ sociologists -- I 3 had to take an ax to the FEMA report.

4 I put on my sociological eyeglasses, and I used 5 this information to look for the kinds of factors I, as a 6 sociologist, would want to discover. The first one, EOC-1 i

7 on this attachment, deals with role definition.

8 And, in Appendix F we gave it a cohesive rating 9 within the organization; that is, the EOC that was being 10 looked at. In reference to role definition, we wanted to 11 know whether or not people knew what their job was.

12 And, I read the paragraph in regard to EOC-1 to

3 see if there was any information that would lead me to make 7-s d 14 I a conclusion that people knew what their job was. It says 15 in that paragraph, " Initial notification of the Unusual 16 Event..." et cetera, and I could read all that's underlined 17 and there was enough there to make me conclude that in is reference to notification that it worked; and, thereby 19 conclude that the people engaged in notification knew that 20 they had that job. If they didn't know that, notification 21 wouldn't have occurred.

22 Q Could I just interrupt a second, Dr. Mileti? Do 23 I assume then that the first passage which is underscored 24 relates to role definition?

25 A It told me that someone knew enough to get O

81601010 5078 cuewalsh 1

notification accomplished. Initial notification of the 2

unusual event, et cetera was received by the LILCO -

i 3 supervising service operator in Hicksville, New York and i

d

. on. And, it also goes on to describe other things'in  !

5 relation to verification of the notification, et cetera.

6 Your conclusion about role definition being Q

1 7

) cohesive for this particular objective, does that-relate

- 8 just to that first sentence of the FEMA report extraction?

9 Or, do you go beyond that to this entire two i 10 paragraphs?

" A No. I would have included other things in there 12 in reference to whether or not people knew their roles in.

13 order to have notification occur. But, an emphasis would (3"\ 14 have been on that first sentence.

15 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. So, if I understand you 16 correctly, the entire underlined material in the first two 17

paragraphs relates to all of these factors which have gotten 18 a C rating over in the right margir.?

19 WITNESS MILETI: That's correct. And, as it 20 should be, if it's not underlined, then it didn't have 21 anything to tell me about factors that aren't listed there.

22 JUDGE FRYE: I see. Some sentences or some 23 statements might have a greater relationship to one factor 24 as opposed to another?

l 25 WITNESS MILETI: That's right. And, it was i

l-f-

81601010- 5079 cuewalsh 1 qualitative in the sense that I had to read the paragraph, 2 knowing what I was looking for to make the judgment.

3 What I just tried to do with this was nothing 4 more than formalize my reading of the FEMA assessment and 5 catalogue what I was looking for when I was reading it.

6 That's all it is.

7 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 8 Q Dr. Mileti, I understand. You read the FEMA 9 report sections, you made a judgment about what that report 10 said to you about these cohesiveness factors, and you 11 indicated that judgment in the column that's entitled 12 " Cohesiveness Rating," correct?

13 A I had assistance in doing that. And, I would 14 make one other correction, and that was that a C score, 15 which stands for cohesiveness, means that it would 16 contribute to that, not that it represented cohesiveness but 17 one of the factors I would want to take into account in 18 drawing a composite picture about whether or not that factor 19 as a whole existed in LERO as a whole as illustrated by the 20 FEMA report.

21 Q Okay. My first question, Dr. Mileti, is is 22 there any way that I, just by looking at what has been 23 identified as Suffolk County Exhibit 58, can determine which 24 of your cohesiveness factors relate to which particular 25 portions from the FEMA report?

l

81601010 5080 cuewalsh

-q l VJ A Absolutely, yes.

2 Q I can? Can you tell me how I can do that?

3 A I had to do it myself in getting ready to come d

here, because I thought it would be fair for me to be able 5

to illustrate that.

6 And, I've done it in two ways. One is, in my 7

testimony I've labeled every entry that I've made with a 8 little footnote; and, then I've broken it down by EOC; and, 9

then I've written the explanation of what came from where on 10 this set of notes.

~

' And, then I got tired of doing it that way, I'm 12 sorry to say, and started color-coding things and color-13 coded entries on the FEMA assessment so, if asked, I could Id tell you where everything came from.

15 0 Dr. Mileti, I wasn't clear perhaps. My. question 16 is, can I look at Exhibit 58 and make the kinds of 17 determinations that you apparently have made?

18 A If you are an organizational sociologist, you

'9 probably could. I take it you are not.

20 Let me just ask you this, Dr. Mileti. Are you Q

21 offering your notes to me so that I can draw some 22 conclusions about Exhibit 58?

23 A You can have a copy of them. I'm not going to 24 let you take the only copy.

25 You might want to ask me a question, and I need h

81601010 5081 cuewalsh

(_/ 1 them.

2 MR. MILLER: Does counsel for LILCO have any 3 objection?

4 MS. MONAGHAN: No objection to that.

5 MR. MILLER: Perhaps, Judge Frye, I can get a 6 copy right at the lunch break and I will try to look at 7 these notes during lunch.

8 I can't make any connection by looking at 9 Exhibit 58, and I would like to be able to do that.

10 JUDGE FRYE: Is it color-coded, Dr. Mileti?

13 Your notes are color-coded?

12 WITNESS MILETI: Half of them are, half of them 13 aren't.

14 MR. MILLER: But, I will look at the notes over 15 lunch and maybe I can draw some correlation and I can 16 obviously then shorten any examination I would conduct on 17 this exhibit.

18 I just can't understand the exhibit by just 19 looking at it in the format that it was provided to us by 20 counsel for LILCO. So, I would like to look at these notes 21 during the lunch break and see if I can help formulate some 22 opinions in my own mind.

23 JUDGE FRYE: All right.

24 MS. MONAGHAN: I assume that you will then make 25 a copy of them if you need to retain your own copy, Mr.

O

81601010 5082 cuewalsh

/

k_)T J I Miller?

2 MR. MILLER: Oh, certainly.

3 MS MONAGHAN: Okay.

d JUDGE FRYE: If you are going to make copies, 5

maybe you could make three copies for the Board as well. If 6 we are going to get into it -- I mean, if you are going to 7

use it, I think it might be helpful for us to have it.

8 MR. MILLER: I'm hopeful that we are not going 9

to get too deeply into it, especially given the fact that I 10 have to finish with Dr. Mileti today. I'm not sure we would il be able to do that.

12 Let me look at the notes. If I see that we are 13 going to get into this, I will make copies for the Board.

O'r:-, Id WITNESS MILETI: If I may add something, I is didn't mean for this to confuse anybody. I read the FEMA 16 report and formed an opinion and just tried to illustrate on 17 what my opinion is based and took notes.

18 JUDGE FRYE: Yeah. I think I understand your 19 notes. I think I understand your notes.

20 MR. MILLER: It's just that I think we are going 21 to need the notes so that we can understand Exhibit 58, 22 That's what I think I'm hearing from Dr. Mileti.

23 And, so I will look at the notes, and if I'm ,

24 going to go into Exhibit 58 in any detail I will try to make 25 copies of the pages of Dr. Mileti's notes. The color will (h

u.J -

81601010 5083 cuewalsh (q

_/ 1 not show up on a xerox, I suppose, but --

2 MS. MONAGHAN: No, it will not. I sincerely 3 doubt it unless you have access to a xerox machine that will 4 xerox colors. There are such things but I don't --

5 JUDGE FRYE: There is probably one somewhere.

6 MR. CUMMING: Judge Frye, just so I understand 7 what has transpired for the time when my witnesses appear, 8 counsel for Intervenors has introduced an exhibit that he 9 doesn't understand?

10 And now he has asked for personal notes of the 13 witnesses to explain it. I thought the time for that --

12 JUDGE FRYE: Counsel has identified an exhibit s 13 which he doesn't understand because it was prepared by the-14 witness.

15 MR. MILLER: Yes, but that's --

16 MR. CUMMING: I assume it was turned over during 17 the discovery to --

18 MR. MILLER: It was not, Mr. Cumming, and that's 19 the problem. Let me just state for the record --

20 MS. MONAGHAN: Yes, it was.

21 MR. MILLER: -- since Mr. Cumming has brought 22 this up, Judge Frye, this is part -- let me back up.

23 Discovery was concluded some time ago, as everyone in this 24 room knows. We never were given nor made aware -- we were 25 never given.nor were we ever made aware of this analysis by O

81601010 5084 r

cuewalsh

(-y/> I Dr. Mileti.

2 At some point in time, precisely on March 20th, 3

1987, we were served with LILCO's testimony on Contention d

50. Then, for the first time we were at least aware of the 5 fact that Dr. Mileti had conducted an analysis based on 6

NUREG 3524. We still, however, had never been given this 7

document that has been labeled Exhibit 58.

8 JUDGE FRYE: I don't want to --

1 9

MR. MILLER: I then filed a motion to strike 10 with this Board which --

II JUDGE FRYE: The Board is familiar with what has 12 happened. And, I don't want to get into a rehash of what 13 happened in the past.

7-,-,

(_)d Id Dr. Mileti is going to furnish you his notes so is you can look at them at the lunch hour, and we will proceed 16 from there.

17 MR. CUMMING: I didn't want to rehash it 18 either. I just wanted an explanation. Now, I have an 19 explanation from counsel.

20 JUDGE FRYE: All right.

21 MR. CUMMING: Counsel for FEMA has never seen 22 this document before either.

23 JUDGE FRYE: That's Exhibit 58, 24 MR. CUMMING: It's potentially -- as all 25 exhibits introduced that were not produced in discovery

(-

81601010 5085 cuewalsh

() I before this Board -- an issue which FEMA has not yet 2 established a position on. Before our witnesses go on, we 3 .will with respect to the nature of the review or what is 4 required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and its 5 adjudicatory body for FEMA witnesses to be able to testify 6 to.

7 Normal procedure in a hearing would be, where an 8 exhibit had been marked and entered, it would be fair 9 subject for cross or direct examination of FEMA witnesses.

10 Now, my witnesses have never seen this document either.

31 JUDGE FRYE: Well, if your witnesses haven't 12 seen it, they obviously can't testify about it, you know. I 13 think --

14 MR. CUMMING: I'm hoping that's the position my 15 Agency takes. Thank you.

16 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, let me just make one 17 thing clear, and it's just based on something Mr. Cumming 18 stated.

19 This was turned over to Suffolk County. It was 20 not turned over during the course of the normal discovery 21 period but afterwards.

22 JUDGE FRYE: Let's get off of that subject.

23 Let's get off of that subject.

24 I think we are getting bogged down in procedural 25 matters. Dr. Mileti, let me -- I was flipping through your O

81601010 5086 i cuewalsh I ' I testimony. Frankly, I think we have gotten into so many 2 details here that I'm losing the forest in the trees.

3 Can you summarize for me, or refer me quickly to 4

your bottom line with regard to this effort that you have 5

accomplished?

6 7

8 9

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13 14 15 16 17 i

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21 22 23 24 25 I

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4 81601111 5087 marysimons

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(_/ 1 JUDGE FRYE:

2 WITNESS MILETI: Certainly.

3 (Pause while the witness reviews his documents.)

4 MS. MONAGHAN: I think if you look at page 20, 5 Question 16, that might be what you're looking for.

6 WITNESS MILETI: That's exactly what I just 7 found,and my bottom line is in fact there.

8 JUDGE FRYE: And that would be based then I 9 gather on the summary sheet to the attachment, Attachment F, 10 " Summary of Cohesiveness Factors All Facilities," is that 11 correct?

12 WITNESS MILETI: Unfortunately, no. It's based 13 on that plus all the pages behind it.

14 JUDGE FRYE: But this summarizes the pages 15 behind it?

16 WITNESS MILETI: In fact, it does summarize it, 17 but I state in my testimony that I don't really consider all 18 those scores additive. They really are nominal level of 19 data, and the intervals between them can't be assumed to be 20 equal, and therefore I don't want to treat those numbers as 21 if they are real numbers. So I need to take into account 22 the qualitative rankings that precede them.

23 JUDGE FRYE: Maybe I'm jumping ahead. What do 24 you mean by qualitative rankings?

25 WITNESS WATTS: Whether an organization on the O

81601111 5088 marysimons (q);

I basis of what I read when I read the FEMA report appeared to 2 me as if it was messing up totally being able to achieve a 3 goal or somewhere in the middle, and so I ranked them in d terms of let's just say A, B and C. In this case we used 5 the ranking C, PC and U, but it might as well be A, B and C, T

6 and when you add an A and a B together and then add a C in, 7 it doesn't necessarily mean free.

8 So in that sense I don't consider the summary 9 table, those numbers to b* teal numbers in the sense that 10 two is twice one.

11 JUDGE FRYE: I wouldn't have thought so, no.

> 12 The "C" means cohesive, does it not?

13 WITNESS MILETI: It would contribute to 14 cohesiveness.

15 JUDGE FRYE: Contribute to cohesiveness?

16 WITNESS MILETI: Yes.

17 JUDGE FRYE: And PC would partially contribute I 18 assume?

19 WITNESS MILETI: That's correct.

20 JUDGE FRYE And U would not?

21 WITNESS MILETI: There was a problem, yes.

22 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. So the weighting really is 23 in the three categories?

24 WITNESS MILETI: That's correct.

25 JUDGE FRYE: And in order to come up with a 1

,- - ,-- ,-,,.--r-m . , - , - , ~ --..,a -n.--m- - - - - r - ,--e - --

81601111 5089 carysimons (O

,j 1 favorable conclusion, which you have come up with, could 2 these, and I'm reluctant to say numbers, could the 3 recurrence of C, PC and U have changed very dramatically and 4 still permit you to come up with a favorable conclusion?

5 WITNESS MILETI: I wanted to look, and what I 6 did look at were the patterns of them rather than the 7 numbers of them.

8 In other words, I wasn't trying to do a critical 9 incident analysis in any way, and I'm not comparing the 10 numbers of P's to the numbers of C's. I have a summary 11 table because it helped me make judgments going across 12 categories of concepts.

13 JUDGE FRYE: So you would really be when you 14 went through the attachments to the summary-table or the 4

is material behind the summary table, you would be looking 16 through to pick up patterns?

17 WITNESS MILETI: That's right. If one tore them is out of the testimony and laid them side to side from left to 19 right and made a running look across a particular category 20 of concepts like internal organizational cohesion or intra-21 organizational cohesion, a bird's eye view of the pattern, 22 which is a qualitative array of what occurred in translating 23 the FEMA assessment, as I chose to, is what I really need to

24 make my assessment.

l 25 JUDGE FRYE: So basica11y' you would be looking

81601111 5090 carysimons

( 1 at things like this intra and inter-organizational 2 flexibility formalization for each one of the various things 3 that FEMA looked at, each one of the various functions of LERO that PEMA looked at?

4 5 WITNESS MILETI: We certainly tried to do that, 6 but in reference to that particular one there was very 7 little information reported.

8 JUDGE FRYE: Right. I see that there is nothing 9 on this first line that I looked at.

10 All right, I think I understand a little better il what you were doing.

12 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I appreciate the 13 Board's inquiry. I'm still optimistic that we will get

' (s /" l

,c_,l I will, like I said, 14 through this today with Dr. Mileti.

15 try to take his notes during the lunch break and look at 16 this Exhibit 58 in that context.

17 My initial question was just to ask Dr. Mileti 18 if there was some way I could relate the underlying passages 19 to particular the particular ratings.

20 JUDGE PRYE: I understand what you were trying 21 to do. I just was getting, as I said initially, getting 22 lost in the trees and I wanted to see if I couldn't bring 23 the forest into focus a little bit.

24 MR. MILLER: Maybe we should just take the lunch 25 break now. -

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I l

81601111 5091 l carysimons

! 1 JUDGE FRYE I was going to suggest that it's i

2 probably a good time to do that.

! 3 (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the hearing recessed, 4 to reconvene at 1:45 p.m., the same day.)

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81601111 5092 carysimons

(;-y)2 1 AFTERNOON SESSION 2 (1:45 p.m.)

3 JUDGE FRYE: Back on the record.

d Whereupon, l

5 DENNIS M. BEHR 6 CHARLES A. DAVERIO 7 MICHAEL K. LINDELL 8 and 9 DENNIS S. MILETI 10 a panel of witnesses called on behalf of LILCO resuTid the 11 seats at the witness table and, having been previously duly 12 sworn by Judge Frye, were further examined and testitled

, _ , 13 further as follows:

- 14 JUDGE FRYE Dr. Mileti's notes, were they 15 helpful?

16 JUDGE PARIS: Did you complete your analysis, 17 Mr. Miller.

18 MR. MILLER: No, sir. But in my typical 19 characteristic manner of trying to be as honest as possible 20 with this Board, I will tell the Board that in the space of 21 a lunch break it was simply impossible to really try to 22 digest all of the materials that we were handed right before 23 the lunch break.

24 We made a very, very quick review of the 25 materials. I think the best thing to do in light of Dr.

O

I 81601111 5093 carysimons

() 1 Mileti's time constraint is to simply try to go through 2 Exhibit 58 without using or relying upon the documents that 3 were provided to us before the lunch break. Dr. Mileti will 4 have those available to him and I suppose if he gets a 5 pertinent question where his notes are useful, he can refer 6 to his notes and try to make that information available to 7 everyone.

8 But there just simply wasn't time to conduct 9 that kind of review during a lunch break. So we provided to the notes back to Dr. Mileti and we made no copies of any of Il the notes of any kind for ourselves or anyone else.

12 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, just so it's clear, I i3 think what Exhibit 58 shows is Dr. Mileti's correlations on 14 a paragraph-by-paragraph basis, and in order to establish is some of these cohesiveness factors it may be frequently 16 relate to more than one sentence.

17 What Dr. Mileti's notes permit him to do is to la try to relate more on a sentence-by-sentence basis, but I 19 think Exhibit 58 by itself provides his thinking on the 20 cohesiveness factors.

21 JUDGE FRYE That was the impression I got, but 22 let's go a paragraph or two. I would like to get a feel for 23 this.

24 MR. MILLER: Fine. Can I pick the examples, 25 please?

O

81601111 5094 marysimons

(%i

,)2 1 JUDGE FRYE: Yes.

2 (Laughter.)

3 BY MR. MILLER:

4 I will ask you, Dr. Mileti, about some of your Q

5 ratings for Patchogue, and to be honest with you, I'm asking 6 you about Patchogue because I know from my review of the 7 FEMA report that Patchogue was one of the staging areas a where there were some problems identified. So it's not a 9 completely random selection on my part.

l 10 Why don't we turn to the Patchogue section of Il your Exhibit 58. The pages are not numbered. It's about 12 half way through I think.

__, 13 JUDGE FRYE: Is there an objective number or O"i 14 something that goes with it?

15 JUDGE PARIS: Is all of Patchogue together?

16 MR. MILLER: Yes. It says "Patchogue" at the 17 top in handwriting, and it's maybe two-thirds through it.

18 JUDGE FRYE And it's all clipped together, if 19 I'm not mistaken.

i 20 MS. MONAGHAN: Right, it's all stapled together 4

21 in one packet labeled "Patchogue" on the top. Each of the 22 different units that were analyzed are separately indicated 23 by their name at the top and all the pages that deal with 24 that unit are stapled together.

. 25

. BY MR. MILLER:

1 4

81601111 5095 marysimons

() 1 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, would you look at Patchogue 2 staging area 4, objective staging area 4.

3 (Witness complies.)

4 On Exhibit 58 you have one rating, that is 5 interorganizational, and you have it rated as a "C" for 6 cohesiveness resource adequacy. Could you explain to me and 7 to the Board how you derived that rating for those a particular two paragraphs, or one paragraph from the FEMA 9 report?

10 A (Witness Mileti) Yes, I can. I read what FEMA 11 provided in reference to SA-4 for Patchogue and singled out 12 the following three sentences or. thereabouts on which I

. 13 based that judgment which I'll explain when I get done 73 d 14 reading those sentences.

is The sentences were "The Patchogue staging area 16 met the objective of demonstrating adequate space, parking 17 area, equipment and supplies to support operations, SA-4.

i 18 All operations were conducted on the first floor which was 19 large enough to comfortably accommodate approximately 400 20 emergency workers."

21 And then going down to the sentence after that 22 next one, "Two large parking lots are adjacent to the 23 staging area. All equipment was kept in a locked storage l

r 24 room in the basement. The entire inventory as stated in l

25 OPIP 5.2.1 was verified." ,

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81601111 5096 marysimons

,, . g

(_h 1 I read those statements and we made the judgment 2 that that was indicative of there being adequate resources 3 there and that that was relevant in reference to what I had 4 categorized as the interorganizational network or 5 organizational field of organizations that responds to 6 emerger.cies because that was set up for interaction between 7 organizations.

8 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, could I ask, first of all, in 9 your opinion, how does any of that relate to training?

10 A My general thesis in doing all of this was that 11 in order to make an assessment about whether or not there is 12 a fundamental flaw which was part of the contention in the 13 training program, one would need to look at in reference to b~/ 14 the exercise the good things that happened as well as the 15 mistakes that happened rather than just the mistakes.

16 In order to conclude whether or not there is a 17 fundamental flaw, I wanted to look at the good, the bad and 18 what was in the middle, and I wanted to look at the good and 19 bad and what was in the middle in reference to the concepts 20 that my discipline and I as a sociologist think is important 21 in terms of judging whether or not an organization can be 22 effective because I think the purpose of training is to make 23 an organization effective at accomplishing the goals it sets 24 out to accomplish.

25 Q Dr. Mileti, is it fair to say that in wanting to D

81601111 5097 marysimons A

(_) I look at the good and the bad you did that irrespective of 2 whether it was a training need or problem identified or a 3 non-training need or problem?

4 A I looked at the whole ball of wax as it was 5 revealed in the FEMA assessment in order to make a judgment 6 about organizational effectiveness, and that would include 7 anything that was relevant to training, and it would also e include things relevant to in this case space or resoi.cces, 9 which is why I catalogued it that way.

10 Q Now another follow-up question, Dr. Mileti. In il that paragraph you were reading there is a statement you did 12 not read which says at the bottom "However, only one first 13 aid kit was available. It is recommended that consideration 14 be given to acquiring more first aid kits as well as is additional goggles, gloves and boots."

