ML20215D894
| ML20215D894 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Beaver Valley |
| Issue date: | 06/11/1987 |
| From: | Beckman D, Rogers J, Waters D PARAMETER, INC. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20215D841 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-412-87-34, NUDOCS 8706190179 | |
| Download: ML20215D894 (39) | |
Text
F TECHNICAL REVIEW REPORT NRC REGION I INSPECTION N0. 50-412/87-34 REVIEW OF BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NRC CONTRACT NO. NRC156/018 ONSITE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED MARCH 30 - APRIL 10, 1987 Prepared for:
Under Contract with U.S.N.R.C. Region I Parameter, Inc.
King of Prussia, PA Elm Grove, WI NRC Liaison Personnel:
Authors:
L. Tripp D. Beckman J. Beall J. Rogers D. Waters j
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1 8706190179 870611 PDR ADOCK 05000412 G
PDR 4
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TABLE OF CONTENTS REPORT SECTION TITLE PAGE EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
................ES - 1 TO 3
- 1. 0 INTRODUCTION................................ 1 1.1 PURP0SE.............................
... 1
- 1. 2 BACKGROUND AND GENERAL SCOPE............
1
- 1. 3 GENERAL EVALUATION CRITERIA.............
2 1.4 EVALUATION METHODS......................
3
- 2. 0 INSPECTION RESULTS AND FINDINGS..............
3 2.1 DISAGREEMENTS AMONG TS, FSAR AND/0R SER. 4 2.2
GENERAL COMMENT
S ON DRAFT TS............
6
7 2.4 GENERAL PROCEDURE READINESS............ 11
- 2. 5 AS BUILT DISCREPANCIES AND FIELD OBSERVATIONS...........................
19 i
3.0 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS.........................
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4 APPENDICES
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1.0 LICENSEE PERSONNEL CONTACTED 1.1 DETAILED INSPECTION PLAN 1.2 INSPECTION REFERENCE DATA l
n EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The authors, under contract with Parameter, Inc., and under the direction of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, conducted an inspection at the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit 2:
to determitie whether the draft Technical Specifications (TS) and the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are compatible with the as-built plant configu-ration and operating characteristics; and, to determine whether the draft Technical Specification requirements are de-finitively measurable.
The inspection was concentrated on plant systems, structures, and components iden-tified as having particular significance in minimizing the severity of potential accidents and accident consequences.
The systems evaluated included: containment and support systems, containment spray systems, emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), soluble poison reactivity control (boration) systems, electrical power systems, auxiliary feedwater system, service water system and ultimate heat sink.
The facility descriptions and operating characteristics found in the FSAR, the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and the proposed TS were compared to the licensee drawings, procedures, and actual plant hardware to establish whether the as-built configuration is compatible with the safety analysis and the proposed TS.
Types of licensee documents reviewed included:
Piping and instrumentation diagrams Electrical one line drawings Electrical elementary diagrams Instrument logic diagrams & descriptions Plant Operating Manual Operating and Emergency Procedures Surveillance and Inservice Test Procedures Calibrations Procedures and data Maintenance Procedures Preoperational Test Procedures and data Administrative Procedures Calculations In situ plant equipment was visually inspected on a sampling basis to verify that actual installations agreed with the various documents.
Surveillance procedures were reviewed to verify that the surveillance methods planned by the licensee were consistent with the requirements of the draft TS and that the proposed TS requirements were definitively measurable or determinable.
At the time of the inspection, the draft TS were still under development by the licensee in conjunction with the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR).
The inspection was conducted using draft TS promulgated by NRC on March 27, 1987,
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1 Executive Summary 2
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and using pending revisions to that draft provided by the licensee.
These revi-sions had been submitted to and were under review by NRR.
Final draft TS were expected to be issued within several days of the close of this inspection.
FINDINGS Except for minor discrepancies noted below, the TS were found to be definitive and compatible with the as-built plant.
The licensee's programs for establishing and implementing surveillance and operating procedures responsive to the TS require-J ments were in place.. Nearly all procedures were issued in near final form.
J Although the procedures were substantially complete, they had been prepared well in advance using a very early draft of TS and, nearly universally, required revision l
to incorporate current TS requirements and finalized plant data (setpoints, operat-
)
ing limits, equipment nomenclature,-etc.).
Because both the proposed TS and the procedures were still under development, many of the above details had not been a
finalized, The licensee's plans and programs'for finalizing the plant data, TS, and procedures were in place and appeared adequate.
The licensee plans to finalize the plant data and procedures incrementally as the individual items are needed to support plant heatup.and startup (on an operational mode by mode basis).
Licensee management, including the Plant Manager, acknowledged the extensive effort and resources required to accomplish these activities on a schedule to support the proposed plant licensing and startup schedule. (Resources and schedule were not evaluated as part of this inspection.)
Specific Findings:
Inconsistencies between the TS, FSAR, and SER were identified and referred to NRR for resolution.
Examples included:
Testing frequencies for protection system slave relays; Initial conditions for off site power transfer surveillance testing; Emergency Diesel Generator trip and trip bypass testing; and, Engineered Safety Features response time testing acceptance criteria.
Deficiencies in plant procedures were identified in the categories below and referred to the licensee for resolution:
Changes in TS numbering, frequencies, mode applicabilities, cross refer-ences, and text resulting from changes in previous TS drafts; Outdated or superseded plant data, setpoints, operating limits, etc.;
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Executive Summary 3
Inappropriate or incorrect procedure steps, initial conditions, precau-i tions, etc.; and, Incorrect equipment nomenclature or identification in' procedures.
Procedures, equipment descriptions, drawings, and nomenclature were found inconsistent with as-built field conditions and were referred to the licensee for resolution.
Examples include:
Valve numbering changes resulting from field engineering changes; Electrical panels referenced in procedures but not shown on drawings or found in plant; Mismatches in process computer point identification between procedures and actual computer programming; and, Electrical meters installed in equipment but not consistently reflected on electrical drawings.
The findings in each category above were generally resolved by the licensee during l
the inspection.
In most cases the resolution involved confirmation that corrective action had been taken or that the item was being actively pursued by the licensee.
CONCLUSIONS The Technical Specification preparation and implementation process appears to be functioning properly.
The TS and implementing procedures reviewed appear to be compatible with the as-built plant configuration.
That information which is still under development for incorporation into the TS j
and implementing procedures appears to be subject to sufficient management control J
to assure adequate completion of the process.
4 Selected specific findings will be subject to reinspection of licensee actions as part of the routine inspection program.
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v INSPECTION RESULTS REVIEW 0F BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS NRC Region I Inspection No. 50-412/87-34 1.
INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE The purpose of this inspection was to determine that the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2, (BVPS-2), Technical Specifications are compatible-with the as-built configuration of the plant's systems, structures, and components and that the TS requirements were definitively measurable or determinable.
1.2 BACKGROUND
AND GENERAL SCOPE Startup testing and subsequent plant operation at commercial nuclear power plants has demonstrated that discrepancies sometimes exist between the facility's Technical Specifications (TS), Final Safety Analysis Re-port (FSAR), NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER), and the as-built plant configuration.
This inspection was conducted to gain additional assurance that the pro-posed BVPS-2 TS are compatible with the assumptions and requirements of the safety evaluations performed and the as-built plant.
Parameter, Inc.
conducted this inspection under the direction of NRC Region I.
The in-spection team consisted of two mechanical engineers having plant operat-ing and licensing experience and one electrical engineer having plant design, construction, and licensing experience.
A total of about 365 inspection hours were applied to the onsite activities.
A listing of licensee personnel contacted during the inspection is provided in Appen-dix 1.0 to this report.
The inspection was concentrated on plant systems, structures, and com-ponents identified as having particular significance with respect to minimizing the severity of potential accidents and accident consequences.
The systems evaluated included:
Containment Isolation Systems (CIA, CIB) and Valves (CIVs)
Containment and support systems Containment Depressurization and Cooling Systems Quench Spray (QSS)-
Recirculation Spray (RS)
Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink Service Water (SWS) l Standby Service Water (SWE)
AC Power Sources
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DC Power Sources Onsite Electrical Distribution Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW)
Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank (PPDWST) l Chemical and Volume Control Systems (CVCS)
Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS)
High Head Safety Injection (HHSI)
Low Head Safety Injection (LHSI)
Residual Heat Removal System (RHS)
Engineered Safety Features Actuation Syshm (ESFAS)
)
Reactor Protection System (RPS)
The following general categories of dscuments ere used for the inspec-l tion:
Technical Specifications (TS)
Final Safety Analysis Reports (FSAR)
NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER, including Supplements 1, 2, 3,
& 4) l Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P& ids)
Instrument and Control (I&C) Logic Diagrams Electrical One Line Diagrams l
Electrical Schematic (Elementary) Diagrams 1
Operating Manual System Descriptions Operating Manual Precautions, Limitations, Setpoints Operating Manual Normal System Arrangements (lineups)
Preoperational Test Procedures (P0s) and data Operating Surveillance Test Procedures (OSTs & BVTs)
Maintenance Surveillance Procedures (MSPs) and data Calibration Procedures (ICPs, LCPs, cps) and data Operating Procedures (ops)
Abnormal Operating Procedures (A0Ps)
Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs)
Administrative Control Procedures Setpoint Calculations 1.3 GENERAL EVALUATION CRITERIA
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The above systems and documentation were reviewed with respect to:
The compatibility of the draft TS with the as-built configuration of the systems, structures, and components; 1
The consistency of the draft TS with the documents listed in 1.2 above; The capability to definitively measure or determine compliance with the TS requirements considering both the software and hardware available; and, J
3 The adequacy of the licensee's surveillance and inservice test pro-grams to provide for the implementation of the TS Surveillance Re-quirements.
i 1.4 EVALUATION METHODS Prior to the onsite inspection activities, the plant systems information and draft TS were reviewed to identify those systems particularly signi-ficant for the prevention or mitigation of analyzed accidents.
Those systems (listed in Section 1.2 above) were used as the basis for the inspection.
During onsite inspection activities, the facility descriptions, operating characteristics and related information found in the proposed TS, FSAR, and SER were compared to the licensee documents listed in Section 1.2.
Concurrently, the TS were evaluated to confirm that the performance criteria and requirements were definitively measurable or determinable.
Particular emphasis was given to the ability of the surveillance and in-service tests to demonstrate conformance with the TS and the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a.
The detailed inspection plan used to conduct the inspection is provided I
as Appendix 1.1 to this report.
Specific documents reviewed are listed in Appendix 1.2 to this report.
Key inspection and evaluation items included:
Plant drawings were reviewed to establish that the plant design and construction documents were compatible with TS, FSAR, and SER.
Preoperational tests were reviewed to verify that the "as tested" system configurations were consistent with the TS, FSAR, and SER.
Surveillance tests were reviewed to verify their conformance with the TS and to establish that the TS requirements could be defini-tively measured.