16 Now does that not indicate that perhaps resource 17 adequacy could have been better than it was determined to be is on the day of the exercise by FEMA?

19 A That indicates that somebody thought that there 20 was only one first aid kit available and that they 21 recommended that someone should consider if they need more.

22 Q Plus additional other equipment, goggles, gloves 23 and boots?

24 A That's correct.

25 Q Now why is it that that did not impact your

81601111 5098 marysimons Ai

( ,)2 1 rating so as to at least result in a PC or partially 2 cohesive rating?

3 A I didn't think it was that central. It could 4 have resulted in a PC, but there was so much of the other 5 positive stuff that seemed more important in terms of 6 organizational effectiveness that I judged it to be a "C".

7 Q Could I ask you, Dr. Mileti, to look at the 8 staging six objective, which is further down on the same 9 page. Let me ask you just with respect to resource adequacy 10 again where again you have rated that as "C" or cohesive.

Il Could you tell me what portions from the FEMA report 12 supported your rating in that regard?

13 A The main portion was the following sentence.

Ol

( J" 14 "The plan complement of guards was posted at all three 15 entrances and sign-in badging was implemented properly."

16 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, at the end of this paragraph 17 which is on the next page of Exhibit 58 it states "It is 18 recommended that a guard should be stationed at this 19 location and that this fire escape should be designed as a 20 guard post."

21 Can you tell me why that statement did not again 22 at least result in a rating of partially cohesive rather 23 than cohesive?

24 A Because I judged that by and large there was 25 resource adequacy.

O

81601111 5099 marysimons O i o Cee1d vee 1eek ae seasine area eiehe under 2 Patchogue, Dr.-Mileti, and let's try looking at a different 3 factor, communications ability which you rated as. cohesive.

4 Can you tell me the particular portion of this 5 paragraph that led you to that conclusion?

6 A It appears that it is part of a sentence that is 7 read as follows, "And directed all operations through his i principal subordinates."

a 9 Q That demonstrated communications ability to you?

! to A Yes, as well as there are some other things that

11 could have been there, but in terms of my color coding,

! 12 that's how it's coded, j

13 Q Dr. Mileti, did you perform-this analysis, or 14 did your assistant perform this analysis?

15 A We both did -- well, my assistant that I used i

i 16 was Vicky Pallimiato. She did it. Then we talked and she 17 did it again, and then the two of us sat down and did it j 18 again.

j 19 Q Did the results change from the three different 20 times that you did the analysis?

21 A Absolutely. That is why we had some changes 22 that we had to submit at the beginning of submitting this 23 week when I wasn't here.

24 Q Does this person work for you at Colorado State?

25 A No. I think she is the Director of Training for

!O 4

i

~ . _ _ .-

81601111 5100 marysimons

. vfi i I LERO.

2 Q Is she a trained sociologist?

4 3 A She has a bachelor's degree in anthropology and t . .

d sociology, and she does speak sociology which made it easy l

5 for us to get along.

t 6 JUDGE FRYE: Dr. Mileti, does one need to be a 7 trained sociologist in order to do something like this?

8 WITNESS MILETI: I think that -- yes. The l' 9 answer is'yes. I think in having a look at the FEMA i

10 assessment with the purpose of making conclusions about il abstract sociological concepts one is best to have some 12 training in sociology, but it's not that difficult. You 13 certainly could sit down and talk with a sociologist for a

{

1 4

14 while.

15 I have no problem in doing it and in making 16 judgments because I think I understand what these concepts l 17 mean and what they're driving at, but I understand also that 18 it's difficult for non-social scientists to sometimes t

19 understand the elaborate jargon that we can use.

l 20 BY MR. MILLER:

! 21 Q Dr. Mileti, can I ask you about staging area.10 22 objective for Patchogue. It's on the same page we were just j, 23 looking at. You again rated resource adequacy as "C" or i 24 cohesive. Is it fair to say from my review of that 25 paragraph that you base that upon the sentence "When the ,

($}

k 81601111 5101 marysimons

/m

(,) i radio of one traffic guide failed the traffic guide found a 2 telephone and called the staging area"?

3 A Partly, yes.

4 0 What else did you base your rating upon?

5 A The objective of demonstrating the ability to 6 communicate with all appropriate field locations and 7 personnel was met.

8 Q Can you tell me, Dr. Mileti, when you have an 9 explicit statement by FEMA that a radio failed why again 10 that did not result in at least a rating of partially 11 cohesive?

12 A I thought it showed, and that's why we have a i3 "C" also in adaptability because that illustrated that that 14 problem that was presented was able to be dealt with.

15 0 I understand why perhaps you would have rated 16 this as a cohesiveness of adaptability in that regard, but 17 with respect to resource adequacy should you not have rated is this as partially cohesive at most?

19 A No, I don't think so at all because a 20 replacement radio was promptly dispatched. There are always 21 going to be failed radios whenever radios are used.

22 Q How do you define partially cohesive, Dr.

23 Mileti?

24 A Well, in the original NUREG report that we did 25 we didn't have anything in the middle. Partially cohesive

d 81601111 5102 marysimons

] 1 or.something that would indicate that something was wrong, 2 but not-totally wrong is basically the offerant that we 3 used, that-is, somebody set out to do something, for d example, and had trouble doing it, but then it finally got ,

5 done. Partially' cohesive, I never intended to be a good

, 6 . score. I mean it indicates that something was wrong, but

? not totally wrong.

8 Q .And then in the NUREG analysis there was no such 9 . rating; is that correct?

10 A No, that's correct. We didn't do that.

13 Q How would you distinguish partially cohesiveness 12 as a rating from neutral as a rating?

! 13 A Neatral in the NUREG report was used to signify O.,_.,J 14 when the field researchers couldn't form a consensus about-is how thingt, went, and there was no neutral score given in the 16 assessment we did on the FEMA exercise of the Shoreham ,

l 17 assessment -- or Shoreham exercise.  ;

18 Q But for neutral -- oh, I see. When there was no

).

19 data available you just rated that as a zero; is that 20 correct?

21 A And then we left the zeros out on the tables 22 that we -- I mean there was no data available. So therefore 23 we couldn't make a judgment on that.

1 24 Q So in Attachment P of the testimony any time i

25 something has been left blank, that indicates no data in l0 i

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81601111 5103 marysimons

( 1 your opinion was available?

2 A We couldn't find an indicant in the FEMA 3 assessment that could lead us to conclude something in this 4 matrix, nor would there be data on everything in the matrix.

5 Q It appears, Dr. Mileti, from my review of i 6 Attachment F that there are a large, large number of factors 7 where there was no data available to you; is that a fair i

8 statement?

9 A There are a large number of blanks where we had 10 nothing from which we could infer any of these sociological j 11 concepts.

12 Q Let me ask you a different kind of question, Dr.

13 Mileti, Patchogue field 6, that objective. You rate 14 knowledge for that objective as PC or partially cohesive 15 under interorganizational. Can you explain to me why 16 knowledge in this case based upon this particular paragraph 17 of the FEMA report was an interorganizational factor?

18 A I'm going to have to read this. I've got orange 19 down and there is no orange here. My color code has 20 failed. Let me take a look.

21 Q I'm looking at Patchogue field 6.

. 22 A I'm sorry, I was looking at SA-6. Okay, I see 23 orange. I read the following section of the FEMA 24 assessment. "However, only one traffic guide out of 14 who 25 were interviewed at nine TCPs knew the location of the p

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81601111 5104 marysimons

() -l reception center, and one traffic guide thought that the 2 general public was to'be directed to the EWDF. It is 3 recommended that all traffic guides be trained to advise 4 motorists with questions to tune to the EBS radio station, 5 WALK FM for the latest information on all matters related to 6 the emergency, including the location of the reception 7 center."

8 A Now I have two questions, Dr. Mileti.

4 9 First of all, why is it that you believe that 10 statement regarding the knowledge of LERO traffic guides 1

li constituted an interorganizational factor?

2 12 A The traffic guides are talking about or 1

_, 13 potentially interacting with the public in reference to I

" 14 information about the reception center and in reference to 15 talking about the EBS station. And, therefore, there is an 16 element of interaction or communication across boundaries of 17 the organization.

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

81601212 5105 joewalsh n

(_,) i Q So, Dr. Mileti, even though the only personnel 2 referenced were LERO personnel you consider that to be an 3 inter-organizational factor?

4 A (Witness Mileti) Oh, absolutely. I took an ax 5 to LERO as well in terms of defining what was an 6 organization for the purpose of this analysis and what 7 wasn't, in that in my opinion LERO is more than an 8 organization.

9 I view it as an organizational network; that is, 10 the organizational response network that was designed to 11 replace. Since one organization doesn't respond to an 12 emergency, a multitude do; and, therefore, I defined it as a 13 multiplicity, or view it as a multiplicity of organizations u or a network of organizations.

15 Q Dr. Lindell, do you agree that you can view LERO 16 in this manner?

17 A (Witness Lindell) Yes, I do. As a matter of is fact, I think I said something to that effect last week.

19 That was the discussion on emergent multi-organizational 20 networks.

21 0 Can you explain to me, Dr. Mileti, why you have 22 a statement by FEMA that 13 out of 14 traffic guides 23 evidenced a lack of knowledge with respect to particular 24 information that the public may need to know, that you 25 concluded that merely indicated partially cohesive rather O

81601212 5106 joewalsh-

, () I than uncohesive?

2 (Witness Mileti) Well, I wouldn't say merely 3 indicated, because I again consider PC as not a good score.

4 But, one traffic guide knew and, therefore, some training 5 did occur, some functioning of the training program did 6 occur in that regard.

7 Q Is there a reason though that this was not rated 8 as uncohesive or a U?

9 A Because there was some success with it.

10 JUDGE FRYE: If I followed that, then it would il mean.that in order to get a C you would, in essence, have to 12 have perfect performance under that particular element.

__, 13 WITNESS MILETI: Not necessarily perfect. This 0"1 14 seemed to be something in the middle.

15 JUDGE FRYE: And a PC is also something in the 16 middle?

17 WITNESS MILETI: That's what I meant to say, a is PC is something in the middle.

19 JUDGE FRYE: Oh, I misunderstood that. And, 20 then a C -- that would imply to me then that a C indicates 21 that they got it completely correct.

22 WITNESS MILETI: Not necessarily, which is why I 23 don't define these as additive scores.

i 24 JUDGE PARIS: To get a U, would you have j 25 assigned a U if none of the traffic guides had known where

(

l

81601212 5107 joewalsh O

\_ ,/ 1 the reception center was?

2 WITNESS MILETI: That's probably the case. They 3 would have had to totally botch something up.

4 JUDGE SHON: Or, would it have to be that one of 5 the traffic guides knew how to direct traffic in order to 6 get a U?

7 WITNESS MILETI: They probably would have gotten a several U's for that in reference to these concepts, because 9 one sentence could indicate several things.

10 And, if a traffic guide didn't know how to do 11 traffic and didn't show up because they didn't know they 12 were supposed to do traffic, I would have given them a U in 13 reference to knowledge as well as a U in reference to role

'- 14 definition.

15 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 16 Q Dr. Mileti, let me just follow up with the 17 Judges' questions, if I could.

18 It seems to me that if you could look at the 19 ratings you have contrived on a scale that in order to have 20 received a U or uncohesive rating there is only that one 21 small part of the scale at the very end that could have been 22 brought into play.

23 In other words, you would not give a U or 24 uncohesive rating unless it was basically total failure with 25 respect to a particular aspect of the FEMA report; is that O

81601212 5108 joewalsh si

,)2 _1 correct?

2 A I wouldn't say total failure. I think we-gave 3 out possibly some U's that were better than that, d

Q But, in this case you --

5 JUDGE PARIS: Well, in this case, it's 6 essentially total failure, isn't it? I mean, the fact that 7 one knew where the reception center was saved them from 8 getting a U; isn't that right?

9 WITNESS MILETI: But they got a PC, which I 10 consider a bad score as well. That's correct.

Il BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 12 Q So, in this case you thought there had to be m_ , 13 total failure of all 14 traffic guides not knowing the OJ 14 information?

15 Is it fair to say, Dr. Mileti, that on the other to end of the scale is the C or cohesiveness rating but that 17 with respect to a cohesiveness rating it would not take a la perfect performance to receive that kind of rating under 19 your analysis?

20 A That is fair, because I would never expect 21 perfect performance.

. 22 JUDGE PRYE: But, it would have to approach it, 23 wouldn't it, in order to earn a C?

24 WITNESS MILETI: I would never expect perfect 4 25 performance. So, I don't know if I would expect it to

('

81601212 5109 joewalsh

/,

k_-) I approach it.

2 JUDGE FRYE: But, to approach that level --

3 WITNESS MILETI: It would have to be 4 substantially better than one out of 14.

5 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

6 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 7 Q Let me ask you, Dr. Mileti, hypothetically, if a this statement would have read that 13 of the 14 traffic 9 guides knew the location of the reception center, would you 10 then have rated this for knowledge as a C for cohesiveness?

11 A Probably.

12 Q If the statement would have read that 12 of the 13 14 knew the location of the reception center, would you have O la rated this as a C for cohesiveness under knowledge?

15 A Probably.

16 Q How far down do you go before you go to the PC 17 rating with respect to this particular sentence?

18 A It wasn't that precise.

19 0 Would 10 of the 14 knowing the location still 20 result in a cohesiveness rating?

21 A It could have. Maybe yes, maybe no.

22 JUDGE FRYE: At that point, we would be getting 23 into a transition area essentially?

24 WITNESS MILETI: It seems less clear.

25 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing)

O

, . . - , . _ _ _ . , _ _ _ _ . _ . , , _ . , _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ , _ _ , . , -.c -,,,._--m ...,- , _r, ,-..,m.-- ---,. - _...--. - 3

81601212 5110 joewalsh

~ I

(_,S 1 Q So, you are getting close to some point around 2 10 or 14 to maybe thinking about giving them a PC or 3 partially cohesive rating?

4 A It would depend a great deal on the specific 5 task here. And, I think it's getting a little cloudy there.

6 This was a judgment.

7 JUDGE SHON: Dr. Mileti, in your view is knowing 8 where the reception center is, the knowledge of where the 9 reception center is located, that a portion of the traffic 4

10 guides training, a portion that is essential to his li performing his job?

12 WITNESS MILETI: Yes, it is.

__, 13 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing)

[s-]"l 14 Q Dr. Mileti, with respect to the sentence we have is been looking at with these traffic guides, given what you 16 told me earlier regarding your communications ability 17 factor, isn't it fair to say that you could have also given 18 a PC to the traffic guides with respect to communications 19 ability, because those traffic guides would be expected to, 20 under certain circumstances, communicate the information 21 they were aware of to the public?

22 A Is this in Field 67 23 Q Yes.

24 A The main thing the traffic guide should know is 25 how to guide traffic.

81601212 5111 joewalsh

() 1 Q I understand. But, looking at this particular 2 statement in the FEMA report, could you not have also have 3 rated communications ability of the traffic guides, and if 4 you would have done so would you not have also provided a PC 5 rating to that factor?

6 A No. I think we tried to focus on the main task 7 of the traffic guide.

8 If this had said, for example, one out of 14 9 traffic guides knew how to direct traffic, that would have to been an U beyond a shadow of a doubt. And, if it had said 11 one traffic guide out of 14 knew how to -- or, d'idn't know 12 how to direct traffic, we probably would have classified it

- 13 as a C. And, we tried to focus on the main function unless k' 14 there was some indication.

is But, again let me just clarify that this is 16 nothing more than the notes to represent what was going on 17 in reference to these concepts as I was reading the report.

is Q Can you tell me, Dr. Mileti, with -- I just 19 maybe want to do another one of these and then we will move 20 on -- reference to the Patchogue Field 9 objective, which is 21 the next objective in Exhibit 58, you rate for this 22 paragraph -- this is one where a deficiency was identified 23 by FEMA --

24 JUDGE PARIS: Where are you?

25 MR. MILLER: Field 9 for Patchogue.

l

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, - - , --m,- . - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,,-----rn , - - - - ----, -

:81601212. 5112 joewalsh

, h I JUDGE PARIS: Field 9?

j 2 MR. MILLER: Yes.

3 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 4 For knowledge, under intra-organizational, you Q

! 5 acknowledge as PC or partially cohesive. What particular 6 statement in this paragraph led you to that conclusion?

7 A The four bus drivers dispatched from the 8 Patchogue staging area were evaluated. They knew that they I

9 were bus-drivers. And, then we can go on and it says, I "

10 ...although one of them missed part of his assigned i 33 evacuation route. More confusion was evident on the part of

12 the other drivers. One driver proceeded to the wrong

, - 13 transfer point, and completed his route only after being j I4 prompted by the Federal evaluator. The other driver took 15 over two hours to get to his transfer point from the staging i

l 16 area because he initially went to the wrong bus garage."

f 17 And that is basically why we gave them a PC> >

18 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, did you tell me that part of l

19 the reason that you looked at the knowledge factor for this l

20 paragraph was because the four bus drivers knew they were '

i 21 bus drivers?  !

22 A That's actually why I would say that they had 23 good role definition or gave them a C for role definition. i I 24 The latter part, which you can't see, which is the yellow  !

i 25 part, is why we gave them a PC.

l

81601212 5113 joewalsh

(') 1 A few bus drivers didn't quite have the act 2 together but some did.

t 3 Q If I understand this, Dr. Mileti, you are 4 telling me that anyone in LERO that knew what their job 5 assignment was or is would receive a C rating for role 6 definition under your analysis?

7 A Absolutely. That's how I define that concept.

8 And, that's one of the major problems in emergency 9 response. Many people don't -- when you don't have to emergency planning -- know what their job is and then those 11 jobs, when there are no emergency plans, sometimes don't get 12 done.

13 Q And, with respect to your knowledge rating, Dr.

{}

\ 14 Mileti, despite all the problems identified by FEMA is regarding the performance of these four bus drivers, again I

- 16 guess from your scale, because there was not essentially 17 total failure, you decided to rate this as PC or partially 18 cohesive rather than U for uncohesive; is that correct?

19 A That's correct. But, again PC is not a good 20 Score.

21 Q Is there any way, Dr. Mileti, from looking at 22 your analysis as set forth in Attachment F or in this 23 Exhibit 58 that one could determine on the greater scale of 24 things whether PC tended to be more toward the upper end of 25 the scale which would be cohesive or the lower end of the

(

1

81601212 5114

. joewalsh

()'

I scale which would be an uncohesive rating?

.2 A No, you can't, because they are all listed as 3 PCs, and I wouldn't recommend it, because again these labels 4 are nothing more than labels.

5 Q Can you tell me, Dr. Mileti, for Field 10, the 6 next objective, why even though there is a statement about 7 the dispatch of inadequate equipment there was no rating for

] 8 resource adequacy under your analysis?

9 A Could you tell me what sentence you are looking to at?

It' Q I would be looking primarily at the entire

]

12 second part of the paragraph beginning with, "Second, the 13 Road Crew was not informed that the impediment was a I 14 multiple vehicle accident..."

15 A Fine. I see it.

16 Q Essentially through the end of the paragraph.

17 (The witness is looking at the document.)

18 A Well, I have a note on the page that the EOC got 19 a U for it, but I think that might be in reference to 20 communication. And, I would like to check that just to make 21 sure.

I 22 But, in looking at it right now, it probably 23 should have gotten that code.

24 JUDGE PARIS: U for communication; is that what
25 you are saying?

1 i

81601212 5115 joewalsh

() 1 WITNESS MILETI: That's what I didn't look up.

2 I should go and look at that.

3 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 4 Q Well, I was asking about resource adequacy, why 5 you did not apparently rate resource adequacy for this 6 particular paragraph, given the statements about the 7 equipment that was dispatched by LERO?

8 A As a U rather than a PC?

9 Q Well, it's not rated at all under -- the way I 10 read Exhibit 58, you have a rating for clarity but not for il resource adequacy.

12 A And, what I said was in reference to this 13 somebody got a U. And, I would have to -- according to my 14 note, I would have to go and look in reference to where it is was placed.

16 And, then I said I think it probably should have 17 been a U rather than a PC.

18 Q Maybe we are miscommunicating, Dr. Mileti. I'm 19 looking at Patchogue Field 10.

20 A Yes, I'm there.

21 Q I don't see the factor, resource adequacy, 22 listed.

23 JUDGE FRYE: I think what Dr. Mileti is saying 24 is that resource adequacy may have gotten a U that hasn't 4

25 been reflected on this exhibit. .

Is that -- am I correct?

j

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81601212 5116 joewalsh

- TI

( ,); 'I WITNESS MILETI: That may be somewhere else, and 2 I would have to look. And, I'm not sure.

3 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 4 0 It should be reflected on Attachment F?

5 JUDGE PARIS: I would like for you to tell me 6 why I didn't get -- why communication wasn't entered? If 7 anything deserves a U, it seems like to me communication in a this one does.

9 WITNESS MILETI: Yes, sir, I agree. And, I 10 think we gave the EOC a U on that.

13 JUDGE PARIS: Yeah. Oh, okay.

12 WITNESS MILETI: Rather than Patchogue, since 13 that's where --

(s ' 14 JUDGE PARIS: Okay. Where would that show on is your Attachment F?

16 WITNESS MILETI: Well, I would have to look.

17 For example, it could be EOC-17 with inter-organizational 18 communications ability. But, I would have to look that up.

19 I can't tell by just looking at this.

20 There are many other U's in reference to the 21 EOC.

22 JUDGE FRYE: But that's the only U under the 23 communications ability that I see.

24 JUDGE PARIS: In other words, one down there 25 under the inter-organizational --

O

81601212 5117

-joewalsh I WITNESS MILETI: That's right. So, that may be 2 it. Let me take a look.

3 (The witness is looking at a document.)  ;

4 MS. MONAGHAN: I think if you will look at the i

5 portion of EOC-17 that is in Suffolk County Exhibit 58 which 6 .is about four pages into the EOC portion of that, you will .

t 7 'see that that does, in fact, deal with the traffic  !

a impediments issue and that that was coded in Dr. Mileti's  ;

9 analysis as a U under communications ability in the inter-10 organizational network section.

11 (The witness is looking at a document.)  !

12 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing)  !

~

13 Q Dr. Mileti, I want to ask you, not Ms. Monaghan, 14 to testify about this rating for Patchogue Field 10. The l 13 EOC-17 objective that was just pointed out, you did -- do 16 you have that in front of you, sir?

17 A I did but --

18 Q Well, why don't you just -- why don't you 19 explain to me again, is it your understanding that you rated 20 communications ability as a U for this particular factor, 21 looking at Patchogue Field 10 under EOC rather than 22 Patchogue?

23 A Yes, it is.

24 0 Now, that's the point that Judge Paris raised, 25 although I note that the U that was pointed out was given .

O

81601212 5118 joewalsh D

ls_ ,4 1 under intra-organizational rather than inter-organizational.

2 Does that make a difference?

3 JUDGE FRYE: There is also one under inter-4 organizational.

5 MR. MILLER: Oh, okay. You are right, Judge 6 Frye.

7 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 8 Q Let me ask you to go back to my question about 9 resource adequacy.

10 I've looked at Attachment F, and there is no Il rating for resource adequacy under Patchogue Field 10. So, 12 is that just a mistake in your analysis?

- 13 A I think I've already said three times that there

( ',b 14 could have been a negative mark there, yes.

15 JUDGE PARIS: Could have been or should have 16 been?

17 WITNESS MILETI: Should have been.

18 MR. MILLER: Thank you, Dt. Mileti. Judge Frye, 19 I think I've explored this as much as I need to unless the 20 Board has questions.

21 JUDGE FRYE: I have some questions, but I'm not 22 sure that this is the appropriate time to get into them.

23 You have got more to go, I gather.

24 MR. MILLER: Oh, yes, sir. I was just trying to 25 follow up on,the Board's inquiry about how to interpret this

l l i l

l 81601212 5119 joewalsh

() 1 data on Exhibit 58.

2 JUDGE FRYE: Yeah. I think we are happy with it  !

3 as it now stands.

4 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 5 Q Dr. Mileti, under your analysis that is 6 reflected in Attachment F, was it possible to have taken a 7 portion of the FEMA report which resulted in a finding of a e deficiency by FEMA and yet not attribute any U or uncohesive  ;

9 ratings to that portion of the FEMA report?

10 A Absolutely. And, vice-versa. And, it happened II in both directions. l 12 Q What's the other direction? l 13 A Where FEMA didn't find anything or didn't O 14 classify something as a deficiency and we sapped it.

1 i is Q Did you do that with respect to objectives '

16 having been fully met under FEMA's analysis?

17 A I don't remember, but it's possible.

is Q Are you telling me that with respect to i

19 statements in the FEMA report that resulted in ARCAs that j 20 sometimes even though that was just an ARCA by FEMA you i

21 could have found an uncohesive or U rating?

22 A I believe that's possible, yes.

I 23 t

24 2$

([)  !

r

81601313 5120 cuewalsh I The reason is, FEMA and I would have been 2 looking for something different.

3 Q I take it that it's also possible, Dr. Mileti, 4 that when you had even deficiencies as identified by FEMA 5 that under your analysis you could have found at least some l

6 factors that received C or cohesiveness ratings; is that l

7 correct?

8 A That's absolutely correct, yes.

9 Q What about when FEMA was unable, or failed, to l

10 evaluate or observe particular LERO performance? How did il you take that into account in your analysis?

12 A If FEMA didn't write anything about it in the m, 13 report, I had nothing to read and, therefore, I couldn't 14 take it into account.

l 15 Q And that would get a zero rating or no data, no 16 listing at all in Attachment F7 11 A Yes, it would.

I In Q Can I ask you, Dr. Mileti, if you would look at 19 Port Jefferson Objective Field 10, which is the next to the 20 last page of Exhibit 587 21 (The witness is complying.)

22 And, for Field 10 under Port Jefferson there is 23 a notation under FEMA Assessment, "Not Evaluated."

! 24 A I'm sorry, I didn't understand your question.

1 25 0 I'm just asking if you would turn to that please l ,

81601313 5121 suewalsh

(,s) I in Exhibit 58, Port Jefferson Field 10 where you have noted 2 unJer FEMA Assessment "Not Evaluated."

3 Do you see that, sir?

4 A Okay. I finally got the two sheets. Now, what 5 do you want me to find on them, please?

6 Q Now, as is clear from FEMA's report, this 7 objective was not evaluated by FEMA because this is the one a where che FEMA evaluator was delayed in awaiting LERO's 9 response to the traffic impedimento.

10 Now, if it was not evaluated by FEMA, how is it 11 that you nevertheless determined that there were four 12 ratings, all indicating cohesivenean under your analysis?

) A Because there were things there that I could 14 read and make come conclusions about these concepts from.

is That in, the statement under the category " FEMA Evaluation,"

in those two paragraphs. It was information for me to use.

17 Q So, ao long as there was information in the FEMA is report, you then applied your analysis to that information?

19 A Abnolutely.

20 0 Thank you. Dr. Mileti, in the Attachment F to 2i the testimony, I just want to ask you a quick question about 22 the very firnt page of Attachment F entitled " Summary of

2) Cohooivenoon Factorn, All Facilities."

2: I annume, Dr. M11eti, that this first page 2s simply summarizon all the factorn that are listed in the b>

~-

i 81601313 5122-cuewalsh 1

Attachment F charts 2 is that correct?

2 A Yes. If you laid the charts out, end to end 3 from left to right, this would be a bird's-eye view.

4 Q So, it simply tabulates the charts of Attachment 5 y?

6 A That's correct.

7 Q Now, could you just briefly define for me, or 8 tell me, the difference between intra-organizational 9 relationships, intra and inter-organizational flexibility 10 and inter-organizational network, the three columns you have 18 here?

12 A Yes. Intra-organizational factors are factors 13 inside of what has been defined as one organization.

j 14 Intra-organizational flexibility is the 1

15 flexibility within an organization. Inter-organis:ational

16 flexibility would be the flexibility in dealing between j 17 organizations, that cross organizational boundaries.

18 And, inter-organizational network are inter-l 19 organizational factors in which more than one organization i 20 was involved.

l 21 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, from our discussion of Exhibit i

22 58 there were, however, times when even though it was just 23 performance of LERO personnel being commented about by FEMA, j 24 you determined that that indicated something about inter-25 organizational networks is that correct?

l 1 _ _ _ _ . _

81601313 5123 suewalsh

() 1 A Absolutely, because again I define FEMA (sic) as 2 more than one organization, as an organizational network.

3 Q You mean LERO?

4 A I'm sorry, although you could almost say the 5 same thing about FEMA.

6 (Laughter.)

7 0 What I would like to know, Dr. Mileti, is how 8 that -- given that statement, how is it that any performance 9 commented upon by FEMA remained within your category of to intra-organizational relationships?

11 A Because many of the things that they spoke about 12 in the assessment dealt with what I would consider intra-13 organizational aspects of how we went about analyzing LERO's 14 performance that day.

15 For example, the EOC was defined as an 16 organization. And, so if there were a comment about what 17 was going on inside the EOC; that is, somebody inside the la EOC doing something inside the EOC, that was an intra-19 organizational factor. But, if it was how the EOC 20 interacted with a staging area, for example, or another

, 21 organization as we divided them up, then we counted it as an 22 inter-organizational factor.

23 0 If you have a relationship between the EOC and 24 the staging area, would that fall within inter-i 25 organizational flexibility or inter-organizational network?

O

81601313 5124 cuewalsh

( 1 A That would have been inter-organizational. .

. 2 Q Yes, flexibility or network; or, could it be j' 3 either?

4 A I'm sorry. Could you repeat the question?

5 I'm looking at your first page of Attachment F.

Q.

6 A Yes.

7 Q Would that fall within inter-organizational e flexibility or inter-organizational network, or could it 9 have been either?

10 A I'm sorry. Could you ask me what is what again?

Il Q If you looked at a relationship or activity 12 between, for example, the EOC and the staging area?

13 A It depends on what it was that was described.

0._;-"

1 14 If it gave information in reference to flexibility, then we 15 took it as flexibility. If it gave information in reference 16 to another one of these concepts, we took it as that.

17 And,.in some cases one sentence gave information 18 on several concents.

19 Q Any activity, Dr. Milcti, that was observed and

' 70 reported on by FEMA within one unit of LERO, for example, a 23 staging area or the EOC, would, however, have stayed within 22 your intra-organizational rating?

23 A Unless it pertained to flexibility, and then it i .

24 would have gone into the flexibility category which on

.25 Attachment F we have combined inter and intra-organizational 4

I 5125

'81601313 cuewalsh

() I flexibility, because there was so little recorded in the 2 FEMA assessment that we could pull out in reference to that

< 3 concept.

4 Q Dr. Mileti, could I take the total number of 5 factors that you rated for any of these three categories as 6 reflected on Attachment F and try to come up with a 7 composite for a percentage calculation Score, if you will?

8 Can that calculation be done and mean anything, 9 in your opinion?

10 A It might mean something to you if you did it.

11 It would mean nothing to me. And, I don't recommend that 12 you do it.

13 Q Okay. So, let me just ask you as an example.

I 14 If you look at this smallest category, intra and inter-15 organizational flexibility, and I total.up all the factors 16 which you seem to have rated, I get 11 factors. And, I see 17 that you have five of those 11 rated as either partially la cohesive or uncohesive.

19 And, I.do the division and determine that in 20 54.5 percent of the time your ratings resulted in a cohesive 21 rating but in the other 45.5 percent of the time there was a 22 partially cohesive or uncohesive rating, would that mean 23 anything to perform that sort of calculation?

24 A It would mean absolutely nothing. And, I also 25 wouldn't recommend that you do it for the other categories O

81601313 5126 cuewalsh (2 1 where it would come out seemingly more in favor to LERO.

2 For example, the intra-organizational relations if you added 3 all that up, there are a lot more C scores. But, I wouldn't 4 do that.

5 JUDGE FRYE: Dr. Mileti, based upon your work 6 here, what particular -- in what particular areas do you 7 think training is lacking or needs more emphasis?

8 WITNESS MILETI: I would have to give that some 9 considered thought. I would have to say that there were 10 some problems revealed by my assessment, leaving FEMA's i 11 alone for right new.

12 My conclusion was only.-- or, my analysis was 13 only to help me formulate an opinion in reference to, is bj N# 14 there a fundamental flaw, which is what I thought the is contention really went to in reference to the training 16 program. And, I thought there was simply too much success.

17 as revealed by how I chose to do my review in terms of the i

18 concepts that I think make sense and are important to look 19 at.

20 In terms of what are the particular things one 21 might want to focus on, I think there probably are some.

22 But, I don't have a list of them.

23 And, before I spoke on that I would have to give 24 it some thought.

25 JUDGE FRYE: Well, let me go back to the way you

i I 81601313 5127 L suewalsh-() i looked at it. You looked at it in terms of fundamental 2 flaws revealed in --

3 WITNESS MILETI: That's correct.

I 4 JUDGE FRYE: -- the training program?

5 WITNESS MILETI: That's correct.

6 JUDGE FRYE: And, do I understand correctly that 7 you didn't find any based on this?

8 WITNESS MILETI: If I were to find a fundamental 9 flaw, what I would have had to have seen in order to do 10 that, to come up with a conclusion that there is a S

11 fundamental flaw in the training program would have been 1: when I laid these sheets end to end, presuming that I'm 13 using my judgments in making codes in reference to different 14 concepts I'm looking at, knowing that I attempted to be is consistent but admitting that there is some judgment 16 involved, my professional judgment, and it's not totally 17 consistent, if I should do this again I'm sure I would find 18 a few changes that I would want to make.

19 JUDGE FRYE: I'm sure. But, my point'-- what

- 20 I'm trying to get at, at some point we have to go back and 21 write a decision.

22 If we look at this study that you have done, how 23 does that help us in determining whether there is a 24 fundamental flaw in the training program?

25 WITNESS MILETI: If I -- I could tell you what I O

81601313 5128 cuewalsh

(,) I did. I laid the pages end to end, from left to right, and 2 for me to think there was a fundamental flaw involved I 3 would have had to have seen evidence somewhere, and I 4 didn't, that several of these things -- let's just take the 5 intra-organizational aspects -- were falling flat on their 6 nose.

7 For example, if I had seen that very few people 8 knew what their job was or what their job description was or 9 what it was that they were supposed to do, I would consider 10 that a fundamental flaw. Were there people who didn't know 11 how to -- what street to take their bus down? Yes, there 12 were.

__, 13 But, there was enough evidence that enough l

OJ A/ 14 people that came out of the training program that are part 15 of LERO knew what their job was. So, I'm not saying that 16 knowing what your job was was perfect. It certainly wasn't.

17 So, I saw no evidence of a fundamental flaw in 18 that regard. Now, in answer to your question in reference 19 to what would I catalogue on the basis of reviewing the FEMA

( 20 assessment or my own assessment as the training needs l

! 21 specifically, I didn't have that in mind. I did this in 22 reference to saying, was there a fundamental flaw or not?

23 And, it was simply my way of having a checklist, l

24 so to speak, at my side as I read through the FEMA 25 assessment. In other words, I saw no systematic enough i

81601313 5129 cuewalsh I patterns in reference to these abstract sociological 2 concepts that I value so much to suggest to me.that there 3 was enough bad in reference to these good concepts that I 4 think should be in a plan or in an organization's response 5 to an emergency.

6 JUDGE FRYE: I guess what -- I may not be 7 understanding you correctly, but are you saying that

, a basically your conclusion is that there are no fundamental 9 flaws in the LERO organization based on this?

10 WITNESS MILETI: I would infer that if there is 11 no fundamental flaws in the LERO organization's potential 4 12 performance in an emergency that there could not be a 13 fundamental flaw in the training program.

14 JUDGE FRYE: I would tend to agree with you on that. And, this I gather is.what you are saying, is you I 15 i 16 looked at the organization and you came to the conclusion 17 based on this study that there was no fundamental flaw in l

i la the organization?

i 19 WITNESS MILETI: In its potential performance in 20 response to --

l 21 JUDGE FRYE: In its potential performance? I i

l 22 see. Okay, i 23 Now, in some of these categories, if you look, 24 for instance, under inter-organizational network, the L-25 resource adequacy -- maybe this is not a good example -- you ,

p 1

. , - - , . . , . - , , .,_--...,.,-,,._,m.,,,_,.,,_n- ,,,.,,,,.,,.n,.,,,,

81601313 5130 suewalsh lh I have 13 PC's, four U's as compared to 67 C's.

2 Would that indicate -- I mean, would it be 3 reasonable to draw an inference from that that perhaps 4 that's an area that should be given some attention?

5 WITNESS MILETI: I certainly would go back and 6 have a look at the reason for that. On occasion, we were 7 very free in giving out PC's. And, we may have been giving 8 out PC's that had nothing in -- in reference to things that 9 had nothing to do with training, for example. -

10 JUDGE FRYE: Well, as I say, that's probably a _

11

[

bad example because it's resources and that's not

~

12 necessarily -- if you look, say, under intra-organizational

. _ , 13 relationships, knowledge, there are 17 PC's and three U's as G-l 14 opposed to 67 C's.

15 WITNESS MILETI: That would lead me to conclude 16 that there was some evidence that some people didn't know 17 some things and some evidence that some people did. And, is that would not lead me to conclude that there is a 19 fundamental flaw in imparting knowledge in the training 20 program in LERO but that there may be some things we could 21 go back and have a look at in reference to what --

22 JUDGE FRYE: In other words, this would be an 23 area that could be flagged for a little bit more intensive 24 study perhaps to see if some improvements might be made?

25 WITNESS MILETI: Diagnosis.

01 l

81601313 5131

'cuewalsh

-() i JUDGE FRYE: Diagnosis.

2 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 3 Q Let me just ask you about one, Dr. Mileti. The 1

4 priority setting under intra-organizational where there is 5 nine PC's or U's flagged for a total of -- from a total of 6 24 factors, that would be another area where you would think 7 perhaps some additional training would be needed?

8 A Again, I would want to go back and have a look 9 at the specifics involved.

10 But, I wouldn't make that judgment just on the 11 basis of the numbers. I would go back and look at the 12 content of what led to what we've catalogued here as 13 problems.

14 Q So, you would certainly want some additional is diagnosis, as you just stated, for this factor I take it?

I 16 A I did not reach the conclusion in this 17 assessment that I thought training was perfect in LERO. I is reached the conclusion that I did not think it contained a 19 fundamental flaw.

20 Q- Did you reach a conclusion about whether or not 21 training for the LERO organization was adequate?

22 A Yes, I did. In my opinion, I thought it was 23 quite adequate.-

24 Q Do you draw a distinction, Dr. Mileti, between a 25 determination that there is no fundamental flaws in the O

81601313 5132 cuewalsh' I training program and a determination as to whether or not a 2 training program is adequate?

3 A No. I would base the judgment that it was 4 adequate on the basis that I thought LERO illustrated, as 5 revealed in the content of the FEMA assessment, the 6 potential to be quite an effective organization were it 7 responding to a real emergency.

8 Q Can you tell me, in follow-up to Judge Frye's 9 questions, how you are defining fundamental flaw?

10 A I would define fundamental flaw as something

< 11 that could not be corrected; fundamental flaw as something 12 that just was unworkable.

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

81601414 5133 marysimons

( ) i JUDGE FRYE: You would define it that way as 2 opposed to say something that must be corrected before 3 operation were authorized? You would find it as something 4 that could not be corrected at all?

5 WITNESS MILETI: I thought that is what the 6 whole point of the contention was going at. I think the 7 whole point of having exercises, and I think in any exercise a one could find things that are in need of being corrected.

9 JUDGE FRYE: Well, that's the whole purpose of to having the exercise.

11 WITNESS MILETI: I agree.

12 JUDGE FRYE: Well, if I modify your definition 33 of fundamental flaw to something that must be corrected p

14 before operation could be permitted, would that change your 15 conclusion?

16 (Witnesses conferring.)

h 17 WITNESS MILETI: I would still continue to is define fundamental as something that is irreversible.

i9 JUDGE FRYE: No, but can you accept my 20 definition?

21 WITNESS MILETI: I would be willing to call that 22 as serious flaw.

23 JUDGE FRYE: All right. Did your study reveal 24 any serious flaws in the training program?

25 WITNESS MILETI: Again, I would have to go back

1 81601414 5134 marysimons

,q

(_,); I and have another look.

2 JUDGE FRYE: Do you recall whether it revealed 3 any serious flaws in the LERO organization?

4 WITNESS MILETI: I don't suspect that it did.

5 In fact, in many ways the LERO organization stood out on 6 some dimensions fairly Well. In fact, one would predict 7 that it would have more in reference to interorganizational 8 cohesion in an actual emergency, more than you would expect 9 from the more standard form of emergency response which 10 actually involves a multitude of different organizations.

11 BY MR. MILLER: (Resuming) 12 Q I want to follow up again on Judge Frye's

,_, 13 questions, Dr. Mileti. I thought you told me a moment ago

- 14 that you really do not distinguish between a fundamental 15 flaw in a training program and the determination that a 16 training program is inadequate. Is that your opinion that 17 you do not draw that distinction?

18 A (Witness Mileti) I'm not sure I understand the 19 question.

20 0 If you defined a fundamental flaw as something 21 which could not be corrected or which is unworkable or l

22 irreversible, which is what you have said it is in your 23 opinion, do you draw a distinction between such a concept 24 and the concept of an inadequate training program?

25 A Adequacy and fundamental flaw are different.

[

81601414 5135

.marysimons-v 3 i Q Do you would agree that you could have an 2 inadequate training program which still under your 3 definition would not constitute a fundamental flaw in a

! 4 training program; is that correct?

4 5 A Yes, particularly in the sense that it would be, 6 for example, presently inadequate but could be corrected.

i

7 Q So you could correct an inadequate training a a Program?

9 A Yes.

i 10 JUDGE FRYE: But a fundamentally flawed training 11 program would also by definition be inadequate.

! -12 WITNESS MILETI: Yes, it would subsume that.

i3 JUDGE FRYE: And you could not correct that O i4 under your definition ---

l 15 WITNESS MILETI: Yes, I agree.

16 BY MR. MILLER:

17 Q Let's go to page 15 of the testimony, please.

is Dr. Mileti, on pages 15 and 16 you have a number of these i

19 factors that you say were taken into account in your NUREG 20 study listed. I just want to ask you about a couple of

21 those.

i 22 The factor of normativeness, which is in the 23 first paragraph of Answer 11.

I

24 A Yes, I thought you might ask about that, i

25 Q Can you just tell me how you define 1

. . _ , , _ , _ , , , _ . . , _ _ , _ . , - . _ . _ , . . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ , _ _ . - . . - - , _ . ~ , . _ . , _ _ _ . _ , _ . _ . , _ . . - _ , . _ _ _ - . . _ , - _ , _

81601414 5136 marysimons

-[ .

I normativeness?

2 A This is a general concept that has emerged from 3 research over several decades in the social sciences about l

4 how it is easier for organizations when they respond to 5 emergencies to do things that are more in line with what 6 they do normally. In other words, in the generic sense it's 7 better in emergency planning to have police do police Work a rather than fire work.

9 Q Now given that definition, Dr. Mileti, I assume 10 you would agree with me that with respect to normativeness 11 LERO does not typically perform -- well, LILCO personnel in 12 LERO do not typically perform the kinds of emergency 13 responsibilities they hold in LERO during their normal daily O_",l 14 jobs; is that a fair statement?

! is A There are actually two responses to your 16 question. In general absolutely yes, and I think that is 17 one of the fundamental issues here and always has been, and is I even remember speaking out on this several years ago 19 during the other hearings, and it was in reference to 20 normativeness is relevant in the sense that it makes it 21 easier for people to learn how to do what they need to do in 22 an emergency. It doesn't mean that you can't take people 23 and teach them how to do those same things successfully 24 through other means.

25 Normativeness generically as a concept is good

1 4

4 81601414 5137 marysimons

() i to design into an emergency plan, but that'doesn't mean that

~

you can't have an effective emergency response when it 2

3 doesn't exist. At the same time, there was some attempt

4 when LERO was being put together to take this notion into 5 account, that is to take advantage of it to the extent that 6 it Could be taken advantage of.