Operating, Emergency, Maintenance, Calibration, and related proce-dures were reviewed to establish their conformance with the TS and accuracy with respect to the design and construction documents and the as-built plant.
1 Visual inspections (walkdowns) of the plant systems and equipment j
were conducted to confirm, on a sampling basis, that the aggregate j
documents above compared acceptably to the installed hardware.
The j
walkdowns focused on general system configuration, wiring and ter-j mination, instrumentation and controls, equipment identification j
and labeling, procedure agreement with the systems, and drawing agreement with the systems.
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'4 2.
INSPECTION RESULTS AND FINDINGS The inspection results identified some minor disagreements either among the various documents reviewed or.between the documents and the as-built plant.
No cases of substantial disagreement involving the as-built plant _were iden-tified.
Because nearly all findings involved documentation disagreements, the findings are grouped into subtopics below by like characteristics.
In many cases, the findings are generic to (nearly) all licensee procedures of a given type, e.g. dozens of surveillance procedures are potentially affected by a change
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in TS ESFAS parameters,'etc.
1 In such cases, a general finding supported by one or several specific examples is provided.
No attempt was made by the inspection team to identify or docu-ment all such discrepancies or deficiencies.
Such findings were identified to cognizant licensee personnel and generic potentials-were highlighted.
2.1 DISAGREEMENTS AMONG TS, FSAR, AND/0R SER
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These findings in this category were' individually referred to NRR for
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review during the inspection; where available, NRR's informal response 1
is noted.
1 a.
SER Section 7.3.3.3 addresse:; an NRC staff concern regarding unde-tectable failures in on line testing circuitry for Engineered Safety Features (ESF) slave relays and requires that the TS include monthly (rather than quarterly) slave relay testing pending acceptable circuit modifications planned by the licensee.
Draft TS 3/4.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, did not include a specific
-requirement for monthly testing in accordance with the SER.
Table 4.3-2 requires a monthly Channel Functional Test of the Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays which would appear to meet the SER requirement; however, Note 2 of the table states that: "Each I
train or logic channel shall be tested at least every other 31 days",
which would permit less restrictive testing than specified by the SER.
NRR advised that the licensee had appealed the above requirement and that the appeal was under NRC review.
b.
SER Section 8.2.3.1, Capability to Test Transfer of Power Between Normal and Preferred Offsite Circuits, states, in part:
"..in response to a staff concern that periodic testing of the
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transfer may create transients in the plant, if done during power operation, the applicant indicated that testing would be performed during refueling.", and
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". Testing durin'g refueling resolves.the staff concern and is, there-fore, acceptable.
Testing at 18 month intervals when the plant is shutdown will be included in the. Technical Specifications."
TS 4.8.1.1 provides the'roquirements_for testing the power transfer function at 18 month.inte"vals but does not restrict performance
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of the-test to shutdown plant conditions.
The BVPS_-2 TS-Procedures Matrix identifies OST 2.36.5, Emergency Switchgear Operation Test (Transfer from Unit to System Station Service Transformer), as the applicable procedure.
OST 2.36.5, Section 2, Initial Conditions, permits the test-to be conducted
'in various operating configurations up to full power.
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NRR was advised of the above and stated that the TS would be appro-priately revised.
The matter was also_ discussed with the licensee i
Manager, Nuclear Safety, who advised that the test is typically-performed during the power reduction for a plant shutdown'and that an appropriate resolution would be coordinated with NRR.
c.
.FSAR Section 8.3.1.1.15, Onsite Emergency Power Supply, states that the maximum' load on the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs)'does not exceed the smaller uf:
- 1) the 2,000 hr. rating, or;2) 90% of the 30 minute rating specified by Regulatory Guide 1.9, and 3) is less than the continuous rating of the machine (identified in FSAR Sec-tion 8.3.1.1.15 as 4,238 kw).
SER Section 8.3.1.6, Diesel Generator Loading Above its Continuous Rating, corrects a prior FSAR' error, noting that the design complies with the'above and that the worst case load on an EDG would be 4211 kw based on the as licensed plant design.
TS 4.8.1.1.2.b.6 requires " verifying that the autoconnected loads to each diesel generator do not exceed the 2,000 hour0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> rating of 4,535 kw" at least once per 18 months.
The allowance for load growth permitted by the TS appears to be in excess of the design basis stated in FSAR 8.3.1.1.15.
This matter was identified to NRR; NRR advised that the TS is correct as written and that the FSAR and/or SER would be revised accordingly.
d.
The EDGs are equipped with protective trips which are bypassed when the EDG receives an emergency start signal (except for generator current differential, overexcitation, engine overspeed).
TS 4.8.1.1.2.b.4 provides requirements for verifying that the trip bypass functions are operable.
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- SER Section 8.3.1.2, Bypass of Diesel Generator Protective Trips, discusses the trip bypass functions and states that: " Surveillance requirements for the protective trips that are bypassed will be in-cluded in tb ochnical Specifications."
1 No TS requirements were found to correlate with the SER provisions for testing the other protective trips which are automatically by-passed.
NRR advised that the draft BVPS-2 TS are consistent with current Standard TS (STS) and that the SER will be revised appro-priately.
TS 3.3.2.1 requires that ESFAS instrument channels be operable with e.
response times as shown in Table 3.3-5.
Table 3.3-5 includes re-sponse times for Safety Injection (SI) from the Containment Pres-sure - High and Pressurizer Pressure - Low initiating signals'as
<27 seconds.
This time includes EDG starting and loading sequence ilelays, opening time for valves to establish an SI flow path, and attainment of discharge pressure for the HHSI and LHSI pumps.
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Table 15.6-1 specifies a time difference of 25 seconds between I
generation of the initiating signal for SI following a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and delivery of SI flow to the reactor coolant loops.
The minimum system response time required to be demonstrated by TS appears to be 2 seconds greater than that used in the safety analysis.
Similarly, TS Table 3.3-5 permits a response time of <P2 seconds (including EDG sequencing) for Steam Line Pressure - Eow SI init b ation.
Reference to FSAR pages 15.1-15, -17, and -18 shows a re-quirement of 12 seconds for valves to be in final position and pumps at full speed following a main steam line rupture with off site power available, and an additional 10 seconds for EDG sequencing and loading if off site power is unavailable.
An additional 2 second time allowance is also provided, apparently for sensor and protection system response for a total response time of 24 seconds.
The TS, therefore, appears to be 2 seconds more restrictive, in this instance, than the accident analysis requirements.
This matter was referred to NRR and the licensee.
NRR advised that the licensee had been requested to justify the response times em-q ployed in the current TS version or provide revised and justified values.
2.2
GENERAL COMMENT
S ON DRAFT TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS Findings in this category were referred to NRR for disposition as indi-cated below.
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a.
TS 3.7.1.2, Auxiliary Feedwater. System, Actions A and B, provide escalating actions for one and two AFW pumps inoperable.
Action l
C requires that, with all three AFW pumps inoperable, corrective action must be immediately initiated to restore at least one AFW pump to' operable status "as soon as possible".
Action C provides neither a specific action to be taken nor a time
' limit to successfully restore the pump (s) or take other remedial action.
Upon referral of this item, NRR advised that Action C was specific-ally as desired by the staff.
The licensee advised that they'had similarly objected to the lack of specificity with similar staff response.
The probability of simultaneous loss of all AFW pumps from'a common
.i mode failure is acknowledged to be extremely low.
Further the most likely failure source, loss of the Primary Plant Demineralized Water Storage Tank, is adequately addressed by TS 3/4.7.1.3.
BVPS-2 is equipped with motor driven main feed pumps (vice steam dependent turbine driven main feed pumps) and also has a motor driven, lower capacity, startup feed pump.
This design can better j
support a deliberate and controlled plant shutdown without AFW available than other plant designs, reducing or eliminating the concern for loss of steam generator feed or feed control.
b.
TS Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1.1.5 provides a re-quirement for having the " capability to transfer lubricating oil from storage to the diesel generator unit".
No corresponding Sur-veillance Requirement is provided.
EDG lube oil is remotely stored in drums in on-site warehouse faci-lities and is transferred by vehicle and portable pump to the EDGs.
NRR advised that the TS is consistent with STS as written.
The licensee advised that chemical inventory procedures are in place i
for weekly lube oil inventory and that, in the absence of specific TS requirements, DLC intends to provide a procedure for transporting the stored lube oil and transferring it to the EDGs.
This procedure i
was not available during this inspection.
2.3 LICENSEE PROCEDURES - DISAGREEMENT WITH TS, FSAR, SER As indicated in Section 2.4.d of this report, the licensee plans an ex-
' tensive procedure revision activity following finalization of the TS.
All procedure related findings herein were provided to the licensee for evaluation and eventual incorporation into the procedure revision acti-I vity.
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8 OST 2.36.5, Emergency Switchgear Operation Test, permits testing a.
of automatic bus transfer functions at power in conflict with SER Section 8.2.3.1.
See Section 2.1.c above.
b.
FSAR Table 6.2-60'and TS Table 3.6-1, Containment Penetrations, list valves 2RCS-A0V519 (Primary Grade Water) and 2RCS-A0V101 (Nitrogen Supply Manifold) as outside containment isolation valves which re-ceive a Containment Isolation Phase A (CIA) signal and thus are required to be closed during plant operation or capable of being automatically closed on ESF actuation.
Neither OST 2.1.3, Containment Isolation Trip Test CIA Train A, nor OST 2.1.4, Containment Isolation Trip Test CIA Train B, contain steps that will verify the actuation of these valves under the manual initiation of a CIA signal.
c.
Numerous examples were identified wherein setpoints and numerical /
quantitative criteria in procedures were not current with the draft TS.
Typical examples include, but are not limited to:
EDG Day Tank minimum fuel oil inventory requirements in TS are not currently reflected in the applicable OST.
Current TS setpoints for the Pressurizer Pressure Reactor Trip are not reflected in the Operating Manual, calibration proce-dures, etc.
Current TS setpoints for the Steam Generator Level Reactor Trip are not reflected in the Operating Manual, calibration proce-dures, etc.
Current TS setpoints for the Nuclear Instrument System Inter-locks are not reflected in the Operating Manual, calibration procedures, etc.
The licensee had prepared nearly all TS implementing procedures well in advance, had performed many of them as part of the initial cali-bration and procedure proof testing efforts, and had elected to defer final pre-license procedure revisions until finalized TS were available.
t The licensee controls such criteria via several methods, depending on the type of criteria involved.
The inspection team observed I
the methods applied to TS and non-TS setpoints, operating limits, etc. and found them to be in place and apparently effective.
j However, the licensee does not maintain a manual or computerized matrix of such data vs. procedure.
Therefore, consistent incorpora-tion of finalized data into all affected procedures will require a comprehensive and accurate review of all potentially affected 1
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9 procedures.
The licensee acknowledged the above and indicated that planning for such a program' was in process, including checklists for procedure reviewers / writers (See 2.4.d).
d.