7 And, therefore, people who were ascribed roles

~

s of driving buses were people who as a routine drive big 9 things, and I'm sorry, I don't know more explicitly what big to things are. They are not little.

l 11 Q Dr. Mileti, would you agree with me that given

}

k 12 the composition of LERO in terms of the numbers and kinds of

, 13 PeoP l e that make up that organization that it-is at least I( i4 more difficult for LERO to satisfy the normativeness factor?

is A More difficult than what?

ic Q More difficult than the typical emergency l

l i- response organization?

i is A Yes, of course.

19- Q Now at the bottom of page 15 you set forth a 20 number of subfactors which comprise the I guess the overall j 21 factor of having an understanding about interorganizational 22 emergency response. These subfactors go on over to page 16, 4

23 A Yes.

24 0 Is it your opinion, Dr. Mileti, that each of the 25 subfactors listed by you is necessary if you are to have an

(

i

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81601414 5138 carysimons

( )j 1 understanding about the overall interorganizational 2 emergency response?

3 A Certainly not, no. Some are more important than 4 others and there can be varying degrees of some.

5 What is important is that there is a cense to 6 which the interorganizational response network is 7 integrated, and that is why back in '83 and in '84 I had the a LERO training programs splice in information for every LERO 9 member about overall emergency response in the overall LERO 10 organization.

11 Q Can you tell me, Dr. Mileti, of the subfactors 12 you list on pages 15 and 16 which are more important with 13 respect to this particular factor of overall

()'

14 interorganizational emergency response?

15 A I would say the most important factor is the 16 generic general category. That is, that the 17 interorganizational response field is integrated, is coordinated and has some cohesion to it rather than 19 organizations operating autonomously.

20 We've learned that in emergencies for years.

21 For example, not to elongate the day, and I'm the one that 22 wants to catch the plane, but there was a tornado and 23 information got out in the town that there was a bunch of 24 people harmed at a drive-in.

25 One company sent out ambulances to the drive-in, a

81601414 5139 carysimons and there was no EOC at that time, and they didn't

(( ) i 2 communicate back that it was in fact a rumor and nobody was 3 hurt there. There were no cars there and no people there 4 and it was closed for the season. And yet in traffic all 5 the other ambulances in the city went one after another and 6 wasted time out to that drive-in. There was no cohesion 7 there and that hurt effectiveness in that those ambulances a could have been used somewhere else.

9 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, with respect to my question to about the subfactors, is it possible for you to tell me it which, if any, of these subfactors on pages 15 and 16 are 12 the most important?

13 A They are all important in varying degrees.

() 14 Q So you can't really rank them; is that your i3 opinion?

16 A If I could have, I would have.

17 0 The factor of legitimacy of roles, Dr. Mileti, is is that a factor which you believe LERO has more difficulty 19 in fulfilling than perhaps the typical emergency response 20 organization?

2 A No. In terms of how I would define this, I 22 think it would have more easy in fulfilling this. This is 23 legitimacy of roles in terms of the organizations 24 participating in the response network. So in this sense it 25 would be the degree to which a staging area like Riverhead, i

i

{

. _. _. -_- - _ ._=._ . -. - _

81601414 5140 marysimons for example, would acknowledge that the EOC was supposed to i

(

2 be in command and control.

3 Q Is there such a thing as an interorganizational t

4 legitimacy factor?

5 A This is interorganizational legitimacy.

6 Q And if you look at interorganizational, meaning 7 LERO as compared to other non-LILCO organizations, such as a hospitals, nursing homes and schools, do you believe that 9 there is general acceptance of LERO by these other kinds of 10 organizations?

11 Q Are you asking me about acceptance of LERO as it 12 would occur in an actual emergency or in terms of what one 13 would conclude about the current public opinion on Long

/

14 Island?

15 Q Let's talk about the latter first.

16 A I really have no informed basis on which to make 17 a judgment. I've not done a poll, for example, to measure

la people's perception, but I'have a real good secondhand sense 19 from the fact that these hearings are going on, for example, 20 that a lot of people oppose Shoreham and a lot of people
21 Oppose LILCO and that sort of thing. I think that's common 22 sense.

23 Q Would you look at page 16 of your testimony, 24 Please. Communications ability, the subfactor of 25 communications ability, Dr. Mileti ---

81601414 5141 marysimons

(_,) 1 A Yes.

2 0 --- you define it, I take it, as a high level of 3 linkages between organizations; is that correct?

4 A Yes, it is.

5 Q I take it that it's not just the number of 6 communications links, but the capability to utilize such 7 linkages in an effective manner which is important?

8 A To communicate when communication needs to 9 occur, yes. My ambulance story in the tornado is an event to of that not existing.

in Q Now, Dr. Mileti, in Answer 12 in the testimony, 12 you explain the NUREG 3524 study that we've been referencing 13 from time to time today. Can you tell me, and I'm looking 14 at the last paragraph on the page, when you stated that you is reviewed and summarized the results of actual studies of 16 organizational effectiveness in non-emergency situations, 17 just tell me the numbers of actual studies you looked at if is you can?

i9 A Well, it's difficult to do because from a 20 theoretical point of view I study organizations. In my 21 career up until that point I've looked at a lot, but in 22 reference for an interim draft report that I prepared 23 Probably two or three dozen or thereabouts. That category 24 of organizational research was part of that interim report 25 that I sent to Oak Ridge to review and in the process NRC O

81601414 5142 carysimons

(,_,9) ; I decided that they didn't want that included, and other 2 studies I was reviewing to put in a second draft of it never 3 got included in that draft, and I know I sent you that 4 draft. None of it in that category ended up in the final 5 document.

6 Q Now with respect to the second factor where you 7 state that you also reviewed the results of actual studies s on organizational effectiveness in responding to 9 emergencies, approximately how many other studies did you 10 look at?

11 A My answer would almost be the same. In terms of 12 what we ended up finally putting in the report was probably 13 the major ones and particularly ones that were their own

(',__

)

\ /- 14 summaries of attempts to summarize, for instance, like is Russel Dynes' work on organized behavior in disaster and 16 that sort of thing.

17 Q And based upon these studies you then developed is this integrated theory that is mentioned on page 16 of the 19 testimony?

20 A Based on that study we developed that, which is 21 these lists of concepts in my testimony.

22 Q All the factors and subfactors on pages 15 and 23 16, that's what was developed based upon your studies, 24 correct?

25 A By and large, yes.

O

81601414 5143 marysimons n.

-(,) 1 Q And then later on the page you say that you 2 reviewed emergency plans at nuclear power plants. Can you 3 just tell me approximately how many plants were reviewed?

4 A We ended up reviewing 17. There wasn't enough 5 time, effort and energy to review all of them, but we wanted 6 to do that, but it ended up being 17.

7 Q And then you conducted two case studies at 8 nuclear plants which focused on the factors that you had 9 developed in your theory; is that correct?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Now these are the case studies you can't tell me 12 the names of the plants involved?

i3 A I don't feel like I can feel free to do that u simply because we promised our respondents confidentiality, 15 in this case these two utilities.

16 0 And then you observed a test exercise. I take 17 it that the test exercise observed was at one of the two is plants that constituted your case studies?

19 A Absolutely, yes.

20 Q Did the factors that you had formulated from 21 your review of the literature change in any way based upon 22 the test exercise that was observed?

23 A I don't recollect that they changed in any way.

24 We may have potentially changed some definitions, but I 25 don't think so. What we tried to do was measure them and to O

81601414 5144 marysimons

(/ s i,)2 i see if they were operating and indeed we did try to do that.

2 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, I know you did not observe the 3 test exercise. Were you involved in each and every part 4 though of the parts of the study for the NUREG that are 5 listed.on page 16 of your testimony?

6 (Witness reviews a document.)

7 A Well, I Could tell you what I did and what I )

e didn't do. ,

9 Q My time is running short.

10 A I didn't do everything, no. I did parts.

11 Q You were involved in the review of the 12 literature I take it?

13 A Yes.

(. 14 Q Did you actually conduct the two case studies?

15 A No, I wasn't there.

16 Q Let's look at page 17 of the testimony.

i 17 Dr. Mileti, I assume that from time to time I 18 see the words "we" and "us" in this testimony and I know 19 that you are obviously referring to the other authors of the 20 NUREG analysis, but I assume you are here speaking only for 21 yourself and not for the other members that helped author 22 that analysis; is that correct?

23 A None of the other people who helped author that 24 analysis helped me author this testimony. So I'm sure that

.25 my testimony isn't speaking for them, but I don't suspect C

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81601414 5145 marysimons

~

q ,) i that they disagree with me.

2 Q Have they reviewed this testimony at your a request or for any other reason?

4 A No, but one of them in particular is a good 5

friend of mine and we talk about every week, and we usually 6 talk about nuclear power plants.

7 (Laughter.)

8 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, maybe we could take the 9 afternoon break at this point. I'm on page 17 and I'll to begin with Question and Answer 13.

11 JUDGE FRYE: Well, why don't we do that.

12 When we get through this afternoon I would just i3 out of curiosity and maybe I shouldn't do it, but I would

( i4 like to hear from the parties as to what they consider a is fundamental flaw so that you all will be thinking about 16 that.

17 MR. MILLER: Thank you, is (Mid-afternoon recess taken at 3:05 p.m.)

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 O

81601515 5146 joewalsh (3:20 p.m.)

( 1 2 JUDGE FRYE: Let's go back on the record, 3 please.

4 BY MR MILLER: (Continuing) 5 Q Page 17 of the testimony, Dr. Mileti. Now, in 6 NUREG 3524, it is true, isn't it, that the analysis there 7 was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of interaction a between various and different organizations that could be 9 called upon to respond to an emergency, is that correct?

10 A (Witness Mileti) The analysis was designed for 11 that study, and in that study different organizations were 12 participating.

13 Q And in the NUREG study, Dr. Mileti, there was no 14 single organization where you broke that organization down is into different sub units, is that correct?

16 A Yes.

17 Q You did not break any single organization down is into different sub-units?

19 A Not that I recollect. It is possible we could 20 have done that, but I don't recollect it.

21 Q Now, in the last sentence of Answer 13, you 22 state that the theory proposes what would constitute 23 attributes of an ideal emergency response organization in a 24 radiological emergency.

25 Is it fair to say, Dr. Mileti, that you would C

81601515 5147 joewalsh

() i never expect to find the ideal emergency response 2 organization?

3 A Yes, I think that is fair, yes.

4 Q So, the factors and the analyses conducted in 5 NUREG 3524 really result in a description of an organization 6 which in real life just doesn't exist, is that a fair 7 statement?

a A No, I don't think that is a fair statement. I 9 think what those factors are are the factors that to socAologists who have gone around studying the response of 11 organizations to actual emergencies have concluded to be the 12 factors that affect organizational emergency response 4

13 effectiveness.

14 Q But none of the organizations you looked at in ,

I is the NUREG study met all the factors that you compiled in 16 your study?

17 A I wouldn't say that any organization would meet is all of these factors if in an idea world sociologists could 19 do the kind of research that they might dream up, one would 4 20 get a score in reference to all of these factors.

21 Q Is there something you want to add?

22 A In the ideal world, an ideal organization would 23 be one that scored totally cohesive on all those.

24 0 And certainly none of the organizations in your 25 NUREG study scored a cohesive rating in all aspects for all ,

O

81601515 5148 joewalsh

,29

!. f I factors?

2 A I think my recollection is yes, that is indeed 3 true.

4 Q And certainly you would not expect, based upon 5 the results of the exercise at Shoreham, Shoreham or LERO 6 did not score perfectly with respect to all factors under 7 your analysis.

8 A Got a lot of PCs and Us that attribute to that, 9 that is correct, yes.

10 Q Now, when you state, Dr. Mileti, in the first li sentence of Answer 14, that the factors which were 12 identified as important for organizational effectiveness in i3 response to emergencies were taken into account in the LERO k-- 14 planning and training program, are you referring to the is three basic factors that are listed on Page 14 of your 16 testimony? A clear understanding about what to do, 17 flexibility in approach, and a good idea about the overall is inter-organizational emergency response.

19 A Those three general factors on Page 14 and the 20 degree to which they would subsume the sub-factors listed 21 elsewhere in this testimony.

22 Yes, in fact I will never forget how they were 23 taken into account. Back in '83 or so, I was chatting with 24 John Weismantle, who was in charge of LERO at the time --

25 0 I hate to cut you off, Dr. Mileti, but I don't

81601515 5149 joewalsh

) i think we need the history, because I am in a hurry with this 2 line.

3 A I thought I was the one in a hurry.

4 JUDGE FRYE: Everybody is in a hurry.

$ BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 6 0 Dr. Mileti, the last sentence on Page 17, that 7 during the exercise in your opinion, LERO exhibited all the a factors described in the NUREG study that are critical to 9 effective emergency response.

10 Do you mean to say by that statement that all of il the primary factors in all of the sub-factors listed in your 12 testimony at Pages 14, 15, and 16, were exhibited by LERO i3 during the exercise?

14 A No. The three general categories. There simply 15 wasn't information in the FEMA report that would lead me to 16 be able to make a conclusion about all of those factors.

17 0 And it is true, is it not, Dr. Mileti, that with is respect to certain sub-units of LERO as you broke LERO down, i9 certainly some of those factors were not. consistently 20 exhibited by particular sub-units of LERO?

21 A I wouldn't expect that there would be an exhibit 22 of those factors by all sub-units of LERO. I could only 23 conclude from the exercise what was written down and 24 recorded by FEMA. That was the data base.

.25 Q Now, on Page 18 of the testimony, Dr. Mileti,

81601515 5150 joewalsh

( )] 1 you discuss the method used to apply the NUREG factors to 2 the Shoreham exercise.

3 Is it fair to say that you utilized the methods 4 that are listed on Page 18 of the testimony, because this 5 was the only way that permitted you to apply the NUREG 6 analysis to the FEMA Report at Shoreham?

7 A I thought this was the best way I could take the a concept that I wanted to take into account, into account .

9 I could have, for example, done an interview to with people who participated in the exercise, but it would it have been a year later, and I wouldn't have trusted the data

[ 12 as much as I trusted the data recorded in the FEMA 13 assessment.

14 0 Why would you not have trusted the data as is much? Because of the passage of a year's time?

16 A Sure. A year would have went by. People don't 17 recollect things as well about what would have happened, is although I have to say I would have trusted the data a whole 19 lot better than a behavioral intention mode.

20 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, you stated that each 21 organizational sub-division within LERO was treated as if it 22 were a separate organization.

23 There are approximately, I think, 10 24 organizational sub-divisions that you looked at within LERO, 25 is that correct?

t

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81601515 5151 joewalsh

-( ~) .) A My counting revealed nine.

! 2 Q And the EOC, the ENC, Brookhaven, the three 3 staging areas, those would be-examples of the different 4 organizational sub-divisions you looked at?

5 A Yes, they would.

6 Q Dr. Mileti, within those various sub-divisions j 7 of LERO, in your opinion are certain sub-divisions more

, a important in terms of the function they perform for LERO

9 than others?

! to A In general I would have to judge that I think 11 the EOC is perhaps the most important sub-division of an 12 inter-organizational response network to a disaster or 33 emergency, because that is where most of the information is.

( 14 Q And the EOC, is it fair to characterize it under 15 LERO's structure, as essentially the command center, or the 16 brain center, if you will?

17 A The EOC. That is where all the information is.

18 .It is in that way analogous to most EOCs.

19 Q Do you consider the ENC to be more important.

20 than other organizational sub-divisions within LERO?

21 A It is going to be hard for me to rank all these 22 things. ,

23 Q I am not going to ask you to rank them all. Let 24 me just try to do this all at once. Would it be fair, in 25 your opinion, to basically say that the EOC, the ENC, and i

L 4

1 4

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81601515 5152 joewalsh t

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(,,) ; 1 the three staging areas would probably constitute the most 2 important organizational sub-divisions within LERO?

3 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, I am not sure how 4 this is relevant to Dr. Mileti's analysis here. I am going 5 to object on that basis.

6 MR. MILLER: It in limited inquiry, Judge Frye,

7 to get --

.s JUDGE FRYE: Overruled. ,

9 WITNESS MILETI: I think I kind of leave it at 10 the EOC as being obviously more important. What the 11 particular characteristics of a particular emergency were 12 might make one of the other sub-divisions more important 13 than one of the others, but it is -- all emergency planning 14 is important.

13 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 16 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, the example you give at the 17 middle of Page 18 of the testimony, it is a FEMA comment you 18 use as an example: Verification of this initial 19 notification was received within fifteen minutes.

20 You say it was taken as indicative of there 21 being adequate resources to accomplish this task, and role 22 definition was also clear enough to have the task performed.

23 This example, I take it Dr. Mileti, explains how 24 you conducted your study of the Shoreham Report as depicted 25 in Suffolk County Exhibit 587

81601515 5153 joewalsh

(,m,) 1 A (Witness Mileti) It is supposed to be 2 indicative of that, yes.

3 0 And I take it that using this example, Dr.

4 Mileti, you assumed that 15 minutes was the appropriate 5 amount of time for verification to be given and received?

6 A I don't think I used the word, ' appropriate.' I 7 just said 15 minutes. That seemed like a short amount of a time.

9 I don't think I took the time element here. On in the other hand, working with Vicki, who had more knowledge it about what was anticipated, I am sure here judgments entered 12 into that and I can't speak for her.

i3 By putting this in the testimony, I meant to 14 illustrate that notification occurred, therefore, there had is to have been the resources available for that communication 16 to occur, and it worked. And that the people who knew that 17 they were supposed to engage in that as part of their job is function, performed it.

19 Q The latter part of your explanation, Dr. Mileti, l 20 does that go to the role definition point?

21 A Yes.

22 Q Dr. Mileti, looking at this example, do you 23 believe you could necessarily determine something about role 24 definition from this statement in the FEMA Report?

25 A Absolutely, yes. Unless they are robots that

4 81601515 5154 F .joewalsh (e' T);l, I are engaged in the behaviors, and.it is presumed people.did. ,

2 Q Is it not possible that the verification could 3 have been given by persons who under the LERO plan were

4 really not responsible for providing such notification?

5 A. I am sure that is possible, and I have always 6 said in the world of human behavior, if you can pick it up, 7 it is possible.

8 Q -And if my example would have been the case, then 9 you would not have concluded that role definition was 10 satisfied under this example that you use in your testimony, 11 would you?

12 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, I think it is pretty 13 clear that what Dr. Mileti was using was the FEMA Report, 14 and FEMA made the assessment that this was, in fact, done.

JUDGE FRYE: Why 15 I think this is fairly clear.

16 don't we move on to the next point?

17 MR. MILLER: Okay. Let me just try.

18 JUDGE FRYE: I think you have your point made.

19 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 20 0 Let me just try it this way, and I will w. rap it 21 up and go on, Judge Frye.

22 Dr. Mileti, is it fair to say that you merely 23 looked at the FEMA Report, and did not attempt to go beyond 24 the FEMA Report in drawing or reaching your conclusions

.25 regarding whether factors were satisfied or not satisfied?

s

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81601515 5155 fjoewalsh

.( )~ i A (Witness Mileti) In general, yes.

2 Q Now, at the bottom of-Page 18, you describe how 3 the scores were recorded that were reflected at Attachment F 4 to the testimony. The example you give about -- for a 5 partially cohesive rating, quote: Patchogue bus drivers 6 were not gotten out on time.

7 You say this constituted a partially cohesive, 8 in your opinion, because this was_not -- would not have 9 created a major response problem. That is the definition 10 you employed, correct?

11 A On this page, yes.

12 Q Can I therefore assume, Dr. Mileti, that factors i3 you rated as uncohesive would have been indicative of a

-( -

u major response problem?

is A I would imagine that if we thought something was 16 a major response problem, it would have been coded a U.

17 But again, both PCs and U's are bad scores.

is Q Dr. Mileti, did you create this scoring system 19 that is set forth on Page 18?

20 A I.certainly participated in it in discussions 21 with vicki, and we both contributed to it.

22 Q Now, you state on Page 19, Dr. Mileti, that 23 neutral values were not recorded, since they were not 24 obvious in the Shoreham post exercise assessment.

25 If I recall, Dr. Mileti, Mr. Purse 11 in his O

81601515 5156 joewalsh

(' ) j i analysis stated that there were neutral comments in the FEMA v

2 Report, and those were not included within his analysis.

3 So, do you disagree with Mr. Pursell in that 4 regard?

5 A That is not what we mean by neutral scores, and 6 I have to say, even though I have been here for the whole 7 discussion of the CIT thing, I thought originally I a understood what a critical incident technique is, and I 9 would have to read some documents before I could comment on i 10 it.

l l 11 By neutral values, I was considering how we 12 approach neutral scores in the NUREG Report, and that was l i3 when the group doing the coding couldn't come to a i

Oi

(. /

J 14 consensus, and it is almost as if our PC category subsumed is what was originally coded as neutral in NUREG Report.

16 We did not, by and large, leave any words that 17 were accounts of what went on that day, out of our purview 18 when we were doing our review.

19 Q So, what you are telling me is that a neutral 20 value would be a value or comment in the FEMA Report that 2i you and your assistant could not agree upon?

22 A No. That is what occurred in the NUREG Report, 23 when the people.who were making a judgment about 24 cohesiveness scores could not come to a consensus, they 25 coded it as neutral.

61

1 81601515 5157 joewalsh i Q And what constituted a neutral value under your 2 study of the Shoreham Report?

3 A There were none.

4 Q There just were none in your opinion 5 A' We took all the FEMA words into account. We did 6 not record neutral scores in our study.

7 i

i 8 9

10 11 l

12 13 14 15 i

16 1 17 18 i 19

! 20 21 1 22 23 24 i 25 l

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81601616 5158 cuewalsh

( R);

1 Q Dr. Milet-i, do you have a copy of NUREG-3524?

2 It's Exhibit 59. I think we've handed --

3 A Yeah. In fact, I have two.

4 Q I'm just looking at the. abstract of the NUREG.

5 There is a statement that says that the purpose -- this is 6 the very beginning of the abstract. "The purpose of this 7 research was to determine if existing regulations have led a to effective interfaces between utilities and offsite 9 organizations in emergency planning and response."

10 Do you see that, sir?

11 A Yes, I do.

12 Q Do you believe that your analysis of the Shoreham report looked at both emergency planning and

()

13 14 emergency response?

15 A We looked at the FEMA assessment as our data 16 base and took that as indicators of behavior or of our 17 concepts.

18 Q I assume, Dr. Mileti, that given the fact those 19 comments were made in the context of the FEMA exercise that i 20 they would relate more to emergency response than the 21 emergency planning; is that a fair assumption?

l 22 A It's hard for me to distinguish between the 23 two. I would have to presume that the response that was 24 observed was related to the plans and the training.

25 And, that was the theory that underwent the Q

4 81601616 5159

- guewalsh i assessment.

2 -Q One of the conclusions you reached in the NUREG 3 study,'Dr. Mileti, was that the actual response that.was 4 observed at your test exercise was not as well coordinated' 5 as the planned response; is that correct?

, 6 'A In reference to inter-organizational factors, 7 which is what one would expect.

f .8 Q Did you see any indication of that from your i,

9 review of the FEMA report at.Shoreham?

10 A I had no basis to compare it to. I mean, we i*

in didn't do our study in reference to the plan. We did it in 4 12 reference to what occurred.

33 Q Well, from your familiarity with the LILc0 plan, ja Dr. Mileti, do you believe that there was any indication f

i 15 that the response demonstrated during the exercise was not 16 as well coordinated as the planned response under LILco's t

i7 plan?

is A I would hypothesize that. That's consistent I 19 with sociological theory; it's consistent with behavior of 20 organizations in emergencies.

l 21 One would presume that the normative structure, 1

22 which is the plan, and the performance structure, which is l

! how people actually behave, there is always a difference.

23 24 However, I would have to also hypothesize that in reference

[

i 25 to LERO that I would predict increased cohesiveness in the lO

, . , , , - . - . . ,- ...-,,_,.._n~, _ . _ , . . , _ - . . . _ - . . - . - , ,

81601616' 5160

.cuewalsh j( )j 1 inter-organizational field in an actual emergency.

2 Q Could you just say that last part again?

3 A I would predict increased inter-organizational 4 cohesiveness to be observed in LERO in an actual emergency.

5 In other words, I would expect things to be better in a real 6 emergency than in the exercise.

7 And, I would expect things to be better or not a as good in the exercise as in the plan.

9 Q You found in the NUREG study, Dr. Mileti, that to internal cohesiveness within an organization increased il during the test exercise but that inter-organizational 12 cohesiveness decreased?

__, 13 A Correct. Absolutely.

( 14 Q Do you believe LERO would be any different in is this regard?

16 A Absolutely. And, the reason is simple. LERO 17 comes from LILCO. LILCO is an organization.

18 The great reluctance in emergencies when you try 19 to organize inter-organizational relations in emergencies is 20 that organizations are reluctant to give up the autonomy i 2i they need to give up to have something like an EOC work.

22 And, I don't think LERO would suffer from as 23 many of those problems as when we try to coordinate a multi-24 organizational response in the typical sense.

2s Q But, LERO still has to work with other C

81601616 5161 cuewalsh

'( ) i organizations, does it not?

2 A Absolutely.

3 Q And, in that regard would you expect to see 4 decreased cohesiveness during an actual response between 5 inter-organizational structures?

6 A There could be some in reference to how LERO 7 might relate to other organizations outside of LERO. But, a the most significant inter-organizational relations are 9 those pointed to maximizing evacuation; and, for example,

io that's protective action.

11 And I think, therefore, that one could expect 12 greater effectiveness in an organization like LERO to get 33 warnings out on time, for example, to enhance consistency in i4 those warnings and EBS messages. And, in the inter-15 organizational networks like those defined in this 16 assessment.

17 Q Do you expect problems, or would you expect is problems, Dr. Mileti, with legitimacy during an actual i9 response involving the LERO organization?

20 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, it seems to me that 21 this question really goes to the credibility issue that was 22 litigated in the plan proceeding.

23 MR. MILLER: It's a limited inquiry. I will not 24 pursue this much longer, but it is one of the factors in the 25 testimony.

O

81601616 5162 cuewalsh

/="

( ,)1; i JUDGE FRYE: Yeah, I thought so. It's 2 overruled.

3 WITNESS MILETI: I was going to say, I think 4 that's probably one of the most interesting pieces of 5 sociological work that I could imagine ever doing. And, in 6 thinking about the potential data base available on which to 7 offer a hypothesis, I could -- I would envision a two-tail e directional hypothesis. I could think of reasons why -- how 9 LERO might relate to other organizations on Long Island that to it's at odds with right now, might dissipate. The generic 11 principal is that when emergencies occur, people come 12 together. I think that principal would hold between the 13 County and LILCO if an emergency actually occurred.

4 (_ "l 14 At the same time, I would have to predict that a is week or two or three after the emergency, that there 16 probably would be a fleet of attorneys, even larger than 17 there currently are, on Long Island and that conflict would la probably escalate way beyond where it is now.

19 Those are the hypotheses I would offer.

20 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 21 Q It does sound like an interesting study.

22 (Laughter.)

' 23 Now, Dr. Mileti, Answer 15 to your testimony 24 explains the differences between the method that was used to 25 assess organizational effectiveness for LERO and the method

81601616 5163 cuewalsh

() i that was utilized in your NUREG analysis; is that correct?

2 A Yes.

3 Q You have, first of all, that the research 4 performed for NUREG/CR-3524 had the factors clearly 5 established before a data collection began.

6 Can you tell me briefly, Dr. Mileti, why that is 7 an important distinction in your opinion?

8 A If one is going out to measure concepts like the 9 kind sociologists like to measure in particular, it's nice io to use the best measurement tool you could within the limits 11 of your resources put together. And, if one had in mind a 12 study to measure those concepts, one could create a better

^

, i3 set of measurements or data base of those concepts than if ia one used another data base.

is Q So, it's nice to be able to create your own data 16 base before you conduct your own study?

17 A No, that's not what I said. It's nice to create is the best, the most reliable and valid measures you can and ig then go to the field and implement your methodology in the 20 most appropriate way.

2 Q Since, in the case of Shoreham, Dr. Mileti, you

! 22 relied on an existing data base, the FEMA report, can you 23 characterize for me how you think that limits the usefulness 24 of your study?

25 A I think it limits my confidence in the data in

!(

i i

81601616 5164 cuewalsh l( )) I the following way: One, I didn't feel comfortable about 2 combining scores in reference to a particular concept into 3 one score for that concept. I think it made the data, 4 therefore, less editive, if you will. And, that's why I 5 laid the pages out from left to right and tried to make an l

6 assessment without adding things.

7 And, we had to infer concepts from what FEMA a happened to record. And, what we were able to assemble, 9 therefore, would not be as precise as if we put together a 10 study with the explicit purpose of measuring these abstract 11 concepts.

12 And, I wasn't surprised that the people who

__, i3 participated in the FEMA exercise didn't have the

( 14 sociological jargon in mind. I suppose we should all be 15 glad they don't.

16 Q Now, when you state, Dr. Mileti, further down on 17 Page 19 that it was necessary, therefore, to use indirect 18 measures; we had to infer the NUREG factors from the text of 19 the Shoreham post-exercise assessment, is it fair to say 20 that your assessments were, therefore, unstandardized?

21 A They were very unstandardized. Basically, I've 22 presented this as note taking in terms of how I read the 23 FEMA assessment.

24 A standardized measure is the same measure. We 25 didn't have the same words. In one case, we had to infer O

81601616 5165 cuewalsh (A

4

_,j i that someone knew what their job was on the basis of a 2 communication being completed. That inferred that the job 3 was known about. And, in another case we concluded that 4 someone had -- knew their job or had role definition on the 5 basis of something totally different.

6 Q And, I take it, Dr. Mileti, from the statement 7 at the very bottom of Page 19 that another limiting factor 8 was this fact that the different exercise evaluators may 9 have looked for different things depending on what part of to LERO was being looked at and what FEMA objective was it involved?

12 A That's always an issue in social research when i3 there are different people doing the measuring.

O

\' 14 Q And, then on Page 20, Dr. Mileti, you talk about 15 a fact that there was no valid way to integrate the scores 1

16 compiled on the basis of the Shoreham report into single

i7 scores for each factor within each organizational is subdivision of LERO.

, i9 You did, I take it, develop such composite 20 scores in the NUREG study?

21 A Yes. All the scores in that study are of that

, 22 character.

23 Q Those are at the end of the NUREG study; is that 24 correct?

l 25 A Yeah, I believe in one of the appendices.

81601616 5166 cuewalsh

()] 1 Q Appendix E?

2 A That's correct.

3 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, you did not assign a number 4 score to your factors in the NUREG study, did you?

5 A We assigned C, U and N. Those aren't numbers.

6 Q Did you attempt any sort of a percentage 7 calculation about success or failure based upon your NUREG a studies?

9 A I don't believe so. But, I'm sure in the 10 process of doing this we would have tried it out.

Il Q Dr. Mileti, if you looked at Appendix E in the 12 NUREG, is there any way for you to relate or compare your 13 results as set forth in Appendix E of the NUREG to the 14 results that are reflected in Attachment F of the LILCO 15 testimony?

16 A No. And, I wouldn't do that. I don't think it 17 would be a legitimate comparison.

18 They were both qualitative studies done in 19 different ways.

I 20 Q Now, Dr. Mileti, in Answer 16 of the testimony 21 on Page 20, you state, "Within the limits imposed by the 22 available data..."

23 Are the limits you are talking about the ones i 24 referred to on Pages 19 and 20 of the testimony?

25 (The witness is looking at the document.)

O

~

81601616 5167 suewalsh

() 2 A

Q Yes, they are.

You state that the analysis within those limits a demonstrates that LERO exhibited a high effectiveness 4 potential during the exercise.

5 Can you, as precisely as possible, tell me what 6 you mean by "high effectiveness potential?"

7 A I think the whole point of emergency planning is 8 to construct an organized response to a future emergency in 9 which significant emergency goals can be met. And, I think to LERO illustrated in reference to enough indicators of si cohesion, to use my jargon, potential to be able to 12 accomplish what are the major emergency tasks in reference 13 to an emergency at Shoreham.

9 ( 14 For example, I think the public would have been i3 warned. I think the evacuation would have been carried out 16 effectively. I think we would have maximized the odds, that 17 the public would have formed good perceptions about what the is risk was and what to do, and then from a cohesive point of ig view there is enough going on here that the organization 20 probably would have worked.

2i Q That's your best judgment, I take it?

22 A Absolutely. I mean, my judgment is all I have 23 to offer.

24 Q Now, on Page 21, Dr. Mileti, you end up with --

25 I think you characterize it as your bottom line conclusion.

o . H j

1 81601616 5168

<- cuewalsh

' , , l

'I a i The training program, in your judgment, appears to be i 2 fundamentally successful.

L 3 Do you draw a distinction -- well, let me ask 1 4 you'this, Dr. Mileti.

Is the training program, in your-I 5 opinion, fundamentally successful cut is it structured with i

j 6 the potential for success?

7 A Well, let me distinguish between planning j

e elements or plan and behavior, which is what would happen in 9 an exercise or in an actual future emergency.

l I

  • 10 I tried to look at the FEMA assessment in terms

\

i 11 of measuring these factors that I think are the determinants i

l 12 or causes or independent variables of success in an 1

) - 13 emergency. And, I attempted to measure these as best I 14 could.

I j 15 And, on the basis of them coming out the way 1

j 16 they did, which seemed okay but there were some problems, I 17 would judge and predict the dependent variable into the i

j is future of effectiveness in emergency response on the basis 19 of this assessment as saying that it looks to me like LERO

! 20 could effectively manage a future emergency.

1

! 21 And, from that I conclude, since that's the 1

l 22 object of the training program, that the training program in i

j 23 my judgment appears to be fundamentally successful.

i 24 0 I was more or less using your words on Page 20, l

{ 25 Dr. Mileti. And, is it fair to say that your analysis i  !

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?

i l i

81601616 5169 cuewalsh C)'

v i indicates to you the potential for success of LERO's 2 training program?

3 A In a real emergency, yes.

4 Q I think, Dr. Mileti, the only other place you 5 appear in this testimony is Page 54 in response to Question 6 62. I believe I'm right about that. I don't really have 7 much to ask you about this particular answer, Dr. Mileti, a except let me just ask you this.

9 Is it your opinion that a training program to cannot teach common sense?

l 11 A I don't think you can teach people to have l

12 common sense.

i3 Q Do you believe you can teach people to use good u judgment?

l 15 A I think you can help people form better 16 judgments and more informed judgments.

17 Q Do you believe you can teach people or train is people to use independent judgment?

19 A If by independent judgment you mean to do it 20 alone or make a decision on their own, I imagine you 21 probably could. But, you would have to look at it in 22 reference to what.

23 Q So, with respect to Contention 50.E, Dr. Mileti, 24 it -- the contention itself is set forth in Attachment A of 25 the testimony if you want to look at it, I take it that you O

81601616 5170 cuewalsh (5); I would agree that a training program can train people to 2 exercise independent judgment and perhaps good judgment but 3 not common sense.

4 Is that a fair statement?

5 A I don't think you can teach someone to have 6 common sense. Some people just don't have it. And, I don't l 7 think there is much you can do about it. And, unfortunately a I know of too many of them in my life.

9 I think if one wanted to teach someone how to 10 make decisions, I think decision-making could be something 11 that people could learn how to do, what factors to take into 12 account and that sort of thing.

13 Q And, I'm curious, Dr. Mileti, about your

() 14 statement I think in response to a question by Judge Frye is earlier today that during an actual emergency at some point 16 procedures get thrown in the wastebasket.

17 Was that your statement?

18 A I don't think I made a statement anything like 19 that.

20 0 Do you recall some statement about the I

21 procedures going somewhere?

22 A Well, you've got me pointed in the direction of 23 a wastebasket, and I don't recollect that.

24 Q You just don't recollect that?

25 JUDGE PRYE I think that was my statement. I'm o

81601616 5171 cuewalsh

( ) i not sure he totally subscribed to it.

2 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 3 Q Do you believe, Dr. Mileti, that during actual 4 . emergency responses ad hoc responses by personnel will 5 almost invariably be required?

$ 6 A If by that you mean, do I think people need to

7 be flexible and know when to exercise good judgment'and not a go by the letter of the book, then I think those 1

9 circumstances arise. I think that's why flexibility is io important in an emergency response organization.

i- 11 And, the people in the social sciences have 12 known that for two or three decades, and other people for i3 longer.

u (Laughter.)

15 Q I take it, Dr. Mileti, that the need to be

! 16 flexible in the way you have just described would certainly u tend to arise more in an actual emergency than perhaps 18 during an exercise that's graded by FEMA?

19 A That's a possibility. Then, again it may not be 20 a possibility. It would depend on the actual emergency.

. 21 Q Well, in an actual radiological emergency, would 22 you expect there to be more occasions that would require f

23 Personnel to be flexible and to adapt than you would expect 24 to see in the context of an exercise as conducted and graded 25 by FEMA?

4 l

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81601616 5172 cuewalsh

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-1 'A Well, as you know, I've only seen a couple of 2 FEMA exercises by reading about them. And, I think that an 3 actual emergency would likely be longer and would involve 4 more things.

5 So, in that sense it's possible. That's the 6 hypothesis I would make.

7 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, at this time I would a like to move in Suffolk County Exercise Exhibits 57 which is 9 the NUREG report, and 58 which is -- I will characterize it to as Dr. Mileti's work papers for Attachment F to the 11 testimony.

12 JUDGE FRYE Any objection?

__, 13 MS. MONAGHAN: No.

( 14 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: No objection.

15 JUDGE FRYE: So ordered.

16 (Suffolk County Exercise Exhibits 17 marked 57 and 58 for identifica-tion are admitted into evidence.)

is 19 MR. MILLER: And, I would have no further 20 questions for Dr. Mileti.

21 JUDGE FRYE Mr. Zahnleuter.

22 CROSS EXAMINATION 23 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER:

24 Q Dr. Mileti, on Page 12 of your testimony, there

. 25 are several references to job performance aids. You believe Q

= .. - - . - - - .. _ . - - - . _ . - - . . .. .. . - -

81601616 5173 cuewalsh i that job performance aids would correct most performance 2 errors, right?

3 A I think it would depend on the kind of 4 performance error it is. I don't think that is a good 5 categorical statement to make in reference to anything.

6 7

- 8 9

10 11 4 12 13 O ,,

15 l 16 I

i 17 1 18 19 j 20 I 21 i ,

22

. 23 l 24 25 1

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81601717 5174 carysimons

-s

( ),, i 0 What kind of performance error would not be ws 2 corrected by a job performance aid?

3 A one in which more detailed training was needed.

4 Q And is there a specific example that you can 5 give me regarding the exercise on February 13th?

6 A Probably dosimetry might be an example.

7 Q Are there any others?

e (Witnesses conferring.)

9 Dr. Mileti, are there any others?

10 A There could be. I would have to go back and it have a look. I don't certainly recollect.

12 Q so right now, to the best of your recollection,

__, 13 you believe that dosimetry would be an area that would g

(_ / 14 require more training as opposed to job performance aids?

15 A (Witness Lindell) No, it's the reverse of that, 16 that dosimetry ---

17 Q Excuse me, I asked Dr. Mileti the question and I is really meant to have an answer from him and then you can 19 answer afterwards, Dr. Lindell. I think that's the rule 20 we've been following.

21 JUDGE FRYE Well, we've been following that 22 rule where the answer was subscribed to only by the person 23 that you're directed the question. Now you've got a joint 24 answer.

25 WITNESS LINDELL: I also sponsor this

).

81601717 5175 '

marysimons

^

() 2 i testimony. That's the reason I spoke up.

JUDGE FRYE So I think you have to give him a

[

3 crack at it.

4 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I would like to clarify 5 this procedural matter also. I had always assumed that the 6 rule was that you could at least direct your initial 7 question to anyone on the panel that sponsors the answer, e and if that person cannot then respond, then of course the 9 other person can add or could contribute. But I felt that io the lawyer did at least have control as to whom the initial it cross-examination question is directed.

i 12 JUDGE FRYE: Oh, I think you do clearly, but i3 when you've got an answer where two of them have sponsored

( i4 it, I think you may have consultation or they may consult is with each other before they answer.

16 MR. MILLER: Okay. Thank you.

ir JUDGE FRYE That way you've got an answer.

! is Where only one sponsored it, then I don't think consultation ig would be proper.

20 WITNESS MILETI: I'm sorry. I thought we had

~

21 talked about how the numbers for dosimetry were useful in 22 terms of giving it on a card for somebody to take out with 23 them in an emergency. ,

1 24 BY MR. EAHNLEUTER:

25 Q Well, Dr. Mileti, didn't you just tell me that

(

81601717 5176 marysimons

, s; (v) , 1 dosimetry was an area where job performance aids would not 2 be corrective?

l 3 A (Witness Mileti) No, I thought it was the other 4 way. I apologize.

! 5 Q You just said it the other way, okay.

6 Now, Dr. Lindell, you were going to add 7 something?

l 8 A (Witness Lindell) No. It's just that when I 9 heard the question and I apparently misinterpreted it as to well. I thought you were talking about an area in which job 11 performance aids would be effective. So that's the reason I 12 also responded that dosimetry would be effective in that is area, or that job performance aids would be effective with

()

14 respect to dosimetry.

l 15 Q Let's flip the question around then so that we 16 understand it together. Are there any areas where job 17 performance aids would not be adequate?

18 (Witnesses confer.)

19 A (Witness Lindell) A job performance aid 20 wouldn't fix a broken copier.

21 JUDGE FRYE: But would a training program.

l 22 WITNESS LINDELL: Well, if you got into it -- I 23 mean it's hard to conceive of a situation in which something 24 would be absolutely inappropriate because if you brought a l

l 25 copier or a repairman onto the staff or trained somebody to i

81601717 5177 marysimons

[ i repair copiers and provided them -- I mean job performance 2 aids, most copying machines have troubleshooting guides.

3 That's a job performance aid. So if there was a minor 4 malfunction, yes, I suppose that a job performance aid would 3 be of some effectiveness.

6 JUDGE FRYE: I hear what you're saying, but you 7 might need to train personnel in how to repair the copier.

e WITNESS LINDELL: Absolutely. I've run into  !

9 problems with copiers before and I can use the 10 troubleshooting guide one some cases, but.there are other

  • 11 things that are simply beyond the ability of anybody to use 12 a troubleshooter's guide for. So it's very difficult to i3 answer the question absolutely in the negative.

14 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER:

i3 Q Let me focus this a little more. On page 12 in 16 the second paragraph in the second to the last sentence you 17 say "In our judgment, most of these recommendations for is refresher training would be more appropriately corrected by i, means of job performance aids such as fact sheets and check 20 lists."

21 A (Witness Lindell) That's directed specifically 22 toward dosimetry, the fact that people could not remember 23 their administrative dose limits and the procedures for 24 obtaining authorization to exceed those limits.

25 Q Well, it says most of these recommendations, and O l

__.. ~ . - . -- -. .

^

81601717 5178 carysimons

](,)) I that leaves some room for a recommendation that would not be 2 corrected by job performance aids, and that's what I'm 9

3 asking about right now.

4 Is your testimony more appropriately in our 5 judgment all of these recommendations for refresher training 6 would be more appropriately by means of job performance 7 aids?

e A No, sir.

9 Q What is it that occurred during the exercise on to February 13th that would not be more appropriately corrected 11 by means of job performance aids?

12 A Just a moment and I'll look.

,,_ 13 (Pause while the witness reviews his documents.)

14 I have these cross-referenced and it will take S

15 some time to sort through them. If you want to pursue the 16 question, it could take five minutes or more to go through 17 and identify the exception. I don't have the exception is code, but I can find it given enough time.