OST 2.47.3A, Containment Penetration and ASME Section XI Valve Test, provides for quarterly valve testing to meet the requirements of j
TS 4.6.3.1.1.a.1, by cycling each power operated or automatic valve.
l-Data Sheet 1 of the procedure lists the valves to be tested and the stroke time acceptance criteria.
The three main steam lines outside containment are equipped with individual drain lines which join into a single header.
Outside containment, the drain line is equipped with two air operated valves in series.
Valve 2SDS-A0V129A is the second (downstream) isolation valve in the main steam line drain system outside the containment and is included in the OST as a containment isolation valve subject to testing.
However, TS Table 3.6-1 and FSAR Table 6.2-60 list only the first isolation valve, 2SDS-A0V129B, as the " required" outside isolation valve for containment penetrations 73, 74, and 75.
Application of the OST's testing requirements to valve -129A appears to be in excess of the TS and FSAR requirements.
This was referred to the licensee to establish whether the valve should be considered a containment isolation valve and included in the FSAR and TS or dropped from the procedure.
e.
OST 2.47.3a (above), Precaution 2, repeats the requirements of TS 3.6.3.1, Action Statement A for inoperable containment isolation valves:
"a.
Restore the inoperable valve (s) to operable status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />, or b.
Isolate the affected penetration within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one deactivated automatic valve secured in the isolation position, or c.
Isolate the affected penetration within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> by use of at least one closed manual valve or blind flange, or d.
be in at least Hot Standby within tne next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in Cold Shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />."
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Precaution 4 of tha OST reads:
"If the valve fails to exhibit the required stroke time, an MWR (Maintenance Work Request) shall be initiated for the valve's immediate repair.
If the condition cannot be corrected within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, the valve shall be declared inoperative (sic)."
y 10 Precaution 4.is in conflict with Precaution 2, TS 2.6.3.1 and Article IWV of ASME Section XI.
The ifcensee procedures group personnel were unable to provide.the source for Precaution 4 and stated that the above would be corrected, f.
TS 4.5.2.a, ECCS Subsystems - Tave <350 F., requires, in part, that valves in the CHS and SIS systems be verified to be in the proper position with power to the valve operator control circuits disconnected.
The BVPS-2 Operating Manual (0M), Section.2.11.2, SI System Precautions, Limitations, and Setpoints, includes a list of the valves addressed by the above TS but contains out of date valve numbers and omissions: (1) valve 2 SIS *M0V836 should read 2 SIS *MOV8889; (2) valve 2 SIS *M0V841 should be correctly iden-tified as "HHSI to Cold Leg"; (3) valves 2CHS*M0V8132A and B and *8133A and B should be included in the listing for com-pleteness.
.g.
TS 3/4.3.2.1 requires that the ESFAS instrumentation channels be tested to verify response times.
The licensee has developed procedure BVT 2.1-1.1.2 in draft form to administer ESFAS time response testing.
BVT Section II, General Test Method, breaks the ESFAS response time determination into three discrete sections:
The time delay from the monitored process reaching.the actuation level to the input of the protection channel (sensor response time);
The time delay from the input of the protection channel to-the input of the last slave relay (channel time); and, I
The time delay from the input of the slave relay until all of the necessar/ equipment is fully performing its intended function (actuation time).
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The actuation time is subdivided into three parts, consisting of the slave relay time, the equipment time, and the diesel generator time (where applicable).
The various incremental times are then combined for individual equipment listed in the TS and compared to the acceptance criteria.
The times described above are obtained from the oerformance of various Maintenance Surveillance Procedures 4SPs) and OSTs with one exception.
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The BVT states that an " assumed" value will be used for the l
slave relay time and will be twice the nominal relay response i
time of 0.18 seconds, or 0.36 seconds.
Reference is made to Regulatory Guide 1.22 (Ref. IX.B in the procedure) for the nominal response time.
The numerical time values are further noted as preliminary (laters) in the procedure.
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The licensee confirmed that under present test techniques, the actual time response of the installed slave relays would never be physically measured.
Simple relay actuation and continuity are confirmed via other TS required tests.
l The licensee advised that the & thad of using an assumed time rather than a measured time for :, lave relay actuation was de-veloped to avoid inadvertent equipment operation during testing or the alternative necessity to lif t numerous leads in control circuitry to inhibit equipment operation.
Review of Preoperational Test P0 2.1A.2, RPS and ESFAS Time l
Response Test, showed measured slave relay response times in the range of 0.060 - 0.080 seconds, indicating that the pre-liminary values above are nonconservative.
The licensee was advised that, in order to justify the above test methods: (1) development of a justifiable, high confidence level slave relay average actuation time would be necessary, (2) justification for never testing installed relays, even on a sampling basis, apreared appropriate.
The licensee acknowledged the above stating that the matter would be reviewed, h.
In addition to g. above, Step VII.5 of BVT 2.1-1.1.2 requires l
that Equipment Times be obtained from the various OSTs refer-enced in the procedure's data sheets.
Twelve of referenced OSTs were reviewed and eleven did not contain any requirement to obtain equipment response times.
The twelfth OST that did contain equipment response time measurements obtained valve stroke time measurements for other reasons.
The licensee's procedure group supervisor stated that provi-sions for obtaining the equipment response times would be in-corporated into the BVT or other appropriate procedure (s).
2.4 GENERAL PROCEDURE READINESS FINDINGS As previously indicated herein, the licensee had prepared many plant pro-cedures well in advance of the availability of final or near final TS.
As the early TS matured, numerous changes occurred and continue to occur.
The licensee has deferred any major effort to upgrade procedures until the TS content stabilizes.
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The.following findings evoke from the above circumstances.
Many of the i
findings are editorial in nature but most of the findings affect a large majority of the OSTs and MSPs.
The licensee's plans to address these and related findings are further discussed in Section 2.4.d of this report.
a.
TS - Procedure Matrix The licensee has prepared a computerized "BVPS-2 Technical Specifi-cation and Procedure Matrix" to correlate specific TS line items with specific implementing procedures, plant operating modes, sur-veillance frequency requirements, etc.
The matrix is used by pro-l cedure writers and reviewers to ensure that procedure coverage of TS requirements is caplete.
l This document provides a controllable, " top tier" framework for ensuring that all requirements are adequately addressed. The most a
recent matrix (2/18/87 issue) was based upon draft TS issued in late 1986 and predating the " Proof and Review TS" which preceded the
" draft TS" used for this inspection.
During this inspection the licensee engineer responsible for matrix J
maintenance was manually inputting matrix changes resulting from i
intervening TS versions.
The completely revised matrix was not expected to be issued for procedure engineer use until the final draft TS were received (expected April 10,1987) and incorporated in the matrix.
The TS had changed significantly since the previous matrix and pro-l cedure issues.
Examples of the changes and their impact on matrix content and procedure readiness are provided below:
1.
Between versions, numbering of TS LCOs and Surveillance Re-quirements had changed substantially.
This has resulted in the TS number references in the matrix and in a large number of procedures to be rendered incorrect.
j i
Although seemingly editorial in nature, the new TS numbering i
must be reconciled with the procedure references to accurately
]
establish that all TS line items are addressed and that the procedures accurately reflect the proper TS on their cover sheets, objective sections, acceptance criteria, etc.
i 2.
Some recurring changes occurred in TS text content, particu-i larly for Inservice Testing / Surveillance Requirements.
Equip-ment specific requirement texts have been replaced with general references to TS 4.0.5, IST Requirements.
Although these changes will not materially affect the scope of testing re-quired, minor changes will be required to delete some former specific TS requirements which are not requirements of ASME l
J
i 13 Section'XI.as. implemented by TS 4.0.5, e.g. equipment starts only from main control board, specific minimum. equipment run:
times, etc.
Specific.TS. involved _ include AFW, QSS, RSS, CHS/-
HHSI and.SWS pumps and valves.
f 3.
Some changes in TS Surveillance Frequency were also noted in-cluding valve lineup verifications for.ECCS and ESF systems, periodic valve exercising for!IST valves, etc.
4.
Similar to 3. above, several mode applicability changes were noted, e.g. TS Table'3.3-3 for ECCS Switchover I&C, Main Steam Line Isolation I&C, etc.
5.
Changes in operating limits and acceptance criteria were noted,.
e.g. EDG fuel oil day tank minima, ECCS pump head - flow ac-ceptance criteria, and others.
6.
New.TS line items have been incorporated in recent versions, including new EDG Surveillance Requirements (4.8.1.1.2.c.1, c.2, d.1, d.2, d.3, e, f, g, h, i), additional Remote Shutdown Panel Instruments, and others.
7.
TS line item deletions were noted including ESFAS slave relay testing as a unique requirement (now incorporated in another TS subparagraph), SWS valve exercise requirements, CVCS valve exercise requirements, and others.
8.
The matrix further appears to omit some procedures which appear applicable to specific TS.
For example:
(a) TS 4.6.3.1.1.A.1 and TS Table 3.6-1 require testing of I
AFW Pump steam supply isolation valves and throttle valves (2 MSS *S0V105A, B, C and 2FWE*HCV100A - F) as automatic containment isolation valves.
The TS - Procedure matrix l
shows only OSTs 2.47.3A and 2.44.C1 as applicable to CIV testing per Table 3.6-1.
The subject valves are not addressed by the above OSTs
)
but are tested in OST 2.24.1, Auxiliary Feedwater System i
Valve Exercise.
Additionally, OST 2.24.1 does not re-
)
ference its applicability to the above TS.
l (b) Similarly, TS Table 3.6-1 lists the Main Steam Isolation Valves (2 MSS *HYV101A, B,.C) as requiring testing.
OST 2.21.7, Main Steam Trip Valves Full Closure Test appears to provide the testing required by TS 4.6.3.1.2.d but neither the OST nor the matrix reflect this relationship.
14 (c) TS 4.5.2.d and 2.e require visual inspections of the con-tainment and containment sump for debris and absence of structural distress and corrosion.
The matrix did not identify a procedure responsive to those requirements.
OST 2.47.2, Containment Integrity Verification, contains provisions meeting the TS requirements and appropriate references to the corresponding TSs.
The above generic and specific comments were discusred with the cognizant licensee engineer who advised that they would he addressed in the next issue of the matrix.
The inspection team emphasized that, although the inspection sample was limited to the TS and systems listed in.Section 1 of this re-port, the above findings appeared to be generic to all TS.
b.
PROCEDURE CONTENT The TS-Procedure Matrix comments of Section 2.4.a above individually and collectively imply the need for a comprehensive and accurate screening of all surveillance procedures for applicability.
The relevant comments above were also provided to the licensee's proce-dures group supervision.
Additional, specific procedure content findings are discussed below and were also presented to procedures group supervision who advised that they would be individually evaluated for incorporation in final procedure revisions.
1.
Within the sample reviewed, 2MSP1.15-1, ESFAS and RPS Logic Time Response, was the only procedure identified as not avail-able in at least draft or preliminarily approved form.