19 Q Well, Dr. Mileti, do you have anything to add to 20 this question?

21 A (Witness Mileti) No. Our work in reference to 22 these sheets was done together, and most of the effort that

. 23 I expended in preparing this testimony was in reference to 24 my P's and Z's and U's, and I would have to rely on Dr.

25 Linde11's pages that he has here. ,

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81601717 5179 carysimons p

(_-) 1 MS. MONAGHAN: Perhaps Mr. Zahnleuter could give 2 him an example and then maybe they could respond giving an 3 example. That might move things along.

4 JUDGE FRYE: I think Mr. Zahnleuter started out 5 asking for an example, didn't you?

6 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: I think I did, and I don't 7 really know why things got so troublesome.

a BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER:

9 Q Let me start from another direction. On this to page 12 you describe job performance aids as maps, check 11 lists and fact sheets.

12 Are there any other type of jobs performance i3 aids that you could give as an example?

O #

i4 A (Witness Lindell) Well, I think the LERO ID is badges are an excellent example of the kind of job 16 Performance aid that could be used.

17 Q How about OPIPs?

is A Those would constitute a job performance aid.

39 In general the definition, the generic definition of a job 20 Performance aid would be something or a general defining 21 criteria criterion for a job performance aid would be 22 something that assists people in remembering either numbers 23 that may be easy to forget or long lists of steps.

24 0 Would the purpose of a job performance aid be to 25 increase the level of performance in the event that a LERO O

81601717 5180 c0rysimons

([,)) I worker couldn't remember what to do correctly?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Is there any limit to what a job performance aid 4 could constitute?

5 A Well, yes, there is a limit in that if you took 6 the -- as a matter of fact, I just established the limit on 7 a job performance aid. I had the ARCAs and deficiencies e coded according to certain areas, but I didn't have the 9 ARCAs and deficiencies listed specifically. So if I had to 10 cross-reference from one piece of material to another piece 11 of material it would take me too long to do that cross-12 referencing to go through and identify the one or two 13 exceptions. That would be an ineffective job performance l

14 aid, and it obviously in this case did not assist my is Performance.

16 A (Witness Daverio) Mr. Zahnleuter, if you would 17 like, maybe we can give you one. I didn't sponsor the is answer, but if you would like I can probably come up with 19 one.

20 Q Come up with a job performance aid?

21 A No, a non-job performance, one of the issues 22 that was non-job performance fixable, because I heard Dr.

I 23 Lindell saying he would need time. We could give you one if 24 you would like t,o have an example of one we think would fit.

25 Q In other words, one of the issues that was O.

81601717 5181 marysimons

(-m,,) i fixable by training?

2 A (Witness Lindell) Right.

3 A (Witness Daverio) But not by job performar.ee, 4 right.

5 0 Okay. What would that example be?

6 A I think if you look in our testimony we talk 7

about the bus driver problem and that when we analyzed that a

we discovered that it wasn't so much that the maps weren't 9 the problem, but it was a tradition, I'll use that word, io that developed in running the drills at that staging area 11 where people could volunteer to go to different places, and 12 therefore to change the map wouldn't have done anything i3 because what was happening is that they could volunteer.

14 So a better map wouldn't have improved the Performance. We had to do some kind of different training is 16 to reinforce and fix how we ran drills so that that could 17 not happen again. So there was no job performance aid that 18 would have solved that singular problem.

39 Q Dr. Mileti, FEMA found that the radiation 20 monitors at the coliseum during the drill didn't -- or that 2i they had performance errors because they did not monitor at

! 22 a quick enough pace. Do you recall that?

A (Witness Mileti) I have to admit I don't, but 23 24 I'm willing to presume that it's there.

25 Q You will assume that it's true.

(O/

l

81601717 5182 marysimons

( ,g,/ ; 1 Do you recall by any chance that FEMA 2 recommended that the radiation monitors be given training?

3 A I do, yes.

4 Q And do you disagree with that FEMA 5 recommendation that the radiation monitors receive more 6 training?

7 A I'm of the generic opinion that everybody should 8 continue to have training as is appropriate. I wouldn't

  • 9 suspend training.

10 Q Well, we are specifically talking about a 11 recommendation for refresher training of radiation monitors 12 because of inadequate performance at the exercise. So do

,_, 13 you agree or disagree with the FEMA recommendation?

( 14 A I would have to answer as follows. I think if is that was an identified problem, then an appropriate way 16 should be discovered to rectify the problem, and if training 17 is an appropriate way, then sobeit.

18 However, I really think someone like an 19 industrial psychologist who knows about that might be better 20 to make a judgment than a sociologist.

2i Q Do you have an opinion of whether a job 22 performance aid would help increase the level of performance 23 of a radiation monitor?

24 A It sure would help me if I were a radiation 25 monitor to have a job performance aid. One of the things d>. l q -

81601717 5183 marysimons g)

(_ , i that we've learned, not just me, but other people who have 2 researched emergencies, is that the functional equivalent of 3 job performance aids help.

4 0 What kind of job performance aid would help a 5

radiation monitor increase the pace at which that person 6 monitored evacuees?

7 A I would have to say I don't know the answer to 8 that question.

9 A (Witness Lindell) It might be possible to come io up with a job performance aid that would do that, but I ti would say that the question is determining how -- if the 12 rate at which evacuees could be monitored was determined

,. i3 using some kind of a behavioral sample, the question would

\- # 14 be to train -- that is, there is a criterion there of I is believe it was 90 seconds.

16 (Witnesses confer.)

u If that's the criterion, then I would say that is there might be some kind of equipment or there might be some i9 kind of job performance aid that might be able to speed the 20 monitoring process, but that in all likelihood in this 21 situation the most effective way of improving the 22 performance of the organization would be to train those who 23 did not reach the training criterion of 90 seconds retrain 24 them so that they could improve their performance. It may 25 be a question of manual dexterity, in which case it's a O

t

i 81601717 5184 marysimons

' (( ,) j i selection problem and not a training problem.

2 Q Well, Dr. Lindell, FEMA did not evaluate every 3 monitor; that's correct, right?

4 A I believe that is correct.

5 Q So your recommendation is just the people that 6 FEMA monitored that FEMA found took too long would be 7 retrained?

8 A No. I would say that if FEMA found that some of 9 the radiological monitors were not capable of maintaining 10 that 90 second time, then that LERO should investigate the 11 degree.to which either people can be trained to that 12 criterion, that is the available pool or labor cannot be 13 trained to that criterion, that the procedures be changed so

( 14 that they can handle -- if in general people can't do it any is faster than 120 seconds, that the number of monitors be 16 increased so that they can handle the expected number of 17 evacuees.

18 0 So in other words, you would agree with FEMA 19 that refresher training would be appropriate?

20 A Either that or job redesign.

21 Q Now on page 12, again in the second paragraph, 22 in the middle of that paragraph you have a sentence "For 23 most of the training related performance errors FEMA

< 24 recommended correction with refresher training to improve 25 LERO's workers knowledge of specific facts."

Q.

81601717 5185 marysimons

() i 2

You are referring to improving the long-term knowledge of specific facts by LERO workers, right?

3 A Yes, the long-term retention of facts like 4 administrative does limits and procedures.

5 Q And your position is that LILCO's training 6 Program is effective; is that right?

7 A In general it's effective, yes.

8 Q And you would agree with me then, wouldn't you, 9 that an effective training program should bring about a io relatively permanent change in behavior?

11 A It may not be possible to achieve certain kinds 12 of changes in behavior. A training program, for example, i3 cannot change somebody's personality. A training program

' cannot change my ability to " slam dunk." I'm notoriously 14 is lacking in that ability and a large part of the problem is 16 my height.

17 Q You would agree with me, wouldn't you, that an is effective training program should strive to bring about a i9 relatively permanent change in behavior?

20 A Where it's feasible, and that's the question 21 that we're addressing is that if people are generally 22 incapable, people generically or at least the pool of 23 workers available to an organization is generally not 24 capable of learning specific facts and that the problem can 25 be better resolved by provision of job performance aids, in O

81601717 5186 marysimons w i

(  ; I a sense redesigning the job so that people can perform 2 effectively, then that makes a lot more sense than trying to 3 beat into their heads something that they are going to keep 4 on forgetting. It's just better to do it the most 5 reasonable way and the most reliable way rather than the 6 most difficult way.

7 0 When you say redesigning the job, do you mean a making the job easier so that people with a generic 9 incapability of performing can perform easier?

10 A Well, in this particular case I think I made the 11 point that it's difficult for people to remember isolated  ;

12 figures like 3.5 rem or 5 rem, administrative does limits 13 versus NRC dose limits versus EPA PAGs and things like 14 that. Those numbers are a little bit difficult to remember 15 for most people.

16 As a matter of fact, we demonstrated that 17 ourselves here in my inability to remember the NUREG CR 18 number for Dr. Mileti's paper or even some NRC reports that 19 I've done myself. It's just difficult to remember isolated 20 numbers. It's a lot more effective to provide those number 21 on some kind of job performance aid like the LERO ID badge l 22 rather than to try to drill people every week or two weeks t

23 to make sure that they remember the number. It's just not 24 that important to remember the numbers.

25 It's easier and more effective for them to have i

t 81601717 5187

^marysimons

() i 2

that number written down some place so that they can refer to it.

3 Q Now as we talked earlier though, we are not just 4 talking about numbers, but we are talking about maps, check 5 lists and fact sheets, right? What is a fact sheet?

6 A Well, in this case the LERO ID badge is a fact 7 sheet. It contains certain facts and numbers.

a Q And a check list?

9 A A check list would be a sequence of actions to io take. That is again on the back of the ID badge.

ii (Witnesses conferring.)

12 In the last appendix there are copies of the 33 LERO'ID badge and it has radiological information and job (I 14 -related information. It says under radiological, and here is I'm looking at road crew job code No. 21, and I'm just 16 P i cking one at random, " Read the dosimeter every 15 17 minutes." That's a specific reminder. And then it says "If is zero to 200 MR goes off scale, read zero to SR and inform ig the route logistics coordinator." That is a specific 20 instruction. It says if an identifiable condition occurs, a 21 specific identifiable objective condition occurs, that 22 worker can verify for himself and then take a specific 23 action. So that's an example of a check list, a systematic 24 list of actions that need to be taken.

25 O

<y w ,, r--- -- ,,w-- w,,-.. -yw,- ,w,.,- yerwaammy.m---m,------n,,,,.,,----..,,,,e,,--,,+a n wrew--,--rw,, - -wwww,,, -wr---,--v.,e -~n, -, , ,,--n---n

81601818 5188 joewalsh

( )j i Q Given the amount of LERO training that has 2 occurred, and given the need for job performance aids as you 3 describe it, isn't it true that the training that has 4 occurred has not resulted in a relatively permanent change 5 of behavior?

6 A I guess my point is that there are some kinds of 7 behavior that simply can't be achieved, and that it is not --

a it would not be a particularly effective training program 9 if it wasted its time trying to change behaviors. It simply to can't be changed. .

11 Q And is it your testimony that all of the actions 12 that were exhibited during the exercise fell into the

__, ia category of job performance aids correctable?

14 A No.

15 0 Okay. And what actions that occurred during the 16 exercise would not fall into that category?

17 A I think we are back to the original question. I is said it would take me about five minutes to sort through 19 those items, but I think you gave an example with respect to 20 radiological monitoring at the reception centers.

21 That would be a case in which a job -- it is not 22 obvious to me at this time what kind of a job performance 23 aid would improve performance.

24 It seems to me that selection or training, or 25 redesign of procedures would be more appropriate than

i d

81601818 5189  ;

joewalsh

,( ) i provision of some job performance aid.

2 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Okay. I have no other 3 questions.

+

4 JUDGE FRYE: Mr. Johnson, any questions?

5 MR. JOHNSON: Yes, sir.

6 CROSS EXAMINATION 1

7 BY MR. JOHNSON:

g Q Dr. Mileti, I would like to focus on some 9 statements you made concerning your findings about io fundamental flaw.

3-11 It seems that you were drawing inferences about i 12 the fundamental success, or potential for success, of the

13 organization, or organizational effectiveness from that to'

( i4 the training programs effectiveness, or whether there was a is fundamental flaw. And in describing what you meant by 16 fundamental flaw, it wasn't clear to me whether you were 17 attributing that description to the performance at the .

i is exercise, and organizational effectiveness in general, or to 19 the training program specifically, because your reasoning, l 20 by inference I think, from organizational effectiveness to l

21 the training program effectiveness.

22 For example, you use the term uncorrectable, I think or unworkable, and irreversible, synonyms for l 23 fundamental flaw, and my question is: To which concept, or 24 25 which conclusion were you referring to when you used those O

\

_ - . . - ---.-__.._.-_ _ ___ _ _ ... .. -._..._ _ _ _ _ -_ ,_ _ _ ...__ _ . ,___. _ ~ .-.._. _.

81601818 5190

~joewalsh

( )j 1 terms? Were you referring to organizational effectiveness 2 in general, or were you referring to the training program, 3 and if so, could you explain?

4 A (Witness Mileti) As I recall it, when I was 5 talking about fundamental flaws, I was talking about 6 fundamental flaws in the training program, and as I. recall, 7 I was making a judgment regarding how effective I thought 8 LERO would be in response to a future real emergency, and I 9 thought that from a sociological point of view, enough to cohesiveness was revealed by the FEMA assessment, that LERO it would be effective in response to a future real emergency.

12 And from that I infer that the training program 13 has to be successful to have gotten up to that level of

( ) 14 organizational performance.

15 Q Let me focus on irreversible. It seems to me it 16 would be pretty difficult to find some flaw in a training l 17 program that was irreversible. Are you referring to a is performance indicator during the exercise that would 19 indicate an irreversibility in performance during an 20 accident, and what that means in terms of the training 21 Program?

22 A I hope I understand your question. I am not 23 sure I do.

f 24 Q Let me try again. Let me draw a distinction 25 between what happens during the course of an accident, for o

81601818 5191 joewalsh f(,)

i example -- in your testimony you refer to patterns of 2 behavior, patterns of errors, and redundant and diverse 3 systems to prevent them from having major consequences.

4 Now, let me draw analogy to quality assurance.

- -5 Quality assurance, for example, in construction you have 6 redundant systems, ways of checking. You have diverse 7 systems, you have defense in depth.

8 But there is an elaborate procedure that takes a 9 fair amount of time with design engineers as well as with io quality assurance, quality control people. There is a ti difference between that kind of a system and what happens 12 during an emergency, in the sense that you don't have the i3 time to employ elaborate systems to review over time. You

( i4 have to get to develop some kind of corrective action if you is are going to have corrective action during the emergency, 16 and I was wondering when you said, ' irreversible,' were you 17 referring to evidence of irreversible errors in performance la that you saw during the exercise, in terms of developing a 19 standard that indicated performance that during an exercise 20 the plan defects were irreversible, or were you talking 21 about the plan itself for training, which is incorrigible.

22 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: I object to the form of the 23 question.

24 JUDGE FRYE: I am lost.

25 (Laughter.)

. .. - - - . . .. = . _ = -

.81601818 5192 joewalsh

. ; ~

g.

1 JUDGE FRYE
Take it one at a time. You had a l 7 2 number of elements in there.

3 BY MR. JOHNSON: (Continuing) 4 Q Okay. When you talk about irreversibility, what 5 are you referring to?

6 A (Witness Mileti) Can't be fixed.

7 Q What can't be fixed?

8 A The flaw, the fundamental flaw.

9 Q In what?

4 to A The training program.

11 Q Give me an example of something that could not 12 be fixed?-

i 13 A Well, in reference to training for emergencies, O

\ "

14 I think emergency planning works. The evidence I have seen j is suggests that that is the proper conclusion. I don't think-16 there is something that couldn't be fixed in reference to i 17 planning for an-emergency at a nuclear power plant.

18 However, I can't imagine some emergencies for 19 which planning may not work.

20 A (Witness Linda 11) This may be -- and I don't 2i want this to sound flip -- but I think it is a little bit -- -

22 the only example I could come up with is that if the 23 training program was that in order to respond effectively to 24 the emergency people needed enough intelligence, and we are 25 talking about literally IQ here, to be able to grasp certain g ,.-----.,-,w.., - y .-,,,,.-.4 ,..m. _w-- --,m-s- - , . . - - . - . , , ,,ymm.-., m.- ,-m .--.-.,-,.---,.mm.,---

81601818 5193 joewalsh

. I ,)

-s i kinds of concepts, and the people that were available, the 2 only people that were available, were at the level of maybe 3 below the educateably mentally retarded, or something like 4 that.

5 It is a very strained example, but I think it is 6 the kind of illustration -- that the people who were 7 available simply could not grasp the material that they a needed to learn. That would be an example, but it is 9 awfully -- like I said, it is awfully far fetched, and it io sounds kind of silly, ii Q So, I gather from both of your answers that when 12 you are talking about unworkable and irreversible, you are i3 talking about the training program and not about performance

( i4 during the exercise, is that correct?

15 A (Witness Mileti) That is correct, yes.

16 MR. JOHNSON: Thank you.

17 MR. CHIMING: Just a couple of questions.

is JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

19 CROSS EXAMINATION 20 BY MR. CUMMING:

21 Q I would like to ask the panel, and any of you 22 may answer.

23 JUDGE FRYE: You understand we are just doing l

24 redirect (sic) for Dr. Mileti and Dr. Lindell.

25 MS. MONAGHAN: I think it is cross.

(2)

81601818 5194 joewalsh

( 1 JUDGE FRYE: It is cross, I am sorry, Ms.

2 Monaghan.

3 BY MR. CUMMING: (Continuing) 4 Q Dr. Mileti in particular may wish to answer 5 this. In your judgment, does not FEMA use a host of 6 problems analyzed as training; under training for Corrective 7 action?

e A Well --

9 Q In other words, doesn't the recommendation for 10 enhanced training, refresher training, et cetera, typically 11 get used by FEMA to cover a host of the items that you have 12 been discussing here this afternoon?

,_, 13 A (Witness Mileti) I would have to say I don't

~

(- 14 know, but perhaps Dr. Lindell does.

l 15 A (Witness Lindell) I haven't seen that many FEMA 16 post exercise assessment. I have seen one post exercise 17 assessment.

is All I can say is it is my experience as an 19 evaluator, I know at emergency exercises for the Nuclear I

20 Regulatory Commission that in general performance errors 21 tend to be depersonalized.

! 22 That is, rather than saying Joe Schmoe blew it,

. 23 and somebody needs to work him over in a back room, that 24 they just say there is a training error, and something needs 25 to be fixed in training.

l l'O

, . . _ , . _ , _ - _ . . . _ _ - _ - . _ _ . . . _ , , , _ . - . _ , _ _ , .__.._..__.----__-_.,.._..-,_,,....--_._,._,_..,_,m__. . . ~ _ _

81601818 5195 joewalsh

~ (,,) i So, to that degree I can answer -- I think that 2 addresses the question.

3 0 To follow on with one of Judge Frye's earlier 4 points, is there any possibility that a training program 5 could ever ensure or assure a hundred percent statistical 6 success as a result? Would that ever be an appropriate 7 objective for a training program?

8 A (Witness Mileti) I couldn't say that that is 9 possible. I don't think one could ever talk with certainty.

10 A (Witness Lindell) It would have to be a very si elaborate training. program for a very simple task.

12 As the training program became more elaborate, i3 and the task became more simple, then I think you can

()

i4 approach that, but it is hard to guarantee anything with a is hundred percent certainty.

16 A (Witness Mileti) Especially when human beings i7 are involved.

is Q This seems like a gross oversimplification, but i9 with respect to the exact working from a portion of 20 Contention Ex. 50, the statement appears: Virtually every 21 error made by a LILCO player during the exercise involved to l

22 some degree a failure of the LILCO training program to 23 prepare personnel adequately to perform necessary actions.

24 Would you agree or disagree with that statement?

25 A (Witness Lindell) Absolutely disagree.

O .

l 1

81601818 5196 joewalsh

-([ ) j i 0 With respect to actual emergency situations, in 2 the expert opinion of the panel, or Dr. Mileti specifically, 3 would you believe or do you have the opinion that the 4 present LILCO Plan with respect to training adequately 5 prepares the individual to, in fact, be flexible enough to 6 deal with the situation beyond that which anticipated 7 preparation is expected to cover?

a A (Witness Mileti) Yes.

9 Q To the extent possible it does so.

10 A Yes.

11 Q With respect to an actual emergency situation, '

12 is it your judgment that in some cases an individual should, 13 in fact, be trained so as to refer back to specifically his

(._-) 14 written procedures, or to check those procedures, and does is the LILCO plan now make that proper definition of that 16 situation?

17 A In general, I would answer the first part of is your question as, yes, 19 A (Witness Lindell) I would say the performance 20 in the exercise suggerts to me that that is the case, but as 21 far as exactly how the plan covers that, I am not 22 sufficiently familiar with the procedures, specifically with 23 the procedures, to address that.

24 A (Witness Behr) We do enforce in training, and 25 continue to reinforce, where practical, to referenced

1 81601818 5197 4

. joewalsh i procedures, and in fact, if you look at the attachment, the 2 job performance aids refer the field workers where they need l 3 more information, to take a look at their packets, and in 4 their packets they generally have procedures.

5 Q So, in your judgment the current plan does, in

, 6 fact, require referencing procedures where appropriate, J.

7 rather than reliance on the individual responder's memory?

8 A Yes.

9 MR. CUMMING: I have no further questions.

10 JUDGE FRYE: Redirect?

11 MS. MONAGHAN: Very limited.

12 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 13 BY MS. MONAGHAN:

14 Q Dr. Mileti, you and Mr. Miller discussed some 15 limiting factors in your analysis, which I believe appear in 16 your testimony on Pages 19 and 20.

! Given' the limiting factors that you described, 17

is what confidence do you have in the results of the analysis i9 you performed?

20 A (Witness Mileti) Enough confidence to come here ,

21 and make my conclusion.

22 Q Given those factors, what confidence do you have 23 if the results of the analysis demonstrates that the LERO l 24 training program has produced an organization with high

(

25 Potential for effectiveness?

lO 1

l l~

. - _ . _ . - - _ .-.-~ .~ . _ _ __..-_..__.__., .-_._,_-...- _ _ _ _-.. -._,- - ,._.-_ . .---.. _ ..~ . _ --__ - -,-. .

-81601818 5198 joewalsh

( ] 1 A A great deal of confidence.

2 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, there has been an 3 awful lot of discussion about these performance aids, and 4 there are xerox copies of them in the back of the LILCO 5 testimony as Attachment I.

6 We have sufficient copies of the actual things 7 for everyone to have one, and I would like to use them as an a exhibit.

9 MR. MILLER: I really don't quite understand --

10 JUDGE FRYE: What is the matter with the 11 attachment to the testimony?

12 MS. MONAGHAN: They are xeroxed copies, and they

, , _ 13 don't show what the actual thing looks like quite as well as 14 this does.

15 (Laminated clip-on tags are distributed to all

16 parties.)

17 JUDGE FRYE: Do you have any objection?

18 MR. MILLER: Procedurally, it seems a little 19 strange to me that they are entering exhibits on redirect 20 examination.

21 JUDGE FRYE: You don't have any problem with --

22 it is the real thing.

23 MR. MILLER: It is not important enough for me 24 to have a problem with it.

25 MS. MONAGHAN: Okay.

,,#-~ .- , ,--w-, ,r----, ~.----.,-.,,,y ,,7 -- - , , , ,,-- - - - . . - - . , , , , , , , - . . ,

81601818 5199

< -j oewalsh .

1 JUDGE FRYE: These are all evacuation route 2 spotters Job Code No. 24?

3 MR. MILLER: Mine is Bus Drivers Job Code No.

4 23.

5 MS. MONAGHAN: The complete set of them is in

, 6 Attachment I. What I have done is given each of you one.

7 JUDGE FRYE: Is this going to be an exhibit now, 4 8 or.is this just for our information.

9 MS. MONAGHAN: Just for your information. I i io don't think we need to put an exhibit number on it and enter it it into the record.

I 12 Actually, all of them are included in Attachment 13 I, but this is just to let you take a look and see what they 14 look like.

15 JUDGE FRYE: Fine.

16 MR. MILLER: We can keep these for our very own, l.

17 though?

18 MS. MONAGHAN: Yes, you can wear them whenever 19 you like.

i 20 (Laughter.)

21 A (Witness Lindell) Except in an emergency.

22 BY MS MONAGHAN: (Continuing) 23 Q Dr. Lindell, is this the type of performance aid 24 that you were discussing in your testimony?

25 A (Witness Lindell) Yes, it is.

! l l

i 3...,_. ..,.,-..,_...,._.m..

81601818 5200 joewalsh

'(v lj 1 Q Why do you consider this to be an effective 2 response to the dosimetry problem noted by FEMA in the post 3 exercise assessment?

4 A Well, it is an effective response because it 5 lists the kinds of numbers that are typically difficult for 6 people to remember, especially if they don't normally use 7 dosimetry in their everyday jobs, and it contains a sequence l

a of steps to follow.

9 Q Do you consider this to be an effective job to performance aid?

11 A Yes, I do consider this to be an effective job 1 12 performance aid, because it lists the sorts of things that 13 were noted in the FEMA post exercise assessment.

( -

14 MS. MONAGHAN: That is all.

15 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I think I have only one 16 recross question.

17 RECROSS EXAMINATION 18 BY MR. MILLER:

19 Q Dr. Mileti, the LERO badges that we have been 20 handed out, can you tell me why, in your opinion, these 21 badges would be looked at by LERO personnel, if such 22 personnel forgot to even look at their own personnel 23 dosimeters during the exercise?

24 A (Witness Mileti) Because they have instructions 25 on them. And I think people might recollect that they can

81601818 5201-joewalsh

.v)['D i gain information about how to do what they are supposed to 2 do.

3 Q If personnel during the exercise -- well, let me 4 ask. Let's do this one step at a time. Is it your 5 understanding that during_the exercise, LERO personnel 6 dispatched into the field wore personnel dosimeters?

7 A Yes.

8 Q And is it your understanding, Dr. Mileti, that 9 those LERO personnel were under LERO procedures to look at to those dosimeters approximately every fifteen minutes?

11 A Yes.

12 0 And there are a number of examples identified by i3 FEMA in its report where personnel did not look at their

()

14 dosimeters in a timely fashion, is that correct?

13 A Some did not, that is correct.

16 Q Now, is it your opinion that those personnel who 17 forgot to look at their dosimeters would not forget to look 1

is at these LERO badges?

, 19 A I think getting handed these LERO badges, 20 putting these LERO badges on, may be cause for someone to 21 having a look at it and recollecting procedures.

22 Q Dr. Mileti, LERO personnel at the exercise were 23 handed their dosimeters, they were briefed on the use of 24 those dosimeters, and they attached them to their garments 1

i 25 to wear.

81601818 5202 joewalsh V]

t 1

2 So, do you have any other basis for believing that LERO personnel would pay any attention whatsoever to 3 these badges?

4 A In a real emergency, I think people would pay 5 keen attention to their dosimeters and their badges and 6 their jobs.

7 I suspect that there may not be as much 8 incentive to look at a dosimeter when you know there is no 9 radiation, perhaps. Recollecting for people procedures, 10 just before they engage in a job, I think would enhance the 11 probability that they would follow those procedures.

12 Q Do you believe, Dr. Mileti, that during a FEMA-i3 graded exercise that received the kind of publicity that t'

(_

j 14 this exercise received, when LERO personnel knew they were is being observed by FEMA evaluators, that those LERO personnel 16 had no incentive to look at their dosimeters?

17 A I think many did.

18 Q And some did not?

19 A That is true.

20 MR MILLER: Thank you.

21 22 23 24 25 C

81601919- 5203 cuewalsh

,/m

( ,) i MR. ZAHNLEUTER: I have one question.

2 RECROSS EXAMINATION 3 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER:

4 Q Dr. Mileti, the LERO personnel who participated 5 in the exercise were supposedly taught the information on 6 the back of this aid, Correct?

7 A That's correct, yes.

8 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: I have no other questions.

9 MS. MONAGHAN: No re-redirect.

10 JUDGE FRYE Are we now through with both Dr.

in Mileti and Dr. Lindell?

12 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, as far as Suffolk i3 County is concerned, we are finished with both Dr. Mileti

( i4 and Dr. Lindell.

15 MS. MONAGHAN: Dr. Lindell will be here toborrow 16 again, but Dr. Mileti will not.

17 JUDGE FRYE: Dr. Mileti, thank you very mach for 1

is your patience and your testimony. We appreciate it.

i9 WITNESS MILETI: Thank you.

20 (Dr. Mileti is excused.)

21 MR. MILLER: I tried, Dr. Lindell. I tried.

22 (Laughter.)

23 JUDGE FRYE: We had, as I recall, only a few 24 questions left for Mr. Pursell from Mr. Miller.

25 MR. MILLER: I think, Judge Frye, that certainly (1)

.. . - . _ -. _ _ . . _ _ . . = . . -- - ._ - . .-

.81601919 5204 cuewalsh Ill t my questioning of Mr. Pursell would be finished within an 2 hour of tomorrow morning. I am going to go through the 3 second analysis.

4 I don't anticipate resistance from Mr. Pursell, 5 and I think it can be done within about an hour. I will 6 have a couple of exhibits I will be using in that cross-7 examination.

8 JUDGE FRYE: Do you have much redirect for --

' 9 MS. MONAGHAN: No, minimum redirect for Mr.

10 Pursell. I don't suspect that it would taken even -- maybe 11 15 minutes at the most.

12 JUDGE FRYE: 15 minutes?

13 MR. MILLER: I would think that by the mid-14 morning break tomorrow we would be with Ms. Goodkind and Mr.

15 Behr on the other exercises.

16 JUDGE FRYE: Any chance we can get through with.

17 Ms. Goodkind tomorrow?

18 MR. MILLER: Mr. Sutko is going to handle that 19 part of the testimony, but I would suspect the answer is 20 probably not.

21 JUDGE FRYE: Is he here?

22 MR. MILLER: Yes, sir. He is here. I know 23 enough to tell the Board that the answer is probably that we 24 would not finish Ms. Goodkind tomorrow. Well -- and, I 25 don't mean to exclude Mr. Behr. He is also sponsoring --

)

i

81601919 5205 cuewalsh

() 1 2

JUDGE FRYE: Well, Mr. Behr is going to have to hang around after tomorrow in any event, because he is on 3 other testimony.

4 MS. MONAGHAN: That's correct, Judge Frye.

5 JUDGE FRYE: It would be nice to be able to get 6 rid of Ms. Goodkind tomorrow.

7 MS. MONAGHAN: I'm sure she would prefer not to a have to come back next week.

9 MR. MILLER: We would all prefer that. And, I'm to sorry that she will have to come back. I'm sorry that ii yesterday we lost some time . But, I don't think, given the 12 fact that we have some wrap-up with Mr. Pursell and given i3 the fact that tomorrow is our shortened day, that we are 0

(_/ i4 going to finish with Ms. Goodkind and Mr. Behr tomorrow.

15 JUDGE FRYE: I think we had better continue with 16 Mr. Pursell this afternoon, then.

17 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I have some commitments is this evening. I'm not sure what the Board anticipates this 19 evening, but as I understand things, as of now already, at 20 five to 5 the Board wanted to hear something about 21 fundamental flaws, the Board wanted to hear --

22 JUDGE FRYE: Well, that can be deferred. We 23 will easily defer that.

24 MR. MILLER: Fine. If the Board wanted to hear 25 some kind of schedule, I'm more than happy to defer that as O

81601919 5206 euewalsh

- (- T I; I well.

2 But, I have got to be -- I can go a little bit 3 this evening. I probably would not finish Mr. Pursell this 4 evening, and no later than -- 5:30 is going to push me in a 5 couple of other matters that I have to do. But, if the 6 Board wants to go until 5:30 --

l 7 JUDGE FRYE: Let's go on and make every effort a to try to get rid of both -- well, not get rid of but get 9 through the testimony of both of these witnesses tomorrow.

10 Why don't you bring Mr. Pursell in?

J 11 MS. MONAGHAN: He's coming.

12 MR. MILLER: I will have to go get some i3 documents from the other room.

,ss

( -

14 JUDGE FRYE: All right.

15 MR MILLER: Judge Frye, I do have to be out of 16 here no later than 5:30 today.

17 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. We may want to start early 18 tomorrow, then.

19 MS. MONAGHAN: Yes. We would like to finish 20 with Ms. Goodkind if at all possible so that she doesn't 2i have to return from Chicago on Monday.

22 MS. MC CLESKEY: And, as always, I would very 23 much like to address the scheduling issue before we get away 24 tomorrow at 4 o' clock.

25 (Mr. Miller leaves the courtroom to obtain Q

1

)

81601919 5207 cuewalsh (p),

i documents.)

2 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, Mr. Sutko's estimate 3

for Ms. Goodkind and Mr. Behr on their testimony is a day 4 and a half. If you want to talk to Mr. Sutko directly, I 5 will bring him into the room. I just talked to him.

6 JUDGE FRYE: Well, let's go on with Mr, Pursell, 7 and we will talk to Mr. Sutko afterwards.

8 Whereupon, 9 DENNIS M. BEHR, 10 CHARLES A. DAVERIO, 11 and 12 MICHAEL K. LINDELL 33 were joined at the witness table by ELLIOTT D. PURSELL and,

( u having previously been duly sworn, were further examined and is testified as follows:

16 CROSS EXAMINATION 17 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) is Q Mr. Pursell, would you turn to Page 26 of the 19 testimony, please?

20 (The witness is complying.)

21 Now, Mr. Pursell, at the top of Page 26 it 22 references the second analysis that you performed with 23 respect to the Shoreham report; is that correct?

24 A (Witness Pursell) That's correct.

25 Q Now, can you tell me, Mr. Pursell, what O

t

- _ , _ , . - - . _ _ , . - , .--- - -_m ,.,, . , ,, . ~ - - - _ . - -

81601919 5208 cuewalsh (v'] 1 percentage of the FEMA objectives you looked at that had no 2 deficiencies or ARCAs associated with them?

3 A Okay. Based on my calculations, the percentage 4 came out to 74.4 percent.

5 Q Now, your testimony states that 74.4 percent of 6 the objectives were either Completely or partially met. I'm 7 asking what percentage had no deficiencies or ARCAs as a identified by FEMA associated with them?

9 A No deficiencies or ARCAs associated with them?

10 Is that the question? _

11 Q Yes, sir.

12 A I don't believe I have calculated the precise 13 percentage that you are asking. The percentage rather that l( 14 I did calculate was the number of objectives which were is completely met by LERO.

16 But, if I'm understanding the percentage that 17 you are asking for -- and I think I do have an understanding is of it -- I have not calculated that exact pe centage.

19 Q And, I take it then also, Mr. Pursell, you would 20 not be able to tell me what percentage of the FEMA 21 objectives had no deficiency or ARCAs or areas recommended 22 for improvement associated with L:lem?

23 A No. I have n'4 t tal< iated that percentage.

24 Q Did you perform the same sort of calculation 25 that you discuss on Page 26 with respect to any other FEMA

81601919 5209

.guewalsh

() i 2

post-exercise assessment report, including the Indian Point compensating exercise?

3 A No, I have not.

4 Q Can you tell me why you did not do this?

5 .A Well, for one reason, the Indian Point report is 6 not written in the exact same format as the Shoreham 7 report. So, it would be -- it would not be possible to take i

a the Indian Point report and make the exact same type of 9 calculations that are presented in response to Question 26 .

io in my testimony.

4 11 Q But, Mr. Pursell, you did compare the Shoreham 12 report to the compensating exercise at Indian Point under i3 your content analysis approach, did you not?

IO u A Yes, that's correct.

is Q So, are you telling me that it was possible to 16 make a comparison with respect to the critical incident i7 technique but not with respect to determining which l- is objectives had been met or not met or only partially met?

[ ig A Certainly, there could be some percentage 20 calculations done for the Indian Point report. Whether 21 those calculations would be precisely the same as these or 22 not, I would have to go back to the Indian Point report and 23 look.

But, from what I recall the calculations would

[ 24

! 25 probably be slightly different at the Indian Point report.

O i

}

y. _ _- . _ _ . _ _ ._ _ _ ..- . .

81601919 -5210

. zuewalsh 4 s
1 Certainly, the deficiencies are laid out. So, I'm certain 2 some sort of counting process could be done, but I have not 3 done that for that report.

4 Q Now, my initial' question, Mr. Purse 11, was why l' 5 you did not perform the same kind of analysis with respect i 6 to any other FEMA post-exercise assessment report?

7 ~A Because our purpose in looking at these numbers

! a for the Shoreham report was simply to look at the positive-9 favorability of the Shoreham report. . We, at no time, I 10 intended to compare this type of analysis to another if exercise report.

12 (The witnesses, Pursell and Lindell, are

, 13 conferring.)

14 Q Mr. Pursell, do you have anything you want to 15 add after that consultation with Dr. Lindell?-

16 A No.

j 17 Q_ Now, Mr. Pursell, earlier today while you were is not in the room, we discussed with Dr. Mileti and Dr.

19 Lindell the various sub-organizational units, if you will, i

!. 20 of the LERO organization. For example, the EOC, the ENC, l

21 the staging areas.

22 Are you familiar with those various sub -

l 23 organizational units?

24 A Yes. I'm aware that they are broken out l

I 25 separately in the report, in the FEMA report.

I

!o i

l i

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'81601919 5211 cuewelsh From your review of the FEMA report for ll h 1 .Q 2 Shoreham, Mr. Pursell, would you agree with Dr. Mileti, who 3 told me earlier today, that he would consider the EOC to be 1

4 the most significant --

5 A I'm sorry, what was the last part of that?

6 Q Let me just start again. I wasn't through.

7 From your review of the FEMA report for

, a shoreham, would you agree with Dr. Mileti's statement to me

! 9 earlier today that the LERO EOC is probably the most io important subunit within the LERO organization?

11 A I would have to say I am not knowledgeable j 12 enough about emergency organizations -- and do not consider 33 myself an expert in that field -- to give an answer to that.

( 14 Q Okay. I'm-not asking you to discuss with me any i3 matter that calls on expertise within organizational .

16 theory. I'm asking with respect to the LERO organization

17 and your review of the FEMA report, would you be able to l

is agree with me that the LERO EOC is the most important 19 subunit within the LERO organization?

20 MS. MONAGHAN: Objection. The witness has just l

21 indicated he is not competent to answer the question.

22 JUDGE FRYE: Overruled. As a matter of your own l- 23 personal opinion, would you hold that opinion or not?

i 24 Maybe you don't know in which --

i 25 WITNESS PURSELL: I really don't have an opinion O

81601919 5212

suewalsh ll -

1 on that subject.

2 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. Now, let's move on.

3 -WITNESS PURSELL: I mean, I don't know.

4 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I'm having handed out a I

5 multi-page document, the first page of which is entitled 6 " Summary of Objectives," and in:the bottom right-hand corner 4

7 is typed " Privileged and Confidential Attorney Work 8 Product."

9 And, I might just state that this was one of the 10 documents that was provided to Suffolk County, not during i

11 discovery but following the County's filing of the motion to 12 strike LILCO's testimony.

13 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 14 Q Mr. Pursell --

is JUDGE PARIS: Are you going to --

}

16 JUDGE FRYE: Is this marked as Number 59?

l 17 MR. MILLER: I'm sorry. We have marked this as is Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 59.

19 JUDGE FRYE: All right.

20 (The document referred to is marked 2i as Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit i 22 Number 59 for identification.)

1 23 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 4 24 Q Now, Mr. Pursell, are you familiar with what we

, . 25 have identified as Suffolk County Exhibit 597 C

i

81601919 5213 cuewalsh lf [ i A Yes, I am.

v 2 Q Could you tell me what this document.is or 3 consists of?

4 A Well, it basically consists of the counting that 5 I did initially to come up with some percentages to look at, 6 the number of percentage of objectives that were completely 7 met, objectives not met and objectives partially met, just 8 sPecifically as defined in the FEMA report.

9 And, basically this is simply going -- consisted io of the counting, as you can see here.

11 Q Is it fair to say, Mr. -- first of all, Exhibit 12 59 was prepared by you; is that correct?

13 A Yes, that's correct.

14 Q And, I assume, Mr. Purse 11, that Exhibit 59 were is essentially your work papers that led to the conclusions

16 stated at Page 26 of the LILCO testimony; is that correct?

17 A The attached pages in the back? Is that what is you are referring to?

! 39 Q No. I'm referring to the entire exhibit. Are 20 these essentially your work papers that led you to tabulate 21 the percentages that appear on Page 26 of the testimony?

22 A That's correct.

23 Q And, I gather, Mr. Pursell, from looking at the l

24 first page of Exhibit 59 that you counted 121 exercise 25 objectives in part because some of those objectives appear

81601919 5214 cuewalsh ffv- )j i more than once in the FEMA report?

2 A That's correct.

3 Q And, if I recall correctly, Mr. Pursell, those 4 objectives that were not observed by FEMA, of which there 5 appear to be five under your count, were not included in 6 calculating your percentages that appear on Page 26; is that 7 right?

8 A That's correct.

9 Q Mr. Pursell, how did you determine which 10 objectives had been met or not met or only partially met?

11 A Simply using the language set forth in the FEMA j 12 report as written by FEMA where they stated typically -- it 13 was at the beginning of a paragraph -- the exercise

'( 14 objective of determining thus and so was, and then they 15 would state either met, not met or partially met; and, then 16 in parentheses after that, it would be the specific exercise 17 objective.

18 For example, SA-1 or Field 1, EOC-1 and so 19 forth.

2a Q And, Mr. Pursell, part of -- in fact, a large 21 part of Exhibit 59 consists of xerox pages, xerox pages from 22 the FEMA report with handwriting next to the numbers and the 23 handwriting says met, partially met, not met.

24 I take it that's your handwriting?

25 A That's correct.

(2)!

- . _ - . _ . , - = . _ . -. .-

81601919 5215 cuewalsh

() i 2

Q And, you simply xeroxed the pages that set forth the overall objectives of the report and then went through 3 the report and determined whether objectives had been met or 4 not met or partially met and.then noted that on your copy of 1

5 the work papers; is that correct?

6 A That's correct.

7 Q Did you do anything to verify whether your a analysis of whether objectives had been met, not met or 9 partially met 18, in fact, Correct Or not?

10 A Yes. In fact, there was a summary -- I believe 11 at one point, there was a summary tally sheet that was a 12 verification process that was a step between the attachments 4

i3 that we have here and the actual numbers that we see on the

$s 24 first three pages.

15 I don't know where that summary tally sheet is.

16 It was just a -- it was a verification sheet that I used to i7 go through and see if, in fact, everything was recorded is correctly. I just went back through and double-checked on 39 that sheet.

20 And, if there was a mistake it was recorded on

! 21 that sheet. And, that's not here. I don't know where -- I 22 don't have it.

23 Q Is it the last two pages of the exhibit, Mr.

24 Pursell? Is that what you are referring to?

25 A No. It's not those two pages. I know what O

81601919 5216 cuewalsh

( j 9,,

I those are. Those were just some work sheets that we started 2 out with, and when the request was made of me for these 3 documents the request was to provide the working documents 4 that I had generated in generating this analysis.

5 And, these are all of the working documents 6 that, you know, are available except for the -- there was a 7 verification sheet that I used to go back in and see if, in a fact, what had been recorded was correct or not. And, that 9 sheet is not here.

to Q I don't know where it is either, Mr. Pursell, 11 because I have handed out as Exhibit 59 the exact document 12 that was provided to me by counsel for LILCO.

13 A That's correct. That's all I have. I don't --

('

\ "

\

14 Q Well, you are telling me there was a summary

, is verification sheet which does not appear in Exhibit 59?

16 A That's correct.

17 Q And, I'm just telling you I don't have it, la because I was never given that sheet.

19 JUDGE FRYE: I don't think he is accusing of 20 having --

21 WITNESS PURSELL: No, no. I don't have it 22 either. I have not seen it for quite awhile. It was not 23 given to my counsel.