2.
A relatively large number of "laters" (several dozens) were identified in the procedures reviewed.
Typically these in-volved valve stroke time acceptance criteria, final pump per-formance curves, pump d/p - flow acceptance criteria, etc.
Most were pending availability of either final TS data, final preoperational test results, or both.
Examples include:
OST 2.24.1 - AFW Header Temperature, pp 3, 7; OST 2.47.3A - Torque values for valve 2 SIS *46 & 47 on pp2, 70; OSTs 2.7.4, 2.11.1, 2.13.1 - Reference and Acceptance Criteria values for vibration on Data Sheets 1;
{
n q
}
15
.0ST 2.13.1 - RWST Level, p3; QSS pump current, p4; OST 2.13.7 - Pump vibration criteria, pump. performance calculations, containment sump level, method to fill re-circulation spray pump seal system, pump current;
.0ST 2.47.2 - RCP Motor oil spillage protection, Atts. A.
& B; RCP Motor Oil Collection System, Att.~C; Nonper-3 manently Supported Equipment Authorized to be Left Inside i
Containment, Att. D.
d
(
3.
Several OSTs were found to have incorrect engineering units 1
in acceptance criteria or incorrect equipment nomenclature, l
for example, (1) use of "psig" instead of "psid" for charging, SI, and containment spray pumps in OSTs 2.11.2, 2.7.4, 2.13.1, 2.13.7;-and, (2) valves 2 SIS *MOV840 shown as S0V instead of 1
M0V in OST 2.47.2.
4.
OST 2.7.11, CHS and SIS Operability Test, tests power operated valves not testable (able to cycle) during power operation and.
to verify that automatic equipment actuates on an SI signal.
Initial Condition 10 of the OST requires verification that the LHSI Pumps have "...a recirculation flow path to the Refueling Water Storage Tank established".
No specific lineup or lineup reference is provided for the procedure performer as to whether this is a normal or special system lineup.
.The ' licensee advised that the recirculation flowpath valves automatically align for the test conditions; however, the pro-cedure includes no provisions for verification of proper auto-matic action or recirculation path flow following pump start in procedure step C.6 of F.9.
The licensee acknowledged that additional operator guidance is warranted to ensure proper alignment and pump protection.
5.
OST 2.36.3, EDG Automatic Test, Step 13.a requires that speci-fic trips be electrically simulated by installation of 5 elec-trical jumper sets on terminals listed in Attachment G, Diesel Generator Trip Disablement Verification.
The first two line items of Attachment G involve installation of jumpers between three (3) terminal points on the same ter-minal block; the following three line items involve installa-tion of jumpers between two (2) terminals on one block and a third terminal on a different block.
No configuration is provided for the jumper installation, e.g.,
a-b-c series, a-c-b series, etc.
r C_
l 16 c.
PROCEDURE IMPLEMENTATION FINDINGS Where available, data resulting from previously performed procedures was reviewed to establish that the procedures were compatible with the as-built plant and resulted in the following findings.
1.
TS 4.3.2.1.1 provides requirements for ESFAS channel calibra-tions.
Nineteen MSPs performed during the previous eight months for initial calibration of ESFAS channels were reviewed.
2MSP-12.08, Containment Pressure Protection Channel II (2LMS-P951) Calibration, Revision 1, performed during October, 1986 was found to include erroneous "as-left data" on Data Sheet 10 for Pressure Recorder PR950, Pen 2.
The "as left data" for the -0.5 psig data points was entered as "0" which was out of specification.
The data had been signed off as acceptable by the supervising I&C Engineer.
Following identification by the inspector, the licensee re-performed the applicable procedure steps establishing that the "as found" data was in specification, suggesting that the pre-vious procedure performer incorrectly transcribed the data entries followed by a supervisory review error.
i Based on the relatively large sample of procedures and data found acceptable and the minimal actual safety significance (circuit actually satisfactory), the above is considered an isolated case.
2.
As indicated above, initial loop calibrations have been per-formed for ESFAS instrument channels.
The procedures typically include specific instruction steps for installation of red metallic calibration stickers on specific instruments / modules and corresponding " checkoffs" on procedure data sheets to document completion.
Several instances of questionable implementation were identi-
)
fied.
For 2MSP-6.39,, RC Temperature Loop T422 Delta T - Tave Protection Channel II calibration performed during October 1986, several data sheets indicated that stickers had not been in-stalled although required by the signed off procedure steps.
The procedures had been reviewed by departmental supervision j
with no exceptions noted.
Inspection of the actual instruments found that stickers had been installed during a subsequent j
calibration.
Licensee supervision advised that the data sheets had apparently been erroneously marked and that supervisory review failed to identify the discrepancies.
i
m 4
17 Similarly, during inspection of control board instrumentation, it was noted that instrument RCS-PI456 did not have a sticker.
attached as required by MSP 6.36.
Similar to item c.2 above, this is also considered an isolated case with minimal safety significance.
3.
Preoperational Test P0 2.13.2, Quench Spray Pumps and Controls,
. includes testing of the response time for the QSS pumps, con-trols and instrumentation.
During initial testing, the time measured between pump start and achievement of full flow was found to be 35 seconds for l
one pump and 38 seconds for the other pump, vice a procedure I
acceptance criteria of 13.0 seconds.
A test deficiency report was written but had not been resolved by the close of this inspection.
The licensee advised that the flow meter used to measure the l
response time was believed to be excessively hydraulically dampened, thus causing an erroneously long time for full flow
. indication.
This appeared to be corroborated by pump starting current recorder traces showing current stabilization in about 1 second.
The licensee System Test Director advised that retesting per P0 2.13.2 was planned and that the open test deficiency would be closed prior to acceptance of the system for operation, d.
LICENSEE PLANS FOR FINAL PRE-LICENSE PROCEDURE UPDATES As indicated previously herein, the licensee's plans include a major final review of TS implementing and operating procedures..The BV2 Procedures Supervisor advised the inspectors of the following key elements of the plans:
Upon receipt of final draft TS, the TS-Procedure Matrix will be revised and reissued to reflect current TS status.
All procedures will not necessarily be revised prior to issu-ance of the Operating License.
The licensee plans to revise and issue procedures on a mode-by-mode, as-needed, basis, be-ginning with those necessary to support licensed activities in the Refueling and Cold Shutdown Modes (Modes 5 and 6).
Prior to each mode escalation, plant management will verify that all procedures required for the next mode are available and have been satisfactorily performed if required.
This verification will be administered by inclusion in a formal prereq'.lisite list.
i l
1
t 18 Each potentially affected procedure and OM section will be reviewed and revised by a procedure writer using a departmental review checklist which identifies key procedure elements and items affected by final design and TS changes.
The inspector's reviewed the checklist in use at the time of the inspection, finding that it did not include some of the problems identified by Sections 2.4.a
.c herein.
The licensee Procedures Group Supervisor stated that elements responsive to these problems would be incorporated into the checklist.
Revised procedures would be subjected to a detailed author, peer, and supervisory review prior to submittal for approval.
Proctdures issued to date have been reviewed by the Preopera-tional Review Committee '(PRC) and approved by the Assistant Plert Manager.
Final procedure issues will be reviewed by the Onsite Safety Committee (OSC) and approved by the Plant
~ Manager or his designee per TS Section 6, Administrative Con-trnis.
The licensee indicated that the PRC and/or other qualified staff members would likely be used as standing procedure review subcom-mittees for performance of detailed procedure reviews.
These bodies would then provide summary review results and recommendations for i
OSC aid Plant Manager disposition, j
No attempt was made by the inspection team to assess the licensee's resources and schedule for completing these activities.
The licen-t see's preparations and plans otherwise appear to be adequate and responsive to the findings of this inspection.
2.5 AS BUILT DISCREPANCIES AND FIELD OBSERVATIONS Overall, good congruity was established between the TS, FSAR, SER and the as-built plant.
However, a number of discrepancies were identified among the plant procedures, drawings and as-built plant, apparently re-sulting from either document preparation errors or design and field changes which have not yet been incorporated in affected documents.
a.
Valve numbering conventions for the facility are based upon using similar number sequences for valves having similar functions on both Units 1 and 2.
Numbers for several valves in the SI system have been revised to better reflect their function in BVPS-2 (different than in Unit 1) thus reducing the potential for operator confusion.
Valves 2 SIS *M0V864A and B have been renumbered as 2 SIS *MOV8888A and B but are not yet correctly reflected in the Operating Manual or FSAR (specifically FSAR page 6.3-3 and Tables 6.3-3 and 6.3-7).
19 b.
OST 2.36.8, AC Power Source Weekly Breaker Alignment Verification, includes equipment not shown on plant drawings and apparently not installed in the plant.
Data Sheet 1 requires data from regulator REG *VITBS2-3C and Panel PNL*VITBS2-3C.
This equipment does not appear on RE-1BA, RE-1AW nor FSAR Figure 8.3-3 (vital bus one line diagrams) and could not be physically located in the plant.
The same circumstances exist for:
OST 2.36.8, Data Sheet 2, for REG *VITBS2-4C and PNL*VITBS2-4C; OST 2.36.9, Data Sheet 1 for REG *VITBS2-3C and PNL*VITBS2-3C; i
l OST 2.36.9, Data Sheet 2 for REG *VITBS2-4C and PNL*VITBS2-4C; 1
\\
The source of the apparently incorrect procedure data could not be identified.
c.
Also, OSTs 2.36.8, pages 12, 16, 23 and 27, and 2.36.9, pages 13, j
18, 25, and 30, require data readings from a rectifier inverter output frequency meter (Device 54), output ammeter, and output voltmeter.
All three meters are installed in the equipment, how-ever, drawing RE-1AW, One Line Diagram, Vital Bus System, shows only the ammeter and voltmeter.
The frequency meter is not shown.
d.
The control room process computer provides numerous analog and digital data display, logging and alarm functions.
Many of the computer point descriptions in the licensee documents do not pre-I cisely match the actual programmed descriptions causing the poten-1 tial for incorrect operator interpretation of computer outputs, l
examples include:
OST 2.36.1, page 5, lists computer point L2810D as "DG 2-1 ROCK ARM OIL L".
The computer shows "DG 2-1 ROCK ARM LVL";
OST 2.36.3, page 5, lists computer point L2805D as "DG 2-1 RSVR 1 STR AIR P ANN".
The computer shows "DG 2-1 START AIR PRESS";
OST 2.36.3, page 6, lists computer point L2806D as "DG 2-1 RSVR 2 STR AIR P ANN".
The computer shows "DG 2-1 START AIR PRESS";
OST 2.36.5, page 3, lists computer point Y29350 as "4KV N BUS SUP ACB PRL".
The computer shows "4 KV BUS SUPP ACB PRL";
OST 2.6.7, steps C.2.a,.b, and.c, list computer points Y62100, Y62120 and Y6211D.
When these points are entered in the computer they are identified as invalid.
20 It should be further noted that the actual, programmed computer points shown in the first four examples above are defective in that they do not specifically identify the data source.
For example, both L2805D and L2806D have the same computer label but apply to two different starting air reservoirs.
Similarly, no specific bus identification is provided for Y2935D.
The licensee acknowledged the above and stated that the discrepancies would be evaluated and corrected.
e.
Equipment installation specifications for the facility require licensee contractors to install tem'porary (tape or similar) hand lettered labels on plant equipment.
The licensee has assigned two construction engineers with craft support to permanent label in-stallation.
BVPS-2 Operations Department supervision prioritizes which equipment is to be labeled first and coordinates discrepancies identified by the construction engineers.
For example, most NSSS valves were found to be acceptably labeled; vital switchgear and I&C equipment were in the process of receiving permanent labels; balance of plant l
equipment will be labeled last.
The DLC Manager, Nuclear Construction, stated that the licensee intends to have essentially all NSSS equipment labels and a sub-stantial fraction of balance of plant equipment labels needed for l
plant operations labeled prior to critical operation.
I Discrepancies were identified as indicated below and referred to the cognizant construction engineer for incorporation into the program.
1.
DC Switchboard DC*SWBD2-1, circuit breaker 1-10, is labeled I
with different permanent nameplates on the front and inside rear of the switchboard.
The licensee stated that the labeling would be corrected.
2.
Same as above for DC*SWBD2-2, circuit breaker 2-10.
3.
The licensee uses the asterisk ("*") as in examples e.2 and 3 above to identify safety related items.
FSAR Section 8.3.1.3 discusses this convention and states that the asterisk is an integral part of the permanent labeling in order to identify the item as being safety related.
Numerous examples were identified for which the nameplate used a dash (" ") in lieu of the asterisk, e.g., EDG 2-1 Room equipment such as 2EGF-LIS-201A, 2EGF-PI-201B.
q 21 The cognizant construction engineer (above) advised that all electrical /I&C equipment was to be labeled with the asterisk as indicated by the FSAR but that, by direction of Operations Department management, the asterisk would be deleted from some or all mechanical equipment identification.
The engineer fur-ther stated that this decision was under evaluation at the time of.the inspection and would involve review of the current equipment markings to ensure consistency wi_th the_ policy.
4.
The various vital station battery surveillance tests and in-spections require identification of individual battery cells and designation of the pilot battery cell.
Battery 2-1 was observed to have no pilot cell identified and missing or illegible individual cell labels.
The licensee stated that the cell markings for all station batteries would be inspected and renewed to assure proper, legible marking.
l 5.
Lighting panel board LP-2-D1 (16 circuits) in EDG 2-1 Room is not equipped with a circuit directory or individual circuit breaker labels.
The licensee stated the correct labeling would be installed.
6.
Also, in EDG 2-1 Room, a wall mounted, padlocked, stainless steel electrical panel (approx. 30"x30"x12") was identified with only a paper and string tag labeled as " security".
The licensee stated that labeling for security equipment was under management review and that this finding would be evaluated in that effort.
7.
Conduit building penetrations are equipped with metal identi--
fication tags.
Again, multiple examples of damaged or 11-legible tagging were found, e.g. penetrations for MCC*E07. The construction engineer advised that this condition had been previously identified as a plant wide problem and would be referred to management for inclusion in the overall program for permanent labeling.
The licensee representative indicated that most labeling de-ficiencies identified fell'into one or more categories of the existing plans for the permanent plant labeling program and that those specific and generic findings above which were not currently addressed would be referred to DLC management for resolution.
f.
Panels PNL*DC2-21 and -22, are each equipped with a small bare cop-per (6 - 8 AWG) grounding conductor running from the panels about 20 feet across the floor to a building ground bus.
The conductorc
m s
I 22 are secured to the floor with cable straps but are not provided physical protection and both have been severely bent and worn by foot traffic.
The licensee's Quality Control Department reinspected the installa-tion and advised that the conductors should be protected in accord-ance with Field Construction Procedure FCP-421, Section 6.2.4, which requires that, "where exposed ground conductors, as finally in-stalled, may be subject to mechanical injury, they shall be properly protected".
The licensee stated that a Construction Work Request would be issued to initiate an engineering resolution.
The inspector advised the licensee Assistant QC Director of the above and of the existence other similar examples indicating the need for further licensee review.
g.
Throughout the plant, wall mounted, vertical conduits terminate from 6 to 30 inches above the floor with the cables continuing downward through floor penetrations.
The floor penetrations are essentially flush with the concrete; only a short (1/2 - 3/4 inch conduit bush-ing protrudes above floor level for cable protection.
In some cases, the floor penetrations are offset one to several feet out from the wall and conduit, resulting in the exposed cable taking a."Z" con-figuration and extending into maintenance and traffic areas exposing the cabling to potential damage.
Construction materials, tool / gang boxes, etc. were observed on and near such: installations. Typical examples can be found in EDG 2-1 Room but are common plant wide.
Similar items have been previously identified by NRC Region I.
The Assistant QC Director stated that QC will issue a request to engi-neering for evaluation and correction of the identified conditions.
h.
The "blackline" prints of some drawings provided for inspection team use were illegible in various areas of the drawings.
Two examples were selected for further evaluation: E-12F and E-12J, EDG 2-1 Ele-mentary Diagrams.
The inspector attempted to determine that legible drawings would be available to operations and maintenance personnel by accessing the controlled drawing files provided for on shift personnel and the pl--t staff.
With the assistance o. the Operating Department staff, these draw-ings were compared to controlled copies in Unit 2 control room drawing file and its backup drawing file in the South Office Shop Building.
Both files contained partially illegible drawings.
When access was requested to the " source" file for the drawings, l
the drawings were retrieved from the site master aperture card j
system, again resulting in deficient copies and indicating defi-i ciencies in the quality of the offsite master reproducibles used to prepare the aperture cards.
Drawing E-12J was legible but mar-4
m
[l _
V 23 ginal due to very light and very dark areas on the print.
Drawing E-12F was still illegible in some areas and light or dark but read-able in others.
.This matter was referred to the cognizant Records Management Super-visor who advised that sporadic legibility problems had been en-countered in the past and that long range planning was in progress i-to place selected drawings.(0perating Manual' figures, etc.) on a computer' assisted drafting system.
On April 9, 1987, in response to the above, the Manager, Nuclear Construction issued Memo BVPS:RJS:12241:3936 to DLC Engineering to evaluate and initiate action to correct legibility problems.
3.0 CONCLUSION
S The Technical Specification preparation and implementation ~ process appears to be~. functioning properly.
The TS and implementing procedures reviewed appear to be compatible with the as-built plant configuration.
That information which is still under development for incorporation into the TS and implementing procedures appears to be subject to sufficient management control to assure adequate completion of the process.
Discussion of the specific findings with NRC Region I personnel has indicated that-selected specific findings will be subject to reinspection of licensee actions as part of thd routine inspection program.
i l
1 1
s I
Y APPENDIX 1.0 i
REVIEW 0F BEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS LICENSEE PERSONNEL CONTACTED DURING INSPECTION The inspection team held disucssions with and inspected plant systems with numerous-licensee personnel.
Listed below are:the licensee contacts who materially parti-
-cipated in the inspection'and entrance or exit meetings.
Name
-Title C. Callaway-SVG Testing Supervisor D. Butor.
Maintenance Engineer S. Checketts Reactor Operator N. Daugherty Director, System Test J. Evans NSSS System Test Specialist-
.J.
Forney I&C Engineer K. Grada Manager, Nuclear Safety J. Godleski Sr. Test Engineer E. Harlow Startup Engineer-W. Lacey.
Plant Manager A. Lerczak BV2 Procedures Supervisor R. Martin Manager, Regulatory Affairs' T. Noonan Asst. Plant Manager L.'Rabenau Lead Compliance Engineer V.'Rupert Procedure Engineer D..Scalfero Construction Specialist F. Schuster Operating Supervisor R. Swiderski Manager, Nuclear Construction J. Tack SVG Records Mgt. Supervisor C. Tresada BV2 I&C Supervisor.
J. Vassello Shift Supervisor J. Wade Procedure' Engineer G. Wargo Asst. Director, QC R. Williams Startup Engineer R. Zabawski Sr. Engineer /TS Coordinator T. Zyra Director, Site T&PP NRC Region I Personnel J. Beall BV2 Senior Resident Inspector
-Wi Troskoski BV1 Senior Resident Inspector L. Prividy BV2 Resident Inspector
e 4
t APPENDIX 1.1 SEAVER VALLEY UNIT 2 - INSPECTION PLAN VERIFICATION OF AS-BUILT CONDITIONS TO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS AND FSAR/SER OBJECTIVES:
Conduct, on a sampling basis, reviews and inspections of as-built safety related systems, structures, and components in order tot determine whether the Technical Specifications and FSAR/SER are compatibile with the Beaver Valley Unit 2
as-built plant, and
.to determine whether Technical Specification requirements are definitively measurable.
GENERAL SCOPE The facility descriptions, operating. characteristics, and related information found in the FSAR, SER and the proposed Technical Specifications (TS) will be compared to corresponding licensee drawings, procedures, and actual plant hardware to establish whether the as-built configuration of the syatems, structures and components is compatible with the safety analyses and proposed (TS).
Concurrent with the above, the TS will be evaluated to confirm that the performance criteria and requirements established by the TS can be definitively measured or determined, i.e.
that the means and methods to establish conformance with the TS requirements are responsive, sensitive, and sufficiently definitive to actually establish the required level of conformance.
Particular emphasis will be given to the efficacy of surveillance tests and inservice tests established by the licensee to demonstrate conformance with TS and the requirements of ASME B&PV Section XI and 10CFR50.55a.
l a
r Appsndix 1.1 Pega 2
In general, the systems, structures, and components to be reviewed will include a sample of the following:
Containment Isolation Containment Depressurization and Cooling Inside & Outside Recirculation Spray Quench Spray & Additive System RWST Service Water System & Ultimate Heat Sink ESF Actuation Instrumentation Reactor Protection System High Pressure Safety Injection & CVCS Low Pressure Safety Injection Residual Heat Removal Emergency Boration (Redundant Reactivity Control)
Auxiliary Feedwater & DWST Vital AC Power Emergency Diesel Generators Vital DC Power Onsite Power Distribution
}
INSPECTION ITEMS Documents:
Technical Specifications Final Safety Analysis Report Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements Surveillance / Test Procedures Preoperational Tent Procedures Inservice Test Procedures Normal, Abnormal and Emergency Operating Procedures Process & Instrumentation Diagrams Elementary, Logic, and Loop Drawings Fabrication and Installation Drawings Equipment Technical Manuals Inspection Tasks:
1.
Identify the TS applicable to the subject systems and select a sample of requirements (Limiting Conditions for Operation, Surveillance Requirements, etc.) for inspection.
Review the corresponding sections of the FSAR and SER.
2.
Obtain applicable as built (or Approved for Construction)
P& ids, Elementary Diagrams, Loop and Logic Diagrams, etc.
for the subject systems.
Select areas of inspection by identifying Cred lining) portions of each drawing.
Develop a
listing of specific equipment items within the system, area U
Appandix'l.l'
- Pcgs '.'3 '
E.
which are' subject to.the'TSs.
3.
- Ver'ify for' selected portions of each system that:
1) the
, proposed, TS adequately reflect the l system.
' configuration. depicted by the drawings,
.2) the drawings match the.information provided in the FSAR-and SER, and
'3)
.the proposed TS are' consistent with the FSAR commitments' and SER conclusions.
Confirm that the system configuration and equipment will support definitive measurement'or determination of conformance with TS. performance criteria and requirements 4.-
Develop a checklist of items for. field verification 'during
- system and procedure walkdowns.
5.
Identify and obtain the operating, ' surveillance and-other pertinent licensee procedures, applicable toLthe. system areas and.TS being reviewed.
Working from the drawings and TSs. Lo the procedures, confirm that:
1) the procedure (s) adequately address the selected equipment and TS_ requirements identified in the FSAR and'SERs, 2) procedures accurately. reflect the installed' Cas-built) hardware configuration.and condition, and 3) the test and.or operating methods meet the.TS or FSAR/SER requirements, commitments and analyses Creview actual performance data where practical).
6.-
Include procedure field verification items-in checklist for system and procedure walkdowns.
7.
Conduct an-in plant walkdown of subject systems to verify the results'of the document reviews confirm that:
1) the as built hardware configuration matches the
.information obtained from the document review, 2) the installed hardware is -adequately addressed in the i
procedures and TS, i
3) the licensee's test and operating methods are appropriate i
to.the actual equipment, and 4) the equipment configuration and features provide for definitive determination or measurement of conformance
)
Appandix 1.1 Paga 4
with the TS.
8.
Review the licensee's program for correlating TS requirements to procedures and procedure revision
- needs, design change impact upon TS and TS implementing procedures, planning and scheduling of surveillance testing, etc.
TECHNICAL REVIEW REPORT OUTLINE Cover Sheet Table of Contents Executive Summary Introduction Purpose of Inspection Background and General Scope
]
General Evaluation Criteria l
General Evaluation Methods
)
l Inspection Results and Findings Disagrements Among TS, FSAR, SER General Comments on Draft TS Licensee Procedure Findings As Built Discrepancies General Conclusions l
Appendices Licensee Personnel Contacted Inspection Plan Documents Reviewed
m Page No.
1 05/19/07 APPENDl1 1.2 BEAVER VALLEY P0WER STATION, UNii 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSPECTION 00CVMENTS USED FOR INSPECTION DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SUBJECT REVISION j
l A. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
)
TS 2.2.1 LIMITING SAFETY SYSTEM SETTIN6S - REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS DRAFT TS3/4.1.1.1 BORATION CONTROL - SHUTD0VN MAR 61N DRAFT TS3/4.1.1.3 BORON DILUTION DRAFT TS 3/4.1.2.1 BORATION FYSTEM FLOV PATHS - SHVTD0VN DRAFT TS3/4.1.2.2 BORATION SYSTEMS FLOW PATHS - OPERATING DRAFT IS 3/4.1.2.3 CHAR 61N6 PUMPS - SHVTD0VN DRAFT TS3/4.1.2.4 CHAR 61N6 PVMPS - OPERATIN6 DRAFT TS 3/4.1.2.5 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PUMPS - SHVTD0VN DRAFT TS 3/4.1.2.6 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PVMPS - OPERATIN6 DRAFT TS 3/4.1.2.7 BORATED WATER SOURCES - SHVIDOWN DRAFT TS 3/4.1.2.0 BORATED WATER SOURCES - OPERATIN6 DRAFT TS 3/4.1.3 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM - SHUTD0VN DRAFT TS 3/4.3.1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION DRAFT IS 3/4.3.2 EN6INEERIN6 SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION DRAFT IS 3/4.3.2.1.1 ESFAS - 6 RID UNDERVOLTA6E / DE6RADED VOLTA 6E DRAFT TS 3/4.3.3.5 REMOTE SHVTD0VN INSTRUMENTATION DRAFT TS3/4.3.3.0 ACCIDENT MONITORIN6 INSTRUMENTATION DRAFT TS 3/4.5 EMER6ENCY CORE COOLIN6 SYSTEMS DRAFT TS 3/4.6.1 PRIMARY CONTAINMENT DRAFT TS 3/4.6.2 CONTAINMENT DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLING SYSTEMS DRAFT TS 3/4.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES DRAFT TS 3/4.6.5 CONTAINMENT SUBATMDSPHERIC PRESSURE CONTROL DRAFT TS3/4.7.1.2 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM DRAFT TS 3/4.7.1.3 PRIMARY PLANT DEMINERIZED WATER (AFV SOURCE)
DRAFT TS3/4.7.13 STANDBY SERVICE VATER SYSTEM DRAFT TS 3/4.7.4.1 SERV!CE VATER SYSTEM DRAFT TS3/4.7.5.1 UTLIMATE HEAT $1NKK - OHID RIVER DRAFT TS3/4.0.1.1 AC SOURCES - OPERATIN6 DRAFT TS3/4.0.1.2 AC SOURCES - SHVIDOVN DRAFT TS 3/4.8.2.1 AC DISTRIBUTION - OPERATIN6 DRAFT TS 3/4.8.2.2 AC DISTRIBVT10N - SHVIDOWN DRUT TS 3/4.8.2.3 DC DISTRIBUTION - OPERATIN6 DRAFT TS3/4.8.2.4 DC DISTRIBUTION - SHVTD0VN DRAFT TS 3/4.9.0.1 REFUELIN6 - RHR & COOLANT CIRCULATION H16H WATER LEVEL DRAFT TS3/4.9.8.2 REFVELIN6 - RHR & C00LANT CIRCULATION - LOW VATER LEVEL DRAFT H B. FSAR/SER SECT 10NS FSAR 10.4.9 AUXILIARY FEEDVATER SYSTEM FSAR 15 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS l
Page No.
'2 03/19/87 APPENDl! 1.2 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UN!i 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSPECTION DOCUMENTS USED FOR INSPECTION DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SUBJECT REVISION FSAR 5.4.7 RESIDVAL HEAT REMOVAL SYSTEM FSAR 6 EN6INEERED SAFETY FEATURES FSAR 6.2 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS FSAR 6.3 EMER6ENCY CORE COOLIN6 SYSTEM FSAR 7.3 EN6INEERED SAFETY FEATURES SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION FSAR 7.4 INSTRUMENTAT10N SYSTEMS RE0V! RED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN '
FSAR 7.5 INFORMATION SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY FSAR 7.6 INTERLOCK SYSTEMS IMPORTANT TO SAFETY FSAR 0.2 0FFSITE POVER SYSTEMS FSAR 8.3 0FFSITE POWER SYSTEMS FSAR 9.2.1 SERVICE VATER AND STANDBY SERVICE VATER SYSTEMS l
FSAR 9.3.4 CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM i
e' C. OPERATIN6 MANUAL / PROCEDURES ADP-5 DROPPED RCCA 0
E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION 1
E-1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT 1
E-2 FAULTED STEAM 6ENERATOR ISOLATION 1
ES-0.0 REDIA 6NOSIS 1
I ES-0.1 REACTOR TRIP RESPONSE 1
ES-0.2 NAi>RAL CIRCULATION C00LD0VN 1
ES-0.3 NG URAL CIRC C00LD0VN VITH STEAM VOID IN VESSEL (V/RVLIS) 1 ES-0.4 NATURAL CIRC CODLDOVN VITH STEAM V010 IN VESSEL (W/0 RVLIS) 1 ES-1.1 il TERMINATION 1
ES-1.2 POST LOCA C00LD0VN AND DEPRESSUR!!ATION 1
ES-1.3 TRANSFER TO COLD LE6 RECIRCULATION 1
ES-1.4 TRANSFER TO HDT LE6 RECIRCULATION 1
OM 2.1.1 REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPT10N 0
DM2.1.2 RPS PitECAVT10NS, LIMITATIONS, SETPOINTS 0
DM 2.1.3 RPS NDRMAL SYSTEM ARRAN6EMENT 0
DM 2.1.4.AA R0D AT BOTTOM ALARM 0
DM 2.1.4.AAV LOOP OVEPPOWER DELTA T ALARM 0
DK 2.1.4.AAI LOOP DVERPOWER DELTA T AVT0 RUNBACK 1 R0D BLOCK ALARM 0
DM 2.1.4.AAZ LOOP OVEPTEMPERATURE DELTA T ALARM 0
OM 2.1.4.ABA LOOP OVERTEMPERATURE DELTA T AVID RVNBACK 1 R00 BLOCK ALARM 0
OM 2.10.1 RHR SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 2
OM 2.10.2 RHR SYSTEM PRECAVT10NS, LIMITATIONS, SETPOINTS 2
DM 2.10.4.AAC.2 RHR PVMP DISCH PRESS H16H ALARM 2
OM 2.10.4.AAE & F RHR TRAIN A (B) INOPERABLE 2
OM 2.10.4.6 OPERATION OF RHR ISOL VALVE POWER TRANSFER SVITCHES 2
PageNo.
3 W
05/19/07 APPENDl! 1.2 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION IhSPECTION DOCUMENTS USED FOR INSPECTION DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SUBJECT REVISION On2.11.1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1
On 2.11.2 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM - PRECAUTIONS LIMITATIONS, SETPOINTS 1
DM 2.13.1 CONTAINMENT DEPRESSVRilATION SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1
OM 2.13.2 CONTAINMT DEPRESS SYSTEM PRECAVTIONS, LIMITATIONS, SEIPOINTS 1
DM 2.24.1 AFV SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1
DM 2.24.2 AFV PRECAVTIONS, LlHITATIONS, SETP0lNTS
'1 OM 2.24.3 AFV NORMAL SYSTEM ARRAN6EMENT (LINEUPS) 1 DM 2.24.4.J AFV PUMP START 1
OM 2.24.4.K S6 LEVEL CONTROL VITH AFV 1
DM2.24.4.0 STEAM BINDIN6 IN AFVS 1
- OM 2.24.4.R RESU TIN 6 AND OPENIN6 TD AFV PVMP TRIP 1 THROTTLE VALVE 1
OM 2.30.1 SVS AND SWE SYSTEM DESCRIPT10N 0
DM 2.30.2 SVSANDSVEPRECAVi!0NS, LIMITATIONS,SETPOINTS 0
OM2.30.3' SVS NORMAL SYSTEM ARRAN6EMENT (LINEVP) 0 DM 2.30.4.A SVS STARTVP 1
OM 2.30.4.AAD SVS $AFETY TRAIN A INOPERABLE 1
OM 2.30.4.AAF SVEPUMPAVT0 START /AVTOSTOP 1
OM 2.30.4.6 SVE STARTVP 1
OM 2.36.1 4 KV SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1
OM 2.36.2 4 KV SYSTEM PRECAVTIONS, LIMITATIONS, SETPOINTS 1
OM 2.39 125 VDC CONTROL SYSTEM OPERATIN6 MANVAL VAR OM 2.6.4.AAY PRT TROUBLE - PRESSURE HI6H ALARM (RHR RELIEF VALVE OPEN) 2 CM 2.7.1 CVCS SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 1
OM 2.7.2 CVCS PRECAUTIONS, LIMITATIONS, SET'0INTS 1
j ON 2.7.3 CVCS NORMAL SYSTEM ARRAN6EMENT (LINEVPS) j OM 2.7.4.AAC VOLUME CONTROL TANK TROUBLE ALARM 1
OM 2.7.4.AAE CHAR 61N6 FLOW PATH TRDUBLE ALARM 1
OM 2.7.4.J TO M BLENDER OPERATIONS 1
OM2.7.4.9 EMER6ENCY BORAT!DN 1
DN CHAPTER 48 CONDVCT 0F OPERATIONS DRAFT OM CHAPTER 50 STAT 10N STARTUP 1
DM CHAPTER 51 STATION SHUTD0VN 1
OM CHAPTER 52 6ENERAL DPERATIN6 PROCEDURES 1
OM CHAPTER 54 stall 0N LO6S 1
DM CHAPTER 55A PERIODIC CHECKS - OPERATIN6 SVRVEILLANCE O
- D. CALIBRATIONS /lNSPECTIONS 2-CP-225 CAllBRATION - CONTROL R00M LEVEL INDICATOR 2FWS-LI454 2LCP-24-L1104A PPDVST LEVEL LOOP L104A CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-1.06 RCP BREAKER POSITION TRIP FUNCT!0NAL TEST - TRAIN A 0
3
Page No.
4 05/19/87 APPENDIX 1.2 BEAVER VALLEY POVER STATION, UNIT 2 I
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIUN INSPECTION DOCUMENTS USED FOR INSPECTION DOCUMENT
' IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SVBJECT REVISION 2MSP-1.104
'RPS LOGIC SYSTER TRAIN A BIMONTHLY TEST 0
2MSP-1.14A MANUAL REACTOR TRIP AND TRIP BREAKER RESPONSE TIME TEST 0
2MSP-10.03 RHR HI OUTLET TEMPERATURE LOOP T606A CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-11.15 SI ACCVMULATOR TK21A LEVEL LOOP L920 CAllBRATION 1
2MSP-11.26 SI ACCUMULATOR TK210 PRES $VRE LOOP P931 CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-12.10 CONTAINMENT PRESSVRE PROTECTION CH IV P953 CAllBRATION 1
2MSP-12.12 CONTAINMENT PRES $VRE TRANSMITTER PT951 TIME RESPONSE TEST 0
2MSP-12.2 CONTAINMENT PRESSURE PROTECTION CH !! TEST 1
2MSP-12.7 CONTAINMENT PRESSVRE PROTECTION CH I P950 CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-12.0 CONTAINMENT PRESSVRE PROTECTION CH 11 P951 CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-12.9 CONTAINMENT PRESSVRE PROTECTION CH III P952 CAllBRAT!0N 1
2MSP-13.05 RVST LEVEL LOOP L104A PROTECTION CH I CALIBRAT10N 2
2MSP-13.06 RVST LEVEL LOOP L1048 PROTECTION CH !! CALBRATION 2
2MSP-13.07 RVST LEVEL LOOP L104C PROTECT!0N CH !!! CALIBRAT!0N 2
2MSP-13.11 RVST LEVEL LOOP L100A CALIBRATION 3
2MSP-13.12 RVST LEVEL LOOP L1000 CALIBRATION 3
2MSP-2.06 POWER RANGE NEUTRON FLVX CH N44 QUARTERLY CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-2.36.127 NO. 1 ED6 ELECTRICAL INSPECTION 2
2MSP-21.21 LOOP A STEAM LINE PRESSURE PROTECTION CH IV P476 CAllBRATION 1
2MSP-21.27 LOOP 0 STEAM LINE PRESSVRE PROTECTION CH IV CALIBRAT10N 2
2MSP-24.17 hR $621A LEVEL PRCTECTION CH I CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-24.33 AFV PUMP DISCHAR6E PRESSVRE SVITCH PS1588 CALIBRATION 0
2MSP-24.36 AFV FLOW LOOP F1008 CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-24A-2.A AFV FLOV LEVEL LOOP LI474 PROTECT!0N CH I CALIBRATION 0
2MSP-36.15 TEST AND CALIBRATION OF UNDERVOLTA6E RELAY ON 4160 V BUS 2AE
-1
'2MSP-36.21 TEST AND CALIBRATION OF TIME DELAY RELAY 62-V200 BUS 2AE 1
2MSP-37.1 TEST AND CALIBRATION OF V/V RELAY 27-RN200, 480 V BUS 2N 1
2MSP-37.3 TEST AND CALIBRATION OF U/V RELAY 27-RN1200 ON 480 B BUS 2N 1
2MSP-39.1 EATTERY NO. 2-1 TEST AND INSPECTION 2
2MSP-39.5 BATTERY NO. 2-1 INSPECTION AND INTERCONNECT RESISTANCE CHECK 0
2MSP-6.03 RC FLOV LOOP F414 PROTECT!0N CH I TEST 1
2MSP-6.35 PRESSVRIZER PRESSURE LOOP P455 PROTECTION CH ! CAllBRATION 1
2MSP-6.36 PRES $URIZER PRESSURE LOOP P456 PROTECIlON CH !! CAllBRATION 1
2MSP-6.37 PRESSURIZER PRESSVRE LOOP P457 PROTECTION CH !!! CALIBRATION 2
t 2MSP-6.30 RC TEMPERATURE LOOP T412 PROTECTION CH IV CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-6.39 RC TEMPERATURE LOOP T422 PROTECTION CH 11 CALIERATION 1
2MSP-6.40 RC TEMPERATURE LOOP T423 FROTECTION CH I CALIBRATION 1
2MSP-6.41 PRESSVRIZER LEVEL LOOP L459 PROTECTION CH 1 CAllBRATION 1
2MSP-6.48 PRESSVRl!ER PRESSURE LOOP P444 CALIBRATION 0
2MSP-6.53 RC TEMPERATURE LOOP T420 PROTECTION CH !! CALIBRATION 1
l
'Page No.
5 r '.
03/19/87 APPENDIX 1.2 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNii 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSPECT 10N
' DOCUMENTS VSED FOR INSPECTION DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SUBJECT REVISION 2MSP-6.65 PRES $URIZER PRESSVRE 100P P455 CALIBRATION 1
ETP-801 AFV PVMP 23A INSULATION TEST 1
ETP-802 AFV PUMP 23A CONTROL CIRCULI TEST 1
ICP-7-TIS 109 BORIC ACID TANK TK21B TEMPERATURE INDICATIN6 SWITCH CALIBRN 1
LCP-10-F605A RHR HEADER FLOW LOOP F605A CAllBRMION 1
LCP-7-F122 CHAR 6ING LINE FLOV LOOP F122 CAllBRAil0N 2
LCP-7-L112 VCT LEVEL CONTROL LOOP L112 CAllBRATION 1
LCP-7-L115 VCT LEVEL CONTROL LJ0P L115 CALIBRATION 1
LCP-7-L163 BORIC i Un TANK TK21B LEVEL LOOP Ll63B CALIBRAT!DN 1
LCP-7-P117 VCT VENT LINE PRESSURE LOOP P117 CAllBRATION 1
H E. OPERATIN6 SVRVE!LLANCE TEST BVT 2,1-1.01.02 SAFt6VARDS TIME RESPONSE TEST DRAFT BVT 2.1-1,39.01 NO. 1 STATION BATTERY AND CHAR 6ER LOAD TEST 0
BVT 2.1-1.39.06 NO.1 STATION BATTERY AND CHAR 6ER LOAD TEST 0
BVT 21-1.47.7 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVE LEAKAGE TEST CONN. VERIFICATION 0
OST2.1.11.
SAFE 6UARDS PROTECTION SYSTEM TRAIN A TEST 0
OST2.1.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TRIP TEST CIA TRAIN A 0
OST 2.1.4 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TRIP TEST CIA TRAIN B 0
OST 2.1.5 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TRIP TEST CIB TRAIN A 0
OST 2.1.6 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION TRIP TEST CIB TRAIN B 0
OST 2.10.1 RHR PVMP P21A PERFORMANCE TEST 2
OST 2.10.2 RHR PVMP P218 PERFORMANCE TEST 0
OST 2.10.3 RHR TRAIN A VALVE EXERCISE 0
OST 2.10.4 RHR TRAIN B VALVE EXERCISE O
OST 2.!!.10 BORON INJECTION FLOW PATH POWER OP VALVE EXERCISE O
OST 2.13.1 QUENCHSPRAYPUNPP21AFLOVTEST 0
OST 2.13.10A CHEMICAL INJECTION SYSTEM VAi.VE POSITION t PVMP OPERABILITY 0
OST 2.13.11 QUENCH SPRAY SYS1EM OPERABILITY TEST 0
OST 2.13.3 RECIRCULATION SPRAY PVMP P21A DRY TEST 0
OST 2.13.7 RECIRCVLATION SPRAY PUMP AUTO START AND FLOV TEST 0
OST 2.13.9 CONTAINMENT DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM MOV EXERCISE - TRAIN B 0
OST 2.21.7 MAIN SIEAM TRIP VALVES FULL CLOSURE TEST 0
OST 2.24.1 AFV SYSTEM VALVE EXERCISE V
OST 2.24.2 MD AFV PVMP P23A TEST 0
OST 2.24.3 MD AFV PUMP P238 TEST 0
OST 2.24.4 TD AFV PVMP TEST 0
OST 2.24.5 MD AFV PUMP AUTO START TEST 0
OST 2.24.6 AFV CHECK VALVE EXERCISE AND FLOV VERIFICATION 0
OST 2.24.7 TO AFV PUMP AVTO START TEST 0
Page No.-
6 05/19/B7 APPEN0lX 1.2 BEAVER VALLEY POVER STATION, VNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSPECT 10'N j
DOCUMENTS USED FOR INSPECTION
{
1 l
l DOCUMENT l
IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SVB]ECT REVISION l
OST 2.30.1A SVE PUMP 21A TEST 0
OST 2.30.1B SWE FUMP 218 TEST 0
OST 2.30.2 SVS PVMP 21A TEST 0
OST 2.30.3 SVS PUMP 21B TEST 0
j OST 2.30.4 SVS VALVE TEST FOR A HEADER 0
I OST 2.30.5 SVS VALVE TEST FOR 8 HEADER 0
)
l OST 2.30.6 SVS PUMP 210 TEST 0
j DST 2.36.1 ED6 N0.1 MONTHLY TEST 0
l OST 2.36.3 ED6 N0.1 AVT0MATIC TEST 0
OST 2.36.5 EMER6ENCY SVITCH6 EAR DPERATION TEST 0
OST 2.36.7 0FFSITE TO DNSITE POWER 0!STR SYSTEM BREAKER ALI6NMENT VERIF 0
OST 2.36.B AC POWER SOVRCE VEEKLY BREAKER Al!6NMENT VERIFICATION 0
OST 2.36.9 AC POVER BREAKER ALI6NMENT VERIFICATION DURIN6 SHVID0VN 0
OST 2.39.!A VEEKLY STATION BATTERY CHECK, BATTERY 2-1 2
OST 2.45.2 REMOTE SHUTDOVN PANEL INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL CHECK 0
l OST 2.47.1 CONTAINMENT AIR LOCK 0009S TYPE B LEAK TEST 0
DST 2.47.2 CONTAINMENT INTE6RITY VERIFICATION 0
l DST 2.47.3A CONTAINMENT PENETRATION AND ASME XI VALVE TEST 0
UST 2.6.6 PORV VALVE POSITION CHECK AND ISOLATION VALVE TEST 0
OST 2.6.7 ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION CHANNEL CHECKS 0
OST 2.7.1 BORIC ACID TRANSFER PVMP P22A TEST 0
OST 2.7.11 CHS AND SIS OPERABILITY TEST 0
OST 2.7.4 CENTRIFV6AL CHAR 6(N6 PVMP P21A TEST 0
OST 2.7.6 CENTRIFV6AL CHAR 61N6 PVMP P21C TEST 0
OST 2.7.B BORIC ACID TANKS & RVST LEVEL & TEMPERATVRE VERIFICATION 0
F. PREOPERATIONAL TEST P0 2.11.A.1 LHS! PUMPS AND CONTROLS PREOP TEST 0
PD 2.11A.3 SAFETY INJECTION FLOV TEST 0
PD 2.13.2 QVENCH SPRAY PUMPS AND CONTROLS PRE 0P TEST 0
SUMMARY
0 PD 2.!A.2 REACTOR PROTECTION AND ESFAS TIME RESPONSE TEST 0
PD 2.248.02 TD AFV PVMP PRE 0P TEST 0
P0 2.30.1 SVS PRE 0P TEST 0
P0 2.36A.1 EMER6ENCY AC POWER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM FRE0P 0
PD 2.368.!
ED6 SYSTEM PREOP TEST 0
PD 2.39.1 CLASS 1E STATION BATTERIES, CHAR 6ERS & INVERTERS 0
PD 2.7.1 CHAR 61N6 PUMPS AND CONTROLS PREOP TEST (SECTION A) 0 P0 2.7.2 BORIC ACID TRANSFER SYSTEM PRE 0P TEST (SECT!DN B) 0 P0 2.7.3 CVCS PRE 0P TEST 0
m Page No.
7 03/19/67 APPENDIX 1.2-g3 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSPECTION DOCUMENTS USED FOR INSPECTION DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SUBJECT REVISION
- 6. DRAWIN6S
.100D993' REACTORTRIPS!6NALFUNCTIONALDIA6 RAMS (SH1-1B)
VAR 2003.220-033-005 PPDWST(TK210)PLANANDELEVATION 11A E-100 WIN 00V ARRAN6EMENT ANNUNCIATOR PANEL A-4 14 E-11]T AFV CONTRCL VALVES HCV100 E & F ELEMENTARY DIAGRAM B
i E-12A ED6 201 AVTD LCADIN6 ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM, SH 2,3 9,10 E-120 MOTOR OPERATED GR0VND DISC SW ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM 2
E-120 THRV J ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAMS - ED6 2-1 VAR E-4P STATUS LI6HT PANEL LAYOUTS - MAIN CONTROL BOAR 0 0
E-5DB 4160 V ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM ED6 2-1 AIR CIRCVli BREAKER 12
{
E-5DM CHAR 61N6 PVMP P21C ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM 10 E-50V BUS 2AE UNDERVOLTA6E ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM, SH 1, 2 16 E-5EM CHAR 61N6 PVMP P21C ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM 9
E-5]J CHAR 61N6 PVMP SVCTION VALVES ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM 19 E-6]K CHAR 61N6 PVMP SVCTION VALVES ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM 14 j
E-6MZ BORIC ACID SYSTEM ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM 11 E-6NS THRV 6NY ED6 AVIILIARIES 400 V MCC ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAMS VAR E-6RV 2RHS-MOV-720 A/B ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM SH 1,2 11 E-6RV 2RHS-MOV-701 A/B ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM 14 E-6RV 2RHS-MOV-702 A/B ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM, SH 1,2 10 E-7A BUS 2AE UNDERVOLTA6E ELEMENTARY DIA6 RAM 15 LSK-17-1H SVS PUMP P210 LO61C DIA6 RAM 4
LSK-17-1M SWS D6 HEAT EXCHAN6ER HEADER VALVES (113 A,D) LO6IC DIA6 RAM 6
LSK-17-1N SVS D6 HEAT EXCHAN6ER HEADER VALVES (!!3 B,0) LO6IC DIA6 RAM 9
OM F16 2.13-1 RECIRCVLATION SPRAY SYSTEM PtID 1
OM F16 2.13-2 QUENCH SPRAY SYSTEM PtID 1
OM Fl6 2.24-1 AFV SYSTEM P&I0 1
DM F16 2.30-1 SVS Pil0 1
l OM F16 2.7-1 TO -4 CVCS P&l0 1
RE-in MAIN ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 1 7
RE-!AN 125 VDC & 120 VAC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM 6
RE-lhR 125 VDC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 1 6
RE-1AU 125 VDC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 4 2
RE-1AV 125 VDC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 5 2
RE-1AV ONELINE DIA6 RAM VITAL BUS SYSTEM, SH 1 9
l RE-1AW VITAL BUS SYSTEM, SH 1 9
l RE-1AX ONE LINE DIA6 RAM VITAL BUS 10A RE-1AY 120VAC VITAL BUS I ONE LINE DIA6 RAM (RED) 5A
}
- Page No, _
8 a1 05/19/87 APPEND!I 1,2
[*
BEAVER VALLEY POWER GTATION, UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION INSPECTION DOCUMENTS USED FOR INSPECTION DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SVB2ECT REVISION RE-1B MAIN ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 2 8
RE-!C E0VIPMENT ONE LINE DIA6 RAM 5
RE-10 4160 V ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 1 6
RE-1E 4160 V ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 2 6
RE-1F 4160 V ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 3 0
RE-1J 480V US ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 3 7
RE-!U 400 V MCC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 10 9
RE-1V 480 V MCC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 11' 9
RE-!V 480 V MCC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, S4 12 8
RE-11 480 V MCC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 13 8
RE-1Y 480 V MCC ONE LINE DIA6 RAM, SH 14 12 RE-216 THREE LINE SYNCHRONIZIN6 DIA6 RAM, 345 KV SVITCHYARD 4
RE-21T THREE LINE POVER DIA6 RAM, BUS 2AE 8
RE-25AT DUTLINE U/V TEST PANELS & POST DBA HYD CONTROL PANEL 8
RE-250 FRONT VIEW '!ERTICAL BOARD SECTION AB, SH 4 48 RE-250E FRONT VIEW EMER SHUTD0VN PNL, SECT 1 4A RE-25DF FRONT VIEW EMER SHVID0VN PNL, SECT 2 6
RE-2506 FRONT VIEV EMER SHVTD0VN PNL, SECT 4 5A RE-25E FRONT VIEW VERTICAL BOARD SECTOIN A9, SH 5 6
RE-25N FRONT VIEW BENCH BOARD SECTS B1 & B2 8
RE-25P FRONT VIEV BENCHB0ARD SECTS B3 1 B4 4
RE-25R FRONT VIEV VERTICAL BOARD SECTION C6, SH 2 7A RE-3BAB WIRIN6 DIA6 RAM - BENCHBOARD SECT 0!N B1, SH 2 5
RE-3FA VIRIN6 DIA6 RAM U/V TEST PANEL TRAIN A 8
RE-48A CONDVII PLAN AVIILIARY BUILDIN6 EL 710'-6' 7
RE-4AA VIRING DIA6 RAM - RX PROT RACK INPUT CAB TRAIN A, SH 1 6
RE-7N VIRIN6 DIA6 RAM ANNUNCIATOR TERM CAB B, BAY 12, SH 1 4
RM-411-1 LHS!/HHS! PtID 1
RM-411-2 SIACCUMULATORS/ NITRO 6ENP110 1
RM-411-3 S1 Pi!0 NOTES & REFERENCES 1
RM-436-1 DIESEL FUEL DIL Pl!D 1
RM-436-3 DIESEL STARTIN6 AIR PilD 1
D;-436-4A DIESEL C00LIN6 VATER FilD 1
RM-436-5A DIESEL 6ENERATOR LUBE Oil P11D 1
RM-758 FLOV DIA6 RAM - RC PIPIN6, SH 2 20 SD 5.4 MAIN FEEDVATER CONTROLS LO6IC DIA6 RAM AND DESCRIPTION 8
- H. VENDOR MANUALS 2501.419-001-006 VESTINGH0V!E NUCLEAR INSTRUMENT SYSTEM MANUAL 2502.210-024-002 CVENCHSPRAYPVMPINSTRUCTIONMANUAL
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o 03/19/87 APPENDil 1.2 BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION, UNIT 2 TECHNICAL SPECIFICAT!0N INSPECTION MOUMENTS USED FOR INSPECT 10N DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION TITLE OR SUBJECT REVISION 2502.290-001-001A LHS! PUMP OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE MANUAL 2502.320-001-001 PACIFIC PVMPS CHAR 61N6 PUMP OPERATIN6 & MAINTENANCE MANVAL 2502.400-208-005 TD AFV PUMP VENDOR MANUAL 1502.510-015-001F RECIRCVLATION SPRAY PUMP INSTRUCTION MANVAL 2702.510-015-015A RS PUMP PERFORMANCE TEST RESULTS, CURVES & LO6S
!. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDVRES MATRIX-BVPS-2 TECH SPEC AND PROCEDURE MATRIX, 2/18/87 SAPS CHAPTER 1 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND 6ENERAL INSTRVCTIONS 4
SAPS CHAPTER 11 PROCEDURE PREPARATION, REVIEW, AND APPROVAL 7
SAPS CHAPTER 14 STATION SVRVEILLANCE PR06 RAM 1
1 SAPS CHAPTER 2 NVCLEAR DIVISION OR6ANIZATION 3
l SAPS CHAPTER A PLANT OPERATIONS 6ROUP 21 1
SAPS CHAPTER 8 MAINTENANCE 10 r
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