24 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, at the time that I 25 asked Mr. Pursell for the documents I told him to send me O-

81601919 5217 cuewalsh

[ (~ i everything he had, which he said he did.

s 2 I think what he is indicating now is that while 3 there may have existed a tally sheet at some time, it was 4 either destroyed or thrown away or just wasn't part of the 5 documents that he has anymore. That's why it wasn't --

i 6 JUDGE FRYE: So, when you forwarded the 4

7 documents you no longer had it?

8 WITNESS PURSELL: Right. When I forwarded the 9 documents I no longer had it.

in JUDGE FRYE: I see.

11 WITNESS PURSELL: I certainly never assumed that 12 it was an important document at the time that I generated i3 it, since the final percentages appeared to be important.

O ,,

15 16 17 18 19 20

' 21 22 23 24 f

25

81602020 5218 carysimons

(' BY MR. MILLER:

V))- 1 2 Q Mr. Pursell, can I assume from the verification 3 process that you did at some time that the numbers reflected 4 on the first page of Exhibit 59 are correct based upon your 5 review of the FEMA report?

6 A (Witness Pursell) To the best of my knowledge, 7 they are, the numbers on the first three pages are.

8 Q Would you look at -- these pages aren't 9 numbered, but I want you to look, if you would, please at, 10 for example, field objective 5 for the Port Jefferson 11 staging area, and the only way I can describe that for you 12 is that at the top of a page about a third of the way into i3 the document in handwriting it says " Port Jefferson" and

( )- 14 then the third page in from that typewritten at the top on 15 page 14 appears " Field Objective 5."

16 That is an objective which states " Demonstrate l 17 the ability to provide backup public alerting if necessary is in the event of partial siren system failure."

19 A (Witness Lindell) We've found Port Jefferson.

20 Then where is it from there?

21 Q Go three pages in from Port Jefferson. At the 22 page typed in, 14, objective 5 is the objective I just read.

23 Do you see that, Mr. Pursell?

24 A Yes, I do.

25 0 You have noted, Mr. Pursell, that from your Q

1 81602020 5219 carysimons l lh i review of the FEMA report that field objective five for Port Jefferson was met; is that correct?

2 3 A Based on this document, yes, that's correct, but 1

4 as I've stated earlier, I'm not a hundred percent sure that 5 this document is correct because this was prior to being 6 proofed or checked or being verified.

7 Q I'm just wondering if I can rely on the numbers a which appear in the first page of Exhibit 59?

9 A Well, I said yes, to the best of my knowledge, to we can.

11 Q Would you look at the FEMA report now, Mr.

12 Purse 11, which we have identified as Exhibit 55. That one i3 will do. Field objective five for Port Jefferson appears on

( i4 page 57. In fact, the first sentence under the heading i3 " Implementation of Field Activities," do you see that, sir?

16 A Yes, I do.

17 Q Can I assume, Mr. Purse 11, that that was the is sentence you relied upon to draw the conclusion that this 19 objective had been met?

20 A I don't recall. I would have to go back and 21 redo the numbers again. I mean I'm not sure. I mean I 22 realize it says " met" on page 14 in these attached 23 documents, but.I would have to go back and regenerate all of 24 the numbers to see which category that was included in.

25 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I will hand out at this

81602020 5220 carysimons gh] i time a two-page document that we can identify as Suffolk 2 County Exercise Exhibit 60, the first page of which is 3 entitled " Exercise Evaluation Critique Form." In the upper-4 left-hand corner it states " Port Jefferson Staging Area,"

5 and in the upper-right-hand corner the evaluator's name is 6 listed as K. Bertram.

7 (The document referred to was a marked Suffolk County Exercise 9 Exhibit No. 60 for to identification.)

il BY MR. MILLER:

12 Q Mr. Pursell, have you ever seen this document

___ i3 before that we have marked as Exhibit 607 O

(_,f- 14 A (Witness Pursell) I've seen quite a few is exercise evaluation critique forms. It is certainly not 16 possible for me to say whether I have or have not seen this 17 specific one.

is Q Mr. Pursell, did you attempt to by use of the 19 FEMA Exercise Evaluation Critique forms to verify the 20 accuracy of your notations on Exhibit 59 of objectives 21 having been met, not met or partially met?

! 22 A No, I did not.

23 Q Would you agree with me, Mr. Pursell, by looking 24 at what we have marked as Suffolk County Exhibit 60 that in 25 fact Port Jefferson staging area objective field five was Q

81602020 5221 carysimons i

i partially met according to FEMA?

2 MS. MONAGHAN
I'm going to object to that.

3 It's unclear as to what FEMA's official opinion is on that.

4 I think FEMA's official opinion is contained in the report 5 itself.

i 6 JUDGE FRYE: Well, let's rephrase the question.

1 j 7 If you look at the form, Mr. Pursell, in the center at the J

i 8 bottom, it appears that it has been checked objective j 9 partially met; is that correct?

10 WITNESS PURSELL: That's correct.

11 BY MR. MILLER:

12 Q And, Mr. Pursell, if you look at the FEMA report

i3 itself, which is what you used as your database ---

14 A Yes, it's my assumption that the FEMA report is i 15 the summary report of all of the observers and is not a 16 report of individual observers.

l 17 Q Well, that's fine, Mr. Pursell, but let me ask

$ , is my question. If you look at page 57 of the FEMA report for 19 Shoreham, which is Exhibit 55, which is where field 20 objective five for Port Jefferson is stated, can you show me li .

21 where, if anywhere, there is a statement that that objective 22 was met according to FEMA's report?

l j 23 (Pause while the witness reviews his document.)

24 A No, I cannot, except to say that it says that it i 25 was the first one demonstrated is the only comment that I i

lO 5

81602020 5222 carysimons

-( l see regarding field five here.

2 Q Did you conclude, Mr. Pursell, when you saw 3 words to the effe:6 that an activity had been demonstrated, 4 that.that activity had been met?

5 A As I have said earlier, I do not recall right 6 now which category I placed that in in the analysis. I 7 don't know whether that would have fallen under looking back e at the different categories under either met or partially 9 met. As I've noted, there were some objectives as a note at 10 the bottom of Exhibit 59, that there was some minimal amount 11 of confusion with respect to a few of the objectives.

12 In other words, there were a handful of i3 objectives that were difficult to classify. In other words, 14 that there was no clear-cut way to make a determination as is to whether the objective was met or partially met because in 16 some CaEes FEMA did not specifically say on an overall basis 17 whether the objective was met or was partially met. And I is noted a specific example on page 44 in my footnote to

( 19 Exhibit 59.

l 20 Q Mr. Purse 11, I don't want to take the Board's 2 time to perform a counting operation, but I'll represent to 22 you that if you take your attachments to Exhibit 59 and i

23 count all the Port Jefferson objectives that you've listed 24 as met, you in fact have listed field objective five for 25 Port Jefferson as an objective which was met. But if you O

l i

81602020 5223 carysimons i would like to count that yourself over the evening, that's 2 fine and you can tell me that tomorrow morning.

3 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, Mr. Pursell, has 4 already stated that there was a sheet that he went through 5 to cross-check against the notations listed on these pages 6 that are copied and attached to Exhibit 59 and that his 7

total numbers and his final count are the ones that appear a on the first page. He has not made any representation that 9 there is a complete correlation between the numbers on the to first pages and the ones that come behind that.

11 MR. MILLER: I've asked, Judge Frye, if I can 12 rely on the numbers on the first page, and I submit that you i3 cannot rely on the numbers given the backup documentation ja and the numbers that appear on the first page.

15 If Mr. Pursell would like to make any kind of a 16 count and tell me tomorrow morning I'm wrong, I would be 17 more than happy to hear that.

is BY MR. MILLER:

ig Q Let me go on, Mr. Pursell. Looking at the LERO 20 EOC, if I understand Exhibit 59, you're telling me there 21 were under 'our f count 18 objectives that were met, two 22 objectives not observed, three objectives not met and seven 23 objectives partially met; is that correct?

24 A (Witness Pursell) No, that's not quite 25 correct. In parenthesis next to the 18 you'll see a one, rm

,/

l

81602020 5224 sarysimons 1 In other words, one objective appeared to be_ completely met, 2 but I was not-certain because of some of the wording-3 provided by FEMA. And as I've said just a minute ago, in 4 this analysis there are literally a handful of objectives 5 that we could go through the report and find where it is not 6 100 percent clear whether FEMA judged the objectives to be 7 completely met or partially met. And where I noted that I a specifically put something in parenthesis, and that's the 9 one in parenthesis next to the 18.

10 I don't recall what page that's on in the FEMA 11 report, but that's why I added the footnote to the bottom of 12 Exhibit 59 so that I'm acknowledging that in~ fact there are 13 a very few objectives that are difficult to classify into h- 14 these categories.

15 But by far the majority of them, nearly all of 16 them in fact, FEMA specifically states in the report, and I 17 think you can see it throughout the report, that the is objective was met or the objective was partially met or not 19 met.

20 Q Now, Mr. Purse 11, if we look at the LERO EOC 21 objectives, if I exclude the objectives not observed, which 22 you say you did, there are approximately 28 total objectives 23 for the EOC in the FEMA report; is that correct? I'm just 24 simply tabulating now.

25 A It's somewhere in that ball park figure not Q

81602020 5225 carysimons counting the ones that I have in parenthesis there.

t 2 0 Now of the 28 objectives, Mr. Pursell, 18 were 3 met under your analysis, and if I do the kind of percentage 4 calculation you did in your second analysis, I calculate 5 that comes out to 64.28 percent of the objectives were 6 completely met for the EOC. Does that sound about right to 7 you?

a A well, I don't know. I don't have a calculator 9 with me. I don't know what ---

10 JUDGE FRYE: Do we dare?

11 (Laughter.)

12 MR. MILLER: Does that sound right, Judge Paris?

i3 JUDGE PARIS: 64.28.

14 MR. MILLER: Thank you, sir.

15 BY MR. MILLER:

16 0 And, Mr. Pursell, if I look at the ENC where I 17 see three objectives that were met according to your la analysis, one not observed, two that were not met and one in that was partially met, and if I exclude the objectives not 20 observed, I would have six total objectives, three of which 21 were completely met for a 50 percent percentage calculation 22 of those that were completely met at the ENC.

I 23 Now you can agree with that, can't you?

24 A Yes, that's true. That's correct.

0 And if I look at the Patchogue staging area, Mr.

25 v

81602020 5226 carysimons gl 1 Pursell, I for Patchogue find that there are a total of 21 2 objectives under your analysis, nine of which were 3 completely met, so that I find that there is a 42.85 percent 4 percentage calculation for those objectives completely met 5 at Patchogue. Would you agree with that?

6 A Well, I'll just -- yes, assuming your 7 calculation is correct.

a Q And if I look at the Riverhead staging area, Mr.

9 Pursell, I see that there are 18 total objectives, 12 of 10 which were completely met under your analysis which means we 11 have a 66.66 percent percentage calculation of those 12 objectives completely met for Riverhead. Does that sound

,__ 13 about right?

o

(,)}- 14 A That sounds about right.

15 Q So if I look, Mr. Pursell, at your total listing 16 of these figures for the subunits of LERO listed on page 1 17 of Exhibit 59, I would determine from my review that four of 18 the ten subunits, the EOC, the ENC, the Patchogue staging 19 area and Riverhead staging area have less than a 70 percent 20 percentage calculation rate for those objectives completely 21 met, correct?

22 A Yes, based on the numbers we just reviewed 23 that's correct.

24 O And if I look at the numbers a little bit more 25 carefully, I guess then I could say that of the 10 subunits

(,V<5

1 -81602020 5227

'tcrysimons i of LERO since only six exceeded a 70 percent pass rate or 70 ll . /

2 percentage calculation rate, if you will, that that comes 3 out to about a 60 percent calculation for those that would 4 have exceeded 70 percent as a pass / fail criterion. Does 5 that sound about right?

6 JUDGE PARIS: Would you run through that again?

7 MR. MILLER: I'm simply, Judge Paris, taking the a ten subunits of LERO that are listed on page 159 and noting 9 that four of those ten had some percentage calculation of l 10 objectives met of less than 70 percent and I'm ---

11 JUDGE FRYE How many percent?

12 MR. MILLER: Seventy percent.

33 JUDGE FRYE Seventy.

b(_/ -i 14 MR. MILLER: And I'm then observing that is therefcae on a gross organizational scheme, if you will, 16 that comes out to be about a 60 percent pass rate for the 17 entire organization broken down by subunits, then total is subunits, six of which exceeded 70 percent.

19 JUDGE SHON: Mr. Miller, where did you get your a

l 20 value of 70 percent as passing? Have we established that? <

21 MR. MILLER: I believe, Judge Shon, that was 22 established with this witness during a deposition that was 23 taken some time ago. I think the Board will recall that Mr.

24 Pursell offered a 50 percent rate last week to the Board his

-25 basis being police shooting in the dark at a target as the O

l 2

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81602020 5228 carysimons i only other time that he has encountered such a low pass

(

2 rate.

3 So 70 percent I think is something that was 4 established in a deposition, but I'll use it arbitrarily 5 today as to what I consider a common place pass / fail rate of 6 70 percent.

7 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Shon, if I might for a a moment, I think Mr. Miller is somewhat misrepresenting what 9 Mr. Purse 11 said in his deposition, and I think Mr. Pursell 10 has made clear his testimony here.

11 What'he has stated is that he is aware that 70 12 percent is frequently used as a cut-off score for other

_ _ , 13 organizations, but he has not in any way attempted to say

,m {

(_)q J 14 that that is what ought to be applied here.

is JUDGE SHON: That's what I thought. We don't 16 have his deposition before us immediately as far as I know, 17 and out of context I'm a little bit reluctant to necessarily la accept that a 70 percent pass / fail rate for this is a valid 19 one.

20 Do you think it is, Mr. Pursell?

21 WITNESS PURSELL: Absolutely not, and in my 22 deposition I merely indicated, not that I necessarily would 23 endorse the 70 percent pasa rate for any particular 24 application. I merely indicated that it was generally 25 accepted, particularly in educational institutions, and I j

. _ _ _ __ __ _ . . ____ _ _.- . . ~

81602020 5229 carysimons

i. think that's a' fact that is well known. For example, 2 university settings was specifically what I had in mind.

3 MR.' MILLER: Judge Frye, perhaps we can Mr.

4 Purse 11 to take a look at his deposition tonight and I'll 5 certainly do so, and if we need to. revisit this tomorrow 6 morning, we can do that. It's 5:30 and I ---

4 l 7 JUDGE FRYE: I realize it's 5:30. My

! a recollection of his testimony here was that he refused to

{ 9 assign a pass / fail rate.

l i

! 10 JUDGE SHON: Yes, but that was in' totally a t

ti different connection, too. That was with respect to your critical incidence, wasn't it?

)~ 12 l 13 WITNESS PURSELL: That's correct, but I do not 14 think that any of these numbers should be viewed as grades f' is Or Pass / fail, and I certainly do not think I'm an 16 appropriate person to suggest a pass / fail for any of these

i7 figures.

. is JUDGE FRYE: That's not say that of course the

39 County can't advocate that 70 percent should be the pass 1

20 fail mark if the County so chooses.

. 21 MR. MILLER: I think that's right, Judge Frye, l 22 and all I'm attempting to do through this witness is to l 23 demonstrate that looked at in certain ways, even the way Mr.

24 Purse 11 looked at the numbers, at least for various subunits i

I' 25 of LERO the rate of objectives met appears at least to me to l

!O i

i I

81602020 5230 marysimons ll 1 be rather low, and that's what I've tried to demonstrate.

2 I consider a rate of 42.85 percent for the 3 Patchogue staging area, for example, not to even meet the 4 rate that Mr. Purse 11 suggests is something that can be 5 compared to when you look at shooting in the dark.

6 JUDGE FRYE Well, let me ask, you're going to 7 want to introduce this I take it?

8 MR. MILLER: Yes, sir.

9 JUDGE FRYE Do you have any objection? Does to anyone have any objection to it coming in?

11 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, I don't think we have 12 clearly established with this witness exactly what the i3 relevance of the backup papers are to the front papers. So l )s;- 14 until we have managed to do that, I think I would object to 1 is entering it into evidence at this point in time without that 16 being clearly understood on the record.

17 JUDGE FRYE: How about the front page?

18 MS. MONAGHAN: I have no objection to entry of 19 the first three pages which in my copy are stapled together.

20 JUDGE FRYE: The first three pages with the 21 numbers on them, right?

22 MR. MILLER: Yes, sir.

23 JUDGE FRYE: So we can, you know, look at the r

24 numbers and compute various statistics based on those 25 numbers.

(!_~

i T-81602121 5231 joewalsh jly/ 1 MR. MILLER: Yes, sir. I am not quite through 2 with this document.

3 JUDGE FRYE: I understand that.

1 4 MR. MILLER: Okay. l

! 5 JUDGE FRYE: I am just trying to shortcut this j I

6 business about seventy percent pass / fail and what is here.

I 7 I think if there is no objection to the first three pages l

a coming in, the first three pages have the numbers that you 9 are interested in right now. You can certainly argue, you

! to know, that 9 is a certain percentage of a total figure. I i

[ 11 It is quite obvious.

12 MR. MILLER
Judge Frye, can I just ask one i3 other question, and then I have got to go. l

) 14 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) is O Mr. Pursell, would you look at Page 2 of Exhibit 16 597 Page 2, you left out the total number of deficiencies  :

i 17 and ARCAs and areas recommended for improvement by your  :

i i

is accounting, from your review of the Shoreham report, is that 19 correct?

20 A (Witness Pursell) That is correct.

21 Q And I can dispute numbers with you, Mr. Pursell,  ;

I 22 such as four deficiencies versus five deficiencies, but

23 using your numbers, I take it that if you total all the s
24 deficiencies, ARCAs and areas recommended for improvement '

4

! 25 together you get 68, is that correct?

i ,

( )

j i

]<

7]

81604121 5232 joewalsh llGg,4 1 A Yes, that would be correct.

2 Q And there is 121 total objectives, and just to 3 end the day on a note of yet another percentage calculation, 4 if you divided 68 by 121, I would come out with 58.67 5 percent of the objectives listed by FEMA required some 6 Correction under FEMA's analysis of LERO's performance at 7 the exercise?

8 A No, that is not correct. Areas recommended for 9 improvement do not require correction.

10 Q All right. Let me state it a different way, Mr.

li Purse 11. Would you agree with me that 58.67 percent of the 12 objectives noted by FEMA for the exercise, for those l . .

13 objectives, FEMA identified some problem or at least --

) 14 well, identified some problem?

15 A No, I would not say that necessarily even 16 related to the areas recommended for improvement that they it identified a problem.

18 Q Do you believe, Mr. Purse 11, that FEMA 19 identified areas recommended for improvement when there were 20 no problems noted by FEMA from it's review of the exercise?

21 A They certainly have not spelled out in the 22 report problems related to the areas recommended for I

2) improvement.

24 Q I will let the FEMA report speak for itself,

! 25 Judge Frye, and --

i i 1

i

01602121 5233 joewalsh i JUDGE FRYE You can ask him whether the 2 Percentage applies to areas recommended for improvement, 3 ARCAs and deficiencies,'I suppose.

4 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 5 Q I suppose you don't dispute my calculation, Mr.

6 Purse 11, given the figures you have on your page here, 58.67 7 percent is the math - .if you divide the 58 by the 121 8 objectives?

9 A (Witness Purse 11) Again, I don't have a 10 calculator, but I am assuming that percentage.

11 JUDGE SHON: I am not at all sure that the 68 12 represent things that stand in one-to-one correspondence i3 with the 121 which would be required for any kind of b)i u,. 14 percentage.

15 I mean, the areas recommended for improvement 16 and deficiencies and such are not necessarily tied one-to-17 one to the summary of objectives. Isn't this true, Mr.

is Purse 11? You know, you can't take percentages of apples i9 that are pears.

20 WITNESS PURSELL: That is correct, sir.

21 MR. MILLER: Judge Shon, that is another 22 Problem, and the problem comes in the fact that there are 23 times when there is more than one problem identified by 24 FEMA, but it only results in one ARCA or one area 25 recommended for improvement, or for that matter, one

'I

81602121 5234 joewalsh j i deficiency.

2 So, it is a difficult calculation to make. I 3 guess we should break for the day.

4 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, would it be possible 5 to start at 8:00 tomorrow morning?

6 JUDGE FRYE: Let us confer for one moment.

7 (The Board members confer.)

8 JUDGE FRYE: 8:30.

9 MS. McCLESKEY: Judge Frye, could we convene a 10 little bit earlier to talk about the schedule without the 11 witnesses?

12 JUDGE FRYE No. We will do that during the i3 break.

(%..

_/L 14 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, we will be here at 8:30 is tomorrow morning, but I want it understood that from our 16 standpoint Ms. Goodkind is not going to be finished 17 tomorrow, regardless of whether we start at 8:30, 8:00, or is 6:00 a.m. We will be here at 8:30, but we have gone late 19 this evening.

20 I have got commitments this evening, and it 2i seems to me a half hour here, a half hour there, it is a 22 long day as it is.

23 JUDGE FRYE It is going to be a short day, 24 because we have to stop at 4:00.

25 We are adjourned until 8:30.

l

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81602121 5235 joewalsh 1

(Whereupon, the hearing adjourned at 5:40 p.m., l 2 to reconvene at 8:30 a.m., Thursday, May 7, 1987.)

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CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL REPORTER K

This is to certify that the attached proceedings before

( the UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION in the l

l matter of: ,

l

! NAME OF PROCEEDING: LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY '

i (Shoreham Nuclear Power

! Station, Unit 1) l 1

J DOCKET NO.: 50-322-OL-f (EP Exercise) l PLACE: HAUPPAUGE, NEW YORK i

. g s I

/? DATS: WEDNESDAY, MAY 6, 1987 were held as herein appears, and that this is the original transcript thereof for the file of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

(si a" -

(ThPED) [

GARRETT J. WALSH Official Reporter ACE-FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

Reporter's Affiliation h

MYRTLE S. WALSH O -

/27 r 0 m 1ARY C. MONS v

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _